Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (May 6-12, 2024)

Overview^[1]

• This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 46 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel. In two of the attacks, three IDF soldiers were killed. Following the beginning of the IDF operation in Rafah, Hezbollah escalated its attacks, including the use of heavy Burkan rockets (whose warheads weigh up to 500 kgs, or 1,100 pounds), and the first use of a suicide attack drone was detected. In response, Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked the organization’s military infrastructure in south Lebanon and Hezbollah field commanders were eliminated in targeted attacks.
• Sources reported that Hezbollah was still preparing to carry out cross-border raids in the Galilee region, adding that Radwan Force operatives were waiting for orders, which would arrive when Hezbollah felt the time was right.
• Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, said that Hezbollah would present its vision for south Lebanon after a complete ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
• According to reports, the Lebanese government forwarded France its response regarding proposals for a lull in the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel in south Lebanon. The United States, France and Britain expect the Lebanese army to take a more significant role in the defense of the region and to erect observation towers in the border area.
• The damage to the south Lebanese infrastructure since the beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023 is estimated at more than $1 billion.

South Lebanon

Hezbollah attacks

• This past week (as of 1:00 p.m., May 6-12, 2024) Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 46 attacks, mainly against military targets in northern Israel using anti-tank missiles, mortar shells, UAVs, a suicide attack drone (apparently Hezbollah’s first use) and various types of rockets, including heavy rockets. Three IDF soldiers were killed in the attacks. Following the start of the IDF operation in Rafah, Hezbollah escalated its use of weapons, introducing Burkan rockets with a 500 kg (1,100 lb) warhead after previously using Burkan rockets with of 300 kg (660 lb) warheads.
• The daily distribution of Hezbollah attacks, according to Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 6-12, 2024:
  • May 11, 2024: Hezbollah carried out nine attacks, claiming responsibility for launching UAVs at the IDF’s Beit Hillel base and at the Iron Dome aerial defense system. Another UAV was launched at the assumed location of IDF officers and soldiers at the base. According to claims, an F-16 attempted to intercept it but was unsuccessful.

     
Right: Hezbollah’s UAV launched to attack the IDF’s Beit Hillel base. Left: An Israeli F-16 fighter jet in pursuit of the UAV (Ali Shoeib’s X account, May 12, 2024)

• • May 10, 2024: Hezbollah carried out seven attacks, claiming responsibility for launching a barrage of rockets at Kiryat Shmona in response to an [alleged] Israeli attack on Lebanese civilians, as well as responsibility for launching dozens of rockets in two separate barrages at an IDF base.
  • May 9, 2024: Hezbollah carried out seven attacks, claiming responsibility for launching a UAV at IDF headquarters and hitting an operations room in Kfar Giladi and its surroundings, and for launching a heavy Burkan rocket at the IDF force deployed in the area of the Dvoranit post.
  • May 8, 2024: Hezbollah carried out 12 attacks, claiming responsibility for launching a suicide attack drone at technical equipment in the Rakefet post. In addition, UAVs were launched at the headquarters of the Western Brigade in Ya’ara and a heavy Burkan rocket was launched at the headquarters of IDF’s 91^st Division. Hezbollah also attacked IDF forces in civilian structures in Shlomi and Avivim. An IDF soldier was killed by a mortar shell in the Malkia area (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, May 9, 2024).
  • May 7, 2024: Hezbollah carried out nine attacks, claiming responsibility for launching UAVs at officers and soldiers in the IDF Yiftah camp. At the same time, UAVs were launched at Iron Dome aerial defense system launchers south of the Ramot Naftali camp. IDF forces in civilian structures in Metula, Menara and Shtula were also attacked.
  • May 6, 2024: Hezbollah carried out nine attacks, claiming responsibility for launching a UAV at IDF positions south of Metula. Two IDF reservists were killed (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, May 7, 2024).

    
Right: Hezbollah rocket launcher firing at Kiryat Shmona. Left: Fires caused by rocket fire near Kiryat Shmona (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 11, 2024)

IDF response

• In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, Israeli Air Force fighter jets and UAVs attacked Hezbollah terrorist operatives and targets, including stationary and mobile launch positions, terrorist facilities, military buildings, a Radwan Force military camp and weapons warehouses (IDF spokesperson, May 6-11, 2024).
•  “Sources associated with the Shi’ite axis” claimed that in the May 8, 2024 attack in Kafr Kila in south Lebanon, Israel used a GBU 10 or Spice 2000 bomb for the first time. The bomb penetrates deeply to attack protected targets below ground, such as tunnels and bunkers (Ror.K’s X account, May 8, 2024).

   
Right: Attack in Yaroun. Left: Attack in Maroun al-Ras (IDF spokesperson, May 7, 2024)

   
Right: Attack in Ramyeh. Left: Attack in Kafr Kila (Rafie’s X account, May 8, 2024)

• According to reports, on May 9, 2024, four people were killed in an Israeli aircraft attack on a vehicle on the Bafliyah-Tyre road (al-Nashra, May 9, 2024). Lebanese sources reported that two of the dead were Ali Hamza and Ahmed Hassan Matouq, Hezbollah field commanders (Sky News, May 9, 2024). According to a different report, the passengers in the vehicle were operatives of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force (al-Hadath, May 9, 2024). Hezbollah confirmed that Hamza and Matouq were killed (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 9, 2024).

• According to reports, on May 10, 2024, an IDF UAV attacked a work crew of the Touch Communications company while it was carrying out maintenance work in the vicinity of Tir Harfa, and two people were killed and several were injured. One of the casualties worked for the PowerTech company, which carries out maintenance work for Touch Communications (Lebanon24, May 10, 2024). According to a different report, before the attack, the team arrived in the area during the afternoon accompanied by Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces (al-Akhbar, May 10, 2024). The Salafi-Jihadist al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya organization reported that one of the dead was Yusuf Fadi Jaloul, a civilian from Sidon (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon Telegram channel, May 11, 2024).

     
Right: Yusuf Fadi Jaloul, a communications company employee who was killed in Tir Harfa (Nabila Fadel’s X account, May 10, 2024). Left: The al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya mourning notice for Jaloul (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon Telegram channel, May 11, 2024)

Hezbollah casualties

• Hezbollah reported the death of seven operatives, six from south Lebanon and one from the Lebanon Valley (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 6-11, 2024).
  • Hassan Muhammad Ismail, aka Hassan Haider, born in 1993, from Kafr Kila.
  • Mustafa Ali Issa, aka Haidar, in 1988 in al-Dallafah in the Lebanon Valley.
  • Ali Ahmed Hamza, aka Abu Ahmed, born in 1958 in Dab’al and lived in al-Majadel.
  • Ahmed Hassan Matouq, aka Abu Jawad, born in 1989 in Seir al-Gharbiyah.
  • Hussein Ahmed Hamdan, aka Hadi, in 1992 in the Barj al-Barajneh area of a-Hallousiyah and lived in al-Hallousiyah.
  • Hassan Ali Karim, aka Tarek, in 1978 in Deir Siryan.
  • Ahmed Ali Mahdi, aka Zein, born in 1991 in Adshit.

Amal casualties

• The Scouts of the Islamic Message Association, which belongs to the Shi’ite Amal movement, reported the death of Ghaleb Hussein al-Hajj, born on May 15, 1971 in Sheiheen in south Lebanon , who served as a civil defense paramedic (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 10, 2024). According to reports, Ghaleb al-Hajj was killed in the IDF UAV attack in Tir Harfa in which a member of a Lebanese communications company was also killed (Meshbas99’s X account, May 10, 2024).

• • The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing, reported the death in south Lebanon of three of its operatives who belonged to its Syrian branch (Jerusalem Brigades combat information Telegram channel, May 8, 2024).
  • Mahmoud Muhammad Balauni, aka Abu Adi, 29 years old.
  • Ahmed Muhammad Halawa, aka Abu Muhammad, 28 years old.
• Muhammad Hussein Joud, aka Abu Ward, 27 years old.

   

Hezbollah Deployment

• During an event in Beirut, Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy commander-in-chief, said the organization would present its vision for south Lebanon after a full ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, and not before (Na’im Qassem’s X account, May 10, 2024). In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah wants to return to the situation along the border before October 7, 2023, when it operated in south Lebanon without hindrance.
• “Sources” stated that Hezbollah was still making preparations to carry out cross-border raids in the Upper Galilee or Galilee Panhandle, in accordance with its interests and as soon as the timing was appropriate. The “sources” claimed Hezbollah’s logistical infrastructure was “almost undamaged” and the Radwan Force operatives were also prepared to follow orders despite the loss of commanders in recent months (al-Nashra, May 9, 2024).
• According to a re port whose reliability is uncertain, because of the IDF airstrikes in south Lebanon on May 8 and 9, 2024, many Hezbollah operatives and commanders fled the area and there was panic in the ranks, but the information was hidden (Dr. Ahmad Yassine’s X account, May 9, 2024).
• According to reports, Hezbollah took advantage of the ongoing political and financial crisis in Lebanon to accumulate large amounts of gold, increasing its asset reserves in preparation for a possible war with Israel. It was reported that many Lebanese took private loans from Hezbollah’s shadow bank, the al-Qard al-Hassan Association,^[2] and gave the organization their gold as collateral for the loans. In addition, Hezbollah increased its financial reserves by smuggling gold though international networks in the Lebanese communities around the world (The Jamestown Foundation, May 6, 2024).

Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group)

• Bassam Hamoud, deputy head of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s political bureau, stated that the organization was “exercising its right to defend the sovereignty of its homeland and the honor of its people,” like all Lebanese, against the ongoing Israeli “aggression” against south Lebanon. He added that the organization stood with all the “resistance” [terrorist] organizations against Israel and that its only message to the “Zionist enemy” was that the era of violation of Lebanese sovereignty was over and that any “aggression” would be responded to accordingly (al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 8, 2024).

The Lebanese Government

Contacts for an Israel-Lebanon border agreement

• A source at the French embassy in Beirut said that the Lebanese government had conveyed its response regarding France’s proposals for a lull in the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. Lebanon had a number of comments regarding the proposals and said they would be examined (al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 7, 2024).
• Ali Hassan Khalil, a member of the Lebanese Parliament and assistant to Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, noted that some of the French representatives were putting pressure on Lebanon to end the correlation between the fighting in Lebanon and the war in the Gaza Strip, but the position of the Lebanese government was clear: it is committed Resolution 1701 and their position as the “resistance” is that as soon as the fighting in the Gaza Strip stops, the Lebanese front will stop fighting (al-Mayadeen, May 9, 2024).
• According to reports, the United States, France and the UK expect the Lebanese army to take on a more significant role in the region, deploy troops and establish observation towers along the border. It was also reported that the United States was not taking action to renew its support for the Lebanese army and in the security forces in Lebanon and that it sought to have other countries replace it when it came to funding, such as Qatar (al-Akhbar, May 8, 2024).

Internal Lebanese Affairs

The extent of the war’s economic damage to south Lebanon

• Hashem Haidar, head of Lebanon’s Southern Council, an official body tasked with assessing the extent of damage in south Lebanon following the fighting, noted that since October 8, 2024, the damage to Lebanese buildings and property had reached more than $1 billion. He added that various facilities, including the water supply, electricity, roads and health services had been damaged to an additional $500 million, for a total of $1.5 billion in damages to the infrastructure. According to the council’s assessment, about 1,700 houses were completely destroyed and about 14,000 more were damaged. The International Organization for Migration announced that the fighting had displaced 93,000 civilians from their homes in south Lebanon, and so far at least 390 people had been killed, including over 70 Lebanese civilians (Al-Monitor, May 8, 202

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] For further information, see the June 3, 2019 ITIC report, "Hezbollah’s socioeconomic foundations: Al-Qard al-Hasan, a quasi-bank that provides interest-free loans, mainly to members of the Shiite community."

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