Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (August 12-19 , 2024)

Overview^[1]

• During the past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 54 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel. An IDF soldier was killed and an officer was seriously injured by a drone strike in the Western Galilee. Two IDF soldiers were injured, one seriously, by an UAV hit in the Upper Galilee.
• Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives in south Lebanon. Hezbollah announced that eight operatives had been killed, including a Radwan Force commander. An operative of Hezbollah’s Lebanese Resistance Companies was killed.
• Senior Hezbollah figures continued to warn that there would be a strong “response” to the killing of Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah’s military commander. According to reports, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, does not want to act without Iranian consent and or to engage in a wider confrontation with Israel.
• Hezbollah published a video of an underground facility for storing precision missiles and heavy rockets, and threatened to use them to attack all of Israel in the event of a war.
• Amos Hochstein, the American envoy, visited Lebanon and met with senior government and military officials in an attempt to prevent escalation amid efforts to reach a cease-fire agreement in the Gaza Strip.
• Hezbollah marked the 18^th anniversary of the end of the Second Lebanon War and stated it was committed to continuing its support for Palestinians along with the entire “resistance axis.”^[2]
• Three UNIFIL observers were injured in an explosion near their vehicle in south Lebanon. The UNIFIL spokesman avoided assigning responsibility and called on all parties to act responsibly.

South Lebanon

Hezbollah attacks

• During the past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 54 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel, compared to 59 attacks the previous week. Hezbollah attacked with anti-tank missiles, artillery, UAVs and various types of rockets. An IDF soldier was killed and an officer was seriously injured by a drone strike in the Western Galilee; two IDF soldiers were wounded, one seriously, by a drone strike in the Upper Galilee. Hezbollah continued attacking sites which had not previously been targeted:
  • On August 15, 2024, Hezbollah fired a barrage of rockets to attack a kibbutz “in response” to the Israeli attacks on the villages of south Lebanon, and in particular to the injury of civilians in Marjayoun (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 15, 2024).
  • On August 17, 2024, Hezbollah attacked a kibbutz in the Upper Galilee with volleys of Katyusha rockets; the kibbutz lies about ten kilometers from the border. According to Hezbollah, it was a response to the Israeli attacks on villages and houses in south Lebanon, particularly the attack on the town of al-Kfour, in which Syrian civilians were injured (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel , August 17, 2024).
  • On August 19, 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for an explosive UAV targeting an IDF base north of Acre, which the organization claimed was a logistics base for the IDF Northern Command (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 19, 2024).
• The attacks were the following (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, until 1 p.m., August 12-19, 2024):
  • August 19, 2024: Three attacks, including Hezbollah’s claim that its forces fired rockets and artillery to prevent a group of IDF soldiers from penetrating Lebanese territory in the Aita al-Sha’ab region. An IDF soldier was killed and an officer was injured in a drone strike in the Ya’ara region of ​​the Western Galilee (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 19, 2024).
  • August 18, 2024: 11 attacks. Rockets fell in open areas in the Galilee Panhandle and the Western Galilee (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 18, 2024)
  • August 17, 2024: Seven attacks. Two IDF fighters were injured, one seriously, by a rocket hit. Hezbollah fired 55 rockets targeting a kibbutz north of the Sea of Galilee, some of which fell in open areas. There were no casualties, fires broke out in the area. Rockets fell in open areas in the Western Galilee, in the Galilee Panhandle and Mount Dov; there were no casualties. An explosive UAV hit a moshav; there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson, August 17, 2024).
  • August 16, 2024: Eight attacks. Two UAVs were intercepted in the northern Golan Heights and in the Upper Galilee. A UAV fell in the northern Golan Heights; falling Iron Dome aerial defense system fragments caused a fire. A rocket fell in an open area near the border. In all cases, there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 16, 2024).
  • August 15, 2024: Seven attacks. Twenty rockets were fired at the Upper Galilee, most of which were intercepted; some fell in open areas. Five rockets fell in open areas in the Galilee Panhandle. A rocket fell in an open area near the border, causing a fire. Rockets hit the Galilee Panhandle and the northern Golan Heights. UAVs launched at the Western Galilee and the Golan Heights were intercepted. In all cases, there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 15, 2024).
  • August 14, 2024: Eight attacks. Rockets fell in open areas in the Galilee Panhandle; there were no casualties. Rockets hit Kiryat Shmona, damaging buildings; there were no casualties. An anti-tank missile hit Metula, there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 14, 2024).
  • August 13, 2024: Six attacks. A UAV launched from Lebanon at the Upper Galilee was intercepted, while another UAV was intercepted in Lebanese territory. Fifteen missiles fell in open areas in Galilee Panhandle. In all cases, there were no casualties (IDF spokesman, August 13, 2024).
  • August 12, 2024 (beginning 1 p.m.): Four attacks. A number of rockets fell in the Galilee and Mount Dov and an anti-tank missile hit an open area on a high ridge. In all cases there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 12, 2024).

   
Right: Damage to a building in Kiryat Shmona (Kiryat Shmona spokesman’s unit, August 14, 2024). Left: Fires in the Upper Galilee after rocket hits (Israel Northern Fire and Rescue spokesman’s unit, August 17, 2024)

IDF response

• In response, Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives in south Lebanon, including armed terrorist squads, terrorist facilities, buildings used for military-terrorist purposes, munitions warehouses, observation posts, launching positions and rocket launchers (IDF spokesman, August 12-19, 2024).
• On August 17, 2024, Hussein Ibrahim Kassab, a Radwan Force commander in Hezbollah’s, was killed in an airstrike in the Tyre area (IDF spokesman, August 17, 2024). Lebanese media reported that an Israeli drone hit a motorcycle in the Kadmos area, northeast of Tyre (al-Nashra, August 17, 2024). Hezbollah confirmed that the attack killed Hussein Ibrahim Kassab, aka Malak, born in 1989, from the town of Tayr Debba and a resident of Burj al-Shamali in south Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 17, 2024).

   
Right: The motorcycle after the attack (Fouad Khreiss’ X account, August 17, 2024). Left: Hussein Ibrahim Kasab (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 17, 2024)

• ust 16, 2024, the Israeli Air Force attacked a Hezbollah munitions warehouse in the al-Nabatieh region of south Lebanon (IDF spokesman, August 17, 2024). The Lebanese media reported that an Israeli fighter jet attacked a residential building in Wadi al-Kfour in al-Nabatieh, killing ten Syrian civilians, including spouses and two small children, and injuring five other people, including three Syrians, two of whom were fatally injured (al-Mayadeen, August 17, 2024). According to Lebanese claims, the attack hit a stone factory and an industrial iron storage facility owned by the Tohmaz family on the outskirts of Kadmous in the al-Nabatieh region. The owner, Hussein Tohmaz, denied that it had been used as a weapons warehouse or that the building had any connection to terrorism, claiming it had been used to store iron, and that all the dead were workers (Lebanese News Agency, August 17, 2024). In ITIC assessment, the site may have been attacked because it supplied iron for Hezbollah’s rocket and missile industry.

Other Hezbollah casualties

• Hezbollah reported the death of seven operatives (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 12-19, 2024):
  • Ibrahim Jamil al-Ashi, aka Wasim, born in 1987, from Bint Jbeil in south Lebanon.
  • Fadi Muhammad Shihab, aka Taysir, born in 1980, from Bar’asheet in south Lebanon.
  • Hussein Yasin Sha’ito, aka Jawad, born in 1995, from al-Tiri in south Lebanon.
  • Muhammad Ali Jihad Badr al-Din, aka Assad Ali, born in 1994, from Harouf in south Lebanon.
  • Ibrahim Shawqi Salamah, aka Alaa, born in 1984, from Blida in south Lebanon.
  • Abbas Badi’ Milhem, aka Jihad, born in 1990, from Majdal Selm in south Lebanon.
  • Muhammad Ali Hassan Qadou’, aka Amir, born in 2005, from al-Ghandouriyeh in south Lebanon.

“Lebanese Resistance Companies” casualty

• On August 18, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked a Hezbollah unit operating in the Shebaa region of ​​south Lebanon (IDF spokesman, August 18, 2024). Lebanese media reported that a UAV attacked a motorcycle in Shebaa and one person was injured (al-Nahar, August 18, 2024). It was later reported that Fadi Kanaan was killed in an airstrike while riding a motorcycle (Janoub24 website X account, August 18, 2024). Hezbollah confirmed that the attack killed an operative of the “Lebanese companies for resistance to the Israeli occupation,”^[3] Fadi Qassem Kanaan, aka Jihad, from Shebaa (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 18,  2024).

   
Right: The motorcycle after the attack (Janoub24 website X account, August 18, 2024). Left: Fadi Qassem Kanaan (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 18, 2024)

Hezbollah Deploys for Escalation

Deploying for a response to the killing of Fuad Shukr

• Senior Hezbollah figures continued to threaten a retaliation for Israel’s killing of Fuad Shukr, the organization’s military commander, in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut on July 30, 2024:^[4]
  • Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, stated that the organization had three courses of action: the first was that the continuation of “aggression” in the Gaza Strip would require the “support fronts” to continue the conflict with Israel at all costs; the second was a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip which would end the “support” operations; and the third was retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr and the Iranian response to the elimination of Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau. Qassem said the third option was separate from the others and had its own plan of action, whether the conflict continued or a ceasefire was achieved. He claimed the response would come, but the manner and timing depended on the organization’s interests and limits (al-Nashra, August 15, 2024).
  • Ali Damoush, deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Committee, claimed the killing of Fuad Shukr meant there was no escape from a “painful reaction” which would deter Israel and return it to “[Hezbollah’s] rules of conflict in effect before the attack on the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia” (Lebanese News Agency, August 16, 2024).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a Hezbollah faction member of the Lebanese Parliament, said that the “resistance” was obligated to respond to the attack in Beirut and that only its leadership would decide on the nature and timing of the response. He claimed that all the threats and pressures exerted by international envoys who arrived in Lebanon would not prevent the “resistance” from exercising its “legitimate right to defend its country,” and that all the messages in the media and those conveyed behind the scenes would be futile (Lebanese News Agency, August 16, 2024).
  • Hassan Izz al-Din, a Hezbollah faction member of the Lebanese Parliament, said that the timing of the response was in the hands of the decision-makers, and that the “enemy” should know that the “waiting period” was supposed to be “nerve-wracking and confusing,” and was part of the organization’s “combat tactics.” He claimed that when Hezbollah had made the decision to confront Israel, it was exercising its “legitimate national responsibility,” which it continued to exercise (al-Nashra, August 12, 2024).
• “Sources” said that Hassan Nasrallah did not want to attack Israel without “Iranian consent,” and did not want a wider confrontation with Israel (CBS, August 16, 2024).
• Despite Hezbollah’s preparations for retaliation, “knowledgeable sources ” claimed that many residents of the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia who, fearing escalation, had left for other areas in Lebanon after the killing of Fuad Shukr, had returned to their homes. According to reports, people around Hezbollah were of the opinion that a war would not break out unexpectedly and that Israel would not initiate a major attack (Lebanon24, August 16, 2024).

Hezbollah perceptions and influence

• Hezbollah released a four and a half-minute video subtitled in Hebrew and English, called “Our mountains, our warehouses” in which it revealed Imad 4, an underground facility for storing precision missiles and heavy rockets. The video showed a wide tunnel with trucks carrying launchers with missiles and rockets. The voice over was an excerpt from the Nasrallah speech about the capabilities of the organization’s precision missiles, which he claimed could reach targets in any area “of occupied Palestine,” from the north to Eilat (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 16, 2024) .
• x According to a report, Imad 4 is equipped with dozens of missile launchers with heavy warheads of various models, including 220mm and 303mm. It has storage areas for weapons and ammunition, and can receive an encrypted missile launch order within a few minutes. It has a logistics team and a team of operatives who receive firing orders based on pre-prepared coordinates. It also has a field hospital and is capable of meeting the needs of those staying there for a period ranging from eight months to a full year. According to the report, it is one of several important facilities which house larger, more accurate and more “important” missiles (al-Mayadeen, August 16, 2024).

   
Right: A truck carrying missiles in a tunnel Left: The Imad 4 facility (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 16, 2024)

•  Simia, the electronic unit of Hezbollah’s Executive Committee, published a psychological warfare video in Arabic with Hebrew subtitles, entitled, “Equipment you will need in the next war.” It showed various items emerging from a suitcase, including running shoes “to escape quickly,” inflatable water-wings for when “your battleships sink,” an electric flashlight for “when you have no power supply,” a passport to “return to where you came from” and sedatives for panic situations (Simia, August 14, 2024).

Diplomatic efforts to prevent escalation

• On August 14, 2024, Amos Hochstein, the American envoy, arrived in Lebanon for a short visit, during which he met with senior Lebanese government and military figures:
  • Meeting with Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Hochstein said that whether or not there would be an all-out war would become clear in the coming days, depending on the ceasefire negotiations in the Gaza Strip (al-Jadid, August 14, 2024). He told Berri that the United States believed the war could be stopped now and a diplomatic solution reached. He emphasized that an agreement in the Gaza Strip would create conditions for reducing tensions between Israel and Lebanon. He also warned that as time passed, the chances of the conflict’s expanding would increase (al-Arabiya, August 14, 2024). According to reports, after the meeting with Hochstein, Berri remarked that “the situation today is better than yesterday” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 15, 2024).
  • Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, told Hochstein that Israel had to be pressured into stopping its attacks, noting that the solution was a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in south Lebanon. Mikati added that extensive diplomatic work was being undertaken for the success of the initiative proposed by the leaders of the United States, Qatar and Egypt for reaching an agreement to end the war in the Gaza Strip (Lebanese prime minister’s X account, August 14, 2024).
  •  Hochstein also met with Joseph Aoun, the Lebanese army commander (Lebanese army X account, August 14, 2024). “Sources” reported that the meeting focused on the preparedness of the army and its needs for the next phase. According to reports, the Lebanese government approved the recruitment of 1,500 new soldiers as part of Aoun’s plan to recruit 6,000 additional soldiers (al-Akhbar, August 15, 2024).

• Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, called Hochstein’s visit a “performance.” He claimed Hochstein had not brought anything new with him and no specific American proposals had been presented (al-Manar, August 16, 2024). It was the first statement made by an official Hezbollah figure regarding Hochstein’s recent visit.
• The Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar reported that everyone who met Hochstein stated that he explicitly or indirectly emphasized that any response by Hezbollah to the killing of Fuad Shukr could result in stalling attempts to stop the war, and that Lebanon would be the first to suffer from any regional deterioration (al-Akhbar, August 15, 2024).
• According to a report, messages were sent from Egypt to Hezbollah calling for restraint in retaliating against Israel and expressing a desire to push for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. According to the report, during a visit to Beirut on August 16, 2024, Badr Abdelatty, the Egyptian foreign minister, received a positive response from Lebanese officials regarding the desire to stop the escalation and prevent the situation from spiraling into an all-out war. However, it was made clear that the cessation of escalation depended on a positive outcome of the negotiations to end the war in the Gaza Strip (al-Araby al-Jadeed, August 18, 2024).

Criticism of Hezbollah

• Samir Geagea, president of the Lebanese Forces Party, said that Hezbollah’s actions along the border with Israel were not intended to support the Gaza Strip but to support Iran’s regional strategy. He emphasized that Hezbollah could not act against the will of the Lebanese people. Referring to the video Hezbollah in which presented the Imad 4 facility, he asked why the organization had not used the facilities until now, adding that they did not serve the interests of the Lebanese people because Iran had financed them. He also accused the government of betraying the residents of the south, adding that Lebanon had to take responsibility for what was happening and not support Hezbollah’s actions (Samir Geagea’s X account, August 16, 2024). In response to his accusations, the Lebanese interim government’s media information office claimed that the government was not responsible for all the problems which had accumulated as a result of poor handling by previous governments, adding that the government was investing all efforts to overcome the difficulties (Lebanese media information office X account, August 16, 2024).

The Situation in South Lebanon

• Nasser Yassin, minister of the environment and chairman of the national emergency committee, said that the number of displaced people in south Lebanon since the beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023, was 102,523 and that more than 500 people had been killed. He said that about 3,000 buildings had been fully or partially destroyed, and 72 educational institutions and six health institutions had been damaged. In addition, an area of ​​17 thousand dunams had been burned, 40 thousand olive trees had been damaged and 340 thousand farm animals had been killed (al-Araby al-Jadeed, August 18, 2024).
• On August 13, 2024, the Lebanese ministry of health published its periodic report on the victims of the fighting in South Lebanon. According to the data, at least 566 people had been killed, including 511 men, 20 children and teenagers up to the age of 19, and 35 women; 1,765 people had been injured. Ninety-five percent% of the victims were Lebanese, 4% were Syrian and 1% were Palestinian. The number of displaced persons stood at 102,523 (Lebanese ministry of health website, August 13, 2024).

The 18th Anniversary of the End of the Second Lebanon War

• Every year Hezbollah celebrates the anniversary of the end of the Second Lebanon War. One of the events is a speech by Hassan Nasrallah about the consequences of the war on the [so-called] “equation” of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. However, this year, between the killing of Fuad Shukr and the fighting against Israel, Hezbollah did not hold a formal ceremony and Nasrallah did not make a speech (Simia, August 15, 2024) “A former senior official in Hezbollah” noted that Nasrallah’s next speech was expected to be given only after Hezbollah had retaliated for the death of Fuad Shukr (al-Nabā’, August 16, 2024).
• On August 15, 2024, Hezbollah released a statement for the 18^th anniversary of its “victory” in the Second Lebanon War. The statement stated that the “Israeli killing machine,” with the support of the United States, had failed to defeat the “resistance” in Lebanon. Lebanon, according to the statement, would never be a hostage of the “enemy’s” desires and would never open the doors to “normalization.” Hezbollah noted that in view of the “great historical changes,” including Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the “resistance” [Hezbollah in Lebanon] was still committed to supporting the Palestinians, along with all the “resistance fronts,”^[5] and to preventing the “enemy” from achieving its goals (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 15, 2024) .
•  Simia, the electronic unit of Hezbollah’s Executive Committee, launched a network campaign on the occasion of the anniversary to mark the “victory” in the Second Lebanon War and called on its supporters to distribute notices on the social networks quoting Hassan Nasrallah and stating that the organization was “duty-bound to respond when an enemy crosses the red lines,” with the hashtag “#The response_is_a_commitment_and a promise.”

The Lebanese Government

•  Stéphane Séjourné, the French foreign minister, met in Beirut with Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament. They discussed the latest developments in Lebanon and the region, as well as the renewal of the UNIFIL mandate in south Lebanon. Séjourné said that France supported Lebanon and was interested in de-escalation. Berri said that Lebanon was bound by the rules of conflict and had the right to defend itself against Israeli attacks. Afterwards, the French foreign minister met with Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, and reiterated his support for Lebanon. Mikati emphasized that UNIFIL’s mandate should be extended (al-Nashra, August 15, 2024).

   
The French foreign minister meets with Berri (right) and Mikati (left) (al-Nashra, August 15, 2024)

•  Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, and Abdallah Bou Habib, the Lebanese foreign minister, met in Beirut with Badr Abdelatty, the Egyptian foreign minister, to discuss bilateral relations and efforts to reduce regional tensions. According to a report, Mikati expressed appreciation for the international, Arab and Egyptian efforts in particular to achieve a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and to stop the Israeli “aggression” against south Lebanon. Mikati added that Lebanon was fully committed to Resolution 1701. Abdelatty expressed Egypt’s support for Lebanon and its commitment to efforts for a ceasefire (Lebanese News Agency, August 16, 2024).

• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, spoke with David Lammy, the British foreign minister, about new developments in security in south Lebanon and the need to increase efforts to end the cycle of violence. Mikati emphasized the need to put pressure on Israel to stop its attacks on towns and villages in south Lebanon, which were causing deaths, injuries and a great deal of damage. Mikati expressed his concern that the current cycle of violence escalate with undesirable consequences. Lammy said that he would increase his diplomatic contacts to stop the escalation and prevent a deterioration on a wider scale (Radio Eleanor, August 17, 2024).

UNIFIL

• On August 18, 2024, Lebanese media reported on an Israeli airstrike in the town of al-Dhahira, (about a kilometer north of Yarin in south Lebanon, which hit a UNIFIL force patrol. According to reports, there were a number of injuries among UNIFIL observers, including one from Ghana (Lebanon 24 and al-Nashra, August 18, 2024).
• UNIFIL said in a statement that three peace observers were slightly injured after an explosion occurred near their vehicle, which was clearly marked as belonging to UNIFIL, in the Yarin region of south Lebanon. According to reports, all the soldiers returned to their base safely and that the circumstances of the incident were being investigated. UNIFIL called on all parties to act responsibly and avoid harming the peacekeeping forces (UNIFIL account X, August 18, 2024).
• The UNIFIL spokesperson called on all parties to avoid attacking the observer force. He noted that recent events were worrying and could lead to escalation, and UNIFIL was trying to communicate with the parties to reduce escalation and prevent a regional war. He emphasized that the only way to resolve the crisis was diplomacy, not militarism (al-Jazeera, August 18, 2024).
•  UNIFIL’s announcement avoided directly blaming the attack on the observers on Israel, however a “source” in the force stated that they were investigating how an Israeli attack had harmed the soldiers. The “source” emphasized that harming the forces in south Lebanon was unacceptable (al-Hadath, August 18 2024).

Sanctions Imposed on Hezbollah

• On August 15, 2024, the United States Treasury Department announced the imposition of sanctions on a Hong Kong-based energy company which owns two tankers that were used by the Hezbollah-controlled Talaqi Group to transfer tens of millions of dollars’ worth of condensed hydrocarbon gas (LPG) from Iran to China. The Talaqi Group, owned by Hezbollah figure Muhammad Qasim al-Bazzal, is a straw company that helps the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Qods Force sell energy products and other goods while circumventing international sanctions (United States Treasury Department website, August 15, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, the "resistance axis" partners seeking the destruction of the State of Israel.
^[3] A Hezbollah wing composed of non-Shi'ite Lebanese.
^[4] For further information, see the August 2024 ITIC report, "Reactions to the Deaths of Fuad Shukr and Isma’il Haniyeh."
^[5] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, the "resistance axis" partners seeking the destruction of the State of Israel.

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