Spotlight on Global Jihad (December 3-9, 2020)

Main events of the week

• Routine attacks continued in ISIS’s various provinces in Iraq, Syria and throughout Africa and Asia. Noteworthy examples:
  • Iraq: ISIS operatives continued their attacks, in the form of activating IEDs, sniper fire, targeted killings, and attacks on the Iraqi security forces and their facilities. It should be noted that a shooting attack was carried out against the headquarters of Kataeb Hezbollah, a Shiite militia operating as a proxy of Iran, about 40 km south of Baghdad (a Shiite area where ISIS seldom operates).
  • Syria: ISIS’s guerrilla attacks continued in the Euphrates Valley and in the desert region of eastern Syria, mainly in the form of activating IEDs, targeted killings, and firing light weapons at vehicles. Noteworthy examples include exchanges of fire in the desert region, in which dozens of ISIS operatives and Syrian soldiers were reportedly killed. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Russian fighter jets carried out intensive airstrikes against ISIS operatives along the roads in the desert region. In the Daraa region in southern Syria, ISIS reported that its operatives had killed a Syrian Military Intelligence “agent.”
  • Nigeria: ISIS reported that its operatives had repelled a Nigerian army attack in the northeast of the country. According to the report, seven Nigerian soldiers were killed and one was taken prisoner. In addition, ISIS’s routine attacks continued (ambushes, attacking checkpoints, and firing mortar shells).
• The Philippines: Dozens of ISIS-affiliated armed operatives reportedly attacked a police station, city hall, a Catholic church and a Philippine army post on the island of Mindanao, in the southern Philippines. No organization has claimed responsibility for the attack. On the other hand, the Philippine army accepted the surrender of dozens of operatives of the ISIS-affiliated Abu Sayyaf organization on the island of Sulu in the southern Philippines.

The Syrian arena

The Idlib region

In the Idlib region, exchanges of artillery fire continued between the Syrian army and the forces supporting it, and the rebel organizations.

ISIS’s activity in Syria^[1]

The region of Deir ez-Zor and Al-Mayadeen

• On December 8, 2020, ISIS operatives broke into the house of an SDF intelligence operative about 9 km north of Al-Mayadeen. He was shot to death.
• On December 7, 2020, ISIS operatives broke into the house of an SDF fighter about 23 km northeast of Al-Mayadeen. He was shot to death.
• On December 6, 2020, an SDF vehicle was targeted by machine gun fire about 8 km southeast of Al-Mayadeen. Two fighters were killed and another was wounded.
• On December 6, 2020, an IED was activated against an SDF APC about 5 km east of Al-Mayadeen. Two fighters were killed and two others were wounded.
•  On December 5, 2020, an SDF commander was captured by ISIS about 23 km northeast of Al-Mayadeen. He was shot to death.
• On December 4, 2020, an intelligence “agent” working for the International Coalition was captured by ISIS in the village of Shahil, about 10 km north of Al-Mayadeen. He was shot to death

The desert region (Al-Badia)

• On December 6, 2020, an IED was activated against a Syrian army vehicle west of Palmyra. The passengers were killed or wounded.
• On December 2-4, 2020, there were exchanges of fire between ISIS and the Syrian army and the forces supporting it. A total of 22 ISIS operatives and 19 soldiers and fighters of the Syrian army and the forces supporting it were killed. Russian fighter jets carried out more than 100 airstrikes on roads in the Syrian Desert (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, December 4, 2020). On December 4, 2020, an IED was activated against a Syrian army vehicle east of Hama. The passengers were killed or wounded.

Southern Syria

Daraa region

• On December 5, 2020, a Syrian Military Intelligence “agent” was targeted by machine gun fire on the road between the villages of Saida and Al-Gharia al-Sharqiya, near Daraa. He was killed.

 The Iraqi arena

ISIS attacks in the various provinces^[2]

Diyala Province

• On December 5, 2020, Iraqi soldiers were targeted by sniper fire west of Khanaqin, about 100 km northeast of Baqubah. An officer and a soldier were killed, and two other soldiers were wounded.
• On December 3, 2020, a Popular Mobilization force was targeted by sniper fire in a suburb of Al-Miqdadiya, about 40 km northeast of Baqubah. Six Popular Mobilization fighters were killed and another was wounded. When another force arrived at the scene to provide assistance, it was targeted by gunfire and an IED was activated against it. As a result, four Popular Mobilization fighters were killed and nine others were wounded.
• On December 3, 2020, Popular Mobilization fighters were targeted by sniper fire west of Khanaqin, about 100 km northeast of Baqubah. Two fighters were wounded.
• On December 3, 2020, an IED was activated against an Iraqi police vehicle about 15 km north of Baqubah. Three officers and a policeman were wounded.
• On December 2, 2020, an Iraqi soldier was targeted by sniper fire about 60 km north of Baqubah. He was killed.

Salah al-Din Province

• On December 4, 2020, ISIS operatives captured two intelligence operatives of the Iraqi National Security Apparatus northwest of Tikrit. They were shot to death.
• On December 3, 2020, ISIS operatives fired machine guns at Iraqi soldiers about 30 km north of Baghdad. One soldier was killed and two others were wounded.

Kirkuk Province

• On December 6, 2020, ISIS operatives raided an Iraqi police compound on the Kirkuk-Tikrit road. One policeman was killed and four others were wounded.
• On December 3, 2020, an Iraqi soldier was targeted by sniper fire about 4 km west of Kirkuk. He was killed.
• On December 1, 2020, Iraqi soldiers were targeted by machine gun fire west of the city of Tuz Khormato, about 70 km south of Kirkuk. One soldier was killed and another was wounded.

Babel Province

• On December 7, 2020, a headquarters of Kataeb Hezbollah (a Shiite militia serving as an Iranian proxy) was targeted by machine gun fire about 40 km south of Baghdad. One fighter was wounded. The headquarters was damaged.

Al-Anbar Province

• On December 5, 2020, ISIS operatives captured a Shiite resident about 6 km southwest of Baghdad. He was shot to death.

Counterterrorism activities by the Iraqi security forces

Salah al-Din Province

• On December 7, 2020, the security forces captured two ISIS operatives who took part in the massacre at Camp Speicher, near Tikrit, in 2014 (Al-Sumaria, December 7, 2020). As will be recalled, on June 12, 2014, ISIS operatives massacred 1,566 Shiite Iraqi Air Force cadets in an attack on Camp Speicher.

• On December 6, 2020, an International Coalition aircraft carried out an airstrike about 60 km north of Baghdad. Five “terrorist operatives” (implicitly, ISIS operatives) were killed (Al-Sumaria, December 6, 2020).
• On December 3, 2020, Iraqi army forces carrying out searches in Makhoul Mountains, about 20 km north of Baiji, located eight bodies of ISIS operatives and captured a wounded ISIS operative. The eight operatives were killed in Coalition airstrikes (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, December 3, 2020). 

Al-Anbar Province

• On December 7, 2020, a force of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Unit captured a senior ISIS commander who at one time had served as ISIS’s deputy governor of Iraq (Facebook page of Iraqi Army Spokesman Yahya al-Rasoul, December 7, 2020).

• On December 3, 2020, an Iraqi army force located an ISIS weapons depot about 30 km northwest of Baghdad. The depot contained 11 IEDs, explosive equipment, and a self-manufactured rocket launcher (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, December 3, 2020).

    
Right: IEDs consisting of 20-liter canisters filled with C4 plastic explosives, found by the Iraqi army (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, December 3, 2020). Left: Two IEDs consisting of metal plates, found by the Iraqi army (Facebook page of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, December 3, 2020)

Kirkuk Province

• On December 3, 2020, teams of the Iraqi National Security Apparatus captured four wanted ISIS operatives. One of them was caught hiding among the displaced families in the Laylan displaced persons camp, about 10 km southeast of Kirkuk. The other operative belonged to the Caliphate Cubs, ISIS’s youth organization (Al-Sumaria, December 3, 2020).
• On December 3, 2020, Iraqi police teams captured a wanted ISIS operative who had been in charge of moving ISIS operatives from one place to another, about 30 km south of Kirkuk (Al-Sumaria, December 3, 2020).

The Sinai Peninsula

ISIS’s activity in northern Sinai^[3]

• On December 7, 2020, an Egyptian soldier was killed by sniper fire in a village north of Sheikh Zuweid.
• On December 4, 2020, an Egyptian soldier was killed by sniper fire east of Sheikh Zuweid.
• On December 2, 2020, an Egyptian soldier was killed by sniper fire south of the anti-aircraft battalion camp in the Bir al-Abd region.
• On December 1, 2020, an Egyptian army bulldozer was hit and destroyed (apparently by an IED) near a roadblock in southern Rafah.

Egyptian security forces’ activity

• According to Arab media reports, the Egyptian army forces began preparations to remove the debris of houses which had been demolished in the city of Rafah in recent years. This activity takes place as part of the establishment of a buffer zone of sorts on the border between the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. A source close to Egyptian Intelligence expects the removal of the debris to cause a flare-up in the Rafah region, as part of the struggle with ISIS’s Sinai Province.
• According to tribal sources, confrontations occur almost daily between ISIS’s Sinai Province and the Egyptian army in the village of Muqata’ah, south of Rafah, and in several areas west of Rafah. The army continues its attempts to take over the village, which is one of ISIS’s main areas of activity in the Rafah region (Al-Araby al-Jadeed, December 6, 2020).

ISIS’s activity around the globe^[4]

Summary of ISIS’s activity in the various provinces (November 26 – December 2, 2020)

• ISIS released an infographic summarizing its activity on November 26 – December 2, 2020. According to the infographic, during this time, ISIS operatives carried out 48 attacks in the various provinces in Asia and Africa, compared to 59 attacks in the previous week. Most of the attacks were carried out in Iraq (20). Attacks were also carried out in ISIS’s other provinces: West Africa (11); Syria (6); Sinai Peninsula (4); Central Africa (4); Khorasan, i.e., Afghanistan (2); and East Asia [i.e., Indonesia] (1) (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, December 3, 2020).
• Over 120 people were killed and wounded in those attacks (compared to 126 in the previous week). The largest number of casualties was in Iraq (37). The other casualties were in the following provinces: West Africa (32); Syria (28); Central Africa (8); Sinai Peninsula (6); and Khorasan, i.e., Afghanistan (5); and East Asia [i.e., Indonesia] (4) (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, December 3, 2020).

Africa

Nigeria

• On December 7, 2020, ISIS operatives repelled an attack by the Nigerian army about 90 km east of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State (in northeastern Nigeria). Seven soldiers were killed, one was captured, and others were wounded. In addition, weapons, ammunition and military equipment were seized.

    
Right: Nigerian soldier captured by ISIS in a battle that took place east of Maiduguri (Telegram, December 8, 2020). Left: Nigerian army vehicle seized by ISIS (Telegram, December 8, 2020)

• On December 7, 2020, ISIS operatives ambushed and fired at Nigerian soldiers in northeastern Nigeria. Four soldiers were killed and others were wounded. In addition, weapons and ammunition were seized.
• On December 7, 2020, ISIS operatives attacked a Nigerian army checkpoint about 90 km northeast of Maiduguri. Two soldiers were killed and others were wounded. In addition, the checkpoint was set on fire.
• On December 6, 2020, ISIS operatives fired machine guns and activated an IED against Nigerian soldiers near a town located about 130 km northwest of Maiduguri. Five soldiers were killed and others were wounded.
• On December 3, 2020, three mortar shells were fired at a Nigerian army camp in a town near Lake Chad. According to ISIS, accurate hits of the target were observed.
• On November 30, 2020, ISIS operatives set up a roadblock west of Maiduguri. A Nigerian soldier and a Nigerian police officer were captured and then executed.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

• On December 7, 2020, a Congolese soldier was targeted by machine gun fire in the area of Beni, in the northeast of the country (about 6 km west of the border with Uganda). He was killed and his weapon was seized.
• On December 6, 2020, ISIS operatives attacked a Congolese army compound in the Beni region (about 6 km west of the border with Uganda). Several soldiers were wounded. In addition, weapons and ammunition were seized.
• On December 6, 2020, ISIS operatives attacked two Congolese army compounds in the Beni region. Six soldiers were killed and others were wounded. In addition, weapons and ammunition were seized.
• On December 3, 2020, ISIS operatives attacked a Congolese army compound in a village in the Beni region. Several soldiers were wounded. In addition, weapons and ammunition were seized.

Somalia

• On December 6, 2020, a hand grenade was thrown at a Somalian soldier in Mogadishu. He was killed.

Asia

The Philippines

• On December 3, 2020, dozens of ISIS-affiliated armed operatives raided a town on the island of Mindanao, in the southern Philippines. The operatives attacked the city hall, a police station, a Catholic church and a Filipino Army post, and set fire to vehicles. To date, no organization has claimed responsibility for the attack, but it was apparently carried out by ISIS.
• On December 4, 2020, Philippine police launched a large-scale operation to locate dozens of operatives of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), an organization apparently affiliated with the ISIS-affiliated Abu Sayyaf Group (Manila Times, December 4, 2020).

Afghanistan

• On December 1, 2020, the vehicle of an Afghan army commander was targeted by machine gun fire in Jalalabad. He was killed and his escort was wounded.

Jihadist activity around the globe

The Islamist uprising in northern Mozambique

In her latest article, researcher Emilia Columbo analyzes the reasons for the success of the Islamist insurgency in northern Mozambique and the characteristics of the insurgency. Following are the highlights of the article^[5].

The entrenchment of Ahlu-Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ) in northern Mozambique

• The jihadist Islamist organization ASWJ^[6] started out in 2007 as a small group of alienated adolescents. It subsequently grew to a group of about a thousand insurgent jihad fighters. Their insurgency was fueled by acute social and economic frustration. Their offensive activity in Mozambique began in October 2017. In 2020, the insurgent group carried out an estimated 357 attacks to date (October 2020), which is double the number of attacks that it carried out during the same period of last year. The attacks, initially on remote rural areas, became complex attacks carried out simultaneously, on two fronts in the northeast of the country.

Reasons for the organization’s success

• The group operates mainly in the Mocímboa da Praia region, which it took over and controlled during the entire month of August 2020, and in the surrounding provinces of Nampula and Niassa in northern Mozambique. Nampula and Niassa represent the poorest provinces in Mozambique, despite their wealth in natural resources, such as timber, natural gas, and precious stones. These provinces are also home to a Muslim majority in a country where Muslims represent about 18% of the total population. This minority feels neglected, and therefore serves as a potential source of collaborators with the insurgency.
• ASWJ has a stable and rapidly growing organizational structure. ASWJ’s success thus far can be attributed in part to the group’s avoidance of the types of strategic errors groups commit in their early days, such as undertaking operations that exceed its capacity and using terror in a way that pushes the population to ally with the government or independently fight back against the insurgents. ASWJ has demonstrated sound strategic thinking in its target selection. The group largely controls the main north-south road in Cabo Delgado. The organization effectively controls the port at Mocímboa da Praia, expanding its Marine presence and cutting the military off from a major resupply point. It claims that it should control this port since the local government “humiliates the poor and gives the profit to the [i.e., their] bosses.”

The organization’s economic activity

• The organization has stepped up its attacks on islands off the coast of Cabo Delgado, threatening to use the potential of the local natural resources – most notably natural gas. Its presence in the region puts it in a very good position to increase its involvement in the economy, which is based on illegal trade (heroin smuggling, as well as trading in timber, ivory and precious stones). However, this is liable to harm the support that it receives from its ideologues. This illegal activity is not acceptable to them and could lead to a split in their ranks if it continues.

Characteristics of the organization’s activity

• When attacking larger towns, the group has made a point of destroying infrastructure associated with the state, such as administrative buildings, cell towers, schools and medical facilities. In doing so, they made it impossible for the government to function in these facilities. Civilians have not actively sided with the government or organized a significant resistance to the insurgency. This suggests the group has kept its use of terror and strategic violence to levels that intimidate civilians without causing them to revolt. Driving civilians away helps the insurgency keep the number of civilians it needs to control to a manageable level, reducing the risk the insurgents would resort to extreme violence as a means of population control. In this context, the author notes that over 250,000 people have been displaced since 2017 as a result of violence in Cabo Delgado – the attacks against Mocímboa da Praia and Quissanga.

Utilization of the media and assistance to local citizens

• The insurgents have been conservative in their use of media. When they do so, they use violent messages, such as the beheading of 52 people in April 2020. In most cases, they appeal to the local public by mentioning that the government is helpless and corrupt or by providing food and money to civilians. The group also takes advantage of mistakes made by the government in the fight against terrorism, and its operatives have a clear understanding of the Mozambican security forces’ limitations. It is possible that disgruntled soldiers will join the ranks of the insurgents, thus providing the group with additional advantages, since they are sources of intelligence and have operational experience.

The organization’s affiliation with ISIS

• ASWJ’s affiliation with ISIS, coupled with loose border control by local security forces, and the proximity of the Cabo Delgado province to other regions where jihadist activity is taking place – all make the region a destination that attracts lone-wolf jihadists. On the other hand, the insurgency is also at risk of exporting terror within southern Africa. In this context, it should be noted that its violent activity near the Tanzanian border has already prompted Tanzanian officials to increase their military presence and activity in that area. There is also growing concern about the implications of the relationship between ASWJ and ISIS’s Central Africa Province. For example, in July 2020, ISIS warned South Africa to stay out of the battle waged by ISIS in Mozambique, which is liable to reach South Africa as well. At present, ASWJ operates only in Mozambique.

Government responses to the insurgency

• The Mozambican government must wage a more significant war against the insurgents. The Mozambican security forces need a total reboot, not just a boost from foreign forces or private military contractors. The government forces also need training; most of the local military personnel come from the south of the country and speak a language different from that of the residents of the north. In addition, the government must ensure that they do not adversely affect the civil rights of the residents affected by the operations against the insurgents.

Increasing economic aid to local residents

• The Mozambican government must also look for foreign partners in its struggle. An example of this is its recent request to the European Union for logistical and training assistance. Continued participation in US-led regional maritime exercises, combined with Mozambican investments in its navy, would help improve security along the Pacific coast. Finally, the government has a great opportunity with the recently launched Integrated Development Agency of the North to start implementing the socioeconomic programs necessary to improve the quality of life in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula^[7].

Summary and conclusions

ASWJ has been successful ever since its first attack on Mocímboa da Praia in 2017. However, due to its success, which continues to this day, it is liable to take risks in the future that will harm its success, for example – controlling territory, exporting terrorism and becoming involved in criminal activity. The Mozambican government and its security forces will be able to take advantage of this. However, in order to advance the fight against terrorism, the government will still need the help of experienced partners such as the United States.

Counterterrorism and preventive activity

Morocco

Arrest of three members of an ISIS terrorist network in northwestern Morocco

• On December 4, 2020, security forces in Morocco arrested three members of an ISIS terrorist network in the city of Tetouan, about 40 km southeast of Tangier (at the northwestern tip of Morocco). The network operatives are aged 21-38 and one of them is a relative of an ISIS operative in Syria and Iraq. The three lived in an apartment that served as a meeting place for the network operatives to plan attacks. Preparations for the attacks were in their advanced stages. Chemicals and equipment used for making IEDs, cold weapons and documents including the wording of the pledge of allegiance to ISIS’s leader were seized (Al-Magrheb al-Youm, portal operating in Morocco, December 4, 2020).

France

• On December 3, 2020, French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin announced that France had flagged 76 mosques out of more than 2,600 throughout the country as a possible threat to France’s Republican values and its security. It was also reported that if these suspicions are confirmed, the mosque in question would be closed. According to Darmanin, there are places of worship in some concentrated areas that are clearly anti-Republican, and their imams are under surveillance by the French security services. Investigators will reportedly examine the sources of funding and background of suspected imams and will also search for evidence at Quran schools for young children (Reuters, December 3, 2020). These measures are being taken in view of the growing threats to France, which have recently been voiced by radical Islamic elements, including those affiliated with ISIS.

The Philippines

• On December 5, 2020, 36 operatives of ISIS-affiliated Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) surrendered to the Philippine army at a ceremony held in Omar, in the Sulu archipelago in the southern Philippines. These operatives, who were involved in carrying out attacks, handed over their outmoded rifles (CNN Philippines, December 5, 2020).

The battle for hearts and minds

• This week, ISIS’s Al-Naba’ weekly published an article about an attack carried out last week in a Christian village on the island of Sulawesi in Indonesia. During the attack, four Christian residents were brutally murdered and a church and six homes of Christians were set on fire. The article states that the residents of the village are “Christian infidels” and that it is located on an island where “Christian infidels committed the most heinous crimes against Muslims.” According to the article, in 2009, dozens of Muslims on the island were massacred and 16 villages were set on fire, destroying mosques and houses. According to ISIS, the church played a key role in inciting this massacre. The article ends with the threat that the soldiers of ISIS’s Islamic State attacked the Christian villages “as part of a settling of accounts that has only just begun.”
• The ITIC does not have any information on the massacre to which the article in Al-Naba’ refers. Many violent incidents have taken place on the island in question over the years due to tension between the Muslims and Christians living there. Hence, it appears that ISIS is attempting to leverage this tension in order to recruit support, presenting itself as the savior of the local Muslim community (Al-Naba’ weekly, Telegram, December 3, 2020).

^[1] According to ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram ↑
^[2] According to ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram ↑
^[3] According to ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram ↑
^[4] According to ISIS’s claims of responsibility posted on Telegram ↑
^[5] Emilia Columbo, The Secret to the Northern Mozambique Insurgency's Success. War on the Rocks/Texas National Security Review, 8 October 2020: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-secret-to-the-northern-mozambique-insurgencys-success/ Emilia Columbo is currently a senior associate with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a renowned research institute in Washington, DC. She previously served as a senior Africa and Latin America security analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. ↑
^[6] Literally: “Sunni people and members of their community.” Local residents call the organization Al-Shabaab, although it has no connection with the jihadist organization of that name operating in Somalia. ↑
^[7] This agency was created in March 2020 and is known in the local arena by the initials of its name in French, ADIN, but actually began operating on August 31, 2020. It was established to deal with ASWJ’s allegations of Mozambican government corruption in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Quissanga and Nampula. ↑

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