



Centre d'Information sur les  
Renseignements et le Terrorisme

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**Critique interne en Turquie du régime islamique qui permet au Hamas et aux Frères Musulmans de mener des activités de propagande politique sur le sol turc, et d'inciter l'opinion publique à la haine contre Israël et l'Occident. En fond : un appel téléphonique du Premier ministre turc Tayyip Erdogan au dirigeant du Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah.**

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**Points principaux de l'article critique dans le journal turc Hurriyet**

1. Le 5 juin 2010, le journal turc Hurriyet a publié un **article critiquant le parti turc AKP au pouvoir ("Justice et Développement")**, vilipendant la politique du régime qui permet au Hamas et aux Frères Musulmans de mener des activités de propagande politique sur le sol turc (Pour le texte intégral de l'article voir l'Annexe I). Hurriyet est un journal laïc, le plus lu en Turquie, et appartient à un conglomérat de presse qui subit les pressions du régime d'Erdogan. L'auteur de l'article, Soner Cagaptay, est le correspondant d'Hurriyet aux Etats-Unis. C'est un chercheur attaché à l'Institut de Washington et y dirige le programme de recherche turc.

2. L'article critique le parti AKP qui diffuse des **sentiments anti-israéliens et anti-occidentaux** depuis son arrivée au pouvoir, outre la violation de la liberté de la presse en Turquie. Selon l'article, cette politique se manifeste par la diffusion d'une propagande de haine contre Israël et l'Occident. Il note que sous **le régime de l'AKP, la Turquie a**

commencé à accueillir des conférences du Hamas et des Frères Musulmans sur son sol. Ces conférences participent à l'importation du combat violent du Hamas contre Israël et son idéologie dans le débat politique turc interne.



Le 17 avril 2010, le Premier ministre turc Tayyip Erdogan reçoit un doctorat honoraire de l'Université Islamique contrôlée par le Hamas dans la bande de Gaza. La cérémonie a eu lieu au domicile du Premier ministre à Ankara, en présence de Jamal al-Khudari, le président du conseil d'administration de l'université (activiste du Hamas et président du comité populaire contre le siège de la bande de Gaza) et de Kamalain Shaath, le recteur de l'université (Site Internet de l'Université Islamique)

3. Concrètement, l'article déclare qu'**au cours des trois dernières années, le Hamas a organisé sept conférences et collectes de fonds à Istanbul :**

A. **La première a eu lieu en Juillet 2006** en présence de dirigeants idéologiques des Frères Musulmans d'Égypte et d'autres pays, dont le cheik **Yussuf al-Qardawi**, qui l'a qualifiée de "Conférence des Musulmans d'Europe" (Al-Qardawi est un cheik égyptien influent. Il vit au Qatar et est idéologiquement affilié aux Frères Musulmans. Il a fondé l'Union of Good, qui soutient le Hamas.) Selon l'article, **sa visite en Turquie a été subventionnée par le Ministère des Affaires étrangères britannique.** Pendant la conférence, le Hamas et les Frères Musulmans ont abordé le thème des Musulmans en Europe, présentant aux Turcs et aux Musulmans européens le Hamas et son idéologie radicale.

B. **Le Hamas et les Frères Musulmans ont organisé une conférence en Novembre 2007 intitulée "Journée de Jérusalem."** L'événement a été organisé par l'Association des Organisations Volontaires Turques (TGTV), une organisation proche de l'AKP, et l'Association Islamique des Organisations Non Gouvernementales Mondiales Musulmanes. La conférence a notamment été l'occasion d'appeler à **"libérer Jérusalem des sionistes par le jihad."**

C. **D'autres conférences ont suivi en Février, Avril, Mai et Juillet 2009** et leur fréquence a fortement augmenté. **Les conférences ont commencé à épouser**

**l'idéologie radicale du Hamas**, avec notamment celle de Février, qui a **appelé à un jihad centré sur Gaza** (Voir l'Annexe II). **En Avril, le "Symposium de la Mosquée Al-Aqsa"** a été l'occasion d'appeler à la "libération" de la mosquée Al-Aqsa, par la violence si nécessaire. Il a été organisé par une organisation turque appelée la Plate-forme de Paix d'Istanbul (IPP), qui inclut plusieurs ONG proches de l'AKP. **En Mai, les organisateurs de la "Conférence de Collaboration de la Palestine"** ont appelé à la "résistance continue afin de libérer la Palestine." **Osama Hamdan, le représentant du Hamas au Liban, y a assisté.**

## Analyse

4. **Depuis début 2009, la Turquie est l'hôte d'une nouvelle activité islamique radicale intensive, avec la participation du Hamas et d'activistes affiliés aux Frères Musulmans.**

5. Ainsi, à l'occasion d'une **conférence organisée les 14 et 15 février 2009** qui réunissait 200 activistes et personnalités religieuses du monde arabo-musulman (dont plusieurs proches de l'idéologie islamique radicale préconisée par le Hamas et les Frères Musulmans), **quatre-vingt-dix participants ont signé un document jihadiste baptisé la "Déclaration d'Istanbul,"** appelant chaque Musulman à accomplir son devoir religieux du jihad et à "résister" contre Israël (dénonçant "les occupants sionistes juifs"). La conférence a également été l'occasion d'appeler à soutenir le jihad et "la résistance" avec de l'argent, des armes, des vêtements, de l'équipement alimentaire, médical et autre (Pour le texte intégral de la déclaration et les noms des signataires, voir l'Annexe II).

6. **Les Frères Musulmans, le mouvement-mère du Hamas, étaient particulièrement bien représentés parmi les passagers du Mavi Marmara. Ses activistes se retrouvaient au sein des délégations arabes (Jordanie et Egypte - où les Frères Musulmans sont dans l'opposition) et occidentales (Grande-Bretagne, où les Frères Musulmans mènent une campagne de délégitimation d'Israël). Deux des passagers du Mavi Marmara étaient des activistes islamiques radicaux ayant signé la Déclaration d'Istanbul** (Dr. Walid al-Tabatibai du Koweït et cheik Muhammad bin Nasr al-Hazmi du Yémen, photographié à bord du bateau brandissant un poignard.) Un autre activiste des Frères Musulmans/Hamas, Mahmoud Sawalha, qui vit en Grande-Bretagne et a participé à la planification de la flottille, ne l'a pas rejointe (selon nous, de crainte d'être arrêté par les forces de sécurité israéliennes.)



Cérémonie avant le départ du Mavi Marmara pour Gaza. Muhammad Sawalha (portant un costume gris) est le quatrième à gauche, au premier rang, n'a pas pris part à la flottille (Site Internet IHH, 23 mai 2010)



Walid al-Tabatibai agite une chaussure en signe de condamnation de Mahmoud Abbas. A l'arrière-plan une image de cheik Ahmed Yassin et l'emblème du mouvement salafiste



Cheik Al-Hazmi photographié pendant le voyage du mouvement

7. Le 7 juillet 2010, la chaîne Al-Manar du Hezbollah a annoncé que le **Premier ministre turc Erdogan avait appelé le dirigeant du Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah** pour exprimer ses condoléances suite au décès du leader spirituel du mouvement, Fadlallah. **Nasrallah a salué Erdogan pour sa position.**

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## The AKP's Hamas Policy: "Us vs. Them"

by Soner Cagaptay

[\*Hurriyet Daily News\*](#)

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<http://www.cagaptay.com/7683/akp-hamas-policy>

At home, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has promoted the Islamist mindset of "us Muslims" in conflict with "the bad others" through the media and also by spreading Hamas' views throughout Turkey, whether through official Hamas visits to Turkey or through AKP-supported conferences and fundraisers.

Recent changes in media ownership in Turkey under the AKP are closely related to the spread of anti-Western sentiments in the country. Turkey is a country with free media. Media independence in Turkey, however, is increasingly under threat.

The Turkish media remains free (in that it is not illegal to produce journalism), but the AKP is trying to curb media freedoms by transforming media ownership through legal loopholes. Such was the case in December 2005 when the AKP took over the Sabah-ATV conglomerate, which represents around 20% of the Turkish media market, selling this conglomerate to a media company of which Turkish Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's son-in-law Berat Albayrak is the CEO.

The AKP has also brought a \$3.2 billion tax fine against Dogan Yayin, a conglomerate that owns around 50 percent of the Turkish media. This excessive fine exceeds Dogan's total net worth—is political, because Dogan's news outlets promote secular, liberal and nationalist views that often criticize of the AKP.

The transformation of the Turkish media is not an esoteric issue, for it affects the future of Turkish democracy and also has a bearing on Turkish views of the world.

Where there is no independent media—as in Russia—there is simply no viable opposition to government. Whenever Turkey goes through a political spasm, analysts warn of the collapse of Turkey's democracy. Despite this, Turkey has survived numerous crises in the past thanks to the balancing power of its fourth pillar.

As Turkish media becomes less free, there is a higher likelihood that it will become a tool for the government with which to shape an anti-Western public opinion. What is bad for secular liberal western Turks is bad for the West. Turkey's free media needs to remain free because if it is all either state-owned or owned by pro-AKP businesses, anti-Western and anti-Israeli viewpoints will spread through the media, which we have been witnessing since 2002.

A recent show on Turkey's publicly-funded Turkish Radio Television, or TRT, network is a perfect example. The debut of the series, entitled "Ayrilik" (Separation), came on the heels of Turkey's cancellation of Israeli participation in the Anatolian Eagle exercises. TRT, whose head is appointed by the AKP, and which is entirely funded by Turkish taxpayer money, ran "Ayrilik," a show with an anti-Israeli stance, including one which depicts an imagined situation in the Palestinian territories where a newborn baby is intentionally killed by Israeli soldiers.

What do 18-year-old Turks think of Israel now? They hate it, and they will do so because of images depicted in shows like "Ayrilik." These are the images they have been seeing for the last seven years and this is what they'll continue seeing. A Turk who has come of age under the AKP is now more likely than not to hate Israel and the West after seven years of such

propaganda. Unlike Turks now in their forties or older who came of political age in a different Turkey, younger Turks in their twenties and thirties have more radical and negative views of the West as a result of what they see in government-controlled media as well as media owned by pro-government businesses.

### Through Conferences

While government-controlled media promotes an evil image of the Israelis, international Hamas conferences in Turkey build legitimacy for Hamas and other extensions of the International Muslim Brotherhood movement. Before the AKP came to power, Turkey had never hosted a Hamas conference. Now, such conferences render the Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood agenda more accessible to Turks, making Hamas' violent struggle against Israel a part of daily political debate in Turkey.

In the last three years alone, there have been seven Hamas conferences and fundraisers in Istanbul. The first one of these, held in July 2006 and attended by one of the spiritual leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, was given the title "Muslims in Europe." Qaradawi's visit was funded by the British Foreign Office, and Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood came to talk about Muslims in Europe, exposing Turks and European Muslims to Hamas and its ideology.

The list continues: other Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood conferences in Turkey include a November, 2007 conference called "Jerusalem Day," co-organized by nongovernmental organization the Association of Turkish Volunteer Organizations, or TGTV, close to the AKP and Islamic Association of Muslim World Nongovernmental Organizations, or IDSB. This conference, entitled "Jerusalem Day," called for "liberating Jerusalem through jihad from the Zionists."

Other conferences followed in February 2009, April 2009, May 2009, and July 2009. What is interesting is that the frequency of these conferences has been steadily increasing, with four such meetings alone held in 2009.

Moreover, these meetings have started to espouse a violent agenda. For instance, at the February 2009 conference, Hamas members called for a jihad centered on Gaza. The April 2009 meeting was a "Masjid al-Aqsa symposium" which called to "liberate Masjid al-Aqsa" and it was organized by the Istanbul Peace Platform, or IBP, which includes a number of NGOs close to the AKP. The symposium called on all Muslims to liberate al-Aqsa through violence, if necessary, and also claimed that Israel has plans to demolish it. The "Palestine Collaboration Conference" in May 2009 called for "continued resistance to liberate Palestine." Conference participants included former Sudanese President Mushir Sivar Ez-Zeheb, President of the International Union of Muslim Scholars Yousef al-Qaradawi, and Hamas Representative and Spokesman in Lebanon Usame Hamdan. In his speech at this conference, AKP deputy Zeyd Aslan said that Israel "commits genocide in Palestine."

On the other hand, the "Environment Conference" in July 2009 was organized by the Earth Centre of Dialogue Partners in cooperation with the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the city of Istanbul, and the Fatih University in Istanbul. The conference, attended by al-Qaradawi, concluded with the declaration of a seven-year-action plan on climate change. The conference also served as platform to bring Hamas and MB members to Istanbul.

These conferences are organized by NGOs close to the AKP government. Although they appear to be civil society initiatives, the meetings are held in city halls of Istanbul or convention centers under the control of the AKP city government, which in essence means that taxpayer funds help pay for these events.

## ANNEXE II

### Texte de la "Déclaration d'Istanbul" et noms des signataires (14-15 février 2009)<sup>1</sup>

In the name of Allah the Most-merciful the All-merciful

A statement by the religious scholars and proselytizers (*du'a*) of the Islamic Nation (*ummah*) to all rulers and peoples concerning events in Gaza

Praise to Allah who strengthened His troops, aided His servants and alone routed the Zionist Jews, who says,

"It was incumbent on Us to aid the believers." [Qur'an 30:47]

And blessing and peace be on the Imam of the mujahidin who says,

'There will remain a group of my Ummah adhering to the truth, and those who oppose them will not harm them until Allah's command comes.' [Hadith]

(And now to our topic).

This statement is addressed to the Islamic Nation, its religious scholars, its rulers and its peoples. In it we congratulate the whole family of Islam on the manifest victory which Allah has granted us in the land of Gaza, a land of pride and dignity, over the **Zionist Jewish** occupiers. Allah has appointed it as the first step in the complete victory for all of Palestine and the holy places of the Muslims. Furthermore, we herein emphatically affirm various resolutions and judgments.

I. Affirmation of the following unequivocal resolutions:

1. We affirm that the victory that Allah accomplished by means of our brothers the *mujahidin*, our defiant and steadfast kinsfolk in Gaza, was indeed achieved through His favor and help -- exalted be He! It was also achieved through **fulfilling the religious obligation of jihad** in His way. This is a confirmation of His statement -- sublime is He! -- "How often a small party overcame a large party, by Allah's leave." [Qur'an, 2:249]

2. We affirm that this manifest victory has clearly disclosed the volume of international and local military and political conspiracy against the jihad and the *mujahidin* in Gaza, as represented by the following:

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.standcampaign.org/wiki/index.php?title=Istanbul\\_Declaration](http://www.standcampaign.org/wiki/index.php?title=Istanbul_Declaration)

- Military co-operation in tightening the blockade and closing the crossings to the people of Gaza, especially the Rafah crossing.

- Public or quasi-public support for the enemy.

- The prevention of demonstrations and popular events held in support of the mujahidin; the arrest, trial and severe punishments of those who instigate them.

- The aggressive pressure put on the mujahidin to break their will and force them to agree to their [the conspirators] terms and the stipulations of the Zionist enemy.

- The attempt to present the Hamas government as the cause of this malicious Jewish Zionist war over Gaza.

- The absence of any official and effective Arab and Islamic stance and its weakness in reflecting the will of the Arab and Islamic peoples to help our brothers in Gaza win. This indicates the width of the gap between the Nation and those rulers who lead it.

- The use of funds for reconstruction and aid to those hurt as a negative pressure card on the mujahidin to abandon their legitimate demands, or some of them.

- The prevention of delivery of aid and reconstruction funds to the Hamas government and the reliable authorities in Gaza; deeming the Palestinian Authority, represented by the presidency of Abbas and the Fayyad government, the sole representative of the Palestinian people, without the Hamas government; and the delivery of such funds and aid to increase their grip on the legitimate elected government of Hamas. This redoubles the suffering of the people of Gaza at the time they mostly need those funds and aid.

3. **We affirm in full conviction that the Palestinian Authority, whose mandate is coming to an end, is not eligible to represent the Palestinian people.** It stands outside the will of its people, and has given up the choice of jihad in the way of Allah Almighty as an effective means in defeating the occupation and the liberation of the Islamic holy places. It adopts the wishes of the Nation's enemies in exchange for the illusions of false peace.

4. We affirm in full conviction that the so-called Arab peace initiative is a proven betrayal of the Islamic Nation and the Palestinian cause, and a blatant betrayal of the Palestinian people. It aims to criminalize the Resistance [*muqawama*] against



the Zionist occupying entity in perpetuity through its de facto recognition of it, as well as the confiscation of the right of refugees to return to their homes and their property.

II. Affirmation of the following legal judgments:

1. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to rush to the aid of the people in Gaza; to rebuild what the Zionist aggression destroyed; to compensate the injured and support the widows, orphans, those suffering permanent disabilities, and the old and infirm.

2. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to restrict itself to dealing only with the legitimate elected Palestinian government (Hamas) in the delivery of aid and reconstruction of dwellings. It is the sole government authorized to do that by reason of its official legitimacy as well as its **maintaining the Resistance against the Jewish Zionist occupation**, its integrity, and its solidarity with the people in all circumstances.

3. The obligation of the Islamic Nation not to recognize the Palestinian Authority, whose mandate is ending, as representative of the Palestinian people. It must not elect it again, in view of its proven financial and administrative corruption as well as its squandering of time and assets behind the false peace process. It is also necessary to work seriously to choose a new authority that will guard the Palestinian ranks, respect their will and their right to resist the occupation, and work for the complete liberation of its land and holy places.

4. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to circulate a declaration to withhold aid funds from the undeserving or placing them in the hands of those who are not trustworthy. It must regard this as a legal betrayal that should be prosecuted, and punish those who cause mayhem, negligence and waste of these moneys.

5. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to find a fair formula of reconciliation between the sons of the Palestinian people, under whose responsibility a legitimate authority will be formed that will attend to the fixed norms and the legitimate and national rights; and will carry on with the **jihad and Resistance** against the occupier until the liberation of all Palestine.

6. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to open the crossings -- all crossings -- in and out of Palestine permanently, in order to allow access to all the needs of the Palestinians -- money, clothing, food, medicine, **weapons** and other essentials, so that they are able to live and **perform the jihad in the way of Allah Almighty**. The closure of the crossings or the prevention of the entry of weapons

through them should be regarded as high treason in the Islamic Nation, and clear support for the Zionist enemy.

7. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard everyone standing with the Zionist entity, whether countries, institutions or individuals, as providing a substantial contribution to the crimes and brutality of this entity; the position towards him is the same as towards this usurping entity.

**8. The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard the sending of foreign warships into Muslim waters, claiming to control the borders and prevent the smuggling of arms to Gaza, as a declaration of war, a new occupation, sinful aggression, and a clear violation of the sovereignty of the Nation.** This must be rejected and fought by all means and ways. To conclude: the Nation's scholars and proselytizers remind the Islamic Nation, rulers and ruled alike, of the necessity of returning to its religion, adhering to the book of its Lord and the sunna of his Prophet, working for its unity, and seizing control of the instruments of power that will make possible its supremacy and the preservation of its holy places and provisions

'Allah prevails in his purpose, but most people know not.' [Quran, 12: 21]).

### *The Signatories*

As presented in the Declaration:

- 1) Sheikh Ahmad Sulaiman Ahif, Yemen
- 2) Dr. Ahmad al-Ghamidi, Saudi Arabia
- 3) Dr. Ahmad al-Misbahi, Yemen
- 4) Sheikh Ahmad Abdul Razzaq al-Raqihi, Yemen
- 5) Proselytizer [da'iyah] Ahmad Muhammad Abdullah, Egypt
- 6) Sheikh Isma'il Abdul Bari, Yemen
- 7) Sheikh Isma'il Uthman Muhammad, Sudan
- 8) Dr. Amin Ali Muqbil, Yemen
- 9) Proselytizer Al-Amin Karkush, Algeria
- 10) Sheikh Bilal Baroudi, Lebanon
- 11) Proselytizer Tawarim Kishlakci, Turkey
- 12) Dr. Harith Sulaiman al-Dhari [Iraq]
- 13) Dr. Hakim al-Matiri, Kuwait

- 14) Proselytizer Hasan Salem Hasan, Qatar
- 15) Proselytizer Khalid al-Dhahir, Lebanon
- 16) Proselytizer Khalil Asi, Denmark
- 17) Proselytizer Daud Abdullah, Britain
- 18) Sheikh Raed al-Jabouri, Iraq
- 19) Sheikh Rachid al-Ghannouchi, Tunisia [resides in Britain]
- 20) Proselytizer Ribhi Subhi al-Atiwi, Jordan
- 21) Proselytizer Rabi Haddad, Lebanon
- 22) Dr. Sami Muhammad Saleh
- 23) Proselytizer Sami Najid Sa'id, Jordan
- 24) Dr. Shafi al-Hajiri, Qatar
- 25) Dr. Shaker Tawfiq al-Adouri, Jordan
- 26) Proselytizer Shah Jahan Abdul Qayyum, Britain
- 27) Dr. Shawkat Karashji, Kosovo
- 28) Sheikh Safwan Murshid, Yemen
- 29) Sheikh Salah Nasr al-Bahr, Yemen
- 30) Dr. Adel Hasan Yusuf al-Hamad, Bahrain
- 31) Sheikh Arif bin Ahmad al-Sabri, Yemen
- 32) Sheikh Abbas Ahmad al-Nahari
- 33) Sheikh Abdul Hai Yusuf, Sudan
- 34) Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Khamisi, Yemen
- 35) Proselytizer Abdul Rahman Abdullah Jami'an, Kuwait
- 36) Dr. Abdul Salam Daud al-Kubaisi, Iraq
- 37) Dr. Abdul Samid al-Radhi, Morocco
- 38) Dr. Abdul Aziz Kamel, Egypt
- 39) Dr. Abdul Ali Masul, Morocco
- 40) Proselytizer Abdul Fattah Hamdash, Algeria
- 41) Dr. Abdul Karim al-Sheikh, Sudan
- 42) Sheikh Abdullah Ahmad al-Adini, Yemen

- 43) Sheikh Abdullah Hasan Khayrat, Yemen
- 44) Sheikh Abdullah Faysal al-Ahdal, Yemen
- 45) Sheikh Abdul Majid bin Muhammad al-Rimi, Yemen
- 46) Sheikh Abdul Malik al-Wazir, Yemen
- 47) Sheikh Abdil Wahid al-Khamisi, Yemen
- 48) Sheikh Abdul Wahhab al-Hamiqani, Yemen
- 49) Dr. Abdul Wahhab bin Lutf al-Dulaimi, Yemen
- 50) Proselytizer Izz al-Din Jarafa bin Muhammad, Algeria
- 51) Proselytizer Azzam al-Ayyubi, Lebanon
- 52) Dr. Ali Muhammad Maqboul al-Ahdal
- 53) Proselytiser Imad al-Din Bakri, Sudan
- 54) Proselytiser Imad Sa'ad, Iraq
- 55) Sheikh Omar Sulaiman al-Ashqar, Palestine
- 56) Proselytiser Faris Muhammad, Denmark
- 57) Sheikh Latif al-Sa'idi, Britain
- 58) Dr. Muhsin al-Awaji, Saudi Arabia
- 59) Proselytizer Muhammad al-Khalid, Denmark
- 60) Sheikh Muhammd al-Sadiq Mughlas, Yemen
- 61) Prof. Muhammad al-Ani, Britain
- 62) Proselytizer Muhammad al-Ghanim, Saudi Arabia
- 63) Proselytizer Muhammad al-Mufrih, Saudi Arabia
- 64) Sheikh Muhammad Ahmad al-Wazir, Yemen
- 65) Sheikh Muhammad bin Musa al-Amiri, Yemen
- 66) **Sheikh Muhammad bin Nasr al-Hazmi, Yemen**
- 67) Dr. Muhammad Juhaid Bu Aynain
- 68) Dr. Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah, Bahrain
- 69) Proselytizer Muhammad Khalid Muwasi, Palestine
- 70) Proselytizer Muhammad Salem al-Ali
- 71) Sheikh Muhammad Sa'ad al-Hatami, Yemen

- 72) **Proselytizer Muhammad Sawalha, Palestine** [resides in Britain]
- 73) Sheikh Muhammad Abdul Karim al-Da'is, Yemen
- 74) Sheikh Muhammad Abdul Karim Abu Faris
- 75) Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah al-Ghubaisi, Yemen
- 76) Sheikh Muhammad Ali al-Anasi, Yemen
- 77) Sheikh Muhammad Ali Mir'i, Yemen
- 78) Dr. Muhammad Magdi Krekar, Egypt
- 79) Sheikh Mudashir Ahmad Isma'il, Sudan
- 80) Sheikh Murad Ahmad al-Qudsi, Yemen
- 81) Dr. Mustafa al-Rif, Morocco
- 82) Proselytizer Nasser al-Fadhala, Bahrain
- 83) Dr. Nasser Jasim al-Sani, Kuwait
- 84) Proselytizer Nasif Nasser, Palestine
- 85) Proselytizer Nadhir Alan, Turkey
- 86) Sheikh Huza bin Sa'ad al-Asouri, Yemen
- 87) Dr. Hamam Sa'id, Jordan
- 88) **Dr. Walid Musa'id al-Tabatibai, Kuwait**
- 89) Proselytizer Yusuf al-Jababili, Tunisia
- 90) Proselytizer Yusuf Muhammad al-Barahimi