Spotlight on Global Jihad (August 1-7, 2019)

Main events of the week

• On August 2, 2019, the Syrian army announced a ceasefire in the Idlib area following the statement that was made by participants of the Astana meeting
  (August 1, 2019). The Astana statement called for a calm on the ground in the Idlib area based on the implementation of the Sochi Memorandum for the creation of a demilitarized zone (September 17, 2018). The ceasefire lasted four days until the Syrian army announced the resumption of military activity (August 5, 2019). In its announcement on the resumption of fighting, the Syrian army blamed Turkey for allowing the rebel organizations affiliated with it to violate the terms of the ceasefire and renouncing its commitment to the Sochi Memorandum.
• Following the Syrian army’s announcement, exchanges of fire in the Idlib area resumed. The Syrian army reportedly fired artillery at the rebel organizations’ positions in the south and northwest of the Idlib area (the main fighting zones). In addition, on August 5 and August 6, 2019, Russian warplanes reportedly attacked dozens of targets of the rebel organizations. On the other hand, the rebel organizations reportedly fired artillery at the areas of Aleppo, Latakia and Hama (including rocket fire at the Russian airbase in Hmeymim).
• Up to now, the Syrian army’s ground attacks have not resumed. It should be noted that since the beginning of the campaign more than three months ago, the Syrian army has had local tactical achievements in the southwestern Idlib area, but has not managed to achieve significant results that would fundamentally change the situation on the ground. On the other hand, rebel organizations, led by the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham and with the participation of Turkish-sponsored organizations, have so far engaged in fierce fighting in an attempt to prevent the fall of their last remaining territorial area in Syria (in stark contrast to their far less intensive effort in Damascus, the Syrian Golan Heights, and Daraa).
• In the Iraqi arena, ISIS’s intensive activity in the various provinces continues. The most common types of attacks this week were the activation of IEDs, shooting attacks, targeted killings, attacks on positions and installations, and setting fire to the homes of members of the Iraqi security forces. On the other hand, the widespread operation by Iraqi security forces to mop up northern Iraq and western Iraq from the presence of ISIS operatives has continued, apparently without significant results so far.
• On August 3, 2019, ISIS renewed its Raids of Attrition campaign in Syria, Iraq and the various provinces around the globe (the third campaign of its kind since ISIS lost control of the Lower Euphrates Valley, in March 2019). These are coordinated and orchestrated attacks coupled with a propaganda campaign. The campaign is intended to encourage ISIS’s supporters and to reinforce the message that ISIS is enhancing its presence and activity around the globe. To date, the campaign has included more than 30 “routine” attacks.
• Intensive activity in Afghanistan was the major part of ISIS’s attacks around the globe. This week, ISIS continued to attack Taliban operatives in eastern Afghanistan (the provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar). In addition, an IED was detonated in the capital Kabul against a minibus carrying personnel of a local TV channel, and an (unusual) attack was carried out against Shiites in the city of Herat (in western Afghanistan). In addition, “routine” attacks by ISIS operatives continued in the Sinai Peninsula, Nigeria, Niger, Mozambique, Somalia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yemen.

The Idlib area

Overview

This week, the Syrian army announced its willingness to accept a ceasefire in the Idlib area (August 2, 2019), based on Russia, Turkey and Iran’s statement at the end of the Astana meeting (August 1, 2019). The Syrian army’s readiness to accept a ceasefire was contingent on the establishment of the demilitarized zone in the Idlib area, from which the rebel organizations will withdraw their heavy weapons, based on the Sochi Memorandum (September 17, 2018). The Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham, the dominant jihadi organization in the Idlib area, announced its decisive opposition to the terms of the ceasefire. In the wake of the ceasefire, the intensity of the fighting in the Idlib area temporarily decreased, but exchanges of fire between the sides continued. Due to the unwillingness of the jihadi rebel organizations and organizations supported by Turkey to withdraw their heavy weapons and enable the establishment of the demilitarized zone, the Syrian army announced the resumption of fighting (August 5, 2019). Following the announcement, the Syrian army resumed its artillery fire, mainly at the southern and northwestern parts of the Idlib area. Russian Air Force planes reportedly also resumed their airstrikes. On the other hand, the rebel organizations fired at Syrian army targets and at the Russian airbase in Hmeymim.

The Astana International Meeting on Syria

• On August 1, 2019, the 13th round of Astana talks took place with the participation of Russia, Syria, Turkey, Iran, and representatives of the rebel organizations (sponsored by Turkey). In the evening of August 1, 2019, Russia, Turkey and Iran issued a joint statement, stressing the need to establish calm on the ground in the Idlib area based on the implementation of the Sochi Memorandum of September 17, 2018. The three countries expressed concern over the increased presence of the “terrorist organization” the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham in the Idlib area, and reaffirmed their determination to cooperate with the goal of ultimately eliminating ISIS, the Al-Nusra Front (i.e., the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham) and other terrorist groups as designated by the UN Security Council (official website of the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry, August 2, 2019).
• The Sochi Memorandum of September 17, 2018, stipulated the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the Idlib area 15-20 km wide along the line of contact between the forces of the Syrian regime and the rebel forces (see map). The memorandum stipulated that the demilitarized zone would be established by October 15, 2018, and would be accompanied by the removal of the “radical armed forces” from the demilitarized zone (i.e., jihadi organizations, mainly the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham). At the suggestion of the Turkish President, the agreement also stipulated that, by October 10, 2018, the heavy weapons, tanks, rocket launchers, rifles and mortar shells of all opposition groups in the area would be removed from the demilitarized zone. Supervision of the demilitarized zone will be carried out by Turkish mobile patrol groups and Russian Military Police units. However, in practice, the Sochi Memorandum was not implemented on the ground due to the refusal of the jihadi organizations, particularly the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham, to withdraw from the demilitarized zone or remove their heavy and medium weapons.

Syrian army announcement of a unilateral ceasefire and the response of the rebel organizations

• Based on the Astana meeting, on the night of August 1-2, 2019, the Syrian army announced that it was ready to accept a ceasefire in the Idlib area based on the Sochi Memorandum, namely, a buffer zone would be established under Russian and Turkish supervision and the heavy weapons of the rebel organizations would be removed 20 km deep into the Idlib enclave (SANA, August 1, 2019). According to a Syrian “military source,” the Syrian army “is giving the extremists a last chance to save themselves, for if they do not withdraw, the Syrian army will resume its operations” (almasdarnews.com, August 2, 2019).
• Abu Mohamad al-Julani, commander of the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham, announced his decisive opposition to the announcement of the Astana meeting. He stressed that “linking the ceasefire to Astana [i.e., the Sochi Memorandum] was a wrong thing to do” (Ibaa, August 4, 2019). The Turkish-affiliated rebel organizations whose representatives had participated in the Astana meeting agreed to stop the fighting to “guarantee the safety of civilians.” However, the organizations reserved the right to respond to “violations by Assad’s regime and its militias” (Reuters, August 2, 2019). In the ITIC’s assessment, the Turkish-affiliated rebel organizations refrained from addressing the issue of the demilitarized zone due to their objection to its establishment.

Collapse of the ceasefire and resumption of the fighting

• The ceasefire announced by the Syrian army (the night of August 1, 2019) lasted four days. During this short period, no progress was made in the establishment of the demilitarized zone and the removal of heavy weapons. In addition, fighting in the Idlib region did not stop, although its intensity decreased for a short while. Due to that, on August 5, 2019, the Syrian army announced that it was resuming its military operations against the rebel organizations (“the terrorist organizations”). In its announcement, the Syrian army accused Turkey of not being committed to the ceasefire. The announcement noted that “the fact that the Turkish regime continues to allow its proxies among the terrorist organizations deployed in the Idlib area to attack, indicates that Ankara persists in its destructive attitude and continues to ignore its obligations as part of the Sochi Memorandum […]” (Sama, August 5, 2019; SANA, August 5, 2019).
  • After the Syrian army’s announcement, exchanges of fire resumed between the Syrian army and the rebel organizations:
  • The Syrian army fired artillery at the southern Idlib region (SANA, August 5, 2019; Ibaa, August 6, 2019). In addition, artillery was fired at towns and villages in the northern Idlib region (Anatolia, August 6, 2019). The Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham reported that on August 5 and 6, 2019, Russian Air Force fighter jets attacked dozens of targets, the main one being Khan Shaykhun (Ibaa, August 6, 2019).
  • According to Russian reports, the rebel organizations (the “militants”) opened fire 25 times at Syrian towns and villages in the regions of Aleppo, Latakia and Hama (TASS, August 6, 2019; Sputnik, August 7, 2019). In addition, the rebel organizations fired three rockets at the Russian airbase in Hmeymim. According to a Russian military source, the rockets fell in an area adjacent to the airbase and caused fatalities and heavy damage to property (SANA, August 5, 2019). According to a Russian version, four inhabitants of a village near the Hmeymim airbase were wounded (TASS, August 6, 2019).

Interim summary of the losses since the beginning of the Syrian offensive move

• The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that since April 30, 2019, at least 2,925 people had been killed in the Idlib region. Fatalities included 1,069 rebel organization operatives, including 669 operatives of the jihadi organizations. Fatalities also included 984 soldiers and operatives of the Syrian army and the forces supporting it, and 872 civilians (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 5, 2019).

Northeastern Syria

Attacks inside the Kurdish control area continue

• This week, ISIS operatives continued their guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks in the Kurdish control zone in northeastern Syria. Highlights of the terrorist attacks this week:
  • July 31, 2019: A motorcycle bomb was detonated against an SDF patrol in the village of Markadah, about 80 km south of Al-Hasakah. Two SDF fighters were killed and two others wounded (Telegram, July 31, 2019).
  • August 1, 2019: Two IEDs exploded in the house of an SDF commander in Khirbat al-Laban, north of Al-Hasakah. The house was damaged. The officer managed to escape (Telegram, July 31, 2019).
  • August 3, 2019: A booby-trapped motorcycle was detonated in central Al-Shadadi (south of Al-Hasakah), as part of the Raids of Attrition campaign (see below). Four SDF fighters were killed, including two commanders (Telegram, August 3, 2019).
  • August 3, 2019: An SDF vehicle about 100 km south of Al-Hasakah was hit by machine gun fire, as part of the Raids of Attrition campaign. Three SDF fighters who were inside the vehicle were killed (Telegram, August 4, 2019).
  • August 4, 2019: Three motorcycle bombs were detonated in various areas in Al-Hasakah against SDF vehicles. At least 15 fighters were killed or wounded (Telegram, August 4, 2019).

The Euphrates Valley

The Al-Raqqah region

• Following are highlights of ISIS’s activity in the region of the city of Al-Raqqah:
  • Two SDF fighters were killed by machine gun fire after their house north of Al-Raqqah was broken into (Telegram, August 3, 2019). The attack was carried out as part of the Raids of Attrition campaign (see below).
  • The house of a mukhtar in Al-Raqqah was damaged in an explosion (Telegram, August 6, 2019).
  • An IED was activated against an SDF vehicle in central Al-Raqqah. Three SDF fighters were killed (Telegram, August 6, 2019).
  • An IED was activated against an SDF vehicle north of Al-Raqqah. All the passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, August 6, 2019).
  • The house of a mukhtar in Al-Raqqah was blown up with an IED. The mukhtar was killed (Telegram, August 6, 2019).

The Deir ez-Zor region

• Following are highlights of ISIS’s activity in the region of Deir ez-Zor:
  • As SDF fighter was killed by machine gun fire in the area of Diban, southeast of Deir ez-Zor (Telegram, August 1, 2019).
  • An IED was activated against an SDF vehicle southeast of Deir ez-Zor. All the passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, August 5, 2019).
  • SDF forces about 20 km southeast of Al-Mayadeen were hit by machine gun fire. Two SDF fighters were killed (Telegram, August 6, 2019).

Main developments in Iraq

ISIS’s terrorist and guerrilla activity in the various provinces

• Following are ISIS’s main activities in the various provinces in the past week (according to ISIS’s claims of responsibility):
  • Salah al-Din Province: Iraqi policemen and Popular Mobilization fighters in the Dujail area, southeast of Samarra, were attacked. Five policemen and fighters were killed and two others were wounded in the exchanges of fire (Telegram, August 1, 2019).
  • Salah al-Din Province: An IED was activated against an Iraqi army vehicle east of Tikrit. The passengers were wounded (Telegram, August 2, 2019).
  • Salah al-Din Province: Iraqi policemen were ambushed and shot at northwest of Samarra. Four policemen were killed and several others were wounded (Telegram, August 2, 2019).
  • Al-Anbar Province: ISIS operatives captured and executed a Tribal Mobilization fighter in Al-Ma’mourah, north of Hit (Telegram, July 30, 2019).
  • Nineveh Province: Two Tribal Mobilization fighters were shot and killed about 35 km south of Mosul (Telegram, August 2, 2019).
  • Diyala Province: ISIS operatives carried out a series of attacks against Iraqi and Kurdish members of the security forces in northeastern Diyala. Twenty of them were killed and wounded, including an officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel. The attacks started with sniper fire at Kurdish security forces. An IED was activated against an Iraqi government Counterterrorist Service force arriving at the site. In addition, ISIS operatives fired mortar shells at houses of the Kurdish security forces (Telegram, August 1, 2019).
  • Diyala Province: An IED was activated against a Tribal Mobilization operative north of Jaloula, killing him (Telegram, August 2, 2019).
  • Diyala Province: An IED was activated against a vehicle carrying Kurdish members of the security forces about 40 km north of Khanaqin. The passengers, including an officer, were killed or wounded (Telegram, August 4, 2019).
  • Diyala Province: An IED was activated against an Iraqi army vehicle in eastern Diyala Province. All the passengers were either killed or wounded (Telegram, August 4, 2019).
  • Diyala Province: Iraqi army soldiers in eastern Diyala Province were hit by machine gun fire. Two soldiers were wounded (Telegram, August 4, 2019).
  • Baghdad Province: An IED was activated against a Popular Mobilization vehicle south of Baghdad. All the passengers were hit (Telegram, August 4, 2019).
  • Babel Province (south of Baghdad Province) and Al-Anbar Province (west of Baghdad): IEDs were activated south and west of Baghdad. Four vehicles were destroyed and several Popular Mobilization operatives were killed or wounded (Telegram, August 4, 2019).
  • Kirkuk Province: An IED was activated against a Popular Mobilization vehicle in the Al-Daqouq area. The passengers were either killed or wounded (Telegram, August 4, 2019).
  • Diyala Province: Houses of Iraqi army soldiers were fired at. Several soldiers were wounded (ISIS’s Iraq Province – Diyala region, August 5, 2019).
  • Diyala Province: Mortar shells were fired at houses of Iraqi army soldiers and houses were blown up with IEDs southeast of Baqubah. Four soldiers were killed and another one was wounded (Amaq News Agency, August 5, 2019).
  • Nineveh Province: An IED was activated against a truck carrying three Iraqi army “spies” in western Mosul. Two of them were killed and the third was wounded (Amaq News Agency, August 5, 2019).
  • Diyala Province: An IED was activated against a Popular Mobilization vehicle northwest of Khanaqin. The four passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, August 6, 2019).
  • Al-Anbar Province: A Popular Mobilization vehicle 15 km southwest of Baghdad was shot at. All the passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, August 6, 2019).
  • Kirkuk Province: An IED was activated against an Iraqi police vehicle on the Kirkuk-Baiji Road. All the passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, August 6, 2019).
  • Kirkuk Province: Mortar shells were fired at Tribal Mobilization forces west of Kirkuk. There were definitive hits (Telegram, August 6, 2019).
  • Salah al-Din Province: ISIS operatives shot a Tribal Mobilization commander to death after having interrogated him at his house, about 30 km southeast of Samarra (Telegram, August 6, 2019).
  • Babel Province: Iraqi army soldiers were hit by sniper fire south of Baghdad. Two soldiers were killed (Telegram, August 6, 2019).

Counterterrorist and preventive activity by the Iraqi security forces and the Coalition forces

• The security operation dubbed “Will to Victory,” whose purpose is to mop up the north and west of Iraq from the presence of ISIS, continues. On August 5, 2019, the Iraqi security forces launched the third phase of the operation. The focus of activity was in the Diyala Province and southern Nineveh Province (Al-Sumaria, August 5, 2019). The Popular Mobilization forces (the Shiite militias) mopped up villages south of Mosul (al-hashed.net, August 5, 2019).

• Warplanes of the US-led Coalition reportedly attacked and killed five ISIS operatives north of Baghdad (Reuters, August 5, 2019).

The Sinai Peninsula and Egypt

• This week as well, ISIS attacks in the Sinai Peninsula continued. Following are highlights of the activity:
• An IED was activated near an Egyptian army checkpoint in Rafah. Ten soldiers were killed or wounded. Four armored vehicles were destroyed (Anbaa Sinaa Facebook page, July 30, 2019).
• An IED was activated near an Iraqi army checkpoint west of Rafah. Subsequently, the ISIS operatives exchanged fire with the Egyptian soldiers. Several soldiers were wounded (Telegram, August 3, 2019).
• An IED was activated against an Egyptian army vehicle near a cement factory in central Sinai. The passengers were either killed or wounded (Telegram, August 4, 2019).
• Two “collaborators” with the Egyptian army were executed south of Rafah (Telegram, August 6, 2019).

• An IED was activated against an Egyptian army minesweeper. All the passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, August 6, 2019).

ISIS’s activity around the globe

Nigeria

• On July 29-30, 2019, ISIS operatives launched two attacks against Nigerian army camps in Borno State, in northeastern Nigeria:
• The first attack was carried out against a Nigerian army base near Baga. According to ISIS, its operatives killed at least 15 soldiers and seized large quantities of weapons and equipment (Telegram, July 31, 2019).

• The second attack was carried out against a Nigerian army camp some 70 km west of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State. According to ISIS, 25 soldiers were killed in the attack, the camp was set on fire, and weapons and ammunition were seized (Telegram, July 31, 2019).
• On July 29, 2019, some 30 ISIS operatives attempted to attack the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) some 70 km southeast of Maiduguri (the capital of Borno State). According to MNJTF Spokesman Colonel Timothy Antigha, the attack was repelled by the force, which operates against the rebels in the Lake Chad area. Ten ISIS operatives, including four suicide bombers, were killed and the rest fled. One MNJTF soldier was killed and five were wounded (thedefensepost.com, July 29, 2019).

Niger

• ISIS operatives fired four rockets at a group of Nigerian soldiers at Diffa Airport in southeastern Niger (on the border between Niger and Nigeria). There were definitive hits (Telegram, August 6, 2019).

Mozambique

• ISIS’s Central Africa Province announced that ISIS operatives set fire to the homes of “infidel Christians” residences in the Cabo Delgado Province in northeastern Mozambique (Telegram, August 3, 2019). This is the second time in the recent past that homes of local residents opposed to ISIS have been set on fire.

Afghanistan

Attack against the Taliban forces in the Tora Bora area

• Operatives of ISIS’s Khorasan Province carried out a large-scale attack against Taliban positions in the Tora Bora region (a mountainous area in eastern Afghanistan, about 40 km south of Jalalabad, where Osama bin Laden had been in hiding). According to ISIS’s announcement, its operatives took control of many Taliban positions and seized weapons and ammunition. A total of 16 Taliban operatives were killed and wounded (Telegram, July 30, 2019).

   
Right: Weapons and ammunition that were seized. Left: Bags of drugs that were found in the possession of Taliban operatives (Telegram, July 30, 2019)

The capital Kabul

• ISIS operatives detonated an IED in Kabul against a minibus carrying personnel of independent TV channel Khurshid, which broadcasts from Kabul and supports the Afghan government. ISIS claimed that 22 employees of the station were killed or wounded. The attack was carried out as part of the Raids of Attrition campaign (Telegram, August 4, 2019). According to official Afghan sources, at least two people were killed in the attack, one of them the minibus driver and the other a passerby, and two others were wounded (Reuters; voanews.com, August 4, 2019).
• ISIS operatives detonated an IED against guards at Pul-e-Charkhi Prison in Kabul^[1]. Five policemen were killed and wounded (Telegram, August 6, 2019).

Kunar Province

• Last week, ISIS operatives continued to carry out attacks against the Taliban forces in the Kunar Province, near the border with Pakistan, which is the main focus of ISIS’s activity. On August 1, 2019, the following operations were reported: the capture and execution of a Taliban operative; an attack against Taliban positions (killing of commander and wounding six operatives); and deployment of IEDs against Taliban operatives (five killed) (Telegram, August 1, 2019).

• Additional activity carried out in the Kunar Province:
  • Ambush against Taliban operatives. Three Taliban operatives were killed (Amaq News Agency, August 4, 2019).
  • Machine gun fire at a Taliban operative. The Taliban operative was killed (Khorasan Province, August 4, 2019).
  • Ambush against a vehicle carrying Taliban operatives. ISIS operatives exchanged fire with the Taliban operatives. Three operatives were killed (Khorasan Province, August 4, 2019).

Nangarhar Province

• ISIS’s intensive activity continued in the Nangarhar Province, in eastern Pakistan (near the border with Pakistan). Main attacks carried out by ISIS operatives during the past week:
  • ISIS operatives captured a senior officer in a militia supporting the Afghan government. The captive was executed (Telegram, August 4, 2019).
  • An Afghan intelligence operative riding a motorcycle was shot at. He was wounded (Telegram, August 4, 2019).
  • A Taliban attack in the Wadi Hazar area was repelled. The two sides exchanged fire for eight hours. A total of 26 Taliban operatives were killed and wounded (Telegram, August 4, 2019).

The city of Herat

• According to an announcement by ISIS’s Khorasan Province, its operatives detonated an IED among a gathering of Shiites in the city of Herat, in western Afghanistan (around 120 km from the border with Iran). Five Shiites were killed and over 30 were wounded (Telegram, August 6, 2019). This is an unusual event, since ISIS’s activity in Afghanistan centers on the east of the country, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area.

Pakistan

• According to an announcement by ISIS’s Pakistan province, 18 people were killed or wounded by an IED detonated by ISIS operatives among a gathering of Shiites in the city of Quetta, in western Pakistan (Telegram, August 6, 2019).

Somalia

• ISIS’s Somalia Province reported that its operatives had killed two policemen in two open-air markets in the capital Mogadishu (Telegram, August 4, 2019). In addition, in the city of Bosaso, in eastern Somalia, there was an attempt on the life of Shair Haji Farah, a former senior official of the Puntland Province government. An IED was activated against his car, wounding two of his bodyguards, but he emerged unscathed (Telegram, August 5, 2019).

The Philippines

• ISIS reported that its operatives had exchanged fire with the Philippine army on the island of Mindanao, in the southern Philippines. Ten soldiers were killed in the exchange of fire. According to the report, 13 other soldiers were killed by friendly fire in an airstrike carried out by mistake by the Philippine Air Force in an attempt to allow soldiers to retreat (Telegram, July 31, 2019). Official sources in the Philippines confirmed that 10 soldiers had indeed been killed by friendly fire on the island of Mindanao (www.dw.com, August 1, 2019).

Yemen

• On August 1, 2019, an ISIS suicide bomber blew himself up with a car bomb at a police headquarters in the city of Aden. According to ISIS, dozens of policemen and members of the militias supported by the United Arab Emirates were killed or wounded (ISIS’s Yemen Province, Aden-Abyan Region, August 2, 2019). Local media reported several policemen killed and about 20 wounded (UNews, August 1, 2019).

The battle for hearts and minds

Renewal of the Raids of Attrition campaign

On August 3, 2019, ISIS renewed its Raids of Attrition campaign around the globe. This is a campaign of coordinated and orchestrated attacks coupled with a propaganda campaign. The campaign is intended to encourage ISIS’s supporters and to reinforce the message that ISIS is enhancing its presence and activity around the globe. To date, ISIS operatives have carried out more than 30 “routine” attacks as part of the campaign. These attacks still continue.

• Since the blow that it suffered in Al-Baghouz in Syria (March 2019), ISIS has carried out two such campaigns, so this is the third campaign of its kind. In the past (late May through early June 2019), the campaign was carried out for about a week, during which time there was an increase in ISIS’s volume of activity, mainly in Syria and Iraq. However, most of the attacks carried out as part of the campaign were “routine” attacks (detonating IEDs, shooting attacks, and killing enemies).

^[1] Pul-e-Charkhi Prison, also known as the Afghan National Detention Facility, is located east of Kabul. It is considered Afghanistan’s largest prison, with around 5,000 inmates. ↑

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