Islamic Resistance in Iraq attacks on American and Israeli targets since the beginning of Operation Iron Swords

Overview^[1]

• On October 17, 2023, ten days after the start of Operation Iron Swords in the Gaza Strip, an organization called the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) began publishing claims of responsibility for attacking United States military bases in Iraq and Syria. As of November 2, 2023, it began claiming responsibility for attacks on Israel. However, no such attacks were detected and Israel did not publish an announcement regarding them. So far, the organization has claimed responsibility for carrying out between 81 and 84 attacks on American military targets in Syria and Iraq and three attacks on Israeli targets, and threatens to escalate its activity against Israel and the United States.
• The announcement of a temporary ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, which began on November 24, 2023 to free the hostages and deliver humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, led to a dramatic decrease in the organization’s activity. When the hostilities resumed in early December 2023, attacks on American targets in Iraq and Syria were renewed.
• Unrelated attacks by pro-Iranian militias against American targets in Iraq and Syria began before the war in Gaza. In the months leading up to the war, there was a lull in the attacks, apparently due to unofficial understandings reached between the United States and Iran on the nuclear issue. Since the outbreak of the war, the attacks have been renewed more forcefully and their frequency has increased.
• The IRI is actually an umbrella organization uniting several pro-Iranian Shi’ite militias in Iraq, operating under the direction of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The generic name “Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” without the names of commanders or operatives and without publishing a logo, is used to blur the organization’s identity and its direct connection to Iran. The IRI’s use of the Saberin News Telegram channel, which is used by the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, and the Telegram channel of its military information unit, to issue claims of responsibility, as well as the nature of its operational activity, indicates the close connection between the militias.
• The use of general names for existing and new organizations is not new. Iran’s proxies often use them, especially to avoid leaving an address for reprisals. Other organizations with ties to Iran also sometimes refer to themselves by other names and nicknames, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is often referred to as the “Islamic resistance in Lebanon.”

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq

• On October 17, 2023, the existence of an organization called the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” (al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq) was made public for the first time when it used its Telegram channel to claim responsibility for attacking United States military bases in Iraq and Syria. As of November 2, 2023, the organization claimed it had attacked Israel, although in practice, no attack was located.
• The IRI unites the pro-Iranian Shi’ite militias in Iraq directed by the IRGC’s Qods Force. The militias belong to the Popular Mobilization, an umbrella organization which was established to fight ISIS but which continued operating after ISIS was defeated and which receives funding from the Iraqi government. The name of the IRI’s commanders and operatives have not been revealed and no symbols or logos have been made public.
• According to a study by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the IRI can easily be linked to the Tashkil al-Waritheen another nom de guerre used by the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. It claimed responsibility for the first UAV attack on the al-Harir base in Erbil in the Kurdish region of Iraq on October 17, 2023. Immediately thereafter, the IRI published a claim responsibility and the Tashkil al-Waritheen notice was deleted.^[2] Since then, all claims of responsibility for attacks on United States bases in Iraq and Syria have been published by the IRI. According to the Washington Institute, their objective was to obscure the identity of the militias attacking the United States bases (“low signature,” i.e., covert operations) lest they be exposed, and to show the unity of the pro-Iranian militias. According to the Washington Institute, any attack for which the IRI accepts responsibility can be linked to the Hezbollah al-Nujaba (“The Nobles” movement and even to some extent to the IRGC.
• Tracing the organizations that compose the IRI revealed that on November 13, 2023, Akram al-Kaabi, the secretary general of the al-Nujaba militia, exposed the connection between the IRI and the pro-Iranian militias when he congratulated the “heroes of the IRI” for their attack in Eilat. He added that Israel and its partners should know the IRI had greater capabilities and Israel would “pay the price for its [alleged] crimes against Gazans” (Akram al-Kaabi’s X account, November 13, 2023).
• Additional information about the identity of the organization was revealed on November 21, 2023, when for the first time since the attacks on the American forces in Syria and Iraq began, the IRI’s Telegram channel issued a mourning notice for Fadel al-Maksusi, aka Sayid Rida, the “resistance operative [terrorist] who was killed in the battle of the truth against the lie, the fight against the American forces.” The notice did not specify when or how he was killed (IRI Telegram channel, November 21, 2023). The mourning notice was also quoted on the official Telegram channel of the Hezbollah Battalions and on the Saberin News Telegram channel, which is affiliated with the pro-Iranian Iraqi militias (Saberin News and Hezbollah Battalions Telegram channels, November 21, 2023). Thus it can be assumed he was a Hezbollah Battalions operative.

• The al-Nujaba militia issued a mourning notice for death of Fadel al-Maksusi which, according to the notice, was “caused by American aggression.” The notice stated the militia “was continuing to wage jihad” and warned “the American occupation” would pay a price for its “barbaric crimes” and receive “double and redoubled punishment” in the near future (al-Nujaba militia Telegram channel, November 21, 2023).
• On November 25, 2023, Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, secretary general of the Hezbollah Battalions,^[3] revealed that the militias which had attacked the enemy under the IRI banner” were Ansar Allah, the al-Nujaba militia, the Sayyid al-Shuhadaa’ militia and the Hezbollah Battalions” (Kaff Telegram channel, November 25, 2023).^[4] Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (“The league of the righteous”) should also be added to the list.

• Al-Hamidawi’s omission of the Asa’ib Alh al-Haq militia as an IRI participant was resented by the militia operatives. Jawad al-Talibawi, the organization’s military spokesman, said he was “surprised.” He said al-Hamidawi knew what the real situation on the ground was, and it was strange that he had mentioned the names of certain organizations and omitted the names of others “without justification” (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Telegram channel, November 25, 2023). In our assessment, it may have been the result of tensions between the pro-Iranian militias and the struggles to take “credit” for IRI activities.

Links to Iran

• The senior operatives of the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq which compose the IRI are in close contact with Esmail Qaani, commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force, and with Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah. According to a report published on October 18, 2023 on the Arab Post website, in mid-October 2023 Qaani was in Syria for a secret visit to coordinate with the heads of the pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq and discuss escalating the campaign against Israel. According to the report, while he was there a joint operations room was established for Iran’s allies in Syria and Iraq, in order to monitor the situation and coordinate the deployment of forces under the command of the IRGC. It was also reported that Qaani visited Baghdad on October 16, 2023, where he planned to meet with commanders of the pro-Iranian Shi’ite militias to discuss including them in the campaign in the coming weeks. The report added that “an Iranian intelligence source officer close to the IRGC” claimed Iran had plans to escalate the war through the Syrian arena and not through Lebanon, so as not to endanger Hezbollah, which was the strongest element in the “axis of resistance.”^[5]

Senior operatives

• Among the senior operatives in contact with Qaani and Nasrallah are:
  • Abd al-Azis al-Mohammadawi, the head the Popular Mobilization’s general staff (as of February 21, 2020), aka Abu Fadak, one of the founders of the Hezbollah Battalions and who held a number of positions in the organization (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 22, 2020; BBC in Arabic, February 24, 2020). Al-Mohammadawi has been a member of the leadership (Majlis al-Shura) of the Hezbollah Battalions since 2003, and also commanded many militia operations. He served as the militia’s secretary general and established its special units (al-Hurra TV, February 26+23, 2020; ahlalrafidain.online, February 25, 2020).
  • Akram al-Kaabi, al-Nujaba militia secretary general.
  • Qais al-Khazali, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq secretary general.

   
Right: Former Quds Force commander, the late Qassem Soleimani (right) with his hand on the shoulder of al-Mohammadawi (al-Nujaba militia Media War, January 13, 2021). Left: Qods Force Commander, Qaani and Akram al-Kaabi, secretary general of the al-Nujaba militia (Nabd, January 11, 2020)

     
Right: Abu Fadak (left) and Qais al-Khazali, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq secretary general (al-Qirtas, January 14, 2021). Left: Qaani and Abu Alaa al-Walaai, secretary general of the Sayyid al-Shuhadaa’ militia (Nabd, January 11, 2020)

• Another operative is Ahmed al-Hamidawi, aka Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, secretary general of the Hezbollah Battalions. On February 26, 2020, his name was put on the United States list of designated international terrorists because of his involvement in carrying out terrorist attacks on American forces and noncombatant Iraqi civilians; the Hezbollah Battalions were designated a terrorist organization in 2009) (al-Hurra, February 26, 2020; the website of the United States Department of State, February 26, 2020). According to the media, his full name is Ahmed Muhsen Faraj al-Hamidawi, and a large number of his family members are integrated into senior positions in the militia. His photo was published in February 2022. In July 2021 Muhammad Hasab al-Majdi was appointed by the organization’s Shura Council to replace al-Hamidawi, but he refused to vacate his position and continues to serve as the militia’s secretary general (euro-times. com, 4 Mar. 2022; washingtoninstitute.org, 9 Mar. 2022).

• Using a general name to include existing and new organizations is not new and Iran’s proxies frequently do it. Following the targeted American attacks that killed the late Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force, and the elimination of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandas, deputy chairman of the Popular Mobilization and the commander of the pro-Iranian militia Hezbollah Battalions on January 3, 2020, and even shortly before their elimination, the names of new pro-Iranian Iraqi militias began to appear. Later it became evident that the frameworks were the cover names of the old pro-Iranian militias, changed for purposes of carrying out “low signature” attacks against the targets of the United States Army in Iraq and in Syria and against other targets, mainly the opponents of the Iranian regime in Iraq.
• Such militias include al-Thairin (The Avengers); Saraya Thawrat al-Ishrin (1920 rebellion companies), Tha’r al-Muhandis (Revenge of Abu Ali al-Muhandis); Jund Soleimani (Qassem Soleimani’s brother-in-law); Liwa al-Muntqimin (Avengers Brigade); Saraya al-Muntaqim (Avenger Companies); Quwwat Dhu al-Fiqar (Forces of Dhu al-Fiqar, the sword of Ali bin Abu Taleb, the prominent Shi’ite figure); al-Shahi Karim Dara’m (faction named after Karim Dara’m); Qabdat al-Huda wa Ahl al-Ma’aruf (The Righteous Path and People of Good Deeds); Firqat al-‘Aysha (Firqat al-‘Aysha Group: the exciting event, named after chapter 88 of the Koran, which deals with heaven and hell); Ahbab Allah (Those Dear to Allah); Alwiya al-Wa’d ak-Haqq (Truth Assurance Divisions).^[6]

Militia Activities

Attacking American Army targets

• The IRI attacks in Syria and Iraq have so far been rocket and UAV attacks, and the targets were the United States Ain al-Asad military base in western Iraq; a United States military base near Erbil Airport in northern Iraq; the al-Harir base northeast of Erbil; the al-Tanf base and al-Rukban camp in southern Syria, in the border area between Syria and Jordan; the Conoco base next to the Amr oil field, about 15 kilometers (12 miles) northeast of Deir ez-Zor; the al-Shadadi base, south of al-Hasaka in Syria; and the Kharab Algiers airport in northeastern Syria. There was also an attack for which the organization has so far not claimed responsibility, on the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC), located in the city’s airport complex. According to American sources, the attacks caused little damage and some were intercepted, contrary to the organization’s claims that it had inflicted significant damage.
• On November 23, 2023, the Saberin News Telegram channel, which is affiliated with the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, published an infographic of the IRI’s activity against American targets in Syria and Iraq, and against targets in Israel between October 18, 2023 and November 23, 2023, noting the targets and weapons used (Saberin News Telegram channel, November 23, 2023). According to the infographic, the organization carried out 71 attacks, 34 in Iraq, 34 in Syria, and three attacks on “Occupied Palestine,” two of them missile barrages targeting Eilat and one attack on the shores of the Dead Sea with two UAVs.
• On November 25, 2023, the IRI’s Telegram channel published an infographic which focused on its activities between October 18, 2023 and November 25, 2023. According to the infographic, the organization carried out 78 attacks:^[7] 39 in Iraq, 36 in Syria and three in Israel. The infographic claimed that “neither the Americans nor the Israelis will have a safe harbor” and the land and the sea were within the range of the “resistance.” In addition to infographic, maps were published showing the targets of the attacks (IRI Telegram channel, November 25, 2023).

     
The areas of the attacks in Syria and Iraq (Google Maps)

Notifications of attacks on Israel

• On November 2, 2023, the organization announced that it had attacked Israel for the first time, targeting an Israeli “vital target” on the shores of the Dead Sea. According to the announcement, “To aid our people in Gaza and in response to the massacre the Zionist entity is carrying out against Palestinian children, women and the elderly, today [November 2, 2023], early in the morning, the jihad fighters of the IRI attacked a vital target of the Zionist entity in the coast the Dead Sea. The IRI emphasizes that it will continue to destroy the enemy’s strongholds” (IRI Telegram channel, November 2, 2023).

• On November 3, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility for an attack on Eilat, stating that “the attack was a sign of support for our people in the Gaza Strip and as a response to the massacres of women, children and the elderly,” adding that that “the resistance will continue to destroy the enemy’s strongholds” (IRI Telegram channel, November 3, 2023).
• On November 12, 2023, the IRI again announced its operatives had attacked a target in Eilat “with appropriate weapons” and that “the resistance confirms it continues to destroy the enemy’s strongholds” (IRI Telegram channel, November 12, 2023). On November 10, 2023, the IDF attacked targets of a terrorist organization in Syrian territory which had launched a UAV at Eilat on November 9, 2023 (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram channel, November 10, 2023).

The IRI’s arsenal

• Short videos^[8] released by the IRI indicate that some of the attacks were carried out by UAVs used by the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, and the vast majority of them were launched during the night. In addition, the organization also launches rockets and missiles. On November 6, 2023, the IRI revealed its al-Aqsa 1 rocket, which it claimed to have used to attack American targets in Syria and Iraq (al-Nashra, November 6, 2023). On November 14, 2023, the IRI revealed a short-range smart missile called Tsarim (al-Mayadeen, November 14, 2023). In one isolated case, the IRI attacked an American vehicle in a protected area in Iraq with an IED.

   
From a video issued on October 24, 2023, documenting the launching of a UAV at the Ain Al Asad base (Telegram channel of the IRI, October 24, 2023)

   
From a video issued on October 23, 2023, showing an UAV before and during its launch at the al-Tanf base and al-Rukban camp (IRI Telegram channel of the IRI, October 23, 2023)

   
From a video issued on October 21, 2023, showing the launch of a UAV at the Ain Al Asad base (IRI Telegram channel, October 21, 2023)

Differences of opinion regarding the temporary ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

• The Arabic daily al-Araby al-Jadeed reported differences of opinion between the armed factions in Iraq regarding the continuation of attacking American targets during the temporary ceasefire in the Gaza Strip (November 24 – December 2, 2023). According to the newspaper, most of the factions’ leaders supported the cessation of attacks, partially due to concern of consequences if they continued attacking during the ceasefire (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 24, 2023). The Iraqi al-Rabia Network announced that the pro-Iranian Iraqi militias had decided to stop their military operations during the temporary ceasefire in the Gaza Strip (Iraqi al-Rabia Network, November 23, 2023). On the other hand, Kazem al-Fartousi, spokesman for the Sayyid al-Shuhadaa’ Brigades, a pro-Iranian Iraqi militia, stated that the cease-fire between Hamas and Israel “does not include the Iraqi resistance.” He added that all reports regarding a ceasefire between the Iraqi resistance and the American forces were false (Rudaw, November 23, 2023).
• The Hezbollah Battalions pro-Iranian Iraqi militia announced a “reduction in the rate of escalation against the American occupation bases in the region and a halt to operations against Israel until the end of the ceasefire.” At the same time, it emphasized that the confrontations with the forces threatening Iraq’s sovereignty would not stop until the country had been “cleansed” of the American presence (Hezbollah Battalions Telegram channel, November 25, 2023). In response, Jawad al-Talibawi, the military spokesman for the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq pro-Iranian Iraqi militia, attacked the announcement of the Hezbollah faction, claiming it was a disappointment and violated “the secrecy of the resistance activity.” He claimed the “resistance” was one, with only one goal, and he hoped not to come across such statements again (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Telegram channel, November 25, 2023).
• In practice, during the temporary ceasefire, there was a dramatic drop in the organization’s activity.

Threats to transition to “a new stage in the confrontation with the enemy”

• On November 3, 2023, the IRI announced that in the coming week they would initiate a new phase of the conflict, which would be stronger and more extensive. A photograph of a rocket on a launch pad was attached to the announcement (IRI Telegram channel, November 3, 2023). The “new phase” may include increasing the attacks of the militias on Israel, especially from Syrian territory.

The Presence of Iraqi Shi’ite Militias on the Syrian Border

• In March 2017 Iran, along with Hezbollah, formulated a plan for establishing themselves in the Syrian Golan near the border with Israel, by means of the pro-Iranian Iraqi militias. That was reflected in the March 8, 2017, announcement issued by Akram al-Kaabi, secretary general of the al-Nujaba militia, regarding the establishment of the Golan Liberation Brigade. He stated that together with the Syrian army, his operatives in Syria were prepared to “liberate” the Golan Heights when the campaign against ISIS ended. On November 24, 2017, interviewed in Tehran, he stated that his militia had established the Golan Liberation Brigade to “fight the takfir [“infidel”] organizations [the ISIS-led jihadist organizations] operated by the Zionist entity,” representing ISIS as an Israeli military wing to increase hostility to it. He added that if requested, his brigade would help the Syrian army “liberate the Golan.”

• In August 2020, a Syrian opposition source, quoting local military sources, reported that Iran had begun establishing a new military force in the Quneitra district near the border with Israel in order to expand its regional influence. According to the report, Iran was working through Hezbollah and under the auspices of Branch 220 of the Syrian political security administration to establish the new force. It would be commanded by former Syrian army soldiers and operatives of the Fawj al-Julan militia, which operates within the Syrian regime and consists mainly of Druze (Anab Baldi, August 12, 2020). The new military force may combine forces with operatives of pro-Iranian militias, especially with the Golan Liberation Brigade.
• On June 11, 2021, Nasr al-Shamari, a spokesman for Hezbollah’s al-Nujaba militia, said the Golan Liberation Brigade was fully prepared to participate in the operation to “liberate” the Golan Heights at the request of the Syrian government, adding that its operatives had been trained and had the weapons to cause damage deep inside Israeli territory, not only in the Golan area. He said the brigade had been established by the al-Nujaba militia movement to join the “brothers in Syria” in the campaign to “liberate” the Golan, which was getting closer every day (al-Ahed, June 11, 2022).
• After the beginning of Operation Iron Swords, the Golan Liberation Brigade explicated threatened that it would join the fighting. The brigade may operate within the framework of the IRI or cooperate with it. On October 20, 2023, a video was published on social networks with captions in Hebrew and Arabic, threatening that “the ‘resistance’ is preparing something for you,” an example of the psychological warfare conducted by Iran through its proxies [the Hebrew translation, which is inaccurate, reads “The resistance is prepared for you”) (X account, October 20, 2023).

Appendix

Claims of responsibility

• According to some of the announcements of the organization’s claims of responsibility for attacks on American targets in Syria and Iraq, they were responses to the “American occupation,” according to others they were responses to American aid to Israel in the war in the Gaza Strip. The claims of responsibility for attacks against Israel were allegedly to “aid the residents of Gaza” and “a response to the “massacre” [Israel] is carrying out against Palestinian civilians.” (All the claims of responsibility were issued on the IRI Telegram channel.)
  • On November 23, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on the American base in the Conoco oil field in Syria, reporting direct hits on the targets.
  • On the same day, the IRI claimed responsibility for the UAV attack on the American base at the al-Amar oil field in Syria. According to the claim, the aircraft “hit its target directly” and “it was in response to the crimes committed by the enemy against our people in the Gaza Strip.”
  • On November 23, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility for two UAV attacks on the Ain al-Asad airbase and two attacks on the American base near the Erbil Airport, in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The IRI said “we attacked with a UAV that hit their targets directly, in response to the crimes committed by the enemy against our people in the Gaza Strip.”
  • On November 22, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility for the launch of a UAV to attack the American al-Harir base, in northern Iraq, “in response to the crimes committed by the enemy against our people in the Gaza Strip.”
  • On November 2, 2023, a claimed responsibility was issued for an attack on “a vital target of the Zionist entity on the shores of the Dead Sea in response to the massacre it is carrying out against Palestinian civilians.” The claim added that “the IRI will continue to destroy the enemy’s strongholds.”
  • On November 3, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility for a morning attack on Eilat, ” carried out as a sign of support for our people in the Gaza Strip and as a response to the massacres of women, children and the elderly.” The claim added that “the resistance will continue to destroy the enemy’s strongholds.”
  • On November 1, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility for an attack on the al-Tanf American base in Syria carried out using two anti-aircraft missiles and claiming they “hit their targets directly.”

• • On October 30, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility for an attack on the “occupation’s base in the Koniko gas field in the Deir ez-Zor region, carried out using a barrage of rockets, which caused direct injuries.” The IRI also claimed responsibility for an attack on the Ain al-Asad airbase “using rocket barrages that hit their targets.”
  • On October 29, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility for attacking the “occupation’s base al-Shadadi, south of al-Hasaka, using two UAVs that caused direct injuries.”
  • On October 28, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility for the attack on the American al-Tanf base in Syria, using two anti-aircraft missiles, and claimed they “hit their targets directly.”
  • On October 27, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility a UAV attack on the American airbase in Ain Al-Asad, in western Iraq, adding that “the attack directly hit its targets” (Telegram channel of the IRI, October 27, 2023).
  • On October 26, 2023, the IRI claimed responsibility on an attack of a United States Army camp near Irbil airport in northern Iraq using two UAVs “that hit their targets directly.”

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications. ↑
^[2] Amir al-Kaabi, Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, Facade Group Linked to Iran Claims Five Attacks on Americans in Iraq and Syria, 20 October 2023: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/facade-group-linked-iran-claims-five-attacks-americans-iraq-and-syria ↑
^[3] For further information about the militia, see the ITIC December 2022 report, "Kata’ib Hezbollah: A Dominant Iraqi Pro-Iranian Militia." ↑

^[4] For further information, see the November 2022 ITIC report, "The Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq – the current situation." ↑
^[5] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. ↑
^[6] For further information, see https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/84368, https://arabic.iswnews.com, and the November 2022 ITIC report, , "The Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq – the current situation." ↑
^[7] The discrepancies in the numbers of attacks in the two infographics are apparently the result of updating. The later infographic is probably the most accurate and up-to-date. ↑
^[8] The videos published are extremely short (a matter seconds) and do not include text, but only the inscription "Combat information - the Islamic Resistance in Iraq." ↑

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