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Highlights of the week
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Following the Geneva talks: conservatives say talks are a "victory”; the government’s opponents emphasize reports on Iran’s willingness to compromise
Early last week, Iran’s conservative media defined the first round of Iran-G5+1 talks held a week earlier in Geneva as a victory for the Iranian foreign policy. In an editorial published on October 2, the daily Keyhan claimed that the six countries had to recognize Iran’s right to nuclear energy thanks to Iran’s fierce opposition to the terms offered by the Western powers and its refusal to give in to their threats. The Geneva talks, says the article, are proof that Iran is able to move the negotiations into the areas it is interested in despite Western anti-Iranian propaganda. The West was forced to hold talks with Iran without any ability to step up the sanctions or exercise a military option. The economic crisis and recession in the West, coupled with Iran’s major, influential role in the Middle Eastern and global balance of power, forced the West to enter talks with Iran without any preconditions, going as far as to agree that the talks be held on the basis of the package of proposals delivered by Iran last month.
Resalat, yet another conservative daily, also claimed the Geneva talks were an achievement for Iran’s foreign policy, saying that, after many years, the West was finally forced to recognize Iran’s power. The Geneva talks reflected the victory of the Iranian behavior model over the Western behavior model. While in recent years the West has adopted a policy based on economic, political, and military threats against Iran, the latter persisted with its nuclear activity while ignoring those threats and adopting a foreign policy based on its Islamic and national values. Tehran is therefore the ultimate winner in the Geneva talks. The secret of Iran’s international position lies in its unswerving adherence to the principles of the Islamic revolution and reliance on its offensive foreign policy (Resalat, October 2).
The pro-government conservative media completely ignored reports which appeared on Western media following the Geneva talks about Iran supposedly agreeing to transfer low-enriched uranium from the new facility recently exposed near Qom for further enrichment and transformation into nuclear fuel in a third country, such as Russia. While Iranian spokesmen denied those reports, those denials appeared mostly on English-language Iranian news websites. Citing Iranian diplomats, the Press TV website and the English edition of Mehr News Agency’s website reported that no agreement had been reached during the Geneva talks about transferring enriched uranium outside of Iran (Press TV; Mehr, October 3).
In an editorial published by the daily Keyhan on Tuesday, October 6, editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari wrote that Western countries, which had earlier objected to the installation of only twenty centrifuges in Iran, agreed to let Iran enrich uranium to five percent and then transfer it to a third country for further enrichment to twenty percent. According to Shariatmadari, Iran has yet to agree to that offer, but even if it does, it would mean that the West backed down from its previous position regarding the suspension of uranium enrichment by Iran, letting Iran enrich uranium to five percent in its territory, which would mean the recognition of Iran as a nuclear state.
In contrast, several reformist websites have emphasized reports on Iran’s willingness to compromise on the issue of uranium enrichment, portraying them as a reflection of Iran’s government backing down from its position. For example, Rah-e Sabz, a website affiliated with the supporters of reformist leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi, cited Western media reports that Iran agreed to transfer uranium for enrichment in a third country. In an article titled "The Geneva talks: Iran backing down, West optimistic”, the website stressed the discrepancy between the reports on pro-government media, saying the Geneva talks were a success and claiming that Iran would never give up its nuclear rights, and Western reports about Iran’s willingness to reach a compromise regarding the enrichment of uranium (Rah-e Sabz, October 2).
Tabnak, a website affiliated with the pragmatic conservative bloc, criticized the pro-government media’s dismissal of reports about Iran’s supposed agreement to compromise on the issue of uranium enrichment. According to Tabnak, that dismissal by senior Iranian officials and by official media has forced the public to rely solely on Western media reports on that issue, allowing Western media and governments to swing Iranian public opinion according to their goals. It is not right, says Tabnak, to deny the Iranian public access to information on foreign policy issues which directly affect their lives while, at the same time, that public is called upon to express support of Iran’s right to nuclear technology (Tabnak, October 3).
Fordo—from a tiny village to a nuclear enrichment facility
Last week, Iranian media provided some details about the small village of Fordo near the city of Qom, which became renowned a week earlier when the nuclear facility named after it was exposed.
The village is situated about 30 miles south of Qom; however, the enrichment facility which, according to Iranian media reports, is located north of Qom, was still named after that village. Several Iranian websites reported that Iran’s authorities had decided to name the enrichment facility "Frodo” not necessarily due to its proximity to the village but rather due to symbolic reasons.
In relative terms, that mountainous village ranked first in the number of casualties during the Iran-Iraq War. According to information published on Iranian websites last week, 151 out of the village’s 1000 residents had died during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The village name is based on the word Ferdows (Persian for "paradise”) (Alef, October 5).
Even though it is a small village, Fordo has its own website (www.fordo.ir). The well-known slogan appeared last week on the website’s homepage: "Nuclear energy is our indisputable right”.
Ongoing structural changes in the Revolutionary Guards: the Basij militia will be subjected to the land forces of the Revolutionary Guards
Iranian media reported last week that according to instructions issued by Revolutionary Guards chief Mohammad Ali Jafari, the Basij force (the popular volunteer-based militia of the Revolutionary Guards) will be incorporated into the land forces of the Revolutionary Guards. The united wing will be called "The Revolutionary Guards’ Land Resistance Forces”. The decision to incorporate the Basij force into the land force is meant to improve the coordination between the two organizations (various news agencies, October 2).
Incorporating the Basij into the land force of the Revolutionary Guards is yet another step in a series of structural changes undergone by the Revolutionary Guards, implemented by the current Revolutionary Guards chief since he assumed his position in September 2007. Shortly after that, Jafari issued an instruction to subject the Basij directly to the Revolutionary Guards chief. Furthermore, last year Jafari announced the establishment of 31 regional Revolutionary Guards units across Iran in order to improve the Revolutionary Guards’ military capabilities, increase communication and coordination between the Revolutionary Guards land force and the Basij force, and to expand the Revolutionary Guards’ authority in the various provinces.
The structural changes in the Revolutionary Guards are designed to improve Iran’s readiness for a potential American military attack. According to Jafari, who prior to his appointment as the Revolutionary Guards chief served as that organization’s chief of strategic studies, the new organizational structure is intended to improve coordination between the parallel military bodies operating on separate paths, and strengthen the Revolutionary Guards’ ability to cope with outside threats. In the past, Jafari claimed that the Revolutionary Guards must be flexible enough to cope with the threats facing Iran, requiring it to adopt a new strategy and modify the structure of the Revolutionary Guards according to the existing conditions.
It should be noted that the Basij force plays a key role in Iran’s defense program, being part of its emergency plan for a potential military attack. Within the context of that plan, the Iranian regime delegates considerable authority to the Basij force, both on the battlefield and in managing the home front in emergency scenarios.
Meanwhile, last week Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Mohammed Reza Naqdi (see photograph below), who had previously served in various positions in the Revolutionary Guards and in the internal security forces, as the new Basij commander instead of Hossein Taeb, who was appointed the chief of intelligence division in the Revolutionary Guards (Fars, October 4; E’temad, October 3).
What has Khaled Mash’al done to anger the Iranians?
The speech given by Hamas Political Bureau chief Khaled Mash’al in Damascus last Friday on the occasion of the anniversary of the conquest of Jerusalem by Saladin triggered angry reactions by some of Iran’s media, after Mash’al used the term "Arab Gulf” to refer to the Persian Gulf.
Iranian media quoted Mash’al saying that he hoped all Muslim countries "from North Africa, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Arab Gulf, Iran, Indonesia, to Malaysia” would form one line to face the enemy. The headline chosen by reformist website Fararo for the report on Mash’al speech was "Khaled Mash’al repays Iran for its love” (Fararo, October 3).
Qodratollah Alikhani, a member of the Majles National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, also strongly criticized Mash’al’s statement, saying that Iran expected the Hamas Political Bureau chief to reconsider his position and to avoid using the term "Arab Gulf” in his speeches and declarations. The world’s key personalities should know, Alikhani said, that Iran’s people and authorities are extremely sensitive about the Persian Gulf (Ayandeh, October 5).
It should be noted that the name of the Persian Gulf has been a bone of contention between Iran and the Arabs since the 1950s, with Iran taking an aggressive stance against anyone in the Arab world and on the international scene making use of the term "Arab Gulf”. In recent years Iran has been waging a media campaign against the use of that term, including boycotting international organizations and publications making use of it, Google bombing (attempting to influence a website’s ranking in the search results) the term "Persian Gulf”, and even hacking various websites which employ the term "Arab Gulf”.
Several months ago, a crisis broke out between Iran and the Islamic Solidarity Games, which were supposed to be held in Tehran in October, after Iran refused to comply with Saudi Arabia’s demand to remove the name "Persian Gulf” from all the medals and flyers to be distributed in the games. During the crisis, Iranian news websites claimed that the term "Persian Gulf” was used by the world’s nations for over 2500 years and that there was no reason for Arab countries to use the distorted term "Arab Gulf”, which appeared in the time of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser as part of his struggle against the Persian Shah in the 1950s and 1960s.
Picture of the week:
the Supreme Leader on a visit to Mazandaran Province in the north of Iran