Spotlight on Global Jihad (October 24-30, 2019)

Main events of the week

• The main event of the week was the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by an elite force of the US Army in northwestern Syria, near the border with Turkey. The killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is undoubtedly a major blow to ISIS since he was a charismatic and authoritative leader who has been a dominant figure in the organization’s leadership. During the years of ISIS’s existence, Al-Baghdadi was the final arbiter on military, religious and governmental issues, and the dependence of ISIS’s leadership on him was absolute. In the ITIC’s assessment, following the killing of Al-Baghdadi, ISIS is expected to weaken, but not collapse, since it still possesses important strategic assets. Its principal asset is its Salafist-jihadi ideology, which constitutes a source of attraction. ISIS also has an infrastructure of operatives and supporters in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere around the globe.
• A few hours after the killing of Al-Baghdadi, Abu Hassan al-Muhajir was also killed. Al-Muhajir was ISIS’s spokesman and a close aide to Al-Baghdadi. Al-Muhajir was killed in an airstrike which, according to the commander of the SDF forces, was coordinated between the SDF and the US army. A “senior official” at the US Department of State confirmed the report. The killing of Al-Muhajir is yet another blow to ISIS at the morale level. In addition, on the practical level, it may damage ISIS’s media infrastructure, which has lost skilled media professionals in recent years.
• So far, ISIS has refrained from issuing a formal statement on the killing of Al-Baghdadi. Spontaneous comments by ISIS supporters appeared on social media (Facebook, Telegram) and other websites.^[1] The comments glorify Al-Baghdadi and his activity, expressing confidence that the Islamic State will continue to punish the “infidels,” and promising revenge. The following appeared on an ISIS supporters channel on Telegram: “[…] The Prophet [Muhammad] is dead, Osama bin Laden is dead, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi is dead […] But jihad does not stop when a particular person dies, even if he is the Caliph himself” (Telegram, October 27, 2019).
• Even after the killing of Al-Baghdadi, ISIS’s routine activity on the ground continued in Syria and Iraq and in the various provinces in Africa and Asia. Following are the main attacks of the past week:
  • In eastern and northern Syria, ISIS’s intensive activity was directed mainly against the SDF forces. Most of the attacks took the form of activating IEDs, shooting attacks, and targeting SDF intelligence and security personnel. One noteworthy attack this week was the detonation of a car bomb (according to another version, a car was blown up by a sticky bomb) in central Qamishli, a city in the hinterland of the Kurdish control zone.
  • In northern and western Iraq, ISIS’s intensive activity continued, especially against the Iraqi security forces, concurrently with the wave of protests against the Iraqi regime in Baghdad and the southern provinces. ISIS’s attacks generally took the form of sniper fire and the activation of IEDs against moving vehicles.
  • In ISIS’s various provinces outside Syria and Iraq, routine activity continued: In the northern Sinai Peninsula, ISIS continued its intensive attacks against the Egyptian forces. The attacks took the form of activating IEDs, attacking an Egyptian checkpoint, and sniper fire. In addition, ISIS carried out attacks in Nigeria, Mozambique, The Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere.

The killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (updated to October 30, 2019)^[2]

On October 27, 2019, US President Donald Trump announced that a US military elite unit had killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a night raid. Several other operatives, apparently senior ISIS members, whose names will be published over the next few days, were killed along with him. Several members of Al-Baghdadi’s immediate family were also killed. Two people (whose identity has not yet been disclosed) were caught. According to the US media, the raid included fire from the air and landing of Special Forces. Al-Baghdadi reportedly blew himself up with his explosive belt in a tunnel after he had realized that the American forces were closing in on him. The remains of his body were thrown into the sea (like the remains of Osama bin Laden).

• President Trump said in a special announcement to the media that fighters of the American Special Forces had arrived at the area in eight helicopters which flew in Iraqi airspace and Russian-controlled Syrian airspace. Turkey, according to him, knew about the operation. The fighters arrived at the building where Al-Baghdadi was hiding. He fled to a tunnel along with three of his young children, and blew himself up with his explosive belt. According to President Trump, genetic tests proved beyond doubt that it was Al-Baghdadi.

The killing of ISIS’s spokesman Abu Hassan al-Muhajir

On October 27, 2019, SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi reported the killing of Abu Hassan al-Muhajir, ISIS’s spokesman and Al-Baghdadi’s close aide. He was reportedly killed in an airstrike which hit two trucks carrying metal tanks where ISIS operatives were hiding near the city of Jarabulus (close to the Syrian-Turkish border). The airstrike, which was carried out a few hours after the killing of Al-Baghdadi, was implemented in coordination between the SDF Intelligence and the US military (Reuters, October 27, 2019; BBC, October 28, 2019). A “senior official” in the US Department of State confirmed the report (Reuters, October 28, 2019). The killing of Al-Muhajir represents yet another blow for ISIS, at the morale level. In addition, at the practical level, the killing of Al-Muhajir may compromise ISIS’s media infrastructure, which has lost skilled media professionals over the last years.

• Abu Hassan al-Muhajir was appointed ISIS’s official spokesman in late 2016 replacing Abu Ahmad al-Adnani, who was killed on August 30, 2016 (probably in a Syrian airstrike in northeastern Syria). Previously, Al-Muhajir had held several positions in Al-Qaeda’s media infrastructure in Iraq and in the Al-Furqan Media Foundation (an institution of Al-Qaeda’s branch in Iraq prior to the establishment of ISIS). In his years as ISIS’s spokesman, Al-Muhajir maintained a low media profile, in contrast to his predecessor Al-Adnani, probably fearing for his life.

The US will continue to maintain a military force to help defend the SDF-held oilfields

US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced that an American military force would remain in the strategic area of the oilfields to prevent ISIS from accessing this essential resource (referring to the oilfields in eastern Syria, which are held by the SDF). According to Esper, the US “will respond with overwhelming military force against any group that threatens the safety of our forces there.” He added that the SDF forces were relying on the oil income to fund its fighters, including those guarding prisons where ISIS operatives are being held. Therefore, Asper noted, “…our mission is to secure the oilfields” (Reuters, October 29, 2019).

Idlib region

The ceasefire: overview

While the main attention of the Syrian regime has been focused on the Turkish invasion of Syria and the killing of Al-Baghdadi, the unilateral ceasefire in the Idlib region was generally maintained. However, there were several local ground attacks by the Syrian army in the Kabanah area, in the northwestern Idlib region (13 km southwest of Jisr al-Shughur). In addition, Syrian and Russian airstrikes were carried out in the Kabanah area. Apart from that, “routine” exchanges of artillery fire continued between the Syrian army and the rebel organizations, focusing on the Kabanah area.

Local Syrian army attacks in the Kabanah area

• On October 26, 2019, operatives of the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham halted a local ground attack by the Syrian army in the Kabanah area. Reportedly, troops from the Syrian army’s 4th Division, Shiite militias, and a Hezbollah force took part in the attack. According to the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham, over 90 fighters of the attacking force were killed or wounded. The Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham reported that in the days preceding the attack, the Syrian army had made three attempts to advance on the road leading to Kabanah but they all failed (Ibaa, October 26-27, 2019). On October 29, 2019, the Syrian army tried once again to advance towards the rebel positions in the Kabanah area (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, October 29, 2019).
• The ground attacks were accompanied by airstrikes. On October 26, 2019, it was reported that four helicopters of the Syrian Air Force had dropped barrel bombs on the Kabanah area (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, October 26, 2019). On October 27, 2019, the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham reported that Syrian and Russian aircraft had carried out airstrikes in the Kabanah area and dropped barrel bombs (Ibaa, October 27, 2019).

• In addition, the Russian media reported that Russian fighter jets had carried out airstrikes against command posts and forces of the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham in the rural area south of Idlib. Three command posts were destroyed (Sputnik, October 27, 2019). The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that on October 29, 2019, Russian fighter jets had attacked targets in the rural area south of Idlib.

Recruitment of operatives for the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham

• The Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham announced that on October 27, 2019, it had started to recruit operatives for four units: the Army of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the Army of Umar bin al-Khattab, the Army of Uthman bin Affan, and the Army of Ali bin Abi Talib^[3]. The notice included telephone numbers in various areas around Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama (Ibaa, October 27, 2019). The telephone numbers which were published included Syria’s international area code for callers from abroad. In the ITIC’s assessment, the recruitment of new operatives is intended to compensate for the shortage of manpower in the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham following the prolonged fighting in the Idlib region, while conveying a message of business as usual.

Summary of the losses since the beginning of the Syrian army’s ground attack

• Since the beginning of the Syrian army’s ground attack in early May 2019, a total of 4,317 people have been killed in the Idlib region. Fatalities included 1,741 rebel organization operatives, including 1,144 operatives of jihadi organizations [bearing the brunt of the fighting]. Fatalities also included 1,481 soldiers and operatives of the Syrian army and the forces supporting it, and 1,095 civilians (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, October 29, 2019).

The Euphrates Valley

Al-Raqqah area

• ISIS’s intensive activity in the Al-Raqqah area continued. Following are the main activities according to ISIS’s reports:
  • On October 24, 2019, an SDF vehicle was targeted by machine gun fire on the Al-Karamah-Al-Shadadi Road (several dozen kilometers south of Al-Hasakah). Three fighters were killed (Telegram, October 25, 2019).
  • On October 27, 2019, an IED was activated against a vehicle carrying SDF fighters about 7 km northwest of Al-Raqqah. Four fighters were killed or wounded (Telegram, October 28, 2019).
  • On October 28, 2019, a vehicle carrying SDF fighters was targeted by machine gun fire in the village of Al-Hawaij, 4 km northeast of Al-Mayadeen. Two fighters were killed and another was wounded (Telegram, October 28, 2019).
  • On October 28, 2019, an SDF intelligence operative was shot and killed in the village of Shahil, 9 km north of Al-Mayadeen (Telegram, October 28, 2019).

The area of Deir ez-Zor, Al-Mayadeen, and Albukamal

• ISIS continued its intensive activity in the Euphrates Valley, in the area between Deir ez-Zor and Albukamal. This activity included the activation of IEDs, shooting attacks, and targeting SDF intelligence and security operatives. Following are highlights of ISIS’s activity according to ISIS’s reports:
  • On October 23, 2019, an IED was activated against a truck carrying Syrian soldiers in the Al-Mayadeen area. The soldiers were killed or wounded (Telegram, October 24, 2019).
  • On October 23, 2019, a “double agent” of the Syrian Army Intelligence and the SDF Intelligence was arrested by ISIS in the village of Shahil, 9 km north of Al-Mayadeen. He was interrogated and then executed (Telegram, October 24, 2019).
  • On October 24, 2019, a Syrian army “agent” was targeted by machine gun fire in the village of Darnaj, 14 km southeast of Al-Mayadeen, and was severely wounded (Telegram, October 24, 2019).
  • On October 24, 2019, SDF fighters were targeted by light weapons fire in the village of Tiana, 8 km southeast of Al-Mayadeen. Several fighters were wounded (Telegram, October 25, 2019).
  • On October 25, 2019, an IED was activated against a business of an SDF intelligence operative in the village of Al-Sousa, 7 km northeast of Albukamal. It was destroyed (Telegram, October 25, 2019).
  • On October 25, 2019, ISIS operatives captured an SDF fighter in the village of Darnaj, 14 km southeast of Al-Mayadeen. He was interrogated and then executed (Telegram, October 27, 2019).
  • On October 26, 2019, an IED was activated against a Syrian army vehicle in the Al-Mayadeen area. The soldiers were killed or wounded (Telegram, October 27, 2019).
  • On October 28, 2019, an IED was activated against the house of an SDF intelligence operative and another IED against a house used as an SDF command post 27 km north of Al-Mayadeen. Both buildings were damaged (Telegram, October 29, 2019).

Palmyra-Al-Sukhnah area

• On October 26, 2019, an IED was activated against a Syrian army vehicle west of Al-Sukhnah (about 62 km northeast of Palmyra). One soldier was killed and two others were wounded (Telegram, October 27, 2019).

Northeastern Syria

Attacks deep inside the Kurdish control zone

• On October 23, 2019, a parked car exploded near an SDF headquarters in central Qamishli, which is close to the Syrian-Turkish border. Several SDF fighters were killed or wounded (Telegram, October 24, 2019). According to another version, a van was detonated by a sticky bomb near the Qamishli Communications Center (Syria Star Times, a Syrian news website, and Syrian TV, October 23, 2019). As it will be recalled, last week, a car bomb was also detonated among SDF fighters near the SDF Intelligence Headquarters in central Qamishli.

Main events in Iraq

During the past week, ISIS carried out intensive terrorist and guerrilla activity, against the backdrop of the renewed wave of protests against the Iraqi regime in Baghdad and the southern provinces of Iraq. The attacks were carried out mainly in the Kirkuk, Diyala, Salah al-Din and Nineveh provinces, and generally took the form of sniper fire and the activation of IEDs against moving vehicles. Highlights of the activity:

Kirkuk Province

• On October 23, 2019, an IED was detonated against a vehicle carrying Tribal Mobilization fighters about 45 km southwest of Kirkuk. The passengers were killed and wounded (Telegram, October 24, 2019).
• On October 25, 2019, an IED was detonated against a vehicle carrying policemen about 45 km southwest of Kirkuk. The passengers were killed and wounded (Telegram, October 25, 2019).
• On October 26, 2019, a Tribal Mobilization base around 70 km southwest of Kirkuk was targeted by machine gun fire. Several fighters were killed or wounded (Telegram, October 28, 2019).
• On October 26, 2019, an IED was activated against a Tribal Mobilization vehicle a few dozen kilometers northwest of Kirkuk. A fighter was killed and two others were wounded (Telegram, October 28, 2019).

Diyala Province

• On October 24, 2019, an Iraqi army base around 80 km north of Baqubah was targeted by sniper fire. One soldier was killed and another was wounded (Telegram, October 25, 2019).
• On October 24, 2019, Tribal Mobilization fighters were targeted by sniper fire around 70 km northeast of Baqubah. One soldier was killed and three others were wounded (Telegram, October 25, 2019).
• On October 25, 2019, an Iraqi police post west of Baqubah was targeted by sniper fire. A policeman was killed (Telegram, October 26, 2019).
• On October 26, 2019, a police station in west Baqubah was targeted by sniper fire. Two policemen were killed and another was wounded (Telegram, October 26, 2019).
• On October 26, 2019, an IED was activated against an Iraqi Federal Police vehicle around 20 km northeast of Baqubah. Three policemen were wounded (Telegram, October 27, 2019).
• On October 26, 2019, a SWAT policeman at a police station about 20 km northeast of Baqubah was killed by sniper fire (Telegram, October 27, 2019).
• On October 27, 2019, a Popular Mobilization base 30 km south of Khanaqin was targeted by sniper fire. A Popular Mobilization operative was killed and another was wounded (Telegram, October 27, 2019).
• On October 27, 2019, an IED was activated against a Popular Mobilization vehicle 30 km south of Khanaqin. All the passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, October 27, 2019).
• On October 27, 2019, a convoy carrying Popular Mobilization operatives was attacked 30 km south of Khanaqin. There was an exchange of fire between the ISIS operatives and the Popular Mobilization operatives. A Popular Mobilization commander and two fighters were killed and the rest fled (Telegram, October 27, 2019).
• On October 28, 2019, an IED was activated against a vehicle carrying an Iraqi counterterrorism intelligence officer about 30 km northeast of Baqubah. He was killed (Telegram, October 29, 2019).
• On October 29, 2019, an IED was activated against a vehicle carrying Tribal Mobilization operatives about 80 km northeast of Baqubah. One operative was killed and six others were wounded (Telegram, October 29, 2019).

Salah al-Din Province

• On October 25, 2019, an IED was activated against a vehicle carrying a Tribal Mobilization commander and one of his escorts, about 60 km north of Baiji. The two men were wounded (Telegram, October 26, 2019).

Nineveh Province

• On October 24, 2019, an IED was activated against an Iraqi army vehicle on the western outskirts of Mosul. The passengers were killed or wounded (Telegram, October 26, 2019).

Counterterrorist activities by the Iraqi security forces

• Although the main focus of the Iraqi regime’s attention is the wave of protests in Baghdad and the southern provinces, this week the Iraqi security forces continued their counterterrorism activities against ISIS in northern and western Iraq. Following are the main counterterrorist activities:
  • On October 24, 2019, the Iraqi Interior Ministry announced that the counterterrorism forces had arrested five ISIS operatives in Mosul (glgamesh.com, October 24, 2019).
  • On October 27, 2019, a Popular Mobilization force attacked two ISIS operatives on a motorcycle during fighting that took place about 30 km south of Khanaqin. Both operatives were killed (Iraqi News Agency, October 27, 2019).
  • On October 27, 2019, an airborne force attacked “terrorist operatives” on motorcycles west of Lake Tharthar (about 50 km west of Samarra). Three “terrorist operatives” were killed and two were taken prisoner (Al-Sumaria, October 27, 2019).
  • On October 27, 2019, Iraqi Federal Police intelligence teams captured two ISIS operatives about 50 km west of Kirkuk. Under interrogation, the two operatives admitted having murdered a civilian and taken part in conveying weapons and food to the ISIS’s operatives (Al-Sumaria, October 27, 2019).
  • On October 27, 2019, the Iraqi Federal Police headquarters announced the killing of five ISIS operatives in Kirkuk. Hand grenades, bulletproof vests, mobile phones and forged documents were found in their possession (Al-Sumaria, October 27, 2019).

The Sinai Peninsula

• In the northern Sinai Peninsula, ISIS’s intensive activity continued, and was characterized mainly by the activation of IEDs against Egyptian army vehicles and tanks, an attack on an Egyptian checkpoint, and sniper fire. The main activity was as follows:
  • On October 22, 2019, ISIS operatives attacked a checkpoint west of Al-Arish. Several Egyptian soldiers were killed and wounded (Telegram, October 23, 2019).
  • On October 23, 2019, an IED was activated against a tank in south Rafah. The tank was destroyed and the soldiers inside it were killed and wounded (Telegram, October 23, 2019).
  • On October 23, 2019, a checkpoint in southern Rafah was targeted by sniper fire. An Egyptian soldier was killed (Shahed Sinaa Facebook page, October 23, 2019).
  • On October 24, 2019, an IED was activated against an Egyptian army vehicle on the international highway west of Al-Arish. Several soldiers were killed and wounded (Telegram, October 25, 2019).
  • On October 26, 2019, an IED was activated against an Egyptian army tank in Sheikh Zuweid. The soldiers in the tank were killed and wounded (Telegram, October 28, 2019).
  • On October 26, 2019, an IED was activated against an Egyptian army tank near an army camp in Sheikh Zuweid. The tank was destroyed and the crew members were killed or wounded (Telegram, October 28, 2019).
  • On October 29, 2019, an IED was activated against an Egyptian army vehicle east of Bir al-Abed. The passengers were wounded (Telegram, October 29, 2019).
  • On October 29, 2019, an RPG rocket was launched at an Egyptian army tank west of Sheikh Zuweid. The members of the tank crew were wounded (Telegram, October 29, 2019).

ISIS’s activity around the globe

Nigeria

• On October 23, 2019, ISIS fired mortar shells at a Nigerian army camp in Borno State, in northeastern Nigeria, near the border with Chad. No casualties have been reported (Telegram, October 24, 2019).
• On October 28, 2019, an attack was carried out against a Nigerian army camp in Gubio, in Borno State. Several soldiers were killed or wounded (Telegram, October 29, 2019).

Mozambique

• ISIS’s Central Africa Province announced that its operatives had repelled an attack by Mozambican army forces against its positions in northeastern Mozambique. A number of soldiers were killed or wounded. ISIS operatives seized weapons and ammunition (Telegram, October 25, 2019).

Afghanistan

• On October 25, 2019, Taliban operatives were targeted by machine gun fire in the Nangarhar Province. Two Taliban operatives were killed and another was taken prisoner (Telegram, October 27, 2019).
• On October 26, 2019, an IED was activated against Taliban operatives in the Kunar Province (around 60 km northeast of Jalalabad). Two operatives were killed (Telegram, October 26, 2019).
• On October 28, 2019, Taliban operatives were shot at in the Nangarhar Province. Three operatives were killed and two others were wounded. ISIS operatives seized weapons and ammunition (Telegram, October 28, 2019).

• On October 28, 2019, Taliban operatives were targeted by machine gun fire in the Kunar Province. A Taliban operative was killed (Telegram, October 28, 2019).

The Philippines

• In the Maguindanao Province, in the southern Philippines, ISIS operatives attacked operatives of the Moro Liberation Front^[4]. Eight members of the militia were killed and wounded (Telegram, October 24, 2019).

    
Right: ISIS attack against the Moro Liberation Front (Telegram, October 24, 2019). Left: Weapons seized by ISIS operatives (Telegram, October 24, 2019)

Pakistan

• On October 28, 2019, one of the leaders of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama party (a legitimate Islamic political party in Pakistan) was shot and killed in the Bajour District in northern Pakistan, near the border with Afghanistan. According to ISIS, the dead man “incited to kill the jihad fighters [i.e., ISIS operatives] and recruit forces against them” (Telegram, October 28, 2019).

Tajikistan

• During the past week, ISIS-affiliated entities in Tajikistan and in Telegram launched a fundraising campaign for ISIS. The Tajik-language message disseminated on Telegram stated that those transferring funds from Tajikistan should call ExpressPay directly at 446309999 and verify that [the money] was transferred to the account. The message states that if they do not make the call, the money will not be transferred. This is another expression of ISIS and its supporters’ use of digital means to raise funds to finance the organization’s activity (Telegram, October 23, 2019).

^[1] See the ITIC's Information Bulletin from October 30, 2019, “ISIS supporters spontaneously respond to the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, while so far there has been no "formal response" ↑
^[2] See the ITIC's Information Bulletin from October 29, 2019, “Significance of the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Initial assessment)” ↑
^[3] These units (Juyush in Arabic) are named after the first four Caliphs in Islam, who ruled after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (“the Rightly Guided Caliphs”). ↑
^[4] A militia of the Moro people, an ethnic group in the southern Philippines. Its full name: The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). ↑

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