Tag Archives: Iran

Ramazan Sharif (source: Shargh)

As Rowhani is about to assume the presidency of Iran, the spokesman for the Revolutionary Guards talks about that organization’s interaction with the government

This week Revolutionary Guards Spokesman Ramazan Sharif gave an extensive, rare interview to the reformist daily Shargh. In the interview, the high-ranking officer discussed the Revolutionary Guards’ interaction with past governments, their involvement in politics and economy, the role they played in suppressing the 2009 riots, and their attitude towards president-elect Hassan Rowhani.

Sharif denied claims of Revolutionary Guards support for Ahmadinejad and said that the organization faced greater difficulties than before during his presidency,concerning their involvement in economic projects. The spokesman rejected criticism leveled at the Revolutionary Guards over their growing involvement in politics and economy, saying that the organization intends to help the new government within the framework of the law.

The timing of the interview—just as Rowhani is about to assume office—is not coincidental, and neither is the spokesman’s decision to give it to the reformist daily Shargh. The interview reflects what may be some of the Revolutionary Guards’ concerns over the consequences of Rowhani’s election for president on domestic and foreign policy. It may also be the Revolutionary Guards’ way of sending the incoming president a message to deter him from pursuing a policy that, as far as they are concerned, could jeopardize the regime’s vital interests and their own as well.

This week Revolutionary Guards Spokesman Ramazan Sharif gave an extensive, rare interview to the reformist daily Shargh. In the interview, the high-ranking officer discussed the Revolutionary Guards’ interaction with the governments of Iran since the Islamic revolution, the organization’s involvement in politics and economy, the role it played in suppressing the 2009 riots, and its attitude towards president-elect Hassan Rowhani (http://www.sharghdaily.ir/Default.aspx?NPN_Id=164&pageno=5#).

The Revolutionary Guards’ interaction with past governments

Sharif discussed the relationship that developed over the years between the Revolutionary Guards and the governments of Iran during the presidency of Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997), Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013). Sharif spoke out against the often heard argument that, up until Ahmadinejad’s two presidential terms, and particularly during Khatami’s reformist administration, the relations between the Revolutionary Guards and the government were strained. While he did admit that the Revolutionary Guards disagreed with the domestic and foreign policy pursued by President Khatami, he argued that it was during President Ahmadinejad’s time that the Revolutionary Guards faced more difficulties, concerning their involvement in economic development projects.

He said that there was less interaction between the Revolutionary Guards and Khatami’s government, since the Revolutionary Guards support positions that reflect Iran’s strength and have a positive effect on its ability to deter its enemies. However, when it comes to their involvement in national development, the Revolutionary Guards faced greater difficulties during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, as was also attested by the former commander of Khatam-ol-Anbia’, the Revolutionary Guards’ construction headquarters. According to Sharif, it is impossible tosay for certain which government enjoyed the best relations with the Revolutionary Guards. The organization’s relations were easier and more reasonable, he said, with governments that obeyed the law. He noted that, in their capacity as protectors of the revolution, the Revolutionary Guards helped all the governments deal with the outside challenges facing the revolution and deter the enemies of the country. Iran’s security is the Revolutionary Guards’ gift to the government, Sharif said, and a president who is not preoccupied with security problems can do a better job of fulfilling his promises to the public.

The spokesman denied claims of Revolutionary Guards support for Ahmadinejad in the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections and stressed that the organization had never attempted to bring any particular president to power. He noted that the Revolutionary Guards’ involvement in presidential elections is evident in two specific areas approved by the Supreme Leader: ensuring a safe environment during the elections and providing for maximum citizen participation.

Sharif said that, while it is true that members of the Revolutionary Guards’ Basij force were positively influenced by Ahmadinejad’s positions and conduct, as seen during his term as mayor of Tehran, it does not mean that the Basij worked in any organized fashion to have him elected. The Basij members did prefer the approach represented by Ahmadinejad and tended to vote for him in the two election campaigns in which he ran for president. However, the Revolutionary Guards don’t tell the Basij members how they should vote, even though the Basij is subordinate to the Revolutionary Guards in the military chain of command. Sharif noted that the Revolutionary Guards are religiously barred from becoming involved in elections and in sectarian political struggles, and that it is a lie for anyone to contend that the Revolutionary Guards work for the benefit of one candidate or another.

Speaking about the deterioration in the relationship between the Revolutionary Guards and Ahmadinejad halfway through his second presidential term due to his disagreements with the Supreme Leader, Sharif said that the Revolutionary Guards are committed to support the government as long as it works within the confines of the law, and admitted that in the past two to three years differences of opinion have emerged between the organization and the president. He stressed that the Revolutionary Guards have an obligation to carry out the instructions of Iran’s decision-making bodies, including the Supreme National Security Council, as well as the instructions implemented with the Supreme Leader’s approval.

The Revolutionary Guards’ involvement in national economic projects

In the beginning of the interview, Sharif stressed that the Revolutionary Guards were established by the founder of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, to protect the revolution and its achievements, and that Khomeini did not restrict the organization’s responsibility to specific threats or areas.

He noted that the Revolutionary Guards became involved in economic development projects in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War on orders from the Supreme Leader. This was owing to the organization’s engineering capabilities, the equipment it had available, and its manpower skills. Sharif said that the Revolutionary Guards, being in charge of protecting the revolution, could not remain indifferent to Iran’s ruined infrastructure and go back to their military bases once the war ended.

Sharif stressed that President Rafsanjani and his government gladly accepted the Revolutionary Guards’ involvement in the development of Iran, and that the organization was able to complete numerous large-scale projects during the Rafsanjani administration. The organization continued using its technical know-how and development experience during Khatami’s presidency, when many projects were turned over to the Revolutionary Guards. He noted that, during the Rafsanjani and Khatami governments, not even one claim was brought up against the organization’s involvement in economic development projects. The involvement continued under President Ahmadinejad, but during that time, according to Sharif, the Revolutionary Guards encountered greater difficulties than before since there were some in Ahmadinejad’s government who were opposed to the organization’s involvement in the development programs. He noted, however, that the sanctions imposed on Iran in recent years have made it necessary for the Revolutionary Guards to increase their involvement in various economic projects—in the field of gas, for instance—since those projects could not be carried out through local contractors.

Sharif said that, contrary to claims brought up by some of the media, the Revolutionary Guards make no attempts to get new projects and jobs for themselves, and that it is the government that takes advantage of the organization’s abilities on its own initiative. He argued that Mohammad-Ali Ja’fari, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, has worked since the beginning of his term to restrict the organization’s involvement in projects that can be completed through local contractors. Ja’fari resolved that the Revolutionary Guards would only be involved in projects that could not be carried out by local contractors but only by foreign companies. The Revolutionary Guards are not in charge of most of the national projects, Sharif said, which can be proven by statistical data. He noted that the Revolutionary Guards work in accordance with the law and that those who, during the recent presidential campaign, called for their exclusion from economic activity did so assuming that it would help them get more votes. The Revolutionary Guards have no wish to take on projects, but since they have sacrificed thousands of martyrs since the revolution, they are not willing to give away Iranian assets to the enemy. This is why, for example, they accepted the project to complete the development of the South Pars gas field.

The Revolutionary Guards’ involvement in suppressing the 2009 riots

Sharif justified the involvement of the Revolutionary Guards in suppressing the riots that broke out after the 2009 election, saying, however, that their involvement didn’t begin until well into the crisis. He noted that, when protesters first took to the streets in the first days after the election, the Revolutionary Guards avoided becoming directly involved in the events and simply attempted to prevent damage to life and property. Only when the regime opponents, who weren’t among the millions who had voted for the defeated candidates, took advantage of the opportunity to escalate the situation and the first incidents of damage to life and property started taking place were the Revolutionary Guards forced to intervene—temporarily and on a limited scale—to make the streets safe again.

According to Sharif, an investigation into the conduct of the Revolutionary Guards in the 2009 riots showed that no mistakes were made by the Revolutionary Guards during the events. The only flaw pointed out by Sharif in the way the organization handled the riots was not using the Revolutionary Guards commanders, who were popular with Iran’s citizens, for PR purposes. This had to do with concerns that the very fact of their media presence would create the impression that the Revolutionary Guards were intervening in the election.

The Revolutionary Guards’ involvement in the 2013 election

Sharif stressed that the Revolutionary Guards were not involved in the 2013 election in any way, and said that even the media of Iran’s enemies admitted that there was no such involvement. He said that there is no substance to reports that top commanders in the Revolutionary Guards, particularly Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, allegedly supported one candidate or another. He said that even though some candidates’ election headquarters wanted to use the names of popular, well-liked Revolutionary Guards commanders to gain political support, all reports about top commanders supporting a particular candidate were denied as soon as they appeared.

The Revolutionary Guards’ relations with the new government

Sharif noted that the Revolutionary Guards consider the recent election and the new president a good opportunity to achieve revolutionary ideals, and that they intend to help the new government as instructed by the Supreme Leader. Contrary to claims made by Iran’s enemies, the Revolutionary Guards have an obligation to help the government within the confines of the law and consider its success to be a success for the whole nation. He noted that, immediately after Rowhani’s victory, the Revolutionary Guards released an official statement announcing their intention to assist the new government. The organization plans to assist the government so that the regime can continue on the path of prestige and development and become a source of inspiration.

The Revolutionary Guards’ strengths and weaknesses

At the end of the interview Sharif discussed the strong and weak points of the Revolutionary Guards. The organization’s greatest strength, he said, comes from faith, adherence to divine values, its populist features, and its definition based on law and on the “rule of the jurisprudent”.

The organization’s main weakness has to do with public relations. Despite making considerable efforts, the Revolutionary Guards have been unable to boost public awareness of the organization and its performance. This can be seen in arguments made by Iran’s enemies that the organization controls approximately 95 percent of the projects, when in fact less than five percent of Iran’s development projects are held by the Revolutionary Guards. This is an indication of the organization’s weak public relations and media presence.

The Revolutionary Guards and the Rowhani challenge

The timing of the interview—given by Sharif just as president-elect Rowhani is about to assume office—is not coincidental, and neither is the spokesman’s decision to give it to the reformist daily Shargh. The interview reflects what may be some of the Revolutionary Guards’ concerns over the consequences of Rowhani’s election for president of Iran. One aspect that clearly stood out in the interview was the attempt made by the Revolutionary Guards spokesman to obscure the organization’s affiliation with the conservative right and with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in particular—an affiliation that became all the stronger in the wake of the 2009 political crisis. Sharif took advantage of the interview to criticize Ahmadinejad’s conduct and lavish praise on the government of Rafsanjani, in whose footsteps Rowhani is seen as following. In addition, the spokesman used the interview to respond to criticism made in recent years by the political left and center in Iran, including former President Rafsanjani, over the Revolutionary Guards’ growing involvement in politics and the economy.

As far as the Revolutionary Guards are concerned, Rowhani’s election for president may lead to adopting a policy that could jeopardize the regime’s vital interests and their own as well. On the domestic scene, it is possible that Rowhani will take a conciliatory approach towards the reformist opposition, which supported him in the election campaign, and push for liberal political and cultural reforms that will include releasing political prisoners, increasing the freedom of the press, reducing censorship, promoting civil society institutions, and decreasing the involvement of the security apparatuses in citizens’ lives. During the election campaign, Rowhani criticized the “security atmosphere” that currently prevails in Iranian society, and, for instance, said he is opposed to security forces’ raids on the homes of those who use satellite dishes. Such reforms are considered by the conservative establishment and the Revolutionary Guards a potential threat to the stability of the regime and the values of the Islamic revolution.

The new president’s possible intention to reduce the involvement of the security apparatuses in society may lead to an attempt to diminish the involvement of the Revolutionary Guards on the political scene. Since the late 1990s—and particularly since the political crisis in 2009—senior figures in the Revolutionary Guards have clearly and unambiguously sided with the conservative right and spoken out firmly against the leaders of the reformist camp. For instance, in a press interview given in July 2011, Mohammad-Ali Ja’fari, chief of the Revolutionary Guards, lashed out against former President Mohammad Khatami for supporting the opposition leaders in the 2009 riots, and argued that he would not be able to come back to politics. During the recent presidential campaign top Revolutionary Guards officials stressed that they were not intervening in the election. However, reports that appeared in the Iranian media indicated that high-ranking members of the organization supported candidates affiliated with the conservative right. For instance, media reported on the close relationship that Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani had with presidential candidate and Tehran’s mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. During the presidential campaign, Soleimani was quoted by the Supreme Leader’s representative to Kerman Province as saying that he was going to vote for Qalibaf.

The economy is another arena where Rowhani may promote reforms that have the potential of hitting the economic interests of the Revolutionary Guards. Rowhani is known to have economic views that advocate reducing the government’s involvement in the economy. Neo-liberal reforms could hit some of the vital interests of the Revolutionary Guards, whose economic involvement has increased in recent years. The Revolutionary Guards’ deepening penetration into economic projects—which has gathered speed as a result of the economic sanctions, among other things—is increasingly criticized by the political establishment in recent years. Rafsanjani, head of the Expediency Discernment Council, argued in May 2010 that there was no justification for the Revolutionary Guards to remain intensively involved in the economy. Speaking at a meeting with governors, Rafsanjani said that while the organization’s involvement in the economy had been vital after the Iran-Iraq War to help revive the industry factories, that kind of involvement was no longer justified.

Rowhani’s views in the field of regional foreign policy could also pose a challenge for the Revolutionary Guards. The Supreme Leader may be the architect of Iran’s foreign policy, but it is not unlikely that Rowhani will push for a more pragmatic foreign policy, especially on the regional scene. Rowhani has announced his desire to improve the relations between Iran and its neighbors, mainly Saudi Arabia. In his efforts to improve Iran’s regional status, he will possibly strive to reduce the Iranian involvement in Syria. Recently Rowhani has time and again emphasized Iran’s support for the president of Syria and for Hezbollah, and Iran will most probably continue to consider the preservation of Bashar Asad’s regime as a top strategic interest. And yet, his stated pursuit of improved relations between Iran and its neighbors may also influence his stance on Iran’s involvement in Syria, where the Revolutionary Guards play a leading, major role.

The interview given by the Revolutionary Guards spokesman to Shargh might also be considered as a way of sending the incoming president a message to deter him from pursuing a policy that is not in line with the objectives of the regime. This message could be seen recently in a number of statements made by top Iranian officials affiliated with the conservative radical right. For instance, several days after Rowhani became president, Majles member Esma’il Kowsari, a former top commander in the Revolutionary Guards, warned about the return of Rafsanjani and Khatami to positions of political influence (http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/280550). In an interview to Fars News Agency, Kowsari said that, even though Rowhani needs to fulfill his promises to the public that voted for him, it is more important to protect the revolutionary, Islamic, and national values, and that Rowhani needs to appoint ministers who can put those values into practice (http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920403000212). In an interview given to the Tasnim News website several days later, Kowsari warned that, if Rowhani’s government engages in factional politics, the Majles will react accordingly (http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/88173).

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The EU Designates Hezbollah’s Military Wing as a Terrorist Organization

Published: 23/07/2013

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EU and Hezbollah flags (Al-Manar, July 22, 2013)

Overview

1. On July 22, 2013, the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU unanimously agreed to add Hezbollah's military wing to its list of terrorist organizations. According to the official announcement, it will not prevent the continuation of dialogue with all political parties in Lebanon. The EU also agreed that the delivery of legitimate financial transfers to Lebanon and delivery of assistance from the European Union and its member states would not be affected. The position will be reviewed on a 6 monthly basis, which is the normal timeframe for review in circumstances such as this (Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, Document A 395/13, July 22, 2013).^[1] According to the media, the significance of the announcement is that the EU's 28 member states and their governments will be forbidden to transfer funds to Hezbollah, its assets will be frozen and its operatives will be not be allowed to travel to Europe.

2. The decision to add Hezbollah's military wing to the EU's list of terrorist organizations came after ongoing diplomatic and information activities carried out to convince the EU's foreign ministers. The vote became unanimous after Ireland and Austria reversed their objections. According to the New York Times, Britain led the diplomatic efforts, especially after the terrorist attack in Bulgaria in July 2012 and after a Hezbollah operative was caught in Cyprus while making preparations for a similar attack (February 2013). EU support to designate Hezbollah's military wing as a terrorist organization recently increased after Hezbollah sent fighters to Syria to support the Assad regime's forces in their war against the opposition (New York Times, July 22, 2013).^[2] A contributing factor was the statement made by Tsvetlin Yovchev, the Bulgarian minister of the interior, who told reporters that "There are clear signs that say Hezbollah is behind the Burgas bombing."^[3]

3. Throughout its 30-year existence, Hezbollah has systematically and methodically carried out terrorist attacks in the Middle East and around the globe. In most instances Hezbollah has not claimed responsibility for them, although in some instances it has used the names of fictitious organizations to claim responsibility or simply denied involvement. It has been done to keep from incriminating itself and to ensure that neither it nor Iran becomes a target for reprisal. However, the interrogation of Hezbollah operatives captured in various countries over the past 30 years, academic researchers, articles by experts and reliable intelligence information all expose the terrorist nature of Hezbollah and its role as the preferred proxy of Iran, which is the number one exporter of terrorism in the world. To carry out terrorist attacks abroad Hezbollah established a designated apparatus, called the Unit for Overseas Operations. Hassan Nasrallah is the overall commander of the apparatus, and carrying out terrorist attacks abroad necessitates his personal authorization.

The Artificial Distinction between Hezbollah's Military and. Political Wings

4. The EU decision distinguishes between Hezbollah's military wing and its political wing (as opposed to the United States, which designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization in 1995). The distinction it is artificial and does not actually exist (even senior Hezbollah figures have made it clear that they themselves do not distinguish between the organization's military and political wings). In effect, both wings are commanded by Hassan Nasrallah and are interconnected. Hezbollah's military force strengthens its political force in Lebanon's internal affairs, while its political and social activities reinforce its military-terrorist infrastructure.

5. Ideologically, Hezbollah is an organization which fits the definition of a terrorist organization. It makes deliberate use of violence against civilians to achieve political objectives, and jihad (the so-called "resistance") is a central value in its ideology. One of its founding principles is the legitimacy of terrorism, sanctioned by Iran, is the ongoing and determined terrorist campaign against Israel for the so-called "liberation of Jerusalem" and the destruction of the State of Israel. Another founding principle is its deep, abiding hatred for the United States ("the great Satan") and the West in general, manifested by its support for the Iranian regime's terrorist attacks abroad and its involvement in the fighting in Syria.^[4]

Initial Responses to the EU Decision

Israel

6. Israel applauded the decision:

1) Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu welcomed the decision and thanked the leaders of the member states. He said that "[i]n recent years, the State of Israel has invested great effort in explaining to all EU member states that Hezbollah is the terrorist arm of the Iranian regime and perpetrates attacks around the world."^[5]

2) Israeli President Shimon Peres sent letters to the leaders of the EU, in which he wrote that he welcomed the EU's decision, calling it "a significant and necessary step towards putting an end to the spread of terror across the globe."^[6]

3) Minister of Defense Yaalon said that the EU's decision would improve the struggle against Hezbollah, and that it would be possible to increase intelligence cooperation between countries regarding Hezbollah (Israel Reshet Bet Radio, July 22, 2013).

Hezbollah

7. Hezbollah rejected any attempt to blame it for terrorist attacks carried out in Europe and accused the Europeans of surrendering to the dictates of the Americans and the "Zionists:"

1) Hezbollah said in an announcement that the organization rejected the EU decision, claiming it was "hostile and deprived [Hezbollah], and not based on proof." Hezbollah claimed that the decision was the result of the EU's surrender to pressure from the United States and Israel, and that it was "written by an American hand in Zionist ink." In addition, according to the announcement, the decision did not reflect the interests of the people of Europe and their values, which were based on independence and liberty (Al-Manar, July 22, 2013).

2) According to the Hezbollah media, the decision was "not worth the ink it was written with" (Al-Manar, July 22, 2013), and it was a vindictive anti-Hezbollah Zionist-American-European decision (Al-Ahed, July 22, 2013).

Iran

8. Iran was critical of the EU decision. A spokesman for the Iranian ministry of foreign affairs held a press conference where he called it "a strange and ill-considered decision," which served the interests of Israel and would only make the situation in the Middle East more complicated. Not only that, he said, the decision would not change the identity of Hezbollah, as a "popular organization seeking justice" (Agence France-Presse, July 23, 2013).

Initial Assessment of the Decision's Practical Significance

9. In our assessment, the EU's decision may have practical influence on the war on Hezbollah's international terrorism. That is because even if the decision is not perfect, it makes Hezbollah's identity as a terrorist organization more manifest and gives governments and law enforcement authorities better tools to cope with Hezbollah in the spheres of prevention, intelligence, and political, legal and economic issues. It may make it easier for law enforcement agencies to prevent Hezbollah operatives from entering European countries, to detain the operatives already there, to make intelligence cooperation more effective and to bring operatives to trial. It will also make it more difficult to transfer contributions and money obtained from criminal activities to the organization.

10. In addition, in our assessment the EU decision may erode Hezbollah's legitimacy in Lebanon and limit its freedom of action, especially in the current sensitive situation in which internal criticism of Hezbollah is increasing because of its involvement in the civil war in Syria (accompanied by attempts to attack Hezbollah). Hezbollah's opponents in Lebanon, especially the Sunnis and a great part of the Christian camp, can be expected to be more vigorous in labeling it as a terrorist organization, make greater demands to dismantle the vast military-terrorist infrastructure it built in Lebanon with Iranian and Syrian support, and claim that its participation in the government may harm Lebanon and brand it as a state that sponsors a terrorist organization.

Appendix

Selected Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center Bulletins about Hezbollah and Iranian Terrorist Activity (2012-2013)

Terrorist Activity around the Globe

1. June 6, 2013 – The findings of a report released by the U.S. Department of State indicate that in 2012 there was a marked resurgence of Iran’s terrorist activity across the globe, both directly and through its proxies.

2. February 21, 2013 – Admission of a Hezbollah operative asked to collect information about sites frequented by Israeli tourists and their transportation made public by Cyprus.

3. February 18, 2013 –Argentina and Iran have agreed to hold a joint investigation of the terrorist attack on the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires.

4. February 7, 2013 – The report issued by Bulgaria about the terrorist attack in Burgas clearly indicates that Hezbollah was involved in its planning and execution.

5. February 5, 2013 – Bulgaria reportedly issues an account accusing Hezbollah of the terrorist attack in Burgas.

6. November 29, 2012 Hezbollah, Portrait of a Terrorist Organization.

7. April 18, 2012 – Latin America as a Terrorist, Subversive, Criminal Arena for Iran and Hezbollah.

8. February 16, 2012 – Iranian and Hezbollah Terrorist Attacks against Israeli Targets Abroad The Situation on the Ground and Background Information (February 15, 2012).

Hezbollah's Involvement in the Fighting in Syria

9. June 27, 2013 – Hezbollah Operatives Killed in Syria – Update

10. June 19, 2013 – Following the victory at Al-Qusayr Hezbollah is preparing to support the Syrian army forces to take over Aleppo.

11. June 4, 2013 – Hezbollah Involvement in the Syrian Civil War

Hezbollah as an Iranian Proxy

12. August 7, 2012 – The Quds Force, an elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, spearheads Iran's global terrorist campaign.

13. June 17, 2012 – Hezbollah as the strategic long arm of the Iranian regime

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^[1]http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138309.pdf
^[2]http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/world/middleeast/european-union-adds-hezbollah-wing-to-terror-list.html?src=me&_r=0
^[3]http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/18/us-bulgaria-hezbollah-idUSBRE96H0XI20130718
^[4]For further information about designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and a survey of the terrorist attacks it has carried out, see the Terrorism Information Center, November 29, 2012 bulletin “Hezbollah, Portrait of a Terrorist Organization.”
^[5]http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Spokesman/Pages/spokeuro220713.aspx
^[6]http://www.president.gov.il/English/Presidential_Activities/Press_Releases/Pages/news_220713_04.aspx

Molavi Abdolhamid, the leader of Iran’s Sunnis

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A text message contest organized by the Irancell telecommunication services company causes a storm among Iran’s Sunnis

A prize contest held by the Irancell mobile phone carrier has drawn anger from Iran’s Sunni minority and prompted calls for a boycott of the company in recent days. The outcry began when one of the questions in Irancell’s text message contest used a derogatory term to refer to Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second Muslim caliph.

The spiritual leader of Iran’s Sunnis strongly condemned the affront to their faith and demanded an apology from the company. The protest against Irancell took place mostly on social networks. A specially created Facebook page called for a boycott of the company until it issued a public apology. As a result of the protest, the company had to put the text message contest on hold and officially apologize for using the derogatory term.

The Irancell incident has reopened the public discourse on the ongoing discrimination of Iranian Sunnis, who make up approximately eight percent of the population. The public outcry over the affront to Sunni faith comes at a time of growing expectation in Iran’s Sunni community that their status will improve now that Hassan Rowhani has been elected president. Rowhani, who won a particularly high percentage of the vote in some of the Sunni-populated provinces, recently met with the Sunni religious leader and promised to push for a change in the anti-Sunni discrimination policy.

A prize contest recently held by the Irancell mobile phone carrier has drawn anger from Iran’s Sunni minority and prompted calls for a boycott of the company in recent days. The outcry began when Irancell offered its clients to take part in a text message contest that had several questions for them to answer. In one of the questions, Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second Muslim caliph, was described as “the one who was deceived by Satan” (فریب خورده شیطان).

The choice made by Abu Bakr, the first caliph, to appoint Umar as heir to the caliphate is considered misguided in Shi’ite tradition, since it barred Ali ibn Abi Talib, whom Shi’ites consider Prophet Muhammad’s legitimate heir, from rising to power. The way that the question was formulated drew strong reactions from the Sunni minority, who claimed that it was yet another serious affront to Sunnis and Sunni faith.

Molavi Abdolhamid, the spiritual leader of Iran’s Sunnis, released a statement condemning Irancell and demanding a public apology from the company. In his Friday sermon Abdolhamid demanded that the company leaders apologize to the Iranian people for offending the Sunni faith, saying that it was an offense to all Iranians. He called on the judiciary to take the necessary measures to prevent companies and establishments from offending the faith of the country’s citizens (http://www.tayab.ir/post/599).

A group of students of religion and other disciplines from Sistan and Baluchestan Province, populated by the Baluchi minority, which is largely Sunni, also released a statement condemning the company. The statement said that, by affronting the faith of Iran’s Sunnis, Irancell is playing into the hands of the country’s enemies and undermines the national unity. The statement mentioned a directive once issued by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who decreed that offending Sunni religious symbols was Islamically prohibited. The authors of the statement demanded that the authorities take measures against those responsible for the inclusion of the offensive question in the cellular carrier’s text message contest (http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920429001289).

The protest against Irancell took to the Facebook social network, where a specially created page called for a boycott of the company until a public apology was given. The organizers of the Facebook protest called on Irancell’s clients to throw away the company’s SIM cards and to stop purchasing its cards altogether.

Offending Umar ibn al-Khattab, said the statement released by the organizers, is the same as offending the religious sentiments and culture of all Iranians. The statement went on to call for opposition to the moral affront to Iran’s different religions, which have coexisted side by side in peace and friendship for hundreds of years. The organizers of the protest said that, by boycotting the company, Irancell’s clients will give its directors an idea of the heavy financial price they will have to pay as a result of their inappropriate behavior (http://sunni-news.net/fa/articles.aspx?article_no=29655).

As a result of the public protest, Irancell had to put the text message contest on hold and officially apologize for using the derogatory term. This weekend the company’s PR department issued an apology stressing that Irancell respects the unity of Muslims and all Iranians, regardless of their religious affiliation. The company claimed that the offensive content that appeared in the text message contest was the work of another company with which it cooperated for the contest, and that it was published without Irancell’s knowledge or consent. The mobile phone carrier promised to take measures against the company legally responsible for publishing the content. The statement released by Irancell also included a clarification and an apology from the management of Golden Key, the company responsible for posting the questions for the contest (http://www.tayab.ir/post/602). At the same time, the prosecutor general of Sistan and Baluchestan Province announced the start of an investigation of the Irancell company over incitement and affront to the tenets of Sunni Islam (http://www.tayab.ir/post/601).

Sunnis make up approximately eight percent of Iran’s population and constitute the majority among the Kurds, Baluchis, and Turkmen living in Iran. The public debate on the ongoing discrimination against the Sunni religious minority resurfaced following the Iranian presidential election. Hassan Rowhani, the president elect, won considerable support from voters in a number of provinces populated by ethnic minorities that practice Sunni Islam—particularly the Sistan and Baluchestan Province and Kurdistan Province, where Rowhani won over 70 percent of the vote.

Shortly after winning the election, Rowhani met with Molavi Abdolhamid, the spiritual leader of Iran’s Sunnis. In an interview given by Abdolhamid to the reformist daily Bahar, the top Sunni cleric described the meeting with Rowhani in positive terms and said that the Sunnis expected the new president to push for an end to the discrimination practiced against them. He had praise for Rowhani and expressed his hope that the new president would take action to improve the situation and status of the minorities and bring them into his new government. Abdolhamid said that the Sunnis demanded equality, justice, and complete freedom of religion. Residents of Sunni-populated areas still face hardship and discrimination, according to Abdolhamid, even though in recent years there has been some improvement in their economic situation thanks to development programs launched in their provinces. He made particular note of the problem of discrimination practiced against Sunnis when it comes to appointment to top executive positions at the national and provincial level (http://www.baharnewspaper.com/News/92/04/04/13709.html).

Abdolhamid has on several occasions in the past strongly criticized the authorities’ attitude towards the Sunnis. In a sermon delivered in September 2010 the cleric said that, after the Islamic revolution, the Sunnis were hoping for the new regime to foster brotherhood and unity among Shi’ite and Sunni believers in Iran, but those hopes were dashed. Abdolhamid took issue with the authorities’ increasing persecution of schools and religious centers for Sunnis. He argued that the authorities prevented the Sunnis from performing their religious ceremonies and educating their children in accordance with their faith, did not allow even one Sunni mosque to operate in Tehran, and imposed restrictions on Sunni prayers on Eid al-Fitr. He stressed that while the Sunnis were loyal to Iran, opposed to any form of violence, and committed to national unity, Iran’s independence, and defense of the country’s borders, they insisted that their legal rights must be upheld by the authorities (www.sunnionline.us, September 11, 2010).

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From Islamic filmmaker to “propagandist working for the Zionists”:

Film director Makhmalbaf’s visit to Israel sparks controversy in Iran

In recent days Iranian film director Mohsen Makhmalbaf’s visit to Israel for the Jerusalem International Film Festival is causing a public and media outcry in Iran and in the Iranian exile community.

This week the head of the Cinema Organization at the Ministry of Islamic Guidance instructed the director of the Film Museum to remove all exhibits pertaining to Makhmalbaf, including dozens of international awards won by the film director over the years that were contributed to the museum by his family.

Some elements of the conservative right lashed out against Makhmalbaf and branded him a traitor. The conservative media, which provided extensive coverage of his visit to Israel, accused him of collaborating with Israel, the West, and the Baha’is. Criticism against Makhmalbaf is also being voiced by supporters of the reformist camp and even regime opponents in Iran and elsewhere. Approximately 150 intellectuals, academics, and human rights activists of Iranian descent released a public letter condemning the film director’s visit to Israel. On the other hand, about 80 academics and political activists of Iranian descent released a letter in support of the visit and of the film director’s call to strengthen the friendship between the peoples of Iran and Israel.

This week Javad Shamaqdari, head of the Cinema Organization at the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, instructed the Iranian Film Museum to remove all exhibits pertaining to film director Mohsen Makhmalbaf in the wake of his last week’s visit to Israel.

Shamaqdari instructed the museum director to “cleanse” the museum of exhibits dedicated to the filmmaker, which include dozens of international awards he has won over the years. In a letter sent to the museum director, Shamaqdari said that Makhmalbaf, who created his first ten movies with the support of “revolutionary institutions and government organizations” in Iran, is now taking the side of “the occupiers of Jerusalem and the criminal Zionism”, praising them, and preaching for peace and religious piety based on the British-created “stray faith” (a term used to refer to the Baha’i religion). Shamaqdari said it is appropriate to cleanse the museum of all items pertaining to Makhmalbaf in the month of Ramadan, the last Friday of which is a day for millions of Muslims to express their solidarity with the fight on Zionism (http://isna.ir/fa/news/92042314373).

In response to the directive issued by the head of the Cinema Organization, Makhmalbaf’s family released a statement demanding the return of all the awards it contributed to the museum. The awards, the announcement said, belong to Iran’s artistic history and were handed over to the museum on the condition that they were kept safe. The family members stressed that, according to the contract they signed with the museum to ensure that the awards could not be damaged or confiscated by the authorities, the awards were donated to the museum provided that it could keep them safe. If it cannot, the museum must return them to the Makhmalbaf family as soon as possible until such time as they can be returned to the people of Iran (https://khodnevis.org/article/51714#.UeQdamtBS1t).

At the same time, film director Fereydoun Jeyrani released a public letter addressed to Shamaqdari, saying that the Iranian cinema’s past involves all Iranians and calling him to avoid mixing politics with the cinema’s past. Jeyrani said that the Film Museum deals with history and the past, and that the past has nothing to do with the present. He called on the head of the Cinema Organization to revoke his directive and keep the museum immune to politics (http://www.isna.ir/fa/news/92042414604).

Makhmalbaf: from Islamic revolutionary to collaborator with the Zionists

Makhmalbaf, born 1957, is one of the most prominent film directors in the new wave of Iranian cinema, and has so far directed over 20 movies. Many of them have been screened at international film festivals and won awards. When he was young, he was involved in underground Islamic activity for which he was sentenced to four and a half years in prison. He was released after the Islamic revolution and became an author and filmmaker. In 2005 he went into exile in Paris and became a strong critic of the Iranian regime.

Last week Makhmalbaf was at the Jerusalem Film Festival for a screening of his documentary The Gardener, shot in the Baha’i World Center in Haifa. Speaking at a press conference he held during his visit to Israel, Makhmalbaf called for the promotion of peace and friendship between the peoples of Iran and Israel. He also said that Israel would be better advised to support the democratic forces in Iran rather than launch a military attack.

In recent days Makhmalbaf’s visit to Israel is causing a public and media outcry in Iran and in the Iranian exile community. Some elements of the conservative right lashed out against the film director and accused him of treason. Mohammad-Nabi Habibi, chairman of the conservative Islamic Coalition Party, said it was hardly a surprise that a person who supported the 2009 riots ended up in Haifa and Tel Aviv, since the Zionists were the root cause of the riots. Makhmalbaf, who took advantage of his art to disgrace the Islamic revolution, is now in the service of Israel, the final stop for those who work against the revolution. In a pun on the director’s name, Habibi said that Makhmalbaf gets his “nonsense spinning” (mehmal-bafi) money from the enemies (http://alef.ir/vdcgtx9qtak9yy4.rpra.html?192944).

Media affiliated with the conservative right provided extensive coverage of Makhmalbaf’s visit to Israel and accused him of collaborating with Israel, the West, and the Baha’is. According to Fars News Agency, the filmmaker has gone from being a revolutionary to a propagandist working for the Baha’is and the Zionists, and his visit to Israel is part of the “soft war” in which Iran’s enemies turn Iranian artists into traitors in the service of the West. Having already created “pornographic and anti-Iranian themed” movies, Makhmalbaf is now showing a new film that openly preaches the Baha’i faith, Fars said (http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920422001057).

The daily Resalat also lashed out against Makhmalbaf and accused him of treason. An editorial published by the daily said that his trip to Israel to shoot a film about the Baha’is is “treason against the nation” and part of a project directed by Iran’s enemies whose objective is to turn Muslim artists into traitors against their people and the whole of humanity. Israel is the final stop for the “homeland sellers”, the article said, and it’s not just plans to assassinate nuclear scientists that are devised in the Zionist war room—it’s also plans for a war on all fronts against the Iranian nation and the Muslim peoples. Part of this war effort could be seen in the film director’s visit to Israel and the press conference he held in Jerusalem. His public visit to Israel and the screening of his “traitorous work” that protects the Baha’is expose Israel’s covert activity against Iran in the cultural sphere (http://www.resalat-news.com/Fa/?code=146506).

News websites affiliated with the pragmatic conservative camp and even with reformist elements also criticized Makhmalbaf’s visit to Israel. Reformist journalist Ali Shokouhi attacked the filmmaker in an article published on the Ayandeh website. Shokouhi wrote that he was greatly influenced by Makhmalbaf’s work from an early age, and that even when his films began criticizing the regime, he himself had reservations about the massive attack that was launched against Makhmalbaf by the Iranian media. He noted, however, that since leaving Iran in 2005, Makhmalbaf has taken the side of the enemies of his country. A man who says that he has removed himself from politics and works for the promotion of peace between nations cannot ignore the fact that participating in a festival organized by Israel and collaborating with Baha’i organizations is clearly a political act, Shokouhi said.

According to Shokouhi, Makhmalbaf has turned a blind eye to the crimes committed by Israel against the Palestinians and recognized the existence of an occupying regime. He called for peace and friendship between the peoples of Iran and Israel instead of fighting the grievous wrong inflicted by the Zionists upon millions of Palestinians and the new holocaust they are creating in the Middle East. Even those who oppose the Islamic republic and criticize the regime need to make sure that their resistance to the regime does not clash with other important political struggles waged across the globe. Unfortunately, Makhmalbaf’s visit to Jerusalem proves that Iran’s fight against imperialism and Zionism may bring regime opponents and the enemies of the Iranian nation to cooperate with each other, Shokouhi concluded (http://ayandehonline.com/?a=content.id&id=1787).

The Khabar Online website, too, published a post criticizing the visit. The author of the post said that he has always had respect for Makhmalbaf and his intellectual integrity and thought him to be loyal to himself and driven by sincere faith in his principles and opinions, even if they are deserving of criticism. In the author’s eyes, Makhmalbaf is a much more respectable filmmaker than Iranian filmmakers who rely on government support and funding.

However, his visit to Jerusalem and his willingness to receive an award from the organizers of a festival directly supported by the Israeli government call his integrity into question. Makhmalbaf has forgotten the apartheid practiced by Israel against the Palestinians every day and ignores the movement to boycott Israel, led by human rights activists across the globe whose motivations are humane rather than ideological or political. He visits Israel and talks about peace in a place where peace is trodden underfoot (http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/303314).

The post drew a number of comments from the website readers, who also expressed their appreciation for the filmmaker while criticizing his visit to Israel. One of them wrote that there can be no talk of peace and love in a place where crimes are committed, citizens are killed, and human rights are violated. Another reader claimed that Makhmalbaf is a “good filmmaker” but a “bad Iranian”. Still another wrote that while he supports establishing relations with the United States, support for Israel is not something he can stand for.

An exceptional reaction to Makhmalbaf’s visit to Israel was published in the reformist newspaper Ebtekar. An editorial published by the daily this week said that, even if the filmmaker’s way is deserving of criticism, his willingness to admit his past mistakes is praiseworthy. Makhmalbaf’s way reflects the political changeover that he has undergone. He and his fellow filmmakers worked to purge the “corrupt” Iranian cinema and turned it into an instrument for the new regime to fight against its enemies from within and without. In just a few years he radically revised his views and went from being a symbol of post-revolutionary Islamic cinema to the target of an unprecedented attack launched by his critics, who denounced his films, portrayed him as “anti-Muslim”, and did not allow him to continue working in his own country.

Even if there is justification for criticizing the path followed by Makhmalbaf, Ebtekar said, the rabid attack against him reflects a hysteria characteristic of his critics in the conservative camp. His critics belong to a group that considered Ahmadinejad to be the savior of Iran, Islam, and the regime, but shortly changed its mind and began attacking the president as a symbol of the “deviant faction”. That is a group of radicals who believe themselves to be the only true Muslims and consider anyone who does not share their opinion a heretic and a traitor. They will not accept any alternative interpretation of Islam and the revolution, think that truth is always on their side, and demand that everyone else yield to their opinion.

Makhmalbaf also underwent quick and sudden changes, the article said, but unlike his critics, he is willing to openly admit his past mistakes. On the other hand, “admission” is not a word in his critics’ dictionary—they will never admit their mistakes and think that it is only others who can be in the wrong (http://www.ebtekarnews.com/Ebtekar/News.aspx?NID=117790).

Differences of opinion about the visit among the Iranian regime’s opponents

Criticism against Makhmalbaf is also being voiced by the Iranian regime’s critics inside Iran and by the Iranian exile community. Approximately 150 intellectuals, academics, authors, artists, journalists, and human rights activists released a public letter addressed to Makhmalbaf condemning the film director’s visit to Israel and his participation in the Jerusalem Film Festival. The signatories argued that the visit was a violation of the cultural and academic boycott imposed on Israel due to its anti-Palestinian policy. An artist who is so conscious of the political violence used in his country cannot ignore the boycott imposed on Israel, which is intended to pressure it into changing its policy and respect the rights of the Palestinians. Makhmalbaf, the letter said, allows Israel to take advantage of the visit as an instrument of propaganda while pursuing its colonial policy against the Palestinians and encouraging the policy of sanctions against the people of Iran (http://www.k-ve.com/2013/07/002makhmalbafjuresalam.html).

One of the signatories, blogger and human rights activist Kaveh Reza’i, wrote on his personal blog that while he used to be proud of Makhmalbaf as an Iranian, lately he has been ashamed to have the filmmaker as his fellow countryman. He accused Makhmalbaf of becoming an instrument of propaganda for the Israeli government, and argued that there is no justification for taking part in the Jerusalem Film Festival while ignoring the happenings in the Palestinian Authority territories, Israel’s policy towards Israeli Arabs, and its crimes in Lebanon (http://www.k-ve.com/2013/07/001cinemamakhmalbafjuresalam.html).

At the same time, about 80 political activists and academics of Iranian descent signed a letter expressing support for Makhmalbaf’s visit to Israel and for his message of friendship from the people of Iran to the people of Israel. The letter stated that supporting the rights of the Palestinian people is not a justification for criticizing the visit. The signatories also expressed support for the film director’s call for Israel to prefer supporting the democratic forces in Iran over launching a military attack (http://news.gooya.com/politics/archives/2013/07/163443.php).

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Mesbah-Yazdi

Mesbah-Yazdi and Sa’id Jalili

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The rise and fall of radical cleric Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi

Since the Iranian presidential election, Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, considered the radical right-winger of the conservative religious establishment, has come under growing criticism from top figures in the religious establishment, the political system, and the conservative media. The criticism revolves around the support he offered in the past to President Ahmadinejad, his support for the Steadfast Front candidates in the recent election (first Kamran Baqeri Lankarani and then Sa’id Jalili, after the former withdrew from the presidential race), and his radical views.

In recent years, and all the more so in the wake of the 2009 political crisis, Mesbah-Yazdi has greatly increased his political influence. However, Ahmadinejad’s siding with the “deviant faction” and the growing differences of opinion in the conservative right have led to Mesbah-Yazdi being increasingly criticized. The criticism directed at the top cleric has reached its peak as the conservatives are trading accusations after their failure in the election.

The erosion of Mesbah-Yazdi’s status may be temporary and it is quite implausible that he will lose all of his political and religious influence. It may, however, undermine his ability to play a central, influential role in future political struggles, particularly the succession struggle that will likely emerge after the death of the current Supreme Leader.

In a recent interview given by Hojjat-ol-Eslam Hossein Ebrahimi, member of the conservative Militant Clergy Association, to Arya News, the cleric said that the political conduct of top cleric Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi during the Iranian presidential election had a lot to do with the failure of the conservative faction in the election. By initially supporting Steadfast Front candidate Kamran Baqeri Lankarani and then shifting his support to Sa’id Jalili after Lankarani’s withdrawal from the presidential race, Mesbah-Yazdi weakened the conservative faction, Ebrahimi said (http://www.aryanews.com/News.aspx?code=20130705143346077&svc=22).

Several days prior to that, Ahmad Karimi Esfahani, the head of Tehran’s bazaar unions, accused Mesbah-Yazdi of creating differences of opinion among the clerics during the presidential election campaign. In an interview to ILNA News Agency, Esfahani said that the top cleric must put an end to his disagreements with the other top clerics (http://ilna.ir/news/news.cfm?id=83106).

Mesbah-Yazdi: the radical right winger of Iran’s religious establishment

Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, born 1934, is considered the radical right wingerof Iran’s religious establishment and the most characteristic representative of the “absolute rule of the jurisprudent” (Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih), which considers the authority of the Supreme Leader to be divine, indisputable, and not subject to the elected institutions of the Islamic republic. According to this view, state laws and the decisions of the state’s elected institutions have no legitimacy unless they coincide with the positions of the Supreme Leader, the earthly representative of the Vanished Imam.

Mesbah-Yazdi is thought of as the most prominent spokesman of that group in the conservative establishment that categorically rules out democratic discourse, considering it as being fundamentally opposed to the idea of God’s absolute sovereignty that is the basis for Islamic political thought. He rejects any view that suggests that the people have a role in legitimizing the government, and completely denies the idea that an Islamic government needs the people’s mandate. Whereas in democracy the citizens can change the law through elections and the parliament, the law in Islam is established by God, making it eternal and immutable. Furthermore, the liberal view gives priority to personal interests over the good of the community and asserts that the laws of religion may be abolished if the people are so inclined, which is completely opposed to the religious view. In Islam, on the other hand, a person has no right to think independently about anything, since the law governs all aspects of life.^[1]

Changes in Mesbah-Yazdi’s political influence

Mesbah-Yazdi’s political influence grew stronger after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president of Iran. The election of Ahmadinejad, considered Mesbah-Yazdi’s spiritual protégé, for president in June 2005 was perceived as an expression of growing commitment to the implementation of Islamic revolutionary ideology. Following Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s defeat in the 2005 election and the ousting of the reformist camp from the political scene after eight years of Muhammad Khatami’s presidency, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei became increasingly dependent on Mesbah-Yazdi’s brand of radical right-wing conservatism and on the Revolutionary Guards.

Even though Mesbah-Yazdi and his allies entrenched their hold on the political system and the conservative media, the traditional conservative faction was still able to maintain its political status. Some commentators speculated ahead of the Assembly of Experts election on December 15, 2006 that the supporters of Ahmadinejad and Mesbah-Yazdi would attempt to take over the assembly as well so that they could restrict Khamenei’s power and, in due course, have a say in the appointment of his heir. When the election results were made public, it became clear that the traditional conservative faction was able to maintain its hold on the assembly. Rafsanjani, who had lost to Ahmadinejad in the 2005 election, won the first spot in the Assembly of Experts election in Tehran. While Mesbah-Yazdi won a seat as well, the supporters of the traditional conservative faction proved that they were able to maintain their status vis-à-vis their political opponents in the conservative camp and the radical right.

The political crisis that hit Iran in the summer of 2009 made the Supreme Leader even more dependent on the radical right. Mesbah-Yazdi took that opportunity to entrench his status while putting an emphasis on his support for Khamenei. He referred to the Supreme Leader as “Imam” and praised his rare, unique qualities.

And yet, President Ahmadinejad’s association with the “deviant faction” and his ongoing, unconditional support for his controversial office chief Rahim Masha’i forced Mesbah-Yazdi to remove his support for the president. On several occasions these past two years the top cleric has strongly criticized the “deviant faction” and expressed reservations about Ahmadinejad’s constant siding with Masha’i. Mesbah-Yazdi warned about the intention of the “deviant faction” to take over the presidency in the 2013 election and about its increasing influence on society, which, he said, was a threat to Islam, the regime, and the achievements of the revolution.

Prior to the March 2012 Majles election, Mesbah-Yazdi orchestrated the establishment of the Steadfast Front (Jebhe-ye Paydari). Affiliated with the radical right of the conservative camp, the front was able to make substantial accomplishments in the election and put several dozens of its members into the Majles; however, control of the legislative branch remained in the hands of those Majles members affiliated with the centrist faction of the conservative camp, who ran on the United Osulgarayan Front ballot.

Mesbah-Yazdi’s growing political involvement, his initial support for Ahmadinejad, and his siding with the Steadfast Front resulted in him being increasingly criticized by the political system and the religious establishment. As the date of the Iranian presidential election approached, differences of opinion arose between Mesbah-Yazdi and elements in the Steadfast Front. In September 2012 the Iranian media reported that the “Qom faction”, affiliated with the top cleric’s supporters, and the Steadfast Front’s “Tehran faction” were at odds in the wake of a heated debate on the front’s position with regard to a presidential candidate to run on its behalf (http://www.digarban.com/node/8933).

The differences of opinion further escalated during the presidential campaign itself. While Mesbah-Yazdi publicly expressed support for Lankarani’s candidacy and said that there was no worthier candidate “on earth and under the sky”, most Steadfast Front members supported the candidacy of Sa’id Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. It was only after Lankarani, pressured by most members of the front, announced that he was quitting the presidential race that Mesbah-Yazdi was forced to shift his support to Jalili (http://alef.ir/vdcd5j0fzyt0jx6.2a2y.html?188270).

In May 2013 a group of students from the religious seminary in Qom released a public letter sent to Mesbah-Yazdi criticizing his political conduct in the past several years. The religion students expressed reservations about his support for Ahmadinejad, his statements about the president and his government enjoying the support of the Vanished Imam, and his support for the Steadfast Front. The religion students also called on Mesbah-Yazdi to stop his involvement in day-to-day political issues (http://irangreenvoice.com/article/2013/may/15/33958).

Score-settling with Mesbah-Yazdi in the aftermath of the 2013 election

After Hassan Rowhani’s victory in the presidential election, the conservatives began accusing each other of responsibility for their failure. These recriminations soon led to fingers being pointed at Mesbah-Yazdi. Jomhuri-ye Eslami, a daily affiliated with Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, has recently published a particularly strong-worded editorial which made an unprecedented personal attack on the top cleric. The author of the article accused Mesbah-Yazdi of radicalism and argued that his conduct and remarks in the past several years have deepened the schism in Iranian society. According to the article, the election results show that the vast majority of the Iranian public rejects his radical way and advocates moderation.

The author of the article argued that the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in Qom, headed by Mesbah-Yazdi, encourages ideas aligned with radical views that were firmly rejected by the founder of the Islamic revolution at the time. The article also said that Mesbah-Yazdi’s stance in favor of the “absolute rule of the jurisprudent” goes against the Iranian constitution and Khomeini’s position.

Jomhuri-ye Eslami also questioned Mesbah-Yazdi’s commitment to the war effort during the Iran-Iraq War. According to the daily, the top cleric had no involvement whatsoever in the eight-year war, did not send his children or students to the front line, did not support the fighters, and did not go to the front even once to cheer up the fighters. The daily also criticized Mesbahi-Yazdi’s support for Ahmadinejad and his controversial statements on the Vanished Imam’s support for the outgoing government (http://www.jomhourieslami.com/1392/13920401).

The article prompted a detailed response from one of Mesbah-Yazdi’s students, Hojjat-ol-Eslam Ahmad Abu-Tourabi. It was posted on Raja News, a website affiliated with the radical right of the conservative camp. The top cleric’s student categorically denied the claims and allegations brought up by Jomhuri-ye Eslami, saying they are part of an all-out campaign waged in recent years by bodies with ties to the CIA against Mesbah-Yazdi, who has been identified by U.S. intelligence as a considerable threat to Western culture.

Abu-Tourabi had praise for his teacher’s contribution to the Islamic revolution before and after it took place, and for his fight against the revolution’s enemies. He categorically denied the claims about Mesbah-Yazdi being radical, saying that his position is in perfect agreement with the position of the regime and the views of the founder of the revolution. He noted that the institution headed by Mesbah-Yazdi works for education in accordance with the values of Islam and the principles of “rule of the jurisprudent”, and that the only “crime” of which Mesbah-Yazdi and his students are guilty is not believing that their sole objective is to teach lessons, discuss religious law, and engage in personal religious practice—instead, they seek to manifest their involvement in other areas, including the political scene, as part of their struggle against the enemies of the regime and the revolution.

Speaking about the claims of Mesbah-Yazdi’s alleged non-involvement in the Iran-Iraq War, Abu Tourabi said that his teacher contributed greatly to the war—by donating some of his book revenues, by sending students to the front (some of whom were even killed in the war), and by making numerous off-camera visits to the front line.

In response to the claim about Mesbah-Yazdi’s support for Ahmadinejad, Abu Tourabi said that the top cleric supported Ahmadinejad based on the views he held early in his tenure, and that he cannot be faulted for his decision to support the president simply because of the fact that the president strayed from his path during his term. Prophet Muhammad, too, supported those who would later stray from his path, and the Supreme Leader previously supported politicians who would go on to take part in the October 2009 riots, the article said (http://www.rajanews.com/detail.asp?id=161419).

The Alef website also criticized Mesbah-Yazdi and his positions during the presidential campaign. The website, affiliated with Majles member Ahmad Tavakoli, one of President Ahmadinejad’s political opponents in the conservative camp, argued that just a few months prior to the election, Mesbah-Yazdi said at a meeting with Mohammad-Nabi Habibi, secretary-general of the conservative Islamic Coalition Party, that if the reformists took part in the election, the conservatives needed to reach an agreement on one candidate to represent them all. It is therefore unclear why he refused to support the candidate that had the support of the majority of conservative clerics and did not instruct his supporters in the Steadfast Front to reach an agreement even when it was clear that the reformists were, in fact, going to take part in the election and that Sa’id Jalili had no chance of winning it (http://alef.ir/vdcjhvevvuqehvz.fsfu.html?191191

The religious establishment has also stepped up its criticism of Mesbahi-Yazdi in recent days. Last week the criticism was joined by top cleric Mohammad Yazdi, head of the Society of Qom Seminary Teachers. Yazdi accused Mesbah-Yazdi of responsibility for the divide between the clerics during the presidential campaign.

In an interview to Mehr News Agency, Yazdi described his attempts to get the top clerics to agree on a single conservative candidate ahead of the election. He noted that, on the eve of the election, he had a meeting with Mesbah-Yazdi and Ayatollah Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi-Kani, chairman of the Assembly of Experts and secretary of the Combatant Clergy Association, in an attempt to reach a common ground prior to the election. While the meeting ended on a positive note, Mohammad Yazdi said, just three days later Mesbah-Yazdi announced his public support for Lankarani even though it wasn’t clear whether his candidacy would be approved by the Guardian Council. Yazdi added that the Combatant Clergy Association and the Society of Qom Seminary Teachers worked together for months in an effort to reach an agreement before the election; however, Mesbahi-Yazdi derailed those efforts by supporting first Lankarani and then Jalili, taking advantage of his influence among some of the clerics to prevent an agreement from being reached. Yazdi had praise for Mesbahi-Yazdi’s religious, academic, and moral abilities, but said that he is greatly to blame for the divide between the top clerics that led, according to him, to the conservatives’ defeat in the election (http://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2087992).

Criticism against Mesbahi-Yazdi is also starting to be heard from his former students. The Shebke-ye Iran website reported last week that, in a press interview, Hojjat-ol-Eslam Mohsen Gharavian spoke about the radicalization undergone in recent years by the educational institution that Mesbah-Yazdi heads.

Gharavian, a former student of Mesbah-Yazdi whose views have grown more moderate in the past several years, said in an interview to the weekly Nasim-e Bidari that he had to leave the educational institution when it became engaged in political persecution of anyone who did not share Mesbah-Yazdi’s radical political views, such as Rafsanjani. According to Gharavian, Mesbah-Yazdi has turned from an academic personality to a political personality.

Gharavian’s remarks drew anger from some of Mesbah-Yazdi’s students, mainly Hojjat-ol-Eslam Qasem Ravanbakhsh, the editor-in-chief of the weekly Parto Sokhan. Ravanbakhsh, affiliated with the Ammar Headquarters, a think tank established in early 2011 on the initiative of regime supporters affiliated with the radical right of the conservative camp, said that Gharavian’s remarks were “immoral” and “completely groundless”. He argued that in recent years Gharavian has adopted views that fall in line with those held by the reformist faction and threatened to expose documents pertaining to the circumstances of Gharavian’s retirement from the educational institution (http://www.inn.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?Serv=0&Id=157608&Rate=0).

Following the media storm sparked by the press interview, Gharavian claimed that his statement was taken out of context and exploited by a number of “anti-revolutionary” websites, and that he still respects Mesbah-Yazdi. He said that his sole intention in the interview was to criticize the immoral behavior of several political radicals. He stressed, however, that Ravanbakhsh had no right to speak on behalf of the Khomeini Educational Institution, and that his remarks represented his own personal opinion. Speaking about the threat made by Ravanbakhsh to expose documents that could incriminate him, Gharavian said that the institution is not a defense-related body that keeps personal documents on file (http://www.ghanoondaily.ir/?News_Id=18334).

Temporary erosion of status or loss of influence?

The growing criticism against Mesbah-Yazdi in the religious establishment, the political system, and the conservative media is an indication that his political status has eroded. Having lost his influence in the president’s office, he may lose even further influence within the political system and the conservative media to the benefit of the centrist faction of the conservative camp.

It is not inconceivable that, similarly to other processes undergone by the Iranian political system since the Islamic revolution, the apparent erosion of Mesbah-Yazdi’s and his supporters’ status in the radical right is only temporary—at any rate, it is unlikely that he will lose altogether his influence in the religious establishment and the political system. However, the damage done to the radical cleric’s status may undermine his ability to fulfill a major, influential role in future political struggles, particularly the one that will likely emerge for the succession of the current Supreme Leader.

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^[1] In this context, see Meir Litvak, “The rule of jurisprudent and the struggle for democracy: the religious discourse in Iran” (Hebrew), in David Menashri and Liora Hendelman-Baavur (Eds.), Iran – Anatomy of Revolution (Tel-Aviv, 2009), pp. 47-75.

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The killing of Shi’ites in Egypt gets a tame official reaction from Iran and draws severe criticism from the media against the Egyptian government

The death of four Shi’ites in a village in Giza, Egypt has provoked strong reactions in Iran. On June 23, an angry mob attacked the house of Hassan Shehata, one of the leaders of Egypt’s Shi’ite community. Four people were killed in the attack, including Shehata himself, and dozens more were injured.

The reactions that the serious incident got in Iran show the difference between the official reaction on the one hand and the reactions of the religious establishment and conservative media on the other. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contented itself with issuing a relatively mild condemnation, saying it had confidence in the ability of the Egyptian leadership to thwart plots intended to sow discord between Shi’ites and Sunnis. On the other hand, top clerics and some of the media blamed the killing of the Shi’ites on the Egyptian government and the leaders of Al-Azhar.

While the official reaction reflects the ongoing efforts made by the Tehran authorities to improve the relations with Egypt, the media’s reactions reflect a demand for more commitment from Iran to Shi’ites worldwide. Time after time, the regime’s reactions to loss of Muslim lives across the globe illustrate the mingling of state political interests and revolutionary vision in the Iranian foreign policy, and the preference for pragmatic considerations when vision and national interests collide.

The killing of four Shi’ites in the village of Zawiyat Abu Musallam in Giza, Egypt has provoked strong reactions in Iran. On June 23 an angry mob led by Salafi clerics stormed the house of Hassan Shehata, one of Egypt’s top Shi’ite clerics. The incident took place during a religious ceremony marking the 15th day of the month of Sha’ban, the birthday of the 12th Shi’ite Imam. Accusing the Shi’ites of heresy and propagation of their faith, thousands of people threatened they would torch the house if the dozens of worshippers inside did not leave the village by the end of the day. When their demands were rejected, the mob attacked the house and set it on fire. Four people were killed in the attack, including Shehata himself, and dozens more were injured. The attack came after weeks of inflammatory rhetoric from Salafi preachers against the Shi’ites. A number of websites and Facebook pages affiliated with Salafi elements praised the attack, dubbing it the beginning of the end of the Shi’a in Egypt.

Hassan Shehata is considered one of the leaders of Egypt’s Shi’ites. Several years ago he went to Iran and met with some of the top clerics in the city of Qom. Among other things, the Shi’ite cleric met with Ayatollah Sadegh Shirazi and gave him a report on the situation of the Shi’ites in Egypt (http://www.shia-online.ir/article.asp?id=29269&cat=18).

Official Iranian reactions and strong condemnations from the religious establishment

On Tuesday, June 25, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official announcement saying that Iran condemns any act of extremism and violence that goes against Islam. Iran is confident, the announcement went on, that the Egyptian nation and its leaders will take action to defend the revolution and Egypt’s national unity, and thwart any plot intended to sow discord between the different Islamic schools of thought (ISNA, June 25).

The Majles Foreign Policy and National Security Committee also issued a condemnation of the killing of the Shi’ites, calling on the Egyptian government to severely punish the perpetrators. The committee’s announcement said that clerics in the Muslim world must condemn radical Salafis’ attacks on Muslims in Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and other Islamic countries (IRNA, June 25).

Statements condemning the incident were also issued by the religious seminaries in the city of Qom and top Iranian clerics. The administration of the religious seminaries demanded that the Egyptian government guarantee the safety and religious freedom of its Shi’ite population, arrest those responsible for the crime committed in Giza, and punish them. The administration of the seminaries called on Egypt’s top clerics and the Al-Azhar institute in Cairo to fight against extremism in Egypt and the growing influence of anti-Shi’ite incitement in the Egyptian society

(http://hawzahnews.ir/news/1973/322702/دولت+مصر+امنیت+و+آزادی+شیعیان+را+تامین+کند).

The top cleric Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani called for the immediate intervention of Al-Azhar clerics to stop any further attacks on Shi’ites in Egypt. He noted that the Egyptian clerics cannot content themselves with condemning the crime that was committed, and that they need to use their religious and spiritual power to take strong action against the ongoing incitement led by “Wahhabi clerics” calling to spill the blood of Muslims (http://www.jomhourieslami.com/1392/13920405).

Ahlulbayt, an association working to spread the Shi’ite faith in the world, also issued a strong-worded condemnation, demanding that the authorities of Egypt, particularly President Mohamed Morsi, urgently intervene to protect the country’s Shi’ite citizens. In its announcement, the association noted that, according to its information, radical Salafi elements intend to assassinate Shi’ite leaders in Egypt, and that the Cairo authorities need to take immediate action to prevent the terrorists from committing the acts of murder and terrorism that they are planning

(http://www.598.ir/fa/news/143208/فهرستی-برای-ترور-رهبران-شیعه-مصر-تهیه-شده-است).

The media blames Egypt’s government for the killing of the Shi’ites

While the Iranian authorities issued a relatively mild statement of condemnation which did not blame the killing of the Shi’ites on the Egyptian authorities and especially President Morsi, media affiliated with the radical right took a tougher, more critical stance towards the Egyptian government.

The daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami, which in the past few months has on several occasions taken a critical stance towards the Egyptian government and President Morsi, published on June 26 a particularly strong-worded editorial accusing the president and the clerics of Al-Azhar of responsibility for the killing of the Shi’ites in Giza. The daily argued that Morsi allowed the United States and the “Zionist regime” to reclaim the status they had enjoyed in Egypt under presidents Sadat and Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood-led government of Egypt still maintains close relations with the United States and Israel, severs its ties with Syria to protect the terrorists working against President Asad’s regime, operates in line with the regional policy of the United States and Israel, works with the reactionary Arab leaders against the Islamic awakening in the Arab world, assists radical Salafi groups, and restricts the religious freedom of the Egyptian people.

At the same time, the religious establishment in Al-Azhar has adopted a passive approach towards the Salafis and takfir groups and takes no significant action to curb the growing radicalism in Egypt or reinforce the culture of moderation. As long as the Egyptian clerics fail to live up to their responsibility, they are accomplices in the anti-Shi’ite crimes. The Morsi government’s inaction against the radicals and the indifference shown by Al-Azhar’s leaders towards the Salafis is exactly what the United States and the Zionists want, Jomhuri-ye Eslami concluded, because they are the ones who benefit the most from the war between the Shi’ites and the Sunnis (http://www.jomhourieslami.com/1392/13920405/).

Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-chief of the daily Keyhan, also published a strong-worded article on the killing of the Shi’ites in Egypt. Titled “Remember you are indebted”, the editorial said that Egypt is indebted to Iran for its liberation from the United States and the Zionists. If it wasn’t for the commitment, sacrifice, and tolerance of the Iranian Shi’ites, Egypt would still be under Mubarak.

There is no doubt, the article said, that the Salafis are involved with the United States and Israel, that they are the Zionists’ mercenaries, and that they receive political support and assistance in weapons and equipment from the United States and its allies. The crime against the Shi’ites in Egypt was committed in the wake of the Salafis’ humiliating defeat in Syria. In view of that defeat, the Americans want to make Egypt responsible for supporting the terrorists in Syria, and the Salafis exacted revenge on the innocent Shi’ites for the defeat suffered by Israel and the United States in Syria.

Keyhan strongly criticized President Morsi for taking part in a conference in support for the Syrian opposition, held in Cairo about two weeks ago with Salafi groups and radical Islamic organizations in attendance. The daily argued that by participating in the ceremony and deciding to sever Egypt’s ties with Syria, Morsi in fact formed a coalition with the Salafis.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has forgotten that it would not have come to power without Iran’s support over the years, and that it would not have been able to contend with Israel without Hezbollah or without Iran’s direct support for Hezbollah and Hamas in those organizations’ conflicts with Israel. Although the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood had no direct part in the crime against the Shi’ites and even condemned it, their positions and the unreasonable actions they took encouraged the Salafis to commit those crimes, the daily concluded

(http://www.kayhan.ir/920405/2.htm).

The Tabnak website, too, partly blamed the Egyptian government for the killing of the Shi’ites. A commentary article titled “The Shi’ites in Egypt: The New Victim of Sectarian Violence” said that it is impossible to ignore the Salafi anti-Shi’ite incitement heard during the conference in support of Syria held in Cairo approximately two weeks ago. Tabnak stressed that President Morsi, who took part in the conference, remained silent as he heard blatant anti-Shi’ite incitement from radical clerics.

Web readers’ reactions to the Tabnak article reflected sentiments of anger and even desire to avenge the Shi’ites killed in Giza. Some of the readers demanded that the authorities of Iran take immediate action to protect the Shi’ites from the Wahhabis and the Salafis. One reader called on the Iranian authorities to expel the Egyptian chargé d'affaires in Tehran, while another called on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to declare a jihad against the Salafis. Yet another reader accused President Morsi of giving Salafis a go-ahead to carry out crimes against the Shi’ites, and warned that similar incidents could take place in other Arab countries. Some readers said that the Wahhabis are pawns in the hands of “the United States and the Zionists” (http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/327858).

Iran’s reactions to attacks on Muslims across the globe: where interests and revolutionary vision collide

The reactions to the killing of the Shi’ites in Egypt reflect—as they have on several occasions—the gap between the tame official reactions from the Iranian authorities to violence against Muslims across the globe and the strong reactions from the religious establishment and conservative media. The official reactions reflect the ongoing efforts made by the Tehran authorities to improve their relations with Egypt, led by Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Iranian media’s reactions, on the other hand, are more indicative of a demand for greater commitment from the Islamic republic to Shi’ites worldwide.

The discrepancy between Iran’s official reaction to suppression and violence against Muslims in other countries and reactions published in media affiliated with the conservative right could be seen on various occasions in the past. For instance, the Iranian authorities remained almost completely silent over the clashes that broke out in July 2009 between the Chinese authorities and the Uyghur Muslim minority in the country’s west, in which over 150 people were killed. Iran’s commitment to Muslim solidarity threatened its national interests in view of the strategic relationship between Iran and China. Accordingly, Iran merely expressed its concern over the killing of Muslim citizens in China, stressed the need for maintaining national unity in that country, and said that it was opposed to any foreign attempt to intervene in China’s internal affairs.

The Iranian government’s relative indifference to the suppression of the riots in China contrasted sharply with the condemnation and strong criticism voiced by top clerics and some of the country’s conservative media. For instance, the Asr-e Iran website accused the Chinese government of consistently discriminating against China’s Muslim minority and pursuing an anti-Islamic suppression policy. The Tabnak website claimed that the Iranian government's stance with regard to the events in China was evidence of a double standard in the way it treated attacks on Muslims in China as opposed to attacks on Muslims in Palestine. The website questioned whether the relationship with communist China was more important than the murder of Chinese Muslims.^[1]

The Iranian authorities’ reactions to suppression of Muslims globally show time and again that Iran’s foreign policy reflects a constant mingling of state political interests on the one hand and a revolutionary vision and ideological views on the other, and that whenever Iran perceives that the revolutionary vision may compromise its fundamental national interests, its tendency is to follow pragmatic considerations.

Full document in PDF format

^[1]Raz Zimmt, “Islamic Solidarity in Action: Iran’s Reaction to the Riots in Western China”, Iran Pulse no. 36, August 13, 2009, The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at the Tel-Aviv University (http://humanities.tau.ac.il/iranian/en/previous-reviews/10-iran-pulse-en/91-36).

Ramazan Sharif (source: Shargh)

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