Tag Archives: Iran

Spotlight on Global Jihad (June 2-7, 2017)

Spotlight on Global Jihad

Spotlight on Global Jihad

The scene of the attack in London (Twitter page of the London Fire Services, June 5, 2017;  Twitter page of the London Metropolitan Police, June 6, 2017).

The scene of the attack in London (Twitter page of the London Fire Services, June 5, 2017; Twitter page of the London Metropolitan Police, June 6, 2017).

The three terrorists involved in the attack (from left to right): KhuramShazad Butt, RachidRedouane, and Youssef Zaghba (London Metropolitan Police website, June 6, 2017).

The three terrorists involved in the attack (from left to right): KhuramShazad Butt, RachidRedouane, and Youssef Zaghba (London Metropolitan Police website, June 6, 2017).

The SDF announces the opening of the “Big Campaign” to liberate Al-Raqqah from ISIS (Enab Baladi, June 6, 2017).

The SDF announces the opening of the “Big Campaign” to liberate Al-Raqqah from ISIS (Enab Baladi, June 6, 2017).

An SDF operative removing ISIS’s flag in the town of Al-Mansoura, southwest of the Al-Ba’ath Dam (Twitter, June 4, 2017).

An SDF operative removing ISIS’s flag in the town of Al-Mansoura, southwest of the Al-Ba’ath Dam (Twitter, June 4, 2017).

ISIS operatives firing at the Syrian forces northeast of the Palmyra grain silos  (Haqq, June 2, 2017).

ISIS operatives firing at the Syrian forces northeast of the Palmyra grain silos (Haqq, June 2, 2017).

The new base northeast of Al-Tanf (Akhbar AdalatHammurabi, June 4, 2017).

The new base northeast of Al-Tanf (Akhbar AdalatHammurabi, June 4, 2017).

Mohammad Hosseini (Enab Baladi, June 6, 2017).

Mohammad Hosseini (Enab Baladi, June 6, 2017).

Suicide bomber codenamed Abu Jihad al-Moslawi, who carried out a suicide bombing attack in the Al-Zanjili neighborhood (Haqq, June 3, 2017).

Suicide bomber codenamed Abu Jihad al-Moslawi, who carried out a suicide bombing attack in the Al-Zanjili neighborhood (Haqq, June 3, 2017).

The three operatives who carried out the suicide bombing attack at the village of Halabsa, north of Baghdad: Abu Omar al-Suri, Abu Mus’ab al-Idlibi, and Abu Omar Bahra (Haqq, June 4, 2017)

The three operatives who carried out the suicide bombing attack at the village of Halabsa, north of Baghdad: Abu Omar al-Suri, Abu Mus’ab al-Idlibi, and Abu Omar Bahra (Haqq, June 4, 2017)

Qassem Soleimani (third from the right) with the Iraqi Shiite militia fighters (Twitter, May 29, 2017).

Qassem Soleimani (third from the right) with the Iraqi Shiite militia fighters (Twitter, May 29, 2017).


Main events of the week

  • The main event of the week was a combined vehicular and stabbing attack on London Bridge, for which ISIS claimed responsibility. Seven people were killed and 48 others were wounded. The attack is part of ISIS’s efforts to carry out showcase attacks during Ramadan in various places around the world (Iraq, Egypt, the Philippines, Afghanistan (?) and now Britain as well). ISIS continues to call on its supporters to carry out attacks in Western countries (the “Crusader countries”), taking advantage of the month of Ramadan.
  • On the ground, pressure on ISIS is increasing: Syria: on June 6, 2017, SDF forces began an attack on the city of Al-Raqqah,with Coalition air support.  According to reports, they are now fighting in one of the eastern neighborhoods of the city. In the Yarmouk basin in the southern Golan Heights, ISIS suffered a severe blow following the killing of senior operatives in an airstrike.In Iraq, Iraqi forces continue to take over neighborhoods in western Mosul from ISIS, and the campaign to take over the city is approaching its final stages.
  • It is worth noting the increasing “competition” between the various international, regional and local forces to demonstrate their presence along the Syrian-Iraqi border (from a strategic perspective with regard to the importance of controlling the border area after the fall of Mosul and Al-Raqqah). This week, Syrian forces reached the area west of Lake Assad, near the Euphrates Valley; The US-led Coalition is supporting the rebel force (Commandos of the Revolution) advancing to the city of Abu Kamal (ISIS’s rear stronghold in the Euphrates Valley); and (once again)Coalition aircraft attacked a force affiliated with the Syrian regime, which apparently included fighters from Shiite militias handled by Iran, which attempted to advance towards Al-Tanf (the Iran-Iraq-Jordan tri-border area); while the Iranians are helping the Shiite militias (the Popular Mobilization) advance along the Iraqi-Syrian border to the city of Al-Qaim, on the Iraqi side of Abu Kamal (Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian 

 

ISIS attacks in Western countries

Combined vehicular and stabbing attack in London: initial overview
  • On the evening of June 3, 2017, a commercial vehicle carrying three terrorists crossed London Bridge, drove onto the sidewalk and began ramming pedestrians. The vehicle then stopped in the nearby entertainment area of Borough Market. The terrorists got out of the vehicle and began to stab passersby with knives. Eight policemen who arrived on the scene eight minutes after receiving the call fired about 50 bullets (an unprecedented number for the British Police) and killed the three terrorists.
  • Seven people were killed and 48 others were wounded (21 of them severely or critically). Some of the casualties are foreign nationals. The wounded include four policemen (The Guardian; the  London Police website;Twitter page of the London Ambulance Service, June 4-6, 2017).
  • Following the attack, British Police made a series of arrests in the suburbs of East London in order to locate possible accomplices of the perpetrators. One of the places searched was apparently the home of one of the terrorists. Police detained 12 suspects, seven women and five men, but they were released without charges being filed. Searches of the area are still ongoing. Following the attack, the safety level of 33 bridges in the city was examined, and barricades were set up on London Bridge (Reuters; The Guardian; London Police website, June 4-6, 2017).
  • On June 5, 2017, British Police reported that investigators had identified the three terrorists and published details about them:
  • KhuramShazad Butt, 27, a British citizen born in Pakistan and married with two children. He lived in the East London Borough of Barking. He was known to the British police and intelligence services because he had previously participated in videos bearing jihadi messages. However, the police allegedly did not have information that could have indicated that he planned to carry out an attack.
  • RachidRedouane, 30, the son of immigrants from Morocco and Libya. He was married to a Scottish woman. According to the identity card found on his body, he lived for some time in Dublin, Ireland. He used another identity, RachidElkhdar (London Police website, June 4-6, 2017).
  • The details of the third terrorist, Youssef Zaghba, were published by the Italian and British media. According to the reports, he was 22 years old, an Italian citizen with an Italian mother and a Moroccan father. According to Italian media reports (Corriere della Serra, La Repubblica), he was arrested at the airport in Bologna attempting to fly to Syria via Turkey. He was interrogated but was released after no evidence was found. According to several reports, his personal phone contained propaganda films and religious sermons confirming his desire to join the Islamic State. An official Italian source claimed that when Zaghba moved to East London, the Italian security services warned the British authorities about him and gave them the information in their possession. However, the London Metropolitan Police said that he was unknown to the British authorities prior to the attack (London Metropolitan Police website; The Guardian, June 6, 2017).
ISIS’s claim of responsibility
  • On June 4, 2017, ISIS issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack. The wording of the statement: “A security source told the Aamaq News Agency that a unit of the Islamic State fighters carried out the attacks in London last night.”In addition, a poster was published in three languages: French, Arabic and English, showing London Bridge in flames and with inscriptions in English and Arabic: “Revenge, No compromise in the security of Muslims” (Haqq, June 5, 2017).

 

  • It should be noted that ISIS has again called on its supporters to carry out terrorist attacks in Britain and in other Western countries during the month of Ramadan.  On June 1, 2017, following the attack in Manchester, ISIS published an editorial in its organ titled “The Blessed Manchester Raid – A New Lesson for the Tyrants of the Crusader Countries.” In the editorial, ISIS promised to continue attacking Britain as well as other Western countries (Al-Naba, June 1, 2017). The Telegram account of the ISIS-affiliated Al-Sawarimagency published a poster with the inscription in English and Arabic: “Kill the Crusader civilians, ram them with, take advantage of Ramadan” (June 4, 2017).

 

Terrorist attack in Australia (?)
  • On June 5, 2017, an armed man entered a building in the city of Melbourne, Australia and murdered one person. He barricaded himself in an apartment and took a woman hostage. The police shot him and killed him. The woman was released unharmed. While he was barricaded in the apartment, the armed man called an Australian news channel, saying that he was carrying out the attack for ISIS and Al-Qaeda. According to the police, the perpetrator of the attack was YacqubKhayre, 29, of Somali descent. He reportedly had a criminal record, and in 2009 he was tried and convicted for planning to attack an army base in Sydney (Express, June 6, 2017).
  • ISIS claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack.According to the announcement, the attack was carried out by a “soldier of the Islamic State” in response to Australia’s involvement in the international Coalition forces against ISIS (Aamaq News Agency, June 5, 2017). So far, it is unclear whether ISIS’s announcement is credible, and the matter is still under investigation.

Main developments in Syria

The campaign to take over Al-Raqqah
  • On June 6, 2017, the SDF forces started the attack on Al-Raqqah, with Coalition air support. Thus, the “Great campaign” to take over the city started after several months of preparations and mopping up the region around Al-Raqqah. The SDF reportedly took over several buildings in the Al-Mashlab neighborhood in east Al-Raqqah (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 6, 2017; Enab Baladi, June 6, 2017).

 

  • A short while before the launch of the attack on Al-Raqqah, an SDF force took over the Al-Ba’ath Dam and the town of Mansoura (about 7 km southwest of the Al-Ba’ath Dam), as part of the process of mopping up the Al-Raqqah region from ISIS presence. Following are the deployment zones of the various forces in the region of Lake Assad.
  • The Russian Defense Ministry announced that its forces would do all they can to prevent the passage of ISIS operatives from Al-Raqqah to other provinces in Syria, such as Homs and Hama. According to the Defense Ministry, SDF forces with US, British and French support, blocked the crossings north of Al-Raqqahbut left open passages south of the city to allow ISIS operatives to leave it. Russia’s Air Force Command in Syria warned that they would foil any attempt by ISIS operatives to leave Al-Raqqah through the open crossing towards Palmyra(Facebook page of the Russian Defense Ministry, June 1, 2017).
Palmyra
  • ISIS reported that its operatives had stopped an attempt by the Syrian forces to advance in the Palmyra region, and said that they had killed forty people:
  • An ISIS suicide bomber codenamed Abu Zayd the Kosovar detonated a car bomb at a staging zone of Syrian forces, near Al-Abbasiyah (about 21 km southeast of Palmyra), killing 21 people (Haqq, June 4, 2017).
  • An ISIS operative codenamed Razaq the Indonesian carried out a suicide bombing attack in the area of Al-Hamad, east of Palmyra, killing 14 people.
  • In the area of the grain silos, about 10 km northeast of Palmyra, ISIS operatives launched an anti-tank missile at the Syrian forces. Five people were killed and two others were wounded (Haqq, June 4, 2017).
Deir ez-Zor
  • In the south of the city of Deir ez-Zor, clashes took place between the Syrian regime forces and ISIS operatives. ISIS operatives attacked the Syrian forces in the area of the military airfield and in the area of the Panorama Roundabout. In addition, a base of the Syrian Army’s 137th Brigade west of Deir ez-Zor was attacked(Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 3, 2017; Sham Network, June 1, 2017). ISIS operatives reportedly had local achievements in these attacks.
  • On the other hand, the Syrian Army reported on more than 70 fatalities among ISIS and the destruction of military equipment following an attack by the Syrian forces against ISIS outposts and operatives in the area of the Euphrates River and the hospital area in Deir ez-Zor (Syrian News Agency, June 1, 2017; Syria-Victory, June 3, 2017).
The Syrian-Iraqi border
  • Muhannadal-Talla, head of the “Commandos of the Revolution” force, reported that his forces and the InternationalCoalitionhad set up a front army base in the area of Al-Zakf, northeast of Al-Tanf, near the border between Syria and Iraq (Khotwa, June 4, 2017).[1]The base is designed to serve as a launching pad for patrols and military activity against ISIS in order to prepare the ground for the takeover of additional territories (Enab Baladi, June 4, 2017). According to the commander of the Al-Tanf base, there are now 150 US soldiers at the new base as well as soldiers of five additional Coalition countries (Al-Monitor, June 1, 2017). In the ITIC's assessment, this base is designed to serve as a front base for the continued advance of the force towards the city of Al-Qaim.
Attack against a pro-Syrian force which tried to advance towards Al-Tanf
  • The US Department of Defense announced on June 6, 2017, that the Coalition forces attacked a pro-Syrian force which tried to advance towards the Coalition base in Al-Tanf. Two pieces of artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, and a tank were destroyed in the attack. The attack was the second of its kind, designed to prevent forces affiliated with the Syrian regime from arriving in Al-Tanf, near the tri-border area of Syria, Iraq and Jordan (on May 18, Coalition warplanes attacked a Syrian force that tried to advance towards Al-Tanf). A spokesman for the Coalitioncountries called on the forces operating in south Syria to focus their efforts on defeating ISIS, which is their common enemy (website of the US Department of Defense, June 6, 2017).
  • On June 6, 2017, it was reported that Mohammad Hosseini, the intelligence officer of the Al-Fatemiyoun Shiite militia, was killed near the Al-Tanf crossing (Enab Baladi, June 6, 2017). Al-Fatemiyoun is an Afghan Shiite military framework operating in Syria, which is directed and supported by Iran. Mohammad Hosseini’s death may indicate that the attacked force included fighters from this unit, which operates in cooperation with the Syrian Army.
The Syrian Army arrives near the Euphrates Valley
  • This week, the Syrian Army took over the town of Maskana, west of Lake Assad (about 36 km southeast of Deir Hafer). In addition, the Syrian Army regained control of two water pumping stations and generators belonging to the pumping station of the town of Al-Khafsa, west of Lake Assad (Al-Hadath, June 4, 2017). Thus, the Syrian arrived near the Euphrates Valley. Their continued advance may bring them closer to the control area of the SDF forces, which began the attack on Al-Raqqah.

 

Southern Syria
Syrian Army operation to remove the rebels from Daraa
  • According to Syrian media reports, on June 5, 2017,the Syrian Army started an operation to retake the city of Daraa from the rebels, including the Al-Nusra Front (i.e., Fateh al-Sham Front). The fighting started at a camp for displaced persons west of the cityand continues in the Manshiyya neighborhood, which the rebels are trying to take over from the Syrian forces (Butulat Al-Jaysh Al-Suri, a website affiliated with the Syrian Army, June 5, 2017).
Airstrike of the Yarmouk Basin hits senior ISIS operatives
  • According to Syrian media reports, on June 6, 2017, unidentified fighter planes,arriving from Jordan, attacked the villages of Jamla and Al-Shajara (Enab Baladi; Khotwa News Agency, June 6, 2017). These villages are held by the Khaled bin Al-Walid Army (ISIS’s Yarmouk Basin). Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, commander (“Supreme Emir”) of the Khaled bin Al-Walid Army, was reportedly killed in the attack. Additional senior commanders were reportedly killed, including the military emir Abu Uday al-Homsi[2](Enab Baladi; Araby 21, June 7, 2017).

Main developments in Iraq

The campaign for the takeover of Mosul
  • The campaign for the takeover of Mosul is approaching its final stage of taking over the Old City, the last significant stronghold remaining in the hands of ISIS. During the week, the Iraqi security forces continued to advance in the western part of the city. Fighting concentrated on the Al-Zanjili neighborhood north of the Old City. A third of it was liberated from ISIS (Nineveh Information Center, June 3-4, 2017). According to Iraqi Police commander’s estimate, there are now about 500 ISIS operatives in west Mosul (Press TV, June 3, 2017).

 

  • ISIS operatives are still fighting against the Iraqi forces. ISIS reported that its operatives had killed over thirty members of the Iraqi security forces in various neighborhoods in west Mosul. According to ISIS’s announcement, they were killed in clashes, sniper shooting and suicide bombing attacks (Haqq, June 3-5, 2017; Al-Jazeera, June 3, 2017).
ISIS’s terror and guerrilla activities throughout Iraq
  • On June 4, 2017, ISIS claimed responsibility for carrying a suicide bombing attack at the headquarters of the regiment (foj) of the Popular Mobilization Units (the Shiite militias) in the village of Halabsa (about 30 km north of Baghdad). The attack was carried out by three operatives who detonated their explosive belts. According to ISIS’s claim of responsibility, 12 Popular Mobilization operatives were killed, including the regiment commander, Aqid (colonel) Ali Kamel al-Shiblawi (Haqq, June 4, 2017).
Shiite militia activity along the Iraqi-Syrian border
  • The force of the Shiite militias (Popular Mobilization Units) which arrived in late May 2017 at the Iraqi-Syrian border started mopping up the border area and moving south. This week, the Popular Mobilization announced that their fighters had taken full control of the city of Ba’aj, about 32 km southeast of Sinjar (Al-Sumaria, June 4, 2017). It seems that the destination of the force is the city of Al-Qaim, a major ISIS stronghold on the Iraqi side of the city of Abu Kamal (which is the destination of a rebel force supported by the Coalition).
  • Photos disseminatedon social media show Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani having his picture taken with Shiite militia fighters near the Iraqi-Syrian border.This may indicate the importance attributed by the Iranians to the Shiite militia move along the Iraqi-Syrian border, having in mind the establishment of an Iranian-Shiite influence zone along the border after the fall of Mosul and Al-Raqqah.

 

Sinai Peninsula and Egypt

Sinai Peninsula
  • Following repeated acts of sabotage on the electricity lines in Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid, causing power outages, the Egyptian Parliament Energy and Environment Committee decided to allocate funds to replace the electricity pylons with underground cables. According to an electricity company representative, the electricity lines have been exposed to acts of sabotage by terrorist operatives since May 2015 (Al-Massa, June 1, 2017).
Global jihad activity in other countries
The Philippines
  • At least 36 people were killed in a shooting attackcarried out on June 1, 2017, at a hotel casino in Manila. Gaming tables were set on fire, and some of the patrons died of asphyxiation as a result of the thick smoke. The terrorist who had carried out the attack was hit by police fire (Reuters, June 3, 2017). ISIS’s East Asia Province announced that about 100 people were killed or wounded after an ISIS operative codenamedAbu al-Khayr al-Arakhbili broke into the hotel and used an assault rifle to fire indiscriminately until he was shot (Haqq, June 3, 2017).
  • Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced that ISIS had no connection with the incident, and that police said that the incident was a robbery that went wrong (Reuters, June 3, 2017). Police sources reported that the perpetrator of the shooting had nothing to do with Islamist radicals. They said that the shooter was a Philippine citizen called Jessie Javier Carlos, who was a gambling addict, lost a lot of money at the casino and incurred heavy debts. He was shot by a security guard and then committed suicide in one of the hotel rooms (Reuters, June 4, 2017).
  • On June 4, 2017, ISIS’s news agencies released a video showing ISIS operatives wreaking havoc on a church in the city of Marawi, in the island of Mindanao, southern Philippines. The operatives were seen destroying statues, taking down the picture of the Pope, tearing down the crucifix and setting fire to pews and religious objects (Al-Sawarim, June 4, 2017; Aamaq, June 4, 2017). Armed operatives affiliated with ISIS took over most of the territory of the city of Marawi in late May 2017.

Propaganda activity

ISIS infographic of suicide bombing attacks in Syria and Iraq
  • ISIS released an infographic summing up the terrorist organization’s activity in Iraq and Syria in May 2017. According to ISIS, its operatives carried out 112 suicide bombing attacks. According to the infographic, a total of 59 attacks were carried out in the city of Mosul and its environs (ISIS’s Nineveh Province); 16 suicide bombing attacks were carried out against the SDF forces; ten against Syrian forces, and three against the rebel forces. A total of 73 suicide bombing attacks were carried out by car bombs, 31 by explosive vests, and eight by explosive belts (Haqq, June 2, 2017).

[1]Originally, the base was set up by the international Coalition countries in 2016 to serve as a training camp for the Free Syrian Army.
[2]The day before the attack, Khaled bin Al-Walid Army executed a group of senior operatives for collaboration with Israel and attempts on the lives of commanders in the organization (Enab Baladi, June 5, 2017).

Spotlight on Iran

May 21 – June 4, 2017 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Masoud Jazaeri, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Iranian army (Tasnim News, May 22, 2017)

Masoud Jazaeri, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Iranian army (Tasnim News, May 22, 2017)

Hossein Salami, IRGC deputy commander (Tasnim News, May 24, 2017)

Hossein Salami, IRGC deputy commander (Tasnim News, May 24, 2017)

Ali Shamkhani (center right) at a meeting with Nikolai Patrushev (second from right) (Asr-e Iran, May 23, 2017).

Ali Shamkhani (center right) at a meeting with Nikolai Patrushev (second from right) (Asr-e Iran, May 23, 2017).

IDF uniform presented to Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi during a visit to Lebanon (Mashreq News, May 24, 2017)

IDF uniform presented to Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi during a visit to Lebanon (Mashreq News, May 24, 2017)

Sha'aban Nasiri, senior IRGC officer, killed in Mosul, Iraq (Twitter, May 26, 2017).

Sha'aban Nasiri, senior IRGC officer, killed in Mosul, Iraq (Twitter, May 26, 2017).

Qasem Soleimani (third from right) with Iraqi Shi'ite militia fighters (Twitter, May 29, 2017).

Qasem Soleimani (third from right) with Iraqi Shi'ite militia fighters (Twitter, May 29, 2017).

Khaled al-Qaddumi meets with Hossein Amir Abdollahian (ircana.ir, May 28, 2017)

Khaled al-Qaddumi meets with Hossein Amir Abdollahian (ircana.ir, May 28, 2017)


Overview
  • Senior Iranian officials responded to remarks made by Donald Trump during his visit to Saudi Arabia by rejecting his claims about Iranian support for terrorism. They said Trump had gone to Saudi Arabia to form a new anti-Iranian coalition and redraw the regional map in Syria and Iraq. The deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) said the statements Trump and the leaders of the Arab states made at the summit meeting in Riyadh were an admission of Iran's regional superiority.
  • Iran and Russia continue coordinating the military campaign in Syria. Iranian President Rouhani spoke on the phone with Vladimir Putin, while Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, met in Russia with Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Russian Security Council. Shamkhani told the Russian newspaper Kommersant that if requested, Iran would consider deploying its soldiers to the "safe zones" in Syria to preserve order and security.
  • The Russian ambassador to Tehran told the Iranian Mehr news agency that Russia was satisfied with Iranian-Russian cooperation in Syria. He added that Russia was convinced the Syrian crisis could not be resolved without Iranian involvement.
  • A high-ranking IRGC officer was killed in battle against ISIS in Mosul, Iraq.
  • New photos circulated on the social networks showing Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, with Iraqi Shi'ite militia fighters on the Syria-Iraq border.
  • Qasem Soleimani congratulated Ismail Haniyeh on being elected head of Hamas's new political bureau based in Qatar, and Yahya al-Sinwar as head of its political bureau in the Gaza Strip. The London-based Saudi Arabian newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat reported that Hamas and Iran had recently reached an agreement to renew Iranian financial support for Hamas.

 

General Information
  • Iranian President Hassan Rouhani rejected the claims of American President Trump regarding Iranian support for Hezbollah and terrorism. During the first press conference held since his recent reelection, Rouhani said Hezbollah was supported and respected by every Lebanese citizen, even Christians and non-Muslims, and calling it a terrorist organization would not solve anything. He defended Iranian involvement in regional affairs, and said Iran would continue supporting Iraq and Syria in their struggle against ISIS and terrorism, both diplomatically and by deploying military advisors (Fars News Agency, May 22, 2017).
  • Hossein Amir Abdollahian, special international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis (Iranian parliament), said on TV that the objectives of Trump's visit to the Middle East were to further American efforts to weaken the "resistance axis," form a new coalition against Iran to curb its regional influence, and redraw the regional map in Syria and Iraq. Regarding the IRGC fighters killed in Syria and Iraq, he said they had sacrificed their lives for the sake of Iran's national security and for regional security, which were one and the same (Mehr, May 22, 2017).
  • Masoud Jazaeri, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Iranian army, said the only way to bring peace and security to the Middle East was through America's withdrawing its forces and ending its support for terrorism and aggression against independent states, carried out by "reactionary regimes dependent [on the West]" (Tasnim, May 22, 2017).
  • Hossein Salami, IRGC deputy commander, said the remarks made by Donald Trump and the Arab leaders at the summit meeting in Riyadh were an admission of Iran's regional superiority. "Fifty heads of state gathered in Saudi Arabia and the only thing they had to say was that Iran was so powerful it could not be restrained, which is a source of pride for us," said Salami (Tasnim, May 24, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • Iranian President Hassan Rouhani spoke on the phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 27, 2017. They discussed bilateral relations and regional developments. Rouhani said their increasing cooperation in Syria was important, and that Iran was determined to continue its cooperation with Russia and Syria (Fars News Agency, May 27, 2017).
  • Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, met in Russia with Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Russian Security Council, on May 23, 2017. They met on the sidelines of the international security conference and discussed Iranian-Russian cooperation in Syria and Iraq, and ways to increase intelligence sharing and improve military and diplomatic coordination. Shamkhani said the military and political successes in the struggle against terrorism, which made it possible to attain a ceasefire in Syria, led the terrorism-sponsoring countries to increase their efforts. He added that the American refusal to implement the Russian-Iranian proposal for an independent investigation into the chemical weapons attack in the town of Khan Shaykhun proved that the United States was looking for an excuse for military intervention in Syria (Asr-e Iran, May 23, 2017).
  • Shamkhani told the Russian newspaper Kommersant that he rejected Trump's claims that Iran undermined regional stability and sponsored terrorism. He said Iran had been fighting terrorism for the past 40 years, while Trump had chosen to begin his first overseas trip by visiting Saudi Arabia, which sponsored and financed terrorists. Shamkhani said the terrorists in Syria and Iraq served as tools of American foreign policy, and that the only group genuinely fighting terrorism was the Iranian-Russian-Syrian-Iraqi coalition. He claimed Iran sought peace and stability for Syria and that if requested, Iran was prepared to consider deploying its troops to preserve order and security in Syrian "safe zones." He objected to American participation in preserving Syrian security because, he said, only the Syrian government was authorized to decide who could be allowed into the country. The Americans, he claimed, supported terrorism and instability in Syria, and the Syrian government therefore had no interest in an American presence (Fars News Agency, May 27, 2017).
  • Levan Jagarian, the Russian ambassador to Tehran, told the Iranian Mehr news agency on May 28, 2017 that Russia was very pleased with its cooperation with Iran in Syria. He said senior Russian and Iranian officials constantly coordinated their Syrian policies. He said Russia rejected the claims made by the United States and some of the Arab leaders that Iran supported regional terrorism. He claimed Iran was itself a victim of terrorism and a serious partner in the fight against it, especially in Syria. He added that according to Russia, Iran played an important role in preserving regional stability and that the crisis in Syria could not be resolved without Iranian involvement. As to the possibility that the Russian air force would again make use of the Iranian military airfield in Hamedan, Jagarian said it could happen if future developments in Syria warranted it.
  • Several Iranian news websites reported that when high-ranking hardline cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi visited Lebanon in April, Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah, presented him with a uniform he claimed had belonged to an Israeli soldier captured during the Second Lebanon War. The uniform was for display in a museum (Mashreq News, May 24, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • Sha'aban Nasiri, a senior IRGC officer and a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, was killed fighting ISIS in Mosul, Iraq, on May 26, 2017.
  • New photos circulated on the social networks show Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, standing next to Iraqi Shi'ite militia fighters on the Syria-Iraq border. Last week Hadi al-Ameri, secretary general of the Shi'ite military Badr movement, said that the militias had advanced to the Syrian border in their fight against ISIS.
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Qasem Soleimani congratulated Ismail Haniyeh on his election to the head of the new Hamas' political bureau in Qatar and Yahya al-Sinwar as head of the political bureau's branch in the Gaza Strip. He wrote that Iran wished for strengthened unity with its friends in Hamas, who were allies in the "resistance axis." He said he hoped Hamas' new leadership would continue strengthening its chosen path of "resistance" and jihad to restore the Palestinian cause to the heart of the Muslims' global struggle to liberate Jerusalem and all of Palestine. He added he also hoped Hamas would counteract the attempts made by "global arrogance" [i.e., the West] and the Zionists to remove jihad from the path of Islam and seize Jerusalem (Fars, May 24, 2017).
  • The London-based Saudi Arabian-sponsored newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat reported on May 30, 2017 that in recent talks held in Lebanon by senior Hamas officials and representatives of the IRGC and Hezbollah, Iran and Hamas agreed, in principle, that Tehran would renew its financial support for Hamas and strengthen bilateral cooperation. The paper, quoting "Palestinian sources," also reported that in the near future Ismail Haniyeh, head of the new Hamas political bureau, would head a Hamas delegation to Tehran to settle disagreements between Iran and Hamas, and strengthen ties following the crisis in relations that began with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Senior Hamas official Musa Abu Marzouq, speaking to the Palestinian newspaper al-Quds, denied the al-Sharq al-Awsat report, calling it false and baseless. He said there had been no changes in Iran-Hamas relations.
  • On May 28, 2017, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, special international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis, met with Khaled al-Qaddumi, Hamas representative in Tehran (Mehr, May 28, 2017).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict May 24 – June 1, 2017)

Improvised rifle belonging to a Palestinian terrorist network that carried out shooting attacks against IDF forces. Two of the terrorists belonged to the Palestinian Authority security forces (Israel Security Agency information unit, May 28, 2017).

Improvised rifle belonging to a Palestinian terrorist network that carried out shooting attacks against IDF forces. Two of the terrorists belonged to the Palestinian Authority security forces (Israel Security Agency information unit, May 28, 2017).

Knife used to stab an IDF soldier at the entrance to Mevo Dotan (Facebook page of the Shehab news agency, June 1, 2017).

Knife used to stab an IDF soldier at the entrance to Mevo Dotan (Facebook page of the Shehab news agency, June 1, 2017).

Knife found in the Palestinian woman's purse near the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron (Facebook page of Shehab, May 30, 2017).

Knife found in the Palestinian woman's purse near the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron (Facebook page of Shehab, May 30, 2017).

Contents of the bag belonging to the two Palestinians (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, May 30, 2017).

Contents of the bag belonging to the two Palestinians (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, May 30, 2017).

Improvised IEDs seized by the Israeli security forces (Israel Security Agency information unit, May 28, 2017).

Improvised IEDs seized by the Israeli security forces (Israel Security Agency information unit, May 28, 2017).

Jamal Muheisen, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, Issa Qaraqe, chairman of the PA's authority for prisoners affairs, and Qadoura Fares, chairman of the Palestinian prisoners club, hold a joint press conference in Ramallah after the Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails end their hunger strike (Wafa, May 27, 2017).

Jamal Muheisen, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, Issa Qaraqe, chairman of the PA's authority for prisoners affairs, and Qadoura Fares, chairman of the Palestinian prisoners club, hold a joint press conference in Ramallah after the Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails end their hunger strike (Wafa, May 27, 2017).

Sabri Sidam, the Palestinian minister of education, and Adnan al-Husseini, the Palestinian minister for Jerusalem affairs, meet in the office of the ministry of education in Ramallah (Dunia al-Watan, May 29, 2017).

Sabri Sidam, the Palestinian minister of education, and Adnan al-Husseini, the Palestinian minister for Jerusalem affairs, meet in the office of the ministry of education in Ramallah (Dunia al-Watan, May 29, 2017).

  • This past week Palestinian popular terrorism was manifested by a stabbing attack at the entrance to the community of Mevo Dotan (northern Samaria) in which an IDF soldier was seriously wounded. The female Palestinian terrorist who carried out the attack was mortally wounded and later died. In addition, a number of terrorist attacks were prevented this week. Palestinians rioted and held demonstrations, however they were less intense than in previous weeks.
  • The Israel Security Agency exposed a Palestinian network that carried out a shooting attack against an IDF force near Tulkarm. The operatives had carried out seven attacks against IDF soldiers and were planning to carry out more. Two of the Palestinians detained were operatives in the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces.
  • This week, after forty days, the hunger strike of the Palestinian prisoners ended. Despite the fact that the strike resulted in very limited achievements for the prisoners, the Palestinians tried to represent its end as a "historic victory." The PA reported that a committee had been appointed to continue negotiations with the Israeli prison authorities. The committee will be headed by Karim Yunis (an Israeli Arab who abducted and murdered IDF soldier Avraham Bromberg) and not Marwan Barghouti (for whom the way the strike ended was apparently a personal blow).
Terrorist Attacks and Attempted Terrorists Attacks
  • June 1, 2017 – Stabbing attack at the entrance to the community of Mevo Dotan (northern Samaria): A Palestinian woman went to the guard post at the entrance to the community. The guard ordered her to halt but she ran towards IDF soldiers stationed at the site and stabbed and seriously wounded one of them. She was shot and mortally wounded, and later died. The Palestinian media reported she was Nuf 'Uqab Abd al-Jabbar Infia't, 16, from the village of Ya'bad, west of Jenin (Watan, June 1, 2017).
Riots, Clashes and Popular Terrorism
  • This past week Palestinian popular terrorism continued with demonstrations, clashes and riots throughout Judea and Samaria, primarily involving the throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails. Israeli security forces prevented a number of attacks and seized weapons. The more prominent incidents were the following:
  • May 31, 2017 – Palestinians threw stones at an Israeli vehicle near the entrance to Kiryat Arba. There were no casualties; the vehicle was damaged (Facebook page of Red Alert, May 31, 2017).
  • May 30, 2017 – The Israeli security forces detained a young Palestinian woman near the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron. A large knife was found in her purse. (Facebook page of Red Alert, May 30, 2017). The Palestinian media reported she was Nur Iman Abdallah Arziqat, 17, from the village of Taffuh, west of Hebron (Facebook page of QudsN, May 30, 2017).
  • May 30, 2017 – Two 17 year-old Palestinians from Jabel Mukaber were detained when Israeli security forces noticed they were carrying a heavy bag. The bag was searched and found to contain two Molotov cocktails ready for throwing, a plastic bottle containing gasoline and a knife, among other items. "Bahaa Alian" was written in Arabic on the bag. (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, May 30, 2017). In September 2015 Bahaa Alian, who lived in Jabel Mukaber, participated in a combined shooting and stabbing attack on a bus in Jerusalem, killing three Israelis.
  • May 26, 2017 – Palestinians threw stones and set fire to tires during a riot near an IDF post in Jericho. An IDF soldier was injured. A number of Palestinians were injured when riot control measures were used (Facebook page of Red Alert, May 26, 2017).
  • May 25, 2017 – Israeli security forces carrying out security operations in the village of Jbba (north of Ramallah) seized large quantities of weapons (Facebook page of Red Alert, May 25, 2017).
  • May 25, 2017 – the Israeli security forces closed a workshop for the manufacture of weapons in the village of Nil'in (Facebook page of Red Alert, May 25, 2017).
  • May 24, 2017 – Palestinians threw stones at Israeli vehicles near Beit Ummar (north of Hebron), inflicting minor injuries on two Israelis (Facebook page of Red Alert, May 24, 2017).

Significant Terrorist Attacks in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem since September 2015

Detention of Palestinians, Including Operatives of the PA Security Forces
  • The Israeli security forces detained a number of Palestinians suspected of involvement in a shooting attack targeting IDF soldiers at the Jabara roadblock near Tulkarm on April 29, 2017. Two of the detainees were operatives in the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces. One had been imprisoned in Israel and released in the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal (2011). Interrogation revealed that before the attack at the Jabara roadblock the terrorist operatives had attacked IDF forces seven times, and attempted two unsuccessful attacks. They planned to purchase standard weapons but could not because of funding problems. The interrogation led to the seizure of a large quantity of weapons, including two improvised assault rifles and several pipe bombs (Israel Security Agency, May 28, 2017).
Rocket Fire Attacking Israel
  • This past week no rocket hits were identified in Israeli territory.

Rocket Fire Attacking Israel

The crisis of the Humanitarian Situation
  • Civilian sources in the Gaza Strip, among them a spokesman for the ministry of health, continue to warn of a crisis in the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, especially with regard to health and the supply of electricity. Ashraf al-Qidra, spokesman for the ministry of health, said fuel necessary to power Gazan hospitals would run out before the end of the week and that there was a serious lack of medicine throughout the Gaza Strip (Twitter account of 'Ajel from Palestine, May 28, 2017). Electricity in the Gaza Strip is now provided in cycles of four hours with a 12-hour hiatus in power (alresalah.net, May 28, 2017).
  • The Hamas energy authority and the Gaza Strip electric company reported they would agree to the conditions of the Palestinian national consensus government to resolve the crisis. However, during a meeting of the heads of the Ramallah-based Palestinian energy authority and international actors, it was stressed that "solving the electricity crisis in the Gaza Strip is by ending the division [between the PA and the Gaza Strip] and enabling the Government of National Reconciliation to work freely in the Gaza Strip and by transferring the electricity bills collected by the distribution company in Gaza to the Ministry of Finance without preconditions" (Wafa, May 29, 2017).
  • Binali Yildirim, prime minister of Turkey, spoke to Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas' political bureau, about the energy crisis. Yildirim promised he would help the Gaza Strip, including donating Turkish funds to purchase fuel for the power plant (Hamas movement website, May 31, 2017).
Exposure of Hamas Exploitation of Civilians Entering Israeli for Medical Treatment
  • The Israel Security Agency exposed a number of instances in which Hamas exploited Gazans entering Israel for medical treatment to transfer funds to terrorist networks. One case was Amal Ahmed, a 52 year-old woman from Jabalia, who accompanied her son when he went to Jerusalem for cancer treatments. She was asked by Hamas to transfer funds and various items to terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria. Another case was Laila Hamoud, 61, also from Jabalia, who had an entrance visa for Israel. She entered Israel accompanying her grandson, who was being treated for cancer. She carried funds from Hamas terrorists in the Gaza Strip to pay for Hamas activities in Samaria (Israel Security Agency, May 28, 2017).
Execution of Suspected Killers of Mazen Fuqahaa
  • On May 25, 2017, the Hamas ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip ordered the execution of three Palestinians accused of killing Mazen Fuqahaa. They were executed publicly in the center of Gaza City in the presence of thousands of Palestinians, including senior officials, without representatives of the media (Safa, may 25, 2017). The ministry of the interior warned against publishing pictures or videos of the executions (Palinfo, May 25, 2017). Iyad al-Bazam, spokesman for the ministry of the interior, said the execution of the three suspects showed collaborators that Israel would not help them (alresalah.net, May 25, 2017).
  • At the inauguration of the Mazen Fuqahaa Mosque in the Gaza Strip, senior Hamas figure Khalil al-Haya said Fuqahaa's death had initiated a new security and military war between Hamas and Israel. He said the Palestinian people did not fear death and had not been broken by the siege, and that the deaths of their commanders only strengthened them. He added that the relations between Hamas and the [so-called Israeli] occupation were struggle and fighting. He called on the Palestinian people to unite their weapons and join the Palestinian national plan to end the occupation, return the refugees and establish a Palestinian state on all the land of Palestine (al-Aqsa TV, May 26, 2017).

Left: The Mazen Fuqahaa mosque in al-Zawayda, in the central Gaza Strip. Right: Khalil al-Haya, a member of Hamas' political bureau, delivers the Friday sermon at the inauguration of the mosque (Facebook page of Shehab, May 27, 2017).
Left: The Mazen Fuqahaa mosque in al-Zawayda, in the central Gaza Strip. Right: Khalil al-Haya, a member of Hamas' political bureau, delivers the Friday sermon at the inauguration of the mosque (Facebook page of Shehab, May 27, 2017).

Iran-Hamas Relations
  • Palestinian sources reported that in recent weeks senior figures from Hamas, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah held meetings in Lebanon, and decided to renew Iranian financial support for Hamas. It was also reported that in the near future Ismail Haniyeh, who was elected head of the new Hamas' political bureau, would visit Iran (Dunia al-Watan, May 30, 2017). In response Musa Abu Marzouq, a member of Hamas' political bureau, said there had been no change in the relations between Hamas and Iran, and that all the information published about the issue was false (al-Quds, May 30, 2017).
  • Mahmoud al-Zahar, also a member of Hamas' political bureau, said Hamas had to align itself with every country that supported it, especially Iran, as long as the country did not harm the principles or holy sites of the Palestinian people. He called for a reassessment of relations with Iran, Turkey, Korea and other countries (Dunia al-Watan, May 25, 2017).
Special Israeli Gestures for Ramadan
  • In accordance with a decision made by Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, Yoav Mordechai, the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, announced a series of gestures to improve everyday life for the Palestinians during the Muslim religious month of Ramadan: residents of Judea and Samaria will be able to visit relatives in Israel between Sundays and Thursdays and during Eid al-Fitr; be able to enter the Temple Mount for the Friday prayers; the opening hours of the crossings will be extended; and residents of Judea and Samaria will be able to go abroad through Ben-Gurion International Airport. In addition, residents of the Gaza Strip will be permitted to pray on the Temple Mount (website of the Israeli Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories, May 21, 2017).
Palestinian Prisoners End Hunger Strike
  • On May 27, 2017, the eve of Ramadan, after 40 days, the Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails ended their hunger strike. The Israel Prison Authority reported that there had been no negotiations with the prisoners, but that they had reached "understandings." According to the Prison Authority announcement, the only prisoners' demand, from a list of many, met by the authorities and the Red Cross was increasing the frequency of visits by relatives to two per month. According to the prison authorities, 1,578 prisoners participated in the strike for various periods of time, most of them Fatah operatives. More than 750 ended their strike before May 27. Eighteen prisoners were hospitalized because of the strike (Haaretz, May 27, 2017).
  • The Palestinian National Committee to Support the Prisoners' Hunger Strike held a press conference in Ramallah to announcement the end of the strike. Jamal Muheisen, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, claimed that after negotiations with the Israeli prison authorities lasting more than 20 hours, an agreement had been reached. He claimed victory for the struggle of the prisoners and the Palestinian people. He congratulated the prisoners on their firm stance and thanked them. He also thanked Mahmoud Abbas for defending them. He called in the International Criminal Court to oversee Israel and the "crimes" it had committed against the prisoners (al-Aqsa, May 27, 2017). In the meantime, the PA announced the appointment of a committee of strike leaders to continue negotiations with the Prison Administration. The committee chairman is Karim Yunis,[2] who was recently appointed to Fatah's Central Committee, chosen over Marwan Barghouti (alresalah.net, May 29, 2017).
  • While the strike resulted in few achievements, the Palestinians represented its end as a victory. Marches and rallies were held in a number of locations in Judea and Samaria to mark the prisoners' "victory" (Wafa, May 27, 2017). Some of the responses to the end of the strike were the following:
  • Marwan Barghouti claimed the hunger strike was stopped to give the prison authorities an opportunity to find common discourse with the prisoners. He said [without specifying] that "unless promises are kept" the prisoners would resume the strike. He called on Mahmoud Abbas and all the Palestinian organizations to fulfill their commitments to the prisoners and do their utmost to effect their release. He also called for conditioning the resumption of negotiations on the release of prisoners and detainees (almayadeen.net, May 30, 2017).
  • Issa Qaraqe, chairman of the PA prisoners' and released prisoners' authority, held a press conference where he claimed the agreement was "a terrific achievement and historic victory" for the strike, the most serious since 1976.[3] He claimed that beyond the great achievement for the prisoners, the strike also chalked up political achievements, such as the appointment of prisoner leader Karim Yunis to Fatah's Central Committee. He claimed the prisoners had received 80% of their demands but said a number of issues remained open, and therefore the committee headed by Yunis had been appointed to discuss them (Filastin al-Yawm, May 29, 2017).
  • Rami Hamdallah, prime minister of the Palestinian national consensus government, posted his congratulations to the prisoners on his Facebook page. He claimed the victory proved to the world that the Palestinians' will power had prevailed (Facebook page of Rami Hamdallah, May 27, 2017). During a Palestinian government meeting he congratulated the prisoners and referred to the end of hunger strike as a "victory" (Wafa, May 30, 2017).

Celebrating the end of the hunger strike. Left: Relatives of prisoners in a protest tent in Jenin (Palinfo Twitter account, May 27, 2017). Right: Palestinians take to the streets in Ramallah (Wafa, May 27, 2017).
Celebrating the end of the hunger strike. Left: Relatives of prisoners in a protest tent in Jenin (Palinfo Twitter account, May 27, 2017). Right: Palestinians take to the streets in Ramallah (Wafa, May 27, 2017).

PA Objections to Israeli Plans for East Jerusalem
  • The government of Israel accepted a suggestion from the ministries of education and Jerusalem affairs and heritage to appoint an inter-ministerial committee to devise a program to reduce social and economic gaps in east Jerusalem (website of the Prime Minister's office, May 28, 2017). One of the goals of the program is to improve the quality of the education in east Jerusalem, especially by encouraging the introduction of the Israeli curriculum into east Jerusalem schools.
  • The decision led Sabri Sidam, PA minister of education, and Adnan al-Husseini, PA minister for Jerusalem affairs, to meet with senior Palestinian ministry of education figures at the ministry's office in Ramallah. They warned of Israel's intention to "Judaize" the curriculum currently taught in east Jerusalem schools. They asked that all means be employed to keep Israel from carrying out its plan (Dunia al-Watan and Ma'an, May 29, 2017)
  • The PA ministry of education said in a statement that funding a government five-year plan to improve education in east Jerusalem proved Israel wanted to attack the foundations of Palestinian national identity. The ministry warned of the "dangers" inherent in the Israeli program, which proved Israel's way of thinking and policies were oppression, racism and disdain for international laws. According to the statement, for the sake of preserving Palestinian national identity, as part of its educational program in Jerusalem the ministry would use all available means to fight the Israeli government plan (Wafa, May 28, 2017).

[1]A significant attack is defined by the ITIC as involving shooting, stabbing, a vehicle, the use of IEDs, or a combination of the above. Stones and Molotov cocktails thrown by Palestinians are not included.
[2]Karim Yunis, an Israeli Arab who lives in the town of 'Ara in Wadi 'Ara in central Israeli, holds an Israeli identity card. He and his brotherabducted and murdered Israeli soldier Avraham Bromberg in 1981, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2012 his sentenced was reduced to 40 years by Israeli President Shimon Peres. His brother was released in the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal. Karim Yunis became one of the prominent leaders of the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.
[3]Since the end of the 1960s Palestinian security prisoners have been trying to improve their conditions and change their status. The hunger strike is one of their main "weapons" in the prisoners' arsenal. In 1976 Palestinian security prisoners struck for 65 days. Their demands included books, notebooks, freedom from work within the prison and longer showers.

Iranian Support for Palestinian Terrorism: This year funds were again transferred to families of shaheeds in the Gaza Strip by the Iranian Martyrs Foundation through the PIJ-affiliated al-Ansar charity association


The al-Ansar charity association and the Iranian Palestinian Martyrs Foundation announce the distribution of funds to the families of shaheeds killed between the beginning of the second intifada and June 31 [according to the original], 2014 (Facebook page of the al-Ansar charity association, May 21, 2017).
The al-Ansar charity association and the Iranian Palestinian Martyrs Foundation announce the distribution of funds to the families of shaheeds killed between the beginning of the second intifada and June 31 [according to the original], 2014 (Facebook page of the al-Ansar charity association, May 21, 2017).

The Iranian Martyrs Foundation, through the al-Ansar Charity Association, Transfers Funds to Families of Palestinian Shaheeds

1.   On May 21, 2017, the al-Ansar charity association, which operates in the Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation announced they would grant financial support to the families of shaheedskilled between the beginning of the second intifada (the "al-Aqsa intifada') and June 31 [sic], 2014 (Operation Protective Edge). The sum mentioned was $2 million, and the distribution of the funds has already begun. Apparently money for the families of shaheeds killed in Operation Protective Edge will be distributed separately, as in previous years. In ITIC assessment the total sum of funds transferred from the Iranian Martyrs Foundation to the al-Ansar charity association is $2.9 million. Thus over the past three years, in ITIC assessment, Iran has transferred about $8.7 million.

2.   The al-Ansar charity associationin the Gaza Strip isaffiliated with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),the second most important terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip. The PIJhas close ties with Iran, from which it receives both military and financial support. Al-Ansar was established during the second intifada (2001) and is in effect the operative arm of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation in the Gaza Strip, used by the Foundation as a pipeline to funnel funds into the Gaza Strip, in indirect support of terrorism. The money also serves to increase Iran's influence among the Palestinian peopleand sends a message to the Sunni Arab worldthat it is Iran which is supporting the Palestinians in their struggle against Israel.

3.   The Iranian Martyrs Foundation, which sends large amounts of money to al-Ansar every year, is an Iranian foundationestablished by the Ayatollah Khomeini to support the families of fighters killed in the Iran-Iraq War. The Foundation has a branch in Lebanon supporting Hezbollah, and a Palestinian branch, also located in Lebanon, which transfers funds to the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria. In 2007 the Iranian Martyrs Foundation and its branches in Lebanon were designated by the American Department of the Treasury as sponsoring terrorism because they gave funds to Hezbollah, Hamas and the PIJ(See the Appendix). In 2003 Israel outlawed al-Ansar, but it renewed its activity after Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005.

4.   Since the days of the second intifada, Islamic charity associations affiliated with terrorist organizations operating the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria have served as pipelines channeling Iranian financial support to the Palestinians. The money sent by Iran is earmarked for the social services that support the terrorist organizations. Past experience has shown that the funds intended for social services can trickle into the military-terrorist wings of the various terrorist organizations, despite their official title of "funds for charity" (the Ayatollah Khomeini gave religious justification for diverting Muslim funds intended for charitable purposes, into supporting the Palestinians instead).

 

5.   In ITIC assessment, the funds are being transferred on the occasion of the Muslim religious month of Ramadan, which began on May 27, 2017. (Last year as well, al-Ansar distributed funds to the families of shaheeds during Ramadan). However, Iran's public declaration of transferring the funds may also be regarded as defying the pressure reportedly exerted on the Palestinian Authority (PA) by the United States and Israel not to give payments to the families of shaheeds and prisoners in Israeli jails.

The Current al-Ansar Money Transfer

6.   Nasser al-Sheikh Ali, spokesman for the al-Ansar charity association in the Gaza Strip, recently said that al-Ansar and the Iranian Martyrs Foundation would together transfer the sum of $2 million to the families of shaheeds in the Gaza Strip. The money would be given to the families of shaheeds killed between the beginning of the second intifada (the "al-Aqsa intifada") and June 31 [sic], 2014. He claimed the money would be distributed through post officebranchesto about 5,000families. The family of an unmarried shaheed would receive $300 and the family of a married shaheed would receive $600(Filastin al-Yawm and al-Istaqlal, May 21, 2017).

7.   On May 21, 2017, al-Ansar issued a statement as to how the funds would be distributed: family members of shaheeds can go to the association's offices between May 23, 2017, when distribution begins, and June 5, 2017, where they will be given checks. They will then be directed to various post office branchesdesignated by al-Ansar where the checks can be cashed. A visitor to the al-Ansar Facebook page asked why funds were not being provided for the shaheeds of Operation Protective Edge, and was told, "That will happen soon, if Allah so wishes" (al-Ansar website, Facebook page and Twitter account May 21, 2017).

Funds Distributed to Families of Shaheeds and Prisoners, 2015-2-16

8.   The Iranians distributed funds to the families of shaheeds and prisoners in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria in 2015 and 2016as well.

a.   On February 24, 2016, the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon held a press conference in the Iranian embassy where he announced Iran's intention to give financial support to the "al-Quds intifada"(the name Hamas gave to the wave of Palestinian population terrorism). Iran, he said, would give $7,000 to the family of every shaheed and $30,000 to every family whose house was razed by Israel. The total amount is estimated at about $2 million. In ITIC assessment, the Iranian objective was to encourage the wave of anti-Israel terrorism. The funds would be transferred by the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation, circumventing the PA. The PA was strongly critical of the announcement, which it regarded as attempted Iranian subversion. It is unclear how much money was actually transferred and by what means.[1]

Press conference held in the Iranian embassy in Beirut where Mohammad Fateh Ali, Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, announced the proposed Iranian financial support for the al-Quds intifada. Also present was Osama Hamdan, in charge of Hamas' external relations. The sign in the background reads, "Press conference to implement the Tehran announcement regarding support for the Al-Quds intifada." The Arabic at the lower left reads, "Iran's embassy in Beirut" (YouTube, February 24, 2016).
 Press conference held in the Iranian embassy in Beirut where Mohammad Fateh Ali, Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, announced the proposed Iranian financial support for the al-Quds intifada. Also present was Osama Hamdan, in charge of Hamas' external relations. The sign in the background reads, "Press conference to implement the Tehran announcement regarding support for the Al-Quds intifada." The Arabic at the lower left reads, "Iran's embassy in Beirut" (YouTube, February 24, 2016).

b.   During Ramadan 2016[2] al-Ansar distributed funds to the families of shaheeds killed during Operation Protective Edge. According to the association, $631,000was distributed to the first group of families of 1,630 shaheeds (al-Wataniya news agency, June 25, 2016). During the first half of June 2016 funds were distributed to the families of shaheeds killed between the beginning of the second intifada and June 31 [sic], 2014(al-Ansar website, May 31, 2016). Abu Khaled, (apparently Nasser al-Sheikh Ali, deputy head of al-Ansar, and apparently also the association's spokesman), thanked the Islamic Republic of Iran and its leadership for their support during an interview with Iran's al-Alam TV channel (July 2, 2016).

Abu Khaled, deputy chairman of the al-Ansar charity association in the Gaza Strip, was interviewed by Iran's al-Alam TV at the association's offices in Gaza. He thanked the Islamic Republic and the Iranian leadership for financial support. At the left are pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei (al-Alam TV, July 2, 2016).
Abu Khaled, deputy chairman of the al-Ansar charity association in the Gaza Strip, was interviewed by Iran's al-Alam TV at the association's offices in Gaza. He thanked the Islamic Republic and the Iranian leadership for financial support. At the left are pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei (al-Alam TV, July 2, 2016).

Left: "Iran is with the Palestinian people until after victory and liberation." In the upper left corner is the al-Ansar charity association logo; the Iranian Martyrs Foundation logo is at the upper right. Right: Screenshot of a program broadcast on the Iranian al-Alam TV channel in the Gaza Strip regarding distribution points for Iranian aid in the Gaza Strip during Ramadan, 2016. The upper inscription reads, "al-Ansar charity association. The shaheed foundation – Palestine. Iran with the families of the shaheeds. Ramadan in Gaza. Iranian support for the families in the Gaza Strip continues during the blessed month" (al-Alam TV, July 2, 2016).
Left: "Iran is with the Palestinian people until after victory and liberation." In the upper left corner is the al-Ansar charity association logo; the Iranian Martyrs Foundation logo is at the upper right. Right: Screenshot of a program broadcast on the Iranian al-Alam TV channel in the Gaza Strip regarding distribution points for Iranian aid in the Gaza Strip during Ramadan, 2016. The upper inscription reads, "al-Ansar charity association. The shaheed foundation – Palestine. Iran with the families of the shaheeds. Ramadan in Gaza. Iranian support for the families in the Gaza Strip continues during the blessed month" (al-Alam TV, July 2, 2016).

c.   On April 12, 2015, al-Ansar announced the distribution of $2 million to the families of 5,000 shaheedswho had been killed between the beginning of the second intifada and June 31 [sic], 2014. The funds would be transferred by the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation (al-Ansar website, April 12, 2015; al-Ansar Facebook page, April 5, 2015).[3]

d.   On January 18, 2015, al-Ansar called on residents of the Gaza Strip whose sons had been killed during Operation Protective Edge to bring the relevant documents to arrange for the transfer of funds from the Iranian Martyrs Foundation. About 2,200 families would each receive $400. The sum totalof the Iranian Martyrs Foundation transfer was estimated at about $900,000(the same amount can be estimated for both 2016 and 2017). The money was distributed through post office branches in the Gaza Strip.

Estimated Amount Transferred from Iran to al-Ansar, 2015-2017

9.   According to the ITIC's partial information, there is a pattern of transferring funds to the Gaza Strip by the Iranian Martyrs Foundation through the al-Ansar charity association (as in 2015-2017).

a.   The sum total of $2 millionis paid annually to the families of shaheeds killed between the second intifada and Operation Protective Edge (September 2000 to June 2014).

b.   The sum total of $900,000 has been paid annually to the families of 2,200 shaheeds killed in Operation Protective Edge. So far this year the funds have not been transferred.

10.       In ITIC assessment, the Iranian Martyrs Foundation transfers $2.9 to the al-Ansar charity association every year, to be distributed to the families of shaheeds. The total for 2015, 2016 and 2017 is estimated at about $8.7 million dollars. In addition, Iran may use other channels besides al-Ansar to transfer funds to the Gaza Strip. The Iranian Martyrs Foundation also transfers money to the families of shaheeds and families whose houses were razed by Israel in Judea and Samaria, through so far unknown channels.

 

Appendix
American Treasury Statement (July 24, 2007) regarding the Iranian Martyrs Foundation[4]

1.   On July 24, 2007, the American Treasury Department designated the Iranian Martyrs Foundation under Executive Order 13224.[5] According to the Department, the Iranian Martyrs Foundation "channels financial support from Iran to several terrorist organizations in the Levant, including Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). To this end, the Martyrs Foundation established branches in Lebanon staffed by leaders and members of these same terrorist groups. Martyrs Foundation branches in Lebanon have also provided financial support to the families of killed or imprisoned Hizballah and PIJ members, including suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories" [ITIC emphasis throughout].

2.   The statement continued, "In addition to fundraising responsibilities senior Martyrs Foundation officials were directly involved in Hizballah operations against Israel during the July-August 2006 conflict. In addition, a Lebanon-based leader of the Martyrs Foundation has directed and financed terrorist cells in the Gaza Strip that worked with Hizballah and PIJ" (Website of the American Treasury Department, July 24, 2007).

[1]See the March 2, 2016 bulletin, "Encouragement for the Palestinian Terrorist Campaign through Financial Support. Iran announces its intention to provide funds for the families of Palestinian shaheeds and families whose houses were demolished by Israel."
[2]In 2016 Ramadan began on June 6 and ended on July 4.
[3]See the April 29, 2015 bulletin, "Iranian Support for Palestinian Terrorism: Funds Transferred to Gazan Shaheeds' Families by Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Affiliated Al-Ansar Charity Association."
[4]https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp503.aspx
[5]https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/122570.htm

Spotlight on Global Jihad (May 18-24, 2017)

Spotlight on Global Jihad

Spotlight on Global Jihad

Participants in the Arab-Islamic-American summit in Riyadh (the official Twitter page of the summit, May 21, 2017)

Participants in the Arab-Islamic-American summit in Riyadh (the official Twitter page of the summit, May 21, 2017)

The Syrian Army on the Damascus-Baghdad highway, about 100 km from the Al-Tanf Crossing (Yusha Yuseef Twitter account, May 24, 2017)

The Syrian Army on the Damascus-Baghdad highway, about 100 km from the Al-Tanf Crossing (Yusha Yuseef Twitter account, May 24, 2017)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the press conference (Russian Foreign Ministry’s website, May 19, 2017)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the press conference (Russian Foreign Ministry’s website, May 19, 2017)

Insignia of the “Revolution Commando,” a rebel organization operating in the Al-Tanf region under US support (Twitter account).

Insignia of the “Revolution Commando,” a rebel organization operating in the Al-Tanf region under US support (Twitter account).

A “Revolution Commando” force (Baladi News, May 18, 2017).

A “Revolution Commando” force (Baladi News, May 18, 2017).

ID cards of Syrian Army soldiers killed fighting with ISIS north of the T-4 military airfield.

ID cards of Syrian Army soldiers killed fighting with ISIS north of the T-4 military airfield.

The Iraqi forces fighting in west Mosul (Nineveh Information Center, May 20, 2017)

The Iraqi forces fighting in west Mosul (Nineveh Information Center, May 20, 2017)

Abu Khattab al-Iraqi, an ISIS suicide bomber who blew himself up in west Mosul (Haqq, May 16, 2017)

Abu Khattab al-Iraqi, an ISIS suicide bomber who blew himself up in west Mosul (Haqq, May 16, 2017)

Infographic released by ISIS on May 24, 2017, summing up the terrorist organization’s activity in Mosul between April 18, 2017, and May 17, 2017. According to ISIS, it has carried out a variety of terrorist attacks, including 44 suicide bombing attacks, causing 750 fatalities among the Iraqi security forces (Haqq, May 24, 2017)

Infographic released by ISIS on May 24, 2017, summing up the terrorist organization’s activity in Mosul between April 18, 2017, and May 17, 2017. According to ISIS, it has carried out a variety of terrorist attacks, including 44 suicide bombing attacks, causing 750 fatalities among the Iraqi security forces (Haqq, May 24, 2017)

The scene of the attack at the Al-Dora neighborhood in Baghdad (Sumar News, May 19, 2017)

The scene of the attack at the Al-Dora neighborhood in Baghdad (Sumar News, May 19, 2017)

Operatives of ISIS’s Sinai Province (Haqq, May 20, 2017)

Operatives of ISIS’s Sinai Province (Haqq, May 20, 2017)

ISIS’s claim of responsibility for the attack in Manchester (Aamaq, May 23, 2017).

ISIS’s claim of responsibility for the attack in Manchester (Aamaq, May 23, 2017).

Infographic published by ISIS following the attack in Manchester, with the heading “The attack in Manchester, one of the most deadly attacks against the Crusaders in Britain.”  The text on the bottom reads: “62 days after the vehicular operation in front of the Parliament in London on March 22, 2017.” On the upper left, there is a picture of the Manchester Arena. The text on the lower left reads: “One of the soldiers of the Islamic State planted explosive devices in the Arena in Manchester, killing 30 and wounding 70 others” (Al-Sawarim, May 23, 2017).

Infographic published by ISIS following the attack in Manchester, with the heading “The attack in Manchester, one of the most deadly attacks against the Crusaders in Britain.” The text on the bottom reads: “62 days after the vehicular operation in front of the Parliament in London on March 22, 2017.” On the upper left, there is a picture of the Manchester Arena. The text on the lower left reads: “One of the soldiers of the Islamic State planted explosive devices in the Arena in Manchester, killing 30 and wounding 70 others” (Al-Sawarim, May 23, 2017).


Main events of the week[1]

  • The main event of the week was the US airstrike on a Syrian mechanized force advancing towards the Al-Tanf border crossing in the Syrian-Jordanian-Iraqi tri-border area. The force was composed of Syrian soldiers, Hezbollah operatives and Shiite militias handled by Iran. The force’s takeover of the Al-Tanf area could have significantly harmed the efforts of the United States and Jordan to create a security buffer zone along the Syrian-Jordanian border and could have enabled the Syrian regime and the Iranians to control an important section of the Damascus-Baghdad highway.
  • The airstrike led to media confrontations between the US and Russia. However, when the dust settled, senior officials from both armies began to discuss the question of how to prevent friction between Russia and the US in eastern Syria (in light of the imminent campaign to take over Al-Raqqah, ISIS’s so-called capital in Syria). According to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army, the US has given Russia a detailed plan on this issue, which is currently under discussion.
  • In Manchester, Great Britain, a terrorist attack was carried out following an American pop singer’s performance, leaving 22 people dead and about 60 wounded. The attack was carried out by detonating an IED while the audience was on its way out. The terrorist killed was identified as a Manchester native of Libyan descent. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack.

 

The coalition countries

Riyadh Declaration: Close cooperation between the US and Arab and Islamic countries in the fight against terrorism
  • On May 21, 2017, a summit conference was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with the participation of US President Trump and leaders or representatives from 55 Arab and Islamic countries. At the end of the summit a declaration was issued, focusing on cooperation between the various countries in the fight against terrorism and extremism. Following are the main points of the declaration (SPA, Saudi Arabia’s official news agency):
  • Establishing a close partnershipbetween the leaders of the Arab and Islamic countries and the US leader to confront extremism and terrorism, achieving peace, stability and development, on regional as well as international stages.
  • The countries are committed to combating terrorism in all its forms.The leaders affirmed the commitment of their States to combat terrorism in all its forms, address its intellectual roots, dry up its sources of funding and take all necessary measures to prevent and combat terrorist crimes in close cooperation among their states.
  • The leaders welcomed the establishment of a global center for countering extremist thought to take base in Riyadh.The center’s strategic objectives are to combat intellectual, media and digital extremism and promote coexistence and tolerance among peoples.
  • Exchanging information on foreign fighters and their movements between the terrorist organizations, in order to prevent terrorist attacks.
  • Forming an Islamic Military Coalition to combat terrorism, which will provide a reserve force of 34,000 fighters.The objective of the force will be to support operations against terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria, when needed.
  • Fighting against the financing of terrorism, including the establishment of a terrorist financing targeting center to be hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh.
  • The leaders explained their countries’ rejection of any attempt to draw a link between terrorism and any religion, culture or race, affirming their determination to protect and promote a culture of tolerance, coexistence and constructive cooperation among different countries, religions and cultures. The leaders emphasized the importance of renewing and rationalizing intellectual discourse to be consistent with moderate Islam, which calls for tolerance, love, mercy and peace, stressing that the misconceptions about Islam (i.e., those linking Islam to terrorism)must be addressed and clarified.
  • The leaders confirmed their absolute rejection of the practices of the Iranian regime designed to destabilize the security and stability of the region and the world at large. The leaders condemned the Iranian regime's hostile positions and continuing interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. The leaders underlined the dangerous Iranian ballistic missile program. The leaders who participated in the summit called for fighting against Iran’s subversive activities through cooperation between the countries.
  • In order torealize these principles, the leaders called for following-up the programs and activities in areas of partnership between the United States and the Arab and Muslim countries.
  • In the ITIC’s assessment, this detailed statement reflects a step up, at least declaratively, by Arab and Islamic countries regarding strengthening cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism (including in concrete areas such as financing terrorism and intelligence cooperation). The declaration also calls for the formulation of plans and the establishment of specific mechanisms for its implementation (which will be based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). The practical test of the Riyadh Declaration will be the willingness of the various countries to implement it and to inject practical content into its various clauses (mainly the strengthening of cooperation in the campaign against ISIS and the jihadi organizations in Syria and Iraq, and in all matters related to curbing Iran’s terrorism and subversion).
  • In the ITIC’s assessment, what is behind the declaration is a deal of sorts between the US and Saudi Arabia: President Trump has agreed to stop linking terrorism with Islam, recognized Saudi Arabia’s senior status in the Arab and Muslim world, and gave great prominence to the struggle against the Iranian regime. The Saudis, on their part, have helped the US mobilize dozens of Arab and Islamic countries to join the partnership against extremism (at least declaratively), join the fight against the ideological roots of terrorism, and promote moderate and tolerant Islam.

 

Turkey’s President: Turkey will not take part in the campaign to take over Al-Raqqah
  • nAfter his meeting with US President Donald Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that Turkey cannot be prevented from taking part in making decisions regarding Syria because Turkey is present in the war zones in Syria and Iraq (Hürriyet Daily News, May 18, 2017). Erdoğan added that Turkey would not take part in the campaign to take over Al-Raqqah because the US intends to include Kurdish forces in it. He added that Turkey would not hesitate to launch another operation like Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria (Reuters, May 18, 2017).  

Main developments in Syria

Status of the ceasefire (the Astana Agreement)
  • The ceasefire in the four fighting zones designated in the Astana Agreement as de-escalation zones is still mostly observed. However, local confrontations continued in the various zones, mainly in Daraa and the Damascus area.
The tri-border area of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan
  • On May 18, 2017, the coalition warplanes attacked a mechanized Syrian force which advanced toward the area of the Al-Tanf crossing in the tri-border area of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. According to various reports, the force also included operatives from Hezbollah and the Shiite militias operating in Syria on behalf of Iran. Sources in the Syrian opposition reported about eight fatalities and two wounded among the Syrian Army (Zaman Al-Wasl, May 19, 2017). According to another source, the Syrian Army, Hezbollah and the Iraqi Shiite militias had 35 fatalities (Local Coordination Committees, May 19, 2017). According to Syrian sources, the Syrian Army (i.e., implicitly, the force attacked by the US) was on the Damascus-Baghdad highway, about 100 km from the Al-Tanf border crossing (Butulat Al-Jaysh Al-Suri, a website affiliated with the Syrian Army, May 21, 2017; Yusha Yuseef Twitter account, May 24, 2017).

 

  • The attack had wide-spread media repercussions and triggered an exchange of accusations between the US on the one hand, and Russia and Iran, Syria’s allies, on the other:
  • According to an American official source, the US attacked Syrian forces loyal to the Assad regime at the Al-Tanf area. According to the source, these forces entered the de-escalation zone without authorization and therefore were perceived as a threat. According to an announcement by the coalition forces, those forces posed a threat to the US troops, and the attack was preceded by warning shots (AP, May 19, 2017). According to US administration officials and experts, the attack at Al-Tanf was carried out against the backdrop of Iran’s attempt to achieve strategic control of an area which represents a corridor of sorts leading to Baghdad from Lebanon and Syria, and from there – to Tehran. US Secretary of Defense James Mattis said at a press conference that the force which was attacked was advancing in a manner that threatened a rebel camp near the Jordanian border, where American advisors were staying (Washington Post, May 20, 2017).
  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrovsaid at a press conference that the US attack was illegal and violated Syria’s sovereignty. According to Lavrov, the purpose of the attack was to encourage the opposition and the radical organizations to fight against the Syrian government. He expressed his concern that the idea of fighting against ISIS was starting to erode (TASS; the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website, May 19, 2017).
  • In the ITIC's assessment, the objective of the Syrian force was to take over the Al-Tanf region, thereby significantly compromising the US and Jordanian efforts to establish a security buffer zone along the Syrian-Jordanian border. Taking over the Al-Tanf region would have allowed the Syrian regime and the Iranians to monitor the Damascus-Baghdad highway, which passes near the tri-border area. In addition, such a takeover would have cut off the rebel force (“Revolution Commando”) which was dispatched, under US support (May 14, 2017), from the Al-Tanf area to the city of Abu Kamal held by ISIS.[2]

 

  • Noteworthy is the participation of Hezbollah and Shiite militias (in the ITIC's assessment, under Iranian instruction) in the Syrian Army’s attempts to take over key areas in east Syria. A Hezbollah force takes part in the Syrian Army’s advance toward Lake Assad and the Euphrates Valley (as noted above), and another force has been integrated into the Syrian force which was dispatched to take over the Al-Tanf area. According to the Iranian Fars News Agency, 3,000 Hezbollah operatives were brought from sites along the Syrian-Lebanese border and in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley to take part in operations in the Syrian Desert. Fars News Agency also reported, based on an informed source, that forces loyal to the Syrian regime would not allow the US and its allies to establish a buffer zone in southern Syria to serve as a shelter for the “militants” (Fars, a news agency affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, May 18, 2017).
  • Confrontations in the media aside, it seems that the incident in Al-Tanf prompted the US and Russia to start intense negotiations between senior officials of the two armies, which were intended to prevent an armed confrontation between the two countries in east Syria. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford said at a press conference that the US had offered Russia a detailed plan, which is now discussed between the two countries. This plan was intended to avoid friction and separate the operations of the two armies, ensure that the US campaign is conducted against ISIS, and protect the lives of the Americans stationed in the area. According to Dunford, the Russian military is eager to find a way to prevent an armed confrontation between Russia and the US in the Deir ez-Zor area and the Euphrates Valley (Washington Post, May 20, 2017).

 

The campaign for the takeover of Al-Raqqah
Mopping up the Tabqa area
  • This week, the SDF forces continued mopping up the Tabqa area, after taking over the city and the dam on the Euphrates River. Local clashes occurred between the SDF and ISIS. SDF forces reportedly took over several additional villages north and east of Tabqa (Sham Network, May 18, 20, 2017). Another fighting zone between the SDF forces and ISIS was the area of Hanida, about 16 km east of Tabqa, on the southern bank of the Euphrates River (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, May 20, 2017).
The Syrian Army’s advance towards the Euphrates Valley
  • After the Syrian forces had taken over the Al-Jarrah airfield last week, they continued their advance toward the town of Maskana, west of Lake Assad (about 17 km southeast of Al-Jarrah). The Syrian Army fired artillery at territories held by ISIS in the rural area near the town. At the same time, Russian warplanes carried out airstrikes (Sham Network, May 17, 2017; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, May 20, 2017).

 

  • ISIS announced that over 22 Syrian Army soldiers and operatives of the [Shiite] militias operating with them had been killed and others had been wounded in clashes that took place south of the Al-Jarrah airfield. According to ISIS, during the clashes, its operatives detonated a car bomb near a village situated about 2.5 km south of the airfield. A tank and an APC of the Syrian Army were damaged, and an off-road vehicle was destroyed (Haqq, May 20, 2017).
Palmyra area
  • The Syrian Army still hasn’t been able to stabilize the situation in the Palmyra area. ISIS released photos showing weapons and equipment seized from the Syrian Army by ISIS operatives after a battle waged in the area north of the T-4 military airfield (west of Palmyra). The photos show personal weapons and ammunition, anti-tank missiles and a launcher, an APC, a bulldozer and a truck, as well as military ID cards and bodies of the Syrian soldiers (Haqq, May 19, 2017).
Damascus area
  • According to Syrian media reports, ISIS has started to prepare for evacuating its strongholds south of Damascus, mainly the Al-Yarmouk refugee camp and the town of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad nearby (Al-Watan, May 21, 2017). ISIS opened registration centers for the evacuees (Al-Sham Network website, May 21, 2017). The operatives and residents who will be evacuated will be transferred to ISIS’s territories in the east, including the areas of Al-Raqqah and Deir ez-Zor (Rai Al-Youm, May 21, 2017).

Main developments in Iraq

The campaign for the takeover of Mosul
  • This week, the Iraqi security forces took over additional neighborhoods in west Mosul. ISIS’s enclave is shrinking. According to a report by an Iraqi forces commander on May 20, 2017, ISIS is now holding a territory of mere 8 km in west Mosul (AP, May 20, 2017).

 

ISIS’s response
  • ISIS continued to carry out terror and guerrilla activities both in west Mosul and outside the city. On May 21, 2017, a senior Iraqi official announced that six Iraqi Army soldiers had been killed and four others had been wounded as a result of the detonation of a car bomb by a suicide bomber northwest of Mosul. In yet another suicide bombing attack in the western part of the city, eight soldiers were killed and nine others were wounded (Anatolia, May 21, 2017).
  • In addition, ISIS operated in several other cities in Iraq:
  • Baghdad: On May 19, 2017, two car bombs exploded in the south Baghdad neighborhood of Al-Dora. One of them was driven by a suicide bomber, and the other, which exploded immediately after the first, was driven by two suicide bombers. As a result of the attack, 13 people were killed and 15 others were wounded (Al-Sumaria, May 19, 2017). ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks (Haqq, May 20, 2017; Al-Sawarim, May 20, 2017).
  • Kirkuk Province: The Kurdish forces announced that they had repelled a large-scale ISIS attack south of the city of Kirkuk (Kurdistan 24, May 18, 2017). That same day, an Iraqi source reported that two Peshmerga soldiers had been killed in the area, as well as another soldier from a Turkmen force, operating in coordination with the Peshmerga (Al-Quds Al-Araby, May 18, 2017).
  • Basra Province: A suicide bomber detonated his vehicle at the Rumeila checkpoint on the highway near the city of Basra. Eight people were killed, including two soldiers (Al-Arabiya, May 19, 2017). ISIS claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing attack by a car bomb in the city of Basra (Haqq, May 20, 2017; Al-Aan Channel, May 19, 2017).
  • Thearea of the city of Baiji: ISIS claimed responsibility for killing three Iraqi soldiers in an attack carried out by the organization’s operatives against Iraqi Army outposts in the area of Jabal Makhul, about 10 km north of Baiji (Haqq, May 20, 2017).

Sinai Peninsula

  • ISIS claimed responsibility for a series of terrorist attacks carried out against the Egyptian security forces in Al-Arish: On May 20, 2017, ISIS announced that four Egyptian policemen were killed by sniper fire at a checkpoint in south Al-Arish. An IED was activated in south Al-Arish against an Egyptian Army armored vehicle. An IED activated in Al-Bahr Street in Al-Arish destroyed an Egyptian Army bullet-proof vehicle. Yet another IED was activated against an M-113 APC in central Al-Arish (Haqq, May 20, 2017).
  • Ibn Taymiyyah Center (an institute affiliated with the Salafist-jihadi movement in the Gaza Strip) and ISIS’s Haqq website reported that Subhi Mohammad al-Attar had been killed in Sinai “fighting the Sharia wars.” Subhi al-Attar is the nephew of Ra’ed al-Attar, Hamas military wing commander who was killed during Operation Protective Edge. According to ISIS’s Haqq website, Subhi Mohammad al-Attar “migrated” to ISIS’s Sinai Caliphate State several months ago, along with other young Palestinians, including operatives of Hamas and its military wing. Several years ago, Subhi al-Attar tried to move to Sinai but was returned to Rafah by the smugglers (Ibn Taymiyyah Center; Haqq, May 20, 2017).
  • The ITIC believes that Subhi al-Attar’s move to Sinai represents a phenomenon of Gaza Strip Palestinians, mainly belonging to Hamas, joining the ranks of ISIS’s Sinai Province. Recently, ISIS reported that another Gaza Strip Palestinian, called Ibrahim Daoud Abu Mohsen, was killed in Sinai. The scope of this phenomenon is not clear, but it is evident that ISIS is trying to attract media coverage to the Palestinians joining its ranks, to spite Hamas and try to drive a wedge between it and Egypt.

 

The conduct of the Islamic State

The Islamic State’s financial conduct
  • According to the head of the currency authority in the Islamic State, the “Islamic currency” project announced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is continuing, despite the obstacles facing the organization. This project has reached the important stage of beginning to trade in three types of coins: gold, silver and copper. According to him, all the ministries and offices of the Islamic State are using the currency. All the goods in the Islamic State can be purchased in this currency alone. He called on all Muslims to get rid of any currency that was not issued by the Islamic State and added that one of the goals of the project was to destroy the “Jewish-controlled” world economy (Al-Naba, May 18, 2017).

Global jihad activity in other countries

Deadly terrorist attack in Manchester (updated to May 24, 2017)
  • On the night of May 22, 2017, at the end of a performance by American pop singer Ariana Grande, a deadly terrorist attack was carried out as the audience was leaving the Manchester Arena. A total of 22 people were killed in the attack, many of them teenagers, and about 60 were wounded. Greater Manchester Police Chief Constable Ian Hopkins said that at this stage he believed the explosion was carried out by one person, who detonated an IED at the scene of the attack (BBC, May 23, 2017). Prime Minister Theresa May convened the British government for an emergency session. She noted that this was the deadliest incident since July 2005, when four Muslims, all of them British citizens, killed 52 people in a suicide bombing attack in London’s transport system (BBC, May 23, 2017).
  • Speaking at a press conference (May 23, 2017), Chief Constable Hopkins said that the terrorist killed in the attack was Salman Ramadan Abedi. The terrorist was born in Manchester in 1994 to parents who had fled Libya during the Qaddafi regime. He was the second of four brothers. The family initially lived in London and later moved to Manchester. He attended a local school and began studying business administration at Salford University in 2014. At some point he abandoned his studies. He was known to the British security services. About three weeks ago, he visited Libya, returning a few days before he carried out the attack. He may have also visited Syria. Security sources believe he was trained in Libya. He recently underwent a process of religious radicalization, wearing a jellabiya and praying at a local mosque. His elder brother Ismail is a teacher of Quranic studies. The British security services are investigating his recent trips to Libya (The Telegraph, May 24, 2017).
  • ISIS claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack.On May 23, 2017, ISIS’s Aamaq News Agency issued a claim of responsibility in Arabic, English and other languages. The claim of responsibility reads: “[…] a soldier of the Khilafah managed to place explosive devices in the midst of the gatherings of the Crusaders in the British city of Manchester […]. The explosive devices were detonated in the shameless concert arena, resulting in 30 Crusaders being killed and 70 others being wounded.”  The claim of responsibility ends with the threat: “And what comes next will be more severe on the worshipers of the Cross and their allies […]” (Aamaq, May 23, 2017).
Attack on the state radio building in Afghanistan
  •  The Khorasan Province of the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack on the Afghan state radio building in the eastern part of the city of Jalalabad, in the Nangarhar Province.The attack killed at least six people, apparently including two policemen, and wounded at least 17 others. Four operatives reportedly participated in the attack. One of them blew himself up at the entrance to the building. Three others were killed in an exchange of fire that lasted 3-4 hours (Reuters, May 17, 2017). ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, which was carried out by two brothers who were ISIS operatives (Haqq, May 17, 2017).

[1]Due to the holiday of Shavuot, publication of next week's Information Bulletin will be delayed.
[2]The incident at Al-Tanf apparently stalled or curbed the advance of the force to the city of Abu Kamal. In the meantime, ISIS reportedly booby-trapped the roads leading to Abu Kamal and dug trenches to protect its operatives (Orient News, May 23, 2017). 

Spotlight on Iran

May 7 – 21, 2017, 2017 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry (ISNA, May 14, 2017).

Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry (ISNA, May 14, 2017).

Ali-Reza Qabadi, killed in Syria (Twitter, May 17, 2017)

Ali-Reza Qabadi, killed in Syria (Twitter, May 17, 2017)

The Iranian ambassador to Iraq meets with Ayatollah Ali Sistani's representative (Mehr, date, 2017).

The Iranian ambassador to Iraq meets with Ayatollah Ali Sistani's representative (Mehr, date, 2017).


Overview
  • A commander of an IRGC brigade spoke in an interview about the IRGC's activities in Syria. He said Iran was operating with three regional headquarters in Syria. He claimed Iran did not provide financial support for Syrian fighters but only vital military advice for Syrian army operations. He also said the widespread rumors of the alleged death of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, seriously lowered the fighters' morale, causing them to retreat from the front until the rumors were disproved.
  • An article published by the Iranian Diplomacy website claimed that Iran had no choice but to recognize the seniority of Russia's role in Syria and rely on Moscow to protect its interests in Syria. It also asserted that Iran's ability to influence developments in Syria was less than that of Russia and some Arab states.
  • Fars News agency, which is affiliated with the IRGC, published a commentary warning of the United States' intention to increase its presence in Iraq once the campaign against ISIS ends. To that end the Americans, according to Fars, are planning to establish a buffer zone between Syria and Iraq to curb Iran's influence and halt the advance of Shi'ite militias to the Iraq-Syria border.
  • Iraj Masjedi, the new Iranian ambassador to Iraq, paid a visit to the Shi'ite holy city of Karbala where he met with the provincial governor, high-ranking clerics and a representative of Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most senior Iraqi Shi'ite cleric.
  • The Iranian foreign minister congratulated Ismail Haniyeh on his election to the post of head of Hamas' political bureau.

 

General Information
  • Interviewed by the daily al-Araby al-Jadeed on May 13, 2017, Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, claimed Iran was not militarily involved in Yemen and that Saudi Arabia had made a serious mistake by attacking the country. He claimed Iran was prepared to hold talks with Saudi Arabia if the Saudis changed their anti-Iranian policies and stopped issuing anti-Iranian statements. Regarding Syria, he said that since the beginning of the civil war, Iran's position had been that the Syrians had to decide their fate themselves.
Iranian Intervention in Syria
  • Ali-Reza Qabadi, an IRGC fighter, was killed in the Syrian city of Hama on May 16, 2017.
  • Interviewed by the daily Jaam-e Jam on May 7, 2017, Javad Qorbani, aka Abu-Zahedeh, 38, a commander of an IRGC brigade, elaborated on the IRGC's activities in Syria. He said Iran operated three regional headquarters in Syria: the Hazrat-e Roqayyeh headquarters in Aleppo; the Nabi Mokarram Islam headquarters, responsible for the area between Damascus and Aleppo as far as Daraa; and the Hazrat-e Zeynab headquarters, responsible for the area between Damascus and southern Syria. He said he was in charge of the Hazrat-e Zeynab headquarters, which was simultaneously responsible for the fighting on 29 fronts.
  • Qorbani was also asked about the support Iran gave to the Syrian forces, and said that despite the Syrian army's financial hardships, Iran did not provide financial support for the fighters, only vital military advice that would allow them to continue fighting.
  • He said he admired Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force. He added that during Iranian-Syrian talks about Russian military participation in Syria, Russian president Vladimir Putin insisted on discussing the issue with Soleimani personally to receive guarantees about Russia's entrance into the war. He said that the rumors spread last year about Soleimani's alleged death had seriously lowered morale, and that many fighters from Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan had retreated from the fighting front until morale was restored when Soleimani was interviewed, proving he was alive.
  • Qorbani praised the Afghan and Pakistani fighters in Syria, saying they were prepared to sacrifice their lives to defend the Iranian fighters. He said that there were currently many trained IRGC Basij fighters in the Tehran area who were prepared to deploy to Syria to fight, but that authorization had not yet been given.
  • An article published by the Iranian Diplomacy website on May 14, 2017, claimed that Iran has no choice but to recognize Russia's senior role in Syria. Ali Mousavi Khalkhali, the site's deputy editor, asserted that Iran's international status was inferior to Russia's, and that unlike Russia, Iran was not capable of nor had any interest in negotiating directly with the United States about Syria's future. Iran's ability to influence developments in Syria was also limited because as opposed to the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran had no direct ties to the armed groups operating in Syria. While such groups had been weakened, especially after the takeover of Aleppo, they continued to threaten the Syrian regime because they still controlled Syria territory and received support from the Arab states. In view of the situation, Iran had no choice but to rely on Russia to guard Iranian interests in Syria. Russia, claimed Khalkhali, needed Iran and Hezbollah to secure its own interests in Syria, since its military success in Syria depended on the ground activity of Iran and its allies. At a time of increasing tension between Iran and the Arab states, Iran had no choice but to strengthen its ties with Russia and rely on Moscow to secure its interests.
  • It was not the first time the Iranian Diplomacy website, which is affiliated with circles within the Iranian foreign ministry, published editorial comment reflecting Iran's growing recognition of Russia's rising status in Syria at the expense of Iran. At the end of March the site posted an article by a senior official in the Iranian foreign ministry who opined that Russia's air support for the Syrian army and the international advantages Moscow could provide for the Syrian regime made it more important than Iran for Bashar Assad, who was forming closer ties with Russia and turning his back on Iran.
  • During the daily press briefing on May 15, 2017, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer said the United States remained open to working together with Russia and Iran to find a solution leading to a stable and united Syria. However for the United States, Iran and Russia to work together to bring an end to the violence in Syria, Russia and Iran had to acknowledge the atrocities of the Assad regime and use their influence to stop them.
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • On May 7, 2017, the Fars news agency, which is affiliated with the IRGC, published a commentary warning that the United States was planning to increase its presence in Iraq at the end of the campaign against ISIS to ensure American and Israeli security interests. The United States, according to the report, sought control of Iraq's oil and gas fields. The United States also wanted to exploit the tribes near the Iraqi-Syrian border and the lack of regional economic and cultural development to form closer ties with radical Sunni groups in the area to be able to exert pressure on the Syrian and Iraqi governments. The United States would also seek to create a buffer zone between Syria and Iraq that would cut off the members of the "resistance front" from one another, prevent the creation of a "Shi'ite crescent" from Tehran to south Lebanon through Baghdad and Damascus, and halt the advance of the Iraqi Shi'ite militias towards the Iraq-Syria border.
  • Last week Iraj Masjedi, Iran's new ambassador to Iraq, paid a visit to the Shi'ite holy city of Karbala where he met with the provincial governor and high-ranking Shi'ite clerics. He met with Abdul Mahdi Karbalai, representative of Ayatollah Ali Sistani, to discuss joint Iranian-Iraqi development projects for the Shi'ite shrines in Iraq and preparations for the annual pilgrimage to Karbala. Masjedi also met with senior clerics Mohammad Taqi al-Modaressi and Sayed Mortada al-Qazvin. Meeting with Akeel al-Turaihi, the governor of Karbala, Masjedi said Iran and Iraq had to increase their cooperation in developing the shrines and that Iran would do its utmost to improve security in Iraq (IRNA, May 16, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iranian foreign minister, congratulated Ismail Haniyeh on his election to the position of head of Hamas' new political bureau. He sent him a letter wishing him success in shouldering his new responsibility and hopes that he would cause the failure of the plots of the "Zionist enemy" and its allies, who were working against Muslim unity, trying to destroy the Palestinian cause and crush the resistance of the Islamic nation. He reiterated Iran's continuing support for the resistance of the Palestinian people (ISNA, May 10, 2017).
  • The international committee to support the Palestinian intifada issued an announcement for Nakba Day (May 15) stating that Iran stressed its continuing support for the Palestinians' "right of return" to their lands and condemned the "crimes of the Zionist regime against the Palestinians." It went on to say that holding a referendum among the "original residents of historical Palestine" to determine their future was the only solution for the liberation of Palestine. It called on Muslims to "speak out" and demand the world assure the liberation of Palestine (Fars News Agency, May 15, 2017).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.