Spotlight on Iran
Spotlight on Iran
Spotlight on Iran
Spotlight on Iran
www.khamenei.ir
Reformist opposition website offers rare glimpse into Supreme Leader’s office
Differences of opinion in conservative camp escalate once again
Picture of the week: waiting for the Mehdi’s return in Jamkaran Mosque
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Highlights of the week
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Iran issues threats and plays down likelihood of attack as calls for military action step up
As calls in the West for a military action against Iran step up in the past two weeks, this week top Iranian officials have intensified threats against the US and Israel over such an attack. Speaking at a conference of entrepreneurs held this week, President Ahmadinejad warned that Iran’s response to any attack on it would be severe. The West knows that Iran has no offensive intentions, but if someone’s hand moved to strike it, the Iranian people will cut it off, the president said (Fars, July 25).
Prior to that, Yahya Rahim Safavi, the Supreme Leader’s top security advisor, also said that Iran would react strongly to any possible threat. Referring to a possible military attack by the US or Israel, Safavi said that Iran’s strategy was defensive and that it had no intention of attacking any country; however, if attacked, the Iranian response would be severe. It was his assessment, however, that the US and Israel are unable to make a political decision to attack Iran, since they know they are capable of starting a war but not of bringing it to completion. He stressed that the Revolutionary Guards and the regular army have the ability to cause numerous problems for the US and Israel should they decide to launch an offensive against Iran (Fars, July 24).
Defense Minister Ahmed Vahidi has also addressed this week the possibility of a military attack in Iran, saying that the possibility for such an operation is low and that the warlike rhetoric from the US is part of an American campaign of propaganda (Fars, July 24).
Meanwhile, the conservative daily Keyhan has published an editorial this week playing down the likelihood of a military attack on Iran. The daily claimed that the American strategy towards Iran is made up of three components: negotiations, sanctions, and support of the reformist opposition.
The intelligence and operative problems facing an American military option have not been resolved, having instead grown even more serious. As far as intelligence is concerned, the fact that no annual intelligence threat assessment has been published in 2010 is an indication of the depth of the intelligence gap faced by the US, according to Keyhan. The American intelligence community is failing to produce an up-to-date intelligence assessment, being able only to determine that Iran continued enriching uranium and developing long-range missile technology after 2007. Operatively, there has been no real change in the US military deployment in the region which may indicate an intention to launch a military attack.
Furthermore, the Americans are fully aware of the consequences of a military attack in Iran: at best, it would only result in a temporary setback for the Iranian nuclear program, following which it would resume with even greater speed; it would strengthen Iran’s domestic national unity against the outside threat; and it would lead to significant upheavals in the Middle East and the simultaneous opening of several fronts against the allies of the US in the region. The conclusion is that a military option is impractical, being part of a psychological and media strategy used by the US in combination with the sanctions, the negotiations, and the support of the opposition to try and influence Iran into changing its policy. Israel is yet another player in the American strategy, threatening to launch a military attack on Iran in case the sanctions fail to influence it or if it does not comply with Western demands (Keyhan, July 26).
Religious ruling issued by Khamenei stresses obedience to "religious jurisprudent” amidst mounting challenges against Supreme Leader
Amidst increasing criticism from reformist opposition elements against the concept of "rule of the religious jurisprudent” (Velayat-e Faqih) and mounting challenges against the leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader issued an unprecedented religious ruling last week stressing the need to obey him.
The religious ruling was issued by the Supreme Leader having received an inquiry about the real-world implementation of one’s commitment to the "religious jurisprudent” (Vali Faqih) during the disappearance of the Vanished Imam. In his ruling, Khamenei argued that obeying the instructions of the government of the "religious jurisprudent” (i.e., Khamenei himself) actually reflected one’s commitment to the "religious jurisprudent”, serving as the representative of the Vanished Imam on Earth and the vice-regent of the Prophet. The conservative website Reja News, which cited Khamenei’s ruling, reported that the Supreme Leader had recently said at a meeting with Majles members that disobeying the "religious jurisprudent” was a serious offense to the entire Islamic regime, and that he would not tolerate that from any person or group (Reja News, July 22).
Shortly after its release, the ruling was taken off the Supreme Leader’s official website (www.khamenei.ir). Iranian media and news websites almost completely refrained from addressing the ruling for several days. Jaras, a website affiliated with reformist opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi, claimed that the ruling was taken off the official website as a result of strong criticism triggered by the ruling and Khamenei’s reference to himself as "religious jurisprudent of the Muslims” both among top Shi’ite clerics in the religious center in the city of Qom and among Muslim communities worldwide, mainly in the Arab world (Jaras, July 23).
Due to the interest sparked by the religious ruling in Iran and even in the West, it was put back on the Supreme Leader’s official website several days later, while his office even released an announcement stating that the ruling reflected no change about the concept of "rule of the religious jurisprudent” and that "anti-revolutionary” media had painted a false image of its implications as part of their efforts to stir domestic disagreements in Iran and compromise Khamenei’s leadership (Alef, July 25).
Iranian top officials have recently stressed the necessity of obeying the "religious jurisprudent” and the major role played by the concept of "rule of the religious jurisprudent”. For example, Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Sa’idi, the Friday prayer leader in Qom, has stated this week that accepting the "rule of the religious jurisprudent” was a condition for accepting the rule of the Vanished Imam (Fars, July 23).
It should be noted that Khamenei’s 1989 appointment as the successor of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic revolution, was perceived as a blatant violation of the principle of "rule of the religious jurisprudent”. According to Khomeini’s opinion and the worldview reflected in the constitution of the Islamic republic from 1979, the Supreme Leader must be the highest-ranking cleric in his devotion to religious studies and in righteousness. The appointment of Khamenei, who held the rank of Hojjatoleslam (a lower rank than Ayatollah), resulted in a situation where sources of religious authority lost their grip on political leadership. Khamenei was not recognized as a "source of emulation” (Marja-e Taghlid), and gained no popular support for his theological achievements or recognition from the top experts on religious law of his time. Several top clerics protested about Khamenei’s insufficient theological skills, claiming that he had never been recognized as a religious jurist with the authority of issuing religious rulings.
Amidst the political crisis which began at the time of the last presidential elections, there have been more and more calls challenging Khamenei’s political leadership and theological skills. Last August, a group of former Majles representatives published a demand to investigate the Supreme Leader’s conduct during the riots which broke out after the elections. In an open letter sent to Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the chairman of the Assembly of Experts, the former Majles representatives demanded that the assembly investigate Khamenei’s conduct during those events on the basis of clause 11 of the Iranian constitution, which gives the assembly the right to impeach the leader if it finds him unable to fulfill his constitutional obligations. Prior to that, several reformist websites reported that dozens of clerics from Qom, Esfahan, and Mashhad had sent an unsigned letter blaming the Supreme Leader for the riots and demanding his resignation.
During the past year, some concerns have been brought up about the Supreme Leader’s theological skills as well. For example, last September, several Shi’ite clerics in Iran issued a ruling contrary to that issued by Khamenei regarding the end date of Ramadan, the month of fasting. That ruling was perceived as a challenge from senior figures in the religious establishment against Khamenei’s skills as religious jurist.
Reformist opposition website offers rare glimpse into Supreme Leader’s office
Jaras, a website affiliated with the supporters of opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi, has published this week a two-part report offering a rare glimpse into the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the key personalities surrounding him.
According to the report, the responsibility for the security of the Supreme Leader and his office belongs to a special Revolutionary Guards unit called Sepah-e Vali Amr, directed by Asghar Hejazi, the head of security in the Supreme Leader’s office (a separate Revolutionary Guards unit, Ansar-ol-mehdi, is responsible for the security of all the other top regime officials in Tehran).
As already mentioned, Asghar Hejazi is the head of security in the Supreme Leader’s office; however, his influence exceeds his official title. For years, he has been considered the most influential figure in the Supreme Leader’s office, even though he strictly avoids making public appearances or being photographed. Hejazi’s influence in the Supreme Leader’s office grew considerably stronger during Mohammad Khatami’s presidential term (1997-2005), when many of the president’s powers in the sphere of security, including the struggle against regime opponents, were handed over to Hejazi. He cooperated with elements from the Revolutionary Guards and from the judiciary, as well as with former members of the Ministry of Intelligence who had been sacked following the wave of murders of intellectuals and regime opponents in the late ‘90s.
During Khamenei’s presidential term (1981-1989), Hejazi served as the head of Foreign Security Department in the Intelligence Ministry; during Khatami’s term, he cooperated with Mohammad Baqer Zol-Qadr, the deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, in supporting the radical group Ansar Hezbollah, which acted against the supporters of the reformist camp.
In recent years, Hejazi’s influence has somewhat diminished for two main reasons: the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which resulted in the restoration of some of the powers handed over to the Supreme Leader’s office during Khatami’s tenure back to the presidential office; and the growing influence of young radical clerics, mainly the Supreme Leader’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei. This does not imply, however, that there is rivalry or power struggles between Mojtaba and Hejazi. This owes to Mojtaba’s respectful attitude towards Hejazi in matters pertaining to security or the Supreme Leader’s office, and to the fact that the Supreme Leader still considers Hejazi to be a uniquely skilled individual.
Another personality of influence in the Supreme Leader’s office is "Vahid”, a former Revolutionary Guards commander who is currently the deputy chief of the Supreme Leader’s office. There is little information regarding "Vahid”; even his full name is unknown (although some claim that his full name is Vahid Haqqani). A great deal of false information has been published about "Vahid”, and many confuse him with Ahmad Vahidi, a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force (currently the Minister of Defense), or Ahmad Vahid (whose full name is Ahmadi Vahid Dastjerdi), the acting Minister of Defense.
Vahid’s presence in the Supreme Leader’s office first became known on the eve of the presidential election, appearing at the Supreme Leader’s side during his trip to Kurdistan Province. Vahid then played a major role in Ahmadinejad’s swearing-in ceremony. Vahid also played a major role in the Supreme Leader’s first Friday prayer after the last presidential election; he appears to have been responsible for the seating arrangements of top regime officials during the sermon.
After the election, a senior official from the election campaign staff of opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi related on his personal blog that, when the first election results were published, he was asked by Mousavi to deliver to the Supreme Leader a letter warning about election forgery. Upon arriving in the Supreme Leader’s office, he handed the letter to Vahid, who informed him that the election results favored Ahmadinejad and that there was no point in bringing up reservations about the results. Vahid was also involved in an incident with the daughter of Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Fatemeh Hashemi, who met with him following the television debate between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi which took place during the presidential election campaign, and in which the president strongly lashed out against Rafsanjani. When Fatemeh came to the Supreme Leader’s office to submit her protest against the president, she was threatened by Vahidi. Shortly afterwards, the license of a school in Tehran established by Fatemeh was revoked, and its principal was arrested.
Another key figure in the Supreme Leader’s office is Khamenei’s second son, Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei (born 1959). Even though he holds no official position in the Supreme Leader’s office, he commands considerable influence there, is involved in many sensitive issues, and takes part in unofficial consultations in the office as his father’s representative. He also has close relations with senior Revolutionary Guards and Basij officials.
Mojtaba received his religious education from the top conservative clerics Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, and Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer Kharazi; he also participates in weekly religion classes in the city of Qom. Those close to Khamenei claim that Mojtaba has become a certified religious jurist, even though that claim seems exaggerated in light of his young age and numerous occupations which do not pertain to religious studies.
He first became involved in politics during the 2005 presidential campaign, at which time he was an activist in the election campaign staff of the conservative candidate, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who is currently the mayor of Tehran. He changed his mind shortly prior to the election and shifted his support to Ahmadinejad. Several rumors claim that the Supreme Leader decided to support Ahmadinejad due to Mojtaba’s influence, having been convinced that Qalibaf was taking an overly moderate approach with regard to the West and had no intention of fighting the reformists. Some of the regime’s opponents claim that Khamenei would like to appoint his son as his successor after his death; however, those claims cannot be confirmed.
Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani is the chief of Khamenei’s office. Even though his is officially the highest-ranking position in the office, his actual influence is insignificant compared to Hejazi or Vahid. He is fairly uninvolved in political or security-related affairs, settling for his official, ceremonial position. Rumors say that Golpayegani is married to an Irish woman he met while on a trip to London.
He frequently takes place in official and public functions as the Supreme Leader’s representative and delivers messages on his behalf at various ceremonies. He usually refrains from taking a stand on political issues or intervening in domestic political conflicts.
Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri is the head of the Supreme Leader’s inspectorate; however, his influence in the office is not significant. In his capacity, he is in charge of addressing complaints from civilians and senior officials who visit the Supreme Leader’s office, and has no considerable influence on sensitive political and security-related affairs. One major reason for his limited influence on such issues is his strong opposition to President Ahmadinejad and his supporters. Nateq-Nouri’s influence in the office has become considerably smaller since the last presidential election due to his undeclared support for Mir-Hossein Mousavi during the election campaign. During the election campaign, Ahmadinejad even accused Nateq-Nouri of financial corruption, while the Supreme Leader refrained from siding with Nateq-Nouri on that issue. During the riots which broke out after the presidential election, Nateq-Nouri, who also serves as a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, refrained from siding with the government against Mousavi. He is considered a close associate of Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the chairman of the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Discernment Council.
Hossein Ta’eb, the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence bureau, is yet another cleric who enjoys Khamenei’s trust and has good connections in the Supreme Leader’s office. In addition to his security-related and military roles, he is considered very close to the Supreme Leader, since he was his student during private religion classes and because he served alongside Mojtaba Khamenei in the last days of the Iran-Iraq War and became one of his closest friends.
He formerly served as deputy intelligence minister but was removed from duty during the presidential tenure of Rafsanjani, whom he antagonizes ever since. After his removal from the Ministry of Intelligence, Ta’eb went on to become the chief of Coordination Department in the Supreme Leader’s office. He subsequently served as the head of Culture Department in the joint Revolutionary Guards headquarters, and fulfilled a key position in the Revolutionary Guards’ Imam Hossein University. He was later appointed the commander of the Basij forces, and in 2009 he was appointed head of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence bureau. He has close relations with Ahmadinejad and even facilitated his election in his capacity as commander of the Basij; he also played a major role in repressing the riots which broke out after the election. Ahmadinejad sought to appoint him the minister of intelligence, but was forced to back down due to the resistance of several top officials in the Ministry of Intelligence.
In addition, there are several other people serving as the Supreme Leader’s advisors: Davoud Danesh Ja’fari is his advisor on economic affairs; Ali Akbar Velayati serves as his advisor on international affairs; and Rahim Safavi is his advisor on security affairs. Those official advisors do not play major roles in the Supreme Leader’s office, their positions being mostly ceremonial (Jaras, July 23, 25).
Differences of opinion in conservative camp escalate once again
Majles speaker Ali Larijani has once again slammed the government this week for allegedly violating the constitution and delaying the implementation of laws passed by the Majles. Larijani claimed that the government does not inform the Majles leadership about its decisions, thus preventing it from monitoring those decisions and making sure they are consistent with the laws passed by the Majles. He noted that such conduct was a violation of the constitution. Larijani also criticized the setbacks in the implementation of the subsidy policy reform, saying that the delays caused by the government constituted a violation of the reform law passed by the Majles. He called on the government to implement the reform as soon as possible (ISNA, July 24).
Larijani’s statements against the government are yet another step in the power struggles between the Majles and the government, which have only escalated in recent months. The president has recently accused the Majles of passing laws which contradict the constitution and the Islamic religious law; Larijani retaliated by accusing the government of interfering with the legislation process, and even threatened to expose to the public incidents where the government’s actions were illegal. Disagreements between the two authorities also arose over the budget proposal submitted by the government for the approval of the Majles and the planned subsidy policy reform. In addition, the Majles has recently rejected a draft law submitted by Ahmadinejad which would give the government greater control of Azad University, many of whose board members are affiliated with Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the chairman of the Assembly of Experts and one of the president’s main political opponents. The strong conflict which broke out between the government and the Majles on that issue forced Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to intervene and issue an instruction freezing any further resolutions about the university.
The escalating differences of opinion in the conservative camp have been the focus of political and media interest in Iran this week. Hojjatoleslam Abolhasan Navvab, the political secretary of the conservative Combatant Clergy Association, issued a warning about a potential rift in the conservative camp, calling on conservatives to return to their fundamental values, morals and justice, to prevent internal differences of opinion. Navvab noted that following the riots which broke out after the presidential election, the conservatives managed to silence their political opponents and currently face no opposition on the political scene. He said, however, that it is precisely because of the lack of political enemies that the threat of political division is all the more tangible (Mehr, July 24).
The conservative daily Resalat also addressed the internal differences of opinion in the conservative camp, calling on the conservative bloc to unite against the threats facing it. An editorial published by the daily last weekend says that the conservative bloc has reached a sensitive stage precisely because of the public’s faith in it. The effectiveness of the conservatives has triggered fear and concerns among the opponents of the Islamic regime both inside and outside of Iran: the reformist opposition and the West. Those two elements cooperate in an attempt to divide the conservative camp, to foment internal conflicts and differences of opinion among the conservatives, and to separate the three administrative authorities the conservatives control. The public expects the conservatives to unite around their common principles: Islam; protecting the revolution, the leader, and the path of Imam Khomeini; and acting in service of the regime so as not to give enemies any ammunition to use against Iran. The success of the conservatives, the article says, depends on their ability to unite around the rule of the religious jurisprudent and the leader (Resalat, July 22).
Picture of the week: waiting for the Mehdi’s return in Jamkaran Mosque
This week, the Muslim world celebrated Mid-Sha’ban. In Shi’ite tradition, that day is considered the birthday of the Vanished Imam, who is said to have disappeared in 874 AD and will someday return, bringing the word of salvation and heralding an era of Islamic justice in the whole world.
According to Shi’ite beliefs, during his disappearance, the Vanished Imam stayed in Jamkaran (about 4 miles to the east of the Iranian city of Qom), declared it a holy site, and ordered that a mosque be built there. In Shi’ite tradition, the Vanished Imam will someday return to that spot, which is why the mosque has become a pilgrimage site for many Shi’ites.
