Ad Hoc Studies

Public Criticism in Lebanon of Hezbollah Activity along the Israel-Lebanese Border

Hezbollah joined the fighting against Israel on October 8, 2023, in support of the Palestinians. The fighting in south Lebanon, and especially the damage caused to the area, led the Lebanese public to criticize Hezbollah, especially for dragging Lebanon into a war which did not concern it. The main criticisms of the war have been that it is a war being fought by the Palestinians, not the Lebanese; Hezbollah is not "protecting Lebanon," although it represents itself as such, but rather it is destroying Lebanon; Hezbollah serves the interests of the Iranian regime; even without a war, Lebanon is undergoing a serious economic and political crisis, and Hezbollah is sending the country into the abyss; Hezbollah operates in the Christian, Sunni and Druze towns and villages in south Lebanon to force local residents to migrate to other areas inside the country. Critics include public figures and politicians, mainly Christians, and the Lebanese street, especially the residents of the south, who are the main victims of the war. There is also criticism from Shi'ite elements in south Lebanon. However, incidents of criticism have been relatively few, and in most cases the critics express their protest orally or in writing, mainly on social networks. So far there are no signs of organized protest, since in some instances speaking out or being active against Hezbollah could be fatal. Hezbollah is trying to moderate the criticism against it, mainly with the help of promises to restore south Lebanon after the war and help local residents. Senior organization figures claim Hezbollah operates not only for the Shi'ite population but for all Lebanese citizens. Read more...

Public protests and criticism of Hamas in the Gaza Strip during recent months

During the past three months, in light of the continued fighting, public criticism of the Hamas government and leadership has increased significantly in the Gaza Strip compared to the protests in the first months. An analysis of the demonstrations indicates that currently they are local and sporadic, apparently organized spontaneously. They are not held particularly frequently, only a few per month, and are attended by a few hundred people. Apparently Hamas is not trying to stop them, possibly because it does not currently regard them as endangering its status. Furthermore, Hamas [falsely] claims that most of the demonstrations do not represent the feelings of the population and are fabricated or directed by Israel. Criticisms are also posted on the social networks. However, at the moment there are relatively few threads, managed by a handful of people with a limited number of followers. So far, the number the protests is small and they do not endanger the Hamas administration. However, as time passes and Israel's military pressure increases in the Gaza Strip, and as a result the humanitarian crisis worsens and the lack of food and shelter for the residents increases, the protests will continue and most likely increase. It is also possible that the approaching month of Ramadan, which begins on March 11, 2024, will further increase the public's sense of want and its frustration, and therefore the extent of the protests. Read more...

More than half of the Palestinian journalists killed in the Gaza Strip during Operation Iron Swords were affiliated with terrorist organizations (Full version)

The government media office of Hamas in the Gaza Strip reported that as of February 18, 2024, 131 Palestinian journalists had been killed in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the war (October 7, 2023). The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center's comprehensive examination of the 131 names revealed that approximately 60% were operatives in or affiliated with the terrorist organizations, Fatah or the Palestinian Authority. Hamas alleges that Israel deliberately attacks journalists to "hide the truth" and prevent the disclosure of events in the Gaza Strip during the war. Of the 78 journalists identified as having organizational affiliation, 44 were identified with Hamas, five were identified as the operatives of the military wing and the rest were employed by or represented Hamas media. Nineteen were affiliated with PIJ, six of them actual PIJ terrorist operatives. It is not the first time we have dealt with journalists who also had a military role in a terrorist organization, covered operations and wars and worked to influence the battle for hearts and minds, considered of utmost importance by the terrorist organizations. Read more...

Hamas Governance in the Gaza Strip: Activity, Institutions, Administration and Public

The Hamas government media office recently reported that since the beginning of the war (October 7, 2023), 140 facilities belonging to Hamas government institutions in the Gaza Strip had been destroyed. Despite the prolonged fighting and the IDF presence on the ground, the destruction of buildings and the damage to Hamas' military and political capabilities, apparently many Hamas government and public institutions continue to function partially or almost fully. They include some of the government ministries, security forces, municipal authorities, and sometimes also mosques and religious institutions. Despite the evidence that Hamas is making efforts to regain its control and influence on the ground, the overall picture is unclear because of the complex situation in the Gaza Strip and the presence of IDF forces. In addition, the northern and southern Gaza Strip are almost completely disconnected from one another, making any form of central control difficult. For now, it is hard to gauge whether the activity is carried out under the direct guidance of the Hamas leadership, which indeed still functions, possibly indicating the capabilities of the Hamas government and its ability to adapt its activities to the situation on the ground, or whether it is mainly an initiative of the local leadership Read more...

Support for Hamas in France since the Outbreak of Operation Iron Swords

The pro-Hamas demonstrations and protest marches in France are organized by collectives of groups representing the local Palestinian community, Muslim movements and far-left organizations (including anti-war and anti-establishment movements) and political parties. The collectives are an example of Red-Green Alliance activity, a strong partnership of far-left and Palestinian organizations, including groups affiliated with Hamas. Organizations and activists participating in the protests expressed support for the October 7th, 2023 attack and massacre, and the continued Palestinian armed terrorist activity, while accusing Israel of "genocide in the Gaza Strip." France, as a member of the European Union (EU), has designated the entire Hamas movement (its military wing and political bureau) as a terrorist organization and imposes the sanctions established by the EU institutions against the movement, persons on the list of designated terrorists and entities providing Hamas with financial assistance. Read more...

Houthi military-terrorist escalation and the deterioration of the situation in the Red Sea

Since the start of Operation Iron Swords (October 7, 2023), the Houthi campaign in the Red Sea area has escalated and drawn in many participants, the most important of which are the United States, Britain and Iran, whose involvement has increased. Initially the Houthis launched missiles and UAVs at Israel, but their tactics gradually morphed into attacking ships sailing in the Red Sea and near the coast of Yemen which they identified as "having connections to Israel. As the war continued, and especially during December and January 2024, the campaign in the Red Sea area. The Houthis carry out direct attacks on Israel, such as launching missiles and UAVs continue, but their frequency has declined significantly, apparently due to the failure of the Houthis to penetrate the IDF and American Army aerial defenses and hit targets inside Israel. In ITIC assessment, the campaign in the Red Sea area can be expected to continue as long as the war in the Gaza Strip continues. Recently a kind of balance of actions and reactions has been created, and it will be difficult to halt it without intervention to convince the Houthis to withdraw their demand for an end to the fighting in the Gaza Strip as a condition for stopping their attacks. Without external intervention (especially directly from Iran, but possibly also from Russia and China indirectly through Iran), it is likely that the Houthis will continue their attacks since their actions give them legitimacy. They also provide them with a reputation as a significant regional force with leverage for its objectives in Yemen's internal struggle and against regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Read more...

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