Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (June 10 – 18, 2024)

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• This past week IDF activity focused on the al-Zeitoun and al-Sabra neighborhoods in Gaza City in the northern Gaza Strip and in the Rafah area in the south. Meanwhile the activity in Deir al-Balah and the al-Bureij refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip ended. Ground and air forces, with the assistance of navy forces, attacked terrorist operatives, destroyed terrorist facilities and rocket launchers and located a large number of tunnels and weapons. Sixteen IDF soldiers were killed in four different incidents.
• Rafah: IDF forces killed dozens of terrorist operatives above and below ground, located large quantities of IEDs, including inside a mosque, and destroyed mined buildings. On June 10, 2024, five fighters were killed in the explosion of a mined structure; on June 15, eight fighters were killed when an anti-tank missile hit an engineering APC; on June 16, a fighter was killed when a tunnel shaft exploded and another fighter was seriously injured. The IDF spokesperson reported that since the start of operations in Rafah on May 7, 2024, the IDF forces had achieved full operational control over the entire Philadelphia Axis on the border with Egypt, between the Kerem Shalom Crossing and the sea, and over several neighborhoods in the city, including al-Brazil, Tel al-Sultan and the al-Shaboura refugee camp. More than 550 terrorist operatives were killed, long-range rockets aimed at the center of Israel were located, as were more than 200 tunnel shafts and 25 long tunnel routes reaching the Egyptian border (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, June 10-18, 2024).

    
Right: Terrorist facilities revealed in the “Swedish Village” in West Rafah. Left: Rockets found in a mosque in Rafah (IDF spokesperson, June 18, 2024)

• The Palestinians reported that Israeli vehicles had advanced to various areas in Rafah accompanied by artillery shelling and heavy bombing from the air, while “armed Palestinians” attempted to stop them. It was also reported that dozens of buildings were set on fire by IDF forces (al-Araby al-Jadeed, June 17, 2024). Another report stated that Israeli Air Force fighter jets attacked the central and western regions of Rafah (Anadolu Agency, June 17, 2024).The Palestinians also claimed that IDF forces set fire to the departure hall at the Rafah Crossing, which Hamas claimed was “clearly a war crime” (Hamas website, June 17, 2024).
• Al-Zeitoun and al-Sabra: IDF forces killed dozens of terrorist operatives, located rocket pits ready for launching and destroyed about fifty terrorist facilities, including a store of rockets. They also destroyed a half-mile long, 33-yard deep Hamas tunnel located about .6 miles from the Israeli border. On June 15, two IDF soldiers were killed when an IED hit a tank (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, June 10 to 17, 2024). According to reports, Israeli artillery targeted the eastern and southern areas of Gaza City and military vehicles advanced from the Netzarim Axis towards the center of the al-Zeitoun neighborhood. It was also reported that hundreds of Palestinians left the areas near where the IDF forces were operating and moved to the west of the city (Anadolu Agency, June 17, 2024).
• The central Gaza Strip: On June 11, IDF forces completed their operation in eastern Deir al-Balah and the eastern region of the al-Bureij refugee camp. During the operation, the forces killed approximately one hundred terrorist operatives and destroyed two kilometers-long tunnels and more than two kilometers of underground offensive compounds, as well as dozens of terrorist facilities and launch sites close to the towns and villages surrounding Gaza (IDF spokesperson, June 11, 2024).

     
Right: A tunnel in the central Gaza Strip. Left: A tunnel shaft exposed in the central Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, June 11, 2024)

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• This past week there was an increase rocket launches, compared to last week. All the rockets targeted the cities, towns and villages surrounding the Gaza Strip:
  • June 12: Sirens were sounded in Mefalsim and Nir Am; the rocket fell in an open area (Shaah HaNegev spokesman, June 12, 2024).
  • June 13: Sirens were sounded in Sderot, in the towns and villages surrounding the Gaza Strip and western Lakish. The IDF spokesperson stated that a number of rockets were launched from the northern Gaza Strip, some of which were intercepted while the rest fell in open areas; no casualties were reported (IDF Telegram channel, June 14, 2024). Seven rockets were launched from the northern Gaza Strip, four of which were intercepted; the others fell in open areas (Israeli media, June 13, 2024). The military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for launching rockets at Ashdod, Ashkelon, Mefalsim, Nir Am and Sderot (Jerusalem Brigades’ Telegram channel, June 13, 2024).
  • June 14: Sirens were sounded in Nir Am. According to reports, two rockets fell in an open area (Israeli media, June 14, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for firing rockets at Sderot and the surrounding communities (Jerusalem Brigades’ Telegram channel, June 14, 2024).
  • June 15 (after midnight): The IDF spokesperson in Arabic reported that five rockets had been fired at the Kissufim region from the humanitarian zone in the central Gaza Strip. Two fell in an open area inside Israel and three fell inside the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson’s X account in Arabic, June 15, 2024). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for launching a barrage of rockets at the IDF Kissufim post (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, June 15, 2024).
  • June 15 (afternoon): A rocket fell in an open area in the western Negev; no casualties or damage were reported (Israeli media, June 15, 2024). The military wings of Hamas and the PIJ claimed joint responsibility for launching a barrage of rockets at the IDF Sufa post (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, June 15, 2024). Later, the military wings of the Popular Resistance Committees and the PIJ announced they had launched a barrage of 107mm rockets at the Kissufim post (Salah al-Din Brigades Telegram channel, June 15, 2024).
  • June 15 (evening): A rocket was launched from the central Gaza Strip and exploded in an open area in the Kissufim area, with no casualties; a fire broke out in the area (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, June 15, 2024).

Monthly Distribution of Rocket and Mortar Shell Fire since June 2022

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits

The hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• On June 11, 2024, Hamas and the PIJ submitted to Qatar and Egypt their response to the proposal for a ceasefire and the release of the hostages, following the speech of President Joe Biden on May 31, 2024, in which he presented the main points of the Israeli proposal. Hamas and the PIJ said in a joint announcement that their response prioritized the interests of the Palestinian people and the need to completely stop the [alleged] “ongoing aggression” against the Gaza Strip, and that they wanted to reach an agreement which would end the war (Quds news network Telegram channel, June 11, 2024).
• The Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar published Hamas’ and the PIJ’s “remarks” [demands] regarding the draft proposal, based on “informed sources” (al-Akhbar, June 12, 2024):
  • Both sides will begin a temporary ceasefire and IDF forces will evacuate the densely populated areas near the border.
  • On the second day of the ceasefire, the IDF will begin withdrawing from Salah al-Din and al-Rashid streets and all military installations along the Netzarim Axis will be dismantled. At the same time, the IDF will withdraw from the entire Philadelphia Axis and clear the Rafah crossing within seven days.
  • Agreement to release 32 hostages, instead of 33 as Israel demands, with the release of three hostages every three days. If the withdrawal of the IDF is not completed within seven days, the release of the hostages will stop.
  • Preference for the release of long-incarcerated Palestinian prisoners and opposition to imposing conditions for those to be released.
  • At the end of the first phase and the completion of the withdrawal, a “sustainable peace” will be declared with a complete cessation of all military operations.
  • Demand to add China, Russia and Turkey as guarantors for the implementation of the agreement.
• An official statement by Hamas claimed that during all stages of the negotiations it had demonstrated a “positive attitude” with the objective of reaching an agreement to end the war and return the hostages. Hamas claimed it had also expressed a willingness to enter into indirect negotiations, while accusing Israel of opposing a permanent ceasefire. Hamas also condemned the American administration, which accused Hamas of being responsible for not reaching an agreement (Hamas Telegram channel, June 13, 2024). Those positions were also expressed by senior Hamas and PIJ members:
  • In a speech for Eid al-Adha, Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, said that Hamas and the “resistance” [terrorist] organizations had demonstrated “seriousness and flexibility” to reach an agreement which would stop the “aggression,” and that Hamas’ response was consistent with the principles of the Biden proposal and with the Security Council resolution, but Israel and its allies had not responded, and continued “with maneuvers and attempts to deceive and propose ideas aimed at obtaining prisoners and renewing the war.” He claimed that Hamas was prepared to provide an opportunity for the efforts of the mediators to stop the war and had demonstrated “seriousness” regarding any agreement which would guarantee a permanent ceasefire, Israel’s withdrawal from the Strip, the reconstruction of the Strip and a prisoner exchange deal (Hamas Telegram channel, June 16, 2024).
  • Ghazi Hamad, a member of the Hamas political bureau, claimed that the movement’s first choice was to reach an agreement which would end the “suffering” of the Palestinian people. He expressed doubt regarding Israel’s commitment to adhere to the agreement (al-Ghad, June 11, 2024).
  • Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas member, said that Israel wanted to continue fighting after a six-week ceasefire, and therefore he called on the American administration to convince Israel to agree to a permanent ceasefire as a condition for the agreement. He added that Israel should agree to a ceasefire, a complete withdrawal, the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and lifting of “the siege,” and should allow the Palestinians to determine their own future. Hamdan also claimed that “no one has any idea” how many Israeli hostages were still alive (CNN, June 13, 2024).
  • Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, claimed that the reaction of the movement and the Palestinian factions [terrorist organizations] to the ceasefire proposal was “responsible, serious and positive” and opened a “broad path” to reaching an agreement. He accused the Israeli media of “incitement” against Hamas’ response, indicating Israel’s intention to evade commitments (al-Risalah Telegram channel, June 12, 2024).
  • Hamas spokesman Jihad Taha claimed that the movement and the “resistance” organizations had presented “some simple amendments” which would improve the agreement, especially the first phase. He added that Hamas was prepared to answer any question that arose as part of the negotiations (al-Araby al-Jadeed, June 16, 2024).
  • Muhammad al-Hindi, deputy PIJ secretary general, said that the “resistance” would not accept the ceasefire proposal without a complete cessation of “aggression” and a complete withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip. He claimed that the goal of Israel and the United States was to crush the “resistance” and not to reach a ceasefire (al-Jazeera, June 14, 2024).
• The efforts to promote an agreement on a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the release of the hostages continued in the international arena as well:
  • On June 10, 2024, the UN Security Council, with a majority of 14 in favor and with Russia abstaining, approved Resolution 2735 initiated by the United States in support of President Biden’s proposal (Israeli media, June 10, 2024).
  • On June 15, 2024, the summary announcement of the meeting of the leaders of the G7 countries in Italy was published and included a reference to the war in the Gaza Strip. The leaders expressed support for President Biden’s proposal and emphasized the need to reach a ceasefire and release the hostages. They called on Hamas to accept the ceasefire proposal fully and without conditions and urged countries with the capability to influence Hamas to assist in efforts to obtain the movement’s agreement. The leaders also called for full access to humanitarian aid through all land crossing points, including the Rafah crossing (White House website, June 15, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported at 2:00 p.m., June 18, 2024, that since the beginning of the war, 37,372 Palestinians had been killed and 85,452 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, June 18, 2024).
• According to reports on June 12, 2024, Muhammad Nazmi Nasser, aka Abu Suheib, from the founding generation of Hamas’ military wing, was killed in the most recent IDF raid on Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Along with Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, he participated in the kidnapping and murder of IDF soldiers Avi Sasportas and the Ilan Saadon in 1989 (Ma’ad Hassan’s X account, June 12, 2024; Muneir al-Jaghoub’s X account, June 12, 2024)

• On June 16, 2024, the Hamas government information office reported the death of Mahmoud Qassem, a journalist who worked for Felesteen and the Palestine Online website. The bureau claimed that 151 journalists had been killed since the beginning of the war (Hamas government information office Telegram channel, June 9, 2024). He was reportedly killed in an Israeli attack in central Gaza City on June 11, 2024 (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, June 15, 2024).

Aid for the Gaza Strip

• This past week the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip continued. On June 17, the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) said that only 62 of 1,400 aid trucks were collected from the Gazan side of the Kerem Shalom Crossing, all by private organizations. He said that the UN agencies removed a small number of trucks, despite “the steps taken to help them” (COGAT X account, June 17, 2024). He also reported that more than 24,000 tons of medical supplies and equipment, including anesthetics, insulin and antibiotics, had been delivered to the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the war (COGAT X account, June 14, 2024).

• On June 15, 2024, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that due to the forecast for rough seas, the floating marine pier constructed off the Gaza coast would be temporarily dismantled and towed to Ashdod to ensure its continued future activity. According to the CENTCOM, since the pier’s activity was renewed on June 7, 2024, it has been used to transfer approximately 2,500 tons of humanitarian aid, and a total of 3,500 tons since it began operations on May 17, (CENTCOM X account, June 15, 2024).

     
Trucks on the pier (CENTCOM X account, June 15, 2024)

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that 17 of the 36 hospitals in Gaza were partially functioning, with partial access to only 14 due to lack of security and physical obstacles. The organization noted that there were no functioning hospitals in Rafah and that a Red Criss field hospital was the only one of the six field hospitals in Rafah that was fully operational, while the UAE field hospital was partially operational. In Khan Yunis, al-Kheir Hospital has returned to partial functioning, and access to al-Awda and Kamal Adwan Hospitals and the Indonesian Hospital in northern Gaza was partially restored (OCHA website, June 14, 2024).
• The Palestinian Red Crescent announced the resumption of the activities at its clinic in the Jebaliya refugee camp, which was rebuilt by volunteers after the IDF’s activities (Palestinian Red Crescent X account, June 13, 2024). It was also reported that 11 Red Crescent clinics and medical stations provided health services for thousands of patients throughout the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Red Crescent X account, June 14, 2024)
• The municipal authorities in the Gaza Strip continued their operations. The al-Nuseirat municipality reported that it continued to provide essential services for the residents and its crews cleared garbage from the streets “despite the difficult circumstances” (al-Nuseirat municipality Facebook page, June 13, 2024). Khan Yunis municipality employees drained sewage water in different areas of the city (Khan Yunis municipality Facebook page, June 12, 2024). Crews from the Khiza’a municipality worked to maintain the main water system (Khiza’a municipality Facebook page, June 13, 2024).

    
Right: Garbage removal in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp (al-Nuseirat municipality Facebook page, June 13, 2024). Left: Khan Yunis sewage drainage (Khan Yunis municipality Facebook page, June 12, 2024)

• Mazen Ghanem, director of the PA water authority, said that the delivery of 23,000 liters of fuel to the Gaza Strip enabled the operation of about twenty wells, including five wells in the east of Gaza City, two in Beit Hanoun, four in the Beit Lahia area and nine in the Jebalya area (PA water authority Facebook page, June 14, 2024).
• Carl Skau, deputy director general of the UN World Food Program (WFP), paid a two-day visit to the Gaza Strip, the second since the beginning of the war. He said the introduction of supplies from the UN Food Program and its partners through the West Erez Crossing had improved the level of aid to the northern Gaza Strip, however he said aid had to continue and increase. Skau also said that the situation in the southern Gaza Strip was rapidly deteriorating after a million residents had been displaced from Rafah and were staying in a crowded area along the coast in the heavy heat (WFP website, June 14, 2024).

Hamas-Fatah talks postponed

• Azzam al-Ahmed, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee, reported that the Hamas-Fatah meeting which was to take place in China at the end of the month had been postponed. Lebanese “sources” stated it was because they were waiting for the results of the ceasefire negotiations in the Gaza Strip and because there was lack of clarity regarding “the day after” the war (al-Shahed, June 14, 2024).

Hamas opens a “political office” in Iraq

• On June 11, 2024, Muhammad al-Hafi, a member Hamas’ Arab and Islamic Relations Office, opened the movement’s political office in Iraq amid reports that Qatar might order Hamas leaders to leave the country if they did not accept the ceasefire proposal. The office is reportedly located in the al-Radwaniya neighborhood in Baghdad, not far from the international airport. The ceremony was attended by Yaqoub al-Sidi, the assistant secretary general of the Islamic Movement of Iraq,^[2] who arrived at the head of the pro-Iranian militia delegation (Nova News Agency, June 12, 2024). A “knowledgeable source” denied reports that Hamas planned to open a military camp in the outskirts Baghdad, and claimed that it was only opening an office for information and strengthening bilateral ties (Shafaq News, June 13, 2024).

Terrorist attacks

• This past week, June 10-18, 2024, no terrorist attacks were reported.
• On June 16, 2024, the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha began, and end on June 19, 2024.

Critical terrorist attacks, 2024^[3]

Annual distribution of critical terrorist attacks

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria. The main centers of activity were Tubas, Tulkarm and Jenin. Since the beginning of the war, approximately 4,150 wanted Palestinians have been arrested, of whom more than 1,750 were Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson, June 10 to 18, 2024):
  • On the evening of June 10, 2024, Israeli security forces operated in Kafr Naama, northwest of Ramallah, to detain one of the terrorist operatives who had carried out the arson attack on the Sde Efraim farm the previous night.^[4] The wanted Palestinian and three other terrorist operatives tried to escape by driving away and running over the soldiers as they drove. The forces shot and killed them. An improvised Carlo machine gun and IEDs were found in their vehicle. An IDF fighter was slightly injured (Israel Police Force Telegram channel, June 10, 2024). Hamas said the four were operatives of its military wing. The most senior of them, Muhammad Jaber Abada, called ” commander” in the announcement, previously served 20 years in prison in Israel. The other dead were Muhammad Raslan Abda, Wassim Bassam Zidan Abu ‘Adi and Rashdi Samih Omar Ataya (Hamas website, June 11, 2024).

     
Right: The weapons found in the terrorists’ vehicle (Israel Police Force Telegram channel, June 10, 2024). Left: Hamas mourning notice for the four (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, June 11, 2024)

• • On June 10 and 11, 2024, Israeli security forces operated in the al-Far’a refugee camp, south of Tubas, for 18 hours. They attacked armed terrorist operatives and detained eight Palestinians wanted for terrorist activity; no casualties were reported. In addition, an explosives laboratory was located with more than 80 IEDs and barrels of explosives. (IDF spokesperson, June 11, 2024).

     
Right: Israeli security forces in the al-Far’a refugee camp. Left: Explosives found in the laboratory (IDF spokesperson, June 11, 2024)

• • On the evening of June 11, 2024, Israeli security forces operated in the village of Dan, northwest of Jenin. The forces surrounded a building where armed terrorist operatives had barricaded themselves. There was an exchange of fire during which an Israeli Air Force combat helicopter attacked the building. Four terrorist operatives were killed and several others were injured. There were no casualties to the security forces. Three rifles, a pistol and a vehicle containing a number of IEDs were found at the scene (IDF spokesperson, June 11, 2024). according to the ministry of health in Ramallah, six Palestinians were killed: Saqr Araf Abed, from Kafr Dan, 28 years old; Mustafa Alam Mar’i, from Kafr Dan; Ahmed Abu Obaid, from al-Yamoun, 21 years old; Muhammad Haza Mar’i, from Kafr Dan, 32 years old; Ahmed Muhammad Samoudi, from al-Yamoun, 24 years old; Ayman Abd al-Karim Fadallah, from Burqin, 24 years old (ministry of health in Ramallah Telegram channel, June 11, 2024; Wafa, June 12, 2024). The Jenin Battalion of the Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, issued a mourning notice, claiming the dead as operatives in its ranks. According to the notice the first four were killed in Israeli security force attack on the building and the other two in clashes with IDF forces (Filastin al-Yawm TV website, June 11, 2024). The PIJ stated that Abed, Marai and Abu Abid were operatives of the organization and called on the Palestinians to continue to clash with Israel with all means at their disposal (PIJ combat information Telegram channel, June 12, 2024).
  • On June 13, 2024, Israeli security forces conducted a counterterrorism operation in the Jenin region. The forces surrounded a building where two wanted terrorists were hiding and exchanged fire. The two wanted operatives were killed; an IDF soldier was slightly injured. The forces also detained a number of suspects and located weapons; IDF engineering forces uncovered shafts where explosives had been planted (IDF Telegram channel, June 13, 2024). The Palestinian media reported that the Israeli forces surrounded a building in the town of Qabatiya where two terrorists were killed: Muhammad Aseri Fayad and Muhammad Jaber al-Shalabi, both from the Jenin refugee camp. According to reports Qays Muhammad Zakarna, 21 years old, was killed in a clash with Israeli security forces during the operation (Wafa, June 13, 2024). The Jenin Battalion of the Jerusalem Brigades issued a mourning notice for al-Shalabi, aka Abu al-Jaber, and Fayad, aka Abu al-Aseri, claiming they were members of the Jenin Battalion’s military council (Paltoday, June 14, 2024).

     
Right: IDF forces in the Jenin area (IDF spokesperson, June 13, 2024). Left: Muhammad Aseri Fayad and Muhammad Jaber Shalabi (Paltoday, June 14, 2024)

Mahmoud Abbas’ international activity

• On June 11, 2024, the emergency conference regarding humanitarian aid for the Gaza Strip was held in Jordan at the initiative of King Abdullah II of Jordan, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi Abdel and UN secretary general Antonio Guteres. Mahmoud Abbas participated in the conference together with leaders and representatives from 150 countries and international organizations, including American Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and the Charles Michel, president of the Council of the European Union (Jordanian foreign ministry website, June 11, 2024).
• Mahmoud Abbas gave a speech in which he noted the need to continue efforts for an immediate, permanent ceasefire in the war in the Gaza Strip and a full Israeli withdrawal. He added that the PA government was prepared to responsibility for managing the Gaza Strip, as it does in Judea and Samaria. He also called for exerting pressure on Israel to open all land crossings and hand them over to the PA. He also called for “Palestine” to be granted full membership in the United Nations and urged other countries to recognize a Palestinian state (Wafa, June 11, 2024).
• During the conference Mahmoud Abbas, King Abdullah II of Jordan and President al-Sisi of Egypt met. They called for a full Israeli withdrawal from the entire Gaza Strip and for an increase in humanitarian aid. They claimed the Gaza Strip was an integral part of the Palestinian state and that Israeli attempts to separate the Strip from the rest of the Palestinian territories were unacceptable. They also stated that a just, comprehensive and sustainable peace was their “strategic choice” and accused Israel of trying to undermine the two-state solution (Wafa, June 11, 2024).
• Mahmoud Abbas held meetings with other leaders who participated in the conference, including the president of the European Council, Charles Michel; the prime minister of Spain, Pedro Sánchez; and the President-Elect of Indonesia, current minister of defense, Prabowo Subianto. In his meeting with the prime minister of Slovenia, Robert Golov, he welcomed Slovenian recognition of a Palestinian state and said that the decision would contribute to the defense of the two-state solution and to achieving regional peace and stability (Wafa, June 11, 2024).
• The conference’s summary statement expressed deep concern for the enormous loss of life in the Gaza Strip and the damage to its infrastructure. The announcement also condemned the [alleged] “attacks” on UN and humanitarian workers and the damage to UNRWA institutions. The statement also called the Gaza Strip an integral part of the Palestinian territories, and called for an immediate and permanent ceasefire and the immediate and unconditional release of all “hostages and illegally detained civilians,” to allow immediate and uninterrupted access of humanitarian aid, to provide long-term funding to UNRWA and to increase diplomatic efforts to end the “Israeli occupation” and promote the two-state solution (al-Mamlaka, June 11, 2024).

Program for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip

• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, said at the meeting of PA-EU investment platform, that his government was preparing a comprehensive reconstruction plan for the Gaza Strip for the day after the war. He stated that the government was prepared to assume responsibility for the Gaza Strip after a ceasefire was reached and a political agreement had been formed. He added that his government had begun the first phase of a “comprehensive and significant” reform plan, would complete another phase towards the end of the year and additional reforms would take effect next year (Wafa, June 13, 2024).

Public opinion poll

• On June 12, 2024, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), headed by Khalil Shikaki, published the initial results of the quarterly survey conducted between May 26 and June 1, 2024, among the residents of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip:
  • 73% of the respondents in Judea and Samaria answered that Hamas made the right decision to attack Israel on October 7, 2023, a 2% increase compared to the previous survey in March 2024. In the Gaza Strip the percentage of supporters dropped from 71% to 57%.
  • 48% of respondents in the Gaza Strip thought that Hamas would win the war, compared to 56% in the previous survey, while in Judea and Samaria 79% answered that Hamas would win, compared to 69% in the previous survey.
  • Satisfaction with Hamas dropped from 62% to 52% in the Gaza Strip, while in Judea and Samaria it increased from 75% to 85%.
  • Support for Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, remained at 52% among respondents in the Gaza Strip, while in Judea and Samaria it increased from 68% to 81%.
  • In a presidential election between Fatah senior official Marwan al-Barghouti and Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, 48% answered that they would support al-Barghouti, compared to 41% in the previous poll, and 24% for Haniya.
  • Support for Hamas in Judea and Samaria increased from 35% to 41%, while support for Fatah increased from 12% to 17%.

Bid to keep Israel from participating in the Olympic Games

• Jibril al-Rajoub, chairman of the Palestinian Olympic Committee and chairman of the Palestinian Football (soccer) Federation, held a press conference in al-Risalah where he called for preventing Israel from competing in the Olympic games which will begin in Paris on July 26, 2024. He claimed that Israeli athletes and officials violated the principles of the international Olympic Committee and that “some of the delegation’s participants contributed directly or indirectly to the [alleged] massacres of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.” He added that the Olympic Games were an opportunity to tell the world “that the time has come to say enough,” in view of the events in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria (al-Araby al-Jadeed, June 12, 2024).