Boko Haram: The Relations between the two factions of the organization

Overview

• Boko Haram, whose official name is Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wal-Jihad, is an extremist Islamic organization that began to operate in the late 1990s and 2000s in Nigeria. In 2016, about a year after pledging allegiance to ISIS, the organization split into two factions, JAS and ISWAP. The split was a starting point for a long series of conflicts between the two factions, which continue even today and have resulted in a large number of fatalities on both sides.
• The death of Abubakar Shekau, former leader of Boko Haram and then of JAS after the split, in May 2021, was a significant turning point in the relationship between the two factions. Shekau’s faction weakened due to severe defeats and mass defections of operatives to the ranks of ISWAP and due to activity against it by security forces of the countries of the region (especially Nigeria). ISWAP, on the other hand, became significantly stronger and expanded its area of activity in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region.
• ISWAP’s getting stronger at the same time as JAS weakened caused the interruption of the territorial continuity of the area held by JAS in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region and led to two forces (belonging to JAS) being separated by territory controlled by ISWAP. This could lead to a significant worsening of the conflicts and both factions having to pay a heavy price. Those who have the most to gain from this situation are the countries of the region (especially Nigeria) that regard both factions as a threat to their stability.
• In the ITIC’s assessment, the struggle between the factions will continue and even intensify in the near future and will be detrimental to both factions in terms of their power and activity. ISWAP will continue to act as the main organization in everything related to jihadi terrorist activity in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region whereas JAS will mainly continue to try to rebuild its capabilities.

The split and its implications

• The exact point in time of the appearance of Boko Haram^[1], or in its official name, Jama’at Ahl as-Sunna lid-Da’wa wal-Jihad (freely translated as the group of people of the Sunnah for Da’wah and Jihad), is not known for certain. It is customary to estimate the time of its establishment in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It was established in the city of Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria. In its early years, Mohammad Yusuf was the figure most identified with it and is considered the founder of the organization.
• In 2009, Boko Haram experienced one of the lowest points in its history when Nigerian security forces raided its central compound in Maiduguri, destroyed it and killed about 1,000 operatives, including Mohammad Yusuf, who was executed. One of Yusuf’s deputies, Abubakar Shekau, was appointed as the new leader and launched an all-out war against the government and security forces in Nigeria, which since 2010 has claimed tens of thousands of lives and affected millions of people (International Crisis Group, April 2014).
• In 2015, Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The setbacks suffered by Boko Haram in 2015-2016 undermined Shekau’s status as a leader and provoked criticism of his leadership among senior figures in the organization. In August 2016, the Islamic State leadership announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of Muhammad Yusuf, had been appointed as Shekau’s replacement as the leader of Boko Haram, which would change its name to the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). Although Shekau did not agree to accept the new leader’s authority, he declared that he was still loyal to the Islamic State.^[2] Thus, Boko Haram split into two factions: ISWAP, led by Al-Barnawi^[3], and the other faction, led by Shekau, while maintaining the official and original name of the organization (referred to as JAS, according to the initials of its name, Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wal-Jihād) (GICS, April 2019).
• After the split, operatives of ISWAP, which was the weaker faction during this period, moved the center of their activity to the north of Borno State in northeastern Nigeria and to the Lake Chad area, which includes areas that also belong to Chad and Niger. JAS, the stronger faction at that time, maintained its base of activity in the south of Borno State and especially in the Sambisa Forest, its stronghold for years, south of Maiduguri.
• The difference between the factions is reflected in their modus operandi: while JAS does not hesitate to attack civilian targets and even to harm Muslims whom it considers infidels, ISWAP mainly attacks military targets through raids on bases, ambushes military convoys, and avoids harming Muslims. In the years following the split, conflicts often occurred between the factions, both because of the proximity of their areas of activity and because of criticism expressed by each faction on the ideology and operations of the other (ISS, July 2018).

     
Right: Mohammad Yusuf during his arrest, before he was executed in 2009 (mainaram global Twitter account, November 29, 2020). Left: Abubakar Shekau
(Plus Nigeria Twitter account, December 1, 2020)

The relations between the factions and their impact

• On May 20, 2021, ISWAP operatives attacked the JAS stronghold in the Sambisa Forest. After hours of fighting, it was reported that Shekau, the leader of JAS, asked to discuss with the leaders of the attacking forces the conditions for a ceasefire. The latter demanded that he give up his position as JAS leader and order his organization’s fighters to pledge allegiance to ISWAP. During the conversation, Shekau apparently detonated a hidden explosive belt that he wore on his body, causing his own death and the death of several senior ISWAP operatives who were present at the conversation (HumAngle, May 20, 2021).^[4] During this attack, it was reported that many JAS operatives were killed or captured in the Sambisa Forest and it was claimed that many of them sought to join the ISWAP forces (Al-Naba, issue No. 293). On June 25, 2021, ISWAP’s media arm released a video documenting various fighters, who apparently belonged to JAS, announcing their joining ISWAP and their allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. The fighters in the video speak in several local languages as well as Arabic and English. In the video, groups of ISWAP operatives are seen declaring their allegiance to the Islamic State and at the end, a raid on a Nigerian army base is seen and a fighter who allegedly belonged to JAS in the past announces the success of the raid which indicates the strength of the union between the factions (ISWAP’s media arm, June 25, 2021).
• On September 18, 2021, a video was published by ISWAP which allegedly shows JAS fighters captured by ISWAP in the Sambisa Forest area. An ISWAP operative in the video appeals to JAS operatives, urging them to join ISWAP and abandon their infidel leaders while promising that they will not be harmed if they do so, as many other JAS operatives have done. However, he also threatens that operatives who surrender to the Nigerian army will not be pardoned and will be considered traitors (ISWAP’s media arm, September 18, 2021).

• In the months after Shekau’s death, JAS’s power weakened significantly and many of its operatives were killed, defected to ISWAP, or surrendered to the Nigerian security forces (New York Times, September 23, 2021). However, on September 27, 2021, JAS fighters led by Bakura Doro, a senior leader of the organization, attacked an ISWAP camp on the shores of Lake Chad, near the border of Nigeria and Niger. The attack, in which many ISWAP operatives were reportedly killed, was carried out as a retaliatory action against ISWAP following the many defeats suffered by JAS in the previous period. Bakura, who was known as a senior leader in JAS back when the organization was led by Shekau, is considered one of the potential candidates to succeed Shekau (HumAngle, September 28, 2021).
• The clashes between the factions have continued to this day and especially in the last few months. Among the main events that were reported: battles in the Sambisa Forest area in which 34 operatives from both sides were killed (Anatolia News Agency, April 24, 2022); the killing of two JAS leaders in a raid by ISWAP fighters on their homes (PM News Nigeria, September 21, 2022); two raids by JAS fighters on ISWAP camps in the Sambisa Forest area and a series of retaliatory actions that claimed the lives of dozens of operatives from both factions (The East African, December 7, 2022)^[5]; In response to that incident, a raid was carried out a few days later by ISWAP forces on a JAS camp in the Sambisa Forest area, which caused the JAS operatives to flee, leaving their wives and children behind (Zagazola, December 12, 2022)^[6]; a raid by JAS forces led by Bakura on several ISWAP camps near the Nigeria-Niger border; in the exchange of fire between the sides, dozens of fighters from both sides were killed (Zagazola, December 31, 2022)^[7]; another attack by JAS forces led by Bakura, in the end of which JAS operatives captured two ISWAP bases in Lake Chad. A total of 35 ISWAP operatives were killed (Punch Nigeria, January 8, 2023).

• It seems that since Shekau’s death, ISWAP has expanded its activity south to the Sambisa Forest area (south of Maiduguri), and even south from there towards eastern Nigeria. Accordingly, the power of JAS has weakened and it is currently active in two areas separated by territory controlled by ISWAP: a force located in the Lake Chad area in the Chad-Niger-Nigeria tri-border area, led by Bakura Doro (Abu Umayma),^[8] and a force led by Ali Ngulde, located in the Mandara Mountains on the Cameroon-Nigeria border, south of the Sambisa Forest area. Currently, ISWAP is apparently not led by a single leader, but by several commanders with fighters organized in sub-groups. It is not clear who ISWAP’s commanders on the ground are and whether there is a declared leadership group that dictates the operational strategy of the organization (International Crisis Group, March 2022).

Conclusion

• In the ITIC’s assessment, the long-standing struggle between the two factions of Boko Haram will continue and even worsen in the near future. The weakness of JAS compared to the strength of ISWAP may indeed tip the scales in favor of the latter, but the ability of JAS to survive after the death of Shekau and its reorganization as two sub-organizations under different leadership may indicate the ability of this faction to adapt to the new reality and maintain its power in the coming period.
• In the ITIC’s assessment, ISWAP will continue to operate as the main organization in the jihadi terrorist activity in Nigeria and the Lake Chad area in the near future while constituting a significant security threat. However, the ongoing conflict between ISWAP and JAS may damage both factions’ power and ability to operate in a way that will enable a successful campaign against them by the countries of the region which will reduce the threat they pose to these countries.

^[1] The name Boko Haram, which describes the organization's aversion to Western influences, is not the official name of the organization. It is not accepted by its leaders but has become the accepted name referring to it in the general public. ↑
^[2] Officially, both factions are loyal to the Islamic State. However, the central leadership does not recognize JAS as part of its global organizational structure. In 2018, a book was even published on behalf of the Islamic State, written by the two sons of Mohammad Yusuf, which presents Shekau as an infidel and a "cancerous tumor" that must be removed from the body of Islamic society ("'Slicing off the Tumour': The History of Global Jihad in Nigeria, as Narrated by the Islamic State,” 2018). ↑
^[3] Abu Musab al-Barnawi was known as ISWAP’s first leader but apparently lost his position as the organization’s leader to other operatives, although he is apparently still alive. Various reports over the years have claimed several times that he was killed by Nigerian security forces, but no conclusive evidence of this has been produced, and ISWAP has never announced his death. According to other reports, he is still alive and still holds a senior role in ISWAP's leadership. The identity of ISWAP’s leader today is unclear. There are reports that the organization is led by senior field commanders in addition to the Shura Council (International Crisis Group, March 2022). ↑
^[4] See the ITIC's Information Bulletin from May 27, 2021, “Spotlight on Global Jihad (May 19-26, 2021)” ↑
^[5] See the ITIC's Information Bulletin from December 7, 2022, “Spotlight on Global Jihad (December 1-7, 2022)” ↑
^[6] See the ITIC's Information Bulletin from December 15, 2022, “Spotlight on Global Jihad (December 8-14, 2022)” ↑
^[7] See the ITIC's Information Bulletin from January 5, 2022, “Spotlight on Global Jihad (December 29-January 4, 2023)” ↑
^[8] In a video published on December 14, 2022, by JAS, an operative can be seen who, among other things, announces the end of Shekau's leadership period and the loyalty of the organization's operatives to Abu Umayma, one of Bakura Doro's codenames (JAS’s media arm, December 14, 2022). ↑

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