Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (October 7 – 14 ,2024)

Overview^[1]

• IDF forces continued their maneuver in south Lebanon. The forces eliminated hundreds of terrorist operatives, located and destroyed terrorist facilities hidden in civilian sites and located large quantities of weapons. The IDF continued airstrikes on Hezbollah targets in Beirut and throughout Lebanon, and carried out targeted attacks of senior Hezbollah terrorists and terrorists operatives on the ground. An IDF soldier was killed.
• A UAV hit an IDF base, killing four IDF soldiers and injuring dozens.
• Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the attack and for 152 attacks on targets in Israel and IDF forces in south Lebanon. Hezbollah launched UAVs to attack northern and central of Israel.
• Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, gave a speech describing the organization’s difficulties after the death of Hassan Nasrallah, adding that they were in the process of choosing a new secretary general. He claimed the IDF had no successes in Lebanon, said he supported Hamas and contacts for a ceasefire in Lebanon, not conditioning it in a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip
• According to increasing reports, Wafiq Safa, chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Council and in charge of Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit, was injured in an Israeli attack. Hezbollah continues the batting for hearts and minds by publishing propaganda videos of attacking IDF soldiers and collecting information within Israel.
• Lebanon authorities said that more than 2,250 people had been killed in Lebanon since the beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023, and more than 1.2 million people were displaced. Lebanon’s political leadership called for a ceasefire.
• UNIFIL reported that several of its soldiers were wounded and positions damaged in south Lebanon by IDF activities. The UN and various countries condemned the attacks. The IDF reported that Hezbollah fired rockets and launched missiles from areas close to UNIFIL forces.
• Syria has reported attacks attributed to Israel in the Damascus and al-Quneitra region.

The Fighting in Lebanon

• In the past week, the IDF continued in the ground maneuver in south Lebanon, killing more than two hundred terrorist operatives from the air and on the ground. The forces found and destroyed terrorist facilities, tunnels and large quantities of weapons, including explosive devices prepared for detonation rocket launchers ready for firing which were hidden in civilian sites in south Lebanon. An IDF soldier was killed in combat in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, October 7-13, 2024).
• The weapons located included double-barrel anti-tank launchers which fire two anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at the same target, making them difficult to deflect by defense systems against ATGMs, mounted on IDF armored personnel carriers (APCs) and Tanks.^[2]
•    Most of Hezbollah’s fighting is guerrilla warfare, while attacking the forces from afar with long-range weapons such as ATGMs and mortar shells. Most of the time, Hezbollah’s operatives avoid short-range clashes with IDF’s soldiers (IDF spokesperson, October 9, 2024).

• In south Lebanon the IDF attacked Hezbollah’s ground units, Radwan Force targets, intelligence headquarters and medium-range rockets (IDF spokesperson, October 10-12, 2024):
  • Fifty Aziz Unit facilities, 30 Nasser Unit targets and five Bader Unit targets were destroyed.
  • Thirty mid-range rocket systems were attacked.

   
IDF attacks against Hezbollah underground headquarters in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, October 8, 2024)

• The IDF continued targeted attacks on Hezbollah terrorist operatives (IDF spokesperson, October 7-12, 2024):
  • Suhail Hussein Husseini, commander of Hezbollah’s headquarters array,^[4] was killed in Beirut on October 7, 2024. He was called a “great jihadi commander,” a title so far given to only three Hezbollah figures before him: Fuad Shukr, Ali Karki and Ibrahim Aqil.

• • Ahmad Hassan Nazzal, from the Radwan Force, was responsible for attacks in Bint Jbeil.
  • ⁠Hussein Talal Kamal, responsible for the Hujeir sector. Killed on October 7, 2024.
  • Musa Diab Barakat, formerly responsible for the Hujeir sector. Killed on October 7, 2024.
  • Mahmoud Musa Karnib, responsible operations in the Hujeir sector. Killed on October 7, 2024.
  • Ali Ahmad Isma’il, commander of the artillery in the Bint Jbeil sector. Killed on October 7, 2024.
  • Ahmad Mustafa al-Hajj Ali, commander of the Houla region, responsible for hundreds of artillery and anti-tank guided missiles attacks on Kiryat Shmona. He was killed on October 10, 2024.
  • Abdullah Ali Daqiq, Hujeir sector artillery commander. Killed on October 7, 2024.
  • Muhammad Ali Hamdan, commander of the anti-tank array in the Meis al-Jabal area, responsible for many anti-tank attacks on the cities, towns and villages in norther Israel. He was killed on October 10, 2024.
  • Hussein Muhammad Asili, Radwan Force commander who replaced Wissam Tawil, was killed by the IDF’s gunfire in south Lebanon on October 12, 2024.

Other terrorist operatives eliminated

• According to reports, on October 10, 2024 an Israeli attack was carried out in Beirut. Several sources reported dead and wounded (al-Manar, Reuters, October 10, 2024). Reportedly, the target was Wafiq Safa, was responsible for the Hezbollah liaison and coordination unit. According to reports, he was in critical condition and not expected to live (Sky News in Arabic, al-Hadath and Israeli media, October 11, 2024). Hezbollah sources claimed the attack and Safa was not in one of the locations attacked (al-Mayadeen and al-Manar, October 10, 2024).
• On the night of October 3, 2024, the Israeli Air Force attacked the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut to eliminate Hashem Safi al-Din, chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Council and considered Hassan Nasrallah’s heir (IDF spokesperson, October 4, 2024). According to assessments, he was at the site of the attack and there is an intelligence basis for assuming he was killed. Hezbollah will confirm his death after they find his body (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 8, 2024).

Hezbollah tunnel entering Israeli territory exposed

• For the first time since 2018, the IDF located a Hezbollah tunnel about 20 meters long on Israeli territory. It was located a few months ago in the western sector on the Lebanese border, and was monitored by the IDF. It crosses the Blue Line but does not have an opening on the Israeli side or reach a settlement in Israeli territory. When the tunnel was discovered it was mined and neutralized (IDF spokesperson, October 8, 2024).

Hezbollah

Attacks

• This past week Hezbollah attacked 152 military, security and civilian targets in Israel, as well as IDF forces in south Lebanon, compared with 148 the previous week. Hezbollah attacked with anti-tank missiles, artillery shells, UAVs, various types of rockets and IEDs (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 7-13, 2024):
  • UAV attack on the IDF base: On the evening of October 13, 2024, a Hezbollah UAV hit an IDF base, killing four soldiers and injuring many others (IDF Spokesman, October 13, 2024).
  • Hezbollah claimed responsibility for launching a swarm of exploding UAVs at a Golani training base in response to “the enemy’s attack on the al-Nuwayri and al-Bastah neighborhoods in Beirut.” The launch was accompanied by shouts of, “At your orders, Nasrallah!” and as part of the Khaybar activity.^[5] Hezbollah said it would remain prepared to “defend” and would not hesitate to “do in our duty to deter the enemy” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 13, 2024). It was the 7^th claim of responsibility as part of Khaybar activity.
  • Hezbollah’s operations room later stated it had previously warned that Israel’s attacks in Lebanon would turn Haifa into Kiryat Shmona, Metula and the rest of the border.” Hezbollah boasted that “Some of our UAVs have returned with sensitive information about military goals and facilities in occupied Palestine. The resistance^[6] also sees and hears in unexpected places.” Hezbollah also claimed Israel would not be able to make good on its threats after killing the organization’s leaders, and the organization decided to demonstrate new capabilities by firing dozens of rockets at various targets near Nahariya to attack Israel’s aerial defense, penetrate them and attack the Golani Brigade base (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 13, 2024).
  • Mahdi al-Mashat, chairman of the Supreme Political Council of the Houthi movement, congratulated Hezbollah on the attack and showered praise on the movement, adding that killing the Hezbollah leadership would only increase their determination to fight (Yemeni news agency Saba, October 13, 2024).
  • UAV attacks on the greater Tel Aviv area: Hezbollah announced that sent on October 11, 2024, it had sent a swarm of explosive UAVs to the suburbs of Tel Aviv “as a sign of support for the Palestinian people and their courageous and honorable [sic] ‘resistance,’ and as a defense of Lebanon and the Lebanese people, and in response to Israel’s [alleged] barbaric violations against cities, villages and civilians.” Two UAVs from Lebanon were identified and monitored as soon as they crossed the Lebanese border. One was intercepted; a building in Herzliya was damaged (IDF spokesperson, October 11, 2024).

Rundown of 366 days of war

• Hezbollah published an infographic of its attacks on Israel between October 8, 2023 and October 8, 2024, claiming it had carried out 3,194 attacks on military locations on the Israeli-Lebanon border and to a depth of 150 kilometers, targeting 250 IDF headquarters 1,153 buildings, 11 military factories, 14 Iron Dome aerial defense system launchers and two surveillance balloons. Hezbollah claimed to have fired 589 artillery shells, 1,305 rockets and three ballistic missiles, launching 221 UAVs, 760 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and 77 surface-to-air missiles were launched. Hezbollah also claimed to have killed and injured 2,000 and forced the evacuation of about 300,000 Israeli residents from more than 100 locations up to 30 kilometers from the border (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 8, 2024).
• The above numbers are greater than those with which Hezbollah published in its daily reports, the number of Israeli casualties given was false, and the number of evacuees is about 65,000.

Na’im Qassem’s speech

• Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general gave a speech on October 8, 2024, addressing the following topics (al-Manar, October 8, 2024):
  • The death of Hassan Nasrallah: “It is impossible to describe out situation without him, but we draw our power and inspiration from him.” The organization is choosing a new secretary general, the process will be completed by their internal mechanisms and that they will make an announcement at the appropriate time.
  • Israel’s activity in Lebanon: Qassem claimed the IDF could not advance in south Lebanon, but admitted that the attacks in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, south Lebanon and the Lebanon Valley were “very painful.” Hezbollah will overcome the attacks, because “a copy of everything in the hands of the leaders who were killed is in the hands of their assistants and those who replace them.”
  • Support from Hamas: Operation al-Aqsa Flood was “blessed” and “the correct path towards to change.” Hamas is fighting in Israel and can deal with it. Hezbollah involvement, which he called the “support front,” was designed to help and ease the situation in Gaza and protect Lebanon. The war did not hurt Hezbollah’s will and determination. Hezbollah is exhausting Israel and displaced “tens of thousands of settlers from their settlements,” and they will not be able to return to their homes.
  • Support from Iran: Iran is determined to stand alongside “resistance”^[7] in the way that seems appropriate to it, and objective of the campaign it to help the Palestinians “liberate” their land.
  • The unity of the Shi’ites: Hezbollah and the Amal Movement are united. Hezbollah trusts the great leader, Nabih Berri (speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and leader of the Amal Movement), who in Nasrallah’ opinion was “the greatest of all.” He also added that Hezbollah supported the measures Berri was promoting for a ceasefire.

Reactions

• Hezbollah confirmed Na’im Qassem’s remarks about the support for the Gaza Strip and preparedness for further fighting against Israel. Hezbollah also claimed that the IDF had failed to enter the villages in south Lebanon “and suffered from severe losses” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 8, 2024).
• Media commentary:
  • According to al-Nashra, Qassem expressed support for the Palestinians but did not link the Lebanese front to the Gaza Strip, which could be a starting point for a ceasefire headed by Berri with a program called “First a ceasefire”(al-Nashra, October 8, 2024).
  • al-Jazeera interpreted the speech in a similar fashion, claiming his message was that Hezbollah would fight and not surrender, but had not explicitly said Hezbollah would not stop fighting as long as the war in the Gaza Strip continued (al-Jazeera, October 8, 2024).

Other remarks

• An anonymous member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament said that “the most recent developments were reminiscent of Hezbollah’s previous Haifa-equals-Beirut equation.” He said that according to the “equation,” if Israel continued to attack Beirut, Hezbollah would increase its attacks on Israel without limit as long as the enemy “continues to massacre civilians.” He added that “all the red lines were crossed,” and Hezbollah would do everything it could to deter Israel (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 7, 2024).
• Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, a Hezbollah member of the Lebanese Parliament, claimed they wanted to “defend the Lebanese and continue to support the Gaza Strip.” He claimed they wanted to stop the fighting and there were no discrepancies between the Hezbollah position and that of Najib Miqati (prime minister of the Lebanese interim government) and Nabih Berri (the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament) (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 8, 2024).
• A Hezbollah field commander and the source close to the organization told Reuters that three days after the death of Hassan Nasrallah, the organization established a new operations room which continued to function despite Israel’s attacks, ordering attacks and giving commands for fighting. The new command operates as a “narrow circle in direct contact with the] field” which operates in complete secrecy.
• Another “knowledgeable” source said that the organization’s dedicated wired network was “essential” to its current communications. According to sources, the network survived attacks against media outlets last month (Reuters, October 10, 2024).
• Another official source close to Hezbollah said that Hezbollah was now engaged in a war of attrition. Four sources defined as “knowledgeable” added that “Hezbollah still has a significant arsenal, including its strongest precise missiles, which have not yet been used.” According to two of the sources, Hezbollah has not yet used its strongest rockets as well as its guided missiles in order to maintain its inventory for a long war, and not provide Israel with excuses to expand its attacks on the country. Regarding the tunnels, “they were the basis for the campaign, Hezbollah spent years to build them, and their time has come.” According to the source, “the tunnels that were located by Israel were built for the Radwan Force, to help the force invade the Galilee in northern Israel,” and “Israel does not know the full extent of the tunnels” (Reuters, October 11, 2024).
• Hezbollah’s combat information Telegram channel has referred to reports about the establishment of a new command center and for more details regarding the organization’s plans and its arsenal, calling the reports “the fruit of the agencies’ correspondents and journalists’ imagination, and nothing more” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 11, 2024).
• Muhammad Afif, responsible for Hezbollah media information, criticized the Lebanese media, saying that some of the country’s networks “believe the Israeli narrative without testing it” and that they incited against the “resistance,” and the government does nothing. To Israel he said, “what you saw in Haifa, Acre and Safed was just the beginning” and that “the resistance is OK and there are thousands of suicide fighters” (al-Manar, October 12, 2024).
• Ibrahim Musawi, a member of Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, admitted to al-Jazeera TV that the organization “faced enormous blows and had losses, including heavy casualties on the battlefield.” That was “because of a kind of technology gap between Hezbollah as a ‘resistance movement’ with certain resources, but nothing like the resources the Israelis have which is all the weapons with elite technology and the most innovative technology in the West, especially in the United States.” However, he said, “losing the first round or losing in a certain aspect of the war doesn’t mean losing the war.” Regarding the elimination of the Hezbollah leadership, he said, “killing leaders never meant victory anywhere in the world” (al-Jazeera, October 12, 2024).

Media commentary

• Ibrahim al-Amin, the editor-in-chief of the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, related to how the “resistance” was dealing with the situation after the blow it had received. He said that its looses at the lead level was very difficult and influential.” However, he said, the “resistance” was now working on the assumption the enemy still had surprises in store and was therefore its methods were changing. He claimed Hezbollah knew Israel “was trying to sow fear both among the public and the resistance and its leadership and therefore its methods of action change. He emphasized that Hezbollah was aware of the fact that Israel “tries to sow fear among the public and among the resistance and its leadership” so that it would make mistakes, but the leadership was aware of it and its actions were “accurate and calculated.” Al-Amin said “the enemy gambled that killing Nasrallah would be a hard blow to Hezbollah and the entire “[resistance] axis,’^[8] but everyone had to adapt to the new situation.” He said, “You can’t ask, not even Allah, to bring us a leader like Nasrallah.” However, he claimed that “the resistance has an opportunity to reorganize [and improve] the quality of various fields” (al-Akhbar, October 10, 2024).

Hezbollah propaganda

Video of detonating IEDs and launching anti-tank missiles

• On October 10, 2024, Hezbollah posted a video showing its operatives planting IEDs during the day near possible routes of IDF forces in the eastern sector on the Lebanon-Israel border, and detonating them at night to attack foot patrols. The video also shows a shoulder-launched, surface-to-air missile being fired from the roof of a building under construction at an IDF helicopter in the skies of Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 10, 2024).

     
Right: Hezbollah IEDs placed in the eastern sector in south Lebanon. Left: IDF foot patrol in the sector (Hezbollah thermal photo) (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 10, 2024).

Hezbollah UAV photographs Haifa and the Carmel

• On October 9, 2024, Hezbollah issued a video, claiming it had been photographed the previous day by a Hudhud UAV. It focused on civilian and military targets in Haifa and the Carmel area, including industrial zones, and various IDF sites. It ended with the caption, “In the crosshairs”, showing Haifa and the Carmel area marked in red (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 9, 2024).

   
Right: Part of the Haifa oil refinery complex; Left: A threat that Haifa and Carmel in Hezbollah’s crosshairs (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 9, 2024)

Radwan Force video

• On October 7, 2024, Hezbollah posted a 3-minute video about its elite Radwan Force, entitled “We are Radwan.” It showed Radwan Force operatives on military parade and during exercises, vehicles and weapons, as well as its naval commandos (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 7, 2024). Its objective was apparently to raise Hezbollah operatives’ morale after the elimination of the Force’s commanders and operatives..

   
Radwan Force operatives (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 7, 2024).

   
Radwan Force naval commandos (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 7, 2024)

Psychological warfare

• On October 10, 2024, Hezbollah posted a 2-minute video entitled, “Don’t think if you are going to be hurt, think when you are going to be hurt.” The actors pretend to be 12 Golani fighters moving in the dark, four kilometers from Ayta al-Sha’ab in south Lebanon. As they quietly enter a built-up area and move through an alley, an RPG is fired at them (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 10, 2024).

   
Scenes from the Hezbollah video (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 10, 2024)

Criticism of Hezbollah

• Dima Sadeq (X account with 838,000 followers), a Lebanese Shi’ite journalist who opposes Hezbollah, wrote about the Israeli attacks on Beirut and reports that Hezbollah operatives were hiding within the civilian population, “At what point exactly during the war will it be possible to say that its wrong for [Hezbollah terrorist operatives] to hide among civilians so that there will be no massacres of civilians without ‘collaborators” who support the enemy’s narrative? ” (Dima Sadeq’s X account, October 11, 2024).
• Gebran Bassil, head of the Free Patriotic Party in Lebanon and a Hezbollah ally, said his party had asked Hezbollah not to participate in the campaign to support Gaza, because there was no legal reason in Lebanon. He said “former President Michel Aoun told senior officials that he was afraid for Lebanon and for the organization.” He said that they demanded to separate Lebanon from Gaza and six months ago had sent a written message to a number of countries and senior officials in Lebanon to publish a UN resolution for a ceasefire in Lebanon and to disengage from Gaza. Hezbollah supporters mocked him and he was ignored by senior Lebanese officials (IM Lebanon, October 12, 2024).
• Charles Jabbour, head of the Samir Geagea Lebanese Forces Party publicity mechanism, said that the lack of concern for UN Security Council Resolution 1559, passed in September 2004, which called for Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty to be respected and for its militias, first of all Hezbollah, to be dismantled, had, over the past 20 years, cost Lebanon 100,000 lives and complete destruction. He said the narrative of “resistance” had collapsed and the time had come to return to the ideologies of Lebanon as a sovereign nation (MTV, October 12, 2024).

The Situation in Lebanon

Killed and wounded

• According to the Lebanese ministry of health, since the beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023, 2,306 people have been killed and 10,968 injured (Lebanese ministry of health X account, October 13, 2024).
• According to the UN Human Rights Commission spokesperson’s unit, more than a hundred medical and emergency workers have been killed across Lebanon since October 2023 (UN Human Rights Commission web site, October 11, 2024).

The displaced

• On October 12, 2024, Nasser Yassin, the minister of the environment in the interim government in Lebanon, who heads the national emergency coordination committee, said that 320,184 Syrians and 117,727 Lebanese had moved from Lebanon to Syria and that 1,032 centers for displaced persons had opened in Syria, but 863 were completely full. The previous week, he reported announced that there were more than 1.2 million displaced persons in Lebanon (Lebanese News Agency, October 12, 2024).
• Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, related the issue of the displaced persons, saying “it is out biggest concern at the moment, and we’re doing everything to ease the situation. As soon as the war ends, the displaced will be able to return to the villages within 24 hours, even if they have to sleep in tents on the ruins of their homes “(al-Joumhouria, October 7, 2024).

Aid for Lebanese civilians

• The Lebanese government strengthened the state’s security procedures and said “we are open to receive humanitarian assistance from every state in coordination with the army.” Ali Hamieh, the minister of transport and public labor (on behalf of Hezbollah), said the ministry of labor would not allow planes with cargoes of humanitarian aid, military planes or battle ships to enter Lebanese territory until they had received security approval (Lebanese government X account, October 7, 2024).
• Lolwah al-Khater, Qatar’s minister of international cooperation, was met with Mikati in Beirut and said that “today we have launched the aerial bridge of a humanitarian aid from Doha to Beirut.” She landed in Lebanon with humanitarian aid from Qatar and met with Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government. She announced the launch of an “aerial bridge” of 10 aircraft loaded with humanitarian aid for Beirut, which were expected to arrive in the coming month, expressing unreserved support in Lebanon (al-Nashra, October 8, 2024).

The Lebanese Government and Contacts for a Ceasefire

• Senior Lebanese government officials and public figures stated their intention and desire to work for a ceasefire in Lebanon:
  • Najib Miqati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, said that ” Arab and international efforts were continuing to stop Israeli aggression against our country, but Israeli intransigence inhibits their success.” He noted the importance of a temporary ceasefire to start political steps, most notably, a full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. He said diplomatic contacts were being held with UN Security Council members to exert pressure on Israel to reach a ceasefire (Lebanese prime minister’s X account, October 9 and 10, 2024).
  • Miqati met in Beirut with Mohammed Qalibaf, chairman of the Iranian Majlis. He said his government’s top priority was to take action for a ceasefire, “to stop Israeli aggression and preserve Lebanon’s security.” He noted Lebanon’s commitment to implementing Resolution 1701. According to reports, he spoke on the phone with Amos Hochstein, the American envoy to Lebanon, to discuss ways to reach a ceasefire and find a comprehensive political solution based on Resolution 1701 (Lebanese prime minister’s X account, October 12, 2024).
  • Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said he was working with Miqati to reach a ceasefire, but they were experiencing “ups and downs.” He said, “the United States talks to us and says it’s in favor a solution, but there’s a lot of talk and little action.” He also claimed that “no one can create a disagreement between us and Hezbollah” (al-Jadid, October 11, 2024). In another media interview, he claimed he adhered to the principles agreed on with Miqati and Jumblatt, the most important of which was an immediate ceasefire on the border. He said they had not discussed the Gaza Strip or a link between the two fronts (al-Jazeera, October 13, 2024).
  • French President Emmanuel Macron spoke on the phone with Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and told him that “a ceasefire should be effected in Lebanon immediately,” adding that “Hezbollah attacks must be stopped immediately” (Agence France-Presse, October 12, 2024).
  • Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze in Lebanon, said that last week he met had met with Nabih Berri and Najib Miqati, and that they had ” decided to denounce the aggression and emphasize the importance of Lebanese unity and our commitment to Resolution 1701.” He added they had decided “not to tie our fate to the fate of the Gaza Strip” (LBCI Network, October 7, 2024).
  • Amin Salam, Lebanese minister of the economy, said that “no foreign country has the right to determine Lebanon’s fate.” Referring to Resolution 1701, Salam said that it “needs a number of amendments in the light of recent developments” and that the resolution “would be a topic for discussion and debate.” He said his country “will not suffer a naval siege” and that “everyone, including Hezbollah, is seriously considering the issue of ceasefire” (al-Arabiya, October 8, 2024).

The Lebanese army

• The Lebanese army announced that in light of Israel’s activities, its forces were deployed throughout the country, including on the southern border, and were carrying out their duties. The army also stated that it had had casualties on the ground but was prepared to protect the country “within its existing capabilities.” The army said that was in accordance with the political echelon decisions to adhere to Resolution 1701, one of which was coordination with UNIFIL (Lebanon’s X Account, October 8, 2024).
• According to a source in the Lebanese army, six soldiers were injured in an attack near a military checkpoint at Housh al-Sayyed on the Syrian border (Sky News in Arabic, October 10, 2024).
• According to several sources, due to the fear that Israel might attack Beirut International Airport because Hezbollah had weapons there, the Lebanese army would be responsible for monitoring takeoffs and landings as well as security inside the airport. That was to prevent any “violation” that Israel could use as an excuse to disrupt air travel.” In addition, the sources reported that the military attaché at the US Embassy toured the airport to ensure there were no weapons (al-Arabiya,, October 10, 2024).
• According to reports, the Lebanese army stalled activity at the port of al-Naqourah and evacuated the offices of the Ministry of Defense following the escalation of clashes with Israel. As a result UNIFIL will not be able to use the port as it had in the previous three months would unload its cargoes in the port of Tyre (al-Akhbar, October 10, 2024).

UNIFIL

• This week, a number of incidents occurred in which UNIFIL forces were injured in south Lebanon, according to their claims by IDF fire:
  • In October 10, October 10, 2024, two UN soldiers were injured by gunfire from and IDF tank at an observation tower at UNIFIL headquarters in al-Naqourah. The injuries were not serious but the soldiers were hospitalized. Later, the IDF reported that the IDF shot at UN Position 1-31, damaging vehicles and communications system. It was also reported that IDF soldiers deliberately shot at the position’s peripheral monitoring cameras and disabled them (UNIFIL website, October 10, 2024).
  • Diplomatic sources told the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar that UNIFIL had sent a communiqué to the UN, claiming its forces suffered from a “difficult situation” and were almost trapped in their positions. In addition, Abdallah Bou Habib, the Lebanese foreign minister, had received notices from European authorities on this issue. The paper reported that “Nepal, Ghana and Ireland, which participate in UNIFIL forces, were among the most worried, and that the Irish were seriously considering pulling out of UNIFIL. According to sources, France initiated contacts with European countries to encourage them to adopt a united European positions to support the UNIFIL’s continued mission. It was reported that “in the assessment of diplomatic sources, the pressure on UNIFIL during this period may lead to its replacement with a non-UN multinational force, and it would not only be placed along Lebanon’s border with Israel but also along the border with Syria” (al-Akhbar , October 10, 2024).
  • The Russian foreign ministry expressed its anger at the injury to UNIFIL soldiers and demanded that hostile action be taken against them, as they carried out their mission in Lebanon according to the existing UN Security Council mandate (Reuters, October 11, 2024).
  • A spokesman for the United States National Security Council said that “the White House is concerned about the reports that Israel attacked UNIFIL forces.” He said the United States understood Israeli targeted actions at the border, but it was critical that such actions did not threaten the safety of the UNIFIL forces (Anadolu Agency, October 11, 2024).
  • Charles Michel, president of European Council, related to reports that IDF forces attacked UNIFIL forces, saying that an assault on a task force whose mission was to keep the peace was irresponsible and unacceptable, calling on Israel and all parties to respect its respect international humanitarian law (Agence France-Presse, October 11, 2024).
  • Forty UNIFIL donor states said in a joint statement that they “strongly condemn the latest attacks on UNIFIL soldiers” and called for an immediate cessation of such actions (Agence France-Presse, October 12, 2024).
• The IDF spokesperson stated that in the past month, 25 rockets and missiles were launched by Hezbollah from areas adjacent to UNIFIL forces.

Syria

• This past week reports of several attacks attributed to Israel on targets affiliated with Hezbollah and Iran were published in Syria:
  • The IDF destroyed a 3.5 kilometer-long tunnel, used by Hezbollah to smuggle weapons from Syria. In addition, a number of munitions warehouses were destroyed on the Syrian side of the tunnel, 14 kilometers west of Qusayr, (IDF spokesperson, October 8, 2024).
  • A Syrian military source said that on October 8, 2024 around 20:15, Israeli air attack was carried out against a residential and commercial structure in Damascus. Seven civilians were killed and 11 were injured. It was noted that other people were trapped under the ruins and that there was also significant damage to property (SAA, October 8, 2024).
  • On October 9, 2024, the Air Force attacked in the al-Quneitrah area, and thwarted Adham Jahout, active in the Golan case unit, the Hezbollah branch in Syria. It was noted that Jahout had transmitted information to Hezbollah, for the benefit of power activities against Israel in the Golan Heights (IDF Spokesman, October 9, 2024).
  • A Syrian military source said that a car factory in the industrial area in the Hisyaa in the outskirts of Homs and one of the military posts in Hamah. It was also alleged that there were only material damages (the Syrian Ministry of Facebook page, October 10, 2024).

Syrian army Division 4 instructed to keep its distance from Hezbollah

• “Sources” reported a repeat, published by Division 4 headquarters, the Syrian Army elite unit, with a series of alleged steps, which should be taken to avoid Israeli air attacks. The division ordered its people not to transfer weapons or host factors from Hezbollah or other pro-Iranian forces within the headquarters and bases in its responsibilities, fearing that they would be a destination for elimination. In addition, Division 4 forces were placed not to take part in some kinds against American forces in East Syria or the shooting of pro-Iranian militias in the Golan Heights (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, October 12, 2024).

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^[2] Apparently double-barrel systems for launching Tharallah anti-tank missiles, based on a Dehlavieh missile, an improved Iranian imitation for Russian-made Kornets. Hezbollah unveiled the system on August 11, 2023 (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, December 9, 2023).
^[3] https://x.com/JanR210/status/1783122757758148610
^[4] Hezbollah's logistical headquarters unit, which deals with budget and organizing the various arrays. He participated in transferring weapons to Hezbollah from Iran and distributing them to the various units in Hezbollah, include their transport. He was also a member of Hezbollah's Jihad Council, its highest military forum. The headquarters include the organization's research and development unit, a unit producing precision missiles, and the logistics of stockpiling and transporting weapons inside Lebanon. By virtue of his position, he was involved in the budgeting and logistical management of the organization's most sensitive projects, including the operational plan for war, and launching terrorist attacks against the State of Israel from Lebanon and Syria (IDF spokesperson, October 8, 2024).
^[5] Named, according to Muslim tradition, for the Muslim massacre of the Jews of Khaybar in Saudi Arabia in 628 CE, used to symbolize the defeat of the Jews.
^[6] Hezbollah, a terrorist organization.
^[7] Palestinian terrorist organizations.
^[8] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, the "resistance axis" partners seeking the destruction of the State of Israel.

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