Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (October 1 – 8 , 2024)

• Senior Hamas figures marked the first anniversary of the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre in Israel, which they refer to as Operation al-Aqsa Flood. They justified the attack, alleging Israel committed “genocide” in the Gaza Strip and praised the “resistance” of the Palestinians^[2] and the “support arenas” of Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen during the past year. They also related to the negotiations for a ceasefire and the release of the hostages:
  • According to Hamas, October 7 was “a historical milestone in the movement’s plan of struggle.” Also mentioned were the “leaders of the Palestinian resistance” who died in Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, and the leader of the “resistance” in Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general. Hamas claimed that “the crimes of assassination” would only increase their determination “to deal with the occupation until it was defeated.” Hamas said it was making “great efforts to stop the aggression” and claimed the movement “responded positively to all initiatives” while maintaining the “principles” of a permanent ceasefire and the complete withdrawal of IDF forces” from the Gaza Strip. Hamas stated they would not “compromise” on the Palestinians’ “right to resist the occupation by all means,” and called on all Palestinians to escalate all forms of “resistance” (Hamas Telegram channel, October 7, 2024).
  • Khaled Mash’al, head of the “external” Hamas leadership, said that the battle that began on October 7, 2023 marked a new stage in the conflict and that they left a “black spot on Israeli history.” He thanked everyone who “supported the Gaza Strip and sacrificed themselves” and praised the establishment of “an entire axis that stands against the occupation and rejects all occupation and aggression.”^[3] He added that “in one year the battle achieved what years could not bring,” alleging that “even the Zionist public opinion lost faith in itself.” He claimed Israel attacked Lebanon because it had failed to achieve its objectives in the Gaza Strip and called for “additional fronts to fight the enemy” (al-Arabiya, October 7, 2024).
  • Khalil al-Haya, deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, claimed “the resistance landed a strategic blow on the enemy and caused it unprecedented losses,” adding that it had restored the “Palestinian issue” to the world’s agenda. He praised the “sacrifice” of the Gazans and the “firm stance” of the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, and emphasized that the “resistance” would continue until “the complete liberation of the Palestinian people.” Al-Haya, who led the ceasefire negotiations on behalf of Hamas, claimed the movement had made every effort to stop the “aggression” and was “completely willing” to reach an agreement. He stated that Hamas would continue its efforts to “end the siege, stop the aggression, give the people a decent life, and restore the Gaza Strip with the help of projects to rebuild and eliminate the effects of the aggression” (al-Jazeera, October 6, 2024).
  • Abu Obeida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, issued a video in which he described October 7 as “the most successful commando operation of our era” and claimed that it was “a necessary response to the Israeli plots to eliminate the Palestinian problem, establish sovereignty over the land of Palestine, and exercise control over al-Aqsa Mosque.” He admitted that they were facing “a long, painful and unequal battle of attrition,” but claimed that “the resistance would continue and remain stable.” Relating to the shooting and stabbing attack in Jaffa on October 1, 2024, he called on the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria to escalate the “struggle.” As to negotiations, he claimed they did not intend to harm the hostages because “it is against our religion,” adding that all the hostages could have been returned “if it had aligned with Netanyahu’s ambitions.” He also warned that the IDF’s activities endangered the lives of the hostages and threatened that there would be “dozens of Ron Arads” (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, October 7, 2024).

• The joint operations room of the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip issued its first statement since the beginning of the war, noting that October 7, 2023 and what happened after it were a “turning point in the ‘struggle’ of the Palestinian people and the nation.” It praised the “unity of the fighters on the ground” and claimed “they dealt with the ‘occupation’s’ war machine, preventing it from achieving any of its goals in the war.” The statement also claimed they were united in making decisions and wanted to halt Israeli “aggression” without waiving the Palestinian people’s rights (Joint operations room Telegram channel, October 7, 2024).
• The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) called the October 7, 2023 attack a “heroic operation” and said its military wing, the Jerusalem Brigades’ operated alongside Hamas’ military wing. The PIJ claimed the forces had showed they had demonstrated the lessons they had learned in “many battles fought against the Zionist enemy in the last decade,” and proved that “the Zionist entity can be defeated.” The PIJ added that “the unity of the arenas led to the defeat of the enemy” and the results would continue to echo into the future (PIJ Telegram channel, October 7, 2024).

• The Palestinian Authority (PA) also related to the anniversary of the October 7 attack and massacre. The PA’s daily al-Hayat al-Jadeeda said in an editorial that the war of the past year was “a nightmare from the depths of hell which turned the Gaza Strip into a killing field and scorched earth.” It criticized Hamas and claimed Operation al-Aqsa Flood had been launched without the necessary preparations, while ignoring the military and political power of Israel and its international aid. Hamas, according to the editorial, relied on support from Iran, but its assessment of Iranian interests was incorrect. Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda also accused Hamas of deviating from Palestinian patriotism and clinging to the path of arrogance, while the path to ending violence was found in patriotism and unity, led by the legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people (al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, October 7, 2024).
• Hundreds of Palestinians marked the anniversary of the war in the Gaza Strip with a demonstration and procession which began in al-Manara Square in Ramallah. Masked youths with bandanas of Palestinian terrorist organizations burned Israeli and American while chanting praise for the “resistance.” They waved flags of “Palestine,” Lebanon and Yemen, as well as of the Palestinian terrorist organizations and Hezbollah. Similar processions were reported in other cities in Judea and Samaria, including Hebron, Nablus, Bethlehem, Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya and Jericho (Anadolu Agency, October 7, 2024). According to reports, Palestinian security forces arrested operatives who participated in the events; Hamas condemned the arrests (Watan Agency, October 7, 2024).

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• This past week IDF forces focused their activities on the Jebalya refugee camp and Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip, while continuing activity in the Rafah area in the southern Gaza Strip and in the Netzarim Corridor in the central Gaza Strip. The forces struck dozens of terrorist operatives from the air and on the ground, and located and destroyed weapons and terrorist facilities. An IDF soldier was killed in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, October 1-8, 2024).
• The northern Gaza Strip: On October 6, 2024, IDF forces began operating in the Jebalya refugee camp, following information about the presence of terrorist operatives and facilities in the area and attempts by Hamas to rehabilitate its facilities in the northern Gaza Strip. The forces located large quantities of weapons and killed terrorist operatives. An IDF soldier was killed in combat (IDF spokesperson, October 6, 2024).
• Towards the beginning of the activity in Jebalya, the Israeli Air Force attacked dozens of terrorist targets, including Hamas nukhba operatives and underground facilities. The IDF also ordered the evacuation of areas in the northern Gaza Strip and expanded the humanitarian zone in al-Mawasi, in addition to opening two humanitarian evacuation routes (IDF spokesperson, October 6, 2024). The Hamas ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip called on the residents not to listen to “the intimidation of the enemy” and not to evacuate their homes and move south (Hamas ministry of the interior Telegram, October 6, 2024). However, Palestinian media reported that following the IDF’s instructions, many Gazans left the Jebalya area and the western area of Beit Lahia. It was also reported that artillery fire and airstrikes killed more than 30 people (Gaza Mubasher Telegram channel, October 5, 2024; Quds Agency, October 5-7, 2024).

   
Right: Map of the enlarged humanitarian area (IDF spokesperson, October 6, 2024). Left: Residents leave the Jebalya refugee camp (Palestinian Center for Communications Telegram channel, October 6, 2024)

• Central Gaza Strip: The IDF spokesperson reported that over the past three months IDF forces killed more than 450 terrorist operatives in airstrikes and clashes. In addition, hundreds of terrorist facilities were destroyed and about eight kilometers (about five miles) of tunnels were destroyed (IDF spokesperson, October 3, 2024).

Eliminating terrorist operatives

• On October 2, 2024, Abd al-Aziz Salha was killed in an airstrike in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip. He had been party to the lynching of two IDF reserve soldiers who were murdered in Ramallah in October 2000. He was detained in 2001, and released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal in 2011 and deported to the Gaza Strip. In recent years he had directed terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria (IDF spokesperson, October 3, 2024).
• On October 3, 2024, the IDF spokesperson confirmed that Rawhi Mushtaha, a member of Hamas’ political bureau and who served as the head of the Hamas civilian government in the Gaza Strip, was killed in an airstrike about three months ago. He held high-ranking positions in the organization and was very close to Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip. Killed with him were two other senior Hamas officials: Sameh al-Sarraj, who held the security portfolio in Hamas’ political bureau and its Executive Committee, and Sami Odeh, the commander of the national security forces (IDF spokesperson, October 3, 2024).

• On October 8, 2024, the IDF spokesperson stated that terrorist operatives who had participated in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre were killed on September 30, 2024, in an Israeli Air Force strike on a Hamas command and control center at the Shejaiya School in Daraj-Tufah, and in an airstrike on Rafah on October 1, 2024 (IDF spokesperson, October 8, 2024).

Activity against Hamas facilities situated in civilian environments

• This past week Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked terrorist operatives and facilities operating under the protection of civilian environments to plan and carry out terrorist operations against the IDF forces and the State of Israel. In all cases, preliminary steps were taken to reduce possible harm to civilians:^[4]
  • On October 2, 2024, Hamas operatives were attacked in command and control centers in sites previously used by the Muscat and Rimal schools in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF Spokesman, October 2, 2024). Palestinian media reported that three people were killed and 17 wounded in an attack on the Muscat school in the al-Tufah neighborhood in Gaza City, and six people were killed in an attack on the al-Amal Orphanage west of Gaza City (Wafa, October 2, 2024).
  • On October 2, 2024, Hamas terrorist operatives were attacked in a command and control center which had previously been the Bureij High School in the central Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, October 2, 2024).
  • On October 2, 2024, terrorist operatives were attacked in a command and control center which had previously been the Nuseirat Girls School in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp (IDF spokesperson, October 2, 2024).
  • On October 5, 2024, Hamas operatives were attacked in a command and control center which had previously been an UNRWA center in the Jebalya refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, October 5, 2024).
  • On October 5, 2024, Hamas operatives were attacked at a command and control center which had previously been the Ahmed al-Kurd School in the central Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, October 5, 2024). Palestinian media reported that several people, including children, had been injured in the attack (Quds Agency Telegram channel, October 5, 2024).
  • On October 5, 2024, the Hamas media information bureau claimed that IDF forces attacked the mosque next to the Shuhadaa al-Aqsa Hospital in Deir al-Balah, where there were hundreds of displaced persons. According to reports, at least 19 Palestinians were killed in the attack and dozens were injured (Safa Agency, October 5, 2024). It was also reported that the Ibn Rushd School was attacked, northeast of Deir al-Balah, which also housed displaced persons. According to Palestinian media, two operatives of the “armed factions” who lived in the al-Nuseirat Rafah Crossing were killed in the attack (al-Nuseirat al-Ikhbariya Telegram channel, October 6, 2024).
  • On October 6, 2024, Hamas operatives were attacked in a command and control center which had previously been the Khalifa bin Zayed School in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, October 6, 2024). Seven people were reportedly killed in the attack on the Khalifa School in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, October 7, 2024).
  • On October 7, 2024, Hamas terrorist operatives were attacked in a command and control center inside the Shuhadaa al-Aqsa Hospital in Deir al-Balah (IDF Spokesman, October 7, 2024).

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• This past week 18 rockets were fired at Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip, 14 on October 7, 2024, including five fired at the Greater Tel Aviv area. It was the first rocket fire from the Gaza Strip since September 14, 2024. Most of the rockets were intercepted; there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 4-7, 2024). The military wings of Hamas, the PIJ and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the rocket fire (military wing Telegram channels, October 4-7, 2024).

The hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• “Sources” said that Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, had recently renewed contact with Qatar, one of the mediators in the ceasefire negotiations, after a prolonged period of inactivity (al-Arabiya, October 7, 2024).
• Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, said Hamas rejected the unofficial proposal published in various media, according to which senior leaders of the movement, led by al-Sinwar, would leave the Gaza Strip for Sudan in exchange for the withdrawal of IDF forces and the transfer of the management of the strip to the PA. He said that distancing Hamas or its leadership from the Gaza Strip was “an Israeli dream and an illusion that will never materialize” (al-Jazeera, October 3, 2024).
• Bassem Na’im, a senior “external” Hamas figure, said the movement was committed to the agreements reached through the mediating countries on July 2, 2024, and Hamas was prepared to negotiate based only on those agreements without new terms (al-Jazeera, October 6, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported that since the beginning of the war, 41,965 Palestinians had been killed and 97,590 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, October 8, 2024).

Hamas governance

• According to claims, Hamas’ security forces in the Gaza Strip uncovered a network of Israeli Security Agency (Shabak) “agents” who “spread chaos and incited anarchy” among Palestinians in preparation for the anniversary of the October 7 attack. According to the claims, the network was identified after security force surveillance of sponsored pages on social networks which contained incitement against the “resistance” and called for demonstrations. It was also claimed that during interrogation the “agents” admitted they followed instructions from the Shabak and had received large amounts of money to operate the fictitious accounts. The Shabak also allegedly provided them with information about senior “resistance” figures in Judea and Samaria to harm them socially and morally (Al-Majd al-Amni Telegram channel, October 6, 2024).

Abducted Yazidi girl rescued from the Gaza Strip

• The IDF announced that Fawzia Amin Sido, a 21 year-old Yazidi woman who was kidnapped from her home in Iraq ten years ago, was rescued from the Gaza Strip after being held by an ISIS-affiliated Hamas operative. According to the IDF spokesperson, she was kidnapped when she was 11 years old by ISIS operatives who sold her to a Hamas operative who held her in the Gaza Strip. After the Hamas terrorist was apparently killed in an IDF strike, she escaped to a hiding place. The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, in cooperation with the American Embassy in Israel and other factors in the international community, transferred her to Israel and from there to Jordan, from where she was returned to her family in Iraq (IDF spokesperson, October 3, 2024).
• The Hamas media information bureau in the Gaza Strip claimed she had married a Palestinian during the Syrian Civil War and of her own free will chose to move to the Gaza Strip after his death. It also claimed that the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip gave her protection after her second husband was killed in an Israeli attack and she was moved “to a safe area under government supervision.” Hamas claimed she asked to leave the Gaza Strip after she felt threatened by the Israeli shelling, and was transferred to Jordan in coordination with the Jordanian authorities (Hamas media information bureau, October 5, 2024).

• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, announced the establishment of a national working party for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, led by the PA ministry of planning and with the participation of the relevant ministries. He said it would prepare for restoring the “main” services, inaugurate a program to rebuild the infrastructure and prepare to launch a program of “economic recovery.” Mustafa said the government would continue its work to “ease the suffering of the Palestinian people, especially in the Gaza Strip” (Wafa, October 8, 2024).
• According to reports, on October 8, 2024, a delegation of senior Hamas figures, led by Khalil al-Haya, deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, arrived in Cairo to meet with a Fatah delegation and to participate in a meeting of the Palestinian “factions” held under Egyptian auspices. Reportedly, the objective was to reach an agreement to end the internal Palestinian conflicts and agree on a “unified vision” for the joint management of the Gaza Strip (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 8, 2024).
• Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, reportedly met in Qatar with members of the Hamas political bureau, including Khalil al-Haya, the bureau’s deputy chairman. According to reports, the parties agreed to promote reconciliation efforts and implement the agreements reached in the talks held in Beijing. Reports added that the atmosphere at the meeting was positive and there was a rapprochement in positions regarding the management of the Gaza Strip. A “source” denied reports of a new crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt and noted the demand to reopen the Rafah Crossing under Palestinian control, in accordance with the 2005 agreement (Sky News in Arabic, October 3, 2024).
• An “exclusive Palestinian source” stated that Hamas and Fatah would meet in Cairo this week to discuss “a number of issues,” chief among them the establishment of a Palestinian “national consensus” government and the administration of the Gaza Strip. “The source” added that Hamas insisted that the establishment of a consensus government would be the top priority and had even informed all “factions” of its decision. He stated that Fatah demonstrated flexibility towards the idea of ​​establishing the government (al-Mayadeen, October 7, 2024).
• According to a report, Egypt and the PA held talks where they agreed that after the war, patients from the Gaza Strip would be able to cross into Egypt through a new border crossing built near the sea. The report claimed Hamas agreed to relinquish responsibility for the crossing and transfer it to the PA (al-Hadath, October 3, 2024).
• According to a different report, discussions were recently held by between Egypt, Israel and the PA regarding arrangements for the day after the war in the Gaza Strip and the introduction of aid to the Strip. They discussed the possibility of constructing a seaport in the Gaza Strip on the shared sea border with Egypt, managed jointly by Egypt and the PA with European supervision and Hamas consent. However, the idea did not receive Palestinian support (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 5, 2024).

• A Hamas delegation led by Muhammad Darwish, the head of the Shura Council, met in Qatar with the Masoud Pezeshkian, president of Iran, and Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister. Other senior Hamas figures participated in the meeting, including Khaled Mash’al, head of the “external” Hamas leadership, Khalil al-Haya, deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau, and Husam Badran, a member of Hamas’ political bureau. According to reports, the Hamas delegation noted the importance of the movement’s strategic ties with Iran and “resistance axis,” and praised the Iranian support for the Palestinian people; Pezeshkian criticized American and Western support for Israel (Hamas Telegram website, October 3, 2024; IRNA, October 3, 2024).

• Hamas movement praised Iran’s ballistic missile on Israel. Hamas called it a response to “Zionist aggression” against the Palestinian and Lebanese people and a strong message of deterrence to the “Zionist enemy” “because its crimes have gone beyond all boundaries.” Hamas also called on all the Arab countries, peoples and political parties to confront the “Zionist crimes” (Hamas Telegram channel, October 1, 2024).
• Abu Obeida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, welcomed the Iranian missile attack on Israel. He claimed it “landed a strong blow on the occupation, which thought its aggression would go unpunished” and called it an “extraordinary day in the history of the conflict.” He called on the Palestinian people to “do their part” in the struggle (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, October 1, 2024).
• The PIJ congratulated Iranian leader Ali Khamenei and the commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps on their “bold and courageous decision to attack the fortresses of the Zionist entity.” It said the “painful blows were only part of what the criminal entity deserves and the only way to curb it, after the whole world was silent about its crimes.” The PIJ called on the peoples of the Arab and Islamic nations to work for the Lebanese and Palestinian people and rise up against “American tyranny” (PIJ Telegram channel, October 1, 2024).

• The United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions on four individuals and ten entities involved in the operation of sham charities raising donations for the terrorist activities of Hamas. The list included Hamid al-Ahmar, a Yemeni businessman who lives in Turkey and is considered a prominent international Hamas supporter. He is involved in the Hamas investment portfolio which enables the leaders of the movement to maintain their luxurious lifestyle abroad. In addition, nine al-Ahmar companies in Yemen, the Czech Republic, Lebanon and Turkey were included in the list. Also on the list are Muhammad Hanoun, a Hamas activist in Italy and the founder of the Charity Association for Solidarity with the Palestinian People, a charity financing the activities of Hamas’s military wing; Majed al-Zir, the senior Hamas representative in Germany and a major fundraiser for the movement; Adel Dughman, a Hamas representative in Austria and involved in the movement’s international activities; and the Hamas al-Intaj bank in the Gaza Strip, which provides Hamas with financial services even though it is not connected to the international banking network and does not operate with a license from the PA (United States Treasury Department website, October 7, 2024).

Terrorist attacks

• This past week Palestinian terrorist organizations carried out three attacks, murdering seven civilians and a Border Police fighter:
  • A combined shooting and stabbing in Jaffa: On October 1, 2024, two Palestinian terrorists opened fire on passengers in a light rail car at the station on Jerusalem Boulevard in Jaffa, and then continued to attack passers-by along the street. Seven people were murdered and 16 others were injured. Security personnel and armed civilians shot the two, killing one and wounding the other. According to reports they came from Hebron (Israel Police Force and Shabak spokesperson’s units, October 1-2, 2024). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for the attack and alleged it had been carried out in cooperation with the Iranian missile attack which took place shortly afterwards (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, October 2, 2024).
  • Attempted stabbing at the Judea Brigade headquarters: On October 3, 2024, a Palestinian from Yatta armed with a knife went to the entrance of the Judea Brigade headquarters in the Hebron area. IDF fighters shot and killed him (IDF spokesperson, October 3, 2024). The Mujahideen Brigades in the West Bank^[5] claimed responsibility for the attack (Mujahideen Brigades in the West Bank Telegram channel, October 3, 2024).
  • Shooting in Beersheba: On October 6, 2024, an Israeli Bedouin opened fire inside the McDonald’s restaurant at the central bus station in Beersheba. A woman Border Police fighter was killed and 12 other people were injured. The terrorist was shot and killed (Israeli media, October 6, 2024).

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, detaining dozens of wanted Palestinians and locating weapons and funds used to finance terrorism:
  • On October 3, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft targeted a building in Tulkarm where terrorist operatives were planning a terrorist attack in the immediately future At least 12 terrorist operatives were killed in the attack, including Zahi Yasser Abd al-Razaq ‘Oufi, head of the Hamas network in Tulkarm, and Ghayth Radwan, a senior PIJ terrorist in Tulkarm (IDF spokesperson, October 5, 2024). Palestinian media reported that 18 people were killed in an attack on a cafe in the Tulkarm refugee camp (Wafa, October 3, 2024). The Hamas military wing and the PIJ confirmed the deaths (Hamas and PIJ military wings’ Telegram channels, October 4, 2024).
  • refugee camp. According to reports, rioters threw stones at the forces, who responded by firing shots at the rioters (IDF spokesperson, October 7, 2024). Palestinian media reported that a teenager was killed, several people were wounded and more than 20 people were detained (Qalandiya communication center Telegram channel, October 7, 2024)

Activities of the Palestinian security forces

• A “Palestinian source” stated that Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, rejected a Fatah Central Committee proposal to stop detaining and pursuing armed operatives “whom Israel was looking for.” The commanders of the Palestinian security forces were instructed to “deal severely with armed operatives,” because loosening the security grip meant “chaos which would allow for a greater Israeli military presence in the West Bank” (Ra’i al-Youm, October 2, 2024).
• A “security source” in the PA claimed that the increase in surveillance and detentions of “resistance” operatives in Judea and Samaria was the result of new instructions issued by Mahmoud Abbas during a meeting of Fatah’s Central Committee. According to the “source,” Mahmoud Abbas said the security forces had to increase their activity in Tulkarm, Nablus and Jenin, and ordered them to tempt “resistance” operatives with promises to make them surrender their weapons. “The source” claimed that Mahmoud Abbas was upset during the meeting, fearing Israel regarded the PA security forces as dysfunctional (al-Shahed, October 2, 2024).
• Hamas offered its condolences on the death of Abd al-Hakim Shahin, a terrorist operative who was shot and killed by Israeli security forces in the Old City of Nablus after PA security forces in Nablus “chased him and tried to arrest him.” Hamas claimed the continued PA security force “persecution” of its operatives in Judea and Samaria, the confiscation of the weapons of the “combatants,” the exposure of explosive devices, shooting at the “fighters” and attempts to capture them were “obscene and reprehensible acts, which go beyond all national norms and values.” Hamas called on the PA leadership to halt its security forces’ activities against “resistance fighters” (Hamas Telegram channel, October 1, 2024).
• Abd al-Hakim Hanini, a senior Hamas official, said the “resistance” in Judea and Samaria lived between “the hammer of the occupation and the anvil of the PA security forces,” because it was persecuted by both Israeli and Palestinian security forces. He called on the PA security forces to change their “security doctrine” because, he said, the “occupation government” does not distinguish between a member of Hamas’ military wing, the “resistance” and the PA security forces (Hamas Telegram channel, October 3, 2024).

Palestinian killed by Iranian missile targeting Israel

The Palestinian police announced that Sameh Khader Hassan al-Asli, from the Gaza Strip, was killed in the Palestinian national security Nuweima camp in Jericho by a direct hit of an Iranian missile launched at Israel on October 1, 2024. According to reports, he was one of the thousands of Gazan workers who left Israel following the start of the war in the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023 and had since been in the national security camps in Jericho. Senior Palestinian figures, including the Palestinian minister of the interior and the governor of Jericho, came to express their condolences on his death (Jericho and Beqa’a District Police Facebook page, October 2, 2024). Al-Asli was the only person killed by the Iranian missile attack.

Mahmoud Abbas visits Qatar

• Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, went to Qatar to participate in the Asian Cooperation Dialogue meeting. He gave a speech in which he said that the PA sought to end the “occupation” and stop “Israeli aggression” in the Gaza Strip, Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem. He claimed that “Israeli aggression” had led to the destruction of more than 90% of the Gaza Strip’s infrastructure and called on the international community to stop the “barbaric aggression in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon.” He also said that peace and tolerance “cannot exist with occupation, war of extermination [sic] and discrimination” (Wafa, October 3 2024).
• While in Doha, Mahmoud Abbas met with the sons of Isma’il Haniyeh, former head of Hamas’ political bureau, who was killed on August 31, 2024. He offered his condolences to the family and noted Haniyeh’s “contribution” to the Palestinian “national struggle.” He said that the Palestinian people would continue to strive for their legitimate rights to freedom and independence, despite the “crimes of the Israeli occupation,” and noted the unity of the Palestinian people in their struggle to establish an independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital (Wafa, October 2, 2024).

• Mahmoud Abbas met with Abd al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman al-Thani, the chairman of the board of trustees of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Humanitarian Funds. He briefed al-Thani on the latest developments in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and thanked the Qatari institutions which provide humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. Al-Thani noted the Humanitarian Funds’ efforts to support “Palestine” (Wafa, October 2, 2024).

Palestinian activity in the international arena

• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, met with Jean-Noël Barrot, the French foreign minister. They discussed efforts to end the war in the Gaza Strip and [alleged] Israeli “aggression” in Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem. Mustafa noted the PA government’s commitment to the Gaza Strip and to ensuring economic stability despite the “Israeli blockade and restrictions.” He also praised French President Emmanuel Macron for saying arms should not be exported to Israel (Wafa, October 7, 2024).

• Mustafa met with Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT). Mustafa updated him on the security situation caused by the continuation of the war in the Gaza Strip and the escalation of “settler violence and the Israeli security forces” in Judea and Samaria. He also presented the PA government’s plans for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip after the war, which include emergency aid, institutional reforms, improving services, the general rehabilitation of “Palestine” and achieving economic stability (Wafa, October 6, 2024).
• Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, met in Doha with Muhammad bin Abdel Rahman bin Jassim al-Thani, the prime minister of Qatar. They discussed developments in the Palestinian arena and in the region, the efforts being made to end the [alleged] “ongoing Israeli aggression” against the Palestinians and the holy places. They also discussed efforts to promote unity and cohesion in the Palestinian ranks in a way that would serve the highest interests of the Palestinian people (Hussein al-Sheikh’s X account, October 2, 2024).
• Ramzi Rabah, a member of the PLO Executive Committee and chairman of the anti-apartheid department, met with Gerardo Fernández Noroña, the leader of the Mexican Senate. Rabah called on Mexico to take action to stop the “war of genocide” Israel was [allegedly] waging, and recommended severing trade and economic ties with Israel. He also asked for Mexico’s recognition of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Noroña expressed support for the Palestinian demands, emphasized Mexico’s commitment to the two-state solution, and promised to work for the recognition of a Palestinian state and to support the lawsuit against Israel in the International Court of Justice (PLO anti-apartheid department Facebook page, October 1, 2024).