Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (October 7 – 14 , 2024)

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• This past week, the IDF operated in the Gaza Strip in the north in the Jebalya area, in the center in the al-Bureij area, and in the south in the Rafah area and along the Philadelphi Axis. Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked more than 70 terrorist targets, including buildings terrorists were planning to use for attacks on the IDF forces. Four IDF soldiers were killed in combat, three from an explosive device in Jebalya, and one in the southern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson October 8-14, 2024).

   
IDF forces in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson October 10, 2024)

• Northern Gaza Strip: IDF forces operated in the Jebalya area, attacking targets from the air, destroying a weapons storehouse and attacking terrorist targets on the ground. They located grenades, Kalashnikov assault rifles, weapons and ammunition; about 250 terrorists were killed in the operation (IDF spokesperson for October 8-12, 2024).
• The IDF called on local residents to evacuate Area D5 (north of Gaza City) to the southern Gaza Strip through Salah al-Din Street (IDF spokesperson in Arabic, October 12, 2024). Satellite photos show the northern Gaza Strip encircled by IDF forces, with one crossing on Salah al-Din Street (Gaza News Telegram channel, October 11, 2024).

   
Right: Satellite photo of the location of IDF forces in the Gaza Strip (Gaza News Telegram channel, October 11). Left: The evacuation map (IDF spokesperson, October 10, 2024).

• Central Gaza Strip: IDF forces operated in al-Bureij, destroying terrorist facilities and killing terrorists with targeted raids and attacks. An Israeli Air Force fighter jet attacked a building where terrorists who planned to attack IDF forces were present; the terrorists were killed. (IDF spokesperson October 8-10, 2024). The forces also used precision weaponry and attack drones to kill approximately ten terrorists who posed a threat (IDF spokesperson October 13, 2024).
• Southern Gaza Strip: IDF forces operating in the Rafah area and in the Philadelphi Axis region attacked terrorist squads, destroyed rocket launchers and weapons, and located tunnel shafts. (IDF spokesperson October 13, 2024).

The elimination of terrorist operatives

• Three Hamas operatives who participated in the terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023, were killed in an airstrike (IDF spokesperson and Israeli Security Agency spokesman’s unit October 8, 2024).
• On October 9, Mustafa Khader, aka Abu Osama, the military commander of the al-Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades in the northern Gaza Strip, was killed.^[2]
• At least 12 terrorist operatives were killed in an aerial targeted attack on a Hamas command and control center in a facility previously used for medical purposes in Jebalya. Some of the operatives participated in the terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023 (IDF spokesperson and Israeli Security Agency spokesman’s unit, October 10, 2024).

Attacks on Hamas operatives in civilian facilities

• On October 13, 2024, Israeli Air Force fighter jets attacked Hamas terrorist operatives operating in a command and control center established in the area formerly known as Shuhadaa al-Aqsa Hospital in Deir al-Balah (Telegram channel of Avichai Adraee, IDF spokesperson in Arabic, October 14, 2024). Palestinian sources claimed the attack caused a fire which damaged the tents of displaced persons. According to the report, at least 5 people were killed and 75 were injured, including women and children. Four bodies were recovered from burned tents, while the search for more missing persons continues (al-Bureij Tajma’na network, October 14, 2024).

Rocket Fire from the Gaza Strip

• This past week six rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory. Most of them were intercepted (IDF spokesperson, October 8-12, 2024). The military-terrorist wings of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for the rocket fire (Hamas and PIJ military-terrorist wing Telegram channels, October 8-12, 2024).
• On October 10, the IDF intercepted a UAV from the Gaza Strip (IDF Telegram channel, October 10, 2024). Hamas issued a video of the UAV’s launch and its alleged impact on an IDF force in the Khan Yunis area (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 13, 2024).

al-Sinwar orders the resumption of suicide bombing attacks

• According to The Wall Street Journal, shortly after Yahya al-Sinwar was elected chairman of the Hamas political bureau (August 6, 2024), he ordered Zaher Jabarin (who took over responsibility for the West Bank after the elimination of Saleh al-‘Arouri) to renew suicide bombing attacks, and Jabarin transmitted the order to Judea and Samaria. On August 18, 2024, Jaafar Mana, a Hamas terrorist operative, tried to carry out a suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv. According to The Wall Street Journal, Hamas stopped suicide bombing attacks about 20 years ago, when some of the organization’s leaders were concerned that such attacks would make the movement a political outcast. However, after the rise of al-Sinwar, there was no one to speak out publicly against them. The Hamas movement did not respond to the newspaper’s request for comment (The Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2024).

The hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• Bassem Na’im, a member of the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip and the chairman of the political department for foreign relations, said that recently there had been no progress in the negotiations, and they were almost at a complete standstill. He reiterated that Hamas was committed to its stated positions, including its agreement to the proposal of July 2, 2024, and would not agree to negotiate new conditions or submit to the pressures that Israel was trying to exert through “massacres.” He said that if negotiations took place in the future, it would be solely for the purpose of implementing the agreements reached in the past (Ultra Palestine website, October 8, 2024).
• Sources with knowledge of Hamas confirmed that Yahya al-Sinwar had recently conveyed a message to mediators reiterating Hamas’ position: a demand for a full withdrawal of Israel from Gaza, the reconstruction of the Strip, the lifting of the “siege,” the return of the displaced persons to their former places of residence without obstacles and a “respectable” prisoner exchange deal. The sources stated that despite periodic delays in communication, al-Sinwar always had full knowledge of events and communication with the Hamas leadership was never completely cut off. Sources outside Hamas said the delays in communication with al-Sinwar caused at least three missed opportunities to advance the negotiations, including an offer received by Israel in December 2023 (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 8, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported that since the beginning of the war, 42,289 Palestinians had been killed and 98,684 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, July 16, 2024).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• The UN Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel (COI) published a comprehensive report on October 10, 2024, in which it accused Israel of committing “war crimes” during its operations in the Gaza Strip. The report alleged that Israel deliberately attacked medical facilities and prevented Gazans access to medical treatment, which led to the deaths of medical personnel. Israel was accused of physically and sexually abusing Palestinian detainees. Reference to the actions of armed Palestinian groups was limited. The commission called on Israel to end the “occupation” and stop any damage to medical facilities, and the authorities in Gaza to immediately release the hostages. The international community was called on to stop its support for violations in accordance with the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (UN Human Rights Council report, October 10, 2024).
• Catherine Russell, UNICEF executive director, announced that the second round of polio vaccinations in the Gaza Strip has been approved and would begin on October 14, 2024. The objective is to vaccinate about 590,000 children under the age of 10 (Catherine Russell’s X account, October 11, 2024). The Palestinian ministry of health announced that the campaign would take place in three stages and the ministry aimed to vaccinate approximately 591,700 children, but its success depended on a ceasefire which would allow its continued operation (Palestinian ministry of health, October 13, 2024).

   
The second round of the polio vaccine campaign in the camps in the central Gaza Strip (Palestinian ministry of health, October 14, 2024)

• UNRWA announced the beginning of the distribution to displaced persons in the Gaza Strip of tarpaulins for protection against rain, first to large families with more than 11 people (Osama al-Kahlout’s Telegram website, October 11, 2024). Fayiz Abu Shamala, a political commentator from Khan Yunis, sharply criticized UNRWA’s conduct in Gaza. He said the organization was wrong to limit the distribution centers of the tarps to a few selected distributors, which creates discrimination. He demanded an equal distribution in all distribution centers for the benefit of the civilians and to ensure correct procedure (Fayiz Abu Shamala’s X account, October 8, 2024).
• Hamza al-Masri announced on his Telegram channel (with 827,000 followers) that on October 11, 2024, 98 trucks entered through the Kerem Abu Salem Crossing in the southern Gaza Strip, but 80 of them were looted (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram website October 11, 2024).
• On October 12, 2024, the al-Oudeh Health Association, which has operated the al-Oudeh Hospitals in Jabalia and in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp since 2022, announced the opening of a new field hospital, al-Oudeh 1, in the al-Nuseirat refugee center. According to the announcement, the hospital has an emergency department, outpatient clinics, a field activities department, and separate hospitalization wards for men and women (al-Oudeh Association Facebook page, October 12, 2024).
• In light of the claims about the damage to bakeries and the lack of bread, the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) said there were 13 active bakeries in the Gaza Strip currently producing 3.1 million pitas per day. In the northern Gaza Strip, there are five bakeries producing 1.3 million pitas per day, and in central Gaza, eight bakeries that produce 1.8 million pitas per day. According to the announcement, during the past 24 hours fuel was supplied to bakeries in northern Gaza (COGAT X account, October 11, 2024).

Governance

• On October 12, 2024, the Khan Yunis District police said they were conducting an operation in the markets to monitor food prices, confiscate spoiled frozen food and encouraging the use of 10-shekel coins.^[3] The operation, with the participation of all police officers in the district, will continue until prices drop. The police have confiscated goods from merchants who refused to reduce prices and made them sign commitments to maintain normal prices (Alersala.net, October 12, 2024).
• The Hamas-affiliated al-Majid al-Amani website reported that Hamas security forces arrested a number of merchants who cooperated with Israeli intelligence. According to the report, the merchants raised prices and hoarded goods, allegedly in accordance with instructions from Israeli Security Agency officers, and in return received allowances on the passage of goods to the Gaza Strip. The merchants “admitted” their involvement, and it was emphasized that they would be dealt with in accordance with the “resistance” laws and without mercy (al-Majid al-Amani website Telegram channel, October 13, 2024).
• The Khan Yunis municipality announced it was continuing its efforts to clear rubble from the city’s streets to allow the movement of residents, address flooding problems resulting from the damage to the sewage system and remove the accumulated garbage to a temporary dump in the north of the al-Amal neighborhood. According to the report, the municipality clears about 500 tons of trash per day (Khan Yunis municipality Facebook page, October 13, 2024).

• During an interview on al-Araby TV, Khaled Mashal, head of the “external” Hamas leadership, claimed that Israel aspired to control Gaza but had to realize it was not possible. Just as the “occupation” had withdrawn from places like Netzarim in the past [i.e., Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2006], Israel would be forced to withdraw from Gaza as well as from Tel Aviv [sic]. He claimed Israel considered bringing in international or Arab forces to manage the Strip, but in the end, he claimed, the mediators [allegedly] realized that the best way to manage Gaza and the West Bank was through a national consensus government which would consist of Palestinian forces. He pointed out that technocrat ministers who would be elected by Palestinian consensus were the ones who would manage the government in Gaza and the West Bank, and that Hamas accepted this formula in order to maintain Palestinian national unity (Hamas website, October 9, 2024).
• Sky News TV in Arabic reported that Fatah and Hamas had reached an agreement to establish a committee to manage the Gaza Strip. The committee, which would be called the Community Support Committee, would be administratively linked to the Ramallah government, be composed of between 10 and 15 professional members who were not affiliated with the Palestinian political factions, and would be responsible for managing areas such as border crossings, health, relief, shelter, social development and education. According to the report, the committee would be budgeted by international bodies, alongside the Ramallah government’s budget and other internal funding sources. The meeting in Cairo between Fatah and Hamas discussed the details of the composition and work of the committee. Agreement on the committee was intended to curb the plan of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to establish an Israeli civil administration to manage Gaza after the war, in which the Israeli army would be the main decision-maker (Sky News in Arabic, October 9, 2024).
• The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) rejected the decision of Muhammad Mustafa, Palestinian Authority (PA) prime minister, to establish a working party for the reconstruction of Gaza, claiming that the decision went against the national agreements established in Beijing. The PFLP warned that the decision would only worsen the internal Palestinian schism and allow the reconstruction to be used for political purposes. They called on the PA to reconsider the decision and commit to the full implementation of the national agreements (Urgent Palestine News Telegram channel, October 11, 2024).
• According to reports, on October 11, 2024, despite the reports of agreements between Fatah and Hamas in Cairo, the contacts stalled due to disputes over the management of the Gaza Strip after the war and the reconstruction. Hamas reportedly demanded that the committee’s finances and administration be independent from the PA, which Fatah opposed. In addition, Hamas demanded that individuals affiliated with the Hamas movement be included in the committee, and that commissions and transitions be monitored, demands that Fatah rejected. The Egyptian-sponsored talks did not lead to progress, and the Egyptians are trying to coordinate another meeting in the coming week in an attempt to unify the Palestinian ranks (Sky News in Arabic, October 11, 2024).
• A senior Fatah figure who insisted on anonymity said that the objective of the talks taking place in Cairo was transferring power in the Gaza Strip from Hamas to the PA as part of arrangements for “the day after.” The figure noted that Hamas was “delusional” it if thought this war would end like its predecessors, with a ceasefire and understandings. He said that “the situation this time is different,” and only the PA would restore its control of Gaza, in view of the security and humanitarian situation emerging in the Gaza Strip (al-Shahed, October 12, 2024) .
• Jamal Nazal, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, said the PA was prepared to return and control Gaza. He said there were tens of thousands of workers in Gaza who had not worked since 2007, and wanted to be active again. He said the PA’s plan to control the Strip after the war, which was transmitted to the American government, included 101 pages detailing the equipping and certification of 12,000 officials. However, the document does not provide answers for security and requires extensive international assistance for security and reconstruction needs. It also does not offer solutions to the smuggling problems of the Rafah Crossing, nor explain how the PA intends to prevent the renewal of Hamas operations (al-Shahed, October 12, 2024).

• The New York Times reported that information seized by the IDF shed new light on Hamas’ preparations for the attack and massacre on October 7, 2023. The information includes documents and minutes from ten secret meetings held by Hamas leaders in which they planned the attack and tried to convince Hezbollah and Iran to participate in it.
• According to the information, Hamas planned the attack in the fall of 2022, but postponed it in order to convince Iran and Hezbollah to join. During the meetings, the leaders talked about the internal situation in Israel, especially the controversies surrounding the changes in the legal system in Israel, as a convenient opportunity for an attack.
• In August 2023, Khalil al-Haya, a senior Hamas figure, met a high-ranking officer from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Qods Force and asked for help in an attack on sensitive sites in Israel. According to the documents, the Iranian officer expressed support in principle but noted that more time and preparation were required.
• To mislead Israel about its plans, during the two years before the attack and massacre, Hamas avoided violent friction with Israel in order to preserve the surprise, making the attack more devastating when it was finally carried out.
• On October 7, 2023, Hamas was aware that Iran and Hezbollah might not join the attack, but decided not to postpone it any longer. Hamas wanted to prevent Israel from activating new air defense systems based on laser technology and also wanted to sabotage the move towards normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia (The New York Times, October 12, 2024).

Terrorist attacks

• This week there was a stabbing attack in Hadera during which an Israeli civilian was murdered and five were injured. The terrorist was an Israeli Arab from Umm al-Fahm.

Stabbing in Hadera

• On the afternoon of October 9, 2024, a terrorist attacked a number of civilians in Hadera with an ax and a knife while traveling by motorcycle between four different places in the city. One Israeli civilian was killed and five others were injured. The terrorist was shot and killed by civilians (Israeli media, October 9, 2024). he was identified as Ahmed Jabarin, 36 years old, from Umm al-Fahm.
• Hamas and the PIJ welcomed the attack (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel and the PIJ media information office, October 9, 2024).

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, detaining more than 70 wanted Palestinians seizing weapons and money and destroying explosives:
  • On October 8, 2024, two terrorists were killed in al-Aroub after throwing Molotov cocktails and explosives at IDF forces. In Qalandia ten wanted Palestinians were detained and weapons and money were seized. In Bayt Ummar dozens of Palestinians suspected involvement in terrorist activities were interrogated, and in al-Khader two additional wanted Palestinians were detained. A wanted Palestinian was detained in Beit Furik and a gun was seized (IDF spokesperson, October 8, 2024).
  • On October 9, 2024, the Israeli security forces killed four terrorist operatives, including heads of local organizations (Israeli Security Agency spokesman’s unit and IDF spokesperson, October 9, 2024). The Hamas movement condemned their killing and said the “resistance” in the West Bank would continue. Hamas called on the residents of the West Bank to escalate the confrontations with Israel (Hamas website, October 9, 2024).
  • On October 10, 2024, in an airstrike on the Nur al-Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm, two PIJ terrorists who were in charge of networks which carried out terrorist attacks were killed. Weapons were found in their possession (IDF spokesperson, October 10, 2024).
  • On October 11, 2024, IDF forces killed an armed terrorist in Aqaba (southeast of Jenin). In Bayt A’innon (west of Ramallah), six IEDs were destroyed and Hamas flags and a gun were confiscated. In Hebron, a wanted Palestinian was detained and his weapon seized (IDF spokesperson, 11 in October 2024).
• According to reports on October 10, 2024, a car-bomb attack on the Azrieli Mall in Tel Aviv was prevented. The terrorist network was exposed in the early stages of planning the attack. Five residents of Taybeh affiliated with ISIS who planned the attack were detained. They had been inspired by videos of attacks in Syria. Weapons were seized (Israeli Security Agency spokesman’s unit and the Israel Police Force spokesperson’s unit, October 10, 2024).

International activity

• The PA foreign ministry praised Bolivia for announcing it would join the lawsuit filed by South Africa against Israel at the International Court of Justice, regarding alleged Israeli violations of the convention on the prevention of genocide in the Gaza Strip. The PA foreign ministry also called on all the convention signatory countries to join the proceedings at the tribunal in the fight against what it defined as “the ongoing genocide of the Palestinian people”^[4] and to ensure that justice was done (Wafa October 11, 2024).
• Ahmed Majdalani a member of the PLO Executive Committee, condemned the Knesset bill which would allow Israel to take control of the area where UNRWA headquarters were located in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in Jerusalem, with the intention of turning it into a residential neighborhood. He claimed the objective was to eliminate the issue of Palestinian refugees and that it disregarded international law. He accused the international community of indifference, allowing the “occupation” to continue, and noted the importance of UNRWA as a symbol of the refugees’ [so-called] “right of return” (Wafa October 11, 2024).
• The Nicaraguan government’s announcement of severing diplomatic relations with Israel received considerable support from the Palestinian terrorist organizations (Hamas, PIJ, Fatah, and he Popular and Democratic Fronts) and they issued a joint announcement (Quds News Network Telegram channel, October 12, 2024).

• Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, returned to Ramallah on October 14, 2024 after attending a conference in Qatar and undergoing medical tests in Jordan, during which he underwent surgery and had a pacemaker implanted. According to reports, the 89 year-old Mahmoud Abbas was under medical supervision and in good condition (Ultra Palestine website October 14, 2024).

PA security force activity in Tubas

• During the past few days the PA security forces have been operating in the town of Tubas to prevent hostile activity and make arrests. Palestinians condemned the activity:
  • The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) called on the PA to stop the “kidnappings” and persecution of “resistance fighters,”^[5] actions which harmed Palestinian social fabric. The DFLP condemned the “kidnapping” of Ahmed Abu al-Aida, a senior operative in the Tubas Battalion, a senior member of the Tubas battalion, which caused violent clashes in Tubas, including shooting and blockading streets (al-Shahed website October 10, 2024).
  • The Hamas-aligned al-Ahrar Movement issued a statement condemning the “pursuit and siege” imposed by the PA security forces on the “resistance” fighters in Tubas who were in the midst of confronting the “Zionist enemy” and were facing what they refer to as a “war of extermination” carried out by the IDF in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The statement harshly criticized elements within Palestinian society who continue to believe in the possibility of living in peace with Israel within the framework of security cooperation with Israel. According to them, such elements work against the Palestinian resistance, while the resistance fighters were preparing to deal with the IDF’s “Nazi crimes” (al-Ahrar Movement press release, October 12, 2024).
  • As a sign of support for the “resistance” in Tubas, a shot was fired at the PA offices Jenin (News of the North Wolves (Jenin) Telegram channel, October 12, 2024). The announcement had the caption “The resistance in Tubas will pursue the [Palestinian] Authority of disgrace that does the dirty work of the occupation” (Nablus News Telegram channel, October 12, 2024).
  • The Hamas movement also issued a warning proclamation claiming that “the continued arrest of those wanted by the PA security forces, the latest of which was the fighter Ahmed Abu al-Aida, and other dissidents and political detainees, constitutes a dangerous line-crossing that threatens national unity (Telegram site of the Hamas movement in the West Bank, October 13, 2024).