Spotlight on Terrorism : Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 19 – October 25, 2022)

Overview

• The agreement delineating the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon is expected to be signed on October 27, 2022. The issue was the focus of discourse of within the Lebanese administration, Hezbollah and other forces in play. Hezbollah regards itself having been responsible for the signing of the agreement with conditions convenient for Lebanon and without particular benefit for Israel, and it can be expected to praise and publicize the achievement for some time to come.
• The area around Damascus was attacked twice from the air. Israel was accused of the attacks, which targeted facilities of the Syrian regime and locations linked to Hezbollah and Iran.
• The Lebanese have shown considerable support for the Palestinians during the recent events in Judea and Samaria, and there have been calls to continue and escalate the attacks on Israel.
• The Lebanese army carried out a broad operation to confiscate weapons and wanted individuals in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon.
• Lebanese intelligence detained a resident of Marjayoun on suspicion of having connections to Israeli intelligence.
• A meeting was held to coordinate between Hezbollah operatives in south Lebanon and as-Sa’ica^[1] operatives in the el-Buss refugee camp in Tyre.

Israel-Lebanon

• The agreement delineating the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon is expected to be signed on Thursday, October 27, 2022, apparently at UN headquarters in Naqoura, south Lebanon. It will determine the territorial and economic naval border between Israel and Lebanon, and will run along Line 23. Thus the Karish gas field lies entirely within Israeli territory and is not mentioned in the agreement. Lebanon will be able to drill for oil and gas in the Qana gas field, most of which lies within its economic territory. Israel will be compensated by the companies drilling in the Qana field according to the percentage of the field lying within its economic territory. The agreement has recently been the focus of interest for the Lebanese administration, Hezbollah and other forces in play in Lebanon. It has broad support, especially from Hezbollah, which is claiming credit for achieving benefits for Lebanon.
• The signing of the agreement has been forestalled by Lebanon’s political inertia and its inability to elect a new president to replace Michel Aoun, whose term of office ends this month, October 2022. The country’s economic circumstances continue to deteriorate, the prices of fuel and basic commodities continue skyrocketing and there is a shortage of flour and ongoing power outages, all of which influence Lebanon’s need to hasten the signing.
• In preparation for signing, on October 19, 2022, Michel Aoun met with a delegation of the French firm TotalEnergies, which will develop the Qana gas field, to motivate it to begin drilling Block 9 [which is bordered on the south by Line 23 and contains most of the Qana gas field] as quickly as possible^[2] (al-Nur, October 18, 2022).
• Most of the reactions in Lebanon to signing the agreement were positive. Most of the forces involved, especially Hezbollah, regard it as benefitting Lebanon and humiliating Israel. Most of the achievements were credited to Hassan Nasrallah and his brinksmanship, which included threats of military action against Israel. Opponents of Hezbollah noted that threats against Israel should have come officially, from the Lebanese government. Most reactions were positive regarding the cooperation between Hezbollah and Michel Aoun in Lebanon’s negotiations, which in their opinion led to most of the country’s achievements. Such cooperation can continue in the future to cope with Lebanon’s political and economic difficulties.

Hezbollah and South Lebanon

• Fights broke of in a number of south Lebanon villages which led to gunfire, wounding and property damage. In the town of Mashghara in the western Beqa’a Valley, a feud between two rival clans caused casualties and damage to vehicles. Hezbollah and Amal sent an open letter to local residents calling for calm and began activities to end the conflict and restore quiet (Ya Tyre website, October 17, 2022). In the south Lebanon village of Houla a fight broke out between two clans and led to gunfire which killed a young man and wounded two others; it also caused property damage. The Lebanese army imposed a closure on the village to locate the shooters (News Folio website, October 17, 2022; al-Jadeed website, October 18, 2022).
• On October 10, 2022, Lebanese general intelligence, operating in the village of Marjayoun in south Lebanon, detained Eli Q [sic], born in the village in 1984. He was detained following information received by general intelligence about his attempts to contact Israeli intelligence. According to the information, Eli Q went to several countries, including the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Denmark, either for work or as a tourist. While in the Ivory Coast he contacted an individual formerly from the South Lebanese Army who had allegedly introduced him to “someone from the Mossad” who asked him about reaching south Lebanon by sea (al-Nashra website October 17, 2022).
• Nabih Salman Aliq, a former member of the South Lebanese Army, who was in charge of security for the town of ‘Aytarun, returned to his village, Bint Jbeil, without any legal measures taken against him. He had been accused of being an agent for the IDF’s Intelligence Unit 504. He fled to Israel with his brothers Hassan and Ali at the end of 1999 and emigrated to Germany. Ghassan Mula, the lawyer who represents the released prisoners in Lebanon, appealed to the Lebanese authorities to investigate his return to Lebanon and the pardon he received despite having collaborated with Israel (Ya Tyre website, September 30, 2022).

Palestinians in Lebanon

• The escalation of Palestinian violence in Judea and Samaria was received with sympathy and support by the social networks in Lebanon:
  • Palestinian terrorist Udai Tamimi, who carried out the shooting attack at the Shuafat roadblock on October 8, 2022, received encouragement and support on the social networks during the 11 days the Israeli security forces searched for him. Following his shooting attack at the entrance to Ma’aleh Adumim on October 19, 2022, in which he was killed, the social networks were flooded with videos of his killing and songs praising his courage and adherence to his goal.
  • Hezbollah issued a mourning notice for him with praise for his sacrifice and the courage of his “struggle” as the highest expression of the entire Palestinian “struggle” (al-Manar website, October 20, 2022).

• • The killing of Tamer Kilani, a senior Lion’s Den terrorist network operative, in Nablus on October 23, 2022, was widely covered by the Lebanese media. The social networks and Hezbollah-affiliated news agencies were flooded with pictures and threats of revenge (al-Mayadeen Twitter account, October 23, 2022).
  • On the official website of the Islamic “resistance” in Lebanon, Hezbollah devoted a page to the threats issued by the Lion’s Den network in Nablus. It included a picture of Lion’s Den operatives and threats against Israel in revenge for the killing of Tamer al-Kilani.

• On the morning of October 25, 2022, the Lebanese army ground, air and naval forces began an operation to locate weapons and wanted Palestinians in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near Tripoli in north Lebanon (al-Nashra, October 25, 2022). In the past the camp was considered a stronghold of jihad movements and a source of unrest where riots broke out, mainly instigated by operatives from Jaish al-Sham, al-Qaeda and ISIS.
• Khalil Hussein, responsible for Hezbollah’s foreign relations in the Jabal ‘Amal region, and Abu Wa’il Zalzali, responsible in Hezbollah for the refugee camps, paid a visit to the as-Sa’ica center in the el-Buss refugee camp near Tyre. They met with the local and organizational leadership. After the meeting they issued a joint announcement praising the coordination between Hezbollah and the Palestinian organizations along the border with Israel (Ya Tyre website, October 23, 2022).
• On October 18, 2022, the Popular Movement for Palestine and the Nation, in collaboration with the Lebanese Order of Physicians, held a meeting at the Palestinian “embassy” in Beirut to show solidarity with the Palestinian “struggle.” The meeting was held following the death of Dr. Abdallah al-Ahmed Abu al-Teen during a clash with the IDF on October 14, 2022 (al-Nur, October 18, 2022).
• A Hamas delegation headed by Fathi Hammad, a member of Hamas’ political bureau and head of the office of youth affairs, visited Lebanon. While there he attended a meeting of “Hamas youth,” calling on them for practical “resistance” [terrorist attacks] against the [Israeli] “occupation” until the day of liberation (Hamas website, October 17, 2022). Hamas also met with the Lebanese minister of culture, youth and sports (Hamas website, October 18, 2022).^[3]
• At the end of September 2022 shots were fired in the Rashidiya refugee camp south of Tyre, following a brawl which deteriorated into gunfire. One shooter was apprehended by camp residents and turned over Lebanese army intelligence (Ya Tyre website, October 1, 2022).

Syria

• This past week there were several aerial attacks, allegedly carried out by Israel, against Syrian regime, Iranian and Hezbollah targets in the Damascus area:
  • At two o’clock on the afternoon of October 24, 2022, targets of the Syrian army aerial defense brigade were attacked in Kharba, Shehab and Kiswah in the Damascus area. An officer and a soldier were killed (Syrian TV Telegram channel, October 24, 2022). According to another report, sites with weapons from Iran for Hezbollah and the Iranian militias operating in Syria were also attacked, and two Syrian soldiers were killed (Syrian Human Rights Observatory, October 24, 2022;al-Jazeera, October 24, 2022).
  • On October 21, 2022, an aerial attack was carried out against the airport in Damascus and the southeastern part of the city. Reportedly, four F-16s attacked the Damascus international airport with missiles, while other targets were also hit with missiles. Reportedly, Syria’s aerial defense intercepted the missiles fired from “Israeli airplanes” and from “Israeli territory” (al-Mayadeen, Twitter account, October 22, 2022). According to another report, the attack on Damascus targeted the warehouses of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, which deals with transferring military equipment to Hezbollah. The equipment was camouflaged as humanitarian assistance. The unit commander is nicknamed Hajj Fadi, and it operates in collaboration with Unit 190 of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, commanded by Behnam Shahriari (al-Hadath, October 23, 2022).

^[1] Al-Sa'ica is a Palestinian organization which serves as the Palestinian wing of the Baath party in Syria. The organization is a member of the PLO but is not active. It was founded at the end of the 1960s by Hafez al-Assad, who was president of Syria at the time. ↑
^[2] Block 9 is the region where the Sidon-Qana reservoir was identified as having the potential to produce gas or oil. ↑
^[3] For further information see the October 19, 2022 bulletin, "Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, October 4 – 19, 2022." ↑

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