Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (September 17- 24 , 2024)

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• This past week the IDF forces continued their activities in the Rafah region in the southern Gaza Strip and in the Netzarim Corridor in the center. IDF forces attacked terrorist operatives from the air and on the ground, destroyed terrorist facilities and tunnels, and located weapons. Four IDF soldiers were killed and five injured when an explosive device detonated in a building in the Tel al-Sultan neighborhood in Rafah (IDF spokesperson, September 17-24, 2024).
• On September 21, 2024, while securing the route used to deliver humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, IDF forces identified armed men looting a truck carrying aid. An Israeli Air Force aircraft struck the looters’ vehicle, killing them (IDF spokesperson, September 21, 2024).
• On September 21, 2024, the IDF killed two Hamas operatives who murdered the six Israeli hostages whose bodies were found in a tunnel in Rafah on August 31, 2024. According to the IDF spokesperson, the two were killed in a clash after they emerged from an underground shaft in the Tel al-Sultan area the day after they murdered they hostages. Objects were found in their possession linking them to the tunnel where the bodies of the hostages were found (IDF spokesperson, September 21, 2024).

Attacks on Hamas facilities in civilian environments

• This past week, Israeli Air Force aircraft continued to attack terrorist operatives and facilities operating in civilian environments in the Gaza Strip, where they planned and carried out terrorist attacks on IDF forces and the State of Israel. In all cases, preliminary measures were taken to reduce possible harm to civilians. Using civilian environments such as schools and hospitals for terrorist purposes is typical of the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially Hamas. The terrorist organizations exploit the IDF attacks for purposes of propaganda and incitement while exaggerating the number of victims, alleging many civilians were injured and for the most part hiding the identity of the terrorists who were attacked:
  • On September 18, 2024, Hamas operatives were attacked in a command and control facility operating in a site that was previously used as the Ibn al-Haitham School in the eastern part of Gaza City (IDF spokesperson, September 18, 2024). Palestinian media reported eight deaths (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, September 18, 2024).
  • On September 21, 2024, Hamas operatives were attacked in a command and control facility operating at a site that was previously used as the al-Falah School in Gaza City (IDF spokesperson, September 21, 2024). The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in Gaza claimed that at least 22 people had been killed, including women and children, and 30 were injured in an attack on the school in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood in southeast Gaza (Safa Agency, September 21, 2024).
  • On September 21, 2024, a warning attack was carried out to evacuate the University College of Applied Sciences in the al-Mawasi region of Khan Yunis. According to reports, four people were injured in an attack on the college’s security room (al-Nuseirat News Telegram channel, September 21, 2024).
  • On September 22, 2024, Hamas terrorist operatives were attacked in the compound that was formerly used as the Kafr Qassem School in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, September 22, 2024). Palestinian media reported that seven people were killed in an attack on the al-Shati refugee camp (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, September 23 2024). According to reports, Majed Saleh, director general of the ministry of public works and housing in the Gaza Strip, was killed in an attack (Telegram channel Palestine Online, September 22, 2024).
  • On September 22, 2024, Hamas operatives operating in a command and control complex at a site previously used as the Khaled bin al-Walid School in the central Gaza Strip were attacked (IDF spokesperson, September 23, 2024). Palestinian media reported three deaths in the attack on the school, which serves as a shelter for displaced persons, east of the al-Nuseirat refugee camp (Shehab Agency, September 23, 2024).

Concerns in the Gaza Strip over Israeli espionage

• According to reports, “resistance” security forces located “Israeli” espionage devices planted between tents of displaced persons in one of the shelter centers in the southern Gaza Strip. According to an officer in “resistance security,” Israeli intelligence disguised the devices as belonging to the environment. In his assessment, the devices had been planted with quadcopters during hours when there was no active movement of displaced persons. He called on the residents who found suspicious objected not to touch them but to establish immediate contact with the security forces (al-Akhras Telegram channel, September 19, 2024).

   
Right: The alleged espionage devices camouflaged as stones (al-Akhras Telegram channel, September 19, 2024).^[2] Left: Announcement from the ministry of interior and defense in the Gaza Strip warning the residents (Quds Agency, September 23, 2024)

• In the wake of the explosion of thousands of Hezbollah operatives’ hand-held communications devices in Lebanon,^[3] a “senior commander” in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s Jenin Battalion said they were planning to take “extreme” precautionary measures. He claimed the operatives were already avoiding the use of mobile phones and had recently given up the use of walkie-talkies for fear that Israel would hack them (The Washington Post, September 22, 2024).

The hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• Khaled Mashal, head of the “external” Hamas leadership, claimed that the leaders of the movement “are in no hurry” to reach an agreement with Israel at any cost, and said they would not waive their demands for the end of the war in the Gaza Strip and the complete withdrawal of Israel (New York Times, September 17, 2024). In response, Hamas claimed that Mashal’s words had been “misrepresented” and that it was an attempt to “distort” the movement’s position. According to Hamas, the movement wants to reach a deal, from a permanent cessation of “aggression” to a complete withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced to their homes, the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and a “serious” prisoner exchange deal. Hamas claimed Israel was hampering the process and promoting a “false narrative” (Hamas Telegram channel, September 18, 2024).
• Senior Hamas officials rejected the Israeli proposal that Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, and other senior Hamas figures be deported from the Gaza Strip as part of an agreement for a ceasefire and the release of the hostages:^[4]
  • Hamas spokesman Jihad Taha said that Yahya al-Sinwar and the “resistance” leadership would not leave the “ground of the campaign.” He claimed the proposal was “a new maneuver” on the part of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu (al-Jazeera Mubasher Telegram channel, September 19, 2024).
  • Ghazi Hamed, a member of the Hamas political bureau, called the proposal “ridiculous and points to the occupation’s bankruptcy regarding negotiations.” He added that the proposal proved Israel’s denial of the developments during the eight months of negotiations, and claimed that the negotiations were at a dead end because of Israel’s refusal to compromise (al-Araby al-Jadeed, September 19, 2024).
  • “A resistance source ” claimed that Hamas had not received a new proposal from the mediators, calling the Israeli proposal to exile al-Sinwar “far-fetched and unrelated to the efforts made in the last eight months.” He added that the proposal showed Israel was confused and “bankrupt” in addition to its insistence on continuing the war (al-Mayadeen, September 19, 2024).
• American Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said there was agreement on 15 out of 18 clauses in the ceasefire proposal, but there were still issues that required a solution. He added that the objective of his frequent visits to the Middle East was to achieve a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, in cooperation with Qatar and Egypt. Regarding the border crossings, he said the United States would not accept a change in the rules established before October 7 at the Philadelphi Crossing. At the same time, Badr Abdelatty, the Egyptian foreign minister, stated his opposition to any Israeli military presence on the Palestinian side of the Rafah Crossing (Sama News Agency, September 18, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported that since the beginning of the war, 41,647 Palestinians had been killed and 95,921 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, September 24, 2024).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) said that the 13^th field hospital had been established in the Gaza Strip. The hospital is located in Deir al-Balah and will be managed by Doctors Without Borders. According to reports, the hospital will be expanded from a capacity of 20 beds to 110, and will include an emergency room, a maternity ward and a surgical ward (COGAT X account, September 22, 2024).

• The Palestinian Red Crescent in the Gaza Strip announced the establishment of a mobile operating room to compensate for the closure of many hospitals. A senior Red Crescent source that the operating room had been designed in accordance with international specifications for hospital operating rooms, while most of the operating rooms sent to the Gaza Strip from abroad were tents, which were unsuitable for winter weather (Palestinian Red Crescent in the Gaza Strip Facebook page, September 18, 2024; Ma’an, September 19, 2024).
• Majed Abu Ramadan, PA minister of health, reported the entry of five trucks carrying medical aid to the Gaza Strip in cooperation with the W.H.O. He said the aid, which was transferred from the warehouses of the PA ministry of health in Nablus, was delivered to the hospitals of the ministry of health in Gaza. Abu Ramadan said the ministry was working with “international medical partners” to provide assistance to the public health system in the Gaza Strip, according to the directive of Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman and Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister (Wafa, September 20, 2024).
• Hamza al-Masri, a Palestinian online influencer from the Gaza Strip with 725 thousand followers, reported that UNRWA senior managers regularly steal resources from civilians and from the agency’s warehouses, especially at night, and claimed there was photographic evidence to prove it. According to al-Masri, relatives of UNRWA workers managed the distribution of food, such as eggs, poultry and vegetables. He added that there was corruption in the sale of UNRWA aid packages and diesel fuel allocated to shelters in the Gaza Strip was sold for private use (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, September 24, 2024).
• The Popular Committee for Refugees in Khan Yunis worked with UNRWA to regulate aid activities at the Khaldiya School, which provides services to approximately 40,000 displaced people. According to reports, UNRWA renewed its activities at the center after a long hiatus (Popular Committee for Refugees, Khan Yunis refugee camp, September 17, 2024).

• Khaled Mashal, head of the “external” Hamas leadership, claimed that Hamas was winning the war and would play a central role in shaping the future of the Gaza Strip. He claimed Hamas had exhausted the Israeli army while the movement remained strong despite heavy losses. He rejected the international proposals to manage the Strip without Hamas and said that only the Palestinians would determine its future. He added that the objective of the Hamas “attack” on October 7, 2023 was “to liberate the Palestinians from their harsh situation” and claimed that the destruction in the Gaza Strip was “the price of freedom.” He also rejected criticism of the attack, including from inside the Strip, and claimed that it was the voice of a minority (Arabia Sky News September 17, 2024).
• Tawfiq al-Tirawi, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee, said there was an urgent need for a unifying Palestinian vision, with international support, to ensure the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip at the end of the war. He noted the importance of developing an integrated plan for reconstructing the Gaza Strip, including financial support, and emphasized the importance of the PA’s role in the Gaza Strip, claiming that “the human component required to maintain law and order in the Gaza Strip is still not sufficiently available” (al-Watan, September 19, 2024).

Terrorist attacks

• This past week no terrorist attacks were carried out.

Attempted blunt-instrument attack at an IDF base in the south

• On September 23, 2024, an Arab-Israeli worker tried to attack a soldier with a hammer at a training base in the south. A soldier nearby shot and killed the attacker (IDF spokesperson, September 23, 2024).

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria. Since October 7, 2023, 5,261 wanted Palestinians have been detained, of whom more than 2,070 were Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson, September 23, 2024):
  • On September 19, 2024, Israeli security forces operated in the town of Qabatiya, south of Jenin, killing four armed terrorist operatives in an exchange of fire. Three terrorist operatives were killed in an aircraft strike on a vehicle in which there were weapons and explosives. One of the terrorists killed in the attack was Shadi Zakarna, who headed a local terrorist network which was responsible for carrying out attacks in northern Samaria (IDF spokesperson, September 20, 2024).
  • The Israeli security forces seized four lathes for the production of weapons operating in Hebron. Materials for making explosives were seized in the town of al-Shuyukh, near Hebron. At least nine wanted Palestinians were detained by the security forces (IDF spokesperson, September 23, 2024).

Last will and testament of the Tel Aviv suicide bomber

• On September 19, 2024, Hamas’ military-terrorist wing released the videotaped will of Jaafar Mana, who carried out the suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv on August 18, 2024, in which an Israeli citizen was injured. In the video, Mana said that he had been chosen to be “the striking hand of the Mujahideen” to protect the “oppressed Muslims in the Gaza Strip.” He appealed to the residents of Judea and Samaria and the jihad fighters “in [Yahya] Ayash’s West Bank” to rise up “and invade the enemy.” He also thanked the “jihad fighters” in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq “and the insurgents” in Jordan, and stated that he would “drink the blood of the Zionists” in revenge for the death of Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau (Palestine Online Telegram channel, September 19, 2024).

• In preparation for the disclosure of Mana’s will, Hamas’ military wing issued a video threatening to resume suicide bombing attacks in Israeli territory. The video, entitled “The flood of the shaheeds will drown you,” showed clips from Hamas suicide bombing attacks in the mid-1990s and during the second intifada, along with a video of Mana walking down the street in Tel Aviv before the attack and a short clip from his filmed will. A terrorist operative whose face was blurred also appeared in the video, and expressed a willingness to carry out a suicide bombing attack, threatening “a flood of suicide bombing attacks” in revenge for the Gaza Strip and “the harm to the prisoners” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, September 18, 2024).

Activities of the Palestinian Authority security forces

• According to reports, the Palestinian security forces dismantled an explosive device in the region of the Balata refugee camp in Nablus, near Joseph’s Tomb (al-Shahed website, September 17, 2024; QudsN X account, September 17, 2024). According to reports, the PA security forces in Jenin dismantled and destroyed explosive devices prepared to attack IDF forces in the village of Kafr Dan (Safa Agency X account, September 17, 2024).

   
Detonating the explosive device in Nablus (Right: QudsN X account, September 17, 2024. Left: al-Shahed X account, September 17, 2024)

• According to reports, in Iktaba., near the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm, there was an exchange of fire between “resistance operatives” and PA security forces while the forces were dismantling an explosive device prepared for an attack on IDF forces. According to unconfirmed reports, a PA security force operative was wounded (Shehab X account, September 22, 2024; Yassin Izz al-Din’s X account, September 22, 2024).
• According to a report, an attempt by PA security forces in Tulkarm to remove Abdu Al-Shabarawi, wanted by the PA, from the government hospital in the city failed. Armed PA security forces broke into the hospital and surrounded the wing where he was hospitalized, but local residents prevented his arrest. The report also claimed that since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, the PA had increased “political arrests” in Judea and Samaria to prevent “resistance activity” (al-Shahed, September 20, 2024).
• Tawfiq al-Tirawi, a senior Fatah figure, criticized the PA security force arrests of “resistance fighters.” He claimed that instead of arresting them, the situation should be contained, the youth should be educated and “resistance fighters” should undergo training before “fighting the occupation.” He was responding to complaints from “resistance” operatives in Jenin who accused the PA security forces of “persecuting” them while not condemning the attacks of the Israeli security forces (al-Shahed, September 21, 2024).

Activities in the international arena

• Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, arrived in New York to participate in the 79^th annual UN General Assembly session. He met on the sidelines with various world leaders to discuss the latest developments in the Palestinian arena:
  • Meeting with Karim Khan, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, Mahmoud Abbas called for the acceleration of investigations into “war crimes” allegedly committed by Israel during the “aggression” against the Gaza Strip and into alleged “colonialist terrorism in the West Bank and violations against detainees.” He claimed that the lack of punishment encouraged the “continuation of crimes” against the Palestinians. He also said that the international community and the UN’s legal organizations had to obligate Israel to implement the relevant resolutions (Wafa, September 23, 2024).

• • Meeting with Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, Mahmoud Abbas thanked the EU for its efforts to promote the two-state solution and develop the “Palestinian state’s” institutions. He called on the EU to take steps to protect the two-state solution, support “Palestine’s” candidacy for full membership in the United Nations, and put pressure on Israel to end its economic “stranglehold” on the Palestinians (Wafa, September 21, 2024).
  • Meeting with Badr Abdelatty, the Egyptian foreign minister, Mahmoud Abbas claimed the PA had jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip as well as Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem, and claimed the PA would continue to meet its responsibilities. He noted the importance of Egypt’s role in achieving a ceasefire in Gaza, and the necessity to continue regional and international efforts to stop the war. He also emphasized the need to cooperate with the international community in order to implement the UN General Assembly resolution regarding the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion, according to which the “Israeli occupation” had to end. Abdelatty said Egypt would continue its efforts with all regional and international bodies to stop “aggression” against the Palestinian people (Wafa, September 23, 2024).
  • Meeting with Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India, Mahmoud Abbas praised India for its support of Palestinian rights and the humanitarian aid it provided. He discussed the aspiration of “Palestine” to join BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and thanked India for its support to UNRWA (Wafa September 23, 2024).
  • Meeting with Børge Brende, the president of the World Economic Forum, Mahmoud Abbas discussed efforts to stop Israeli “aggression” in the Gaza Strip and the need for humanitarian aid. He called for international intervention to end the attacks in Judea and Samaria, and called for progress towards “Palestine’s” achieving full UN membership (Mahmoud Abbas’ Facebook page, September 22, 2024).
• On September 19, 2024, Mahmoud Abbas visited Spain and met with Pedro Sánchez, the Spanish prime minister. He acknowledged Spain’s recognition of the state of “Palestine” and its support for the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state. He called on the international community to implement the opinion of the International Court of Justice and convene an international peace conference. In a joint press conference with Sánchez, Mahmoud Abbas said that the PA demanded jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip. He claimed his priority was to end the “aggression” and effect a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, after which a political process would begin. Sánchez called for a ceasefire and the introduction of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip (Wafa, September 19, 2024).
• Muhammad Mustafa, the PA prime minister, arrived in New York to participate in the annual UN General Assembly session. While there he held meetings with senior figures from around the world and participated in meetings dealing with the war in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian issue, during which he called for an end to “aggression” and the implementation of UN resolutions:
  • At a meeting of the Arab-Islamic Minister’s Committee tasked with international action to end the war in the Gaza Strip, he noted the importance of supporting the Palestinian government and its plans for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria as soon as “the aggression of the occupation” ended (Wafa, September 22, 2024).
  • At a meeting of the foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries, he called on the member states to translate their “firm solidarity with Palestine” into political, diplomatic and legal action to end “the occupation and the [alleged] “apartheid regime,” and achieve “Palestinian freedom and a just and lasting peace.” He urged the states to stop all contact with the “settlements” and to stop the transfer of weapons to Israel, alleging that Israel “does not hide its intentions to wipe out our Palestinian people, their heritage, their identity and their existence in the land of their ancestors” (Wafa, September 23, 2024).
  • At an advisory meeting of the Arab League Council, he noted the need to increase efforts to stop Israel’s “aggression” against the residents of the Gaza Strip and the “escalation” in Judea and Samaria, and the Palestinian efforts to achieve full UN membership (Wafa, September 23, 2024).

• On September 20, 2024, Mahmoud al-Habash, Mahmoud Abbas’ advisor for religious affairs and Islamic relations, and supreme cadi (judge) of the Sharia courts of the PA, met in Moscow with Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian deputy foreign minister and Russian special envoy to the Middle East. They discussed efforts to stop [alleged] Israeli “aggression” in the Gaza Strip, Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem, and the need to strengthen bilateral Russian-Palestinian ties and cooperation (Mahmoud al-Habash’ Facebook page, September 20, 2024). In a speech to the 20^th Conference of the World Islamic Forum held in Russia, al-Habash said that the Palestinian people wanted peace, strived for it and sacrificed for it, proof of which was when the PLO agreed to the establishment of a state on part of the “historic homeland” (Mahmoud al-Habash’ Facebook page, September 21, 2024).

UN General Assembly resolution regarding the end of the “occupation”

• On September 18, 2024, the UN General Assembly approved a non-binding draft resolution submitted by the PA demanding that Israel end its “illegal presence in the occupied Palestinian territories” within 12 months and calling for the imposition of sanctions and an arms embargo on Israel. The resolution is based on the International Court of Justice opinion from July 2024, according to which the Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories is “illegal;” 124 countries voted in favor of the decision and 43 abstained. The Palestinians welcomed the approval of the decision:
  • Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, noted the importance of the resolution, which he viewed as “an international consensus on the justice of the Palestinian issue, and a victory for the indisputable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state.” He called on the countries that supported the resolution to take steps that would obligate Israel to implement it (Wafa, September 18, 2024).
  • The PA foreign ministry called on the international community to quickly implement the UN General Assembly resolution to bring about an end of “occupation and colonization” as a necessary step for peace and stability. The ministry also assigned the Israeli government the responsibility for regional escalation (Wafa, September 19, 2024).
  • Riyad Mansour, the Palestinian delegate to the UN, said that the resolution marked a turning point in the Palestinian struggle for “freedom and justice,” and conveyed the need to “end the occupation” (Wafa, September 18, 2024).
  • Hamas welcomed the UN resolution, claiming it reflected international support for the Palestinian people’s “struggle for freedom” and independence. Hamas thanked the supporting countries and called on them to exert pressure on Israel to end the war (Hamas Telegram channel, September 18, 2024).

Israel closes al-Jazeera’s offices in Ramallah

• On the night of September 21, 2024, the Israeli security forces raided the offices of al-Jazeera TV in Ramallah and ordered their closure for 45 days, in a general order in accordance with the government’s decision from May 2024 (Israeli media, September 22, 2024). The closure provoked condemnations from Palestinians:
  • The Palestinian Journalists Syndicate condemned the move and called for international intervention. The Syndicate stated that the decision was a “serious scandal” and a blatant violation of freedom of the press, calling it a sign of “the occupation’s weakness in the face of the truth,” after the channel had been able to guarantee the public “freedom of information” for years [sic] (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, September 22, 2024).
  • The PA foreign ministry called the closure a “serious violation of international law,” and called for the rapid implementation of UN resolutions to end the occupation (PA foreign ministry Telegram channel, September 22, 2024).
  • Fatah spokesman Jamal Nizal called the closing of al-Jazeera’s offices “another step in the efforts to cancel the Oslo Accords,” claiming that Israel had no authority to operate in PA territories (al-Salam TV Telegram channel, September 22, 2024).
  • Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, claimed the objective of closing al-Jazeera’s offices was to “take revenge for its professional role [sic] in exposing the crimes of the occupation against the Palestinian people.” He claimed it was “a high point in the public war against the journalists” (Izzat al-Rishq’s Telegram channel, September 22, 2024).