Palestinian Activity in Jenin in Reaction to the IDF Presence in Judea and Samaria

Overview

• On June 19, 2023, the Israeli security force activity in Jenin became complicated when IEDs were detonated to attack two IDF armored vehicles. For several hours, during which the forces tried to extract the vehicles, there were heavy exchanges of fire with armed Palestinians; the IDF also used attack helicopters. Seven soldiers were wounded and several vehicles were damaged and put out of commission. For the past two years Jenin, and especially the Jenin refugee camp, has become a focus for terrorism and has been used by many Palestinians as a base for terrorist attacks, including attacks carried out inside Israeli territory. The IDF, which operates in the city and the refugee camp to stamp out terrorism, has had to face partially-institutionalized clashes with operatives from the military wings of the Palestinian terrorist organizations. The event on June 19, 2023, was an escalation in the activities in the refugee camp against the Israeli forces.
• The Jenin refugee camp, with its population of about 11,000, is controlled by military-terrorist wings, led by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s Jerusalem Brigades, and has become a center for terrorism in Judea and Samaria. Their activities include the recent attempts to shoot at Israeli communities near the border and attempts, so far unsuccessful, to manufacture rockets and launch them into Israeli territory. The refugee camp, with its various resident terrorist organizations, operates as one organism and is almost independent; the Palestinian Authority (PA) has virtually no presence or influence in the camp. Some of the refugee camp residents, even those who are not terrorist operatives, participate in the activities against the Israeli security forces by providing early intelligence of IDF force entry into the camp and helping to prevent their operations.
• In the months of confrontation with Israeli security forces in the Jenin refugee camp the terrorist operatives’ methods have evolved and their organizational, intelligence and operational capabilities have developed and improved. They have upgraded their ability to monitor security force activities, study the IDF’s methods and develop countermeasures, hold exercises and train operatives.
• The Jenin refugee camp is unique in its militancy and organized offensives against Israeli security force activity. Monitoring and active participation in events makes the local residents identify with the ongoing “war of liberation” [anti-IDF attacks] which has recently come to dictate their agenda and daily lives and which they perceive as not only defending their rights, but their homes and families as well. The opposition to the Israeli security forces of the Jenin refugee camp inspires the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. Jenin is praised, glorified and has become a model for Nablus, Tulkarm and Jericho, which are beginning to copy its methods.
• This report investigates the recent events in the Jenin refugee camp and presents information about the methods used by the terrorist operatives; their intelligence and operations, including the development of operational capabilities and weapons; improvement in the ability of their monitoring units to alert the camp to the entry of IDF forces and their locations; the fast, capable identification of the IDF units and even their ability to identify IDF special forces (such as undercover and intelligence units); monitoring the types of weapons the IDF forces use; etc. For the most part the report is based on an analysis of local Palestinian social networks in February, March and April 2023, with additional examples from June 2023.

The Jenin Refugee Camp’s Modus Operandi

Overview

• As early as Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, the Jenin refugee camp was known for its fierce opposition to the IDF. The Palestinian forces were composed of a coalition of armed Palestinian operatives, especially from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB). They coordinated surveillance, ambushes, auxiliary and armed operatives, and the use of IEDs. Now, twenty years later, when Israeli security forces enter the refugee camp they face similar opposition, but it is more complex and advanced. Most of the opposition comes from the Jenin Battalion, while some is unorganized and initiated personally.
• The Jenin Battalion is an organized network of armed terrorists which was founded in the Jenin refugee camp. It is affiliated with the PIJ and is a kind of Samaria branch of the Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing. The Jenin Battalion was apparently organized in May 2021 during Operation Guardian of the Walls but its existence was made public in September 2021, when six security prisoners escaped from the Gilboa Prison. The Jenin Battalion was founded by the PIJ but has operatives from other organizations’ military-terrorist wings, such as Hamas and Fatah, and thereby shows unity and coordination between the more prominent organizations in the face of the schism in Palestinian society.^[1] The operatives identify locally rather than organizationally, as is evident from the names of other battalions, i.e., the Nablus Battalion, the Tubas Battalion, etc. The operatives use Telegram channels for basic communications, sending messages and reporting to each other and the population at large.
• During the past months certain types of activities and methods were used to oppose IDF forces in the Jenin refugee camp. The operatives learn from every encounter and improve their capabilities, intelligence and operations, such as the ability to alert the camp when IDF forces enter and to report their location; to better and more rapidly identify special IDF units; develop urban warfare capabilities, weapons and monitoring; and use IEDs and UAVs to meet the challenges posed by the IDF. The local population has joined the effort, supporting the operatives and obeying their orders.
• The methods used against Israeli security forces by the various operatives in the Jenin refugee camp:

Issuing alerts when IDF forces enter the Jenin refugee camp

• The Jenin refugee camp has monitoring units composed of operatives from the military-terrorist wings and local civilians whose role is to issue alerts when Israeli security forces enter the camp. Over time, they learned to precisely identify the types of forces (Yamam, undercover, intelligence), their number and vehicles, the direction from which they came and where they are located, etc. Often the information is accompanied by photographs taken in real time which are disseminated on the assigned social networks. For the most part the forces are monitored from places of concealment (usually rooftops), and sometimes from vehicles routinely patrolling the camp. Pictures uploaded to the social networks identify the type of IDF unit which has entered, indicating the kind of activity operatives will take against it.

  
Right: Jenin Battalion operatives monitor the entry of IDF forces (jeninfirst2023 Facebook page). Left: Terrorist operatives (or possibly local residents) covertly monitor IDF forces after they emerge from their commercial vehicle (jeninfirst2023 Facebook page, March 7, 2023).

Attempts to prevent Israeli security forces from entering Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp

• After identification, attempts are made to prevent the entry of IDF forces, sometimes in a joint effort of operatives on the ground and local residents. The type of combat varies from site to site and event to event. However, generally speaking, the fighting is spontaneous and localized, commanded by the local leadership.
• Some of the methods referred to on the social networks include the positioning of metal obstacles, pouring oil on the road and burning tires. Sometimes operatives patrol to verify that the entrances have been properly blocked. Al-Jazeera correspondents accompanied a patrol which went to verify that the entrances had been blocked and a photojournalist accompanied an operative who drove from one to the other, claiming they customarily blocked 15 entrances (al-Jazeera, March 2023).

    
(al-Jazeera, March 2023)

Terrorists in Tulkarm copy blocking method used by Jenin Battalion

     
Tulkarm Battalion operatives erect blockades and place sandbags at the entrance and alleys of the Nur Shams refugee camp (Ghrab Asia – Ajel Facebook page, April 3, 2023).

• After using a UAV to attack a terrorist squad, sheets of material and plastic were seen strung over the streets of the Jenin refugee camp, covering them to protect terrorist operatives from IDF UAVs (@jenencamb Telegram channel, June 23, 2023). The same system was used in the Gaza Strip in the past to protect terrorists from being monitored by the IDF.

     
Camouflaging the streets of the Jenin refugee camp
(@jenencamb Telegram channel, June 23, 2023).

Activity on the ground

• A great deal of activity on the ground is defensive, to prevent Israeli security forces from entering the refugee camp to carry out detentions and demolish buildings. Offensive actions usually include shooting and throwing Molotov cocktails and IEDs at the Israeli forces, lying in ambush near where the forces are located or concentrated, or near roadblocks, and recently by detonating IEDs to attack IDF vehicles.
• According to various media postings, when the entry of IDF forces is detected, relatively fixed procedures are followed:
  • The news of their entry is disseminated.
  • The camp goes on high alert.
  • Operatives are deployed to concealed locations [aware the IDF will try to lure them out of their stations into open areas].
  • Sirens or the mosque loudspeakers are sounded as a preventive measure and as warnings for local residents to close their stores and take their children inside, and to alert operatives on the ground.
  • If necessary, local residents are called on for help [for example, to delay the IDF forces by burning tires of throwing rocks].

Combat methods

• The activity on the ground varies from site to site and event to event, but generally speaking the fighting is localized and directed by locals, spontaneous and coordinated according to circumstance. The forces are decentralized and there is no clear hierarchy, influencing the decision-making process on the ground. In most cases the combat is defensive and concentrated on keeping the IDF out of the refugee camp.
• When combat is offensive it usually includes gunfire from operatives masked to prevent identification, and the throwing of rocks and Molotov cocktails. Sometimes the IDF forces are ambushed, for example near roadblocks or other locations where they concentrate. An IED was recently detonated to attack an IDF convoy, wounding soldiers and causing extensive damage to vehicles, and forcing Israeli security forces to engage in a massive firefight for several hours.
• Reports from the social networks on various measures taken by terrorist operatives during the fighting:

Continuous reporting about IDF force locations

• During every event reports are sent from the ground by scouts and local residents about the location of Israeli security forces, their entry, confrontations with terrorist operatives and local residents, etc. The reports continue until the forces leave. For example:

Documenting Israeli security force activity on June 19, 2023

• A similar procedure was followed during an Israeli security force activity on June 19, 2023. Reports were issued from the moment the forces set out, as they progressed towards the Jenin refugee camp, during the activity on the ground and as the forces left. The reports were accompanied by pictures posted to the social networks. A call was issued to the public asking anyone who saw or exposed the military forces to document them and send the pictures to the dedicated Telegram channel (Jenin al-Qassam Telegram channel, June 19, 2023).

    
IDF armored vehicles leave from Jalameh (Right: Jenin al-Qassam Telegram channel, June 19, 2023. Left: @jeniincamp Telegram channel, June 19, 2023).

    
Right: IDF forces on Nassera Street. Left: IDF forces on al-Ascar Street (@jenencamb Telegram channel, June 19, 2023).

     
Pictures of reinforcements approaching Jenin from various locations (Right: Jenin al-Qassam Telegram channel, June 19, 2023. Left: @jenencamb Telegram channel, June 19, 2023).

Identifying IDF special units

• The Jenin refugee camp’s awareness is heightened by the presence of IDF special forces and the need to prevent their activities. According to the Palestinian media outlets and social networks, the IDF makes increasing use of undercover and other special forces, especially during counterterrorism activities. The military-terrorist operatives on the ground and local residents have become increasingly aware of the presence of Israeli special forces and they have become skilled in identifying them, sometimes even to the point of exactly identifying a unit. They succeed despite the forces’ use of various types of camouflage (closed civilian vehicles, vehicles with Palestinian license plates, civilian dress, costumes, etc.).
•  After an entry of undercover forces an announcement was issued by residents of the Jenin refugee camp declaring an emergency situation. According to the announcement, until further notice every suspicious vehicle would be monitored, and busses, refrigerator and other trucks and all other vehicles which did not belong to the camp would be denied entry. The warning was issued “to prevent a repetition of the events which recently occurred” (jeninfirst2023 Facebook page).

     
IDF special forces in action (jeninalhadath Facebook page, March 16, 2023).

• At around 4:45 a.m. on June 19, 2023, sirens were heard in the Jenin refugee camp (@jenencamb Telegram channel and @jeniincamp Telegram channel, June 19, 2023). Reports were immediately issued of the exposure of IDF special forces in the al-Jabariyat neighborhood in Jenin, above the refugee camp (@jenencamb Telegram channel and @jeniincamp Telegram channel, June 19, 2023).

It was reported that IDF special forces were located in a building they entered after having been exposed, and armored vehicles and a bulldozer had left various bases and roadblocks to support them (@jenencamb Telegram channel, June 19, 2023).

• According to an al-Quds TV report about activity in the Jenin refugee camp against the Israeli special forces, the local residents reported the continuing failure of the “occupation” and its apparatuses to apprehend wanted Palestinians during their night activities, especially in Jenin, Jaba and Qabatiya, and in other locations as well. That motivated them [the IDF] to use their special units for ambushes.
• According to the report, the minute the undercover unit slipped though the outskirts of Qabatiya, south of Jenin, it was discovered. Within a few minutes the information spread and the “resistance” [terrorist operatives] and local youths went on alert to foil the undercover soldiers’ plan to use Palestinian vehicles on several main streets to detain or kill “resistance fighters.” Local residents and operatives sent pictures documenting the movement around Qabatiya of suspicious vehicles with Palestinian license plates. As soon as the information was disseminated the entire region went on alert and “military” operatives announced preparations for engagement. Operatives deployed to sensitive locations, but as noted they did not leave their familiar spots in the alleys and streets so as not to fall into IDF traps. The report also stated that IDF special units customarily infiltrate under cover of darkness, invade houses and post snipers to hunt “resistance fighters” (al-Quds, April 16, 2023).

Identifying snipers

• There is also growing awareness of the presence of IDF snipers and consequently, the number reports of their locations increases.

   
Marked sniper positions (Jenin al-Qassam Telegram channel, June 19, 2023; @jeniincamp Telegram channel, June 19, 2023).

Identifying UAVs

• The monitoring unit, or operatives with positions in fighting units, also follow events in the skies over Jenin and are aware of the presence of IDF UAVs. Operatives on the ground can not only identify the UAV but its function as well (aerial photography, intelligence collection, support for forces, etc.). They invest efforts to prevent UAV activity and intercept them. UAV activity is primarily disrupted by smoke from burning tires. In several instances operatives in the Jenin refugee camp were documented trying to intercept UAVs by shooting at them. The targeted killing of a squad of three terrorist operatives driving in a vehicle by means of a UAV on June 21, 2023, will in all probability increase their efforts. According to posts to the social networks, the flight and hovering of UAVs alerts “resistance” operatives that IDF forces are planning to enter the area or carry out a targeted killing, and they take appropriate measures.

   
Reports of attack helicopters in the skies over Jenin (Right: @jenencamb Telegram channel; Left: Jenin al-Qassam Telegram channel, June 19, 2023).

Attempts to intercept UAVs

     
Right: Jenin refugee camp documentation of intercepted UAV. Left: Israeli helicopter drops flares after being shot at in the skies over the Jenin refugee camp.

• On March 7, 2023, the Jenin Battalion claimed responsibility for intercepting two drones (Jenin Battalion-Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, March 7, 2023).

• On June 8, 2023, the Jenin Battalion claimed its operatives had intercepted an IDF drone near the Jenin refugee camp, and that the battalion’s engineers were trying to extract “important and sensitive information” from it.

    
Pictures of the drone (Right: Jenin Battalion alternative Telegram channel, June 8, 2023. Left: Shehab Telegram channel, June 8, 2023).

Exercises and training

• There is considerable documentation of terrorist operatives in the Jenin refugee camp and nearby area routinely conducting exercises and undergoing training. Sometimes they brief local residents of their intention to hold an exercise and sometimes they issue announcements to reassure them after an exercise and inform them that the explosions they heard were part of the exercise or training carried out by the forces in the refugee camp. On April 29, 2023, a video was posted to the Palestinian social networks (possibly an image video), documenting a Jenin Battalion training exercise. It showed the operatives engaged in urban warfare and storming a building (Fahmi Kanan’s Twitter account, April 25, 2023; @abwmslmh357195, April 29, 2023).

     
Jenin Battalion training video (Fahmi Kanan’s Twitter account, April 25, 2023).

     
Jenin Battalion operatives at target practice and practicing urban warfare
(al-Jazeera TV, January 6, 2023).

How Israeli security force activity is perceived

• In June 2023 a circular was distributed to terrorist operatives to raise their awareness of the nature of IDF activity. According to the circular, what the “occupation” [Israel] does in Jenin and its refugee camp every night is an effort to deplete the “resistance” fighter’s stock of ammunition, use cameras installed on UAVs to collect intelligence in order to hunt the “resistance” fighters in the alleys, neighborhoods and streets of Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp, in order to make them easy targets for the next military operation or storming. It continued, the army looks for the camp’s points of weakness and strength and its firing positions, and plans its entry into the camp hermetically to be able to control all the camp’s strong points. Therefore, everyone must be careful not to be beneath the planes, to take cover and protect backs and legs, and to keep away from areas exposed to snipers…We hope no one will underestimate what the enemy [Israel] is doing; it’s the Shabak [Israeli Security Agency], not a weak apparatus” (@jenencamb Telegram channel. June 19, 2023).

• To help the operatives on the ground collection boxes were placed at the entrance to the Jenin refugee camp for contributions to the “resistance.” A video was issued calling on residents to donate their ammunition (@jenencamb Telegram channel, June 23, 2023).

     
Collection boxes for donations placed at the entrance to the Jenin refugee camp (@jenencamb Telegram channel, June 23, 2023).

^[1] For further information see the June 7, 2022 report, "The Jenin Battalion: a non-aligned organization of terrorists operating against the Israeli security forces." ↑

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