Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (August 6 – 13 , 2024)

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• On August 9, 2024, Abu Obeida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, said the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades had sworn allegiance to Yahya al-Sinwar, the new head of the Hamas political bureau, and declared they were completely willing to implement his decisions.^[2] He added that appointing al-Sinwar to succeed Isma’il Haniyeh testified to the movement’s cohesion and strength (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, August 9, 2024).
• According to reports, the Hamas movement is discussing the selection of a new deputy head for the political bureau to manage its “external” affairs, since “the conditions of the war forced al-Sinwar into hiding.” It was also reported that Hamas was considering making al-Sinwar’s appointment temporary and was searching for a substitute. Reportedly, Hamas plans to hold a general Shura Council meeting to elect the new deputy, as was customary in the past, but the security situation presents problems (al-Quds al-Arabi, August 11, 2024).
• The Hamas magazine al-Risalah posted an infographic about the appointment of al-Sinwar as the new head of the political bureau, with the following information: Hamas is united behind its leadership; killing senior figures will not create chaos in the movement; [appointing him was] another blow to Israeli intelligence, after the blow on October 7, 2023; [it is] a symbolic continuation of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, in which al-Sinwar played a predominant role; Hamas’ path remains “resistance”; no pressure will be able to divert Hamas from its strong “principles” (al-Risalah, August 12, 2024).

• “Informed sources” said that Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestinian Authority (PA), prevented Fatah’s Central Committee from congratulating Yahya al-Sinwar on his appointment as head of the Hamas political bureau. According to the “sources,” Mahmoud Abbas demanded the wording be changed and not state that Fatah welcomed the appointment. In addition, Mahmoud Abbas was furious when he found out the statement had been written at a meeting to which he had not been invited and demanded the immediate deletion of the sections [with which he disagreed] (al-Shahed, August 11, 2024).
• Osama Ali, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, strongly criticized Hamas and its leaders, Isma’il Haniyeh and Yahya al-Sinwar, and claimed that Sinwar’s appointment was a consolation prize for his destruction of the Gaza Strip. He also claimed that “the crime taking place in the Gaza Strip is unprecedented and was committed by Hamas. (al-Shahed, August 9, 2024).
• Jamil Mazher, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) deputy secretary general, said that appointing Yahya al-Sinwar to head the Hamas political bureau was the initial response to the “enemy.” He claimed al-Sinwar, together with the Hamas leadership, would give the movement new impetus, because he could create national unity (al-Mayadeen, August 8, 2024)

Influence of al-Sinwar’s appointment on the negotiations for a ceasefire

• Hamas “sources” said that Yahya al-Sinwar’s exact location was known only to a small group of trusted people, who secured the connections between him and the other members of the movement’s leadership. According to the “sources,” Muhammad al-Sinwar, Yahya al-Sinwar’s brother, is responsible for supervising his hiding place and movements. It was also reported that al-Sinwar maintained contact with the Hamas leadership in complex ways, sometimes sending handwritten or printed instructions and letters which are transmitted in complete secrecy. In special cases, al-Sinwar even establishes contact by telephone. The “sources” claimed that al-Sinwar considered the negotiations for a ceasefire carefully and showed “surprising flexibility,” desiring to “stop the bloodshed” and end the fighting (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 12, 2024).
• “Sources close to the mediators” in the ceasefire negotiations said appointing al-Sinwar as the head of the Hamas political bureau could delay the negotiations because of al-Sinwar’s inflexibility regarding the continuation of the war. “The sources” stated that shortly after his appointment, al-Sinwar contacted the Egyptian mediators and demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the release of high-profile Palestinian detainees, including Marwan Barghouti and Ahmed Saadat, as part of a final ceasefire agreement. He also informed Egypt that he would not compromise and absolutely opposed PA management of the Gaza Strip after the war or a multinational force stationed in the Strip to maintain security until elections were held (The National, August 9, 2024).
• Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas figure who lives in Lebanon, said that until now the negotiations had been conducted according to decisions made by the Hamas leadership, and that al-Sinwar “was not far from them.” He added that the negotiations would continue even after the appointment of al-Sinwar and that “the problem is not with Hamas, but with the Israeli government and the United States” (Anadolu Agency, August 7, 2024).
• Three “Palestinian sources” said that Khalil al-Haya, Yahya al-Sinwar’s deputy, should continue to lead the indirect negotiations with Israel for a ceasefire under al-Sinwar’s direction. One of the “sources” claimed al-Haya had been trusted by both Isma’il Haniyeh and Yahya al-Sinwar, and was expected to continue as the movement’s “diplomatic face.”

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• This past week IDF activity focused on the Rafah and Khan Yunis regions in the southern Gaza Strip. Ground and air forces attacked terrorist operatives, destroyed terrorist facilities and rocket launchers, exposed tunnels and located large quantities of weapons.
• Rafah: The IDF forces continued their activities in the Rafah region, eliminating dozens of terrorist operatives with ground and air strikes and destroyed terrorist facilities. They located passages opened by terrorist operatives in the walls of residential houses, and in one of the buildings found tunnel shaft in a bathroom. On August 11, 2024, Israeli Air Force aircraft eliminated terrorist operatives as they exited a tunnel shaft (IDF spokesperson, August 6-13, 2024).
• Khan Yunis: On August 9, 2024, IDF forces renewed their operations in Khan Yunis after receiving information of the presence of terrorist operatives and facilities. They eliminated dozens of armed terrorist operatives, located terrorist facilities above and below ground and destroyed sites from which rockets were fired. Meanwhile, IDF aircraft attacked dozens of targets, including munitions depots and terrorist operative assembly sites. On August 11, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed in battle in Khan Yunis (IDF spokesperson, August 9, 2024). Before the start of the operation, the IDF called on the residents to evacuate several neighborhoods and move to the al-Mawasi region in the western Gaza Strip (Avichay Adraee’s X account, August 8, 2024).

   
Right: The Khan Yunis evacuation map (Avichay Adraee’s X account, August 8, 2024). Left: Weapons discovered in Khan Yunis (IDF spokesperson, August 10, 2024)

Attacks on Hamas in civilian regions in the Gaza Strip^[3]

• On August 8, 2024, Israeli Air Force fighter jets attacked Hamas command and control complexes operating at the Abd al-Fateh Hamouda and al-Zaharaa schools in Daraj-Tufah in Gaza City. The sites were also used to plan and carry out terrorist attacks on IDF forces and the State of Israel (IDF spokesperson, August 8, 2024). Civil defense personnel in the Gaza Strip claimed that 16 people had been killed in the attack (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, August 8, 2024).
• On August 10, 2024, Israeli Air Force aircraft used three precision weapons to attack the military headquarters of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) located in a mosque in the al-Tab’in school complex in Daraj-Tufah, which also serves as a shelter for the residents of Gaza City. The headquarters were used by Hamas and the PIJ to promote terrorist activity against IDF forces and against Israeli territory. According to the IDF, the identities of at least 31 Hamas and PIJ terrorist operatives who were killed in the attack have been verified, including company and squad commanders (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 10-12, 2024). According to Hamas, at least 100 non-combatants were killed in the attack, including children,   public servants, clerics and professors (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, August 10, 2024).

   
The 31 terrorist operatives killed in the Hamas-PIJ headquarters in the school complex (IDF spokesperson, August 10-12, 2024)

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• This past week Palestinian terrorist operatives continue firing rockets at the cities, towns and villages surrounding the Gaza Strip:
  • August 6, 2024: Three rockets were launched from the northern Gaza Strip. One was intercepted and two fell in open areas. There were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 6, 2024). The PIJ’s Jerusalem Brigades claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets at Ashkelon, Sderot and other sites surrounding Gaza in response to “the crimes of the Zionist enemy against our Palestinian people” (Jerusalem Brigades combat information Telegram channel, August 6, 2024).
  • August 9, 2024: Two rockets fell in open areas in the western Negev (Israeli media, August 9, 2024).
  • August 10, 2024: Four rockets were fired from the Khan Yunis region. There were no casualties; a fire broke out in the area (Israeli media, August 10, 2024).
  • August 12, 2024: A rocket fired from Khan Yunis fell in an open area in the western Negev. There were no casualties and no damage was caused (Israeli media, August 12, 2024). The Mujahideen Brigades claimed responsibility for attacking the western Negev near the southern Gaza Strip with two 107mm rockets (Mujahideen Brigades TV, August 12, 2024).

Monthly Distribution of Rocket Fire

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits

The hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• On August 8, 2024, the leaders of the United States, Egypt and Qatar issued a joint statement calling for finalizing the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip and the release of the hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. According to the statement, the agreement is based on the principles presented by United States President Biden on May 31, 2024 and which were adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 2735. According to the statement, there was no more time to waste and no room for excuses from either side, the hostages had to be released and a ceasefire implemented. They also called on all parties to meet in Doha or Cairo on August 15, 2024 to bridge the remaining gaps and complete the agreement (White House website, August 8, 2024).
• A ” source” with connections to Hamas said that the movement did not believe that the statement of the three leaders constituted a solid basis for reaching a ceasefire agreement (al-Mayadeen, August 9, 2024).
• In response to the statement, Hamas called on the mediators to present a plan to implement President Biden’s proposal and the Security Council’s resolution instead of holding additional rounds of negotiations or presenting new proposals. Hamas also claimed it was “eager” to reach a ceasefire agreement and had shown “all the necessary flexibility and positivity,” while Israel was not serious about a permanent ceasefire and continued with its “aggression” (Hamas Telegram channel, August 11, 2024).
• Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas figure who lives in Lebanon, said the mediators had presented Hamas with a proposal at the beginning of July 2024 and promised that the American administration would guarantee Israel’s agreement. Hamdan claimed Hamas did not need to negotiate since it had already accepted the proposal, and called on the mediators to take “decisive action” to obligate the Israeli government to implement the proposal and not give it “more time and opportunities to waste time and continue the massacres” (al-Arabi Channel, August 12, 2024).
• Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, accused Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu of not wanting to reach an agreement, but rather to continue the war. According to him, all Hamas’ efforts to reach an agreement were met with “stubbornness and evasion.” He called on the international community to exert pressure on the Israeli government to stop the war and reach an agreement (Izzat al-Rishq’s Telegram channel, August 12, 2024).
• Senior Hamas figure Mahmoud Mardawi said that as long as the United States did not exert pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu, the meeting on August 15, 2024 was not a real opportunity to advance negotiations, since Netanyahu believed that the price of a deal was the dissolution of his government. He added that there was no point in negotiating as long as Netanyahu did not announce a change in his position to the cabinet and the Israeli public, and as long as understandings were not reached. Mardawi said Hamas would not take part in calming the region by entering negotiations to prevent the “resistance axis^[4] response” (Mahmoud Mardawi’s X account, August 13 2024).
• An “Egyptian source” reported that Egypt had made attempts to convince Hamas to participate in the round of meetings as part of the summit planned for August 15, 2024. According to “the source,” Hamas’ participation would allow the movement to refute Israeli claims that Hamas was undermining the ceasefire efforts and it would be able to act openly and jointly with the mediators to reach a ceasefire (al-Akhbar, July 13, 2024).
• “Sources” said that in the first phase of the deal for the release of the hostages, Hamas demanded the release of Marwan Barghouti, a senior Fatah figure imprisoned in Israel, and the leaders of other “Palestinian organizations.” The “sources” added that the United States and the mediators viewed the demand as acceptable and had their support. The “sources” also said that Hamas’ demand to release Barghouti was [allegedly] the result of the understanding that the movement would not be able to return to power in the Gaza Strip and that Barghouti was considered “reliable” if he took power in the Gaza Strip (Sky News in Arabic, August 9, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported at 2:00 p.m., August 13, 2024, that since the beginning of the war, 39,929 Palestinians had been killed and 92,240 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, August 13, 2024).
• Air Force aircraft carried out targeted countermeasures against terrorist operatives:
  • On August 9, 2024, Walid al-Soussi was killed. He was an operative in Hamas’ military wing and head of the organization’s general security forces in the southern Gaza Strip. He was responsible for the activation of human intelligence sources (HUMINT) and an active partner in forming Hamas’ intelligence picture in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, August 10, 2024).
  •  On August 8, 2024, the IDF spokesperson announced that on July 24, 2024, the Israeli security forces attacked the reported location of senior Hamas figure Nael Sakhel in the Gaza Strip and received confirmation of his death a few days later. For more than a decade he had been responsible for Hamas activity in Judea and Samaria and involved in directing terrorist squad activities, financing them and supplying them with weapons (IDF Telegram channel, August 8, 2024). On August 2, 2024 his family was informed that he had died after being mortally wounded in an Israeli attack on a building in the al-Shati refugee camp in Gaza on July 25, 2024. He was born in Nablus, detained in 2001 for involvement in Hamas military wing attacks and sentenced to life imprisonment, but released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal in 2011 and deported to the Gaza Strip. A ” source” stated he was one of the main financiers of the Lion’s Den network in Nablus and of the al-Nur Association in Gaza, which dealt with the issue of prisoners (al-Araby al-Jadeed, August 2, 2024). The Hamas movement issued a mourning notice for the death of “combatant commander” Nael Sa’adi al-Sakhel (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 2, 2024).

• • The death of Amjad Shalail, aka Abu Hamza, an Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades field commander, was reported. According to reports, he carried out the ambush in the Tel al-Saltan neighborhood in Rafah on June 15, 2024, in which eight Israeli soldiers were killed (@huda_gaza’s X account, August 8, 2024).
• On August 9, 2024, IDF forces issued notices offering a financial reward and complete confidentiality to those who provided information on the whereabouts of senior Hamas figures. The notices also stated that eliminating the Hamas movement was an accepted fact  (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, August 9, 2024).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• UNRWA spokeswoman Inas Hamdan said that the agency continued to provide humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip despite the challenges it faced. She said the agency currently operated ten health centers and a hundred mobile medical sites to meet the needs of the Gazan population (Wafa, August 12, 2024).
• The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that as of August 7, 2024, 20 of the 36 hospitals and 73 of the 126 primary care centers in the Gaza Strip were not functioning (OCHA website, August 9, 2024).
• The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said that the discovery of the polio virus in the Gaza Strip was very alarming and vaccinating children was a top priority. It added that delivering the vaccine to the Strip and the safety of health and humanitarian workers had to be ensured (Filastin al-Aqsa Telegram channel, August 9, 2024).
• The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) reported that on August 11, 2024, a truck carrying insulin, vaccines and other refrigerated medicines had entered the Gaza Strip (COGAT X account, August 11, 2024). On August 8, 2024, 1,500 blood units were delivered to the Gaza Strip (COGAT X account, August 8, 2024).
• The ministry of health in Ramallah reported the delivery of blood units to the Gaza Strip as part of the “Our blood is one” campaign. Majed Abu Ramadan, PA minister of health, said the ministry was doing everything possible to support and assist the residents of the Gaza Strip, and striving to meet all their health needs. He praised the contribution of the civilian who demonstrated the unity of the Palestinian people in the face of Israeli “aggression” (Wafa, August 8 2024).
• The UAE Field Hospital in the Gaza Strip used the high-speed Starlink Internet service to consult with experts around the world to discuss the complicated cases of 50 patients. Reportedly, the consultations allowed doctors to receive “scientific expertise from a distance,” enabling them to save the lives of Palestinian patients and provide them with the “highest standards of medical care” (UAE News Agency, August 10, 2024).
•  The Khan Yunis municipality announced that the maintenance project of the water networks damaged by the fighting had been completed in cooperation with the water authority of the coastal municipalities and the National Committee for Partnership and Development. The project cost $51,000 dollars and was financed by the UAE, and included installing and maintaining water pipes in two neighborhoods and the Khan Yunis refugee camp (Facebook page of the Khan Yunis municipality, August 10, 2024).

• A “source” reported that the PA had rejected an Israeli proposal to open the Rafah Crossing under the civilian management unconnected to Palestinian security forces. The Israeli proposal banned the Palestinian flag at the Rafah crossing and at the borders, and stipulated that Israeli forces remain near both the Rafah Crossing and the Philadelphia Axis for the purpose of searches and investigations. The “source” reported the PA had rejected the offer and it adhered to the 2005 agreement to operate the Rafah Crossing, while demanding a full Israeli withdrawal from it (Sky News in Arabic, August 12, 2024).
• Jamal Nazal, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, said the PA had expressed a willingness to return to control the Gaza Strip. He said the PA had tens of thousands of workers in the Gaza Strip, civilians and in uniform, who had refused to work since Hamas took over the Strip in 2007. He noted that now the Palestinian Authority was waiting for the day after the war and hoped the sentiments of its workers were the same (al-Shahed, August 8, 2024).

Terrorist attacks

• This past week Palestinian terrorists carried out two attack, murdering one Israeli civilian and wounding two others.

Shooting in the Jordan Valley

• On the afternoon of August 11, 2024, shots were fired from passing vehicles at Israeli vehicles at the Mechola Junction in the Jordan Valley. An Israeli civilian was killed and another was injured. The Israeli security forces instituted searches for the terrorists who carried out the attack (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 11, 2024). Palestinian media reported that IDF forces closed the Taysir and al-Hamra checkpoints and raided several villages in the Tubas region (Quds Agency and al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, August 11, 2024). The Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades in Judea and Samaria claimed responsibility for the shooting and claimed it was “revenge for the blood of the martyrs and a response to the massacre at the al-Tabi’in school and the ongoing occupation crimes in the Gaza Strip.” The Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades said its operatives had renewed the oath of allegiance to the new Hamas leader, Yahya al-Sinwar, and they would “continue to pull the trigger and pursue the occupier at every crossroads and alley, as long as he sits on our land” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 11, 2024) The PIJ welcomed the attack and claimed that it was “a natural and legitimate response to the crimes and the war of genocide and the massacres committed by the occupation against our people” (PIJ Telegram channel, August 11, 2024).

Shooting in Qalqilya

• On the evening of August 12, 2024, an armed Palestinian terrorist shot and seriously wounded an Israeli civilian who had gone to a garage in Qalqilya [to have his car serviced]. The Israeli security forces launched a manhunt for the terrorist operative and killed him in the village of Azoun. He was identified as Tareq Daoud, 18 years old, who was released from an Israeli prison as part of the hostage release deal in November 2023 (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 12, 2024). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for the attack and stated that Tareq Ziyad Daoud was the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades commander in the Qalqilya District. The Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades claimed that “the crimes of the occupation and the killing of the ‘resistance’ leaders will not break the will of the resistance” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 12, 2024).

   
Right: The weapons discovered in Daoud’s possession (IDF spokesperson, August 13, 2024). Left: Hamas mourning notice for Tareq Daoud (Hamas’s Telegram channel, August 12, 2024)

Shooting and IED attack prevented

• Rabi’ Muhammad Daraghma, aka al-Anabusi, was killed by the Israeli security forces in the northern Jordan Valley (Quds Agency Telegram channel, August 6, 2024). The Tubas Battalion of the PIJ’s Jerusalem Brigades mourned the death of battalion commander Rabi’ Muhammad Daraghma (al-Mayadeen, August 7, 2024).

Critical terrorist attacks, 2024^[5]

Annual distribution of critical terrorist attacks

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria. Since the beginning of the war, approximately 4,440 wanted persons have been detained, of whom more than 1,850 were Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson, August 6-13, 2024):
  • On the afternoon of August 6, 2024, the Israeli security forces ended more than 20 hours of counterterrorism activities in the Jenin refugee camp and nearby villages. During the operation, Israeli Air Force aircraft killed four armed terrorist operatives and the forces killed seven armed terrorist operatives in an exchange of fire. The security forces also destroyed IEDs planted under the roads, detained a number of armed terrorist operatives and located weapons. An IDF soldier was injured (IDF spokesperson August 6 and 8, 2024). The director of the government hospital in Jenin said the Israeli aircraft attack in Jenin had killed Ahmad Hossam al-Din Kamel al-Saadi, 18 years old, Eiham Hassan Jaber Zakarneh, Khatab Majed Badawiya, and the brothers Seif and Omar Ali Mahmoud “al-Zayim” Abu Obeid, all residents of the eastern neighborhood in Jenin (Wafa, August 6, 2024). The PIJ’s Jerusalem Brigades said that al-Saadi, Badawiya, Eiham Jaber, and Omar al-Zayim were operatives of the Jerusalem Brigades’ Jenin Battalion in (Jerusalem Brigades in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 6, 2024). Hamas stated that Seif Abu Obeid was an operative of its military wing (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 6, 2024). On August 7, 2024, the death of Muhammad Ali Abu Hijab, who was wounded in the air strike in Jenin, was reported. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB) said that Abu Hijab was one of their operatives (elaqsa_1965, the AAMB Telegram channel, August 9, 2024). On August 12, 2024, the AAMB announced the death of its operative Subhi Ahmed al-Baath, who was wounded in the IDF activity in Jenin on August 6, 2024 (AAMB, the Fatah military wing, August 12, 2024). It was also reported that Walid Jamal Muhammad Hussein and Khader Hussein Khader Abu Katani, both AAMB operatives, were killed in the Israeli security force activity in Kafr Qud, eight kilometers west of Jenin. In addition, Jihad Hussein, secretary of the Fatah movement in the Jenin refugee camp, Hamada Farahti, and Kafah Issam Dhabaya were detained (Wafa, August 6, 2024). On August 11, 2024, it was reported that Dhabaya, who was a commander in the Jerusalem Brigades’ Jenin Battalion, died in the hospital   (Jerusalem Brigades in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 11, 2024).

     
Right: Identifying armed terrorist operatives operating in Jenin (IDF spokesperson, August 8, 2024). Left: five terrorist operatives killed in Jenin (Hamas Telegram channel, August 6, 2024)

• On August 7, 2024, Israeli security forces operating in Nablus located and destroyed a warehouse where ordinary and heavy IEDs were hidden (IDF spokesperson, August 7, 2024). Palestinian media reported that Israeli forces blew up the headquarters of the Fatah movement in the Balata refugee camp (Quds Agency Telegram channel, August 7, 2024).

     
The IED warehouse discovered in Nablus (IDF Telegram channel, August 7, 2024)

Terrorists’ houses demolished

• On the night of August 7, 2024, Israeli security forces operating in the village of Dura demolished the house of Moamen Fayiz Mahmoud Khalil, who stabbed an Israeli civilian to death and wounded several other civilian in an attack in Gan Yavneh on March 31, 2024 (IDF spokesperson, August 8, 2024) .
•   On the night of August 12, 2024, Israeli security forces operating in Ramallah destroyed the apartments of Khaled Harouf and Isser Barghouti, who shot and killed to Israeli-Arab civilians at the British Police Junction on January 7, 2024 (IDF spokesperson, August 13, 2024 ). Palestinian media reported that IDF forces destroyed the house of Barghouti in the al-Tira neighborhood in Ramallah and the house of Khaled al-Kharouf in the Umm al-Sharait neighborhood of al-Bireh (Ramallah News August 13, 2024).

   
Right: Demolishing the house in Dura (IDF spokesperson, August 8, 2024). Left: Security forces demolish an apartment in Ramallah (IDF spokesperson, August 13, 2024)

Mahmoud Abbas visits Russia

• On August 13, 2024, PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas met in Moscow with Vladimir Putin. Mahmoud Abbas said that Russia was one of the Palestinians most important friends and claimed the Palestinians “continued their struggle.” He also accused the UN of failing to meet its task of establishing a Palestinian state because of American pressure. Putin said Russia did not ignore the situation in the Middle East and viewed the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip “with great pain and concern.” He noted that Russia had sent 700 tons of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip (RIA Novosti, August 13, 2024). Mahmoud Abbas was accompanied by the Hussein al-Sheikh, Secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, and Majed Faraj, head of Palestinian general intelligence, Majdi al-Khaldi, advisor to Mahmoud Abbas for diplomatic affairs, and Abd al-Hafez Nofal, PA representative in Russia (Wafa, August 12, 2024).
• Interviewed by the Russian media before the visit, Mahmoud Abbas claimed the PA was prepared to convene an international peace conference to deal with a permanent settlement of the Palestinian issue. He claimed the strategic solution was to grant the Palestinian people the “right to freedom, independence and self-fulfillment” in accordance with the two-state solution, while stopping Israel’s “hostile and unilateral” actions in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem. He also said the PA was waiting to take responsibility for the Gaza Strip and had already presented a plan for the return of the displaced and the Strip’s reconstruction (TASS, August 12, 2024).

PA appeal to the International Criminal Court

• On August 6, 2024, the PA submitted its arguments to the International Criminal Court in The Hague (ICC) regarding the current legal situation in the Palestinian territories (Wafa, August 6, 2024). The request was submitted to the pre-trial court^[6] which had heard the request of the Karim Khan, the chief prosecutor to issue arrest warrants on suspicion of war crimes and crimes against humanity for the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, and his predecessor, Isma’il Haniyeh, who was killed in Tehran on July 31, 2024, and Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’ military wing, who was killed in an Israeli attack on July 13, 2024.
• The PA sent a letter warning that any attempt to politicize the court or challenge its legal authority would “be unjust to the Palestinian people.” is claimed that the [alleged] “crimes” committed by senior Israeli officials, including senior government officials, were carried out systematically and on a large scale as part of official government policy, with impunity and lack of accountability. It also claimed that the Israeli authorities did not want to investigate the [alleged] “crimes” committed in the Palestinian territories and bring those responsible to justice. Therefore, the PA called on the ICC to fulfill its duty and apply its legal authority to ensure that those responsible did not continue to escape punishment.

Turkey joins the case against Israel in the International Court of Justice

• On August 7, 2024, Hakan Fidan, the Turkish foreign minister, said that Turkey had submitted a request to the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ) to join the lawsuit filed by South Africa against Israel, alleging a violation of obligations under the convention on the prevention of genocide. Fidan alleged that Israel killed innocent Palestinians every day because it felt “empowered by the immunity it received for its [alleged] “crimes,” and called on the international community to stop the [so-called] “genocide” (Hakan Fidan’s X Account, August 7, 2024).
• Hamas congratulated Turkey for joining the lawsuit against Israel, calling it a testimony to the support of the Turkish president and people for the Palestinian national issue and the rights of the Palestinian people. Hamas called on all the countries of the world to join the lawsuit and work to establish a united front to end the “Nazi [sic] occupation of our occupied territories” (Hamas Telegram channel, August 7, 2024).

Criticism of the Palestinian security forces

• On August 7, 2024, the al-Shahed news website, which publishes criticism of the PA, accused Saher Hijazi, an officer of the PA security forces in the explosives disposal unit, of working to neutralize explosives planted by “resistance fighters” in Nablus and the Balata refugee camp, thus enabling the raids of the Israeli security forces. The article claimed that instead of using his expertise to support the “resistance fighters” who need experts in the field of sabotage, he chose to support the “occupation” and act against his own people. According to the website, Hijazi, born in the Balata refugee camp and now living in Rujeib near Nablus, is part of a broader PA security force which on a daily basis confiscates equipment or IEDs planted by “resistance fighters” in and around the Palestinian towns and villages (al-Shahed, 7 August 2024).

     
Right: Saher Hijazi. Left: Hejazi at work (al-Shahed, August 7, 2024)