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Following the victory at Al-Qusayr Hezbollah is preparing to support the Syrian army forces to take over Aleppo

Published: 19/06/2013

Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah leader, gives a speech stressing Hezbollah's determination to support the Syrian regime

Hanging the "Ho, Hussein" banner on the minaret of the mosque (Alarabiya.net website).

Hezbollah operatives celebrate the victory over the rebel forces in Al-Qusayr with a banner reading "Ho, Hussein" (Alarabiya.net website)

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Overview^{^[1]}

1. Following the victory in the campaign for Al-Qusayr, Hezbollah is working to strengthen its foothold on the ground while preparing to support the Syrian forces to take over Aleppo, the second most important and second largest city in Syria. According to the Sunday Times, based on "senior sources," Hezbollah is "preparing to spearhead the ground offensive to drive rebels from Syria's second city of Aleppo." According to a "Hezbollah commander," about 800 Hezbollah fighters were said to have helped secure the city and cut off supplies to the rebels from Lebanon. He also said that "the battle for Aleppo will be fought by Syria's National Defense Force [NDF] and the Syrian army, with Hezbollah supervising and providing military tactical advice on how to coordinate and conduct the offensive." He added that "Aleppo is more of a Syrian matter" (Sunday Times, June 16, 2013).

2. The Arab media also reported that Hezbollah was preparing for the battle for Aleppo after Al-Qusayr had been taken. According to a source in Aleppo, a group of 300 Lebanese Hezbollah operatives, among them Iranian officers, arrived at the military academy located in the city at the beginning of June 2013. They were reinforcements who had come to participate in the campaign waged in the environs north of Aleppo (Facebook page of Aleppo News, June 12, 2013). The commander-in-chief of the free Syrian army, General Salim Idris, said that Hezbollah and Iranian operatives were stationed at a number of sites in Aleppo (Skype interview with Lebanese Al-Mayadeen TV, June 12, 2013). It was also recently reported that Hezbollah operatives were participating in the fighting in the environs of Aleppo (Alarabia.com website).

3. It is not yet clear how many Hezbollah operatives have been allotted for participation in the battle for Aleppo. It is also not known if the Hezbollah operatives sent to Aleppo were taken from the force that fought at Al-Qusayr or if they were newly arrived in Syria from Lebanon. In any event, the statement made by the Hezbollah commander to the Sunday Times, that Hezbollah's role in Aleppo would be one of supervision and advice, might indicate that Hezbollah seeks to behave cautiously in the battle for Aleppo. That is because aware of the internal criticism and military, political and image-related difficulties involved in fighting in Aleppo, and its environs. Nevertheless, the very fact of Hezbollah's participation in the battle for Aleppo can potentially to suck the organization even further into the Syrian civil war, for which they will have to pay a high price.^[2]

Nasrallah's Speech

4. On June 14, 2013, Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech for "Injured Resistance Fighter Day," in which he stressed Hezbollah's commitment to continue supporting the Syrian regime. Hezbollah's involvement in the Syria war, he said, was not undertaken suddenly and without thought, but was rather the product of an orderly assessment of the situation based on an analysis of the events as they occurred. It was intended, he said to help undermine "a dangerous American-Israeli takfir plot"^[3] whose objective was to bring about the collapse not only of Syria but of the entire region, including Lebanon. Thus Hezbollah had decided to become involved in the fighting in Syria and to accept all the consequences, including dead and wounded ("foiling this dangerous plot is far more important that any sacrifice"). Practically speaking, said Nasrallah, even after Al-Qusayr Hezbollah had not changed its policies: "Wherever we have to be, we will be there, and the responsibility we accepted [i.e., supporting the Syrian regime] we will continue to accept, and there is no need for further details" (Al-Manar, June 14, 2013).^[4]

5. In his speech Nasrallah stressed Hezbollah's determination to continue its aid for the Syrian regime, exploiting the momentum of its military and morale victory at Al-Qusayr. However, while he could explain Hezbollah's intervention at Al-Qusayr as defense of the Shi'ites, his reason for fighting in Aleppo was completely different and more relevant: Hezbollah, he said, was helping the Syrian regime suppress a rebellion supported by the West and Al-Qaeda which was liable to harm Iran and Hezbollah's strategic interests in Syria, Lebanon and the entire region. Thus Nasrallah admitted, although indirectly, that Hezbollah had become an actor in a wider campaign with regional and global significance which could expose Hezbollah to greater Shi'ite, internal Lebanese and pan-Arab criticism.^[5]

The Sectarian Celebration of the Victory at Al-Qusayr

6. Below are pictures from a video broadcast on Al-Arabiya TV (affiliated Saudi Arabia) and Al-Jazeera TV showing Hezbollah operatives celebrating the victory at Al-Qusayr, waving banners which are clearly Shi'ite. A YouTube video also showed young men jumping over bodies at Al-Qusayr and shouting sectarian slogans (Al-Safir, Lebanon, June 11, 2013). Hassan Nasrallah, who was fully aware of the potential danger of the videos (in light of the escalating anti-Shi'ite rhetoric in the Arab-Muslim world), made note of the Al-Arabiya video of the celebration and gave the events his own interpretation (Hassan Nasrallah on Al-Manar TV, June 14, 2013).

7. Nasrallah claimed that the flag was waved for the mosque of the Shi'ite Imam al-Hasan al-Mujtaba, which had been built in Al-Qusayr ten years earlier, and not the mosque of the Sunni Caliph Omar al-Khtab (as claimed in the video). He added that authentic Shi'ites had lived in their own neighborhood in Al-Qusayr for decades if not for centuries. He said the flag had been waved out by two young men who "on their own authority" had climbed the minaret of the mosque and hung a banner reading "Ho, Hussein," thus fuelling the claim that they had declared Al-Qusayr a Shi'ite city.^[6] Nasrallah condemned the spreading of false information in the media, which was intended, he said, to foment inter-sectarian war.

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^[1]Update for the June 4, 2012 bulletin "Hezbollah Involvement in the Syrian Civil War."
^[2]For further information see the June 13, 2013 bulletin (Hebrew website only) “Yusuf al-Qaradawi, considered the greatest Sunni Islamic cleric, harshly attacked Iran and Hezbollah ("the party of Satan"), calling on Muslims to support the rebels in Syria. His verbal abuse was an indication of the deepening Sunni-Shi'ite rift in the Arab-Muslim world and the challenges Hezbollah faces as a result of its involvement in the Syrian civil war.
^[3]Hassan Nasrallah calls groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda "takfirs." Takfir refers to the practice of Muslims calling others infidels, thus allowing their blood to be shed.
^[4]Ghassan bin Jiddo is chairman of the board of the Lebanese station Al-Mayadeen TV, which supports Hezbollah and Syrian regime. In commenting on Nasrallah's speech he said it was entitled "Hezbollah will be wherever it has to be," that is, the organization will not renege on its decision to support the Syrian regime (Al-Mayadeen TV, June 14, 2013).
^[5]In the Lebanese daily newspaper Al-Safir on June 11, 2013, Ja'afar al-Attar wrote that "As the battle for Al-Qusayr was won extensive support among Hezbollah supporters in the Dahiya [the southern Shi'ite suburb of Beirut], similar to their open solidarity with the fighting at the compound of the religious gravesite [Al-Set Zaynab], the main question plaguing some of Hezbollah's supporters concerns the future of the fighting in Syria: 'Will our young people defend Assad in Aleppo? Why doesn't Iran send its youth to fight instead of our sons?' The opponents of the fighting in Syria also have raised difficult questions: 'Why should our young people participate in battles whose success we no nothing about? Why do we have to agree to the creation of a hostile Sunni environment in Lebanon and in the Arab homeland? And who says that the participation of the organization in more battles will be decisive as it was at Al-Qusayr?'"
^[6]"Ho, Hussein" is a Shi'ite rallying cry expressing loyalty to Hussein bin Ali, who commanded the supporters of Ali bin Talib in the battle at Karbala (680 AD). The battle represents the central ethic of sacrifice among Shi'ites.

A cache of Hezbollah weapons was recently discovered in Nigeria and a Hezbollah network was exposed.

Published: 19/06/2013

Some of the weapons uncovered in the northern Nigerian city of Kano

The house in Kano where the weapons were found

Some of the weapons found in the cache

The main suspect, Shi’ite cleric Abdullah Mustapha Berende

Nigerian security forces discover the weapons on board.

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Overview

1. On May 28, 2013, after a month-long investigation, the Nigerian security services uncovered a cache of weapons in the city of Kano, in northern Nigeria. It included anti-tank weapons, RPGs and RPG launchers, submachine guns, handguns, and a large quantity of ammunition and explosives (Bbc.co.uk website, May 30 2013). There is a large community of Lebanese businessmen in Kano.

2. According to the Nigerian security services the weapons belonged to a Hezbollah network that operated in the country, and intended to launch terrorist attacks on Israeli and Western targets. In addition, three Lebanese nationals residing in Nigeria were detained, and during interrogation admitted to having been trained by Hezbollah (Allafrica.com website, May 31, 2013). Pictures of the weapons indicated that they had been poorly maintained and most of them were rusty. Some of them, like anti-tank missiles and mines, were suitable for guerilla warfare.

3. Despite the fact that an estimated 20,000 individuals of Lebanese origin live in Nigeria, this was the first time the Nigerian law enforcement authorities had uncovered direct Hezbollah activities in the country. On the two previous occasions when Shi'ite terrorist activity was uncovered, it had been carried out by Iran: The exposure of an Iranian arms shipment in October 2010 caused tension between Iran and Nigeria, and Nigeria lodged a formal complaint against Iran and in the Security Council. (Gambia severed its diplomatic relations with Iran as did Senegal, although Senegal later reinstated them.) In February 2013 an Iranian-handled terrorist network was exposed in Nigeria, headed by a Nigerian cleric who had trained in Iran (See Appendix.). For that reason Iran may now be keeping a low profile in its subversive and terrorist activity in Nigeria, and may be want to use proxy organizations such as Hezbollah.

Exposure of the Hezbollah Terrorist Network in Nigeria

4. At the end of May 2013 it was made public that the Nigerian security services had uncovered a large cache of weapons hidden in a private house in the city of Kano. According to the security services, the weapons belonged to a Hezbollah network. Exposing the network was made possible by an investigation held several months earlier by the security services in the Nigerian capital city of Abuja, which led to a number of detentions, beginning on May 6 with the detention in Abuja of a businessman (Allafrica.com website, May 31, 2013).

5. The house in which the weapons were hidden was located near police headquarters. The hiding place had been specifically constructed for the weapons, and was under the floor of a bedroom, covered with three layers of concrete. The weapons had been wrapped and placed in containers to protect them. The room also had an emergency exit (Allafrica.com website, June 10, 2013).

6. The weapons included 103 packages of TNT, 76 hand grenades, anti-tank weapons, 122mm ammunition, anti-tank mines, 21 RPGs, an RPG launcher, nine hand guns, a submachine gun and two magazines, 17 AK-47 assault rifles, 44 magazines for the rifles and ammunition (Bbc.co.uk website, May 30; Allafrica.com website, May 31, 2013). Pictures of the weapons show that they were not well taken care of and that most of them were rusty.

7. Arrested in the affair were three Lebanese citizens residing in Nigeria who had dual Lebanese and Nigerian nationality. According to the Nigerian security services, during interrogation they admitted they were handled and had been trained by Hezbollah. They also led the local authorities to the weapons.

8. The Lebanese involved in the affair were (Al-Jazeera, May 31, 2013):

1) Mustapha Fawaz, detained on May 16, 2013. He is a Lebanese businessman living in Nigeria who runs an amusement park in Abuja and the popular Amigo supermarket in Kano. His interrogation led to the detention of the other suspects. Several days later the Nigerian security services closed his businesses.

2) Abdullah Tahini, later arrested at Kano airport with $60,000 in undeclared cash, on his way to Beirut.^[1]

3) Talal Roda, a Nigerian and Lebanese citizen. He was arrested at the house where the weapons were found two days later.

9. A fourth individual involved was Abd al-Hassan Tahir Fadlallah, owner of the house where the weapons were found. He is Lebanese and was not in Nigeria when the weapons were discovered. According to the security services he would be detained upon return to Nigeria. The Lebanese consul in Kano said that the house where the weapons were found belonged to a resident of Sierra Leone named Abd al-Hassan Tahir Fadlallah who was currently detained. The consul said that the Fadlallah owned a plastics factory called Amfat Nigeria Limited, which had an import-export license. He also separated the case of the citizen of Sierra Leone from the other suspects in the case (Awoko.org website, May 2013).

10. Several days after they were detained the three Lebanese lodged a suit against the Nigerian security services, the attorney general and the minister of justice. They demanded reparations, claiming they had been illegally detained without trial. They also asked to stop the deportation proceedings against them. They asked the court to rule their detention and interrogation as illegal and unconstitutional (Allafrica.com website, June 10, 2013).

Appendix

Iranian Subversion in Nigeria

1. This was the first time Hezbollah terrorist activity in Nigeria was exposed. Iranian terrorist activity in Nigeria was exposed at least twice in the past.

Detention of an Iranian Terrorist Network in Lagos

2. On February 20, 2013, the Nigerian Department of State Security (DSS) announced it had uncovered a terrorist network operating under Iranian direction. According to the DSS, the network planned to attack American and Israeli/Jewish targets in Lagos (the country's commercial capital and largest city). The three operatives were directed by a Nigerian Shi'ite cleric who had trained in Iran and was familiar with manufacturing explosives (Punching.com website, February 21, 2013).^[2]

3. According to the DSS, the cell leader was recruited while studying in Iran and also underwent military training. In April 2012 his Iranian handlers called him to Dubai for briefing. The mission they gave him was to set up a terrorist network in southwestern Nigeria, especially around Lagos. To that end he recruited the three other suspects (Punching.com website, February 21, 2013).

4. The Iranians instructed him to collect information about the public places and hotels frequented by Americans and Israelis. He said he had personally photographed the Habad House, an Israeli cultural center in Lagos, on the orders of his handlers (Punching.com website, February 21, 2013).^[3] He also collected information about USAID offices in Lagos (New2.onlinenigeria.com website, February 21, 2013).

Iranian Arms Shipment to Nigeria Exposed (October 2010)

5. A more serious affair, one which influenced Iran's relations with Nigeria and other African countries, occurred in October 2010. The Nigerian security forces uncovered a shipment of weapons sent from Iran to the port of Lagos. On October 26, 2010, the Nigeria security forces announced during an examination of the cargo of the M/V Everest, that 13 containers with several tons of weapons had been found. The ship belonged to an Iranian company called Behineh Trading^[4] and was operated by a French company called CMA-CGM and flew the Marshall Islands flag.

6. The affair began in April-May 2010, when the Iranians sent out a shipment of weapons. Two operatives of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards were chosen to represent themselves as businessmen. The ship loaded a cargo of 13 containers at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, listed as containing building materials (primarily fiberglass and stone slabs). The ship made a stop at the Indian port of Mumbai and then arrived at the port of Lagos between the beginning and middle of July 2010. According to Nigerian customs agents and court documents, the shipment remained sealed in the port for several months (German.iranbriefing.net, August 4, 2011).

7. The shipment was declared as building materials (fiberglass and stone, behind which the weapons were hidden). The final destination was the Gambian port of Banjul, and the shipment was addressed to a company with ties to the Gambian president. Among the weapons were 107mm rockets, 120mm mortar shells and light arms.^[5]

8. The Nigerian security services' investigation led to the two Iranian "businessmen," who sought asylum in the Iranian embassy in Abuja when the affair was exposed. The Gambian media later reported that they were Ali Akbar Tabatabaei and Azim Aghajani, two senior Qods Force operatives. Along with them a network of local Qods Force supporters was exposed and their operatives were detained.

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^[1]Hezbollah customarily solicits donations from Lebanese businessmen in West Africa. The money found in Abdallah Tahini's possession may have been donations for Hezbollah.
^[2] For further information see the February 26, 2013 bulletin “Iran as an exporter of terrorism and subversion: Nigerian security services reported the arrest of a terrorist squad that had been trained in Iran and was planning an attack on U.S. and Israeli/Jewish targets in Lagos, Nigeria.”
^[3] Other Habad centers have been targets for Iranian terrorist attacks abroad.
^[4] On March 27, 2012, the U.S. Department of Treasury reported that Benineh Trading, which owned the ship had been designated as a terrorist entity.
^[5] For further information see the March 15, 2011 bulletin “In recent months Iran made two attempts to ship weapons by sea, one to a terrorist organization (Hezbollah in Lebanon in August 2010) and the other to a West African country (Gambia in July 2010).”

The escalating anti-Shi’ite rhetoric from Sunni clerics belonging to different schools of thought reflects an agreement that the Shi’a is the enemy of the moment

Published: 18/06/2013

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Ali Khamenei, Bashar Asad, and Hassan Nasrallah depicted as incarnations of Satan (arabsnews.net, May 28, 2013)

Overview

1. The depth of the Sunni-Shi’ite schism can be seen in all the major arenas? where regional conflicts are being waged. It is reflected in Hezbollah’s growing involvement in the fighting in Syria, the spilling over of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon, record-breaking sectarian violence in Iraq, and the aggressive stance taken by the Persian Gulf states towards Iran and Hezbollah. Thus, the Sunni-Shi’ite schism is emerging as one of the most influential factors shaping the Middle East in a time of regional upheaval.

2. A major force driving the schism is the escalating anti-Shi’ite rhetoric from Sunni clerics who belong to different schools of thought. Of particular note is a speech given on May 31, 2013 by Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, considered by many the current spiritual leader of the Sunni world, in which he said he regretted the many years he had spent on attempts at Sunni-Shi’ite rapprochement. He said that Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi clerics were right to consider Shi’ites as infidels, and adopted their terminology when talking about the Shi’a (“Hezbollah is the Party of Satan”).^[1]

3. The escalating rhetoric is reminiscent of the sentiments in the Sunni world towards the Shi’a during previous “waves”, such as the disillusionment that followed the Islamic revolution in Iran, the campaign in Iraq, and the second Lebanon war. It reflects an agreement—shared by shari’a teachers affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wahhabi establishment, Salafi preachers, and jihadists—that the Shi’a is the enemy of the moment.

4. The meaning of that escalation is that, ideologically speaking, the fight against the Shi’a (and its representatives, Iran and Hezbollah) takes precedence over the fight against the West and Israel—although it does not mean that the fight will necessarily be backed by actual on-the-ground efforts. This coincides with the political and social reality brought about by the regional upheaval: a widening of the fundamental fault lines that run through the Arab and Muslim world.

Appendix I

Taqrib al-Madhaheb (Rapprochement of the Schools of Thought): Death of a vision

1. The idea of Sunni-Shi’ite rapprochement is normally associated with the Society for Rapprochement between Islamic Schools of Thought (Jama’at al-Taqrib bayn al-Madhaheb), which worked in Egypt in the middle of the previous century. In 1959, Shaltut, who was the Sheik of Al-Azhar at the time, issued a fatwa (religious ruling) stating that the Shi’a is “a school of thought that is religiously correct to follow as other Sunni schools of thought.” In the fatwa, Shaltut referred to the Shi’a as “al-madhhab al-ja’fari”—the Ja’fary school of thought, after the Sixth Imam of the Twelfth Shi’a, who is believed to have established the principles of Shi’ite theology. It was a first Sunni recognition of the Shi’a as a legitimate religious-juridical and theological school of thought, alongside the four Sunni schools of thought.

2. The fatwa issued by Shaltut—a cleric of the establishment who, in his official capacity, served the goals of the Egyptian regime and was a mouthpiece for its wishes—was obviously politically motivated and made-to-order. It was intended to help Nasser form a closer relationship with Qassem’s predominantly Shi’ite Iraq at the time.

3. Shaltut, considered a key figure among those who support the Sunni-Shi’ite rapprochement, is also said to be the one who decided to introduce Shi’ite law into the Al-Azhar curriculum as an integral part of education on Islamic schools of thought. However, the decision was phrased vaguely, and in practice Shi’ite law was only taught under comparative law and not as a separate school of thought. Once again, the pro-rapprochement stance was primarily the result of political expediency. This was reflected in the decline of the rapprochement movement in the 1960s in light of political tensions between Egypt and Iran.

4. The view that is opposed to rapprochement is similarly rooted in political factors. For instance, the fatwa issued by the Wahhabi Saudi cleric Abdullah ibn Jibreen in the first week of the second Lebanon war cannot be separated from Saudi Arabia’s stance towards Hezbollah and the deep-rooted historical animosity between the Wahhabis and the Shi’ites. In his fatwa, Ibn Jibreen called on the Sunnis to denounce the Shi’ites, said that helping “that infidel [min al-rafidhin] party [Hezbollah]” was forbidden, and concluded with a verse from the Quran: “And whoever is an ally to them among you—then indeed, he is [one] of them” (Surat al-Maidah, Verse 51). The verse originally refers to a ban on befriending Christians and Jews, and was extended by Ibn Jibreen to include the Shi’ites.

5. As was the case with other fatwas that stirred controversies in the Muslim world, Ibn Jibreen and his allies tried to do “damage control” and retract the fatwa. The websites of Ibn Jibreen’s son and students posted an apology of sorts, saying that the remarks were “taken out of context”. Nevertheless, that back-and-forth could not conceal the clarity and firmness of the fatwa as a true manifestation of Wahhabism, which subscribes to the uniqueness and unity of God and therefore considers the Shi’a to be guilty of the greatest sin: worship of more than one god (shirk).

6. One of the most notable, interest-provoking reactions in the Sunni world to Ibn Jibreen’s fatwa was a counter-fatwa issued by Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and considered by many the current spiritual leader of the Sunni world. Al-Qaradawi ruled that anyone who pronounces the two creeds—“There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah”—is a Muslim for all intents and purposes and will not see the fires of Hell. According to Al-Qaradawi, therefore, the Shi’ites are Muslims, too, and their addition to the creed—“and Ali is the wali (friend, viceregent) of Allah” takes nothing away from that.

7. Al-Qaradawi based his fatwa on a hadith attributed to Prophet Muhammad, a cornerstone of the idea of jihad: “I have been commanded (by Allah) to fight the infidels, until they testify that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger. If they do, I will not harm them or their property, since from now on they are immune and it is only for Allah to judge them.” According to Al-Qaradawi, it is in the branches that Shi’ites and Sunnis differ,not in the roots, meaning that the differences between them are minor.

8. Al-Qaradawi’s apologetic fatwa on the Shi’a was a reflection of his religious and political interest to sanctify the struggle against the West and the Jews. In his view, the enemies on the outside—the Jews, the Christians, and the pagans—have created an anti-Islamic front, which is why the Shi’ites and the Sunnis cannot sit idly by and have to create their own front against the enemy. His argument that the disagreement between the two schools of thought is not about the basic tenets of faith but rather about things of little consequence is incorrect; however, it did serve his political objectives at the time.

9. Loyal to his approach, in 2005 Al-Qaradawi issued a “declaration of principles for dialogue and rapprochement between the Shi’ites and the Sunnis”, a document detailing ten principles aimed to bring about rapprochement (taqrib). One of them, for instance, is the principle of good mutual understanding: Al-Qaradawi stated that a distinction should be drawn between things agreed upon by all Shi’ites and things on which they disagree. Controversial issues within the Shi’ite school of thought itself may form a basis for rapprochement between certain parts (or perhaps even most) of the Shi’a and the Sunna. Such a distinction can be drawn only if each side understands the other’s tenets of faith by studying its established religious legal texts—certainly not on the basis of rumors, myths, and outward behavior displayed by the other side.

10. For instance, Al-Qaradawi said that if the Sunnis were to delve into the Shi’ite view of the Quran, they would discover that only a minority of Shi’ites believe that the Quran has been distorted by the Sunnis—most Shi’ites accept the Quran as it is and make no claims that it has been distorted, only that its most authoritative interpretation is the one given by Ali. It is therefore Al-Qaradawi’s belief that this has to become a common ground for the Sunnis and the Shi’ite majority to come together and reach an agreement that the Quran is the living word of God, “untouched by blasphemy”. The fact is, Al-Qaradawi added, that a Quran printed in Iran is the same as one printed in Saudi Arabia or Egypt.

11. Another principle in Al-Qaradawi’s “rapprochement philosophy” document is focusing on areas where the Shi’a and the Sunna are in agreement, both in the pillars of faith (arkan al-iman) and in the pillars of practice (arkan al-islam). Al-Qaradawi thus plays down the considerable differences in hadith and Quran interpretation that do not serve his purposes, attempting to cover them up.

12. In recent years Al-Qaradawi has launched various activities to promote the idea of rapprochement, some of whose partners have been Iranian clerics belonging to Iran’s Shi’ite rapprochement organization, working under the Supreme Leader’s office. While those activities—mostly conferences or joint appearances in inter-Arab media—have served as a platform for furthering interests shared by both parties, they have also laid bare the differences between them.

13. For instance, Al-Qaradawi spoke out against the phenomenon of “Shi’ite evangelism” and the Shi’ization of countries with a Sunni majority. He also condemned the Shi’ite custom of cursing the three first caliphs and the Prophet’s companions, considered role models in Sunni Islam, going as far as to demand that his Iranian colleagues issue a fatwa explicitly banning the practice. On the other hand, the Iranian clerics, particularly Ayatollah Taskhiri, the head of the Iranian organization for rapprochement, demanded that the Sunnis denounce the idea of takfir (accusations of heresy, frequently targeted at Shi’ites). In other words, the rapprochement efforts have often backfired.

14. The inutility of the rapprochement discourse in the past few years, coupled with the regional upheaval which has made it all the more clear that the West and Israel (considered by Al-Qaradawi to be the chief enemies) are not the issue in the region, has stripped the rapprochement of its political relevance. And in the meantime, the regional upheaval is becoming polarized along the traditional fault lines of the Middle East, particularly the violent Sunni-Shi’ite conflict.

15. With this in mind, it appears that Al-Qaradawi’s recent misgivings about the idea of rapprochement itself and his admission that Sheik Jibreen and his likes had the right idea have closed the door—at least for the next several years—on a dialogue that was far from being representative of the Sunni “hard core” to begin with.

Appendix II

The anti-Shi’ite discourse in radical Sunni Islam: from scripture to sword

1. When a radical group defines its “other”, delineating its own identity becomes easier. This gives rise to the notion that “homegrown” sinners, those who threaten the community from the inside, are worse and more dangerous than other sinners. It is for this reason that Sunni radicals consider the Shi’a worse than Christianity or Judaism.

2. There is now a massive body of literature in the Sunni world filled with hatred of the Shi’a, but it was not always like this. The Ottomans, for example, believed that the Shi’ites were sinners and discriminated against them, but still considered them Muslims. They only persecuted extremist Shi’ites, but did not harm mainstream Twelver Shi’ites. The Wahhabis in the Arabian Peninsula were the exception, even in Ottoman times. They were notable for categorically rejecting the Shi’a as heresy against the uniqueness and unity of God (tawhid).

3. The Islamic awakening that began with Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and later continued in Afghanistan and Iran brought the sectarian tensions back to life. At first, the Sunni religious movements supported the Iranian revolution; however, their support dwindled as the revolution’s pronounced Shi’ite character became clearer. Their renouncement of the revolution reached its apogee after Iran’s Islamic regime provided support to the Syrian regime when the latter massacred the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in 1982. The similarity between that period and our time is immediately obvious, as Hezbollah and Iran’s growing support for the Bashar Asad regime has become the main target of the heated Sunni rhetoric against the Shi’a.

4. The fervent anti-Shi’ite polemics in recent years have been primarily fueled by fear of losing Sunni hegemony, spreading to an enormous extent thanks to internet technology.The polemics are concerned with three issues: theology (for instance, the Shi’a’s attitude towards the first Muslims and recriminations in which each side accuses the other of distorting the Quran), religious law (for instance, the Shi’ite legalization of mut’ah, temporary pleasure marriage), and history (for instance, portraying the Shi’a as a manifestation of paganism that dates back to the Jahiliyya and of Persian animosity towards Arabs). Through these issues, Sunni radicals seek to expose “the true face of the Shi’a”.

5. The following are several examples of Sunni polemic arguments against the Shi’a:

1. The idea of rapprochement (taqrib) is nothing but a conspiracy created by the hypocrite Shi’ites to lull the Sunnis with slogans of conciliation while enjoying a free reign to turn them into Shi’ites. Therefore, conciliation with the Shi’ites is only possible if they give up their faith and become Sunnis.

2. The Shi’ites harbor a deep animosity towards the Sunnis, particularly the Wahhabis, instead of joining ranks with them at a time when Muslims are facing a ferocious Christian-Jewish attack from the outside. This argument is a response to those heard from Arab intellectuals about the anachronism of the sectarian conflict in light of the “Western attack”. On the contrary, the Sunnis say, the ball is in the Shi’ites’ court.

3. Taqiyya, the custom of concealing one’s true religious identity that is practiced by Shi’ite Muslims, is the complete opposite of the idea of “sanctification of God”, which is the duty of every Muslim believer. There is no clearer indication that the Shi’ites are “the most deceptive sect” (akzab al-tawaef”), as they are referred to by the 14th century Sunni theologian Ibn Taymiyyah, one of the greatest luminaries of Sunni radicals.

4. The Shi’ites have adopted heretical ideas from the Jews. For instance, the Shi’ite mehdi is simply the Jewish false prophet, who makes claims to divinity but in fact represents Satan. That mehdi speaks Hebrew and his rule is based on “King David’s shari’ah”—a new Quran that was distorted during the time of Talmudic scholars. What is more, it is the Persians and the Jews who concocted the Shi’ite-Sunni conflict, particularly a Jew from Yemen who sparked sectarian tensions during Caliph Othman’s reign.

5. The Shi’ites are worse than the Jews, since the Jews have no wish to convert the entire world to Judaism, but the Shi’ites want to enforce their faith on all human beings.

6. The Shi’ites are nothing but Persian Zoroastrians (majus, or magi) in disguise, not Muslims. They even make pilgrimages to Kashan to visit the tomb of the Persian slave who murdered Caliph Umar. The Persians have destroyed the pure Arab Islam (it is quite conspicuous that the traditional Salafi hatred of Ottoman Turks has been redirected at modern Persians as a result of Iran’s dominance).

7. The Shi’ites have betrayed Islam throughout history: they surrendered Baghdad to the Mongols and, after the occupation, behaved like “rabid dogs” in that city; they tried to murder Saladin; they worked with the Europeans against the Ottomans and are responsible for the failure of the Ottoman siege of Vienna, which marked the beginning of the end of the Muslim empire. The same is true today: the occupation of Iraq in 2003 was the work of the Shi’ites, who used American assistance to topple the regime and spread their faith. “The outcry should be about a Shi’ite cross, not a Shi’ite crescent”, Sunni polemicists say.

6. Of course, the Sunni polemic arguments are mostly entirely baseless, distorting the sources and having no foundation in history. At times, the Sunni radicals even rely on Western researchers—who suddenly become legitimate—to bash the Shi’a. Those conspiracy theories that blame the Shi’ites for all that is wrong with the world spare Sunni Muslims the need for soul-searching and for actually dealing with their own problems and failures throughout history.

7. The anti-Shi’ite rhetoric reached a peak with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaeda’s previous leader in Iraq. He departed from previous practice by calling for a total war against the Shi’a in Iraq—to the extent of a genocide, in fact. His announcement drew criticism even from such prominent jihad theoreticians as Maqdisi andTartusi, who certainly have no great love for the Shi’a. They did justify attacking Shi’ites but prohibited the killing of all Shi’ites, explaining that not all Shi’ites collaborated with the Americans against the Sunnis.

8. Such differences of opinion among global jihad leaders were (and still are) an indication of the gap between philosophy and practice. Perhaps the reservations about Zarqawi’s stance were politically motivated, and perhaps they have their source in the difference between clerics who are drawn to the idea but are still bound by psychological inhibitions, and the unfettered go-getter mentality of a war bully like Zarqawi. Either way, the reservations voiced by the jihad philosophers had no effect on the actual slaughter taking place on the ground, and Zarqawi’s extremist rhetoric is still felt years after his death. The current reality in Iraq, where the number of casualties in the Shi’ite-Sunni struggle is skyrocketing, is evidence of that.

9. In the Sunni anti-Shi’ite polemics, there is continuity between arguments from different periods. Ibn Taymiyyah was and still is the first and foremost source of inspiration for Sunni radicals, with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab a close second. The arguments they made at the time against the Shi’a are still voiced, unchanged, by their followers. That, however, should not be put down to adherence to history as a scientific discipline. What matters is not the past, but the way it is used for present needs. Therefore, the arguments against the Shi’a are to a great extent ahistorical, and even “orientalist”.

10. The Shi’ites, on their part, also slam the Sunnis with conspiracy theories that have no basis in reality. Each side’s allegations are often a mirror image of those made by the other side. The Sunnis refuse to acknowledge the changes undergone by the Shi’a and completely ignore the differences between the various Shi’ite schools of thought. There is also a considerable resemblance to anti-Semitic claims: for instance, a Sunni belief in the existence of “The Protocols of the Clerics of Qom”, mistakes of Shi’a faith explained simply by the fact that it is the Shi’ites who make them, and other ideas along similar lines.

11. In the current political and religious reality in the Middle East, the anti-Shi’ite diatribes do not remain confined to rhetoric, but are translated into demonization and actual violence. This can be seen in the Syrian civil war and in the spillover of sectarian violence from Syria into Lebanon.

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^[1]For more details on Al-Qaradawi’s speech, see our June 13, 2013 Information Bulletin: “Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the most prominent religious authority in Sunni Islam, lashed out against Iran and Hezbollah and called on Muslims to support the rebels in Syria”.

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the most prominent religious authority in Sunni Islam, lashed out against Iran and Hezbollah and called on Muslims to support the rebels in Syria.

Published: 13/06/2013

Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi delivers a sermon (May 31, 2013) strongly condemning Iran, Hezbollah, and its leader Hassan Nasrallah

Sheik Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Palestine-info, August 15, 2010)

Ismail Haniyeh, head of the de-facto Hamas administration, kisses Al-Qaradawi’s hand during the sheik’s visit to the Gaza Strip (ikhwanonline.com, May 10, 2013)

A poster carried by Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon

Al-Qaradawi and Bashar al-Asad in better days, when Al-Qaradawi worked for Shi’ite-Sunni rapprochement (all4syria.info)

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Overview

1. On May 31, 2013, Sheik Yusuf Qaradawi, the most prominent religious authority in the Sunni Muslim world, delivered a sermon in which he lashed out against Iran and Hezbollah. The sermon was delivered at a conference held in Doha, the capital of Qatar, in solidarity with the Syrian people. Al-Qaradawi accused Iran and Hezbollah of helping Syria’s Alawite regime in its war against the Syrian people by supplying weapons and dispatching operatives from all across the Shi’ite world. Al-Qaradawi used inflammatory rhetoric to condemn Hezbollah (“the party of Satan”), saying that it sends operatives to Syria “to kill the people of Al-Qusayr” and referring to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (whose name literally means “Allah’s victory”) as “Nasr al-Shaytan”, or “Satan’s victory”. Al-Qaradawi called on Muslim volunteers and Muslim countries to help their brothers in Syria, and added, “I swear that if I could, I would go into battle without hesitation” (see Appendix for the summary of the sermon).

2. Sheik Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the most prominent religious authority in the Sunni Muslim world, was expelled from Egypt and found refuge in Qatar. He operates from there throughout the Arab and Muslim world. After President Hosni Mubarak was ousted, Al-Qaradawi returned to Egypt and delivered a sermon in Al-Tahrir Square in Cairo. Many consider him the supreme religious and ideological authority for the Muslim Brotherhood, although he is not officially its leader. Al-Qaradawi is also the supreme religious authority for Hamas and an enthusiastic supporter of Palestinian terrorism. On May 8, 2013, Al-Qaradawi held a first of its kind visit to the Gaza Strip. While there he made radical statements rejecting any possible recognition or negotiation with Israel, and called on Muslims “to prepare for defending the Al-Aqsa Mosque”.^[1]

3. Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s sermon in Qatar was delivered in response to a speech given by Hassan Nasrallah on May 25, 2013, in which he admitted for the first time that Hezbollah was involved in the Syrian civil war.^[2] The sermon was delivered in the midst of the fighting, about one week before the Syrian regime, with the help of several thousand Hezbollah operatives, was able to take over the city of Al-Qusayr—a significant military victory that gave a morale boost to the Syrian government loyalists. That victory, coupled with Iran’s ongoing assistance to the Syrian regime and Hezbollah’s growing embroilment in the Syrian civil war, has further deepened the Sunni-Shi’ite schism in the Arab and Muslim world, as evidenced by Al-Qaradawi’s strong-worded remarks and the calls to wage jihad against Hezbollah and Shi’ite Muslims made by other Sunni clerics. However, even though Al-Qaradawi is a popular and established preacher, his sermon does not carry the authority of a fatwa (religious ruling) and there is doubt whether his sermon will motivate thousands of zealous Sunni volunteers to Syria to wage jihad against the regime.

4. Al-Qaradawi’s statement is a telling indication of the heavy price Hezbollah has had to pay in the Arab and Muslim world—and in Lebanon itself—for its growing involvement in the Syrian civil war.^[3] Hezbollah’s image in Arab Muslim countries has taken a serious blow—it has been demonized and turned from the spearhead of anti-Israeli resistance into “the Party of Satan”. What’s even more, Hezbollah is increasingly faced with the danger that the Sunni-Shi’ite tensions could spill over to Lebanon itself. The violent clashes in Tripoli and Sidon, the rocket attacks on the Shi’ite areas controlled by Hezbollah in Beirut’s southern suburb and in Baalbek, the demonstration recently held by Hezbollah’s opponents in front of the Iranian embassy in Beirut—all of these clearly indicate that Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon have become bolder, and that the Syrian civil war has started to spill over to Lebanon, intensifying sectarian tensions in that country (even if the lessons of the previous civil war are still deeply etched in the collective consciousness of Lebanon’s various sects and opposing sides and serve as a restraining factor).

A poster carried by Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon, with the Hezbollah logo changed from Hezbollah (Party of Allah) to Hezb al-Shaytan (Party of Satan), in the spirit of Al-Qaradawi’s sermon. Hezbollah’s motto, “The Party of Allah are the victors”, was changed to “The Party of Satan are the losers” (molotovnews.com).

5. Al-Qaradawi’s attack on Iran and Hezbollah can also make things difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas, which tries not to upset the status quo and maintain a delicate balance in its relationship with Iran. While Hamas is aligned with the policy of the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement that strongly supports the rebellion against the Syrian regime, we also believe that Hamas would like to continue receiving military support from Iran, which formerly played a major role in the military buildup in the Gaza Strip (mainly by providing advanced weaponry). So far Hamas has not directly commented on Al-Qaradawi’s sermon (who mentioned Bashar Asad’s efforts to bring Hamas over to his side). However, Hamas spokesman Salah al-Bardawil echoed Al-Qaradawi’s strong condemnation of Iran and Hezbollah. In an interview to the Arabic-language newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat, Al-Bardawil said that Hezbollah made a “serious mistake” by becoming involved in the Syrian crisis, that support for Hezbollah was dwindling and that the organization was in a state of “total collapse”. Al-Bardawil added that Iran and Hezbollah’s support for the “resistance” did not “absolve them from the responsibility for the events in Syria and the deadly mistakes made there” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 10, 2013).

6. Al-Qaradawi’s remarks are part of a pattern of escalating Sunni rhetoric—from politicians, clerics, and the media—towards Shi’ite Muslims. More than just a response to Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, that escalation can be considered part of a broader, region-wide conflict between the Shi’ites and the Sunnis that is also manifested in several other arenas: Iraq, where the death toll in bombings between Shi’ites and Sunnis has climbed to its highest in years; Lebanon, where conflicts and clashes take place in Tripoli, Sidon, and Beirut; and the Persian Gulf, where Iran is vying with Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states for control over Bahrain and Yemen.

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^[1] For more details on Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, see our February 27, 2011 Information Bulletin: “Portrait of Sheikh Dr. Yusuf Abdallah al-Qaradawi, senior Sunni Muslim cleric, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood”.
^[2] Following Hassan Nasrallah’s speech, Sunni clerics, including Al-Qaradawi, started calling for jihad (holy war) against Hezbollah and Shi’ite Muslims in general. For details, see MEMRI report issued on June 6, 2013 (975): “Following Nasrallah’s Statements On Syria Fighting, Calls Emerge For Sunnis To Wage Jihad Against Hizbullah, Shiites”, by H. Varulkar, L. Barkan, and R. Green. See also Appendix I of the present Information Bulletin for details on reactions to Al-Qaradawi’s sermon.
^[3] For more information on Hezbollah’s growing involvement in the Syrian civil war, see our June 4, 2013 Information Bulletin: “Hezbollah Involvement in the Syrian Civil War”.

The findings of a report released by the U.S. Department of State indicate that in 2012 there was a marked resurgence of Iran’s terrorist activity across the globe, both directly and through its proxies

Published: 06/06/2013

Hezbollah’s terrorist attack in Bulgaria: the remains of the Israeli tour bus after the explosion

Hussein Atris, Hezbollah terrorist operative, taken for interrogation

The Golden Arches hotel in Limassol, one of the sites about which the Hezbollah operative gathered information

Weapons transferred to an Azeri terrorist cell handled by Iran.

Terrorist attack in New Delhi: the Israeli representative’s vehicle after the explosion

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Overview

1. In late May 2013, the U.S. Department of State released its Country Reports on Terrorism 2012. The findings of the report indicate that the year 2012 saw a “marked resurgence” of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Iran or its proxies. Iran’s terrorist activity in 2012, the report says,“reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s”. Iran sponsored terrorism through the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and Hezbollah, Tehran’s ally in Lebanon. Iran’s terrorist activity in 2012 included attacks and attempted attacks in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa.^[1]

2. According to the Department of State’s report, in addition to terrorist activity Iran was (and is still) involved in subversion intended to stir up instability in the Middle East by funding and supporting Shi’ite militias in Iraq, Palestinian terrorist organizations, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the Syrian regime.

3. See Appendix for our short summary of the terrorist attacks carried out by Iran and its proxies in 2012.

Details

4. In May 2013, the U.S. Department of State released its Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, which contains a detailed discussion of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. According to the report, Iran stepped up its terrorist activity in 2012. Attacks and attempted attacks were carried out in India, Thailand, Georgia, and Kenya. Iran also provided financial, material, and logistical support for terrorists and extremist groups in the Middle East and Central Asia. To implement its foreign policy goals, Iran used local militant groups, provided cover for intelligence operations, and stirred up instability in the Middle East. The IRGC-QF, the report says, is “the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad”.

5. The report mentions the following areas of Iranian terrorist activity:

1. Attacks or attempted attacks: In 2012, Iran carried out planned terrorist attacks in India, Thailand, Georgia, and Kenya.

2. Support for terrorist organizations: Iran provides weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).^[2]Since the end of the second Lebanon war, Iran has assisted in rearming Hezbollah in direct violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. In addition, Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hezbollah in Lebanon and trained Hezbollah operatives at camps in Iran. The IRGC-QF trained Taliban elements on small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect fire weapons, such as mortars, artillery, and rockets. Since 2006, Iran has arranged arms shipments to Taliban members through Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. Support for opposition groups in Iraq: Despite claiming that it supports Iraq, Iran trained, funded, and provided guidance to Iraqi Shi’a militant groups. In this context, the IRGC-QF provided training outside of Iraq as well as advisors inside Iraq for Shi’a militants, particularly in the construction and use of sophisticated improvised explosive device technology and other advanced weaponry.

4. Involvement in Syria: Iran provides extensive support, including weapons, funds, and training, to assist the Bashar Asad regime in its war against the coalition of regime opponents.

5. Support for the rebels in Yemen: Iran actively supports the Shi’ite Houthi tribe in northern Yemen, including activities intended to build military capabilities, which could pose a greater threat to security and stability in Yemen and the surrounding region. In July 2012, the Yemeni Interior Ministry arrested members of an Iranian spy ring headed by a former member of the IRGC.^[3]

6. Assistance to Al-Qaeda members: Iran allows Al-Qaeda members to operate in its territory and enables the organization to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria. Muhsin al-Fadhli, a veteran Al-Qaeda operative who has been active for years, began to work with the Iran-based Al-Qaeda facilitation network in 2009 and was later arrested by Iranian authorities. He was released in 2011 and is now apparently the leader of the Iran-based Al-Qaeda facilitation network.^[4]

Appendix

Summary of terrorist attacks carried out by Iran and Hezbollah in 2012

Attempted terrorist attacks in Bangkok, Thailand

1. In January 2012, Hezbollah, in cooperation with the IRGC-QF, attempted to attack tourist sites in Bangkok visited by Israelis using IEDs. A Lebanese Hezbollah terrorist operative named Hussein Atris, carrying an expired Swedish passport and a Lebanese passport, was detained at the Bangkok airport.^[5] Another Hezbollah operative, also carrying a Swedish passport, managed to escape. Hussein Atris’ interrogation led the police to a commercial building in Bangkok where they found a large quantity of chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives (about 4,400 kilograms of urea and about 40 liters, or 10.5 gallons, of ammonium nitrate). In our assessment, the presence of such a large stock of potentially dangerous chemicals indicates the existence of a long-standing, well-established Hezbollah network in Thailand.

2. A month later, on February 14, 2012, the IRGC-QF attempted another terrorist attack in Bangkok, this time using a magnet to attach an IED to the car of an Israeli diplomat. The Thailand police arrested two Iranians who had activated the IED. A third Iranian national was arrested in Malaysia. Two other Iranians managed to escape from Thailand.

Blowing up an Israeli tour bus in Burgas, Bulgaria

3. On July 18, 2012, an IED weighing about 3 kilos, or about 6.6 lbs, blew up in the back of a tourist bus about to take Israeli tourists from the airport to their hotel in the Black Sea resort of Burgas. According to the Bulgarian minister of the interior, the IED had been assembled in Bulgaria. The terrorist attack was carried out by a Hezbollah operative who, according to information from the Bulgarian authorities, had a collaborator. It is our assessment that he terrorist was killed by a technical fault which caused the IED to explode prematurely. The blast killed five Israeli tourists, the Bulgarian bus driver, and the terrorist. In addition, 36 Israelis were wounded, three of them seriously.

4. On February 5 2013, approximately seven months after the terrorist attack in Burgas, Bulgaria issued a detailed report on the results of its investigation of the event. According to the Bulgarian authorities, the investigation clearly indicated that Hezbollah’s so-called military wing^[6] was involved in planning and carrying out the attack. The Bulgarian minister of the interior, who presented the report to the Bulgarian National Security Council, said that Bulgaria possessed detailed information about the network that had planned and carried out the attack. He added that they possessed reliable, well-founded information linking at least two of the three Burgas terrorists to Hezbollah (Bulgarian News Agency, Sofia, February 6, 2013). The report did not mention Iran, which is behind a global terrorist campaign against Israel, using Hezbollah as its proxy.^[7]

Thwarted attack targeting Israeli tourists in Cyprus

5. On July 7, 2012, the local authorities in Limassol, Cyprus detained Hossam Taleb Yaacoub, a 24-year old Lebanese Hezbollah operative who was collecting information about Israeli tourists arriving on the island by air. He was carrying a Swedish passport. In our assessment, he was collecting information in preparation for an attack on Israeli tourists visiting the island, possibly the same modus operandi of attack Hezbollah carried out in Bulgaria. On March 31, 2013, the Cyprus court charged the Hezbollah operative with collecting preliminary information for a terrorist attack against Israeli tourists.

6. On February 20, 2013,Cyprus made public the written admission of Hossam Taleb Yaacoub, read into the court record at his trial in Limassol. He was tried on eight counts, among them conspiracy to commit a crime, participation in a criminal organization, intent to commit a crime, and obstruction of justice (Cyprus Mail, February 21, 2013). Hossam Taleb Yaacoub has been a member of Hezbollah since 2007. He used the codename “Wael” and was handled by an operative named “Ayman,” who wore a mask to the meetings he held with Yaacoub. Yaacoub admitted to having been trained in the use of weapons. He also used to carry out missions for Hezbollah in several European cities (Lyon and Amsterdam) and in Turkey (Antalya). In all cases he was asked to pick up various items (bags, a cell phone, two SIM cards) and deliver them to Lebanon.^[8]

Attempted attacks in Azerbaijan

7. On January 19, 2012, Azerbaijan’s National Ministry of Defense reported the arrest of two Azeri citizens and a manhunt for a third citizen residing in Iran. The three men were planning to murder two rabbis who taught at the Jewish school in Baku. The authorities presented evidence, including confiscated weapons and cash, that the suspects had been in touch with the Iranian intelligence services.

8. In March 2012, authorities in Azerbaijan reported the arrest of 22 Azeri citizens on charges of cooperation with the IRGC. The network exposed in Azerbaijan was planning terrorist attacks on Western embassies and other organizations with ties to the West. On April 6, the Azeri security services arrested 17 operatives and confiscated weapons.

9. In May 2012, the Azeri security forces reported that they had detained 40 terrorist suspects who were planning to carry out terrorist attacks during the Eurovision song contest, held in Baku. The targets of the terrorist attacks reportedly included the hotels where the country delegations were staying, including a delegation that represented Israel at the Eurovision.

10. On October 11, 2012, the Azeri media reported that a court in Baku had convicted the 22 members of the terrorist network handled by the IRGC. They were found guilty of conspiring to carry out terrorist attacks on Israeli, American, and Western targets.^[9]

Attack on an Israeli diplomat’s car in India

11. On February 13, 2012, a terrorist attack occurred in New Delhi. An Israeli diplomat’s car was attacked using a magnetic IED that was attached to it. In the car was the Israeli diplomat’s wife, who was severely injured when the car blew up. Three Indian civilians were injured as well.

Attempted attack on an embassy car in Georgia

12. On February 14, 2012, the same day as the previously mentioned attacks on Israeli diplomats in Thailand and India,an improvised IED was found in the car of a Georgian employee of the Israeli embassy in Tbilisi. The IRGC-QF was involved in the attacks.

Thwarted attack in Kenya

13. In mid-June 2012, two Iranians, Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammad and Seyyed Mansour Mousavi, were arrested in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. Officials in Kenya said that, after their arrest, the Iranian agents led investigators to a hideout in Mombasa where they had stashed 15 kilograms, or 33 pounds, of RDX explosives. According to officials, the Iranians were apparently planning to bomb Israeli-owned hotels on the Mombasa beach and attack diplomats and businessmen. American experts said that the amount of explosives found in the hideout would have been enough to level a medium-sized hotel (Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth, July 3, 2012).

14. The Iranian agents admitted in their interrogation that they had entered Kenya as tourists and were supposed to get the explosives from a local contact. They were then to deliver the explosives to a golf course in Mombasa, where they would be picked up by another contact and taken to an unknown destination. The detainees’ tourist visas were supposed to expire on June 26, 2012; however, they were arrested five days prior to that, on June 19 (allafrica.com, July 25, 2012).

15. On July 16, 2012, the two Iranians were released from custody on a 2-million Kenyan shilling bond. They were also required to surrender their passports and report to the Kenya Anti-Terrorism Police Unit two times a week (timesofisrael.com, July 16, 2012).

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^[1] For more information on the terrorist activity of the IRGC-QF, see our August 21, 2012 Information Bulletin: “The Qods Force, an elite unit of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, spearheads Iran’s global terrorist campaign. The terrorist attack in Bulgaria was, in our assessment, part of the campaign”. For more information on Hezbollah’s terrorist activity, see our December 18, 2012 study: “Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization”.

^[2] For more information on Iran’s assistance to Palestinian terrorist organizations, see our January 7, 2013 Information Bulletin: “Iranian support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations”.

^[3] For more information on Iran’s involvement in Yemen, see our February 10, 2013 Information Bulletin: “Iranian subversion in Yemen: A ship with a cargo of arms originating in Iran and en route to the Shi'ite Houthi rebels in north Yemen, was recently intercepted”.

^[4] For more information on Iran’s cooperation with Al-Qaeda, see our June 14, 2012 Information Bulletin: “Documents captured by the United States army in an Al-Qaeda safe house in Pakistan expose the ambivalent relations between Al-Qaeda and Iran”.

^[5] In the 1990s Hussein Atris married a Swedish woman and received a Swedish passport, which he used for his activities in Hezbollah’s foreign operations unit.

^[6] Bulgaria’s terminology in the report is the same used by other European countries, which differentiate between what they perceive as Hezbollah’s military-terrorist wing, which carries out terrorist attacks, and its “political” wing, which is part of the Lebanese parliament and is integrated into the Lebanese administration. In fact, they are a single entity and there is no difference between the military and political wings. Senior Hezbollah figures have themselves denied that their “military” and “political” wings are separated.

^[7] For more information, see our February 7, 2013 Information Bulletin: “The report issued by Bulgaria about the terrorist attack in Burgas clearly indicates that Hezbollah was involved in its planning and execution”.

^[8] For more information, see our February 21, 2013 Information Bulletin: “Admission of a Hezbollah operative asked to collect information about sites frequented by Israeli tourists and their transportation made public by Cyprus”.

^[9] For details, see our November 4, 2012 Information Bulletin: “Azerbaijan as an arena for Iranian terrorism and subversion”.

Hezbollah Involvement in the Syrian Civil War

Published: 04/06/2013

The heads of the "resistance camp:" Ahmadinejad, Bashar Assad and Hassan Nasrallah

Mahan Air and Iran Air transport planes at the Damascus airport.

The grave of Raed Muhram Turk, an IIRG officer killed in Damascus during a firefight with the rebels.

Hassan Nasrallah meets with Khamenei in Tehran (Hezbollah website, April 15, 2013).

Poster of Hassan Nasrallah and Bashar Assad (Alankabout, Lebanon, August 17, 2012).

Hassan Nasrallah and Bashar Assad (Hawamir forum website, Saudi Arabia, July 22, 2012).

Hezbollah activists in Lebanon demonstrate in support of the Assad regime (Ilaf website, from All4Syria, July 2012).

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Overview^[1]

1. For Iran and Hezbollah, the preservation of Bashar Assad's regime is of supreme strategic importance. Syria is Iran's greatest "resistance camp" ally, providing it with a firm foothold in the heart of the Middle East as well as political and military influence. Syria also plays a vital role in Hezbollah's military buildup, helping it to construct offensive and deterrent capabilities against Israel. For Iran and Hezbollah, the fall of the Syrian regime would be a disaster, it would weaken Iran's regional position against the United States and Israel and damage Hezbollah's military capabilities and political influence in Lebanon.

2. Iran and Hezbollah have not only strategic interests, but also feel religious-sectarian solidarity for Syria's Shi'ite population (an estimated 400,000-450,000 strong) and with the Alawite sect that rules Syria. That solidarity, noticeable in Nasrallah's recent speeches, has became stronger since the Syrian Shi'ites and their holy sites in Syria became targets for harassment by the rebels (particularly organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda, such as the Al-Nusra Front, which considers Shi'ites as infidels).

3. With those dangers in mind, Iran and Hezbollah employ two parallel strategic courses: the first, immediate course is intended to prop up the Syrian regime's ability to survive and continue governing, and entails military, economic, political and propaganda support. The second, planned as both an intermediate- and long-term strategy, is intended to make it possible for the Shi'ites and Alawites to defend themselves by founding a "popular army." In our assessment such a popular army is planned for an estimated 100,000-150,000 militiamen, and will give Iran and Hezbollah a foothold in the areas populated by Shi'ites and Alawites, making them important factors in the internal Syrian arena in the post-Assad era.

4. In addition to providing a response to potential dangers, Hezbollah seeks to acquire advanced military capabilities from the Syrian regime, the possession of which could deter Israel and challenge its technological superiority. Such advanced capabilities include advanced surface-to-surface missiles (such as the Iranian Fateh-110s), anti-ship cruise missiles (Russian Yakhonts) and anti-aircraft missiles (Russian SA-17s and other systems). In our assessment also Hezbollah wants to exploit the weakness and strategic distress of the Assad regime to gain a foothold in the Golan Heights from which to carry out terrorist attacks against Israeli. Hezbollah's desire for "game-changing" weapons and its willingness to "help" the so-called "Syrian popular resistance" in the Golan Heights were openly mentioned in a speech given by Hassan Nasrallah on May 9, 2013. Israeli policy, as stated by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, was "to prevent, the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah and to [other] terrorist elements."^[2]

5. Iranian policy regarding the civil war in Syria is handled by the Qods Force (commanded by Qassem Suleimani), with Hezbollah as Iran's main subcontractor. Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian civil war is manifested by its sending several thousand operatives to participate in the fighting in Shi'ite regions. Hezbollah also supports the Syrian regime by training (its forces in guerilla warfare),providing it with intelligence, securing the Syrian-Lebanese border, taking preventive measures inside Lebanon and waging propaganda campaigns.

6. The operatives sent to Syria play an important role in the fighting, especially in locations where Hezbollah (and Iran) have sectarian-religious interests. They include the Al-Qusayr region, south of Homs, near the northern border with Lebanon where there is a Shi'ite population living within a Sunni area (on June 5, 2013, the Syrian army announced its takeover of Al-Qusayr) and the grave of Al-Set Zaynab, located south of Damascus, an important holy Shi'ite pilgrimage site. Hezbollah continues to be sucked further into the civil war in Syria despite its losses and the political price it is forced to pay: so far more than one hundred of its operatives have been killed (most of them in the campaign for Al-Qusayr) and criticism of Hezbollah has increased among its opponents in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world.

7. Hezbollah was involved in the first year of the civil war in Syria but was careful to keep a low profile. In 2012 it sent a limited number of its military operatives to Syria, mainly as advisors and for security missions. Hezbollah was actively drawn into the war (as opposed to Iran's caution) during the first half of 2013. That was because in both Iranian and Hezbollah assessment the survival of the Syrian regime was in jeopardy and that Shi'ite religious-sectarian interests were being threatened. However, despite its having been sucked into the Syrian morass, Hezbollah's direct involvement in the war is still relatively limited and its overall influence on events in Syria is secondary. However, its involvement may grow as the Syrian regime weakens and the dangers to Iran and Hezbollah's strategic interests increase.

Contents of This Study

1. Iran and Hezbollah interests in Syria

2. The dangers and potential opportunities of the Syrian civil war

3. Iranian support for the Syrian regime

4. Iran, Hezbollah and Syria coordinate positions

5. Hezbollah support for the Syrian regime

1) Overview

2) Direct Hezbollah participation in the fighting

3) Other areas of Hezbollah support

6. Preparations for the morning after the collapse of the Syrian regime: Establishing Shi'ite and Alawite militias

7. The main campaign: Al-Qusayr (south of Homs)

8. An explosive friction zone: The grave of Zaynab, sacred to Shi'ites (south of Damascus)

9. The price Hezbollah pays for supporting the Syrian regime

10. Analysis of Hezbollah operatives killed in the fighting in Syria

11. Appendix: List and pictures of Hezbollah operatives killed in Syria

Iran and Hezbollah Interests in Syria

1. For Iran, preserving the regime of Bashar Assad is of supreme strategic importance: Syria is Iran's most important ally in the so-called "resistance camp" and provides Iran with a firm foothold in the heart of the Middle East. The Iranians are concerned that the collapse of the Assad regime and its replacement by a pro-Western regime are liable not only to damage Iranian influence in Syria and Lebanon, but to weaken its political influence in the Middle East against the United States, Israel and pro-Western Arab countries, and strike a blow to its desire for regional hegemony.

2. Hezbollah, Iran's proxy, has its own reasons to support the Syrian regime and keep it from collapsing: Syria (with Iran) plays a vital role in Hezbollah's military buildup, and in maintaining its offensive and deterrent capabilities against Israel. For Hezbollah, Syria is an important source of advanced weaponry (including long-range rockets and missiles) and the main transit station for the weapons sent from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition, Hezbollah feels religious-sectarian solidarity with the Shi'ites and Alawites in Syria. For years Syria has supported Hezbollah in the internal Lebanese arena and given it backup in its fight against its political opponents (the March 14 Camp). All of the above made Syria, under President Hafez al-Assad and more so under his son Bashar, a strategic ally, giving Hezbollah logistic depth and important political support.

3. Hezbollah's interests and Syria's importance were expressed by Hassan Nasrallah in a speech on May 25, 2013, marking the 13^th anniversary of the IDF's withdrawal from the security zone in south Lebanon. He publicly admitted Hezbollah's participation in the Syrian civil war and elaborated on the claim that by participating Hezbollah was protecting Lebanon, Palestine and Syria (Radio Nur, May 25, 2013):

1) The threat to Lebanon and the Lebanese: Nasrallah claimed that the civil war was not an uprising of the Syrian people against the regime or a demand for reforms, but rather a war led by global jihad-affiliated networks from all over the world (the takfirs, to quote Nasrallah).^[3] Their conquest of regions near the Lebanese border (a hint at the Al-Qusayr region which Hezbollah later took control of) was, he said, "a danger to all Lebanon and Lebanese," not only to Hezbollah or the Shi'ites. He appealed to the Lebanese to consider the thousands of religious-sectarian suicide bombing attacks carried out by global jihad groups in Iraq and to learn from the lesson of their crimes in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Somalia. He also referred to the atrocities carried out by global jihad groups that "rend bodies, shatter heads, burrow into graves and destroy the past…the present and the future, reject every political solution and insist on fighting."

2) The danger of the West's taking control of Syria: What is happening in Syria, according to Nasrallah, is not a "popular revolution" against the regime. Rather, it is an attempt to enforce an American-Western political agenda, compatible with Israel's agenda, on the region, using "regional states" (a hint at rebel-supporting Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Turkey).

3) The danger to the "Palestinian resistance" [i.e., the Palestinian terrorist organizations]: Nasrallah repeatedly stated that Syria was the "backbone of the resistance" and "its support." Therefore, if Syria fell into the hands of the Americans, Israeli, global jihad organizations (the takfirs) and the Arab-Muslim countries supporting the rebels ("the regional cats paws"), the "resistance would be besieged" and Israel would enter Lebanon to enforce its conditions on the Lebanese people.

4. According to Nasrallah, "if Syria falls, Palestine will be lost, the resistance will be lost, and Gaza, the West Bank and holy Jerusalem will be lost. If Syria falls into American, Israeli and fundamentalist hands, then the people of the region and the countries of the regions will be force-marched to hard times, terrible, dark times…" Therefore, "the resistance remain idle and allow its back to be broken and its support to be broken." He stressed that in recent weeks Hezbollah had entered a new phase, "fortifying the resistance and defending its back [i.e., Syria], fortifying Lebanon and defending its back [i.e., Hezbollah]." Hezbollah, he said, would win the campaign and be victorious, as it had been victorious in other campaigns.

5. A current example of the importance of Syria as a transit station for advanced weapons from Iran was the two aerial attacks attributed by the foreign media to Israel, carried out in the Damascus region at the beginning of May 2013. According to a report in The New York Times, American officials said the attacks had targeted a shipment of Fateh-110 surface to surface missiles sent from Iran to Hezbollah. The missiles, according to the article, had been stored in a warehouse in the Damascus international airport and secured by operatives belonging to Hezbollah and the Iranian Qods Force. The missiles were mobile, accurate and solid fueled, and their range covered most of Israeli territory, including the Tel Aviv area. (The New York Times, May 4, 2013).

The Dangers and Potential Opportunities of the Syrian Civil War

6. In addition to protecting vital interests, a military presence on Syrian soil and the construction of armed Shi'ite and Alawite militias in Syria might preserve the Iranian-Hezbollah foothold in Syrian politics and society for the morning after the collapse of the regime. As far as Iran and Hezbollah are concerned, their presence not only props up the Syrian regime but also provides a response to the dangers which may develop in Syria and Lebanon if it collapses or is significantly weakened. There are three possible dangers:

1) The civil war will seep into Lebanon. The collapse of the Syrian regime may lead to political and physical harm to the Alawites and Shi'ites in Syria. The situation is liable to seep into Lebanon and damage its delicate sectarian fabric, encouraging the Sunnis (and members of other sects) to try to harm Hezbollah's political and military power base. That might in turn lead to violent confrontations between Hezbollah and its opponents and in the end harm its military power and political influence in Lebanon. One current example of what might potentially happen if Hezbollah becomes seriously involved in the Syria civil war were the violent confrontations in Tripoli between Sunnis (who oppose the Syrian regime) and Alawites (who support it) which claimed dozens of lives. Other examples were the two rockets fired at the southern suburb of Beirut and Baalbek, both Hezbollah strongholds.^[4]

2) Significant involvement of Western and/or pro-Western Arab-Muslim countries (Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar) in Syria's internal affairs might lead to the establishment of a pro-Western Syrian regime. The new regime might remove Syria from the "resistance camp," adopt pro-Western policies and politically challenge Iranian and Hezbollah influence in Syria, Lebanon and the entire region.

3) Organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad might become stronger, especially the Al-Nusra Front:^[5] Thsee organizations are hostile to Shi'ites and Alawites as well as to Iran and Hezbollah, and consider Shi'ites as infidels. If they become stronger they might genuinely be a danger to the Shi'ites and Alawites in Syria and Lebanon. They might also turn Syria into an exporter of jihadist terrorism and take on Hezbollah's role as "resistance" leader. In addition, their influence might seep into Lebanon from Syria, strengthening the radical Sunni networks hostile to Hezbollah.

7. In addition to finding ways to overcome the dangers, Hezbollah seeks to exploit the potential advantages from the weakening of the Syrian regime and its deepening great dependence on Iran and Hezbollah:

1) Hezbollah wants advanced military capabilities from the Syrian regime, capabilities whose possession might deter Israel and challenge its technological superiority. Some types of military capabilities that might fall into Hezbollah's hands were noted in a speech given by the head of Israeli military intelligence, General Aviv Cochavi (13^th Herzliya Conference, March 13, 2013). He said they included advanced missiles, anti-ship missiles and aerial defense systems. An example of preventing the Syrians from transferring advanced aerial defense systems to Hezbollah was the attack on a convoy carrying advanced Russian SA-17 missiles in January 2013, attributed to Israel. If the missiles had reached Hezbollah they would have endangered the Israeli Air Force's ability to operate over Lebanon (New York Times, May 4, 2013).

2) Hezbollah's desire to acquire advanced military capabilities was publicly expressed in a speech given by Hassan Nasrallah on May 9, 2013. Referring to the attacks on the shipment of Fateh-110 missiles from Iran on May 3 and 5, attributed by the foreign media to Israel,^[6] he said that one of the objectives of the attack had been to prevent "game-changing" weapons from being delivered to Hezbollah ("the resistance"). He claimed that following the attack the Syrian regime made the strategic decision to provide Hezbollah with "a high quality weapon it had not yet received." He said that Hezbollah was ready to accept a "game-changing weapon" which would be used to repel "Israeli aggression" (Speech given by Hassan Nasrallah, Radio Nur, May 9, 2013).^[7]

3) Hezbollah involvement in terrorist activity from the Golan Heights: Another possible advantage considered by Hezbollah would be to turn the Golan Heights into a terrorist front against Israel. Speaking on Radio Nur on May 9, 2013, Nasrallah referred to what he called the opening of a Golan Heights front for attacks by the Syrian regime following the attacks allegedly carried out by Israel. Nasrallah said that "As Syria has stood shoulder to shoulder with the Lebanese people, supported the [Lebanese] popular resistance both physically and morally so that it could liberate south Lebanon, we, the Lebanese resistance [i.e., Hezbollah] declare that we stand shoulder to shoulder with the Syrian popular resistance, and we will provide it with physical and moral support, collaboration and coordination, for the sake of liberating the Syrian Heights."^[8]

Iranian Support for the Syrian Regime

8. Because of Syria's great importance, Iran and Hezbollah, led by the Iranian Qods Force, provide the regime with military, economic, political and propaganda support^[9] in an effort to prevent its collapse and the collapse of the entire "resistance camp." In our assessment, both Iran and Hezbollah work on the assumption that the Syrian regime may still survive and that the clock can be turned back, or as Qods Force commander Suleimani paraphrased at the end of the first year of the Syrian civil war, the Syrian illness will not lead to the death of the Syrian regime (Speech by Suleimani at a meeting in Qom, ISNA, January 19, 2012). However, in our assessment, the weakening of the Syrian regime may lead to disillusioning the leaders of the Iranian regime who may understand theyshould change their emphasis from supporting the regime to organizing for the morning after its collapse.

9. Iran supports the Syrian regime with military advice, weapons, political and propaganda backup, and economic aid. Senior Iranians meet with their Syrian counterparts to coordinate positions regarding both political strategy and at the military-operative level. The figure prominent in directing Iranian support for the Syrian regime is Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Qods Force.

10. Most of Iran's military aid to the Syrian regime is manifested by large quantities of weapon, flown from Iran to Syria in Iranian transport planes, mostly through Iraqi air space.^[10] It was also reported that arms, goods and military equipment for the Syrian regime were flown from Iran to the international airport in Beirut.[^11] In addition, members of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IIRG) were in Syria as advisors and instructors for the Syrian security forces. Iran is alsohelping Syria establish a popular army of Syrian Shi'ites and Alawites using Hezbollah as its subcontractor (See below.). In addition, Iran gives Syria political, propaganda and financial support.^[12]

Mahan Air and Iran Air transport planes at the Damascus airport. The planes brought materiel from Iran to the Syrian regime in 2011-2012 (Photo from the American Treasury Department)

11. IIRG commander Mahmoud Ali Jaafari publicly admitted that Iran was supporting the Syrian regime. At a press conference in Tehran on September 16, 2012, he said that "We are proud to defend Syria, which is a cornerstone of the struggle against Israel. We are contributing advice and our experience." He also admitted that Iran was giving Syria financial support. He denied, however, that Iran had a military presence in Syria, but threatened that Iran would change its policies if Syria were attacked (Al-Hayat, Al-Jazeera, the Free-syria.net website, September 17, 2012). In May 2012 General Ismail Qaani, deputy commander of the Qods Force, admitted that there were Iranian soldiers in Syria supporting Bashar Assad's regime. He said their objective was to help defend the Syrian people and regime from the rebels, and that "If the Islamic Republic were not in Syria, twice as many Syrians would be slaughtered" (ISNA, Iran, May 27, 2012).

12. In our assessment, IIRG soldiers maintain a limited presence in Syria. So far the Iranians have not put organic military units into action against the Syrian rebels and in general they have not been involved in the fighting (although they have occasionally been killed in the crossfire).^[13] On the other hand, in recent months Iranian proxy Hezbollah has increased its involvement in Syria and sent units to participate in fighting on the side of the regime (See below.).

The grave of Raed Muhram Turk, an IIRG officer killed in Damascus during a firefight with the rebels. His grave, in Iran, reads "Born 1/10/1357 (year of the Hegira, i.e., March 30, 1979), died 29/10/1390 (year of the Hegira, i.e., January 19, 2012). Died in Damascus" (Al-Arabiya TV, September 19, 2012).

Iran, Hezbollah and Syria Coordinate Positions

13. Determining a joint strategy, and if necessary redefining it in view of military and political changes, demands frequent coordination between the Iranian leadership and Hezbollah, and between both of them and the leaders of the Syrian regime. According to the Arab and Lebanese media, they occasionally consult with one another:

1) On April 19, 2013, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Ra'i reported that earlier that month Hassan Nasrallah had visited Tehran. While there he met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Qods Force commander Qassem Suleimani and other senior Iranian figures. The reason for his visit was Iran's decision to put its full support behind the Syrian regime. According to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar on April 21, 2013, "sources close to Hezbollah" confirmed that Nasrallah had in fact visited Iran during the first half of April 2013.

2) On March 12, 2013, the Lebanese daily newspaper Al-Shira'a reported that Qods Force commander Qassem Suleimani had visited Syria at the end of February 2013. Returning to Tehran, he presented the Iranian leadership with a fairly bleak picture of the situation of the Syrian regime's military and strategic situation. As a response to Syria's difficulties he suggested increasing the size of the "people's army" by sending Shi'ite volunteers to Syria to make up for the lack of Alawite fighting manpower.

Hezbollah Support for the Syrian Regime

Overview

14. Hezbollah has been giving the Syrian regime increasing amounts of military support as the civil war drags on and the dangers to the regime's survival grow. The support is mainly expressed by sending Hezbollah military-terrorist operatives to fight in Syria, in our assessment several thousand so far. Their presence was important in the campaign that led to the takeover of Al-Qusayr, south of Homs, and in protecting the grave of Al-Set Zaynab, a Shi'ite holy site south of Damascus. Hezbollah also provides the Syrian regime with intelligence and training, and participates in establishing Shi'ite and Alawite armed militias ("the popular army") in preparation for the morning after the possible collapse of the Syrian regime. Hezbollah also struggles against the Syrian regime's opponents inside Lebanon and conducts a pro-Syrian propaganda campaign.

Direct Hezbollah Participation in the Fighting

15. During the first year of the Syrian civil war Hezbollah was careful to keep a low profile in the fighting. In 2012 a limited number of Hezbollah operatives were sent to Syria and served mainly in advisory and security capacities and were not massively involved in the actual fighting. That apparently changed during the first half of 2013, as Iran and Hezbollah realized that the survival of the Syrian regime was seriously endangered, as were their own interests (their military assets and religious-sectarian interests). The change included sending Hezbollah forces to the campaign in Al-Qusayr, which fell into the hands of the Syrian army after heavy fighting with the rebels.

16. According to head of Israel military intelligence General Aviv Cochavi (March 2013), Hezbollah sent several hundred fighters from its special units to Syria. According to media reports, the numbers grew and as of May 2012 there were several thousand.^[14] Hezbollah's fighting in Al-Qusayr symbolized its being sucked deeper into the Syrian morass despite the price it had to pay in the internal Lebanese arena, in the Arab-Muslim world and in its faceoff with Israel (See below.).^[15] In our assessment, it is liable to be sucked deeper into the Syrian civil war as the Assad regime loses the ability to govern and Iran and Hezbollah's concerns grow regarding a collapse of the regime and possible damage to their vital interests.

17. However, so far Hezbollah's direct involvement in the fighting has not extended to the main battle sites and it cannot tip the scales in the war. Its activities have focused on locations where it hasreligious-sectarian interests (Al-Qusayr, the grave of Al-Set Zaynab).^[16] According to a May 4, 2013 article in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Safir Hezbollah's involvement in the fighting in Syria is still local and its goals are narrow. Hezbollah has not yet brought all its weight to bear, an option it may choose if the conflict becomes broader and if more elements hostile to the Assad regime join the war.

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^[1]Full version. This document was updated after the Hebrew Internet version had been issued.
^[2] http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Spokesman/Pages/spokeStart190513.aspx
^[3] In Islamic law, takfir refers to the practice of the extreme Islamists' declaring other Muslims as infidels and thus they may be killed.
^[4] Another current example of the seeping of the Syrian crisis into Lebanon occurred on June 9, 2013, after this document had been written. In Beirut an unprecedented demonstration was held in front of the Iranian embassy against Hezbollah involvement in the Syrian civil war. During the demonstration shots were fired (from and unknown source) and a student activist who organized the demonstration was killed. Lebanese army forces imposed order and instituted a search for the assassin.
^[5] The Al-Nusra Front for Support of the Residents of Greater Syria is the most prominent Al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic organization fighting the Syrian regime. Its name is generally shortened to the Al-Nusra Front.
^[6] Amos Yadlin, head of Institute for National Security Studies, (INSS) wrote an article based on foreign reports which alleged that Israel had carried out the attack. He said that "It is important to understand that this time, for the first time in a decade, Israel took action against a route used for the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah from Iran and Syria. Until 2000, Assad senior limited the arms to Hezbollah...Assad junior, on the other hand, reshuffled the cards...The weapons from Iran arrive by air at the Damascus international airport and from there are transported to Lebanon. Despite UN Security Council Resolution 1701 passed in 2006, which forbids the supply of weapons to Lebanon to any entity other than the Lebanese government, Israel did not act against the arms shipments. However, when it became obvious at the end of the last decade that all of the obstacles to the provision of weapons to Hezbollah had been overcome, Israeli designated four systems of weapons it would have to act to prevent Hezbollah from attaining, even at the risk of escalation: advanced aerial defense systems, long range surface-to-surface missiles, Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles and chemical weapons" (INSS, Overview (242), May 9, 2013) (ITIC translation and emphasis).
^[7] The declaration was accompanied by a threat from "a senior Hezbollah figure." According to the Hezbollah source, the significance of Syrian-Hezbollah solidarity was that a united front had been created against Israel. If Israel, according to the source, were to be foolish enough to risk entering into a war it would be blown back to the Stone Age: "Every strike on an airport will be answered with a strike on an airport and train stations [in Israel]; every strike on a power station will be answered with a strike on the [Israeli] infrastructure; every strike on a seaport will be answered in such a fashion that the new missiles will paralyze Israel's military and commercial naval movements in the Mediterranean Sea. Thus both we and our enemy will simultaneously return to the Stone Age" (Al-Ra'i TV, Kuwait, May 24, 2013)
^[8] In all the years of its existence Hezbollah has never carried out terrorist attacks through the Golan Heights, primarily because for 40 years it has been Syrian policy to preserve quiet along the border with Israel and Hezbollah's preference for using proxies on other fronts. Nasrallah's declaration of his willingness to participate in attacks in the Golan Heights was met with immediate criticism from the Arab and Lebanese media opposing Iran and Hezbollah. For example, the popular London-based Arab newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat wrote that "Hezbollah fighters are entering a new campaign which cannot be expected to succeed, for many reasons, from the geographical nature of the terrain where they are planning to fight, to the lack of popular support in the [Golan Heights] region for the Assad regime, ending with Hezbollah's lack of means and the expected Israeli response" (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, May 11, 2013).
^[9] For further information about the Qods Force, see the August 7, 2012 bulletin “The Quds Force, an elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, spearheads Iran's global terrorist campaign.”
[^10] On a number of occasions in 2012, the American media revealed that Iran was flying cargoes of weapons through Iraqi air space. On March 16, 2012, the Washington Post reported that Iranian plans had flown 30 tons of arms to Syria with manifests indicating they were "agricultural equipment." On September 5, 2012 The New York Times reported that in July 2012 Iran had renewed it shipments of arms to Syria through Iraqi air space. According to another report, based on "Western intelligence services," the Iranians were making daily flights to Syria through Iraqi air space on planes carrying members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and tens of tons of weapons and ammunition (Reuters, September 19, 2012).
^[11] The Internet news site Al-Watan Al-Arabi reported that Beirut's airport had long since become a depot for merchandise, arms and military equipment sent by Iran to Hezbollah and the Syrian regime. Iran, according to the report, used planes belonging to Iran Air and Mahan Air, flying over Iraq and Turkey (Al-Watan Al-Arabi, May 3, 2013).
^[12] The governor of the Central Syrian Bank, Adib Mayala, said that Tehran had opened a line of credit of $1 billion of which Syria had already withdrawn more than half. He added that Syria expected more help from friendly countries, from Iran, Russia and possibly others (Reuters, Damascus, April 24, 2013).
^[13] According to the Syrian and Arab media, several IIRG soldiers have been killed in the fighting in Syria. The rebels have also taken some prisoner. The bodies of those IIRG soldiers killed in the Damascus region were flown to Iran in an Iranian transport plane which had brought the Syrian regime weapons and ammunition (Al-Mukhtasar, Arabic news website, October 1, 2012).
^[14] On April 18, 2013, the All4Syria website, affiliated the Syrian opposition reported that 700 armed fighters had been sent to the Al-Qusayr region. On April 14, 2013, the Saudi Arabian website Al-Watan reported that 1,200 Hezbollah fighters had been sent by sea to the Syrian port of Tartus. On May 19, 2013, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Hayat reported that "knowledgeable French sources" said that France had "definite information" that 1,500 Hezbollah fighters were fighting for the Syrian regime. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said that the French estimated that 3,000-4,000 Hezbollah operatives were involved in the fighting in Syria (Agence France-Presse, May 29, 2013).
^[15] Hezbollah's being sucked into the Syrian civil war is in contrast to the caution various foreign countries (the United States, Iran, Turkey) have shown so far.
^[16] So far the number of Hezbollah operatives is Syria is far smaller than those of the rebels as well as global jihad operatives. According to the speech given by General Aviv Cochavi, head of Israeli military intelligence, in March 2013, there are about 100,000 opposition fighters, and about 10,000 global jihad-affiliated operatives. Hezbollah, in ITIC assessment, has a few thousand operatives (as of May 2013).

Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah leader, gives a speech stressing Hezbollah's determination to support the Syrian regime

Hanging the "Ho, Hussein" banner on the minaret of the mosque (Alarabiya.net website).

Hezbollah operatives celebrate the victory over the rebel forces in Al-Qusayr with a banner reading "Ho, Hussein" (Alarabiya.net website)

Overview[1]

Nasrallah's Speech

The Sectarian Celebration of the Victory at Al-Qusayr

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Some of the weapons uncovered in the northern Nigerian city of Kano

The house in Kano where the weapons were found

Some of the weapons found in the cache

The main suspect, Shi’ite cleric Abdullah Mustapha Berende

Nigerian security forces discover the weapons on board.

Overview

Exposure of the Hezbollah Terrorist Network in Nigeria

Appendix

Iranian Subversion in Nigeria

Detention of an Iranian Terrorist Network in Lagos

Iranian Arms Shipment to Nigeria Exposed (October 2010)

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Overview

Appendix I

Taqrib al-Madhaheb (Rapprochement of the Schools of Thought): Death of a vision

Appendix II

The anti-Shi’ite discourse in radical Sunni Islam: from scripture to sword

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Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi delivers a sermon (May 31, 2013) strongly condemning Iran, Hezbollah, and its leader Hassan Nasrallah

Sheik Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Palestine-info, August 15, 2010)

Ismail Haniyeh, head of the de-facto Hamas administration, kisses Al-Qaradawi’s hand during the sheik’s visit to the Gaza Strip (ikhwanonline.com, May 10, 2013)

A poster carried by Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon

Al-Qaradawi and Bashar al-Asad in better days, when Al-Qaradawi worked for Shi’ite-Sunni rapprochement (all4syria.info)

Overview

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Hezbollah’s terrorist attack in Bulgaria: the remains of the Israeli tour bus after the explosion

Hussein Atris, Hezbollah terrorist operative, taken for interrogation

The Golden Arches hotel in Limassol, one of the sites about which the Hezbollah operative gathered information

Weapons transferred to an Azeri terrorist cell handled by Iran.

Terrorist attack in New Delhi: the Israeli representative’s vehicle after the explosion

Overview

Details

Appendix

Summary of terrorist attacks carried out by Iran and Hezbollah in 2012

Attempted terrorist attacks in Bangkok, Thailand

Blowing up an Israeli tour bus in Burgas, Bulgaria

Thwarted attack targeting Israeli tourists in Cyprus

Attempted attacks in Azerbaijan

Attack on an Israeli diplomat’s car in India

Attempted attack on an embassy car in Georgia

Thwarted attack in Kenya

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The heads of the "resistance camp:" Ahmadinejad, Bashar Assad and Hassan Nasrallah

Mahan Air and Iran Air transport planes at the Damascus airport.

The grave of Raed Muhram Turk, an IIRG officer killed in Damascus during a firefight with the rebels.

Hassan Nasrallah meets with Khamenei in Tehran (Hezbollah website, April 15, 2013).

Poster of Hassan Nasrallah and Bashar Assad (Alankabout, Lebanon, August 17, 2012).

Hassan Nasrallah and Bashar Assad (Hawamir forum website, Saudi Arabia, July 22, 2012).

Hezbollah activists in Lebanon demonstrate in support of the Assad regime (Ilaf website, from All4Syria, July 2012).

Overview[1]

Contents of This Study

Iran and Hezbollah Interests in Syria

The Dangers and Potential Opportunities of the Syrian Civil War

Iranian Support for the Syrian Regime

Iran, Hezbollah and Syria Coordinate Positions

Hezbollah Support for the Syrian Regime

Overview

Direct Hezbollah Participation in the Fighting

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Overview^{^[1]}

Overview^[1]