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Spotlight on Iran

May 8 – May 22, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Ahmad-Reza Pourdastan (Seraj24.ir, May 11, 2016)

Ahmad-Reza Pourdastan (Seraj24.ir, May 11, 2016)

Ahmad-Reza Pourdastan (Seraj24.ir, May 11, 2016)

Ahmad-Reza Pourdastan (Seraj24.ir, May 11, 2016)

Qasem Soleimani (at right, head down, wearing glasses) at an operational center, apparently in the region of Aleppo, Syria (IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel, May 17, 2016; date of original photo unknown).

Qasem Soleimani (at right, head down, wearing glasses) at an operational center, apparently in the region of Aleppo, Syria (IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel, May 17, 2016; date of original photo unknown).

Hossein Amir Abdollahian (third from left) pays a condolence call to the family of Badr al-Din (Nasim Online, May 14, 2016).

Hossein Amir Abdollahian (third from left) pays a condolence call to the family of Badr al-Din (Nasim Online, May 14, 2016).

Alireza Baba'i, killed in Iraq (Qasemsoleimani.ir, May 16, 2016)

Alireza Baba'i, killed in Iraq (Qasemsoleimani.ir, May 16, 2016)

The Al-Aqsa mosque conference in Tehran (ILNA, May 15, 2016).

The Al-Aqsa mosque conference in Tehran (ILNA, May 15, 2016).


Highlights of the week
  • Senior Iranian officials reacted strongly to the rebel attack on Khan Tuman (south of Aleppo, Syria), during which the rebels took control of the the village and caused heavy losses to Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters and supporters of the Assad regime. The Iranian defense minister said "resistance" fighters would retake Khan Tuman.
  • Senior Iranian officials reacted strongly to the death of senior Hezbollah operative Mustafa Badr al-Din, some of accusing Israel of responsibility for his death. On May 15, 2016, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, paid a condolence call at the home of the Badr al-Din family in Beirut. While in Beirut Soleimani may also have consulted with the high ranking Hezbollah officials regarding the appointment of Badr al-Din's successor.
  • General Ramazan Sharif, IRGC spokesman, said at a press conference that the IRGC was experiencing a growing wave of young volunteers who wanted to be deployed in the fighting in Syria and Iraq.
  • An IRGC Basij militia fighter was killed by ISIS in Fallujah, Iraq.
  • An international convention for solidarity with Al-Aqsa mosque was held in Tehran to mark Nakba Day. 

 

General Information
  • Speaking in Kerman Province in southeast Iran, President Hassan Rouhani praised the regional involvement of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force. He said that hallmarks of Soleimani's courage and fearlessness were evident today throughout Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. He claimed that currently the IRGC had the burden not only of defending the security of Iran, but of responsibility for the security of other countries, which had asked Iran for its aid (ISNA, May 10, 2016).
  • Ahmad-Reza Pourdastan, commander of the Iranian army ground forces, said in an interview with the Iranian army's newsletter that a 40-kilometer (about 25 miles) red zone of deterrence had been designated. Forty kilometers, he said, was as close as Iran would permit terrorist groups operating in Iraq to approach the Iranian border. Crossing the 40-kilometer line would prompt a military response from Iran.
  • He said that during 2014 and 2015 ISIS, operating in Iraq's Anbar Province, had tried to come within 12 kilometers (about 7.5 miles) of Iran's western border. In response five Iranian army ground force brigades with helicopter air cover and intelligence support had been put on alert and were ready to initiate a military campaign in the event that ISIS came closer than 40 kilometers to the Iranian border (Mehr News Agency, May 11, 2016).
  • Morteza Saffari, commander of IRGC's Imam Hossein University for officer training, said that last year 100 of the university's commanders and instructors had been deployed on training and advisory missions to Iraq and Syria. He said some of them returned after two or three months, some had been wounded or killed and that others remained there according to need (Tasnim News, May 14, 2016).
  • Ramazan Sharif, IRGC spokesman, said that IRGC was experiencing a growing wave of young volunteers from all over the country who asked to be deployed to fight in Syria and Iraq.
  • Sharif held a press conference where he said that the progress of the Islamic nation had been halted during the past five years because of the actions of the Muslims' enemies and Arab rulers, but if the defeat of the Zionists at the hands of the fighters of Palestine and Lebanon continued, no trace of Israel would remain. The regional intervention of the United States and the West was intended, he claimed, to overthrow the Iranian regime, considered by the West to be the greatest threat to the Zionists' security. ISIS and Al-Qaeda, he claimed, were established by the West to fight against Iran (ISNA, May 18, 2016).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, international advisor to the supreme leader, meeting Iraqi with clerics and thinkers, said that if Syria disintegrated and the extremist Islamic (takfiri) organizations with ties to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States took over the country, it would influence both Lebanon and Iraq, and Iran would no longer be immune to their aggression.
  • Velayati praised the role played by Hezbollah in Syria, saying that without its presence it would not be possible to establish an effective resistance there. Concerning the death of senior Hezbollah operative Mustafa Badr al-Din, he said his death would increase the motivation of those fighting the takfiri and Zionist organizations in Syria and the rest of the region (Mehr News Agency and IRNA, May 18, 2016)
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • An Iranian cleric was killed in Syria. The circumstances of his death were not made public (Qasemsoliemani.ir, May 17, 2016).
  • Senior Iranian officials reacted strongly to the rebel attack on Khan Tuman (south of Aleppo, Syria), during which the rebels took control of the village and caused heavy losses to IRGC fighters and to supporters of the Assad regime. Mohsen Rezaei, former IRGC commander and secretary of the Iranian Expediency Council, said the takfiri organizations would pay a high price for the attack on Khan Tuman (Tasnim News, May 9, 2016). Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, said Iran and its allies Russia, Syria and Hezbollah would not leave the attack on Khan Tuman without a response. He said it showed that Iran's concerns about the ceasefire in Syria were completely justified and it only served as an opportunity for the governments supporting the terrorist groups to rehabilitate them (Asr-e Iran, May 9, 2016).
  • Hossein Dehqan, Iranian minister of defense, speaking at a memorial service held for Mustafa Badr al-Din said that "resistance" fighters would retake Khan Tuman (Fars, May 14, 2016).
  • Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, said that the United States' continuing support for the terrorist groups in Syria would not lead to the country's surrender and that in the coming year as well the Americans would not achieve their objectives and Bashar Assad would remain in power. The United States, he claimed, wanted to prolong the war in Syria to influence the upcoming presidential elections (Fars, May 12, 2016).
  • Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Iranian Expediency Council, strongly denied reports published in social media that the supreme leader had put him in charge of the military campaign to liberate the Syrian city of Aleppo. He said the rumors were untrue but that he was prepared to do everything in his power to help the military effort (Tasnim News, May 13, 2016).
  • Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, speaking at the talks held in Vienna this past week about the future of Syria, said they had to prevent the terrorist organizations from exploiting the ceasefire to recruit additional forces. He said that despite the efforts of the "terrorist groups and their regional and global supporters," there was no military solution for the Syrian crisis. The campaign against such groups was vital, he said, and they could not be allowed to exploit the ceasefire to escalate their terrorist attacks on Syrian civilians (Fars, May 17, 2016).
  • Senior Iranian officials reacted strongly to the death of senior Hezbollah operative Mustafa Badr al-Din, some of them accusing Israel of responsibility for his death.
  • Mohammad Javad Zarif said Badr al-Din's death would strengthen the determination of the "resistance forces" in their struggle against "the Zionist regime and terrorism." In a letter of condolence he sent to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, he wrote that Badr al-Din had exemplified dedication to defending the values of Islam, the Lebanese people and the struggle against terrorism (Fars, May 13, 2016). Letters of condolence were also sent to Nasrallah by Ali Larijani (speaker of the Majlis), Mahmoud Alavi (minister of intelligence) and Hossein Dehqan (defense minister). Hossein Dehqan wrote that the blood of Badr al-Din and other shaheeds killed in the fight against the "Zionist regime" and ISIS would end regional terrorism (Tasnim News, May 14, 2016).
  • Ahmad Vahidi, former Iranian minister of defense and current head of Iran's center for strategic defense studies, threatened to take vengeance on Israel for the death of Mustafa Badr al-Din, claiming the response against the "Zionist regime" would come at the "right time." He praised Badr al-Din, saying he had devoted his life to the defense of the Islamic nation and the Lebanese people (Mehr News Agency, May 13, 2016).
  • On May 15, 2016, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, paid a condolence call to the Badr al-Din family in Beirut. On May 16, 2016, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar reported that he had praised Badr al-Din saying "we have lost a commander and dear brother." Soleimani called on Badr al-Din's son to continue in the footsteps of his father. It is also possible that during his visit to Beirut Soleimani met with Hezbollah leaders to discuss Badr al-Din's successor as commander of the Hezbollah forces fighting alongside the forces of the Syrian regime.
  • On May 14-15, 2016, Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs, paid a visit to Lebanon where he met with Hassan Nasrallah and paid a condolence call to the family of Badr al-Din in Beirut.
  • While in Lebanon Abdollahian said Iran was serious about its support for the "resistance forces" in their struggle against takfiri terrorism. He said the terrorist groups presented security threats to the resistance fighters and that their actions serve the "Zionist regime" and its objectives. Takfiri terrorism and the Israeli occupation were two sides of the same coin, he claimed (Fars, May 15, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • An IRGC Basij military fighter was killed by ISIS in Fallujah, Iraq.
  • Mohammad Saleh Jokar, a member of the Iranian Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy, claimed Iraq should establish its own revolutionary guards corps. He said the IRGC was a good model for other regional countries and that Iran was prepared to advise any country wanting to establish its own revolutionary guards corps. Today, he said, the Basij militia serve as a successful model in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Jokar made the remark in response to Seyyed Ali Yaseri, the commander of a Shi'ite militia in Iraq, who recently suggested establishing a revolutionary guards corps in Iraq (YCR.ir, May 16, 2016).
  • Last week Mahmoud Alavi, Iranian minister of intelligence, paid a visit to Iraq where he met with senior Iraqi officials, including Haydar al-Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister; Fouad Massoum, the Iraqi president; Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the defense minister; Salim al-Jabouri, the speaker of the Iraqi parliament; and Sayid Amar al-Hakim, head of the Iraqi supreme Islamic council. They discussed regional and Iraqi developments and the ongoing campaign against ISIS. Al-Hakim noted the importance of sharing security information to continue the struggle against terrorism, and expressed his great regard for the support Iran gave Iraq in its war against ISIS (IRNA, May 14 Press TV, May 16, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • On May 14-15 an international conference was held in Tehran whose theme was "We are all Al-Aqsa [mosque]." It was held for Nakba Day, marked every year on Israel's Independence Day, and was attended by 30 representatives from the Arab-Muslim world. It opened with a video-taped message from Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah.
  • Ayatollah Sadegh Amoli Larijani, head of Iran's Judiciary, who was the main speaker, said that the issue of Palestine was the most important issue for the Muslim world and that it demanded the involvement of every Muslim. He said the situation in Palestine exposed the lies of the West regarding human rights, and that the "crimes" of Israel against the Palestinians demanded the attention of Western countries that professed to defend human rights throughout the world. The question of Palestine was, he said, also a yardstick by which it was possible to measure the treason of the heads of the Islamic regimes in the struggle for the sake of the Palestinians against the Zionists. He accused several Arab-Muslim governments which were supported by "imperialism" of turning Iran (instead of Palestine) into the most important regional issue (Fars, May 15, 2016).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks

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Spotlight on Iran

April 24 – May 8, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force (Tasnim News, May 2, 2016).

Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force (Tasnim News, May 2, 2016).

IRGC fighter Qorban Mostafa Arefi, killed in Syria (ABNA, May 1, 2016).

IRGC fighter Qorban Mostafa Arefi, killed in Syria (ABNA, May 1, 2016).

Syrian tribal leaders meet with Ali-Akbar Velayati (Tasnim News, April 27, 2016).

Syrian tribal leaders meet with Ali-Akbar Velayati (Tasnim News, April 27, 2016).

Hojjat-ul-Islam Tabataba'I Ashkazari (Dana.ir, May 1, 2016).

Hojjat-ul-Islam Tabataba'I Ashkazari (Dana.ir, May 1, 2016).

The chairman of the Iranian Shaheed Foundation meets with the leader of Hezbollah (ABNA, April 27, 2016).

The chairman of the Iranian Shaheed Foundation meets with the leader of Hezbollah (ABNA, April 27, 2016).

"Thank you, Soleimani" (Facebook, May 2, 2016).

Ramadan Shallah at a meeting with Ali Khamenei (Website of the supreme leader, May 1, 2016).

Ramadan Shallah at a meeting with Ali Khamenei (Website of the supreme leader, May 1, 2016).


Main Points
  • The deputy chief of staff of the Iranian army said the deployment of regular Iranian army forces to Syria had been authorized by the supreme leader and would continue as long as needed.
  • At least fifteen additional Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters were killed in Syria during the past two weeks. Most of them died fighting in the recent fierce battles south of the Syrian city of Aleppo. During the battles the Syrian rebels took control of the village of Khan Tuman, southwest of the city.
  • Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Hojjat-ul-Islam Tabataba'I Ashkazari as his personal representative in Syria.
  • The Majlis [Iranian parliament] passed a law enabling the government to grant Iranian citizenship to families of non-Iranian "martyrs" killed fighting for Iran in Syria and Iraq.
  • Senior Iranian officials have criticized the violent protests held by the supporters of Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr who stormed and temporarily took over the Iraqi parliament building.
  •  In response to anti-Iranian slogans shouted by Iraqi demonstrators during a protest in Baghdad, pro-Iranian Internet users launched a social network campaign to show their esteem for Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force. Soleimani recently toured the region of Aleppo (northwestern Syria).
  • A Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) delegation headed by its leader, Ramadan Shallah, recently paid a visit to Tehran and met with senior Iranian officials, including the supreme leader. The Iranians reiterated Iran's commitment to continuing aid to the Palestinians.

 

General Information
  • Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, said ISIS was on the verge of collapse, both ideologically and operationally. He said he hoped the coming year would see the end of the organization. He added that if the Syrian government fell, the entire region would fall to the radical Sunni Islamic organizations, ties between Iran and the "resistance front" and ties between Lebanon and Palestine would cut off, and Hezbollah in Lebanon would be under siege.
  • Regarding the situation in Iraq, Masjedi said that Iraq had also come close to falling to ISIS. He said that only by virtue of the IRGC support to the Iraqi army had extensive regions in Iraq (with the exception of the Mosul region and parts of Al-Anbar Province) been liberated from ISIS control and security restored. He added that today the Syrian and Iraqi fronts were Iran's front lines (Tasnim News, May 2, 2016).
  • The Majlis passed a law allowing the government to grant Iranian citizenship to the families of non-Iranian "martyrs" who had died fighting in for Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and afterwards (Defa Press, May 2, 2016). The law's primary objective was to ensure the status of the families of Shi'ite fighters (especially Afghans and Pakistanis) killed in recent years fighting in the ranks of the IRGC in the Syrian civil war and in the campaign against ISIS in Iraq.
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • At least 15 IRGC fighters were killed during the past two weeks. most of them died in the fierce battles fought in recent days to the south of Aleppo between forces of the Assad regime and supporters of the rebel organizations. The rebels, among them Al-Nusra Front, took control of the village of Khan Tuman, southwest of Aleppo on the Aleppo-Damascus road. At the end of last week the Iranian media reported that about 15 IRGC fighters had been killed or captured in the battles.
  • Seyyed Abdolkarim Mousavi, deputy chief of staff of Iran's army, said that the deployment of regular Iranian forces to Syria would continue as long as necessary. He added that since the beginning of the fighting in Syria the Iranian army had stated its readiness to be deployed in the campaign to defend Shi'ite shrines. That was made known to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and he agreed that some of the army's forces be deployed to Syria (Fars, April 25, 2016).
  • Hossein Jaberi Ansari, a spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, condemned the statement made by American President Obama about his intention to commit 250 American special operations forces to Syria to help combat ISIS. Ansari said that at the beginning of the Syrian crisis Iran had stated that any foreign intervention in Syria without Syrian government coordination would lead to an escalation (Press TV, April 25, 2016).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, international advisor to the supreme leader, said that Syrian President Assad had to complete his term of office. He said Iran supported the legal Syrian government adding that Assad had been elected two years ago for a seven-year term, which he should serve to its end (Tasnim News, April 27, 2016).
  • Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs, speaking at Allameh Tabataba'i University in Tehran, said that without the actions of the Iranian security forces, ISIS would today be capable of carrying out terrorist attacks in the Tehran metro stations.
  • Regarding the situation in Syria, Abdollahian said that without Iran's support of Syria, Damascus would have fallen to the terrorists. He stressed the importance of Syria's territorial integrity for Iran, adding that at the current time there were no Iranian "fighting forces" in Syria, only "advisors" deployed by the IRGC and regular army. Some of the advisors, he said, secured the Shi'ite shrines in Syria, and without them the shrines would be in ruins. He also said that Iran was prepared to send additional advisors to Syria if necessary. (ISNA, April 27, 2016).
  • A delegation of Syrian tribal leaders paid a visit to Iran and met with senior Iranian officials, including Ali-Akbar Velayati, international advisor to the supreme leader; and Mohammad Hassan Akhtari, chairman of the Ahl al-Bayt World Assembly. The Iranians stressed Iran's support for President Assad's Syrian regime and the fight against the takfiri groups operating in the country. Velayati was asked by one of the tribal leaders about statements made by Mehdi Ta'eb, an Iranian cleric affiliated with Iran's radical right, who had referred to Syria as an "Iranian province." Velayati said the remark did not reflect Iran's official position (ABNA, April 26; Tasnim News, April 27, 2016).
  • Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Hojjat-ul-Islam Tabataba'I Ashkazari as his representative in Syria. Ashkazari held various positions in the religious establishment, including in the Islamic Propagation Organization, providing religious instruction and delivering Friday prayers (Dana.ir, May 1, 2016).
  • Hojjat ul-Islam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi, chairman of the Iranian Shaheed Foundation, met in Beirut with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Mohammad Fathali, Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, was also present at the meeting, as were several senior Hezbollah officials. At the meeting they discussed regional and Lebanese developments. While in Lebanon Ali Shahidi also met with Lebanese Prime Minister Tammam Salam, and speaker of the parliament Nabih Berri. In addition, he paid a visit to the house of Imad Mughnieh, a senior Hezbollah terrorist operative assassinate in 2008 (Modafeon.blog.ir, April 27, 2016).
  • The Iranian Shaheed Foundation was established in 1980 during the Iran-Iraq War to support the families of the killed and wounded. It has a branch in Lebanon that supports Hezbollah and a Palestinian branch, also located in Lebanon. The Foundation and its branches were designated as sponsors of terrorism by the American Treasury Department in 2007 because they provide financial support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the PIJ.
  • On May 4, 2016, Ali-Akbar Velayati, international advisor to the supreme leader, went to Beirut, where he met with senior Lebanese officials and participated in a conference of the International Union of Resistance clerics (Asr-e Iran, May 4, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati told Jan Kubis, the UN special envoy to Iraq who was visiting Tehran, that the conspiracy of the West and some of the Arab states to divide regional countries, among them Syria and Iraq, would never come to fruition. As to the worsening political crisis in Iraq, Velayati said the political situation was sensitive and that a great effort would be required to institute democracy and establish stable government institutions, because Iraq had no experience with a democratic tradition. He indirectly criticized the violent protest initiated the previous week by supporters of Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who stormed and temporarily took over the Iraqi parliament building. He said Iraqis would fight against every infraction of law and security undertaken by any group. He said Iran supported the preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity and the restoration of stability and security.
  • At his weekly press conference, Hossein Jaberi Ansari, a spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, referred to the political crisis in Iraq. He said Iran was prepared to promote a dialogue between the various political factions in Iraq to settle their differences. He called on all the political factions to show restraint and create an atmosphere conducive to resolving the various issues facing Iraq through dialogue and political understanding. He added that Iran's position was that preserving political achievements and the rule of law would ensure stability, development and Iraq's national unity (Press TV, May 2, 2016).
  • This past week pro-Iranian web users, primarily in Iraq, launched a social network campaign called "Thank you, Soleimani." Its objective, according to those who initiated it, was to acknowledge their appreciation of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, for his actions and support of the campaign to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
  • The campaign, launched with direct Iranian encouragement or guidance, is meant to counterbalance the anti-Iranian slogans shouted during the rallies held by thousands of Iraqis protesting corruption in the government and demanding reforms. The demonstrators protested Iranian attempts to meddle in Iraq's internal political developments. The slogans shouted by Shi'ites, some of them supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr, indicated that even some Iraqi Shi'ites had reservations about Iranian meddling in the country's internal affairs.
  • Soleimani himself reportedly visited Aleppo area in Syria in recent days to supervise the battlefront (ABNA, May 4, 2016).
  • Sources in Iraqi Kurdistan reported Iranian attempts to mediate the violent conflicts that broke out again between the Shi'ite militias and the Kurdish fighters in Tuz Khurmatu (south-central Iraq, south of Kirkuk) in Salah ad-Din Province. According to reports in the Kurdish media, Iranian representatives were holding talks with senior commanders of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Iran-supported Shi'ite militias in an effort to have the two sides reach an agreement (Rudaw, April 27, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • A PIJ delegation headed by organization head Ramadan Abdallah Shallah paid a visit to Iran last week. The delegation met with senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, chairman of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani, chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani. The Iranians and PIJ delegates discussed developments in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The Iranians reiterated their country's commitment to continue its support for the Palestinians. Khamenei told Shallah that in the current situation defending Palestine  was a symbol of defending Islam (IRNA, May 1 and 2, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Yemen
  • The Iranian embassy in Kuwait denied reports in the daily newspaper Al-Watan that the embassy was in contact with the Houthi Shi'ite delegation sent to Kuwait as part of negotiations between the groups fighting in Yemen. The embassy said in a statement that the claim made by the paper, that Iranian advisors were allegedly helping the Houthi delegation conduct negotiations, was baseless (IRNA, May 2, 2016).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

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Spotlight on Iran

April 10 –21, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Captain Mohsen Qitaslou from Special Forces Brigade 65, killed in the fighting in Syria.

Captain Mohsen Qitaslou from Special Forces Brigade 65, killed in the fighting in Syria.

Ali Bayat (from a Facebook page affiliated with the IRGC, April 16, 2016).

Ali Bayat (from a Facebook page affiliated with the IRGC, April 16, 2016).

Amir Ahmad-Reza Pourdastan (Tasnim News, April 17, 2016)

Amir Ahmad-Reza Pourdastan (Tasnim News, April 17, 2016)

Graffiti written by an IRGC soldier in Syria reading,

Graffiti written by an IRGC soldier in Syria reading, "Here sleeps someone who wants to destroy Israel" (IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel, April 17, 2016).

ISIS pictures show a wide variety of weapons, ammunition, Iranian documents and equipment written in Persian and English (Bellingcat.com, April 16, 2016).

ISIS pictures show a wide variety of weapons, ammunition, Iranian documents and equipment written in Persian and English (Bellingcat.com, April 16, 2016).

Qasem Soleimani at a meeting of commanders with the supreme leader (Website of the supreme leader, April 10, 2016).

Qasem Soleimani at a meeting of commanders with the supreme leader (Website of the supreme leader, April 10, 2016).


Main Points
  • For the first time since regular Iranian army forces began deploying in Syria, seven special force officers were killed. In addition, during the past two weeks at least six more Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters were killed.
  • The Iranian commander of the ground forces said that deploying Iranian "advisors" from the regular army and the IRGC was carried out in accordance with requests from the Syrian government, and that the activities of the Iranian fighters in Syria would continue at full strength.
  • The Western media reported that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, paid another visit to Moscow. The Kremlin denied the reports.
  • Iraqi sources reported that Qasem Soleimani visited Baghdad last week following the deteriorating political crisis between the Iraqi prime minister and parliament.
  • The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) strongly criticized Iran and accused it of "continuing support for terrorism" and meddling in the internal affairs of regional countries.
  • Jordan recalled its ambassador to Tehran for consultations, claiming Iran was meddling in the internal affairs of Arab states.

 

General Information
  • At the end of the conference of organization heads in Istanbul, the OIC issued strong criticism of Iran, claiming it provided ongoing support for terrorism and meddled in the internal affairs of regional countries, among them Syria and Yemen. A few days later Jordan joined the Gulf States and recalled its ambassador from Iran, also claiming Iran was meddling in the internal affairs of Arab states.
  • The Iranian media responded to the OIC's announcement by harshly criticizing the organization. The Asr-e Iran website posted an op-ed piece on April 17, 2016, claiming that the fact most of the Islamic states had condemned Iran should be considered a warning to Iran about its relations with them.
  • The policy followed by some of the Islamic states, especially Saudi Arabia, is the outcome of their extremist anti-Shi'ite perspective. Egypt under President Mohamed Morsi, himself a member of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, reinforced the anti-Iranian attitude. Other Islamic stats, such as Azerbaijan, Malaysia, Tunisia, Senegal and others, are secular, making it difficult to institute relations with them on a religious basis.
  • In reality, almost all of the Islamic states prefer relations with the West or with Saudi Arabia to relations with Iran. That can be seen by the position they take regarding the Iran-UAE conflict over the three disputed islands in the Persian Gulf, and their support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Therefore, according to the op-ed piece of April 17, Iran should reconsider its relations with the Muslim countries.
  • On April 17 the conservative Tabnak website claimed that the announcement issued by the OIC reflected Saudi Arabia's efforts to collaborate with Turkey in promoting an anti-Iranian initiative to prevent Iran from widening its regional influence. According to Tabnak, Iran knew in advance there would be an initiative to pass an anti-Iranian resolution during the conference, and should therefore not have sent its president and foreign minister as participants, sending instead a lower-echelon representative. Furthermore, President Rouhani should have postponed his trip to Ankara and not met with Turkish President Erdogan after the conference in Istanbul had ended.
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • For the first time since regular units of the Iranian army were deployed to Syria, seven special force officers were killed. Among them were officers from Special Forces Brigades 45, 65 and 258, and an officer from Brigade 388.
  • It was the first time since the Iran-Iraq War that fighters from the regular Iranian army were killed fighting in combat beyond the borders of Iran.
  • In addition to the regular army forces killed in Syria during the past two weeks, at least 6 more IRGC fighters were killed. Among them were Ali Bayat, who according to the Iranian media was an Iranian officer in the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade, which operates in Syria under IRGC supervision.
  • In his first reference to the regular Iranian army fighters killed in Syria, Amir Ahmad-Reza Pourdastan, commander of the Iranian army ground forces, said they were killed south of Aleppo in a massive attack carried out by Al-Nusra Front and other Islamic rebel groups.
  • Pourdastan added that fighters from several special force units, among them the 65th Brigade, had recently been deployed on "advisory missions" in Syria alongside the IRGC forces already operating in the country. He said that it was the duty of Islamic Republic soldiers to carry out every mission demanded of them regardless of where (Mashreq News, April 12, 2016).
  • Interviewed by Iran's Al-Alam TV, Pourdastan claimed Iran had not send any Iranian army unit to Syria, only "advisors" for military guidance, in accordance with requests made by the Syrian government. He said that ISIS and Al-Nusra Front did not honor the ceasefire in northern and southern Syria, and therefore the activities of the Iranian forces in Syria would continue at full strength, as they had in the past. The coordination between Iran, Russia and Syria would also continue as in the past, he said, despite the partial withdrawal of Russian forces (Tasnim News, April 17, 2016).
  • In the meantime, Yusef Qorbani, commander of the army's airborne base in Kermanshah Province, said airborne personnel  had also been sent to Syria as "advisors" (Mehr News Agency, April 14, 2016).
  • On April 10, 2016, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency criticized the covert burial of Afghan fighters killed in Syria. According to the report, in recent weeks the social networks posted a number of reports about fighters from the Fatemiyoun Brigade (a brigade of Afghans fighting in Syria under the direction of the IRGC) who had been killed in Syria. They were buried in the section of the Tehran cemetery reserved for unknown soldiers after their bodies could not be identified once they had been returned from Syria to Iran.
  • The news agencies criticized the fact that no effort had allegedly been made to locate their families in Afghanistan and to inform them that their relatives had been buried. That was apparently done to prevent "anti-Iranian propaganda."
  • In ISIS's recent attack on the city of Khanasir, southeast of Aleppo, it gained control of a large quantity of weapons manufactured in Iran. ISIS pictures show a wide variety of weapons, ammunition, Iranian documents and equipment written in Persian and English (Bellingcat.com, April 16, 2016).
  •  On April 15, 2016, Fox News reported that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, had arrived in Moscow for a 48-hour visit. According to Fox, he planned to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss developments in Syria. The Kremlin denied the report and claimed Putin had no meeting planned with Soleimani.
  • Ali Larijani, speaker of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament), sent a communiqué to Syrian President Bashar Assad congratulating him on the elections held for the Syrian parliament on April 13, 2016. He wrote that the broad participation of Syrian civilians in the election, despite the efforts of "terrorist groups" to prevent it from being held, was proof of their absolute support for the Syrian regime as "a symbol of the resistance, steadfastness and independence" (Asr-e Iran, April 18, 2016).
  • Amir Khojasteh, a member of the Majlis, said Iran was planning to renew Iranian pilgrimages to Shi'ite holy places in Syria, which had been stopped following the deterioration of the security situation there. Khojasteh, who recently participated in a delegation of Majlis members to Syria and Lebanon, said the situation in Damascus was currently secure and that pilgrimages to Syria could be renewed in the near future.
  • Regarding the visit of the Majlis members to Lebanon, Khojasteh said that the delegation had met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah for six hours. During the meeting they discussed regional matters. The members of the delegation also met with members of the Lebanese government and parliament, and assured them of Iran's willingness to support the "resistance front" and provide the Lebanese government with military aid. According to Khojasteh, the delegation visited south Lebanon and was impressed by Hezbollah's capabilities against Israel. He added that Iran had no "red line" regarding military aid to Lebanon in its war against "the Zionist regime and takfiri organizations" (IRNA, April 11, 2016).
  • The Iranian foreign ministry condemned Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's declaration that the Golan Heights would remain under Israeli sovereignty forever. Hossein Jaberi Ansari, a spokesman for the foreign ministry, said that the Golan Heights were occupied territory that belonged to Syria and had to be returned to Syria. He said Israel's decision regarding the Golan Heights was a clear violation of international law, and he called on the international community to struggle against "the provocative and expansionist measures taken by Israel" (Fars, April 18, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • Iraqi sources reported that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, had visited Baghdad the previous week and held talks with senior political officials regarding Iraq's political crisis (Alsharqiyah, April 17, 2016). During the past two weeks the crisis between Iraqi Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi and the Iraqi parliament over the prime minister's proposed reforms has deteriorated .
  • An Iranian delegation is expected to arrive in the near future in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, to discuss the possibility of exporting oil from Iraqi Kurdistan through Iran to the Persian Gulf. Abdulla Akreyi, who is in charge of Iranian affairs in Iraqi Kurdistan, said that during the past two years Iran and the Kurdish government had held talks about the possibility of exporting oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to Iran. During the talks the Iranian representatives expressed willingness to import Kurdish crude oil and refine it in the refineries at Kermanshah and Tabriz in return for exporting Iranian gas to Kurdistan (Rudaw.net, April 13, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Yemen
  • Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs, said that Tehran supported negotiations between the fighting groups in Yemen, which were supposed to begin in Kuwait. He said that Iran supported a Yemeni dialogue for a political agreement. The resistance of the Yemeni people to the Saudi Arabian military attacks, he said, and the increasing activities of terrorists in the country proved that a national dialogue without foreign intervention was the only solution to the crisis in Yemen (Fars, April 19, 2016).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

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Spotlight on Iran

March 27 – April 10, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the IRGC (Tasnim News, April 5, 2016).

Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the IRGC (Tasnim News, April 5, 2016).

IRGC officer Mashollah Shamseh, killed in Syria (Iranian Telegram channel, April 3, 2016).

IRGC officer Mashollah Shamseh, killed in Syria (Iranian Telegram channel, April 3, 2016).

Special forces' Brigade 65 in training (Tasnim News, April 4, 2016).

Special forces' Brigade 65 in training (Tasnim News, April 4, 2016).

Calendar for the new Iranian year with pictures of IRGC fighters killed in Syria (Iranian Telegram channel, April 4, 2016).

Calendar for the new Iranian year with pictures of IRGC fighters killed in Syria (Iranian Telegram channel, April 4, 2016).

Recent photo of Qasem Soleimani in the Iranian city of Mashhad (Iranian Telegram channel, March 28, 2016).

Recent photo of Qasem Soleimani in the Iranian city of Mashhad (Iranian Telegram channel, March 28, 2016).

Hossein Amir Abdollahian (Mehr News Agency, April 1, 2016).

Hossein Amir Abdollahian (Mehr News Agency, April 1, 2016).

Morteza Abedini, Iranian chargé d' affaires in Yemen (Mehr News Agency, April 2, 2016).

Morteza Abedini, Iranian chargé d' affaires in Yemen (Mehr News Agency, April 2, 2016).


Main Points
  • Speaking before commanding officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari reiterated Iran's support for the Syrian regime, Lebanon, the Palestinians and Iran's allies in Yemen. He said the IRGC was waiting for the order to respond to the "impudence and stupid behavior" of regimes like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
  • This past week at least ten more IRGC fighters, two of them officers, were killed in the Aleppo region of Syria, an increase in the number of Iranians killed in comparison with previous weeks.
  • A high-ranking officer in the regular Iranian army ground forces reported that fighters from special forces Brigade 65 and other units had so far been deployed to Syria. The move reflected a change in Iran's combat strategy in Syria, which until recently had been based on IRGC fighters. However, the deployment will not make a significant change in the fighting on the ground. Apparently the change was related to the rivalry between the IRGC and the regular army over prestige.
  • Senior Iranian officials congratulated the heads of the Syrian regime following the liberation of the Syrian city of Palmyra from ISIS.
  • The US Navy said in a statement that it had intercepted a weapons ship in the Arabian Sea en route from Iran to the Shi'ite Houthi rebels in Yemen. It was the third time in recent months an Iranian ship apparently carrying arms for the rebels in Yemen had been seized.

 

General Information

  • Speaking before the Supreme Council of IRGC commanding officers, IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari reiterated Iran's support for the Syrian regime, Lebanon, the Palestinians and Iran's allies in Yemen. He strongly criticized the leaders of some Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, whom he claimed supported Israel and the killing of innocent victims in Yemen and Palestine, endangering the honor the Arab nation. He said that in the future the people of the Arab states would wreak vengeance on leaders for the policies they pursued, and that the IRGC was waiting for the order to respond to the "impudence and stupid behavior" of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
  • Jafari said Iran supported the Syrian regime and Syria's territorial integrity, and would never permit the division of even one Muslim country. Iran, he said, regarded such a strategy as British, American and Zionist, and was intended to weaken the Muslim nations. He added that Iran would not abandon the people of Palestine and Yemen and would continue supporting the Palestinians with all of its capabilities and power (Tasnim News, April 5, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • This past week at least ten more IRGC fighters, two of them officers, were killed in the Aleppo region of Syria. Several Pakistanis and Afghan fighting in the ranks of the IRGC in Syria were also killed. Their deaths marked an increase in the number of Iranians killed in comparison with previous weeks. The deaths can be explained by the recent confrontations in the Aleppo region between supporters of the Syrian regime and the rebel organizations, especially Al-Nusra Front, and by the Al-Nusra Front and other organizations' takeover of the town of Al-Eis, south of Aleppo.
  • Amir Ali Arasteh, Deputy Chief Liaison of the Iranian Army's Ground Forces, interviewed by Tasnim News on April 4, 2016, said that commandos from the regular Iranian army's special forces' Brigade 65 and other units had recently been sent to Syria as "advisors."
  • At an Iranian army special forces' graduation exercise last month, Amir Ali Arasteh said special force fighters and snipers from the regular army's rapid response force might, in certain circumstances, be deployed to Syria and Iraq. So far only IRGC fighters have been deployed to fight in Syria and Iraq, and not the regular army. Deploying regular army fighters would signal a change in Iran's combat strategy, but would not make a significant change in the fighting on the ground. It is likely that deploying regular army commandos is intended to improve its internal status vis-à-vis the IRGC, which so far have borne the burden of the fighting.
  • On March 28, 2016, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation dealing with developments in Syria. On March 28 Iran's ISNA news agency reported that President Rouhani had stressed the importance of continued collaboration and coordination between Russia and Iran to pursue the struggle against the terrorist organizations operating in Syria. He added that only the Syrians could decide the future of their country.
  • Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, congratulated President Assad on the liberation of the city of Palmyra from ISIS, calling it a "historic victory." In his communiqué to Assad, Shamkhani wrote that the determination of the Syrian people, government and army to liberate the territories occupied by the terrorist groups was praiseworthy and a source of pride, and he expressed Iran's commitment to continue its support for Syria and the "axis of resistance" (Fars, March 28, 2016).
  • Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs, also congratulated Syria after the liberation of Palmyra. Interviewed by the Iranian TV channel Al-Alam on March 27, 2016, he said that in the future there would be no place for terrorists in the region and that with Iran's determined support, Syria would continue its struggle against terrorism.
  • Hossein Dehqan, Iranian minister of defense, held a phone conversation with Fahd Jassem al-Freij, the Syrian minister of defense, to congratulate him on retaking Palmyra. Al-Freij told Dehqan that the support of Syria's friends, especially Iran, had played an important role in the victory. He asked him to convey the esteem of the Syrian armed forces to the Iranian people and the supreme leader. Dehqan stressed the need for continued military activity to "uproot the cancer of terrorism" from the region and liberate the other locations occupied by terrorists (Defa Press, March 29, 2016).
  • IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Jafari said conditions were currently good for the "resistance front" in Syria. Speaking to journalists in the city of Gilan, he said that after the liberation of Palmyra emphasis would be put on continuing to repel ISIS. He added that coordination between Russia and the resistance front would continue after the ceasefire in Syria (Fars, March 28, 2016).
  • An Iranian parliamentary delegation headed by Amir Khojasteh, deputy speaker of the Majlis (Iranian parliament), paid a visit to Lebanon where they met with senior Lebanese officials. The delegation members stressed the need to expand parliamentary relations between the two countries, and also stressed Iran's support for the "resistance front" against Israel. They also said Iran was prepared to provide Lebanon with military support (IRNA, March 31, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • Jawad al-Attar, formerly a member of the Iraqi parliament, said in an interview that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, was advising the Shi'ite militias in Iraq. He said he was not aware of any upcoming meeting planned for Soleimani and representatives of the Shi'ite militias operating in Iraq, but that since ISIS's occupation of Mosul Soleimani had provided the Shi'ite militias with advice and guidance (Ycr.ir, April 2, 2016).
  • Al-Attar's statements follow an Iraqi army announcement issued at the end of March, according to which a campaign had begun to liberate Nineveh Province and the city of Mosul from ISIS. In February Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi said he intended to integrate the Iraqi Shi'ite militias [operating under the aegis of the IRGC] into the campaign to liberate the city. After the liberation of the city of Ramadi at the end of December 2015, Iran tried to emphasize the involvement of the IRGC and Iraqi Shi'ite militias, although the liberation was in fact led by the Iraqi army's special forces in collaboration and coordination with the Western coalition forces fighting ISIS in Iraq.
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs, said Iran would continue to support the Palestinians. In a statement issued for Palestinian "Land Day," he said support for Palestine and the struggle against terrorism were two important regional issues and that the regional "terrorist crises" should not distract the Muslim world from the issue of Palestine and Jerusalem.
  • He added that the "Zionist terrorist regime" was the main source of regional insecurity and that the continuation of the settlements and the "Judaizing" of Jerusalem increased the hatred of regional people for the conduct of the "occupiers of Palestine." The third intifada of the Palestinian people, he said, was the "natural response" of the original proprietors of Palestine to the continuing aggression of the "Zionist regime" (Mehr News Agency, April 1, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Yemen and the Persian Gulf
  • The US Navy said in a statement that on March 28, 2016, it had intercepted a weapons ship in the Arabian Sea en route from Iran to the Shi'ite Houthi rebels in Yemen. The ship was carrying a cache of weapons that included 1,500 Kalashnikov assault rifles, 200 RPG launchers and 21 .50-caliber submachine guns (Washington Post, April 4, 2016). It was the third time in recent months an Iranian arms ship had been seized. On February 27, 2016, the Australian Royal Navy intercepted a craft about 300 kilometers off the coast of Oman en route to Somalia carrying nearly 2,000 Kalashnikov rifles and 100 RPG launchers. On March 20, 2016, the French Navy intercepted an Iranian ship carrying 2,000 AK-47 assault rifles, 64 Dragunov sniper rifles, nine anti-tank missiles and other military equipment.
  • In September 2015 Arab coalition forces fighting in Yemen stopped an Iran fishing boat off the coast of Oman also carrying weapons for the Houthi rebels. The boat was carrying a large quantity of weapons, including shells, anti-tank missiles and weapons systems.
  • In an interview for the first anniversary of the Saudi Arabian attack on Yemen, Morteza Abedini, the Iranian chargé d' affaires, said the position of the Ansarullah, the Shi'ite Houthi movement in Yemen, had become such that no regional army was capable of confronting it. He said the Saudi attack on Yemen would have no results other than the destruction of the Yemeni infrastructure, the killing of almost 27,000 civilians and a severe shortage of food.
  • He rejected claims of the Saudi forces and their coalition allies regarding the liberation of the provinces in southern Yemen, saying the Saudis had failed in Yemen despite their great investment in the military campaign. He said most of the Yemenis were furious about the Saudi attack, evident in the demonstrations held for its first anniversary. Yemeni hatred for Saudi Arabia, he claimed, would pass from generation to generation and lead to a decrease in Saudi influence (Mehr News Agency, April 2, 2016).

[1]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

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Spotlight on Iran

March 13 – 27, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Qasem Soleimani on vacation for the Iranian New Year (Nowruz (Iranian Telegram messaging app).

Qasem Soleimani on vacation for the Iranian New Year (Nowruz (Iranian Telegram messaging app).

Hassan Rouhani in Tehran (Press TV, March 12, 2016).

Hassan Rouhani in Tehran (Press TV, March 12, 2016).

Lieutenant Colonel Mohsen Mandani, killed in Syria (ABNA, March 22, 2016).

Lieutenant Colonel Mohsen Mandani, killed in Syria (ABNA, March 22, 2016).

Hassan Firouzabadi (Sepah News, March 15, 2016)

Hassan Firouzabadi (Sepah News, March 15, 2016)

Kamal Kharrazi (Mehr News Agency, March 19, 2016).

Kamal Kharrazi (Mehr News Agency, March 19, 2016).

Al-Saberin logo

Al-Saberin logo


Main Points
  • At least four more Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters have been killed in Syria, one of them a lieutenant colonel.
  • Responding publicly to Russia's decision to withdraw some of its forces from Syria, senior Iranian officials tried to minimize its importance, stressing that the decision would not influence the continuing collaboration of Iran, Russia and Syria.
  • The Hamas ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip ordered Al-Saberin movement, which operates under Iranian aegis, to close the offices of its charitable association on the grounds that its activities were political and funded by Iran.
  • Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, meeting with a Hamas delegation in Tehran last month, said Iran's position on the question of Palestine had not changed after the nuclear agreement, and that Iran was determined to continue its support of the Palestinians. However, he expressed dissatisfaction with recent criticism of Iran from senior Hamas officials.
  • Saudi Arabia arrested nine Iranian nationals on accusations of involvement in terrorism. 

 

Overview
  • Speaking in the city of Kerman, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, rejected claims made by Iran's rivals that its regional activity was "adventurous." He said it was Saudi Arabia that was behaving adventurously towards Islam and Iran, and that all of Iran's activities were meant to protect the lives and property of Muslims. He also said that Iran sought solidarity and brotherhood between Sunnis and Shi'ites and that it had never tried to covert Sunnis to Shi'a. He accused Iran's enemies of setting up radical (takfiri) Sunni organizations, ISIS among them, to defeat Iran and Shi'a Islam (IRNA, March 13, 2016).Speaking in Tehran for Iranian "Shaheed Day," Iranian President Hassan Rouhani defended Iran's military involvement in Syria and Iraq, saying the terrorist attacks on the shrines of Shi'a in both countries were considered by Iran as having crossed a red line. He said Iran would not stand for terrorists' attempts to harm the sites sacred to Shi'a regardless of where they were located, Iraq, Syria or any other country (Press TV, March 12, 2016).
  • Speaking at the graduation exercises of a training course for Iranian army special forces, Amir Ali Arasteh, deputy chief liaison of the Iranian army's ground forces, said the fighters of the special forces and snipers of the regular army's rapid intervention force could, in certain instances, be deployed to Syria and Iraq as "advisors" (Tasnim News, March 16, 2016). So far, only IRGC fighters have been deployed to Syria and Iraq, not soldiers in the regular army. Deploying them would signal a change in Iran's military strategy, but would be insufficient to cause a significant change in the situation on the ground. Amir Ali Arasteh's statement might reflect the desire of the regular army to become involved in the ongoing military campaigns in Syria and Iraq as a way of raising their status in Iran vis-à-vis the IRGC.
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • At least four more IRGC fighters were killed in Syria during the past two weeks, one of whom was a lieutenant colonel. The Iranian media also reported the deaths of several Afghan and Pakistani fighters of the Fatemiyoun and Zaynabioun Brigades, fighting in Syria under IRGC aegis.
  • Iranian officials publicly responded to the Russian decision to withdraw some of its forces from Syria in an attempt to minimize its importance. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, said the Russian decision was a "positive sign" and proof that Russia did not see an immediate need to use force to preserve the ceasefire in Syria. "We have to wait and see," he said (Press TV, March 15, 2016).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, international advisor to the supreme leader, after meeting with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faysal Mekdad in Tehran, said that reducing the number of Russian forces in Syria would not influence the collaboration of Iran, Russia, Syria and Hezbollah. He added that senior Russian officials, among them President Putin, had stated that if Russia limited the presence of its air force in Syria it would be able to renew and increase its involvement in the campaign against the terrorists, as necessary (IRIB, March 15, 2016).
  • Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, said that the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Syria had been planned in advance and was expected. He said Iranian and Russian support of Syria's army would continue even after the Russian withdrawal from regions where "terrorist groups" continued to threaten national security (Fars, March 16, 2016).
  • The Iranian media also dealt with the Russian withdrawal from Syria. A editorial published in the daily reform newspaper Arman on March 16, 2016, noted that the hasty and surprising Russian decision to withdraw its forces from Syria could indicate the Iranian-Russian partnership in Syria was "not strategic" and that Russian had made the decision based exclusively on its own interests.
  • Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, said that the demand of Saudi Arabia and the opposition groups in Syria to remove Bashar Assad from the presidency was dictated by the "Zionists" and would lead to an ISIS takeover of Syria. He added that only Syrian citizens had the right to decide who would lead them, and that political insistence on choosing or ousting a leader or head of state was undemocratic (Sepah News, March 15, 2016).
  • On March 19, 2016, Kamal Kharrazi, former Iranian foreign minister and today head of Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, met in Syria with President Bashar Assad. Kharrazi stressed that the Syrian people had to determine their own fate and that no foreign entity had the right to interfere in Syria's internal affairs. He also met with the heads of the Palestinian organizations operating in Syria (Mehr News Agency, March 19, 2016). From Syria Kharrazi went to Iraq where he met with Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi (ISNA, March 23, 2016).
  • On March 19, 2016, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, met in Turkey with Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Turkish foreign minister. They discussed bilateral affairs and regional developments. Zarif said the two countries had agreed on the need to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria, and to strengthen their cooperation (ISNA, March 19, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • The Hamas ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip ordered Al-Saberin movement, which operates under Iranian aegis, to close the offices of its charitable association Bakiyat Salihat on the grounds that its activities were political and it was funded by Iran. According to the ministry, its activities violated the law governing charitable associations. Bakiyat Salihat, which operates in the northern Gaza Strip, was established in 2004 to provide Gazans with humanitarian aid. The head of Al-Saberin movement in the Gaza Strip, Hisham Salem, issued a strong statement condemning the decision of Hamas' ministry of the interior and accusing it of political persecution and ignoring the humanitarian needs of the Gazan population. He said the movement intended to take all legal steps to revoke the decision (Asr-e Iran, March 14, 2016).
  •  Al-Saberin movement is a terrorist network established in 2004 by operatives who left the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It is affiliated with Hezbollah and Iran, which apparently finances its activities in the Gaza Strip. On December 16, 2015, it claimed responsibility for detonating an IED to attack an IDF patrol near the border security fence in the southern Gaza Strip. In July 2015 the Hamas administration in Gaza announced the dissolution of the movement, which ran a series of Shi'ite religious charitable associations funded by Iran, but the movement apparently continues its activities. Interviewed in January 2016, Al-Saberin leader Hisham Salem said the movement received money from Iran, but it was mainly intended to fund da'wah activities. He refused to say whether the movement also received military support from Iran, but did say movement activists did not receive salaries from the Islamic Republic (Ma'an, January 16, 2016).
  • Support for Al-Saberin is part of Iran's efforts to regain an important role in the Palestinian arena, given the ongoing crisis in its relations with Hamas since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.
  • In an interview with the French news network France24 on March 15, 2016, Khaled Mashaal, head of Hamas' political bureau, said Iran was no longer Hamas' greatest supporter, and that Hamas was trying to vary the sources of its support. According to Mashaal, who was also quoted by the Iranian media, Hamas' relations with Iran had not been completely cut off, but had deteriorated because of the Syrian civil war.
  • Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Mayadeen TV reported a recent meeting in Tehran of Hamas representatives and Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, held against the backdrop of continuing Hamas-Iran tensions.
  • According to the report, Soleimani expressed dissatisfaction with remarks critical of Iran made by several senior Hamas officials. He said that Iran's position on the question of Palestine had not changed either before or after the nuclear agreement, and that Iran's support of the Palestinians would have continued even if the sanctions imposed on Iran had been significantly increased.
  • He said that Iran had never agreed to discuss its Palestinian policies with the United States. He added that Iran was determined to continue its support of the Palestinians, even if at times its support was reduced somewhat because of financial or other considerations. He told the Hamas delegation that Iran did not object if other Muslim countries supported the "Palestinian resistance." According to Soleimani there was no internal disagreement in Iran over support for Palestine. He added that those who, a number of years ago, had reservations about Iran's support for Gaza or Lebanon [i.e., the reformist opposition, which had reservations about Iranian support for the Palestinians and Hezbollah at the expense of Iran's internal economic woes], were no longer relevant (Asr-e Iran, March 17, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Yemen and the Persian Gulf
  • The Saudi Arabian media reported that 13 Iranian nationals had been arrested on charges of involvement in terrorism. A Saudi security spokesman said that nine Iranian nationals had been arrested during the past two weeks and four others were already in jail. One of them had belonged to a 32-man network of civilians, most of them Saudis, who, according to the Saudi authorities, had spied for Iran in 2013, met with Iran intelligence agents in Iran and Lebanon and with Iranian diplomats in Riyadh and Jeddah, and provided Iran with classified military information about Saudi Arabia (Saudi Gazzette, March 21, 2016).
  • Amir Hossein Abdollahian, deputy Iranian foreign minister for the Arab states and Africa, said Iran was in favor of negotiations to end the war in Yemen. Meeting with Islamil Walad al-Sheikh Ahmad, the UN secretary general's envoy for Yemeni affairs, Abdollahian said he supported the secretary general's efforts to institute political talks between the rival sides in Yemen (Tasnim News, March 21, 2016).

* Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

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Encouragement for the Palestinian Terrorist Campaign through Financial Support

Published:

Press conference held in the Iranian embassy in Beirut where Mohammad Fateh Ali, Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, announced the proposed Iranian financial support. Also present was Osama Hamdan, in charge of Hamas' external relations.
Press conference held in the Iranian embassy in Beirut where Mohammad Fateh Ali, Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, announced the proposed Iranian financial support. Also present was Osama Hamdan, in charge of Hamas' external relations. The sign in the background reads, "Press conference to implement the Tehran announcement regarding support for the Al-Quds intifada." The Arabic at the left reads, "Iran's embassy in Beirut" (YouTube, February 24, 2016).

Iranian Financial Aid: Objectives and Significance

1.   On February 24, 2016, the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon held a press conference in the Iranian embassy where he announced Iran's intention to give financial support to the so-called "Al-Quds intifada" (the name Hamas has given to the current Palestinian terrorist campaign). Iran will give $7,000 to the family of every shaheed and $30,000 to every family whose house is demolished. The total amount is estimated at about $2 million, so far.[1]

2.   The Iranian campaign has several objectives: one, to foment and further incite the Palestinian terrorist campaign against Israel by paying the families of shaheeds (a method used by Iran and Arab countries during the second intifada); two, to increase Iran's influence in the internal Palestinian arena, especially in view of Iran's political difficulties with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (originating from the Syrian civil war and the Sunni-Shi'ite schism); and three, to show the Sunni Arab world that it is Iran that is supporting the Palestinian people in their struggle against Israel.


3.   The Palestinian Authority (PA), aware of Iran's political-propaganda motives, responded with strong anti-Iranian criticism. Nabil Abu Rudeina, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas, said the PA objected to any attempt to circumvent its authority, and called on Iran to formally transfer the funds to the relevant Palestinian institutions dealing with shaheeds and prisoners. However, Hossein Sheikh al-Islam, advisor to the chairman of the Iranian parliament (the Majlis) for international affairs, made it clear Iran would not transfer the proposed funds through the PA because the PA, he said,had proved itself unreliable.

4.   The Iranians announced the funds would be transferred to the Palestinians by the Iranian Martyrs Foundation, established by Ayatollah Khomeini to support the families of Iranians killed during the Iran-Iraq War. It has a Palestinian branch operating in Lebanon which is supposed to transfer funds to deserving families (see Appendix B). Apparently, this time, as opposed to its former practice, Iran will transfer the funds directly though bank accounts and money changers, circumventing the PA.[2] Families were asked to fill in two online forms, one for the support of the family of a shaheed, and one for the support of a family whose house had been demolished (See Appendix A). They were asked to supply bank account numbers or the details of a money changer through which the funds could be sent. The Iranians probably chose that method to make it difficult for the PA to take countermeasures against Iranian move, which the PA considers as subversive.

The Iranians Announce the Transfer of Funds

5.   On February 24, 2016, Mohammad Fateh Ali, the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, held a press conference in the Iranian embassy where he announced Iran's support for the "Al-Quds intifada" and the families of the shaheeds. To show its support Iran would donate $7,000 to the family of every shaheed and $30,000 to every family whose house had been demolished by Israel.[3] The money will be transferred through the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation[4] (Paltoday, February 24, 2016). Mohammad Fateh Ali claimed the money was intended to help the Palestinian people remain on its land (Website of the Iranian embassy in Beirut, February 24, 2016).

6.   Present at the press conference were representatives of several Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Osama Hamdan, responsible for Hamas' external relations, and Abu Ahmed Fuad, deputy chairman of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Osama Hamdan thanked Iran for its support of the Palestinian people. He also said the new Palestinian generation was "a generation of shaheeds," and embodied a "strategic change" in the struggle against Israel (Paltoday, February 24, 2016).

Iranian Martyrs Foundation and Its Palestinian Branch as Financial Conduits

7.   The Iranian ambassador to Lebanon stated that the funds would be transferred to the families through the Iranian Martyrs Foundation. Hossein Sheikh al-Islam, Majlis advisor for international affairs, made it clear Iran would not transfer the funds through the PA because experience had shown the PA was unreliable. He said Iran would shortly transfer the funds "another way," and did not elaborate. He stressed the ties between Iran and the Palestinian organizations were very close and that Iran would not stop supporting the "Palestinian resistance," i.e., the Palestinian terrorist organizations (Alresala.net, February 27, 2016).

8.   The Iranian Martyrs Foundation, chosen as the conduit for the transfer of funds, was established by Ayatollah Khomeini to help the families of the dead and wounded in the Iran-Iraq War. It has a Lebanese branch which supports Hezbollah, and a Palestinian branch, also located in Lebanon, which transfers funds to the Palestinians. In 2007 the Iranian Martyrs Foundation and its Lebanese and Palestinian branches were designated as supporters of terrorism by the American Treasury Department because they provided funds for Hezbollah, Hamas and the PIJ.

9.   Two days after the press conference in the Iranian embassy the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation was quick to post a notice on its Arabic website entitled "Iran has not abandoned Palestine. The  project for support of the Al-Quds intifada and forms to complete." A link was provided to two forms to be completed by the Palestinian families wanting to receive financial support from Iran: one for funds for the families of shaheeds, and one forfunds for families whose houses had been demolished. The completed forms were to be emailed to the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation (Website of the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation, February 26, 2016). The speed with which the forms were posted on the Internet indicates the Iranians had prepared them in advance. That was part of the campaign to show Iran's support of the Palestinians and the current Palestinian terrorist campaign (For a translation of the forms see Appendix A).

The Public Iranian-PA Dispute

10.           The PA quickly responded to the Iranian announcement with harsh criticism. It was probably motivated by concern that the Iranians meant to advance their interests in the internal Palestinian arena and might strengthen the PA's enemies in Judea and Samaria (especially Hamas and the PIJ). Thus "unnamed sources in the PA leadership" told the Lebanese newspaper Al-Mustaqbal that the Iranian ambassador's announcement was another Iranian attempt to intervene in internal affairs of the Palestinians, like what Iran had already done in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain (Lebtime, February 28, 2016).

11. The following were initial reactions of figures affiliated with the PA and Fatah, and relatives of some of the shaheeds:

1)      Nabil Abu Rudeina, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas, said the PA knew nothing of funds donated by Iran to help Palestinian prisoners or families whose houses had been demolished by Israel.  He stressed that the PA opposed any attempt to circumvent its authority and made it clear that the PLO was the central legal institution of the Palestinian people (Wafa, February 26, 2016). As to the declaration of Sheikh al-Islam that Iran would not transfer the funds through the PA, Nabil Abu Rudeina said it would be preferable for Iran to transfer the funds officially to the [Palestinian] institutions dealing with shaheed and prisoner affairs. He added that the declarations of Sheikh al-Islam were unacceptable from the point of view of international law. He said Iran was intervening in internal Palestinian affairs and not serving the interests of the Palestinian struggle against Israel (Wafa, February 27, 2016).

2)      Jamal Muheisen, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, called on Iran to provide support for the families only through the PA. Otherwise, he claimed, Fatah's Revolutionary Council might take strict steps against Hamas (Dunia al-Watan, February 29, 2016).

3)      Abbas Zaki, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, welcomed Iranian aid and said Fatah thanked everyone who supported the Palestinian people through the PA or any other means (Al-Kofia Press, February 27, 2016). In response the PA rushed to issue a statement claiming that Abbas Zaki did not represent the PA or the PLO, and that the opinions he expressed were his own (Wafa, February 27, 2016).

4)      On February 29, 2016, Israeli TV's Channel 2 aired a report by Ohad Hamo with the initial responses of the families of shaheeds to the Iranian proposal. For example, As'ad Ali, the uncle of Muhammad Ali (a terrorist from the Shuafat refugee camp who carried out a stabbing attack at the Nablus Gate in the Old City of Jerusalem) said they welcomed all support, both financial and moral, from whatever source, unconditionally and without limitations. Sheikh Abdallah Alqam, one of the Shuafat refugee camp's leaders, detained by the Israel Police Force a number of times for incitement, claimed all donations would be welcome, but without conditions.[5] That, he claimed, was because no Palestinian institution had transferred funds to the families. The father of another Palestinian killed in a riot in the Shuafat refugee camp claimed the PA had still not transferred funds to him and that he would not object to any donation of money.

Sheikh Abdallah Alqam (Paltoday, July 1, 2012).
Sheikh Abdallah Alqam (Paltoday, July 1, 2012).

12. Despite the presence of Osama Hamdan, in charge of Hamas' external relations, at the press conference in Beirut where the announcement of the transfer of funds was made, so far Hamas has not yet publicly supported the Iranian proposal. That is because Hamas treads lightly in the intense conflict between Iran and its allies on the one hand, and the Saudi Arabian-led Sunni camp on the other. The problematic nature of over-identification with Iran was evident when Mahmoud al-Zahar, a senior Hamas figure, was interviewed by the Iranian TV channel Al-Ayam. He claimed Iran supported the "resistance" but added that Iran did not condition its support on forcing Hamas to join the "Iranian axis" (Safa, February 28, 2016).

13. Other responses were the following:

1) Kayedal-Ghoul, a member of the PFLP's political bureau, claimed Iran was determined to give genuine support to the intifada and the Palestinian people. He claimed the Iranian aid was genuine support for the Palestinian people and the families of the shaheeds, and opposed the policy [of others] working against the Palestinian cause (Cyberaman website, February 24, 2016).

2)  The Al-Saberin Movement in the Gaza Strip, affiliated with Hezbollah and Iran, welcomed the declaration of the Iranian ambassador. It praised the support Iran gave to the Palestinian stance against Israel and Iran's aid for the Al-Quds intifada (Official website of Al-Saberin, February 26, 2016).[6]

[1]According to the Palestinian media, during the "Al-Quds intifada" (that is, the current Palestinian terrorist campaign) 186 Palestinians (as of February 29, 2016). According to a Palestinian version, it began on October 4, 2015 (Dunia al-Watan and Al-Aqsa TV, February 29, 2016). At $7,000 times 186 shaheeds, the Iranians will pay $1,302,000 plus several hundred thousand dollars for current and future houses raised, bringing the estimated total to about $2 million so far.

[2]In the past the Iranian Martyrs Foundation transferred funds though charitable associations (based on a fatwah issued by Khomeini authorizing charity funds to be used to support the Palestinian struggle against Israel). During 2015 Iran transferred funds to the families of shaheeds in the Gaza Strip through the Al-Ansar Charity Association, affiliated with the PIJ. For further information, see the April 29, 2015 bulletin, "Iranian Support for Palestinian Terrorism: Funds Transferred to Gazan Shaheeds' Families by Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Affiliated Al-Ansar Charity Association," Appendix C.

[3]The sum earmarked for the family of every shaheed killed during the current Palestinian terrorist campaign is far greater than what the Iranians paid the 5,000 families of shaheeds in the Gaza Strip killed since the outbreak of the second intifada. According to the Shaheed Foundation, each family received an average of $400. The families of Operation Protective Edge shaheeds (about 2,200) also received about $400. The relatively high sum of $7,000 is intended as an incentive for Palestinians to carry out terrorist attacks and to boost Iran's political-media interests.

[4]The Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation is called "The Shaheed Institution – Palestine." In this report we use the expression "The Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation."

[5]Sheikh Abdallah Alqam is from the Shuafat refugee camp, northeast of Jerusalem. He is chairman of the Clan Reconciliation Committee for greater Jerusalem. He also delivers sermons in the mosques. He was detained a number of times by the Israel Police Force for anti-Israeli incitement. His entrance into the Temple Mount precinct was also prohibited a number of times.

[6]Al-Saberin (the "Al-Saberin Movement for the Victory of Palestine") is a terrorist organization established in the Gaza Strip in 2014 by PIJ defectors. It is affiliated with Hezbollah and Iran, which apparently finance its activities. On December 16, 2015, it claimed responsibility for attacking an IDF patrol with an IED near the border security fence in the southern Gaza Strip (Website of Al-Saberin, December 18, 2015).

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