News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (January 22-29, 2013)

Confrontations during the erection of a Palestinian outpost in Judea and Samaria.

Confrontations during the erection of a Palestinian outpost in Judea and Samaria.

Rioters confront Israeli security forces in the region of Qadoum (near Qalqiliya) (Filastin Al-'An, January 26, 2013).

Rioters confront Israeli security forces in the region of Qadoum (near Qalqiliya) (Filastin Al-'An, January 26, 2013).

The letter found in the possession of the terrorist operatives (Ynet according to the IDF spokesman, January 27, 2013).

The letter found in the possession of the terrorist operatives (Ynet according to the IDF spokesman, January 27, 2013).

Khaled Mashaal and King Abdallah (Shihab website, January 28, 2013).

Khaled Mashaal and King Abdallah (Shihab website, January 28, 2013).

Military and Semi-Military Education for Gazan Children

Military and Semi-Military Education for Gazan Children

The graduation ceremony.

The graduation ceremony.

  • Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip continue holding their fire. This past week as well local Gazans instigated clashes and provocations near the security fence.
  • Local confrontations, some of them violent, continued between the Israeli security forces and Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. A demonstration was held in the village of A'anin (in the Jenin district near the security fence) by Palestinians who initiated a display called the "Prisoners' Village." The Palestinians mounted the roofs of Israeli military vehicles and threw stones at the Israeli security forces.
  • The prime minister of Malaysia paid a visit to the Gaza Strip, another in an accelerating series of visits to the Gaza Strip by senior officials from Arab-Muslim countries since the end of Operation Pillar of Defense. The visits reinforce Hamas' political status and challenge the Palestinian Authority (PA), which condemned the Malaysian prime minister's visit.
Rocket Fire
  • Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip continue to implement the understandings reached at the end of Operation Pillar of Defense. Since 2300 hours on November 21 no rockets or mortar shells hit Israeli territory.

Rocket Fire

The Situation on the Ground
  • This past week local Palestinians continued gathering in provocation near the security fence. The Palestinian media reported that six Gazans were injured by IDF fire in two separate incidents in the northern Gaza Strip (Safa and Ma'an news agencies, January 25, 2013).
Violence Continues
  • This past week friction and violence continued in various locations in Judea and Samaria between Palestinians on the one hand and Israeli security forces and settlers on the other. IDF forces continued detaining terrorist operatives.
  • The more prominent incidents were the following:
  • On January 23 Palestinians rioted in the village of Al-Aroub (near Gush Etzion, south of Jerusalem), throwing Molotov cocktails and stones. IDF forces fired at the rioters, seriously wounding a young Palestinian woman, who later died. The IDF reported that an investigation was being held (Ynet, January 23, 2013). Salam Fayyad, the PA prime minister, condemned the death of the young woman and warned of the consequences if "such crimes" continued. He said the Israeli "attacks" necessitated broad international condemnation (Wafa News Agency, January 23, 2013). Kamel Hamid, governor of the Hebron district, called for the appointment of an international inquiry committee to investigate the circumstances of the young woman's death (Ma'an News Agency, January 25, 2013).
  • On January 25 an estimated 200 Palestinians held a demonstration near the security fence in the region of the village of A'anin (in the region of Jenin near the security fence). Their objective was to initiate a display to protest the conditions of the Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel, another propaganda event in the series which began with the Area E1 outpost. The display became violent after IDF forces banned them from marching from Jenin to the village. Some of the rioters mounted the roofs of military vehicles and threw stones at the IDF soldiers (Ynet, January 25, 2013).
  • On the night of January 26 IDF forces detained two Palestinians who had thrown Molotov cocktails at an Israeli army post south of Nablus. In their possession were three improvised hand grenades and three Molotov cocktails ready for throwing. A letter was also found in their possession stating that the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were responsible for carrying out a terrorist attack at Alon Moreh (northeast of Nablus) [so far unknown]. According to the letter, if the attack did not succeed the first time, it would be carried out again until it did (IDF spokesman, January 27, 2013).
Operatives of Terrorist Cell Detained in Bethlehem Region
  • The Israeli security forces recently detained a terrorist cell from the village of Bayt Fajar (near Bethlehem) whose operatives were responsible for several shooting attacks. They shot at a bus in Gush Etzion, the village of Migdal Oz (Gush Etzion) on January 14, 2013, and at Israeli security forces who arrived on the scene. Interrogation of the cell revealed that they planned other attacks in the area. One of the terrorist operatives in the cell was a policeman in the Palestinian police force (IDF spokesman, January 28, 2013). 
The Crossings
  • This past year, but especially since Operation Pillar of Defense, the Rafah crossing has become the Gaza Strip's main exit and entry point for civilians and foreign delegations (especially Arab-Muslim delegations). The number of individuals passing through the Rafah crossing (ingoing and outgoing) grew considerably during 2012 and according to Israeli security estimation, reached 430,000 (as opposed to 250,000 in 2011). By way of comparison, the number of Palestinian civilians passing through the Erez crossing (northern Gaza Strip) in 2012 was an estimated 50,000.
  • Ziad al-Zaza, deputy head of the de-facto Hamas administration and minister of the treasury, said that the Hamas administration was working to open the Gaza Strip's air lane and to renew the operation of its international airport (Filastin Al-'An, January 27, 2013).
Prime Ministers and Heads of State Visit the Gaza Strip
  • Senior Arab-Muslim figures continue to visit the Gaza Strip. Their numbers have increased since Operation Pillar of Defense, reinforcing the political status of Hamas and challenging the PA.
  • On January 22 Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammad Najib and his wife paid a one-day visit to the Gaza Strip. He was also accompanied by several ministers and businessmen. They were received by Ismail Haniya, head of the de-facto Hamas administration (Radio Al-Aqsa, January 22, 2013). Mohammad Najib placed cornerstones for the new Hamas administration building, rebuilt after it was damaged in Operation Pillar of Defense, and for a vocational school in the southern Gaza Strip.
  • The Malaysian prime minister also received an honorary doctorate from the Hamas-affiliated Al-Aqsa University in Gaza City. He was also taken to view the car in which Ahmed al-Jaabari, head of Hamas' military-terrorist wing, was riding when he was killed by the IDF on November 14, 2012 (Safa News Agency, January 22, 2013). His wife launched two medical projects (Safa News Agency, January 22, 2013). Meeting with the Malaysian prime minister, Ismail Haniya said that it was the first visit of a non-Arab prime minister and was therefore historic (Safa News Agency, January 22, 2013). According to Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum, the visit was an important step towards breaking the "siege" and isolation of the Gaza Strip and it showed support for the Hamas administration (Paltoday website, January 22, 2013).
  • The PA, however, condemned the visit of the Malaysian prime minister to the Gaza Strip and asked the Malaysian government for clarification. The PA said in a press release that as far as it was concerned, the visit "damaged Palestinian representation and strengthened the [internal Palestinian] schism" (Wafa News Agency, January 22, 2013). In addition, following the announcement of the Tunisian president's intention to visit the Gaza Strip, the PA's leadership appealed to him to postpone his visit until a reconciliation could be achieved between Hamas and Fatah. After the appeal and a meeting with Mahmoud Abbas, the president of Tunisia decided to postpose his visit until the end of March so that it would not "harm reconciliation efforts" (Ma'an News Agency, date, 2013).

Prime Ministers and Heads of State Visit the Gaza Strip
Left: Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammad Najib places the cornerstone for rebuilding the Hamas administration building. Right: Mohammad Najib and Ismail Haniya view the car in which Ahmed al-Jaabari was killed.

Khaled Mashaal Meets with King Abdallah of Jordan

Khaled Mashaal, chairman of Hamas' Executive Committee, paid a visit to Jordan during which he met with King Abdallah in Amman. They discussed the internal Palestinian reconciliation and recent regional developments. After the meeting Khaled Mashaal said that he had come to Jordan to consult with the Jordanian regime about various issues connected to the Palestinian cause. He said the Jordanian regime showed great understanding regarding the issues and would coordinate (Shihab website, January 28, 2013).

Marwan Issa, Senior Hamas Terrorist Operative, Visits Egypt
  • Palestinian sources at the Rafah terminal reported that on January 21 Marwan Issa (Abu Baraa), a senior operative in Hamas' military-terrorist wing, crossed into Egypt through the Rafah crossing. They said he sped through in a vehicle with darkened windows, and that senior Egyptian security operatives were waiting for him on the Egyptian side. In the assessment of the Palestinian sources, Issa had gone to Egypt for some kind of "secret mission" (PalPress website, January 21, 2013).
  • Marwan Issawas born in the Gaza Strip in 1965 and lives in one of the refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip. He was formerly responsible for Hamas' special operational unit and for liaising with the movement's external leadership (PalPress website, January 21, 2013). In recent years he was responsible for the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas' military-terrorist wing) forces in the central Gaza Strip refugee camps. He was imprisoned in Israel for five years for involvement in terrorist attacks. In 2006 he escaped an attack on his life but was seriously injured (PalPress website, January 21, 2013). His eldest son, Baraa, died in 2009 after the president of Egypt refused to allow him to leave the Gaza Strip for medical treatment in Egypt.
  • Marwan Issa, who is considered a senior figure in Hamas' military-terrorist wing, enjoys the confidence of both the Hamas leadership and its military-terrorist wing. He was one of the team, which included Ahmed al-Jaabari, Saleh al-Arouri and Nizar Awadallah, which conducted the negotiations for the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal (Al-Watan, October 15, 2011). In the April 2012 elections he was elected to the Hamas' Shura Council (Sama News Agency, April 19, 2012). According to Musa Abu Marzouq, Marwan Issa was appointed to replace Ahmed al-Jaabari (Amad, November 15, 2012).

Marwan Issa (outlined in green) with senior Hamas figures in Egypt (Hamas forum website, November 15, 2012).
Marwan Issa (outlined in green) with senior Hamas figures in Egypt (Hamas forum website, November 15, 2012).

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) March in Support of the Palestinian Prisoners
  • On November 28 the PIJ held a march in the center of Gaza City in support of the Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel who are holding a hunger strike. The march, so-called a "warning march," was attended by senior PIJ figures in the Gaza Strip, among them Khaled al-Batash and Khader Habib.
  • During the march they warned Israel not to harm the Palestinian prisoners in any way. The PIJ also appealed to its military-terrorist wing (the Jerusalem Brigades) and to those of other terrorist organizations to abduct Israeli soldiers for use as bargaining chips in the release of Palestinian prisoners (Jerusalem Brigades website, January 28, 2013).

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) March in Support of the Palestinian Prisoners
Left: Marchers hold signs calling for an attack on Tel Aviv if the Palestinian terrorists die during their hunger strike. Right: Senior PIJ figures walk on American and Israeli flags during the rally (Jerusalem Brigades website, January 28, 2013).

Military and Semi-Military Education for Gazan Children
  • On January 27 a festive ceremony was held, attended by the heads of the de-facto Hamas administration, to mark the end of pre-military education activities throughout the Gaza Strip, in which thousands of children and adolescents participated. The activities were organized by the ministry of culture and education of the Hamas administration and were carried out under the supervision of Abu Obeida al-Jerah (supervisor of the general security service).
  • Ismail Haniya, head of the de-facto Hamas administration, gave a speech in which he praised the military education received by the children in the Gaza Strip. He also mentioned the newly-instituted summer camp program, in which children were trained by operatives of Hamas military-terrorist wing. He reported that there were plans to found a new military academy for Gazan children, the first of its kind, which would educate and train them "to liberate Palestine and establish a Palestinian state from the [Jordan] river to the [Mediterranean] sea." He said that such a curriculum would build a new generation which would be able to "cope with the occupation, and evict it and its aggression" (Al-Aqsa TV, January 24, 2013).
Campaign Launched to Enforce Islamic Way of Life
  • The religious endowment department of the de-facto Hamas administration in the central Gaza Strip district launched a campaign called an "operation to establish values and virtues." The campaign focuses on increasing awareness and proselytizing against western dress, and on activities explaining the importance of conservative dress appropriate to Muslim law. The campaign is implemented through Friday sermons in the mosques, workshops, the dissemination of printed materials, an interactive website, information distributed through the social networks, etc. (Alresala.net website, January 20, 2013).
  • In addition, Al-Aqsa University announced it would continue to require female students to attend classes in traditional Islamic dress and that a team would be formed to enforce the requirement (Al-Quds, January 24, 2013).
PA Reactions to the Israeli Election Results
  • The PA represented the results of the Israeli elections as an expression of lack of confidence in the previous government and as a possibility for the renewal of the negotiations. Various Palestinian spokesmen repeatedly stressed their familiar demands as conditions for peace. Central among them were the demands that construction in the settlements be stopped, that the Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israeli jails be released, and that a Palestinian state be established with the 1967 borders and with Jerusalem as its capital.
  • Some of the spokesmen admitted their surprise at the election results and expressed hope that the prime minister would not form a right-wing government. They said that if a right-wing government were formed, the PA would continue confronting Israel on international stages and would continue the so-called "popular resistance." However, after the elections Mahmoud Abbas appointed a committee headed by Muhammad al-Madani, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, to meet with representatives of Israeli political parties to strengthen trust and explain the Palestinian principles for renewing the negotiations for peace (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, January 25, 2013).
  • The main reactions in the PA were the following:
  • Mahmoud Abbasreferred to the subject in a speech he gave at the African unity summit meeting in Addis Ababa. He said that the makeup of the coalition forming the Israeli government might change but the Palestinian demands for implementing peace would never change. They would always include the cessation of building in the settlements, the release of the Palestinian prisoners and finding solutions for all the issues of the final status agreement (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, January 28, 2013).
  • Presidential spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeina said that the PA was prepared to cooperate with any Israeli government which would commit itself to implementing the UN General Assembly resolution regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders and with east Jerusalem as its capital. He added that the new government had to stop the construction in the settlements (Wafa News Agency, January 23, 2013).
  • Riyadh al-Maliki, PA foreign minister, said that the PA was prepared to work with any future Israeli government which would recognize the Palestinian state and the UN General Assembly resolution recognizing the Palestinian state as a fait accompli (Wafa News Agency, January 23, 2013).
  • Yasser Abd Rabbo, chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee, held a press conference where he said that the Palestinian leadership was not prepared to hold negotiations which would camouflage the policies of a government which was a "new version of the previous government." He said that anyone who wanted negotiations would have to start with the premise of the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders and with Jerusalem as its capital (Wafa News Agency, January 24, 2013).
  • Saeb Erekat, a member of the PLO's Executive Committee, said that the results of the Israeli elections were an internal Israeli issue. However, any government formed had to accept the two-state solution and halt the [construction in the] settlements if it wanted peace (Qudsnet website, January 23, 2013).
  • Ms. Hanan Ashrawi, a member of the PLO's Executive Committee, said that according to all the signs it would be difficult to form an Israeli government. She said that despite the fact that [the Palestinians] did not intervene, Israel had to understand that what was necessary was a significant peace process which began with a halt to [the construction in] the settlements and the release of the [Palestinian terrorist operative] prisoners (Wafa News Agency, January 24, 2013).
  • Hamas spokesmenbarely mentioned the election results. Some of them referred to the decrease in Netanyahu's political power as "the failure of Operation Pillar of Defense." Some of the reactions were the following:
  • Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said that the election results reflected the victory of the Palestinian resistance [i.e., terrorist organizations] and that the decrease in Netanyahu's political power was the result of his failure during Operation Pillar of Defense (Filastin Al-'An, January 23, 2013).
  • Osama Hamdan, responsible for the Hamas administration's foreign relations, said that Netanyahu's victory did not bode well and that it meant the Palestinians had to unite (Alresala.net website, January 23, 2013).
  • Yusuf al-Rishq, Ismail Haniya's political advisor, said that the weakening of Netanyahu's political power was the result of his failure in Operation Pillar of Defense, the way he conducted relations with the United States, his behavior regarding Iran's nuclear program and the merging of his party with Lieberman's (Alresala.net website, January 23, 2013).
Interview with Mahmoud Abbas
  • Mahmoud Abbas, interviewed by the Lebanese television channel Al-Mayadeen, related to a series of issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Al-Mayadeen, January 25, 2013):
  • The so-called "right of return:" Mahmoud Abbas mentioned the claim that he had abandoned the "right of return." He said that he had only relinquished his own personal "right of return" to the northern Israeli city of Safed, where he was born. He added that his statement had been interpreted [i.e., "misinterpreted"] as abandoning the "right of return" of all the Palestinians. He added that the problem of the refugees would be resolved only through an agreement with Israel based on UN Resolution 194.
  • The Oslo Accords: He stressed that he adhered to the Oslo Accords, whose objective was "to give our people tranquility and independence."
  • The final status arrangement with Israel: He claimed that all the Palestinian organizations, including Hamas and the PIJ, had agreed in principle to the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders and to holding negotiating [with Israel].
  • The option of "resistance:"The armed option, which had been tried in the past, he said, had not proved itself and therefore circumstances dictated adherence to the principle of "non-violent popular resistance" [Mahmoud Abbas claimed that was a joint PA-Hamas position].
  • Mahmoud Abbas' remarks were attacked by Hamas on the grounds that as far as Hamas was concerned, Palestine was "all Palestine," and that accepting the principle of establishing the Palestinian state with the 1967 borders did not necessarily mean recognition of Israel (Hamas Info website, January 28, 2013). An announcement issued by the Hamas office of information made it clear that Hamas had never agreed and would never agree to the two-state solution. It emphasized that all forms of violent action against Israel had to be used, both "popular resistance" and armed "resistance" [i.e., terrorism and violence], which had been proved as the only way to defeat Israel (Hamas Info website, January 27, 2013).

The Palestinian Outpost Campaign Continues

  • Rafat Hamdouna, director of the so-called "captives study center" in the Gaza Strip, called for the erecting of a Palestinian outpost near the Erez crossing. The outpost, whose objective would be to show solidarity with the Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel, would also be called "Prisoners' Village." He called on organizations and companies to supply the means for promoting the idea and for young people to use the social networks to spread it. He said the erecting of outposts near the border was an effective way of influencing Israel (Filastin Al-'An, January 24, 2013).

[1] As of January 29, 2013. The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.
[2] The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.