Continuing deterioration of the security situation along the Gaza Strip border (updated to August 24, 2020)

Overview

This past week the deterioration of security along the Gaza border continued, initiated by Hamas: the launching of IED and incendiary balloons continued (causing dozens of fires daily), the IDF responded to balloon terrorism with aerial attacks and tank fire at Hamas facilities and posts, and Hamas and the other terrorist organizations responded to the IDF attacks with sporadic rocket fire (24 rockets have been fired since the beginning of August). The restrictions Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip remain in place: the Kerem Shalom Crossing is closed to the transfer of goods and fuel (with exceptions given to humanitarian considerations), the fishing zone is closed and the supply of electricity was reduced because there was no transfer of fuel to run the power plant. Mediation attempts, centering on the arrival of an Egyptian delegation to Gaza, were unsuccessful, and Hamas continues its balloon terrorism accompanied by sporadic rocket fire.

• An analysis of the events on the ground and media statements from Hamas and the other terrorist organizations indicate that Hamas seeks to impose its rules of engagement. Their objective, in ITIC assessment, is to enable balloon terrorism to continue for as long as possible without resulting in a broad round of escalation or comprehensive military confrontation. The rules of engagement, from Hamas’ perspective, have four levels:
  • Maintaining a low level of violence through the so-called “popular resistance” [i.e., popular terrorism]: In Hamas perspective Israel should not attack military targets in Gaza in response to popular terrorism. That level has been passed. In Hamas’ perspective launching IED and incendiary balloons and rioting along the border fence are legitimate measures, what Hamas calls “non-violent popular resistance.”^[1]
  • Low-level exchanges of fire (“bombardment in return for bombardment”): Israeli responses to balloon terrorism perceived as “tolerable” (for example, Israeli attacks on posts and facilities without casualties), leading in turn to sporadic, monitored rocket fire with no formal claim of responsibility. Within this level Hamas refrains from increasing its attacks, both qualitatively and quantitatively, which might lead to another round of escalation (This is the current level.).
  • Rounds of escalation: Israel’s strong response to balloon terrorism and rockets (responses causing many casualties or particularly painful for Hamas) may increase the scope of rocket fire, up to and including attacks on the center of the country. In ITIC assessment, Hamas has no interest in reaching that level and would rather continue its pressure on Israel through popular terrorism and low-intensity exchanges of fire. However, Hamas is aware that the current deterioration may lead to escalation, for example, if there are casualties on either side (see Appendix C).
  • A comprehensive military confrontation (along the lines of Operation Protective Edge): In ITIC assessment, Hamas has no interest in being drawn into a comprehensive military confrontation. At the same time, Hamas is of the opinion that Israel also has no such interest because of Israel’s internal and external constraints (see Appendix C).
• In ITIC assessment, at this stage, in Hamas perspective the current situation may continue without causing an escalation. Hamas’ interest is in continuing to exert pressure on Israel to force it into making humanitarian and economic concessions as part of the lull arrangement, and to extend (and possibly increase) financial support from Qatar. However, Hamas is aware it is employing a policy of brinksmanship, which may potentially ignite a new round of escalation, which neither side is interested in.

Balloon Terrorism Continues^[2]

During the past week balloon launchings continued, most of them incendiary balloons and some of them IED balloons. They have caused dozens of daily fire epicenters in and around the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip border. The launchings continued both during and after the visit of the Egyptian delegation. An incendiary balloon landed on a greenhouse in an Israeli community to the north of Gaza and the resulting fire caused serious damage. A balloon was found on the roof of a building in Beersheba. All the balloon-launching units in the Gaza Strip apparently participate in the attacks, and some have documented their activities (see Appendix A). On August 23, 2020, about 30 fire epicenters were caused by incendiary balloons. One incendiary balloon landed near a playground and another hit a power pole.

• In response to the balloon launches IDF aircraft attacked Hamas targets. Among them were a site for the manufacture of concrete used to construct Hamas’ underground facilities and tunnels. In addition, IDF tanks attacked Hamas military posts (IDF spokesman). On the night of August 23, 2020, IDF aircraft and tanks attacked Hamas posts and underground facilities (IDF spokesman, August 24, 2020).

Rocket Fire

The tension generated in the Gaza Strip has been accompanied by sporadic rocket fire into Israeli territory without claims of responsibility from the terrorist organizations. Since the current deterioration began in early August, 24 rockets have been fired at Israel, five of which fell inside the Gaza Strip. On the night of August 21, 2020 a barrage of at least seven rockets was fired into Israeli territory. Six were intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system. In ITIC assessment, the rockets were fired by Hamas operatives and/or operatives of the so-called rogue organizations to deter Israel from responding to the balloon launches. So far, over the past three weeks rocket fire has been sporadic, in ITIC assessment because it has been in Hamas’s interest to focus on balloon terrorism insofar as is possible, and to refrain from further escalation.

Rocket fire during the deterioration in security, August 2020

• Rocket attacks over the past week have been the following:
  • August 18, 2020: A rocket was fired at the region of the southern Israeli city of Ashqelon and exploded in an open area. Two girls were slightly injured while running for shelter. In response IDF aircraft attacked a special Hamas military facility (IDF spokesman, August 18, 2020). The Palestinian media reported that Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked the Obeida Post in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood in the southwestern part of Gaza City (Shehab, August 18, 2020).
  • August 20, 2020: Three rockets were fired. They were intercepted by the Iron Dome. Two additional rockets were fired and fell inside the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian media reported that Israeli aircraft attacked the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades’ al-Quds post in western Khan Yunis (Palinfo, August 21, 2020; Ma’an, August 20, 2020). It was also reported that IDF tanks shelled “resistance” [i.e., terrorist organization] posts in various locations in the Gaza Strip (Shehab, August 20, 2020).
  • August 21, 2020:
    • Seven rockets were fired during the night. Six were intercepted by the Iron Dome; one hit the roof of the fortified room of a house in Sderot while the family was inside. No casualties were reported; the house was damaged. A woman was injured while running to a shelter and three women were treated for shock. Two more rockets were later fired from the northern Gaza Strip at Sderot. They were intercepted by the Iron Dome. The Israeli media reported that for the first time in weeks, in IDF assessment most of the rockets were fired by Hamas operatives, possibly in response to its loss of assets in IDF attacks (Ynet, August 22, 2020).
    • In response to the rocket fire the IDF attacked Hamas targets, among them entrance shafts to tunnels and a facility for the manufacture of rockets (IDF spokesman, August 21, 2020). The Palestinian media reported that Israeli aircraft attacked a “resistance” post in western Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip. They also claimed an agricultural field in eastern Khan Yunis was attacked; a farmer was injured (Palinfo, August 21, 2020).
  • August 22,2020: Three rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip and were intercepted by the Iron Dome. Three more rockets (fired in two separate events) fell inside the Gaza Strip. In response IDF tanks attacked Hamas military posts in the southern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, August 22, 2020).

   
From a video issued by the Hamas-affiliated “defenders of al-Aqsa.” The pictures were meant to transmit the message that Israeli reprisals will be met with rocket fire. The caption under the picture reads, “A bombardment in return for a bombardment” (Defenders of al-Aqsa Telegram channel, August 21, 2020).

Riots Near the Border

• As part of the Hamas-initiated deterioration, night riots were held near the border fence for the first time since April 2019. However, after two days (August 15 and 16, 2020) the activities stopped. In recent weeks no riots have been held near the border fence, apparently because Hamas wants to maintain the level of tension generated by balloon terrorism and is saving riots for later, in case the situation deteriorates further.

Israel’s Responses to the Deterioration in Security

Israel again made it clear that it regards Hamas as responsible for what happens in the Gaza Strip. During the current deterioration the IDF has also intensified its attacks on Hamas targets as a response to the balloon launchings (and not only in response to rocket fire). In addition, the economic restrictions Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip continue. On August 12, 2020, the Kerem Shalom Crossing closed and has not yet reopened for the transfer of goods and fuel. Preventing the transfer of fuel reduced the supply of electricity. The fishing zone remains closed.

• During the past week Israel continued its attacks, mainly against Hamas targets. On August 22, 2020 the Palestinian media reported that IDF forces fired artillery at two Hamas restraint force observation posts, one east of Khan Yunis and the other near the Sufa Crossing in eastern Rafah. No casualties were reported; damage to the posts was reported (Shehab website, August 22 2020). On August 21, 2020, the media reported that the Israeli Air Force had attacked Hamas’ al-Quds post in western Khan Yunis (Shehab Facebook page, August 21, 2020).

   
The IDF attacks in Gaza (Right:, Shehab Facebook page, August 21, 2020; Left: Twitter account of Radwan al-Akhras, August 21, 2020).

Transfer of fuel to Gaza stopped

Stopping the transfer of fuel to the Gaza Strip led to an almost immediate reduction of electricity to residents. At 10:00, August 18, 2020, fuel ran out and the power plant stopped operating. The electric company in Gaza said that as a result electricity would be provided to residents in cycles of eight hours with a 16-hour hiatus (Filastin al-Yawm, August 21, 2020).

• Jamal al-Khudri, chairman of the popular committee to fight the siege, said that because of the power cuts workshops had limited their hours and reduced production by 25%. He said that had caused a rise in unemployment, and there were now more than 320,000 unemployed in Gaza (Dunia al-Watan, August 21, 2020). The Gazan energy authority said Israel would be responsible for the consequences of the power outages (Dunia al-Watan, August 16, 2020). Ashraf al-Qidra, spokesman for the ministry of health in the Gaza Strip, warned there would be dangerous consequences for hospitals because of the lack of electricity (al-Aqsa, August 18, 2020). Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum called the “siege” of Gaza, the worsening of the electricity situation and the shutting down of daily life “crimes against humanity.” He added that Hamas would not allow the situation to continue and would not remain silent (Hamas website, August 18, 2020).

Mediation Efforts

Egyptian mediation

An Egyptian General Intelligence delegation headed by General Ahmed Abd al-Khaliq, who holds the Palestinian portfolio, arrived in Gaza. They met with the Hamas leadership and senior figures from other terrorist organizations. The visit ended in failure. The violence initiated by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations continued during and after the delegation’s visit. After the Egyptians left the Gaza Strip some of the networks announced their intention to increase the launching of IED and incendiary balloons.

• According to Palestinian sources, the Egyptians and other mediators (such as Qatar and the UN envoy) held intensive talks to restore the lull. According to the sources, the Palestinian organizations demanded the lifting of the “siege” of Gaza, Israel’s full implementation of the understandings of the lull agreement and an acceleration of the projects demanded by the Palestinians. The sources claimed Israel was “deliberately delaying” carrying out infrastructure projects in water, health and electricity (al-Quds, August 22, 2020). Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, said they had transmitted several demands and questions to Israel through the Egyptians and were now waiting for answers (RTR, August 20, 2020).
• Egyptian sources also related to the visit:
  • According to reports, Hamas told the Egyptian delegation that if no real results were achieved they would continue their activities [against Israel]. The Egyptian sources said that Israel had transmitted the message to Hamas (through the delegation) that it was weighing a return to the targeted killings of the senior figures considered responsible for the deterioration. In addition, Israel transmitted the message that the delivery of funds from Qatar depended on the prevention of an escalation (al-Araby al-Jadeed, August 19, 2020).
  • Samir Attas, a member of the Egyptian parliament, said Hamas had increased its demands for the lull. He called the current situation “arm wrestling”, adding that the Egyptian delegation would not return to mediate unless it received positive responses from both sides (Dunia al-Watan, August 23, 2020).

Qatari mediation

• Mohammed al-Emadi, chairman of Qatar’s National Committee for the Reconstruction of Gaza, is supposed to arrive in the Gaza Strip in the near future to meet with senior figures (Sawa, August 22, 2020). According to al-Emadi, Qatar invests considerable effort in creating connections to halt the gradual escalation in Gaza and in improving the humanitarian situation. He called on the international community, the UN and all international groups to meet their commitments to provide the aid necessary to Gaza (Filastin al-Yawm, August 19, 2020).

UN activity

• Nikolay Mladenov, UN special envoy to the Middle East, said no one wants the present situation to escalate, in view of the power cuts and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. He said they were working with the Egyptians to resolve the crisis and in the coming week the UN Security Council would meet to discuss the issue (Sawa, August 20, 2020).
• In his daily briefing, Stéphane Dujarric, spokesperson for the UN secretary general, said the Palestinians had to immediately stop firing rockets, mortar shells and “incendiary objects” [i.e., incendiary balloons]. He begged Israel to show restraint in its responses and called on Israel to reverse its decision not to transfer fuel to the Gaza Strip (UN website, August 21, 2020).

Appendix A

Document of IED and incendiary balloons launched into Israeli territory

   
Right: Matan Tsuri, Ynet correspondent, posted pictures of balloons to his Twitter account with the caption, “Suspicious object attached to balloon found near a house in the western Negev” (Matan Tsuri’s Twitter account, August 19, 2020). Left: The Hamas-affiliated Sons of al-Zawari unit in eastern Khan Yunis posted a picture of launching a balloon cluster (Sons of al-Zawari unit in eastern Khan Yunis Facebook page, August 19, 2020).

   
IED balloons launched by operatives of the Hamas-affiliated Sons of al-Zawari unit in the northern Gaza Strip (Sons of al-Zawari unit in the northern Gaza Strip, August 22, 2020).

   
Popular Resistance Committees-affiliated Ahfad al-Nasser operatives launch balloons from the northern Gaza Strip (Twitter account of photojournalist Hazem Muzeid, August 18, 2020).

   
Ahfad al-Nasser operatives launch IED balloons
(Facebook page of the Ahfad al-Nasser “young revolutionaries,” August 23, 2020).

   
Right: The Hamas-affiliated “Defenders of al-Aqsa” launch balloons (“Defenders of al-Aqsa” Telegram channel, August 23, 2020). Left: Operatives of the Popular Resistance Movement’s Sons of al-Qoqa units launch IED balloons east of Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip (Abrrar forum, August 21, 2020).

Palestinian documentation of fires in Israel caused by incendiary balloons

   
Right: Fire which broke out on August 22, 2020. Left: Extinguishing the fire
(Shehab Facebook page, August 22, 2020).

 
Right: Incendiary balloon fire near Sderot. Left: Damage to hothouse caused by fire (Shehab Facebook page, August 22, 2020).

Balloons found in Israel territory (reported by Israeli sources)

   
Neutralizing incendiary balloons found in a farm in the western Negev
(Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, August 18, 2020).

 
Right: Incendiary balloon that landed near a house in Sderot (Western Negev spokesman’s unit, August 18, 2020). Left: IED balloon found in the field of a kibbutz near the border (Twitter account of the Lebanese-Judea and Samaria-Gaza region, August 19, 2020).

Appendix B

Selection of statements from Hamas and the other terrorist organizations

• Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, claimed the reason for the increased tension was the continuing “siege” and the sanctions Israel (“the Zionist enemy”) imposed on Gaza. He accused Israel of not honoring the understandings reached through Egyptian and Qatari mediation. He claimed the humanitarian situation in Gaza was on the point of collapse and accused Israel of responsibility for the deterioration. He added that if the Palestinians demands were not met in the near future they might “open a front” (RTR, August 20, 2020).
• Khalil al-Haya, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, claimed the Palestinians were prepared [to continue], their finger was on the trigger and they were not afraid of threats or destruction, fatalities or attacks. He said Israel should know that “a bombardment will be answered with a bombardment and killing with killing” (al-Aqsa, August 19, 2020).
• Khader Habib, senior PIJ figure, claimed the “Palestinian resistance” had means to restrain Israel. He also claimed they would not sit idly by during an escalation in Gaza and that Israel would be responsible for the consequences of its aggression (sabaq24, August 22, 2020).
• The Jihad Units of the Sword (of Islam), a small network called the Battalions of the Sword of Islam, demanded the immediate unconditional lifting of the “siege” of the Gaza Strip (network Telegram channel, August 21, 2020). Abu Sajed, their leader, announced the intensifying of IED and incendiary balloon launching (network Telegram channel, August 23, 2020).
• Salah al-Bardawil, a member of the Hamas’ political bureau, said the Egyptian, Qatari and UN mediation efforts to calm the situation “are worthless.” Israel, he claimed, refuses to meet Hamas’ demands, as transmitted by the Egyptian mediators, making Israel responsible for all events related to the escalation in Gaza (Filastin al-Yawm website, August 23, 2020).
• Usama Hamedan, in charge of Hamas’ external relations, claimed Israel was exacerbating the siege of Gaza and trying to withdraw from understandings previously reached. Therefore, he claimed, the Palestinian people had no choice but to respond with “the lowest level of the struggle,” which was the launching of incendiary balloons. Asked about Israel’s so-called threats to return to targeting killings, he said that if Israel (“the occupation”) escalated the situation, the “resistance” would “advance further” and exert pressure on Israel. He added that “the resistance had successfully sent all the residents [of the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip] into exile and all the residents of Tel Aviv into bomb shelters” (interview with Filastin al-Yawm, August 22, 2020).

Appendix C

Main points of an article by Saleh al-Na’mi, posted to Hamas’ news website, entitled “The resistance and Israel: the horizons and limits of escalation” (alresala.net, August 23, 2020).

• The following are the main points of an op-ed article posted to the Hamas news website by Saleh al-Na’mi:
  • The continuing escalation between the “resistance” [i.e., the terrorist organizations] and Israel is liable to turn into a comprehensive confrontation, especially given the threats made by Israel’s prime minister and defense minister regarding a return to the policy of the targeted killings of senior “resistance” leaders.
  • Despite the threats, it is clear that Israel has no interest in a comprehensive round of escalation. That is because its decision-makers understand that the end of an escalation will return them to the starting point, considering that the Gaza Strip has nothing to lose, given its humanitarian and economic situation. Therefore Israel will be obliged to return to the lull understandings.
  • Israel understands completely that to obviate the security and military dangers from the Gaza Strip it will have to occupy it and remain for a long time. In that case Israel will have two options:
    • To end the operation [i.e., to withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip]. In such a case, Gaza will again become the source of a direct threat to the Israeli heartland. In addition, Israel should take loss of life and an economic and political price into consideration.
    • Israel will have to remain in the Gaza Strip for a protracted period, with “all the terrible consequences resulting from that.” That is because Israel understands that no Palestinian or Arab entity can take upon itself the management of Gaza, only Israel itself.
    • There are other reasons why Israel does not rush towards an escalation. They include a lack of certainty regarding the northern front, the approach of the beginning of the school year, the lack of preparedness of Israel’s home front, Israel’s economic and social crises in the wake of the spread of Covid-19, and concern of the influence of Israel’s agreement with the UAE on the atmosphere in the region.
    • The “resistance” [i.e., Hamas] also has no interest in a comprehensive escalation. That is because it wants to exert pressure on Israel [below the level of escalation] to convince it to reverse its measures to tighten the siege, which worsened the economic and humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
    • Despite the fact that neither side is interested in a comprehensive round of escalation, incorrect considerations are liable to push them into one. For example, an Israeli attack kills Palestinians, or rockets launched from Gaza kill Israelis.
    • The “resistance” operates according to a “compass of interests” for itself and the Gaza Strip. The compass obliges it to remain in contact with the mediators and not to allow the [diplomatic] arena to fall under Israeli influence.

Note: The article was written by Saleh al-Na’mi, a journalist and commentator from Gaza who writes for the London-based Arabic newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat. He writes about Israel and how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict interfaces with the Arab-Muslim world and the international arena. He has a PhD in political science and has written several books about the conflict. Al-Na’mi also has access to Hamas and his article, as noted, was posted to a Gazan news website affiliated with Hamas. Thus it appears that al-Na’mi’s article reflects Hamas’ perception of the current situation.

^[1] Hamas customarily represents the return marches, balloon terrorism and riots along the border as "non-violent popular resistance." In reality they are popular terrorism initiated by Hamas (and the other terrorist organizations) and include violence against civilians and IDF soldiers. Popular terrorism has the potential for escalation, created by the dynamics of IDF reactions and Hamas counterreactions. ↑

^[2] Follow-up of the August 17, 2020 bulletin, "Deterioration of the security situation along the Gaza Strip border(updated to August 17, 2020)." ↑

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