Operation Iron Swords The development of Iranian-Hamas-Hezbollah cooperation

Overview^[1]

• Since October 7, 2023, Israel has been waging war against the “axis of resistance,”^[2] led by Iran and two of its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah goes beyond the current war and previous rounds of conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations in Gaza. It considers its network of proxies part of its military strength and deterrent capability. Controlling a network of armed terrorist organizations, which includes Hamas, the Islamic Jihad in Palestine (PIJ), and Hezbollah, allows Iran to act against its opponents, primarily but not exclusively Israel and the United States, with room for plausible deniability, reducing the risk of escalation to the point of direct military confrontation with its enemies.
• Hezbollah is considered Iran’s preferred strategic arm, providing it with the capabilities to deter Israel and advance its regional interests. Since the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has played a central role in the restoration of Hezbollah’s arsenal of more than 100,000 rockets and missiles, including precise missiles which threaten Israel’s military and civilian infrastructure. Ideologically, Hezbollah is considered the organization most committed to the Islamic Republic, mainly due to the religious commitment of the organization’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, to the leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei.
• Iran’s desire to intensify its threats against Israel with a “ring of fire” around its borders has led Iran to strengthen its ties with other terrorist organizations operating near Israel, especially Hamas. Even though Hamas is a Sunni and not a Shi’ite Muslim movement, their common denominator is the concept of “resistance” and the desire to destroy Israel. Iran regards the two leading Palestinian Islamist organizations, Hamas and the PIJ, as centers of power in the Palestinian arena, which can be used to advance its regional goals, especially vis-à-vis Israel. Through the Qods Force, Iran provides the organizations with weapons and funding of tens of millions of dollars a year, transfers technological knowledge for the development and manufacture of weapons, and trains their terrorist operatives.
• Although Hamas’ ideological attachment to Iran is not as strict and its financial dependence on Iran is less than the PIJ’s, there has been extensive cooperation between the Hamas movement and the Islamic Republic since the early 1990s. Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 led to the strengthening of its ties with Iran because of its desire to advance its military buildup and Iran’s willingness to strengthen its influence in the Gaza Strip as leverage for conducting armed hostilities against Israel’s southern border while establishing the threat of Hezbollah to the north.
• Hamas’ support for the Syrian opposition after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 and its support for the Saudi Arabian attack on Yemen in 2015 cooled relations between Iran and Hamas, although Iran’s military support for the movement did not stop. Since 2017, relations between Iran and Hamas have improved, and Iranian support has increased. During the past two years, Iran and Hamas have conducted ongoing coordination both on the political level, led by the Iranian foreign ministry, and on the military level, led by the Qods Force. Iran also increased its military support for the Palestinian terrorists by transferring weapons to Judea and Samaria to ignite and wage a campaign against Israel from there as well.
• Following the Hamas attack on October 7,2023, senior Iranian regime officials congratulated Hamas on the massacre its operatives conducted and emphasized their continued support for Hamas. Since the outbreak of the war, Iran has been working to instruct, support, and encourage its proxies, especially Hamas and Hezbollah, to use coordinated force against Israel. It also increased its threats against Israel in an attempt to prevent it from continuing the campaign, including by using various members of the “resistance front.”

The Network of Iranian Proxies

• Since October 7, 2023, Israel has been waging war against the “axis of resistance” led by Iran and its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah is broad, deep, and not only related to the current war and previous rounds of conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations in Gaza. Iran attaches great importance to organizations in the Middle East, which it can exploit to promote and realize its national interests. The use of proxies became a central element in the concept of Iranian security and its regional activities after the Islamic Revolution. By the early 1980s, the Iranian regime had begun recruiting non-state organizations, which have become a network of tens of thousands of fighters who maintain ties with Iran at various levels.
• Iran regards its network of proxies as part of its military might and its ability to deter its enemies, increase its strategic depth, and expand its influence and power beyond its borders. Controlling the network allows Iran to act against its opponents, primarily Israel and the United States, ,quickly, simply and relatively cheaply. The objective of Iran’s support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations and Hezbollah is to maintain an effective threat close to Israel’s borders. The use of proxies enables Iran to realize its regional goals without involvement in a direct military conflict with other countries, giving it plausible deniability and reducing the risk of escalation to a comprehensive military conflict.

• Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran has invested a great deal of effort in spreading its revolutionary ideology, especially among Shi’ite populations, who were more willing to accept its revolutionary rhetoric. Iran’s strategic objectives also necessitated the adoption of a pragmatic policy, and Iran supports a wide range of non-state organizations, including Sunni organizations and others which do not share Iran’s fundamentalist ideology. In its efforts to expand its regional influence, Iran encouraged the establishment of a united Muslim front against external enemies, especially the United States and Israel.

Hezbollah: Iran’s preferred strategic arm

• Since the early 1980s, Iran has viewed Hezbollah as a key strategic asset that exhausts Israel and deters it from taking offensive action. Iran regards Hezbollah as serving the campaign against Israel, its policy in Syria, and its subversion in the Middle East. Hezbollah’s extensive and effective involvement in the fighting in Syria and its aid to the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Yemen showed the Iranians Hezbollah’s importance as a tool for advancing their regional interests.

• The establishment and rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the early 1980s under Qods Force leadership was one of the most notable achievements of Iranian foreign policy. After Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, the Qods Force support for Hezbollah increased. The Force established a long-range rocket infrastructure which threatened Israel’s home front and was activated during the Second Lebanon War (July-August 2006). In the years since, the Qods Force has played a central role in the restoration and military buildup of Hezbollah’s terrorist capabilities, particularly an arsenal of over 100,000 rockets and missiles, including missiles capable of precise strikes which threaten Israel’s military and civilian infrastructure. Iranian aid to Hezbollah is estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Iran also provides the organization with extensive military assistance, professional security knowledge, and assistance for its social institutions.
• Ideologically, Hezbollah is considered the organization most committed to the Islamic Republic and its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, which was evident in several statements by senior members of the organization. For example, Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general, interviewed by the Lebanese newspaper Nahar al-Shabab on July 30, 2009, said his organization regarded Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Revolution, as “a ruler wise in Islamic knowledge, which gave him legitimacy,” and his successor, Khamenei “Sets the general guidelines for us, which free us from guilt and give us legitimacy.” He claimed Hezbollah could not launch an operation against Israel without religious justification from “the wise ruler in Iran,” although that did not mean following instructions about how to decide; that was up to Hezbollah.^[3] Hezbollah’s religious affiliation and loyalty to Iran were also evident in a speech given in a closed forum by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. On March 12, 2018, the Iranian conservative Farda News site published the full text of a speech Nasrallah gave at a conference of Iranians living in Lebanon. He stated that his organization was absolutely loyal to the leader of Iran, a commitment that was stronger than the commitment to the Lebanese constitution. He said Hezbollah was committed not only to the express instructions of the Iranian leader but also to his “suggestions and opinions.” He said that when Hezbollah’s Central Council discussed a matter, it avoided taking any action which might displease Khamenei. Nasrallah also said Hezbollah’s transformation into a “world power” was made possible thanks to its loyalty to the Iranian leader, noting that the organization’s loyalty to Khamenei’s “wise religious rule was stronger” than that of many Iranians. However, he said Iran did not tell Hezbollah how to act but consulted with it on regional issues and aided it with money, weapons, and other means.^[4] Senior Iranian officials also referred to Hezbollah’s political and ideological commitment to Iran. For example, Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military advisor to the leader of Iran and the former IRGC commander, said that if Israel wanted to harm Iran, Hezbollah would most likely take action against it. He stated that he considered Nasrallah “a soldier of leader Khamenei.”^[5] However, in addition to its commitment to Iran and its ideological and religious foundations, it is a Lebanese political and social movement which wants to direct resources to increase its grip on Lebanon and gain broad legitimacy, especially among the Lebanese Shi’ite population, while continuing its military buildup.

Iranian activity in the Palestinian arena

• Iran’s desire to increase its threats against Israel by creating a “ring of fire” around its borders led Iran to strengthen ties with other terrorist organizations operating near Israel, headed by Hamas. Despite the fact that Hamas is a Sunni and not a Shi’ite Muslim organization, they have a common denominator which serves as the basis for Iranian support: they are partners in the concept of “resistance” and the desire to destroy Israel. Iran sees the two leading Palestinian Islamic organizations, Hamas and the PIJ, as essential power centers in the Palestinian arena which can be used to advance its regional goals, especially vis-à-vis Israel. Led by the Qods Force, Iran assists them with weapons (including rockets that threaten central and southern Israel), funds amounting to tens of millions of dollars per year to finance the construction of military infrastructure and the ongoing operation of the military force, the transfer of technological knowledge for the development and production of weapons (including rockets) and training terrorist operatives who left the Gaza Strip and went to Iran to be trained by Qods Force operatives.

• Of the two organizations, Iran is more closely allied to the PIJ. Their deep ideological connection is anchored in the organization’s perceptions as shaped by its founder, Fathi Shqaqi, for whom Iran, under the revolutionary leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, was a model to be emulated. In addition, the organization’s limited financial resources, which does not operate a significant network of community-social services as does Hamas, oblige it to rely on Iranian assistance to a greater extent.

The development of Iran-Hamas relations

• The relationship between Iran and Hamas is different from its relationship with the PIJ, both because Hamas is larger and more established and because its ideological attachment to Iran is not as strong. However, from the beginning of the 1990s, Iran’s interest in Hamas grew because Iran saw the movement as a means to increase its active involvement in the Palestinian arena and the “struggle” against Israel. The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 obliged the movement to accelerate its military buildup to continue its strategy of anti-Israeli terrorism, making rockets its primary means of confrontation, inspired by Hezbollah’s achievements in the Second Lebanon War. Hamas needed external strategic support to ensure its political survival and promote its military buildup, and it chose the Iranian-Syrian axis. While unlike Hezbollah, Hamas was not prepared to fully subject itself to Iran’s dictates. Nevertheless, Iran had a ,vital strategic interest in helping Hamas construct and strengthen its rule as leverage for conducting the armed struggle against Israel on its southern border, along with establishing the threat of Hezbollah to the north.

• Israel’s Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014 provided the Iranian leadership with another opportunity to support the Palestinian terrorist organizations. The Iranian regime saw the operation as an opportunity to restore Iran’s relations with Hamas, which had been damaged by Hamas’ support for the Syrian opposition at the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. The restoration of relations might allow Tehran to gain a renewed foothold in the Gaza Strip, increase its influence in the Palestinian arena, and strengthen the cohesion of the “resistance camp.” Hamas realized it needed Iran more than ever for financial and operational support, especially given the deterioration of its relations with Egypt following the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule in Egypt in the summer of 2013.
• Hamas’s support for the Syrian opposition after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War and its support for Saudi Arabia and the deposed president of Yemen at the start of the Saudi Arabian attack on Yemen as part of Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015, undermined relations between Iran and Hamas, even though Iran’s military support Hamas did not stop. The resolution of the Syrian Civil War, the appointment of Ismail Haniyeh as the head of Hamas’ political bureau, and the appointment of Yahya al-Sinwar as the new leader of Hamas in Gaza in May 2017 led to an improvement in relations between Iran and Hamas. The movement benefits from the supply of Iranian weapons, the training of its terrorist operatives in Iran, the transfer of Iranian knowledge and capabilities through various axes to the Gaza Strip, Judea, and Samaria, as well as extensive economic support. For example, in an interview with a media outlet of an Iraqi militia supported by Iran in November 2018, Ali Barakat, the representative of Hamas in Lebanon, said Iran was the only country that supported the Palestinian resistance with money and weapons, enabling the resistance in Gaza to remain stable and robust. For example, he said that Hamas operatives had launched most of their rocket arsenal during Operation Protective Edge. Iran was the only party that supported them with money to renew the stockpile and purchase weapons and equipment.^[6]

• At the end of Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021, Isma’il Haniyeh thanked Iran for its support of weapons and money.^[7] Interviewed by al-Jazeera TV on March 19, 2023, Khalil al-Haya, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, said that Iran had stood by the Palestinian “resistance” with all its capabilities and that Iran’s political, financial, and military aid did not stop even after Hamas left Syria in 2013. Interviewed by the BBC after the outbreak of Operation Iron Swords, Ghazi Hamad, a senior Hamas official, praised the aid and support Hamas had received from Iran for the attack. He boasted that many countries were helping the Palestinians and that Iran helped them and other countries with money, weapons, and political support (BBC in Arabic, October 8, 2023). The military connection between Iran and Hamas and the PIJ is closely maintained by the Qods Force wing dedicated to dealing with “Palestine.”

• During the past two years, Iran and Hamas have coordinated continually. A few instances are the following:
  • Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, the Iranian foreign minister, met with representatives of the Palestinian terrorist organizations in Syria in July 2022 (ISNA, July 3, 2022).
  • The Iranian foreign minister with representatives of the Palestinian terrorist organizations in Damascus, including the Hamas delegation headed by Usama Hamdan, in January 2023 (ISNA, January 13, 2023).
  • The Iranian foreign minister spoke on the phone with Isma’il Haniyeh in January 2023 (Fars, January 29, 2023).
  • Ali Akbar Velayati, the Iranian leader’s senior advisor for international affairs, spoke on the phone with Isma’il Haniyeh in February 2023 (al-Mayadeen , February 26, 2023).
  • Esmail Ghaani, commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force, met with Isma’il Haniyeh and his deputy Saleh al-‘Arouri in Damascus (Lebanese ASAS new website, April 8, 2023).
  • The Iranian spoke on the phone with Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, and Isma’il Haniyeh in April 2023 (Qudspress.com, April 28, 2023).
  • A Hamas delegation headed by Ismail Haniyeh went to Tehran in June 2023. The delegation, which also included Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, and senior members of the organization Khalil al-Haya, Muhammad Nasr, and Nizar Awadallah, met with Ibrahim Raisi, president of Iran, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Hossein Salami, IRGC commander (Mehr, June 19, 2023; Fars, June 20, 2023; palinfo.com, June 21, 2023).
  • Senior Qods Force and Hamas officials met in July 2023 (Reuters, July 25, 2023).
  • A telephone conversation between Velayati, the advisor to the Iranian leader, and Isma’il Haniyeh in August 2023 (ISNA, August 22, 2023).

• In recent years, Iran has increased its military support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations by transferring weapons to the Judea and Samaria arena to ignite and wage a campaign against Israel. At the same time, public references made by senior IRGC operatives to the growth of the “Palestinian resistance” in Judea and Samaria and to the increasing challenges facing Israel and the IDF in that arena have multiplied. The many Iranian references to events in Judea and Samaria are consistent with Israeli exposures of growing Iranian activity in the Palestinian arena, including attempts to establish Iranian intelligence networks in Israel, Judea and Samaria, establish terrorist networks disguised as civilian organizations, and transfer explosives using unmanned aerial vehicles.^[8]

• Following the Hamas attack on October 7, senior officials of the Iranian regime congratulated Hamas for the massacre it had committed, declared Hamas’ action was the beginning of the victory of the Islamic nation and the “resistance” over Israel, and emphasized their continued support for Hamas. Iranian leader Ali Khamenei stated that Iran “kisses the hands of the Palestinians” who planned the attack on Israel. He said Iran was proud of the Palestinians and supported them, although those who linked Iran to the attack against Israel were wrong (al-Alam, October 10, 2023). Since the outbreak of the war, Iran has been working to instruct, support, and encourage its proxies, headed by Hamas and Hezbollah, to use coordinated force against Israel. A few days after the outbreak of the war, Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, the Iranian foreign minister, paid visits to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Qatar, and also met with the heads of the Palestinian terrorist organizations and Hassan Nasrallah, and also spoke on the phone with the leaders of Hamas and the PIJ. Meanwhile, since the outbreak of the war, Iran has intensified its threats against continued Israeli activity in Gaza. Apparently, Iran fears an Israeli ground campaign could challenge the survival of Hamas, which is a key Iranian tool in its efforts to establish its influence in the Palestinian arena. It, therefore, has increased its threats against Israel in an attempt to prevent it from continuing the campaign and by using various members of the “resistance front,” including the pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Syria, Iraq, or Yemen, as a stratum of response against Israel.

     
“The Escape of the Zionist Mice,” cartoons published by the Iranian Fars news agency (October 8, 2023)

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications. ↑
^[2] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Houthis in Yemen. ↑
^[3] For further information see the ITIC report, “Two rare statements about Iran-Hezbollah relations: Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Supreme Leader Khamenei, admits Iran fully supports Hezbollah. Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general, says Hezbollah derives legitimacy for its activities from Khamenei.” ↑
^[4] For further information, see the ITIC report, “Iranian Website Published a Speech Delivered by Hezbollah Secretary General at a Closed Forum Expressing Total Devotion to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Similar Statements were Issued Previously by Hezbollah Officials.” ↑
^[5] Ibid. ↑
^[6] For further information, see the ITIC report, “Senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas figures praise Iran’s military support and threaten that in the next war the rocket fire from the Gaza Strip will reach all the cities in Israel and the “resistance axis” will coordinate its actions on all fronts.” ↑
^[7] For further information, see the ITIC report, “Escalation from the Gaza Strip – Operation Guardian of the Walls – Summary” ↑
^[8] For further information, see the ITIC report, “Declarations of Senior Iranian Officials Concerning the West Bank Point to Intensifying Iranian Effort to Expand Its Influence in this Arena.” ↑

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