Anti-Israel Terrorism from the Palestinian Authority, 2023

Overview^[1]

In 2023 there was a significant increase in the extent of terrorism and violence, with 179 critical terrorist attacks carried out, compared with 86 in 2022.^[2] Twenty-seven were carried out on Israeli territory (16 in 2022); 43 people were killed, 37 civilians and six members of the security forces, compared with 30 killed during 2022. Shootings were prominent, with 108 attacks which accounted for about 60% of the total number (46 in 2022). There were also 35 stabbings, about 19% of the total; 20 vehicle ramming attacks, about 11% of the total; 5 IED attacks and 5 combined attacks. There were also several thousand incidents in which rocks were thrown and several hundred in which Molotov cocktails were thrown, but not all were documented^[3].

• During 2023 the significant increase in terrorist attacks continued as part of what the Palestinian Authority (PA) calls the “popular resistance,” i.e., popular terrorism.^[4] The violence was initiated by lone-wolf terrorists, local networks and “established” terrorist organizations. Senior PA figures, led by Mahmoud Abbas, encouraged the activities and praised the perpetrators, even when Israeli citizens were injured and killed.
• A number of new factors were evident in terrorist activity in 2023:
  • The extent of terrorism: There was been a significant increase in the number of attacks in Judea and Samaria and inside Israel. More than twice as many attacks were carried out compared to 2022, during which there was also an increase in the number of attacks. The general increase also affected the number carried out inside Israel.
  • The deadliness of the attacks: As number of attacks increased so did the number of dead and wounded. In 2023, 43 people, 37 civilians and six members of the security forces, were killed in the terrorist attacks, compared to 30 in 2022 and four in 2021.
  • The types of attacks: The trend which began in 2022 continued in 2023 with an increase in the number of shootings compared to stabbings, which were the most common type of attack in previous years and the main attack carried out by individual terrorists. The increase may be related to the growth of local networks and the reentry of the “established” organizations into the circle of violence and terrorism in Judea and Samaria. For the first time, attempts were made to fire rockets from the Jenin region at Israeli villages close to the border. For the time being the improvised rockets have not caused damage, but should be taken into account. There was also an attempt to launch a drone.
  • The terrorists who carry out the attacks: Unlike previous years, most of the attacks were carried out by “independent” operatives (“lone wolves”) and operatives in local networks such as the Jenin Battalion, the Nablus Battalion and the Tulkarm Battalion,^[5] and there were attacks carried out by operatives of the “established” terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). That was especially prominent after the Gaza Strip War broke out. In 2023 Hamas and the PIJ continued to position themselves within the Palestinian public as defending Jerusalem, the holy places of Islam and the Palestinians in east Jerusalem.
  • Attacks during the war in the south: During the first three months of the Gaza Strip War (October to December 2023) there was no significant increase in the number of attacks in Judea and Samaria compared with the monthly average of the months preceding the war. In all probability the intense Israeli security force counterterrorism activities which began with the outbreak of the war made a considerable contribution.
  • The PA: PA support for the terrorists, including those who carried out including deadly attacks, continued throughout 2023. The PA provided political and media-propaganda assistance, senior governmental figures paid condolence calls to the families, generous salaries were given to terrorists in Israeli prisons, financial aid was provided to the families of shaheeds and prisoners, the demolished houses of terrorist were rebuilt with PA financing, the terrorist and their attacks were glorified, including in the formal and informal Palestinian education system, and plaques and certificates of “appreciation” were awarded.
  • Incitement on the social networks: Incitement continued in 2023 and apparently had a great effect, especially on the younger generation. Youth in the PA were consistently exposed to encouragement for violence, legitimization of attacks and praise for their perpetrators. The main vehicles were Tik Tok, WhatsApp and Telegram, the means of communication favored by the younger generation and which for many are virtually the only sources of information.
  • The Palestinian public: Attempts (mainly by Hamas and the PIJ) to recruit the Palestinian public to fight against Israel continued, despite the increase in local friction resulting mainly from the activity of the Israeli security forces. The response of the Palestinian public to calls from the leadership or the various organizations to participate in protest events was relatively poor. Even during the war in the Gaza Strip, public response was relatively low and many of the various protest events were attended by only a few dozen people.
  • Friction with Jewish settlers: There has been a significant increase in violent incidents by Jewish settlers against Palestinians.

Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem

Overview

• During 2023 there was a significant increase in the number of attacks. A total of 179 significant terrorist attacks were carried out during the year, compared with 86 in 2022. In 2023, as in 2022, shootings were included what the PA the “non-violent [sic] popular resistance” [i.e., popular terrorism]. Unlike the past, when most of the attacks were carried out by lone wolf terrorists without organizational affiliation, in 2023 many attacks were carried out by networks and “established” organizations. The deadliness of terrorism also increased significantly this year, 43 people, 37 civilians and six members of the security forces were killed, compared with 30 in 2022.
• As in 2022, shootings were the most common type of attack in 2023 as well. A total of 108 shootings were carried out during the year, or about 60% of all the attacks carried out, compared to 46 in 2022. Stabbings also continued, with 35 stabbing attacks carried out, about 19% of all the attacks. There were 20 vehicle ramming attacks, about 11% of all the attacks and five combined attacks. There were also several thousand incidents of rock throwing and several hundred of Molotov cocktails thrown.
• The PA supports “popular resistance” [popular terrorism] attacks and systematically avoids condemning them, even when Israeli citizens are injured and killed. It praises and supports the perpetrators and their families, and provides them with financial compensation. The senior PA figures encourage popular terrorism attacks, which they call “non-violent popular resistance,” which is how they are represented to the West, despite their elements of severe and often deadly violence. The violence of the “popular resistance” is initiated by individuals, local networks and “established” organizations. The official Palestinian media either ignore the attacks or report only the bare facts, often partially. Sometimes, especially when a terrorist is killed, the media promote a false narrative in which his death was caused by other circumstances, such as calling a vehicle ramming attack a “traffic accident,” or claiming the terrorist had a history of mental instability, while accusing Israel of executing “innocent civilians” and calling for international investigations. For the most part, the denial continues even after the circumstances and motives of the attack have become clear or when the perpetrator has been shown to be an operative in one of the organizations’ military-terrorist wings.
• Meanwhile, the “culture of shaheeds and terrorism” continues to be fostered, mainly through the provision of political, economic and media-propaganda support for popular terrorism. That includes paying generous salaries to terrorists in Israeli prisons and providing financial aid to the families of shaheeds and prisoners, financing and rebuilding the homes of terrorists that were destroyed, glorifying terrorists in the formal and informal Palestinian education system, the participation of senior PA and Fatah figures in terrorists’ funerals, meetings of PA leaders with families of terrorists, organizing visits to the homes of the families, awarding them certificates of “appreciation” and extensive coverage of the terrorists imprisoned in Israel by the established Palestinian media, while treating them as heroes and role models.

Annual distribution of critical popular terrorism terrorist attacks

Monthly distribution of critical terrorist attacks, 2023

Operation Iron Swords – The Gaza Strip War

• Since the beginning of the Gaza Strip War on October 7, 2023, Hamas, as part of the concept of “unity of the arenas” has attempted to ignite Judea and Samaria to open another front to engage the Israeli security forces. Senior members of Hamas, the PIJ and other terrorist organizations repeatedly call on the residents of Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem, as well as Israeli Arabs, to join the campaign, attack Israeli civilians and the Jewish settlers in Judea and Samaria, confront Israeli security forces and carry out terrorist attacks, including inside Israel. They have also appealed to the operatives of the PA security to turn their weapons on Israeli civilians. Hamas also officially declared “days of rage,” mainly on Fridays, when the public is asked to demonstrate and confront Israeli security forces.

   
Palestinian cartoons calling on the terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria to attack the Jewish settlements (Palestinian cartoonists’ Telegram channel, November 16, 2023)

• Not wanting another front to open and to foil Hamas’ plans, as soon as the war started, the Israeli security forces intensified their counterterrorism activities in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem. Their operations mainly targeted Hamas’ infrastructure and leadership Judea and Samaria and thousands of Palestinians suspected of involvement in terrorist activities were detained, especially Hamas operatives.
• The PA also understood the danger and the possibility of losing control, and therefore, as soon as the war began, Mahmoud Abbas called on the Palestinian security forces to increase their activity in the Palestinian cities. He also ordered them to prevent the protests, during which demonstrators chanted, “The people want to overthrow [Mahmoud Abbas]” and to use force to curb demonstrations of Hamas supporters.
• In practice, the public response to Hamas’ calls was limited. There was no significant increase in the number of attacks and poor participation in events in support of the war in the Gaza Strip, such as demonstrations and marches. During the three months after the war began, 30 attacks were carried out in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem (about four per week), similar to the number of attacks in the weeks preceding the war (16-19 per month, on average). Most of the attacks were spontaneous and improvised (stabbings and vehicle rammings) and it is not clear to what extent the perpetrators of the attacks were influenced by Hamas’ calls for escalation.

Terrorist attacks during the first three months of the war

Types of attacks^[7]

Overview

Continuing the trend that began in 2022, shootings were the most common form of significant attack (compared to stabbings in the past). In 2023, 108 shooting attacks were carried out, 60% of all the attacks, compared with 46 in 2021. A total of 35 stabbing attacks were carried out, accounting for about 19% of the attacks. There were 20 vehicle ramming attacks, about 11% of all attacks, and five combined attacks.^[8]

Distribution of types of attacks, 2023

Annual distribution of attack percentages

^[1] Due to the Gaza Strip War (Operation Iron Swords) which broke out on October 7, 2023, the summary of 2023 was released considerably late and in an abbreviated format, and does not include terrorism from the Gaza Strip.
^[2] A critical attack is defined by the ITIC as involving shooting, stabbing, a vehicular attack, the use of IEDs, or a combination of the above. Rocks and Molotov cocktails thrown by Palestinians are not included. Shots fired at IDF forces during counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria are included.
^[3] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[4] For further information, see the January 17, 2018 ITIC report, "The PLO’s Central Council and Mahmoud Abbas call for the continuation and strengthening of [so-called] “peaceful popular resistance” [i.e., popular terrorism]."
^[5] For further information, see the July 6, 2022 ITIC report, "The Jenin Battalion: a non-aligned organization of terrorists operating against the Israeli security forces."
^[6] Deputy head of the political bureau of Hamas and responsible for the activities of the Hamas movement in Judea and Samaria who was killed in Beirut on January 2, 2024, in an assassination attributed to Israel.
^[7] For full coverage of the attacks and the terrorists who carried out them out, see the weekly ITIC reports, "Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict."
^[8] The data usually do not include violent activity, which was carried out during an operational activity by the Israeli security forces. In addition to throwing stones and throwing Molotov cocktails, it also included shooting and setting off explosives, but we do not have data regarding its scope.

Related Articles