Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (April 15-May 6, 2024)

Overview^[1]

• Hezbollah continued it attacks, mainly on military and civilian targets in northern Israel and the Golan Heights, claiming responsibility for 126 attacks during the past three weeks. In two attacks (Har Dov and Arab al-Aramsheh) an IDF civilian worker and an IDF officer were killed. In response, Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in south Lebanon and the Ba’albek region. Senior Hezbollah and other terrorist organization operatives were targeted and eliminated.
• Hezbollah continues to reiterate its [so-called] “equation” in the conflict with Israel, according to which harming Lebanese citizens will result in a counter attack on civilian targets in northern Israel. Hezbollah also continues reiterating that it has not yet used all its weapons against Israel.
• The United States imposed sanctions on a number of entities facilitating Hezbollah’s economic activities.
• Lebanon’s negotiations with the United States, France and Great Britain continue for an arrangement on the Israel-Lebanon border which will make it possible to enforce UN Resolution 1701, which states that only the Lebanese army is authorized to carry weapons south of the Litani River. The proposals include the deployment of the UNIFIL force and Lebanese army soldiers in the area and the removal of Hezbollah’s Radwan force from the border line.
• Rockets were fired at Israel from Syrian territory; there were no casualties. In response, IDF tanks attacked the sources of the rocket fire. Two attacks on targets in southern Syria were attributed to Israel. A senior Hezbollah terrorist operative was killed in Dara’a; he had been in charge of recruiting operatives for the pro-Iranian militias.

South Lebanon

Hezbollah attacks

• During the past three weeks (April 15 to May 6, 2024), Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 126 attacks, mainly against military targets in northern Israel and using anti-tank missiles, rockets of various types (including heavy rockets), launching unmanned aircraft and firing artillery shells.
• Weekly distribution (all information from the Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, April 15 to May 6, 2024):
  • April 15 to 21, 2024, 58 attacks: IEDs were detonated to attack the IDF force operating in Lebanon’s Tel Isma’il region; two waves of UAVs were launched to attack the Iron Dome aerial defense system batteries in Beit Hillel (April 16, 2024); guided missiles were launched to attack the IDF’s aerial control unit on Mount Miron (April 17, 2024); UAVs^[2] and guided anti-tank missiles were launched to attack an IDF military headquarters in Arab al-Aramsheh, in the western sector of the Israel-Lebanon border; one IDF fighter was killed and 11 were wounded (IDF spokesperson, April 17, 2024). Hezbollah claimed that the attack was in response to the killing of a number of operatives in Ain Baal and Shahabiyeh, which they attributed to Israel; an IDF UAV was intercepted in the al-‘Ayshiyah region in south Lebanon (April 21, 2024). The incident was confirmed by the IDF spokesperson (April 22, 2024).

    
Right: An al-Mas missile in flight towards the target. Left: A Hermes 450 UAV (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, April 17 and 22, 2024)

   
Right: An anti-tank missile launched at the community center in Arab al-Aramsheh. Left: A few moments before the missile hit the community center (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, April 17, 2024)

• • April 22 to 28, 2024, 33 attacks: A UAV was launched at an IDF site north of Acre (April 23, 2024), allegedly in response to the Israeli attack in Adloun, in which a senior operative in Hezbollah’s aerial defense system was killed. Anti-tank missiles were launched, artillery was fired and rockets were launched at a convoy of IDF armored vehicles on Mount Dov, killing an Israeli civilian working for the IDF (IDF spokesperson, April 26, 2024). During the night about 40 rockets were fired at Miron and nearby towns and villages (April 28, 2024).

     
Forty rockets in a multiple-barrel launcher prepared to attack the village of Miron and its surroundings (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, April 28, 2024)

• • April 29 to May 6, 2024, 35, attacks: Anti-tank missiles were launched at an IDF tank in Metula and at IDF vehicles in the Yiftah-Ramot Naftali region (April 30, 2024). Dozens of Katyusha and Falaq rockets were launched at Kiryat Shmona and several kibbutzim (May 5, 2024). Hezbollah claimed civilian targets were attacked in retaliation for the Israeli attack in Meiss al-Jabal, in which several civilians were [allegedly] killed and wounded.

  
Right: A multi-barrel rocket launcher holding 40 Katyusha rockets. Left: The rockets launched at Kiryat Shmona (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 6, 2024)

IDF response

• In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, Israeli Air Force fighter jets attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives. Among the targets were a launch site, terrorist facilities, military buildings, storage facilities and weapons. In addition to attacks in south Lebanon, the IDF also attacked Hezbollah targets deep inside Lebanon. (IDF spokesperson, April 15 to May 6, 2024).

    
Right: Attacks on Aita al-Sha’ab. Left: Attack on an armed terrorist in Kafrkila (IDF spokesperson, April 24 and 26, 2024)

   
Attack in Kafr Kila (IDF spokesperson, April 21, 2024)

   
Right: Attack in al-Adeisa. Left: Attack in Aita al-Sha’ab (IDF spokesperson, April 22, 28, 2024)

• On the night of May 5, 2024, Israeli Air Force fighter jets attacked a Hezbollah military compound in the al-Sefri area, about 17 kilometers (about 10.5 miles) southwest of Ba’albek in the Lebanon Valley (IDF spokesperson, May 6, 2024). According to reports, the attack targeted a factory in the town of al-Sefri. Three people were reported injured and the building was destroyed (Lebanese News Agency, May 6, 2024). According to another report, the attack targeted a parking facility used by trucks (Sawt Beirut International, May 6, 2024).

    
Attack in al-Sefri (Right: Sawt Beirut International, May 6, 2024. Left: (Fouad Khreiss’ X account, May 6, 2024)

• The IDF carried out targeted aerial countermeasures to attack a number of senior Hezbollah terrorist operatives in south Lebanon:
  • On April 16, 2024, Isma’il Yusuf Baz, the commander of Hezbollah’s coastal sector, was attacked in the area of Ayn Ba’al, about six kilometers (3.7 miles) southeast of Tyre. He had in several senior positions in Hezbollah’s military-terrorist wing. His was involved in launching rockets and anti-tank missiles at Israel from Lebanon’s coastal area (IDF spokesperson, April 16, 2024).

    
Right: Attack in the Ayn Ba’al area (IDF spokesperson, April 16, 2024). Left: A vehicle on fire (Chadoua Jbeli’s X account, April 16, 2024)

• • On April 16, 2024, Muhammad Hussein Mustafa, the commander of the rocket and missile unit of the western sector in Hezbollah’ elite Radwan Force, was attacked in the area of Kafr Dounin. He was responsible for launching rockets and missiles at Israel from the central and western sector in south Lebanon. Mahmoud Ibrahim Fadlallah, an operative in the rocket and missile unit, was also killed in the attack (IDF spokesperson, April 16, 2024).

• • On the night of April 22, 2024, Muhammad Khalil Atiya, a key operative in the aerial unit of Hezbollah’s Radwan force, was killed in the Arzoun region, about 15 kilometers (about 9.3 miles) east of Tyre (IDF spokesperson, April 23, 2024) .

• • On April 23, 2024, countermeasures were carried out in south Lebanon against Hussein Ali Azqul, a senior operative in Hezbollah’s aerial defense system in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, April 23, 2024). A Lebanese source reported that the attack was carried out by a UAV which targeted vehicles on the ‘Adloun road, about 15 kilometers (about 9.3 miles) north of Tyre (Fouad Khreiss’ X account, April 23, 2024).

  
Right: Attack on the ‘Adlon road (Hisham’s X account, April 23, 2024). Left: The remains of the vehicles (Fouad Khreiss’ X account, April 23, 2024)

• On April 26, 2024, an IDF counterattack on the Meidoun – al-Srirah junction in the Lebanon Valley (al-‘Ahed, April 26, 2024) targeted Musab Saeed Khalaf, a senior member of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya,^[3] who worked in cooperation with the Hamas branch in Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, April 26, 2024). Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya reported the death of Khalaf and another senior member of the organization, Bilal Muhammad Khalaf. It was noted that they were commanders of al-Fajr forces, the organization’s military-terrorist wing (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya – Sidon X account, April 26, 2024). Their funeral was held in Akkar in northern Lebanon, and a video of the funeral showed the participation of about 50 armed operatives (Samia’s X account, April 28, 2024).

   
Right: The car which was attacked (al-‘Ahed, April 26, 2024). Left: al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya operatives at the funeral (Ray Al Haddad X account, April 29, 2024)

• Ali Abu Yassin, head of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s political bureau in Lebanon, claimed they coordinated with Hamas, but emphasized they were two separate movements. He also implied criticism of Hamas’ activities in Lebanese territory, and said that after the war ended, the issue should be discussed (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 28, 2024).
• Regarding the targeted attacks, a “source in Hezbollah” denied the statement by Yoav Galant, the Israeli Minister of Defense, who said Israel had killed half of the organization’s commanders in south Lebanon (Israeli media, April 24, 2024), claiming that “at most” five senior Hezbollah officials had been killed (Nidaa al-Watan, 26 in April 2024).

Hezbollah casualties

• During the past three weeks, Hezbollah reported the deaths of 15 operatives, all from south Lebanon, except for one from the Lebanon Valley (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, April 15 – May 1, 2024).^[4]
  • Mahmoud Ibrahim Feisal Allah, aka Shadi, born in 1975 in Aynatha.
  • Muhammad Jamil al-Shami, aka Abu Zahraa’, born in 1982 from Kafrkila.
  • Ali Ahmed Hamada, aka Falah, born in 1970 in al-Duweir.
  • Hossein Ali Zima, aka Sajd, born in 1996 in Meiss al-Jabal.
  • Muhammad Hassan al-Saeed Abd al-Muhsen Feisal Allah, aka Abu Hadi, born in 1969 in the town of Ainatha and a resident of Khirbet Selem.
  • Ali Rada Harb, aka Abu Mahdi, born in 1973 in al-Mansouri.
  • Hussein Ali Daghman, aka Malak, born in 1994,from the town of Kafrtebnit.
  • Mubarak Ali Hamia, aka Sadeq, born in 1982 in Tarayya (and a resident of al-Bazzaliyah in the Lebanon Valley.
  • Faraj Allah Ali Hamoud, aka Sajed, born in 1971 from Kafrkila.
  • Raf’ Faiz Hassan, aka Nasser Ali, born in 1974 in al-Khiyam.
  • Isma’il Yusuf Baz Zaballah aka Abu Jaafar, born in 1972 in al-Shahabiyeh.
  • Muhammad Hussein Mustafa Shehouri, aka Jaber, born in 1994 in al-Shahabiyeh.
  • Muhammad Khalil Atiya, aka Sajed, born in 1994 in Qana and a resident of al-Sarafand.
  • Houssein Ali Azqul, aka Hadi, born in 1981 in Qalawiyah and a resident of Adloun.
  • Wahid Abdelhamid Tafili, aka Abu Haider, born in 2000 in Deir al-Zahrani.

Amal casualties

• The Amal Movement reported the deaths of three of its operatives from south Lebanon (Account X of the Amal movement – Central Information Bureau, April 21, 2024).
  • Hussein Kasem Karshet, born in 1972 in Hanawiyah.
  • Wassim Musa Musa, aka Taher, born in 1974, from Kafrkila.
  • Qassem Muhammad Assad, aka Abu Muhammad, general coordinator of the Amal movement in Kafr Shuba.

Interim assessment

• Hezbollah published an infographic summarizing its operations against Israel between October 8, 2023 and April 24, 2024. According to the infographic, the organization carried out 1,650 attacks against military targets on the Israel-Lebanon border, including 92 armored vehicles and 67 IDF headquarters. The attacks were carried with 352 cannon shells and 727 rockets, 55 UAVs, 546 anti-tank missiles and 50 surface-to-air missiles. Hezbollah alleged that the attacks caused the death and injury of approximately 2,000 Israelis and the evacuation of approximately 230,000 Israeli residents from 43 settlements near the border (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, April 24, 2024). That is about three hundred more attacks than the number of attacks for which the organization claimed responsibility in its daily announcements and the number of Israeli casualties it claimed is significantly higher than the actual number. In addition according to Israeli estimates, about 70,000 Israelis left their homes near the Lebanese border.

• According to the Alma Center, during the month of April 2024, 236 attacks were carried out from south Lebanon against northern Israel. A continuous increase in Hezbollah’s use of UAVs has also been noted during the past three months. During the month of April 2024, 42 aircraft penetrated Israel’s airspace, nearly double the number in March 2024, when 24 incidents of this type were recorded, and six times more than in February 2024, when seven were recorded (Alma Center, May 1, 2024).
• The crisis management team of the Lebanese government published data about the war and noted that since October 7, 2023, 4,010 Israeli aerial and ground attacks have been carried out against targets in Lebanon. The five villages which were reportedly attacked the most were Aita al-Sha’ab (339 attacks); Houla (311); Naqoura (256); Alma al-Sha’ab (241) and Tir Harfa (215). The team also reported that since October 7, 2023, 438 people have been killed in Lebanon, including 337 Hezbollah and other organizations’ military-terrorist operatives, 100 civilians and a Lebanese soldier (Lebanon News, April 30, 2024).
• Regarding Hezbollah in combat, according to reports, since the beginning of the war, Hezbollah had to change its combat tactics approximately six times to deal with Israeli technological superiority in the field of unmanned aircraft and in light of the heavy losses it suffered (al-Nashra, April 30, 2024).
• It was recently reported that representatives of towns and villages in south Lebanon met with senior Hezbollah officials and asked them not to carry out attacks against Israel from the territories of their settlements and their surroundings. It was noted that Hezbollah showed a “positive attitude” and treated their words with “relative understanding” (Janoubiya, April 29, 2024).
• It was also reported that as of April 20, 2024, in light of the growing tensions with Israel, the families of senior Hezbollah officials were moved to safe places in Syria. It was noted that at the beginning of December 2023, Hezbollah’s military leadership made known the appointment of a “transportation committee” headed by Emad Maki, whose duties include compiling a list of senior officials who wish to move their families from Lebanon, and especially from the fighting areas in south Lebanon, to safe places in Syrian territory. “Sources” confirmed that the committee listed the names of more than 700 families to be transferred to Syria, including families from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement (al-Janoubia, April 25, 2024). So far Hezbollah has not confirmed the information.
• Senior Hezbollah members officials boasted about “successes” in the confrontation with Israel and of the “equations” they had created:
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said Hezbollah would continue to confront Israel’s “aggression” and support the Palestinian people until it stopped. He added that the political and military attempts to ease the pressure on the northern front would not benefit Israel and that the operation in Arab al-Aramsheh [April 17, 2024] was a “small sample” of what they were preparing for Israel. He also said Hezbollah did not allow others to determine its future , itself dictating the pace for Israel and preventing it from escalating its actions. He also reiterated yet again that any Israeli escalation would have a painful response (al-‘Ahed, April 20, 2024).
  • Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, a senior member of Hezbollah, said at a political meeting organized by the organization, that in the past Israel created equations, but today it was subject to the equations created by the “resistance.” He claimed Israel (“the Zionist enemy”) had failed to achieve anything in the Gaza Strip. He added that Israel tried to force equations through assassinations, but it had not succeeded in changing them, on the contrary, it increased Hezbollah’s determination to continue its path (al-Nashra, April 21, 2024).
  • Nabil Qaouk, a member of Hezbollah’s Central Council, said that Hezbollah’s suicide drones had bypassed the Israeli air defense systems and reached their destinations 96% of the time, and claimed they were considered “a strategic success.” He claimed that Israel’s many threats were not evidence of strength but [allegedly] of panic, pain and confusion (al-Nashra, April 27, 2024).
  • Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, reiterated his claim yet again that so far Hezbollah had used only some of the military capabilities and weapons at its disposal, and was prepared for a war but had no interest in one (al-Manar, May 3, 2024).

The battle for hearts and minds

• Hezbollah’s al-‘Ahed news website has launched a new interactive site called “al-Aqsa Flood – the Lebanese front” which puts the organization’s official awareness activities during the war together in one place. It features Hezbollah’s claims of responsibility and its videos documenting attacks, as well as the map of the areas where it claims Israel attacked Lebanon (al-‘Ahed, May 5, 2024).

• Hezbollah issued a video threatening Israel which included a quote from the Book of Exodus 21:24-25: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot, a burn for burn, a wound under wound, a bruise for a bruise.” In the video, an operative of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force, is shown firing at a target marked with a Star of David (electronic Hezbollah Telegram channel, April 17, 2024).

   
Right: The quote from the Book of Exodus. Left: Shooting at the Star of David in a Hezbollah video (electronic Hezbollah Telegram channel, April 17, 2024)

Criticism of Hezbollah’s activities

• Samir Geagea, the chairman of the Lebanese Forces Party, said at his party’s conference, that Hezbollah was carrying out military operations under the guise of supporting the Gaza Strip, but nothing happening in south Lebanon had benefited the Gaza Strip in any way. He said no one had the right to make the Lebanese people go to war. He also stated that he hoped that Iran or Hezbollah would occupy Tel Aviv, but it was not realistic (al-Nashra, April 27, 2024).

American Sanctions of Hezbollah Facilitators

• The United States Treasury Department has announced economic sanctions against entities which facilitate the economic activities of Hassan Moukalled, a Lebanese businessman and Hezbollah business partner in terrorist financing. The announcement focused on two facilitators who carried out deals and founded financial entities for Hassan Moukalled in the UAE, and two businessmen who own shares of the CTEX exchange office, which was sanctioned in 2023 because of its ties to Hezbollah. Sanctions were also imposed on Firas Moukalled, one of Hassan Moukalled sons, due to his involvement in the LCIS company together with a company shared by Hassan Moukalled sons (United States Department of the Treasury, May 2, 2024).

The Lebanese Government

Contacts for an Israeli-Lebanese border agreement

• Recently, international efforts led by the United States and France have continued with the Lebanese government to consolidate a political arrangement in south Lebanon to prevent the escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. To that end, on April 20, 2024, Najib Mikati, the prime minister of the interim government in Lebanon, met with French President Emmanuel Macron, to discuss the plan presented by France a few weeks ago as part of the efforts to reduce regional escalation. According to reports the French proposal has a number of stages, the first of which is the withdrawal of some of Hezbollah’s military capabilities from the border area, along with the cessation of Israeli presence in Lebanon’s airspace (al-Hadath, April 21, 2024).
• A few days later, Stéphane Séjourné, the French foreign minister, visited Lebanon and met with senior government and military officials. In a press conference held by Séjourné after the meetings in Beirut, he said that every party in Lebanon had to take responsibility for the situation, adding that stability on the border would be restored through the return of the Lebanese army to the south. He emphasized that France would continue to support the Lebanese army (al-Nashra, April 28, 2024). “Informed sources” said that Hezbollah refused to discuss the French proposal because it did not contain amendments to the basic document regarding the deployment of Radwan forces in south Lebanon (al-Akhbar, May 1, 2024).
• The French proposal has three phase (al-Akhbar, May 3, 2024):
  • First phase: Hezbollah and the militias in south Lebanon stop attacking and allow the UNIFIL force to move freely and without restriction. Israel will stop its attacks on Lebanese territory and will stop jamming the radar in Lebanon. UNIFIL will increase patrols in south Lebanon.
  • Second phase (within 3 days from the beginning of the first phase): Hezbollah and the militias will dismantle all their facilities near the Blue Line, including observation towers and tents. All military operatives, including the Radwan force as well as its equipment, will be moved north beyond the ten kilometer line from the border with Israel. Israel will cease flying over Lebanon. Lebanon will begin deploying 15,000 Lebanese army soldiers in south Lebanon, with the support of UNIFIL and international agencies. The UNIFIL force will renew its participation in the meetings of the tripartite mechanism (with Israel and Lebanon) and will assist logistically in the deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River.
  • Third phase (within ten days): Renewal of negotiations between Israel and Lebanon to demarcate the land border line based on the 2017 negotiations. Beginning of negotiations on the establishment of a demilitarized zone south of the Litani River, with the exception of the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL forces.
• Meanwhile, it was reported that during April 2024, an official British delegation, which included a senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of the Middle East and a senior officer in British intelligence, had secretly visited Beirut. The members of the delegation met with Najib Mikati, Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese army, and Tony Kahwaji, head of the Lebanese Intelligence Directorate. The delegation presented a proposal which included the construction of observation towers along the Israel-Lebanon border around which Lebanese army posts will be established and the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese army soldiers in the border area (al-Akhbar, May 3, 2024).
• Najib Mikati stated that the government’s priority was the implementation of Resolution 1701, and that they were holding talks to restore stability to the south of the country. He said there are no guarantees that the exchange of fire in south Lebanon would stop if a ceasefire was reached in the Gaza Strip LBCI Lebanon News, May 2, 2024).
• Gebran Bassil, the chairman of the Free Patriotic Movement in Lebanon, called for a ceasefire in south Lebanon regardless of the situation in the Gaza Strip. He said the UN should formulate a new resolution that would be based on the principles of Resolution 1701, recognize Lebanon’s sovereignty within the recognized borders in accordance with the armistice agreement of 1949 and call for a permanent ceasefire along the border between Lebanon and Israel (al-Nashra, April 15, 2024

UNIFIL

• Recently, there have been two incidents between UNIFIL vehicles and Hezbollah operatives in the Dahiyeh al-Janovia area, a Hezbollah stronghold in the south of Beirut:
  • A UNIFIL vehicle was stopped after entering the al-Salam neighborhood. According to the sources, the vehicle had a diplomatic license plate, and it arrived in the area due to a malfunction (Beirut News, April 15, 2024).
  • Hezbollah operatives detained two trucks belonging to the Spanish UNIFIL battalion while they were passing through al-Shuhadaa square at the entrance to the Dahiyeh district. Lebanese army soldiers were sent to rescue the trucks (Gaby’s X account, April 29, 2024).

    
UNIFIL trucks at the entrance to the Dahiyeh (Right: Gaby’s X account, April 29, 2024. Left: NewsForLebanon X account, April 29, 2024)

Internal Lebanese Affairs

Lebanese communications issue

• Ali Hamia, minister of public works and transport in the Lebanese interim government, accused Israel of continuing to threaten the safety of air navigation, not only within Lebanon, but also in the Middle East region, by disrupting and falsifying GPS signals. He stated that they see these actions as a blatant violation of Lebanese sovereignty, adding that the Lebanese government had submitted an official complaint to the Security Council regarding Israel’s actions (al-Nashra, May 2, 2024).

Clashes between Lebanese Christians and Hezbollah operatives

• Hezbollah operatives clashed with Christian civilians in the capital, apparently due to the criticism leveled at Hezbollah, especially by the Christian population in Lebanon. According to a video of the incident, Hezbollah operatives threw stones at cars carrying a cross in the al-Karantina area, in the northeast of Beirut, and chanted slurs against Christians (Tanzim Thuwwar Lubnan X account, April 17, 2024).

     
Confrontation between Hezbollah and Christians (Tanzim Thuwwar Lebanon X account, April 17, 2024)

Solidarity with the Gaza Strip

• Student rallies were reported at many Lebanese universities in solidarity with the Gaza Strip (Radio al-Nur, April 30, 2024).

Syria

• On May 5, 2024, two rocket launches were detected from Syrian territory at the southern Golan Heights, falling in open areas. No casualties were reported. IDF forces responded by firing tank shells at the sources of the attack (IDF spokesperson, May 6, 2024). According to reports, three rockets were fired at the Golan Heights by Hezbollah-affiliated militia operatives from Syrian territory, and in response Israel fired at least four missiles at positions about 25 kilometers (about 15.5 miles) northwest of Daraa (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, May 5, 2024).

Aerial attacks

• A Syrian “military source” reported an aerial attack attributed to Israel attacking aerial defense sites in southern Syria. Material damage was reportedly caused (SANA, April 19, 2024). According to another report, strikes were carried out against a radar station about 25 kilometers northeast of Daraa, after it detected Israeli planes which had penetrated Syrian airspace (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, April 19, 2024).
• A Syrian “military source” reported an airstrike attributed to Israel targeting a military site in the Damascus area. Eight soldiers were allegedly injured and material damage was reported (SANA, May 2, 2024). According to another report, the attack targeted a training center of Syrian General Intelligence, about 10 kilometers (about 6 miles) south of Damascus, which Hezbollah had taken over in 2014 (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, May 3, 2024).

Hezbollah liaison officer killed

•    Local sources reported the killing of Iyad al-Saleh, aka Abu Haider, Hezbollah’s liaison officer and responsible for recruiting the pro-Iranian militias in al-Hasakeh in northeastern Syria. He was killed when a bomb attached to his car was detonated. The vehicle had been parked inside the Syrian army’s “security square” in the city. According to one of the sources, al-Saleh was appointed to his position in May 2023, and since then he had been looking after the interests of the Quds Force in al-Hasakeh district (Thawra account X, May 5, 2024). The official Alawite military establishment did not announce the incident and so far no one has taken responsibility for the incident.

Establishing a force to combat Iranian and Hezbollah presence Syria

• Abu Zuheir al-Shami, head of the Free Syrian Army’s counterterrorism force, reported the establishment of a task force in Damascus and its countryside for military operations against concentrations of forces, positions and patrols of Iranian, Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces in the Damascus area and its countryside (Abu Zuheir al-Shami’s X account, April 29, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] According to reports, the UAV which hit the building in Arab al-Aramsheh was an Iranian aircraft of the Mersad-1 type, also called Ababil-T. It can carry explosives weighing about 45 kg (99 lbs) (Rasid al-'Adu's Telegram channel, April 17, 2024).
^[3] A Salafi-jihadi organization operating in Lebanon. It is a subsidiary of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon, just as Hamas is a subsidiary of the Muslim Brotherhood in "Palestine."
^[4] The list includes four senior terrorist operatives killed in IDF targeted attacks.

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