Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 30 – October 7 ,2024)

Overview^[1]

• On the night of September 30, 2024, the IDF began a limited ground maneuver in south Lebanon. The forces eliminated hundreds of terrorist operatives, and located and destroyed terrorist facilities hidden in civilian sites. Ten IDF soldiers were killed. The IDF continued airstrikes on Hezbollah terrorist targets in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut and throughout the country, and carried out targeted attacks on senior Hezbollah terrorists.
• This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 148 attacks on targets in Israel and on IDF forces in south Lebanon, twice the number of attacks of the previous week. Hezbollah announced the launch of Operation Khaybar in response to the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah, and launched rocket barrages at the Tel Aviv and Haifa areas. Hezbollah also issued false information regarding the extent of the damage it had done to IDF forces in south Lebanon.
• The IDF attacked Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters in Beirut while Hashem Safi al-Din, head of the Central Council and Nasrallah’s successor, was present. Hezbollah has not yet officially issued a report on his condition.
• Senior Hezbollah figures claimed the Israeli attacks and the elimination of senior officials did not affect the organization’s activities, including combat against IDF forces in south Lebanon and attacks on Israeli territory. Hezbollah continued to link the cessation of fighting in south Lebanon to the cessation of the war in the Gaza Strip.
• Lebanese authorities said that more than 2,000 people had been killed in Lebanon since the fighting began on October 8, 2023. In addition, more than 1.2 million people have been displaced, most of them since the increase in Israeli attacks which began on September 23, 2024.
• The prime minister of the Lebanese interim government called for a ceasefire and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The American State Department denied the Lebanese foreign minister’s claim that Nasrallah had agreed to a 21-day ceasefire before he was killed in the Israeli attack.
• Syria: Attacks attributed to Israel were reported in the ​​Damascus and Homs regions.

The Fighting in Lebanon

• On the night of September 30, 2024, the IDF began a ground maneuver in south Lebanon. The forces eliminated hundreds of terrorist operatives in combat from the air and on the ground, including about 20 Hezbollah field commanders. The forces located and destroyed terrorist facilities, tunnel shafts and large quantities of weapons, including explosive devices and launchers ready for firing which were hidden in civilian sites in villages in south Lebanon. Ten IDF soldiers were killed from the start of the maneuver (IDF spokesperson, September 30 to October 1, 2024).
• On October 1, 2024, the IDF spokesperson reported that since the start of hostilities on October 8, 2023, IDF forces had carried out targeted operations in south Lebanon, exposing Hezbollah’s underground facilities and the weapons which Hezbollah planned to use to invade and occupy the Galilee (IDF spokesperson, October 1, 2024).

   
Pictures of the Radwan Force’s underground facilities in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, October 5, 2024)

• This past week the Israeli Air Force continued attacking Hezbollah headquarters, weapons storehouses and terrorist facilities throughout Lebanon, including facilities hidden under residential buildings in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in south Beirut. The IDF also attacked roads and terrorist facilities on the Syria-Lebanon border used to smuggle ammunition for Hezbollah, including a 3.5 km tunnel that crossed the border into Syria and the smuggling infrastructure at the Mitzna Border Crossing (IDF spokesperson, October 1 to 7, 2024).
• The IDF continued targeted attacks on senior terrorist operatives of Hezbollah and other organizations (IDF spokesperson, October 1-7, 2024). Hezbollah stopped issuing official announcements about the deaths of senior figures and operatives with the start of the IDF’s ground maneuver:
  • Muhammad Jafar Qusayr, commander of Unit 4400, which transfers weapons from Iran and its affiliates to Hezbollah in Lebanon, was killed in an Israeli Air Force strike in Beirut on October 1, 2024.
  • Zulfiqar Hanawi, commander of the Imam Hussein Division, was killed in an Israeli Air Force attack on Beirut on October 1, 2024.
  • Muhammad Yusuf Anisi, a senior member of Hezbollah’s munitions production department, was eliminated in an Israeli Air Force attack on Beirut.
  • Muhammad Rashid Sakafi, head of Hezbollah’s communication system, was eliminated in an air force attack on Beirut on October 3, 2024.

Hezbollah Attacks

• This past last week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 148 attacks on military, security and civilian targets in northern Israel, as well as on IDF forces in south Lebanon compared with 77 attacks the previous week. Hezbollah attacked with anti-tank missiles, artillery, UAVs, exploding drones, various types of rockets and explosive devices (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, September 30 to October 7, 2024):
  • Hezbollah’s response to the ground maneuver: Since the beginning of the IDF’s ground operations in south Lebanon, Hezbollah has increased its attacks on IDF assembly areas on the northern border. It has also increased rocket fire on targets deep in Israel in response to “the ferocity of Israel’s barbaric hubris towards Lebanese cities, villages and civilians,” in addition to the claim of “supporting the Palestinian people and protecting Lebanon and the Lebanese people.”
  • Hezbollah’s reactions to the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah: On October 1, 2024, Hezbollah announced the beginning of the Khaybar^[2] Operations and the response to the call “For you, oh Nasrallah!” The response began with the first launch of heavy barrages Fadi-4 rockets^[3] at the Tel Aviv area, first at “Mossad headquarters” and at a military airbase. On October 3, 2024, Fadi-2 rockets were launched at Haifa. On October 6, 2024, Fadi-1 rockets were launched at southern Haifa.
  • Fabrications regarding damage to IDF forces in south Lebanon: Hezbollah began issuing reports, many of them allegedly based on a “field officer in the operations room of the Islamic resistance,” which included lies about the “success” Hezbollah operatives had in fighting against the IDF forces in south Lebanon and false claims that Israel censorship hid the truth. For example, on October 2, 2024, Hezbollah falsely claimed that three tanks were destroyed by anti-tank missile fire. On October 3, 2024, Hezbollah falsely claimed that explosive devices were used to attack elite IDF units on the outskirts of Maroun al-Ras and Yaron and that more than 20 officers and soldiers were killed and wounded. On October 5, 2024, Hezbollah falsely claimed its operatives had ambushed Israeli elite forces and caused deaths and injuries, forcing the soldiers to retreat. Hezbollah’s claims were not verified by the IDF.
  • Using a previously unused weapons: Hezbollah escalation included bringing new weapons into play. On September 30, 2024, Hezbollah announced the first use of a Nur missile to attack Kfar Giladi.^[4] On October 1, 2024, Hezbollah used Fadi-4 heavy rockets for the first time to attack “Mossad headquarters.” Hezbollah’s video of a drone attack October 2, 2024 indicated the use of a new model but Hezbollah did not provide details.

Uncertainty regarding the fate of Hashem Safi al-Din

• On the night of October 3, 2024, the Israeli Air Force attacked Hezbollah’s main intelligence headquarters in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia (IDF spokesperson, October 4, 2024). According to reports, Hashem Safi al-Din, head of Hezbollah’s Central Council and considered Nasrallah’s successor, was believed to be at the scene of the attack (Sky News in Arabic and Israeli media, October 4, 2024).

• A “Lebanese security source” stated that Hezbollah lost contact with Hashem Safi al-Din on October 4, 2024, when he was in an underground headquarters in the al-Marija area of ​​Beirut during an Israeli attack. “The source” added that Israeli drones attacked the rescue teams trying to reach the scene of the attack (al-Jazeera, October 5, 2024).
• A “senior Hezbollah source” confirmed there had been no contact with Hashem Safi al-Din since the attack, but claimed it was not known if he had been there or who was with him (Agence France-Presse, October 5, 2024).
• A “Lebanese security official” stated that the intensity of Israel’s aerial activity in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia made it difficult to reach Hashem Safi al-Din. He said that the chance of anyone surviving the attack was almost non-existent (Sky News in Arabic, October 5, 2024).
• Hezbollah did not provide information on Hashem Safi al-Din but issued an official statement following “reports attributed to sources in the organization regarding the fate of our senior officials as a result of the brutal Israeli attacks the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut.” The announcement stated that Hezbollah’s official position was that “fake news was issued about the roles of senior officials in the organization. It is psychological warfare against the resistance” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 5, 2024).
• Hassan Izz al-Din, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, stated that noting said about Hashem Safi al-Din’s fate was official. He added that “the resistance will not be affected by the assassination of its leader or its people” (al-Arabiya, October 6, 2024).

Hezbollah terrorist operatives send Nasrallah a letter

• On October 1, 2024, Hezbollah published a message from the organization’s operatives to “His highness, the holy and exalted shaheed,” Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli attack on September 27, 2024. They thanked him for giving them the “blessing of the jihad” and leading them “from victory to victory.” They called, “For you, oh Nasrallah” and declared that “from the borders of Palestine, on whose path you marched as a shaheed, and from the sites of Islamic resistance throughout the homeland, we will continue our journey and continue to fulfill our promise until our hopes and your goals have been attained, no matter how great the sacrifices.” They addressed the “arrogant enemy” [Israel] and threatened “you will meet us as skilled snipers, from places where you expect us and from places where you do not.” The soldiers signed the letter with the words: “Your faithful sons” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 1, 2024).

Hezbollah announcement for October 7

• On October 7, 2024, Hezbollah issued an announcement to mark the anniversary of the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre in Israel and the beginning of Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Hezbollah claimed that the Palestinian people had a “full right to resist the occupation by all means” and that “the unjust and aggressive entity has proven that it is fragile and unable to survive without American support.” Hezbollah added that “there is no place for the temporary Zionist entity in our region” and called Israel “an aggressive and deadly cancerous gland that must be removed.” Hezbollah also accused the United States and its allies of being “partners in aggression” and praised the “stance of the Palestinian people and their brave resistance,” praised Iran and the other members of the “resistance axis”^[5] for their attacks on Israel, and justified its decision to join to combat on October 8, 2023. Hezbollah expressed confidence in “the ability of our resistance to repel the aggression” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 7, 2024).

Coordination between Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations

• According to reports, many Palestinians in the refugee camps in Lebanon are mobilizing to fight in the south of the country. “Sources” in a joint committee of Hezbollah and the “Palestinian resistance” stated that thousands of applications had been submitted by young Palestinians in Lebanon who wanted to participate in the fighting, and that hundreds more asked to help with logistics. According to the report, there is close coordination between the Palestinian organizations and Hezbollah, which doubled the equipment and the ammunition it allocates to the operatives of Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AAMB) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s Jerusalem Brigades (Ra’i al-Yawm, October 4, 2024).

Casualties from other terrorist organizations

• Muhammad Hussein Ali al-Mahmoud, a senior Hamas terrorist operative in Lebanon, was killed in an Israeli Air Force strike on October 5, 2024. According to reports, he promoted attacks on Israeli targets in Israel and abroad and advanced the establishment of Hamas in Lebanon, including firing rockets at Israel (IDF spokesperson, October 5, 2024). The Hamas’ military wing confirmed the death of Muhammad Hussein al-Luwis in an attack on al-Fayda-Sa’adnayel in the western Lebanon Valley (Hamas Telegram channel, October 5, 2024).
• On October 5, 2024, Sayid Alaa Naif Ali, the operative in Hamas’ military wing, was killed in an Israeli Air Force strike on Tripoli in northern Lebanon. According to reports, he led terrorist attacks on Israeli targets and recruited operatives for Hamas (IDF spokesperson, October 5, 2024). Hamas’ military wing reported the death of “commander” Sayid Atta Allah Ali in a “Zionist” attack on his home in the al-Badawi camp in the Tripoli district in the north Lebanon (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, October 5, 2024).

• Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Lebanon, announced the death of Ali al-Hajj in an attack on his house in al-Rafid in the western Lebanon Valley (al-Manar TV X account, October 5, 2024). He was reportedly the director of the movement’s al-Abrar School (Imad Hadi’s X account, October 5, 2024).
• The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades announced the death of Hassan Munir Maqdah, an AAMB terrorist operative in Lebanon, in an Israeli attack in south Lebanon. The Brigades said they would “remain steadfast on the path of resistance until liberation” (AAMB Telegram channel, October 1, 2024).

Statements from Hezbollah

• Senior Hezbollah figures claimed that the Israeli attacks and killing of senior figures did not affect the organization’s activities, including fighting against IDF forces in south Lebanon and attacks on Israeli territory. Hezbollah continued to link the cessation of fighting in south Lebanon to the cessation of the war in the Gaza Strip:
  • Mahmoud Qamati, a member of Hezbollah’s Political Council, claimed that Hezbollah’s structure was strong despite the loss of its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah. He noted that appointing his successor “is subject to a mechanism,” adding that “it will take time, but not a long time” (al- Arabiya TV, October 3, 2024).

• • On another occasion, Qamati stated that “the resistance fighters are sacrificing their souls to defend the land of Lebanon and repel the Zionist enemy.” He claimed Israel damaged civilian centers and structures and wanted a regional war. He falsely claimed that Hezbollah attacked “only military targets” and warned that “the resistance in the region numbers millions, and there is a readiness to participate in the war.” He also emphasized that negotiations for a political settlement could only begin after “the Zionist aggression has stopped” (Iraqi State News Network, October 6, 2024).
  • Muhammad Afif, responsible for Hezbollah information, gave correspondents a tour of the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, while denying that the organization had hidden weapons in the buildings attacked by Israel. He claimed the condition of the “resistance” was “good,” as were its command and control system and military capabilities. He added that the “resistance” was acting in a calculated manner and was at the highest level of preparedness (al-Mayadeen, October 3, 2024).
  • Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, a senior Hezbollah figure, claimed that the Israeli army was trying to advance into Lebanese territory, but “the strength of the resistance is forcing it to retreat.” He also emphasized that the Lebanese effort was insufficient to pressure Israel to “stop its crimes” and called for international involvement (al-Jazeera, October 5, 2024).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said that Nasrallah’s “assassination” had a negative effect on the “enemy” by motivating “resistance fighters.” He claimed the decision of the “resistance” was to stand firm and prevent “the enemy” from attaining its goals in south Lebanon. He admitted that there were many victims in Lebanon, but said that “Israel is occupying our lands and we will not stand idly by.” He added that the Lebanese government was in charge of the negotiations and did not need anyone’s approval (al-Jazeera, October 3, 2024).
  • Hassan Izz al-Din, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said that the most important condition for a ceasefire in Lebanon was that it be coordinated with the “front” in the Gaza Strip, and said there was full coordination with all the elements of the “resistance axis” in all arenas (al-Arabiya, October 6, 2024) .

Lebanese Political Commentary

• The Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar continued the organization’s false narrative about damage to IDF forces at the start of the ground maneuver, claiming that 60 officers and soldiers had been killed or wounded in the first 24 hours. The paper claimed that the “resistance” groups on the front line gad not evacuated their posts despite the Israeli attacks over the past year, and that Hezbollah’s assessments of the movement of Israeli forces were “precise” (al-Akhbar, October 3, 2024).
• “Military sources ” claimed that the clashes between the IDF forces and Hezbollah operatives in south Lebanon showed that the organization maneuvered easily and quickly through tunnels, and that Hezbollah’s command and control system was not seriously damaged. The “sources” also stated that Hezbollah’s attack units were based on hiding, emerging to attack and returning to hiding, and therefore the organization did not yet need to introduce large units into combat (Lebanon24, October 3, 2024).
• “Informed sources” claimed that Hezbollah would allow IDF forces to enter south Lebanon in some areas, but would prevent them from gaining a firm footing on the territory and their heavy losses would force them to retreat. According to the “sources,” the ground operation would be the basis for future negotiations since they would be based on “political power and military force in the field,” and therefore the results will have consequences for the contacts (al-Nashra, October 3, 2024).
• Nadim Koteich, an anti-Hezbollah Lebanese political commentator, claimed that the elimination of Nasrallah and the almost complete dismantling of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure constituted a “complete loss” for Iran. He said that just as the fall of Saddam Hussein opened the door to Iran’s entrance into the region, the fall of Nasrallah could open the door to its exit. He said restoring Hezbollah and ensuring its continuity would be Iran’s top priority, and that Iran believed that eliminating Nasrallah directly challenged its regional position, and it was still considering how to respond (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 3, 2024).

The Situation in Lebanon

Casualties

• The Lebanese ministry of health reported that 2,083 people had been killed since the beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023 and 9,869 people had been injured (Lebanese ministry of information, October 7, 2024).

Displaced persons

• On October 2, 2024, Nasser Yassin, minister of environment in Lebanon’s interim government and head of the National Coordination Committee for Emergency Situations, said there were more than 1.2 million displaced Lebanese. He said that between September 23 and 30, 2024, more than 234,000 Syrians and more than 76,000 Lebanese had crossed the border into Syria (Lebanese News Agency, October 2, 2024).
• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, meeting with representatives from UN organizations and donor countries, said that approximately one million residents were displaced due to the war. He said it was one of the most difficult moments in Lebanon’s history and called on the international community to continue to stand by Lebanon. According to reports, he asked for $426 million to deal with the displaced persons (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account and al-Hadath, October 1, 2024).
• Mikati met with Filippo Grandi, the UN commissioner for refugees, who came to visit Lebanon. Mikati welcomed the commission’s efforts to ease the conditions of the displaced and said that “the only solution to end their suffering is an immediate ceasefire, the cessation of Israeli aggression and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which will lay the foundations for the return of the displaced to their areas and maintain stability in the region.” Grandi said he had come to express solidarity with Lebanon in these difficult times and to assist in the humanitarian efforts for the displaced Lebanese (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, October 6, 2024).

The Lebanese Government

• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, met with Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, who came to Beirut. According to reports, Araghchi said that Iran was determined to continue supporting Lebanon and the “Lebanese resistance” and would launch a “diplomatic campaign” to support Lebanon (Iranian foreign ministry Telegram channel, Lebanese News Agency, October 4, 2024). Their meeting was reportedly “stormy.” Mikati insisted on separating Lebanon from the other arenas and not linking it to any front, while Araghchi reiterated that “the resistance is one front” (Here Is Lebanon, October 5, 2024). In response, Mikati’s information office claimed that there was no truth in the report, and that the meeting “was held according to diplomatic principles” (al-Nashra, October 5, 2024).

• Mikati called on all the political forces in the country to put political differences aside and hold a dialogue. He said the “Israeli enemy” did not distinguish between Muslim and Christian, and called on the international community to exert pressure on Israel to stop its “aggression” in Lebanon (al-Nashra, October 4, 2024).
• Mikati met with Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader. The three said in a joint statement that they condemned “Israeli aggression.” Mikati said that Lebanon supported an immediate ceasefire and was committed to Resolution 1701 (al-Nashra, October 2, 2024). .
• Mikati said that if a ceasefire was reached, Lebanon would comply with it thanks to the contacts led by Speaker Nabih Berri. He warned that if the current situation continued, not only Lebanon would pay the price. He added that “the time has come for the residents of the south to return to their homes.”
• Abdallah Bou Habib, the Lebanese foreign minister claimed that Hassan Nasrallah had agreed to a 21-day ceasefire before he was killed. According to Bou Habib, the Speaker Berri consulted with Hezbollah and updated the Americans and the French, and Lebanon was told that Prime Minister Netanyahu also agreed to a ceasefire (CNN, October 3, 2024). Matthew Miller, spokesman for the United States State Department, said in response that the United States had not been informed that Hezbollah was prepared for a ceasefire (State Department website, October 4, 2024).
• Nasser Yassin, minister of environment in the interim Lebanese government, said that the government’s official position was to implement Resolution 1701, regardless of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. He said that proposals had been presented during the UN General Assembly which included a Lebanese demand for a ceasefire, the deployment of the Lebanese army in cooperation with UNIFIL and respect for international laws. Yassin also called on Israel to respect international laws, international humanitarian law and international resolutions, especially Resolution 1701 (Sky News in Arabic, October 6, 2024).

Criticism of Hezbollah

• The leader of the Christian Kataeb Party, Samy al-Gemayel, said he hoped the “absurd” war imposed on Lebanon would lead to laying the foundations for a modern state. He said that “the era of betrayal and bullying is over” and that they would not allow it to happen again. He said that starting today, they would not agree to have any political party possess weapons, only the Lebanese army and the “legitimate forces.” He said that the illegitimate weapons circulating without supervision contributed nothing to Lebanon and only brought “internal hostility and the incitement [sic] of internal fires and crises” (al-Nashra, October 6, 2024).
• Nadim al-Gemayel, a member of the Kataeb Party in the Lebanese Parliament, called on Hezbollah to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state. He said that it was no longer possible to accept Hezbollah’s narrative of being Lebanon’s only defender. He said everything had collapsed and therefore Hezbollah had to return the weapons to the Lebanese state just as all the Lebanese handed over their weapons to the Lebanese army and the state after the Taif agreement, which ended the Lebanese Civil War in 1990 (Sky News in Arabic, October 6, 2024).

UNIFIL

• Before the start of the IDF maneuver, UNIFIL spokesman Andrea Tenenti warned that Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon was “a source of serious concern.” He added that there were no UNIFIL observers present on the ground and they were working with the parties to calm the growing tensions (al-Araby al-Jadeed, September 30, 2024).
• Stéphane Dujarric, spokesman for the UN secretary general, said that UNIFIL forces were unable to patrol because of the “intensity of the Israeli attacks” and Hezbollah’s rocket and missile launches into Israel. He added that UNIFIL forces remained in their positions in areas under their responsibility, but he claimed that the intensity of the fighting prevented them from carrying out their mission. When asked about the possibility of evacuating UNIFIL forces “if the situation worsens,” Dujarric replied, “there is an emergency plan if necessary” (al-Arabiya TV, September 30, 2024).
• When the IDF maneuver began, UNIFIL called it a “dangerous development” and said it had plans ready to be carried out if necessary. UNIFIL announced that any “passage” into Lebanon violated Lebanese sovereignty and Resolution 1701, civilian targets should not be focused on and International law had to be observed. UNIFIL added that the safety and security of the personnel were top priorities and all parties were called to respect them (UNIFIL Telegram channel, October 1, 2024).
• UNIFIL expressed deep concern about the IDF’s activity near its post southeast of Maroun al-Ras in south Lebanon. UNIFIL called it “an extremely dangerous development, since it is unacceptable to undermine the security of our operatives, who carry out the tasks assigned to them by the UN Security Council.” UNIFIL added that “all parties must fulfill their duty in protecting UN personnel (UNIFIL X account, October 6, 2024).

Syria

• This past week several attacks on targets identified with Hezbollah and Iran in Syria were attributed to Israel:
  • A “Syrian military source” stated that on the night of September 30, 2024, Israeli aircraft attacked several sites in Damascus. It was claimed that the aerial defense systems intercepted most of the missiles, but three civilians were killed and nine were injured, and property was damaged (SANA, October 1, 2024). According to reports, the attack killed the Syrian journalist Safaa Ahmed (Syrian TV, October 1, 2024). The Syrian foreign ministry condemned the attack. It called on the world to put an end to such actions and noted Syria’s right to defend itself (Syrian foreign ministry Telegram channel, October 1, 2024).

• • On October 1, 2024, “Syrian military sources” reported that an “Israeli airstrike” had attacked three anti-aircraft radar stations at a military airport in southern Syria (Reuters, October 1, 2024). A local news website published alleged footage from the area, which showed radar which had been hit, and claimed that a Syrian soldier was slightly injured (al-Suwayda24, October 1, 2024).
  • On the afternoon of October 6, 2024, Israeli missiles reportedly hit two vehicles brining aid in the area of ​​the town of Hisyaa (al-Watan, October 6, 2024). According to another report, the attack was aimed at a factory for the manufacture of vehicles in Hisyaa al-Sina’yah in the Homs region (al-Mayadeen, October 6, 2024).
  • On the evening of October 6, 2024, “sources on the ground” reported explosions in warehouses in the Homs region (al-Mayadeen, October 6, 2024). A “Syrian military source” claimed that Israel had attacked a number of military sites in the Homs-Hama area from northern Lebanon and that property had been damaged (SANA, October 6, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] The name Khaybar is taken from the massacre of the Jews by the Muslims in Khaybar in Saudi Arabia in 628 CE, and is used as a symbol of their defeat.
^[3] Hezbollah did not provide details about the rocket, but it belongs to a series of Fadi-1 and Fadi-2 rockets that were first fired on September 22, 2024, and the Fadi-3 rocket that was first fired on September 24, 2024.
^[4] Nur is an Iranian cruise missile designed to attack vessels and is based on Chinese C801 and C802 coastal missiles. It reaches a range of 170 km (106 miles) and carries a warhead weighing 165 kg (364 lb).
^[5] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

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