Escalation of the Confrontation Between Israel and the Houthis Background and Significance

Dr. Raz Zimmt

Overview^[1]

• On July 19, 2024, an explosion occurred in the center of Tel Aviv, killing one civilian and injuring eight others. The IDF spokesperson confirmed that Tel Aviv had been attacked by an Iranian-made UAV launched in Yemen by the Houthis. It was the first successful Houthi UAV attack on Israeli territory since the beginning of the war on October 7, 2023.
• The spokesman for the Houthi forces claimed responsibility for the launch and said they had used new drone named Yafa (Jaffa), adding that Tel Aviv would become a prime target for Houthi attacks.
• In response to the attack on Tel Aviv and previous Houthi attacks, on July 20, 2024, the Israeli Air Force attacked several targets in the area of ​​the Houthi-controlled Red Sea port of al-Hudaydah, in northwest Yemen, including, oil installations, a power plant and operational facilities. According to reports, at least six people were killed and more than 80 injured. On July 21, 2024, the Houthis announced the launch of ballistic missiles at Eilat; the IDF reported intercepting a missile before it entered Israeli territory.
• The leader of the Houthi movement said the UAV attack marked the beginning of the “fifth phase” in the “conflict” with Israel. Senior Houthi officials praised the attack in Tel Aviv and said it was deliberate escalation, part of a new phase in Houthi “activity” against Israel designed to attack strategic targets deep inside Israeli territory. However, they claimed that the Israeli attack on al-Hudaydah was a “crime” committed against “civilian facilities” which would not keep the Houthis from “supporting” the Gaza Strip.
• Palestinian organizations and other organizations affiliated with the Iranian-led “resistance axis”^[2] praised the Houthis for its “spectacular action” and condemned Israel’s attack on al-Hudaydah as a “foolish measure” which could drag the entire region into an “escalation.”
• In ITIC assessment, the Houthis fully intend to react directly against Israel, possibly leading to further escalation in the confrontation. The Houthis apparently act independently and without outside intervention, but Iran, whose influence on the Houthis is limited, seems to have no particular interest in expanding the conflict.

The Houthis and the War in the Gaza Strip

• After the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, the Houthis announced their support for Hamas and warned Israel that if it did not stop attacking the Gaza Strip, they would not hesitate to undertake a “military response.” On October 10, 2023, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi movement, announced that Yemen was prepared to respond in the event the United States intervened directly in the fighting between Israel and Hamas. He said the Houthis were fully coordinated with their allies and prepared to “respond” by sending soldiers to the battlefield and/or by attacking with missiles, UAVs and other weapons (al-Manar, October 10, 2023).
• As part of their “support” for the Gaza Strip, the Houthis launched UAVs and missiles at Israel. They also declared a “ban on entry to Israeli ports” and attacked vessels in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, claiming the vessels were Israeli-owned or that the ships and the companies operating them had violated the “ban.”^[3]
• According to the IDF, since the beginning of the war on October 7, 2023, the Houthis have launched more than 200 UAVs and missiles at Israel. The only hit before the attack on Tel Aviv was a cruise missile in the Eilat area on March 18, 2024, while most of the launches were intercepted by the forces of the United States Army’s Central Command (CENTCOM) and by the Israeli Air Force (Israeli media, July 19, 2024). For the Houthi attacks on Israeli territory of Israel, see Appendix B.

The UAV Attack on Tel Aviv

The attack

• Before dawn on July 19, 2024, an explosion was heard in central Tel Aviv. Scans identified it had been caused a hostile aircraft which hit near the American Consulate (the former American Embassy). The explosion killed an Israeli civilian and injured eight others. The IDF spokesperson stated the explosion had been caused by an Iranian-made Samad 3 UAV launched from Yemen. According to reports, it flew over the Red Sea, crossed the Sinai Peninsula to the Mediterranean Sea and then headed east towards Tel Aviv (IDF spokesperson’s website, July 19, 2024; Israel Police Force X account, July 19, 2024; Israeli media, July 19, 2024).
•  “Sources” reported that the Houthis had launched four UAVs and a ballistic missile at Israel. The missile and three of the UAVs were intercepted by the United States Army’s CENTCOM, while the fourth UAV continued to its destination (al-Arabiya, July 19, 2024).

The Houthi claim of responsibility

• Yahya Sarieh, spokesman for the Houthi military forces, claimed responsibility for launching the drone at Israel “to support the Palestinians” and in response to “the Zionist enemy’s [alleged] massacres of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip:”
  • He said that the UAV unit of the Houthi forces had carried out a “precision military operation” on an important target in the “occupied Jaffa” area which “achieved its objectives successfully.”
  • The attack was carried out by a new UAV called Yafa (Jaffa), which Sarieh claimed was capable of bypassing the “enemy’s” interception systems and could not be detected by radar.
  • The Houthis have marked down the Tel Aviv region, the so-called “occupied Jaffa region,” as the most important target within the range of their weapons and claim the area is “unsafe.”
  • The Houthis have a “bank of targets ” in Israel which includes sensitive military and security targets, and will deliberately attack Israel’s home front deep inside the country.
  • He praised the “heroic mujahideen” in the Gaza Strip who allegedly “protect all the peoples and countries of the Arab and Islamic nation.” He said the attacks would continue “unless the aggression and the siege on the Palestinian people in the Gaza  Strip stop.”

Israel Attacks the Yemeni Port of al-Hudaydah

• In the afternoon of July 20, 2024, Israel attacked targets in ​​al-Hudaydah, an important port city in the territory under Shi’ite Houthi control. According to the IDF spokesperson, the attack was a response to the Houthi terrorist attacks on Israel in recent months, including the UAV attack on Tel Aviv with killed an Israeli civilian. The attack targeted the port city of al-Hudaydah, through which Iran supplies the Houthis with weapons, and which is an important economic asset for the Houthi government. The IDF spokesperson added Israel attacked alone without assistance from other parties (IDF spokesperson’s X account, June 20, 2024).
• Dozens of planes participated in the attack, targeting oil installations, a power plant, operational facilities in the commercial port, and possibly even military targets, such as bases. Sources in Yemen said that at least six people were killed, more than 80 were injured and at least three were missing (a-Masirah, July 20-21, 2024).
• On July 21, 2024, Yahya Sarieh announced that ballistic missiles had been launched at “important targets” in the Eilat area and that “the operation successfully achieved its goals” (Yahia Sarieh’s Telegram channel, July 21, 2024). The IDF confirmed that the Arrow 3 aerial defense system had intercepted a surface-to-surface missile launched from Yemen and it had not entered Israeli territory (IDF X account, July 21, 2024; Israeli media, July 21, 2024).

The Houthi Reaction

Speech by the Houthi leader

• On July 21, 2024, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi movement, delivered a speech addressing the attack on Tel Aviv and the Israeli response in al-Hudaydah (al-Masirah, July 21, 2024):
  • He said the UAV attack marked the beginning of the “fifth phase” in the “conflict” with Israel, and the “Jaffa” UAV attack was a severe moral blow for the “Zionist entity.”
  • Israel in general, and Tel Aviv in particular, is no longer safe. Israel and the countries which defend it failed to prevent the new [so-called] “equation.”
  • The objective of the Israeli attack on al-Hudaydah was to damage Yemen’s economy and the Yemeni people’s quality of life, and to create pictures of fire and destruction to raise the morale of the “angry, scared” Israeli people.
  • The battle against Israel is “sacred,” and the Houthis are not afraid because their capabilities “constantly evolve” to meet the challenges at all levels. He added that they were “happy about a direct confrontation with the Israeli enemy, after the failure of its strategy to confront us through other actors.”

Reactions to the attack on Tel Aviv

• Hazem al-Assad, a member of the Houthi political council, said the attack on Tel Aviv was the first of many “escalation actions.” He said Yemen had entered “a new strategic phase” in its attacks on Israel and that “the ‘resistance fronts’ in Lebanon, Iraq and occupied ‘Palestine’ were ‘integrated.’ ” He added that attacks would continue and increase as long as there was “aggression” against the Gaza Strip” (al-Mayadeen, July 19, 2024).
• Fahmi al-Yusfi, the Houthis’ deputy minister of information, said that the operation was “a qualitative escalation which would lead to an Israeli military defeat.” He said Yemen was escalating its efforts towards attacking “the Israeli depth by hitting the symbols in Tel Aviv, where decisions are made.” He added that the attack was also meant to convey the message to NATO that the government in Sana’a would not sit by quietly in the face of the “massacres in the Gaza Strip” (al-Mayadeen, July 19, 2024).
• Nasr al-Din Amer, chairman of the Houthis’ news agency, said that the Samad 3 UAV which attacked Tel Aviv was an advanced model made in Yemen and had technologies which made distant early warning difficult. He claimed Iran did not have advance knowledge about the attack and that the Houthis informed the Iranians only afterwards (The New York Times , July 19, 2024).
• “Military sources” in Yemen said that the UAV used in the attack was a “fifth phase” weapon. They said the Houthi forces had more “military surprises” and that the attack on Tel Aviv was only “the beginning of a series of attacks crossing more of the enemy’s red lines” (al-Akhbar, July 20, 2024).
• An op-ed piece on the Houthis’ al-Masirah news website claimed the Yemeni armed forces had broken “a historic barrier” by attacking Tel Aviv, in addition “to the list of unprecedented strategic achievements in the battle to ‘support the Palestinian people,’ a new equation and a sudden, ground-shaking development on the path of escalation with a tremendous change in the present and future of the conflict.” According to the article, even if the American embassy [sic] had not been a target, the attack showed that the Houthi forces were capable of hitting sensitive sites in Israel’s strategic depth, and the attack, “which included a sudden update of the bank of targets and the introduction of long-range weapons capable of bypassing Israeli security,” represented the opening of a new front for the “Zionist enemy” (al-Masirah, July 20, 2024).
• Kamal al-Maamri, who writes about security issues, said the UAV had flown a distance of 2,300 kilometers (about 1,430 miles) and bypassed many advanced aerial defense systems. He claimed the Houthis’ intention to continue attacking Tel Aviv reflected an attempt to impose a new “equation: “civilians in Tel Aviv versus civilians in the Gaza Strip.” He added that Israel’s security challenges would increase and greater pressure would be exerted on Israeli defense systems, and there would also be political and economic consequences for Israel, while “the panic among the civilian population in the Tel Aviv area would cause the    displacement of tens of thousands of people” (al-Masirah, 20 in July 2024).

Reactions to the attack on al-Hudaydah

• Houthi spokesman Yahya Sarieh said the forces would respond to Israel’s “outlandish aggression” and would not hesitate to attack significant enemy targets, as they had previously announced. He added that the Houthi forces would continue to stand with “our brothers in the Gaza Strip” and were prepared for a long war, until “the aggression ends and the siege is lifted” (Yahya Sarieh’s X account, July 20, 2024).
• Houthi spokesman Muhammad Abd al-Salam claimed that the objective of Israel’s “cruel aggression” against Yemen, which damaged civilian facilities, oil tanks and a power station in al-Hudaydah, was [allegedly] to “intensify the suffering of the people” and exert pressure on Yemen to stop “helping” the Gaza Strip. He claimed the “aggression” would only make the Yemeni people and their armed forces persevere and continue “assisting” the Gaza Strip, adding that the Yemeni people were capable of meeting all the challenges on the path to victory for “disadvantaged Palestine” and the residents of the Gaza Strip (Muhammad Abd al-Salam’s X account, July 20, 2024).
• On another occasion, al-Salam said that Israel had openly started the war, and threatened that the Houthi response would be “without red lines and without borders.” He added that the Houthis were prepared and capable of bearing all the consequences of a long campaign, adding that Israel should expect a response at any moment and all sensitive Israeli facilities would be targets (al-Jazeera, July 21, 2024).
• Muhammad al-Bakhiti, a member of the Houthis’ political council, claimed that the Houthi “military operations that support Palestine will continue until the crimes of mass destruction in the Gaza Strip are stopped and the siege on our residents is lifted, whatever the sacrifice.” He threatened that Israel would pay the price for attacks on civilian facilities and that escalation would be met with escalation (Muhammad al-Bahiti’s X account, July 20, 2024).
• Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, a member of the Houthis’ political council, said that the campaign with the “temporary entity” continued and called its attack on al-Hudaydah “a crime added to the list of its brutal crimes.” He added that the “crime” would not have occurred without the support of the United States, the United Kingdom and their partners. He said the “crime” would not prevent continued “support” for the Gaza Strip and what the Houthis did next would make it impossible for the “temporary entity” to sleep at night (Muhammad Ali al-Houthi’s X account, July 20, 2024).

Reactions of the Palestinian Organizations and the “Resistance Front”

Reactions to the attack on Tel Aviv

• Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), other Palestinian organizations and organizations belonging to the “resistance front” praised the Houthis for the attack on Tel Aviv:
  • Hamas praised the “spectacular military action” which attacked the center of Tel Aviv, which it called “the heart of the Zionist entity and symbol of its pride.” Hamas added that what “our brothers” were doing in Yemen, and what the “resistance fronts” were doing in Lebanon and Iraq with the continued damage to Israeli interests and the Israeli home front, were “an original right of the resistance of our nation and our people” and an affirmation “of the unity of our nation and of the common destiny uniting us.” Hamas called on the armies, movements and parties of the Islamic nation “to unite and join the battle of honor and decency and strike the enemy, with victory for the blood of the innocent in the Gaza Strip” (Hamas website, July 19, 2024).
  • The Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, praised the Houthis and issued a photograph of a UAV over Tel Aviv and a statement from Abu Obeida, the Brigades’ spokesman, from November 2023, thanking the Yemenis for their support (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, July 19, 2024).

• • The PIJ praised the “spectacular, daring action” of the “heroes of Yemen” against Tel Aviv, claiming it was “a natural response to the continuation of the [alleged] “war of extermination of our people and the war crimes the enemy continues to commit, with the support of the Biden administration and Western governments.” The PIJ added that “our brothers in Yemen, as well as our brothers on the support fronts in Lebanon and Iraq, proved that Palestine and al-Aqsa Mosque were central for the Arab-Islamic nation, and that resistance is the only way to confront Zionist and Western arrogance” (PIJ Telegram channel, July 19 2024).
  • The Resistance Committees in Palestine welcomed the “heroic action” of the Yemeni forces who attacked Jaffa with “blessed” drones that damaged “Zionist arrogance and shook the foundations of their entity.” The Committees added that the “action” confirmed that “there is no stability or security for the Zionists” and that “the war criminals in the Zionist entity and their supporters from the American government are only selling their audience illusions and mirages” (Manakashat Ramallah al-Tahta Telegram channel, July 19, 2024).
  • The Palestinian al-Mujahedeen Movement called the attack “a qualitative development in the resistance axis’ battle against the fascist Zionist enemy,” adding that “what Yemen and the rest of the resistance axis are doing is the most honorable military intervention in support of the oppressed and for stopping Zionist injustice at a time when the international system established for that express purpose is in league with the Zionist regime.” The movement called on all “resistance forces” to increase all forms of pressure, especially military pressure, on Israel and its American supporters (al-Masirah, July 19, 2024).
  • The Hezbollah Brigades congratulated the “leaders of the resistance axis and its jihad fighters on the attack that destroyed the remnants of the enemy’s arrogance and increased its humiliation,” adding the operations of the “resistance axis” had become more effective on the front lines of the conflict with Israel and that the axis’ operatives were prepared if “the enemy expands the battlefield” (Sabarin News Telegram channel, July 19, 2024).
  • Qais al-Khazali, the secretary general of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the Iraqi Shi’ite militia, said the Houthi attack on Tel Aviv and the “resistance” attacks which preceded it were clear evidence that the Palestinians were not alone in the confrontation with “Israeli aggression.” He praised “all sides of the resistance axis,” adding that “the equations of war are constantly changing” (Qais al-Khazali’s X account, July 19, 2024).
• Media outlets identified with the “resistance axis” also published editorials on the attack and its position in the overall strategy:
  • Ibrahim al-Amin, the editor-in-chief of the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, stated that the Houthi attack on Tel Aviv, in addition to Hezbollah attacks against new “settlements” [cities, towns and villages] in northern Israel, were the first signs of the “resistance axis’ ” new plan and their objective was to show that the “resistance” could carry out actions “which the enemy cannot prevent.” According to al-Amin, since the beginning of the war, Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, had made it clear that they were “supporting” the Gaza Strip and its “resistance,” and had developed operational coordination among all the “resistance axis forces” on all fronts, from the center in Iran, through Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon to the Gaza Strip and the rest of “Palestine” (al-Akhbar, July 20, 2024).
  • According to Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV, the Houthi announcement was a “new qualitative change” in the conflict with Israel regarding “general deterrence” to prevent Israel from attacking neighboring countries, and regarding “support” for the Gaza Strip, the “resistance” and the people, to increase the pressure on Israel to stop its “aggression” against the Strip and to lift the [so-called] “siege.” Al-Manar added that the attack conveyed messages to the relevant regional and international parties, and to all those who directly or indirectly supported “aggression.” In addition, the attack testified to the development of the Houthi forces’ capabilities, despite years of “aggression” and siege (al-Manar, July 19, 2024).

Reactions to the attack on al-Hudaydah

• Nasser Kanaani, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, condemned the Israeli attack on al-Hudaydah in Yemen and added that the Yemeni people were “paying the price for their support regarding the killing of innocent civilians in Gaza.” He added that the attacks had led to the death and injury of “masses” of innocent people, and it was “an expression of Israel’s aggressive nature, which could drag the entire region into an ‘escalation’ ” (Iranian foreign ministry Telegram channel, July 20, 2024).
• Hezbollah published support for the Houthis following the Israeli attack, which it called “treacherous Zionist aggression against Yemen, backed by full American protection and support.” Hezbollah said that Israel’s “foolish measure” was “a new and dangerous phase in a very important regional conflict,” adding that Hezbollah “stood strongly” with the Yemeni people and had “full confidence that the Yemeni leadership, with its knowledge, courage and strength, is able to take the necessary, appropriate steps to deter the enemy and its regional and international allies” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 20, 2024).
• Hamas condemned “in the strongest terms” the “brutal Zionist aggression” against Yemen, claiming the attack was a “Zionist orgy and a dangerous escalation” and a “desperate attempt to deter our nation’s forces of ‘free resistance’.” Hamas also expressed solidarity with “our brothers” in Yemen and praised them for their “courageous stance and decision to provide all means of support and assistance to the oppressed Palestinian people” (Hamas Telegram channel, July 20, 2024).

International Reactions

• The United States National Security Council stated that America had not been involved in the Israeli attacks on Yemen, nor had it coordinated or assisted Israel. However, the Council emphasized that the United States recognized Israel’s right to self-defense (The New York Times , July 20, 2024) .
• The Saudi Arabian defense ministry stated that the kingdom had not participated in the Israeli attack on al-Hudaydah and “has nothing to do with the incident.” The ministry added that would not allow any entity to penetrate its airspace (Saudi Arabian defense ministry X account, July 20, 2024). The ministry said it was monitoring the military developments and escalation in the wake of the Israeli attacks “which have increased regional tensions,” and called on all sides to exercise restraint. According to the ministry, Riadh was trying to end the war in the Gaza Strip and was supporting ongoing efforts for peace in Yemen (Saudi Arabian foreign ministry X account, July 21, 2024).
• The Egyptian foreign ministry stated it was monitoring the developments following the Israeli military operation in Yemen “with concern,” and said the attack further heightened tension on all fronts. The ministry called for action to preserve international security and urged all parties to exercise restraint (Egyptian foreign ministry Facebook page, July 20, 2024).
• The Syrian foreign ministry strongly condemned the attack on al-Hudaydah, claiming it was an escalation of the “occupation’s regional aggression.” The ministry expressed its support for the Yemeni people and claimed the attack proved Israel’s “desperation.” He warned against the “dangerous consequences” of the Israeli attacks, whose objective was [allegedly] aimed to drag the Middle East into an all-out war (Syrian News Agency, July 21, 2024).
• Antonio Guterres, the UN secretary general, said he was “very concerned” about the reports of Israeli airstrikes in Yemen and called on all concerned to avoid events which could harm civilians and damage infrastructure. He also warned of the risk of further regional escalation and called for maximum restraint (UN website, July 20, 2024).

Appendix A: The Samad 3 UAV

• On July 26, 2018, the Houthis air force revealed the Samad 3. It is the third model in the series of Samad UAVs named after Saleh Ali al-Samad, who was the head of the Houthis’ political council and acting president of Yemen until was killed in a targeted attack carried out by the Saudi Arabian-led coalition in April 2018 (al-Masirah, July 26, 2018).
• The original Samad model had a range of more than 1,000 kilometers (about 620 miles), but it was later reported to have a range of more than 1,600 km (a little less than 1,000 miles). According to the Houthis, it was used for the first time to attack the airport in Abu Dhabi in the UAE in July 2018, after which it was used to attack targets in Saudi Arabia and in the UAE (al-Alam TV, January 18, 2022).

    
Right: The Samad 3’s technical specifications. Left: A picture of the Samad 3 (al-Masirah Telegram channel, March 11, 2021)

• According to experts, the UAV used by the Houthis was an adapted Samad 3, apparently painted in colors darker than the original model to make it more difficult to identify, and equipped with a larger fuel tank and engine to allow it to make the long distance to Tel Aviv, about 2,000 kilometers (about 1,240 miles). The Samad 3 is capable of carrying an explosive charge weighing 40 kgs (88 pounds), but according to assessments its warhead was reduced to allow it to fly the long distance (The New York Times and Israeli media, July 19, 2024).

Appendix B: Houthi Attacks on Israel

• After the war in the Gaza Strip began on October 7, 2023, in the wake of the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre, the Houthis announced offensive actions against Israel as part of their “support front” for the Palestinians:
  • On October 19, 2023, the Houthis launched five cruise missiles and about 30 UAVs at the Red Sea region and at Israel.
  • On February 2, 2024, the Arrow aerial defense system successfully intercepted a surface-to-surface missile in the Red Sea region, en route to Israeli territory (IDF spokesperson, February 2, 2024). The next day, Houthis spokesman Yahya Sarieh confirmed that they had attacked specific targets in Eilat with several ballistic missiles (Yahia Sarieh’s Telegram channel, February 3, 2024).
  • On February 22, 2024, the Arrow system detected a long-range ballistic missile launched at Israel from Yemen. The system followed the missile’s flight and intercepted it beyond Israel’s borders (IDF spokesperson, February 22, 2024). Sarieh said the Houthis had launched ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles at various targets in the Eilat area in response to the American-British “aggression” (Yahia Sarieh’s Telegram channel, February 22, 2024).
  • On March 18, 2024, the IDF spokesperson reported that a suspicious target has crossed into Israeli territory from Red Sea region and had fallen in an open area north of Eilat (IDF spokesman, March 18, 2024). The next day, the Houthi forces confirmed that they had launched a number of cruise missiles at “Umm Rashrash” (Eilat), which had [allegedly] successfully hit their targets (al-Masirah X account, March 19, 2024). The claim was confirmed later in the day by the IDF spokesperson who reported that a cruise missile from the Red Sea region had fallen in an open area in an area north of Eilat. No casualties or damage were reported, and the incident was under investigation (IDF spokesman, March 19, 2024). It was the first time that a Houthi missile or UAV had penetrated Israeli airspace and exploded in its territory.
  • On the night of April 13, 2024, the Houthi forces participated in the Iranian attack on Israel by launching ballistic missiles and UAVs. Forces of the United States Army’s CENTCOM intercepted most of them and destroyed a ballistic missile ready for launch and seven UAVs in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen (CENTCOM website, April 14, 2024).
  • On May 16, 2024, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi announced that the Houthi forces had carried out two “operations” against Israel in the Mediterranean area as part of the “fourth stage of the conflict” (Houthi combat information X account, 16 May 2024).
  • On June 3, 2024, the IDF announced the interception of a surface-to-surface missile approaching Israeli territory from the direction of the Red Sea (June 3, 2024). Yahya Sarieh announced that the Houthi forces had launched a “Palestine” ballistic missile at a “military target” in the Eilat area for the first time (Yahia Sarieh’s Telegram channel July 3, 2024).
  • On July 14, 2024, the Houthis claimed responsibility for attacking “military targets” in the Eilat area with UAVs, adding that the operation had “achieved its goals” (Yahya Sarieh’s X account, July 14, 2024). The claim of attack was not verified.

     
“Palestine” missile launched at Israel (Yahia Sarieh’s Telegram channel, June 5, 2024)

• Besides independent operations, the Houthis also announced joint attacks on Israeli targets with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq:
  • The first attack was on June 6, 2024. Yahya Sarieh said that a UAV attack had targeted ships in the port of Haifa carrying military equipment as well as a ship “which violated the ban on entering the port of Haifa.” He claimed the attacks were “precise” and carried out in response to Israel’s “massacres” in Rafah and the American-British “aggression” against Yemen. He said Israel should expect “more specific” joint operations until the “brutal and criminal aggression” stopped (Yahia Sarieh’s X account , June 6, 2024).The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also confirmed it had carried out two joint military operations with the Houthis, attacking the port of Haifa with UAVs to support the Palestinian people and in response to Israel’s “massacres” (Islamic Resistance in Iraq Telegram channel, June 6, 2024). The claims of attack were not verified.
  • On June 12, 2024, an announcement was made of two joint operations with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, in which a “vital target” in Ashdod was attacked with cruise missiles and a “vital target” in Haifa with UAVs. The claims of attack were not verified.
  • On June 22, 2024, a UAV attack on four ships carrying general cargo and shipments of concrete in Haifa port was reported. A UAV attack targeted the Shorthorn Express which was sailing to the port of Haifa (Telegram channels of Yahya Sarieh and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, June 22, 2024.) The claims of attack were not verified.
  • On June 26, 2024, a joint UAV attack was carried out on the “Israeli” ship MSC Manzanillo in the port of Haifa. On June 27, 2024, a joint cruise missile attack was carried out on a “vital target” in Haifa. On June 28, 2024, a UAV attack was carried on the Waler oil tanker in the Mediterranean Sea while sailing to the port of Haifa. On July 2, 2024, an attack was carried out on a “vital target” in Haifa using a number of cruise missiles (Telegram channels of Yahya Sarieh and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, June 26-July 2, 2024). The claims of attack were not verified.
  • On July 8, 2024, the Houthis in Yemen and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for a joint attack on a “vital target” in Eilat (Telegram channels of Yahya Sarieh and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, July 8, 2024). The IDF spokesman said that a fighter jet intercepted a suspicious aerial target flying to Israel from the Red Sea region. The target did not cross into the territory of the country (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram channel, July 8, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
^[3] For further information, see the November 2023 ITIC report, "The Houthis and Operation Iron Swords;" the December 2023 report, "Military-Terrorist Activities of the Houthis in Yemen during Operation Iron Swords;" the March 2024 report, " Expansion of Houthi Activities in the Red Sea;" and the biweekly reports, "Spotlight on Iran."

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