Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (August 5-12 , 2024)

Overview^[1]

• During the past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 59 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel. A civilian was killed and 14 were injured by the interception of a Hezbollah UAV launched at the Western Galilee.
• Hezbollah announced 14 operatives had been killed. A senior commander in Hamas’ military wing was eliminated in Sidon.
• The Hezbollah secretary general threatened harsh retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr, the organization’s military commander. He stated that Hezbollah would act alone or in conjunction with the “resistance axis.”^[2]
• A Lebanese government position paper called for an immediate ceasefire and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 by means of deploying the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL in the south of the country. The Lebanese foreign minister called on the UN to stop Israeli “aggression” against Lebanon.
• The Lebanese army and UNIFIL said they would continue to cooperate, following the temporary suspension of joint patrols after an incident in a village in south Lebanon.
• Syria: A Hezbollah missile warehouse near the al-Shayrat military airport was hit in an attack attributed to Israel.
• Classified documents revealed direct ties between the head of the recently closed Hamburg Islamic Center and Iran and Hezbollah.
• A Lebanese-Colombian citizen who was on the United States sanctions list for aiding Hezbollah was arrested in Colombia.

South Lebanon

Hezbollah attacks

• During the past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 59 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel, compared to 43 attacks the previous week. The attacks included the use of anti-tank missiles, artillery, UAVs and various types of rockets, including heavy rockets. One civilian was killed when a UAV launched at the Western Galilee was intercepted, and 14 others were injured:
  • Continuation of attacks on targets not previously attacked since the beginning of the war: On August 10, 2024, Hezbollah announced a drone-swarm attack on an IDF base in the Lower Galilee. Hezbollah claimed it was a response to IDF counterterrorism activities in Sidon targeting a senior Hamas figure (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 10, 2024).
  • Use of a new rocket: On August 8, 2024, Hezbollah published pictures of recent attacks on Israeli targets on the northern border, including an attack on Metula on August 3, 2024 (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 8, 2024). Hezbollah-affiliated TV channels claimed it was the first use of a Burkan IRAM rocket. According to the channels, it was a 122 mm Grad rocket with an accelerator and a 100 kg (220 lb) warhead (al-Ayn Press, August 8, 2024). The Burkan rockets which have been launched so far have a range of up to ten kilometers and carry a warhead weighing 300 to 500 kg.

   
Right: Burkan IRAM rocket launch targeting Metula on August 3, 2024. Left: The rocket hits a building (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 8, 2024)

• The attacks this past week (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 5-12, 2024):
  • August 12, 2024 (before 1 p.m.): Two attacks. About 30 rockets were launched at the Western Galilee before dawn. A number of hits were detected in open areas; there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson, August 12, 2024) Hezbollah claimed that the attack targeted an IDF base and was in response to an Israeli attack on the town of Maaroub in which civilians were injured. According to the Lebanese ministry of health, 12 people were injured, 11 Syrians and one Lebanese, and half of the victims were children (Lebanese News Agency, August 11, 2024). Two anti-tank missiles hit Metula; there were no casualties (Israeli media, August 12, 2024).
  • August 11, 2024: Nine attacks. An anti-tank missile hit a house in Netu’a; there were no casualties (Israeli media, August 1, 2024).
  • August 10, 2024: Ten attacks. Several UAVs were launched into the north of the country; one was intercepted and some hit, causing damage and fires. There were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 10, 2024).
  • August 9, 2024: Nine attacks. Rockets fell in northern agricultural areas; there were no casualties. Rockets hit Kiryat Shmona; there were no casualties but property was damaged. Anti-tank missiles hit a kibbutz house and library; there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 9, 2024).

• • August 8, 2024: Eight attacks. Twenty-five rockets were launched to attack the Western Galilee, there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson, August 8, 2024).
  • August 7, 2024: Seven attacks. UAVs fell in an open area in the northern Golan Heights. Rockets hit Mount Miron. There were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 7, 2024).
  • August 6, 2024: Nine attacks. Three UAVs were launched from Lebanon; an interception system launched at one of the UAVs ad accidentally hit Route 4, south of Nahariya. One civilian was mortally wounded and later died, 14 people were injured. An anti-tank missile hit a border community; no casualties or damage were reported. Twenty rockets fell in open areas in the northern Golan Heights, ten fell in the Galilee Panhandle. There were no casualties, but the rocket hits caused fires (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 6 and 9, 2024 ).
  • August 5, 2024 (from 12:40 p.m.): Five attacks. UAVs hit Mount Miron; there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson, August 5, 2024).

IDF response

• In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah terrorist targets and operatives in south Lebanon, including armed terrorist squads, terrorist facilities, buildings used for military-terrorist purposes, munitions warehouses, observation posts, launching positions and rocket launchers (IDF spokesperson, August 5-11, 2024).
• Israeli Air Force aircraft carried out targeted attacks on Hezbollah operatives:
  • On August 5, 2024, Ali Jamal al-Din Jawad, commander of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force, was killed in an attack on the Ebba region of south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, August 5, 2024). Lebanese media reported that an Israeli drone attacked a motorcycle in the town of Ebba. One person was killed and another was wounded (Lebanese News Agency, August 5, 2024). Hezbollah confirmed that the attack killed Ali Jamal al-Din Jawad, aka Karbala, born in 1987, from the town Zebdin in south Lebanon (Hezbollah combat  information Telegram channel, August 5, 2024).

   
Right: Ali Jamal al-Din Jawad’s scooter (Mulhaq’s X account, August 5, 2024). Left: Ali Jamal al-Din Jawad (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 5, 2024)

•  On August 7, 2024, Hassan Fares Jashshi, a Hezbollah anti-tank commander, was killed in an attack on the Jouaiyya region of south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, August 7, 2024). “Local sources” reported that a “very small Israeli missile” was launched at a motorcycle and killed the rider, a Hezbollah operative (Ahmed Dahab’s X account, August 9, 2024). Hezbollah confirmed that the attack killed Hassan Fares Jashshi, aka Ghaleb, born in 1986, from the town of Jouaiyya in south Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 7, 2024).

   
Right: The remains of Hassan Fares Jashshi’s motorcycle (Shevon’s X account, August 7, 2024). Left: Hassan Fares Jashshi (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 7, 2024)

Other Hezbollah casualties

• Hezbollah reported the deaths of 12 additional operatives (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 5-12, 2024, as of 1 p.m.):
  • Hassan Mansour Mansour, aka Jihad, born in 1998, from Jibchit in south Lebanon.
  • Ali Mustafa Shams al-Din, aka Sajed, born in 2003, from Majdal Salam in south Lebanon.
  • Hussein Ali Yassin, aka Karar, born in 1993, from al-Sultania in south Lebanon.
  • Amin Hassan Badr al-Din, aka Zulfiqar, born in 1988, from al-Ghabiri in al-Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut.
  • Adham Khanjar Hussein Nasser, aka Mahdi, born in 1997, from Arki in south Lebanon.
  • Muhammad Hussein Taleb, aka Amir, born in 1992, from Burj al-Shamali in south Lebanon.
  • Hassan Ataf al-Sayyid, aka Gharib, born in 1978, from Aitaroun in south Lebanon.
  • Mehdi Mahmoud Kasibani, aka Saraj, born in 1994, from Harouf in south Lebanon.
  • Hadi Jihad Daib, aka Haidar, born in 1997, from Bafliyah and a resident of Debal in south Lebanon.
  • Muhammad Hani Haidar, aka Abu al-Faisal, born in 1988, from Blida in south Lebanon.
  • Ali Samir Hejazi, aka Abu Zeinab, born in 1997, from Hadatha and a resident of Dardgh’ia in south Lebanon.
  • Hassan Ghadhban Mustafa, aka Jihad, born in 1994, from Beit Lif in south Lebanon.

Hamas commander eliminated

• On August 9, 2024, Samer Mahmoud al-Hajj, a commander in Hamas-Lebanon, was killed in an attack by the Israeli Air Force in Sidon. He was responsible for promoting, orchestrating and carrying out terrorist attacks and launches from Lebanon. He was the commander of the Hamas military force in the Ein al-Hilweh camp in the Sidon region, and responsible for recruiting and training terrorist operatives to attack Israel, and also responsible for attacking Israel from Lebanese territory (IDF spokesperson, August 9, 2024). According to reports, two Hamas operatives were killed in an attack on a car at the southern entrance to Sidon (al-Hadath, August 9, 2024). The Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, confirmed the death of commander Samer Mahmoud al-Hajj, aka Abu Mahmoud, from the village of al-Sumayriyya in the “Acre Governorate”^[3] (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, August 9, 2024).

   
Right: Samer Mahmoud al-Hajj’s car on fire in Sidon (Khaled bin Farhan’s X account, August 9, 2024). Left: Samer Mahmoud al-Hajj (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, August 9, 2024)

Israeli defense minister sends a message to Lebanese

•  Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant addressed a letter in Arabic to the people of Lebanon which said, “People of Lebanon, Shi’ite Iran and its proxies, led by Hezbollah, have taken Lebanon and its people hostage for the sake of narrow sectarian interests. The State of Israel strives for peace, prosperity and stability on both sides of the northern border and therefore will not allow the Hezbollah militia to destabilize the border and the region. If Hezbollah continues its aggression, Israel will fight a war of attrition. Remember Nasrallah’s regret for the dangerous and ill-advised adventure in August 2006, learn the lesson and do not repeat the dangerous adventure in August 2024. Anyone who plays with fire can expect to be burned” (Yoav Gallant’s X account, August 8, 2024).

Nasrallah Gives Another Speech

• On August 6, 2024, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, gave a speech to mark one week since the death of Fuad Shukr (Sayyid Muhsen), the organization’s military commander. He warned that the response to his death would come and be severe (al-Manar, August 6, 2024):
  • Setbacks do not deter the “resistance:” Nasrallah said the deaths of Fuad Shukr and Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, were great losses for the Palestinian people and the “resistance axis,”^[4] but did not undermine the “resistance,” which continued its activities as usual.
  • Hezbollah’s response to the death: He said that the attack in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut in which Fuad Shukr was killed, could not go without a response. He said the response would be “strong” and that Hezbollah would act alone or as part of a comprehensive response with the “resistance axis,” since Iran and Yemen also had to respond to the Israeli attacks. He added that Hezbollah would respond with “caution and discretion” and that making Israel wait for the response was psychological warfare and “part of the punishment,” because it kept “enemy” on alert. He also warned that Hezbollah forces were capable of attacking Israeli factories in the north and destroying them “in just half an hour.”

• • Israel’s weakness: He claimed that Israel today was no longer as strong as in the past and was unable to deal with the “axis of resistance” on its own, therefore it needed the aid and support of the United States and European countries, and even several Arab countries. He added that despite Israel’s preparedness, Hezbollah’s drones had reached Acre. He claimed that the “resistance” had become stronger than Israel and was forcing a “symmetry” on it of displaced people and damage to homes on both sides, and that if the airport in Beirut was shut down, Ben Gurion Airport would also shut down.
  • Israel is working to destroy the Palestinians: He claimed there was an Israeli consensus against a Palestinian state and Israel was working to “destroy” the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and push them out of Judea and Samaria in order to annex the region. He warned that if the “resistance” was defeated, Israel would have regional hegemony, al-Aqsa Mosque would be “in great danger” and the holy places for Islam and Christianity in “Palestine” would “no longer exist.” Therefore, he claimed that the purpose of the current battle was to prevent Israel from winning and thereby eliminate the Palestinian issue.
  • Israel promotes escalation: He pointed out that there were Lebanese who said Hezbollah was responsible for the escalation, but in practice Israel crossed the red lines and Hezbollah was “responding.” He claimed Hezbollah balanced the need to help the Palestinians with the needs of Lebanon.
  • The lie that the IDF was responsible for the damage to Majdal Shams: Nasrallah reiterated his lie that Israel did not tell the families of the children and youths killed in Majdal Shams that it was an interceptor attack and not a Hezbollah rocket that killed the children. He referred to an incident which occurred a few hours earlier, in which Israeli civilians were injured by an interception system launched at Hezbollah’s drones, noting that the mayor of Nahariya initially said that Hezbollah had attacked Nahariya, while the IDF spokesperson later announced that it was an Iron Dome missile. “What happened in Majdal Shams was the same,” he claimed falsely.

Deployment for Escalation

Hezbollah – Preparations for a response to the killing of Fuad Shukr

• Ali Damoush, deputy head of Hezbollah’s executive council, said that Israel had to understand it would not escape punishment for “its crimes” in the Gaza Strip and the region, and that the response to the killings [of Shukr and Haniyeh] would inevitably come. He claimed that with the threat of a response Hezbollah had exhausted, paralyzed, terrified and panicked the “Zionists,” enabling the “resistance” to achieve some of its goals even before the response. However, he added that the “resistance” would not be satisfied with a psychological blow and was determined to respond in a painful and deterrent way outside of the established rules of warfare, as Israel did, and in a manner consistent with the “crimes” regardless of the consequences. He said the leadership would determine the response, its details and timing according to the circumstances on the ground and the availability of opportunities, in a calm and “wise” manner (al-‘Ahed, August 12, 2024).
• An “influential source close to Hezbollah” stated that the organization was carefully calculating its steps regarding a response on an Israeli military target following the killing of Fuad Shakr in Beirut. According to the source, Hezbollah was afraid of falling into a trap which would give Israel an excuse to attack civilian areas in Lebanon. He added that the organization was concerned that its smart missiles, which it had never used on the battlefield, would deviate from their defined targets due to Israel’s disruption and diversion of their flight. “The source” emphasized that it was certain Hezbollah’s response would be directed against an Israeli military target without harming civilians. However, he claimed the organization was prepared for long-term fighting with Israel, and would have no problem with its lasting even ten years (al-Anbaa, Kuwaiti, August 12, 2024).
• According to reports, there were signs Hezbollah was evacuating all its headquarters in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia area in Beirut. The organization was removing computers and other equipment, indicating that the “response” was about to take place and the organization was preparing for the worst in the event of an Israeli counterattack (al-Joumhouria, August 12, 2024).
• Sources in Hezbollah said that the timing of the response to the killing of Fuad Shukr would be determined at the moment when a high-level target (“fat [sic] target”) appeared, and then there would be no delay in the decision to hit him (al-Joumhouria, August 8, 2024).
• Hassan Izz al-Din, a member of the faction loyal in the Lebanese Parliament to Hezbollah, said that a response to the “Zionist enemy” would eventually come from Hezbollah or Iran or Yemen or Iraq, because of the continuation of the “crimes of the enemy” and its attempt “to cross the red lines” (al-Nashra, August 9, 2024).
• According to reports, the United States was leading negotiations in an attempt to prevent a Hezbollah-Iran response to the killings in exchange for declaring a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon and completing a deal for the release of the hostages. A senior “resistance” figure confirmed the information, but claimed the “resistance” had rejected the proposal (al-Liwaa, August 8, 2024).
• Ibrahim al-Amin, the editor-in-chief for the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, stated that the reactions which Iran, Hezbollah and the Houthis were planning against Israel had to be distinguished from one another. He said that some restrictions had been applied in Iran, which wanted to punish Israel for a “specific, designated crime” [the killing of Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, in Tehran, attributed to Israel], therefore harming civilians was not a clear goal. On the other hand, Hezbollah’s response might target Tel Aviv, with the possibility of harming civilians on the periphery of the “main target,” as civilians had been harmed in the death of Shukr. Al-Amin added that such restrictions did not apply to the Houthis, since Israel attacked a civilian installation in the port of al-Hudaydah (al-Akhbar, August 6, 2024).
• On August 7, 2024, “two intelligence sources” said that there were increasing signs that Hezbollah intended to attack Israel, regardless of Iran’s plans. One of the “sources” stated that Hezbollah was advancing faster than Iran in planning its response, and would probably attack Israel in the coming days. According to one of the “sources,” given that Hezbollah was geographically closer to Israel, it could act indiscriminately, which was not true of Iran. In addition, a number of “officials” said that it was not clear how or whether Iran and Hezbollah were currently coordinating regarding a possible attack, and there was a consensus among a number of senior officials that both would not fully coordinate regarding how to respond (CNN, August 7, 2024).
• “Sources” claimed that Hezbollah would receive or expected to receive Russian weapons, which would be the “surprise” in a future war against Israel. According to the report, it was possible that they were related to aerial defense, intended to counter the superiority of the Israeli Air Force (al-Diyar, August 8, 2024).
• According to reports, many residents of al-Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, the Hezbollah stronghold in southern Beirut, were trying to leave the region, fearing an all-out war following the killing of Fuad Shukr (Naharnet, August 8, 2024).

Lebanese authorities

• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, convened an emergency meeting to discuss the state of the country’s preparedness, including the readiness of shelters and the supply of food for residents. (al-Jadeed, August 7, 2024).

• Dr. Firas Abiad, the Lebanese minister of health, said Beirut had increased the public health system’s preparedness for dealing with any possible escalation, and that the country had received a shipment of emergency medical aid from the World Health Organization for the treatment of war wounded. He noted that Lebanon had identified the most dangerous sectors and areas, which were mainly in south Lebanon, and that all hospitals were maintaining a high level of preparedness in terms of drills and emergency plans. He also stated that they were conducting war simulation exercises (al-Araby al-Jadeed, August 6, 2024).
• Several government ministries, including the ministries of health, economy and social affairs, updated their emergency plans and announced that the emergency management teams had been placed on high alert. In addition, shelters were established for thousands of families in Beirut and central settlements in south Lebanon, as well as in north Lebanon and the Lebanon Valley. Meanwhile, UNRWA allocated 11 places of refuge for Palestinian refugees in case they have to be displaced, most of them in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in the north of the country (al-Nashra, August 12, 2024).
• Indira al-Zuhairi, chairman of the Lebanese real estate authority, said that according to relevant sources, Lebanon had no more than 10% of the necessary number of shelters and they were below standard. Al-Zuhairi added that most of the old buildings did not have shelters and their basic structures could barely survive attacks, while in new buildings, contractors built parking lots and warehouses and the construction of shelters had been removed from building permits (Lebanon24, August 6, 2024).

Criticism of Hezbollah

• Given the preparations for Hezbollah’s response to the death of Fuad Shukr and the possibility of an escalation in the fighting against Israel, criticism against Hezbollah continues within Lebanon, especially from the country’s Christian leaders, who accuse Hezbollah and Iran of endangering the lives of the Lebanese. Samy Gemayel, chairman of the Kataeb Party, said that if Hassan Nasrallah thought he was allowed to trade in the lives of Lebanese citizens to promote an Iranian agenda, he was wrong and they would not allow it to pass in silence (Samy Gemayel’s X account, August 7 2024). Samir Geagea, chairman of the Lebanese Forces Party, said that the current war would end with catastrophic results for Lebanon and that those responsible for starting the military operations in south Lebanon would bear responsibility for the losses (Samir Geagea’s X account, August 7, 2024).

The Lebanese Government

• The Lebanese government sent a communiqué to all Lebanese diplomatic missions around the world presenting its positions regarding ways to achieve long-term stability in the south of the country. According to the document, the government believes that an all-out war can be prevented and is therefore obligated to protect the safety and security of the citizens and exercise its right to self-defense in accordance with international law, but it also calls on the international community to play a role in preventing escalation. In the short term, the government stated that there was a need for an immediate halt to the escalation and an end to “provocative actions,” while a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip would help calm tensions in south Lebanon as well. In the medium term, the government said that Resolution 1701 was the basis for stability and security in south Lebanon, but accused Israel of violating it. According to the communiqué, the Lebanese army and UNIFIL will play a decisive role in implementing the resolution, including recruiting new soldiers to the army. In addition, the government is promoting a plan for the rehabilitation of the damaged communities in south Lebanon (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, August 9, 2024).
• The Lebanese government welcomed the joint statement of the leaders of Egypt, Qatar and the United States, who called for the reduction of regional escalation and the prevention of a comprehensive regional war. It also thanked the leaders for their efforts to contain the conflict and emphasized the need to exert maximum pressure on Israel to compel it to participate in granting the ceasefire, since it was “the party which wanted escalation and was raising difficulties in reaching an agreement” (al-Nashra, August 9, 2024).
• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, said in a meeting with Lebanese Parliament opposition members that the most successful way to prevent Israel from winning was to return to the situation before October 7, 2023. Mikati referred to his discussions with senior Western officials regarding the implementation of Resolution 1701 and said that he focused on three points which had to be completed by the end of President Joe Biden’s term: sending 15,000 soldiers to Lebanon’s border with Israel; demarking the disputed points on the border and a decision regarding the final wording of the ceasefire line; and dealing with tunnels and missiles to prevent Hezbollah from carrying out a ground attack on Israeli territory. According to a report in al-Akhbar, Western officials were interested in the construction of a road 30-40 meter-wide along the border for joint Lebanese army-UNIFIL patrols (al-Akhbar, August 10, 2024). Mikati’s media information office stated the report in al-Akhbar was inaccurate (al-Nashra , August 10, 2024).
• Abdullah Bou Habib, Lebanese foreign minister, met with Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, special UN coordinator in Lebanon, to discuss the latest developments after the killing of Fuad Shukr in Beirut. Bou Habib said the UN should increase its efforts to stop Israeli “aggression” against Lebanon and prevent the region from entering into a spiral of mutual revenge, which, if it got out of control, would cause a regional war. He reiterated Lebanon’s adherence to the comprehensive and full implementation of Resolution 1701 as the only way to restore peace to south Lebanon (Lebanese foreign ministry X account, August 5, 2024).
• Bou Habib said the Lebanese government had previously consulted with Hezbollah regarding a response to an Israeli attack which would not lead to war. However, he noted that today Israel’s attacks on Iraq, Tehran and Palestinians in Tehran had expanded, and therefore the decision was broader and not only related to Lebanon (al-Hadath, August 6, 2024).
• Bou Habib, also visited Egypt and met with Badr Abdelatty, the Egyptian foreign minister. Bou Habib expressed his appreciation for the Egyptian efforts to support Lebanon, stop the escalation and calm the situation in south Lebanon. Abdelatty said Egypt condemned the Israeli attacks in Lebanon, especially those aimed at al-Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, and rejected the “Israeli policy of targeted attacks” which threatened international peace and security. He added that Egypt continued diplomatic efforts to distance Lebanon from worsening tensions (al-Qahera News, August 6, 2024).
• Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said the current situation was sensitive and required maximum unity among the Lebanese to fortify the country against the dangers threatening it from Israel. He emphasized Hezbollah’s right to respond to Israeli “aggression” and alleged that the “resistance” adhered to the rules of confrontation throughout the fighting without deviation, while Israel violated them by attacking civilians deep inside Lebanon (al-Joumhouria, August 6, 2024).
• Nabih Berri stated that the possibility that the situation would deteriorate into a wide-scale war existed, since, he claimed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was trying to push everyone into one. Berri added that the “resistance axis” was conducting the campaign in a “calculated, wise manner,” and that Hezbollah limited its response to Israeli military goals. “The prime minister of Israel killed ‘negotiator’ [sic] Haniyeh and his family, is that the behavior of someone who wants to reach a ceasefire?” (al-Joumhouria, August 12, 2024).

The Lebanese Army

• According to reports, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, special UN coordinator in Lebanon, met with members of the Lebanese parliament and announced the willingness of several countries to contribute funds for the rehabilitation and equipping of the Lebanese army, with an emphasis on the implementation of resolution 1701 (al-Akhbar, August 10, 2024) .
• According to reports, during the visit of General Joseph Aoun, the commander of the Lebanese army, to the United States in June 2024, he stated that the situation in south Lebanon was very difficult but ongoing attempts were being made to take control of the situation and maintain the rules of the conflict. He emphasized that Lebanon did not want war, but the situation in south Lebanon was related to the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. According to Aoun, since the beginning of the current conflict on October 8, 2023, there had been no direct military friction between the Lebanese army and Israel, but if Israel decided to attack by land, the Lebanese army would perform its duty, protect the country and deal with the attack. He added that if Resolution 1701 was implemented and Hezbollah withdrew north of the Litani River, the Lebanese army would deploy additional units in south Lebanon, but only after a diplomatic solution had been reached for the border points still in dispute (al-Akhbar, August 10, 2024).

UNIFIL

• On August 10, 2024, an incident occurred between a Lebanese army force and a French UNIFIL force during a joint patrol in the settlement of Kafr Hamam in south Lebanon, northeast of Metula. “Sources” said that the French force deviated from its course and therefore the Lebanese force blocked it. According to the report, shortly after the French force left the area, Israel attacked the region. It was claimed that Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese army, had reservations about the performance of the French forces after the incident (al-Hadath, August 10, 2024). After that, it was reported that the Lebanese army stopped joint patrols with UNIFIL on the grounds that the UNIFIL patrol force had violated procedures and entered private territory. However, a “security source” stated that after an investigation, it was decided to resume joint patrols (al-Mayadeen, August 10, 2024. UNIFIL spokesman Andrea Tenenti denied that joint patrols had stopped and emphasized that UNIFIL continued its work in coordination with the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese army to reduce tensions (Lebanese News Agency, August 11, 2024). The Lebanese army also stated that it continued to cooperate with UNIFIL as part of Resolution 1701 in view of the “extraordinary developments in the country and the attacks of the Israeli enemy” (Lebanese army X account, August 12, 2024) .
• UNIFIL spokesperson Andrea Tenenti said that the families of UNIFIL members were required to leave Lebanon. He said many families had already left Lebanon, but there were still those who remained in Beirut. He added that it was a temporary measure last until the end of August at least, and not an evacuation but a “resettlement” (al-Nashra, August 8, 2024).
• The Irish Army announced that on the evening of August 10, 2024, an explosion of unknown origin occurred near a patrol of two vehicles in the area of ​​activity of the Irish battalion in UNIFIL in south Lebanon. According to reports, the patrol soldiers and the vehicles were not injured and they returned to their position after the incident (Irish Army X Account, 11 August 2024).

Syria

Attack on Hezbollah missile warehouse

• According to reports, on the evening of August 8, 2024, an attack attributed to Israel caused strong explosions at the al-Shayrat military airport, about 24 km southeast of Homs and about 32 km northeast of the Syria-Lebanon border (Saberin News Telegram channel, August 8, 2024). A Syrian “military source” said that an Israeli airstrike from the direction of north Lebanon hit several military sites in central Syria. Four military personnel were injured and material damage was caused (SANA, August 8, 2024). According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which follows the events in Syria, the target of the attack was a weapons warehouse where Hezbollah missiles were stored in a compound belonging to a unit of the Syrian army, about five kilometers from al-Shayrat airport, and seven military personnel had been injured, including three members of pro-Iranian militias According to the report, the missiles had arrived at the warehouse a few days earlier (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 9, 2024).

International Activity Against Hezbollah

Islamic Center in Germany’s ties to Iran and Hezbollah

• Classified documents obtained by the German weekly Der Spiegel revealed a direct connection between Mohammad Hadi Mofatteh, the head of the Islamic Center in Hamburg (IZH), which was closed by the German ministry of the interior in July 2024, and the Iranian regime and Hezbollah. According to the documents, Mofatteh exchanged about 650 messages with the office of Ali Khamenei, the Iranian leader for two years and received instructions that included messages from the supreme leader to German-speaking Muslims and instructions regarding anti-Israel propaganda. The documents also revealed direct ties with Hezbollah and fundraising for the organization and the Houthis (Der Spiegel, August 9, 2024).

Hezbollah financer arrested in Colombia

• Colombian law enforcement authorities arrested Mahdy Aqil Helbawi, a 36 year-old Lebanese-Colombian citizen, on suspicion of money laundering and illegal coal trade in the Middle East (El Tiempo, August 10, 2024). The United States Treasury Department put both Helbawi and his company, Zanga S.A.S., on its sanctions list in September 2023 due to the financial aid it provided to Hezbollah. Helbawi was the son of Amer Muhammad Aqil Rada, a Hezbollah operative who had a senior position in Hezbollah’s foreign operations unit and was involved in the attack on the Jewish community [AMIA] building in Buenos Aires in 1994. According to the Treasury Department, Helbawi’s company sold coal to Lebanon as part of the venture established by Rada to finance Hezbollah (United States Treasury Department, September 12, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
^[3] The Arab village of al Sumayriyya was abandoned during Israel's War of Independence in 1948. The Hamas statement indicates that Samer Mahmoud al-Hajj is a descendant of village residents.
^[4] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

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