Sites in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, where IEDs were detonated (November 5, 2012).
Sites in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, where IEDs were detonated (November 5, 2012).
Bahraini supporters of Iran and Hezbollah demonstrate against the regime.
The yellow flags are Hezbollah's. The pictures at the bottom of the left-hand picture are of Khomeini and Khamenei
Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, advisor to Khamenei (Al-Jazeera, February 22, 2013).
Tariq al-Hassan, head of Bahraini general intelligence, at a press conference held February 19, 2013
Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah leader, appeals to the people of Bahrain to sacrifice and not remain silent until the oppressor is removed, March 19, 2012 (YouTube.com).
Overview
1. On February 16 and 19, 2013, the Bahraini authorities announced they had exposed a terrorist cell run by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards. The cell's operatives had been involved in shooting policemen and were planning to assassinate public figures and carry out terrorist attacks on various sensitive targets, among them the King Fahd Bridge (which links Bahrain to Saudi Arabia), Bahrain International Airport and the ministry of the interior. Two affairs preceded the exposure: in November 2012 five suspects were detained on suspicion of placing IEDs which exploded in various locations in Manama, and at the beginning of November 2011 a terrorist cell was captured who members had been planning to carry out showcase attacks in Bahrain and attack important facilities. One of their targets wasthe King Fahd Bridge, which in our assessment is regarded as a strategic target by the Iranians.
2. Tariq al-Hassan, head of Bahraini general intelligence, said that the cell most recently exposed had been recruited by two men living in Qom, Iran. Its operatives were handled and funded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, and trained by Guards proxies in Iraq and Lebanon. In previous affairs Iran and Hezbollah were accused of handling terrorist cells in Bahrain, training them and providing them with weapons. In every instance Iran and Hezbollah denied the accusations.
3. Actually, however, in our assessment the terrorist cells are part of Iran's comprehensive, ongoing efforts at subversion and terrorism, sometimes carried out with the assistance of Hezbollah, its Lebanese proxy. Their efforts have accelerated in the past two years, the result of the upheaval in the Arab world and the intensified Iranian confrontation of the United States and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf.
4. Since the regional upheaval began, there have been protests in Bahrain by its Shi'ite majority. The Shi'ites are supported by Iran, which exploits them to further its efforts to overthrow the Bahraini regime. The regime has acted to contain the protests but the Shi'ites have become more daring and confrontations between Shi'ite demonstrators and the Bahraini security forces have become routine. This explosive situation provides, in our assessment, fertile ground for the continuation and intensification of Iran's subversive and terrorist activities within the Bahraini Shi'ite population. The Iranians do that either directly or by using proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq as subcontractors (the Iranian modus operandi in other Shi'ite communities throughout the Arab-Muslim world).
Bahrain: Iran's Choice as a Target for Its Terrorism and Subversion
5. Iran chose Bahrain as a target for terrorism and subversion because it is located in the heart of the Persian Gulf, which is strategically important for Iran, and because of its political-societal makeup: it has a Shi'ite majority and is ruled by a Sunni monarchy which has Saudi Arabia as an ally and is oriented toward America. In concrete terms there are several reasons for Iran's decades of terrorism and subversion in Bahrain:
1) The presence of the American army: Bahrain hosts the United States' largest Persian Gulf naval base, Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, home of the Fifth Fleet. NSA Bahrain has been the seat of American army support for the wars in Iraq (ended) and Afghanistan (ongoing). As far as Iran is concerned, an American military force in Bahrain is capable of providing a response to an Iranian threat to the Gulf States and can threaten vital Iranian interests (most of Iran's commercial activity, including its oil exports, is channeled through the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf). In addition, from the Iranian point of view, if and when the time comes, the American presence in Bahrain is liable to be used in an attack on Iran (as it was in the attack on the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq).
Bahrain, a tiny country with a Shi'ite majority ruled by a Sunni monarchy. Its proximity to Iran and its basic geopolitical-societal conditions have made it an attractive venue for Iranian terrorism and subversion (Map from the watanee.com website).
2) Bahrain's politics and demographics: An estimated 60%-70% of Bahrain's more than a million inhabitants are Shi'ites ruled by a Sunni minority. Bahraini Shi'ites have a long history of protesting, both nonviolently and violently, against various issues on the Bahraini and regional agenda. Iran, with Hezbollah support, intensively incites Bahrain's Shi'ite population to overthrow the monarchy. The regional upheavals escalated both the Shi'ite protests and the Iranian efforts to subvert and destabilize the Bahraini regime, which so far has been able to contain the protests.
3) Iran's irredentist aspirations: Iran claims sovereignty over Bahrain (calling it "Iran's 14th province") and has even claimed to have found "historical proof" for the claim. In February 2009 Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei, said that until its independence in 1970, Bahrain was Iran's 14th province and even had representation in the Iranian parliament. At the time, the statement (not the first time it was made) led to a storm of protests in Bahrain and gave rise to open expressions of solidarity with Bahrain throughout the Arab world. In 1979, during the first months of Iran's Islamic Revolution, the Ayatollah Sayyid Sadeq Rohani, an important Iranian cleric, asserted that Bahrain was an integral part of Iran and that it was illegal to separate it from Iran. He called on the inhabitants of Bahrain and the other emirates to rise up against their rulers and to institute regimes of "justice and equality" (Shia-online.ir website).
Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, advisor to Khamenei (Al-Jazeera, February 22, 2013). His claim that Bahrain was Iran's 14th province led to tension between Bahrain and Iran and a storm of protests in the Arab world.
4) Iran's aspirations to hegemony in the Persian Gulf: Iran regards the Gulf as strategically extremely important both in terms of its economy and its security. Iran seeks hegemony in the Gulf and to remove the presence of Iran's enemies, principally the United States, other Western countries, and Saudi Arabia and its allies. The Shi'ite communities in the countries in the Persian Gulf and at the entrance to the Red Sea, among them Bahrain, Yemen, southern Iraq and eastern Saudi Arabia are, in Iran's perception, bridgeheads for Iranian influence and the advancement of its regional interests.
6. Exploiting the Shi'ite community in Bahrain for subversion and terrorism is a permanent part of the Iranian pattern, carried out by the Qods Force and with Hezbollah as a subcontractor. The most recent example was in Yemen, where on January 23, 2013, a ship was intercepted and found to be carrying a large quantity of weapons from Iran. The weapons were en route to the Shi'ite Houthi rebels in north Yemen.[1] Other countries with Shi'ite communities which are targets for Iranian subversion and terrorism are Lebanon (a prominent example of Iran's success in exporting the Islamic Revolution), Syria (where Iran and Hezbollah support the Alawite regime, which they regard as Shi'ite), Iraq (where Iran established Shi'ite militias), Pakistan (where there is a large Shi'ite community) and Azerbaijan (a Shi'ite country which Iran has traditionally targeted for its subversion and terrorism).
7. Three appendices follow:
1) Appendix A: Iranian subversion and terrorism in Bahrain since the beginning of the regional upheaval.
2) Appendix B: Iranian subversion and terrorism in Bahrain in the 1980s and 1990s.
3) Appendix C: The Iranian-Hezbollah anti-Bahrain propaganda and incitement campaign.
[1] For further information see the February 11, 2013 bulletin “Iranian subversion in Yemen: A ship with a cargo of arms originating in Iran and en route to the Shi'ite Houthi rebels in north Yemen, was recently intercepted.”
