Tag Archives: Iran

Terrorism in Cyberspace: Hezbollah’s Internet Network*

Published: 04/03/2013

Hezbollah sends Iranian messages of deterrence to Israel and boasts of its military capabilities

Hezbollah's main war room (Al-Manar website, December 18, 2012).

A Hezbollah sectorial operations room (Al-Manar website, December 25, 2012)

Hezbollah pickup mounted with a rocket launcher (Al-Manar website, December 25, 2012).

Picture posted on the forum of Sayid Hassan Nasrallah's admirers: Nasrallah and Khamenei under the title "Admirer of Khamenei."

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Overview

1. For Hezbollah, its cyberspace presence is of great importance, and is considered by both Hezbollah and Iran as an important weapon in the battle for hearts and minds. Hezbollah and Iran use the Internet for both internal information and indoctrination (in Lebanon, the Shi'ites and its own operatives) and external pro-Iranian propaganda (especially the Arab-Muslim world and the West). The network enables Hezbollah to circumvent the limitations placed on its other media (television, radio, the press) by the West, especially the United States.

2. Today Hezbollah's vast media network includes a satellite television channel (Al-Manar TV), a radio station (Radio Nur), the press (Al-Ahad/Al-Intiqad) and network of websites. Hezbollah also uses the social networks, YouTube and various Lebanese media which it does not own but which are affiliated with it, to publicize its positions and policies (for example, the newspaper Al-Akhbar and the Al-Mayadeen TV channel).

3. During the past decade Hezbollah developed an extensive Internet presence, much larger than those of the other terrorist organizations. Since the Second Lebanon War (2006), and with greater intensity during the past year, Hezbollah has increased its Internet presence, improved its quality and upgraded it technically. Currently (updated to March 2013) Hezbollah has more than 20 websites in seven languages, some of them news sites and some of them relating to specific issues. The sites are used by senior Hezbollah figures, the organization's social institutions, its media and several important Shi'ite villages in south Lebanon where Hezbollah is entrenched.

4. From the point of view of a terrorist organization like Hezbollah, developing and maintaining such a broad Internet network in particular and its media empire in general is very expensive. It also necessitates technical capabilities and trained manpower. In our assessment, Iran supports the development and maintenance of Hezbollah's Internet presence and media empire, which exceed, both in extent and capabilities, Hezbollah's needs in Lebanon per se. In addition, Iran itself operates two Farsi websites devoted to Hezbollah.

5. The propaganda and information strategy of Hezbollah's websites is uniform, and both serves the organization and promotes Iran's ideology and political agenda. In our assessment, media strategy is formulated by Hassan Nasrallah and the Hezbollah leadership, based on overall Iranian strategy. Hezbollah's media policy is coordinated with Iran, whose policies and considerations are well known to senior Hezbollah figures.

The Main Themes of Hezbollah's Websites

6. The main themes of Hezbollah's websites are the following:

1) Glorifying the organization, representing it as a force gaining in strength while Israel is represented as growing weaker and about to collapse: That includes messages of deterrence for Israel, which also serve Iranian strategy. Such messages were more conspicuous during the past year, resulting from the open discourse between Israel and Iran regarding the international sanctions imposed on Iran.

Glorifying Hezbollah: Scenes from a 17-part Al-Manar TV documentary entitled "What if Hezbollah were defeated," broadcast beginning December 17, 2012

2) Fostering the personality cults of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and of Hezbollah shaheeds, represented as heroes and role models. The three principle shaheeds commemorated by the organization are Sheikh Gharb Kharb, Sheikh Abbas Musawi and Imad Mughnieh.

3) Legitimizing terrorism towards Israel and the West by cultivating the ideologies of shahada (death as a martyr for the sake of Allah), muqawama ("resistance") and jihad; at the same time, there is strong condemnation of any Arab or Palestinian peace process and the agreements or arrangements with Israeli they might produce.

4) The hate industry: Vicious propaganda and incitement against Israel, the Zionist Movement, the Jewish people, the United States and the West. Hezbollah rejects the existence of the State of Israel, calling for its annihilation and the establishment of a Palestinian state on the ruins.

5) Disseminating Iranian Islamic Shi'ite ideology based on the principles set down by the Ayatollah Khomeini, including hatred for the United States, the West, Israel and the Jewish people. Hezbollah websites also promote the personality cult of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, representing Hassan Nasrallah as one of his supporters and admirers.

6) Promoting Hezbollah and Iran's political agenda: Hezbollah's websites support Iranian policy in the Middle East and its positions concerning the United States and the West. They also foster the "resistance camp," which includes Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations. During the past year Hezbollah's media, including its websites, were enlisted in a propaganda campaign to support the Assad regime in Syria it defaming and criticizing the Syrian opposition and the popular uprising.

Hezbollah's Target Audiences

7. The main target audience of Hezbollah's websites is Lebanon, especially the Lebanese Shi'ite population. Hezbollah wants Shi'ite support and to recruit its members as fighters in its ranks. Another important target audience is Iran. In our assessment, its second priority is the Arab-Muslim world, whose support it also needs. Third in importance are the West and Israel, especially their Arab-Muslim communities (exposed to anti-Israeli and anti-Western as well as pro-terrorism incitement through Hezbollah's websites).

8. Hezbollah's websites appear in seven languages, the most important of which is Arabic, the language of the Lebanese and Arab target audiences. Until recently, they appeared in Arabic, English, French, Farsi and Hebrew;^[2] Azeri and Spanish have lately been added. Their addition indicates the importance Iran and Hezbollah give Azerbaijan and Latin American countries (in which there are large Arab-Muslim communities, especially Lebanese communities). Thus, through Hezbollah's Internet network, Azeri and Spanish-speaking populations are exposed to anti-West, anti-Israeli and pro-terrorism incitement, with Iranian orientation.

Examples of Hezbollah Website Homepages

The Popularity of Hezbollah's Websites

9. Despite the efforts Iran and Hezbollah have invested in launching and developing the Hezbollah website network, most of them received relatively low ratings in a survey conducted of Lebanese news sites. According to the global web metrics provider Alexa.com, the only Hezbollah website enjoying high ratings the Al-Manar TV website, which in 2012 was rated second of the ten most popular Lebanese news sites (after Tayyar, the site of the Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah's opposition in Lebanon. In eighth place was the website of the newspaper Al-Akhbar, affiliated with – but not owned by – Hezbollah).

10. Most of Hezbollah's websites, especially those belonging to its social institutions, are not particularly popular in Lebanon and especially not beyond its borders. In our assessment that is because most of its visitors are Shi'ites (the largest community in Lebanon), who visit them because of their religious/sectarian slant and because of their clearly Iranian orientation. On the other hand, most other communities, which are are hostile to Hezbollah (and its Iranian and Syrian sponsors), prefer websites which do not identify with Hezbollah and Iran's political and ideological agendas.

11. Hezbollah operates in a number of ways to break through the constraints of its religious-sectarian-political identity. For example, it makes use of Lebanese media such as Al-Mayadeen TV and the newspaper Al-Akhbar, which are affiliated with but not owned by Hezbollah. In some instances Hezbollah tries to blur the identity of some of its websites and attempts to represent them as overall-Lebanese or at least generally Shi'ite. Another marketing tactic is the large number of languages used by Hezbollah to appeal to Arab-Muslim communities around the globe, especially those in the West and in Latin America.

Results of a Technical Analysis of Hezbollah Websites^[3]

12. Most of Hezbollah's websites receive technical support from Internet companies in the United States, Europe (Britain, France) and Lebanon. They provide Hezbollah with IP addresses and/or access to the Internet. In our assessment, most of the time the Internet service providers (ISPs) are approached by front men or by Internet companies, usually from Beirut, which not necessarily affiliated with Hezbollah. They are then listed as contact personnel for a number of websites (For further information see below). In addition, as opposed to past practice, Hezbollah's websites frequently change their IP addresses and ISPs (almost every year), and each of them has addresses with various extensions (.org, .com, .net).

13 In our assessment, using front men and Lebanese Internet intermediaries, like frequently changing ISPs, has three objectives: the first is to blur, insofar as is possible, Hezbollah's ties to the websites and prevent the ISPs from connecting it to them. The second is to make if difficult for the authorities in the United States and other Western countries to shut the sites down (the United States is especially problematic for Hezbollah, where Hezbollah is designated as a terrorist organization and where in the past law enforcement authorities used measures against Hezbollah media). The third is to prevent cyber attacks. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which maintains close relations with Iran, uses similar tactics to make it difficult to identify its websites.^[4]

14. Two important websites do not hide their Iranian identities: Moqawama.ir is a Farsi site and is registered to the owner of an Internet company in Mashhad, who is head of the culture and communications department of the Islamic information ministry in the province of Razavi Khorasan, in northeastern Iran. The website is devoted in its entirety to Hezbollah and Lebanon. It may be officially or semi-officially run by the Islamic Information Organization in Iran and promotes Hezbollah's image in Iran. Another Iranian website is moqavemat.ir, registered to a man living in Iran (in Qom, and in the past in Mashhad); its IP is with a company in Qom. It mostly posts articles about Iran, combined with relatively scanty coverage of Hezbollah. In our assessment, the website is also operated by Iran to promote Hezbollah's image.

15. Most of Hezbollah's websites are interactive: Programs broadcast by its radio station, Al-Nur, can be heard on its website; Al-Manar TV broadcasts can be viewed, and its newspapers and magazines can be read in PDF format. Moreover, Hezbollah uploads propaganda videos to YouTube, has a Facebook page and a Twitter account, some of its sites have RSS feeds and others can be downloaded to smart phones.

16. The graphic design of Hezbollah's websites has improved in recent years and there are links to the social networks. In particular, the graphics of the news websites are more professional.

Main Findings of the Analysis of Hezbollah's Websites

17. Hezbollah websites can be divided into seven general categories according to the functions they serve:

1) Category 1 – Main news sites: Hezbollah's leading news site is Al-moqawama al-islamiyyah fi-lubnan ("the Islamic resistance in Lebanon"). It also has other news sites, among them Moqavemat ("resistance")wa-inbaa ("news") and Daam al-moqawama al-islamiyya fi-lubnan ("Support for the Islamic resistance in Lebanon) (which can be accessed through a link in Hezbollah's Qawem forum). There was also a now-defunct news site called Wa'ad ("promise"). The category also includes the Farsi sites Moqawama.ir and Moqavemat.ir, which are apparently run directly by the Iranian administration to promote Hezbollah (and Iranian) public relations.

2) Category 2 – Hezbollah media sites: Among them are the Al-Manar TV site, the Radio Al-Nur site and the website of its newspaper Al-Ahad, (whose full name is Al-Ahad/ Al-Intiqad).

3) Category 3 – Hezbollah's social institutions' sites: Hezbollah's social institutions are active in the fields of health, welfare, education and aid to the needy, particularly from the Shi'ite community. The institutions are maintained through generous Iranian support, and in several instances they are Lebanese branches of Iranian institutions. They support Hezbollah's military-terrorist infrastructure and are an important platform for spreading revolutionary Iranian Islamic ideology to the local Shi'ite population. The websites include:

i) Website of the Martyr's Institute (Muassasat al-shahid) provides aid to the families of Hezbollah shaheeds.

ii) Website of the "Construction Jihad" (Jihad al-binaa) provides social services for the Shi'ite population and deals with initiatives for construction and rehabilitation in south Lebanon.

iii) Website of the Institute of the Wounded (Muassasat al-jarha) aids wounded Hezbollah operatives and their families.

iv) Website of the Islamic Health Authority (Al-hayaa al-sahiya al-islamiya), an institute providing medical services to Shi'ites and Hezbollah operatives.

v) Website of the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts (Kashafat al-imam al-mahdi), Hezbollah's scouting movement, whose goal is to influence the younger generation of Shi'ites and prepare them to join Hezbollah.^[5]

vi) Website of the Imam Mahdi Guides Association (Jamiat murshidat al-mahdi), a women's association guiding young girls in the spirit of Shi'ite Islam, who participate in social and religious activities affiliated with Hezbollah.

vii) Website of the Al-Emdad ("aid") Committee, the Lebanese branch of an Iranian aid society founded by the Ayatollah Khomeini. It helps the needy, including orphans, some of them children of Hezbollah terrorist operatives killed in confrontations with Israel. The society also runs kindergartens, schools and organizations offering vocational training.

viii) Website of the Islamic Institute for the Study of Culture – the Al-Mahdi schools, which operates educational institutions used by Iran and Hezbollah to spread Shia and Iranian ideology in Lebanon.

ix) Website of the Society of Knowledge (Al-Maaref), an association established in 1996 to spread Khomeini's version of Shi'ite Islamic ideology. It has dozens of cultural and religious centers which operate in the spirit of Khomeini's ideology, and also publishes books and newspapers.

x) Website of the Friends of the Environment, an association affiliated with Hezbollah, although it represents itself as Lebanese-nationalistic. It maintains a pretense of being oriented towards ecology, but in fact its activities focus on Hezbollah's propaganda campaign (in collaboration with other Hezbollah-affiliated organizations). The campaign trumpets the "environmental pollution" allegedly caused by the Second Lebanon War. Its website was set up in 2008 and has not been updated since.

xi) Websites distributing anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic books: Hezbollah formerly had a website for its publishing house, Dar Al-Hadi, which distributed anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic books. Dar Al-Hadi was closed, but the books published by Hezbollah (including Iranian books translated into Arabic) are still offered for sale on Arab book sites and by Western sites abroad, including in the United States (whose target audience, in our assessment, is Arabs/Muslims living there).

Selling Hezbollah Publications in the United States

xii) Website of the Association of Imam Khomeini Cultural Centers in Lebanon, an institute with many branches in Lebanon whose objective is to spread the ideology of the Ayatollah Khomeini throughout Lebanon.

xiii) The ShiaWeb, which deals with Shi'ite theological issues. It has a link to a site affiliated with Hezbollah.

xiv) Other websites linked through the Society of Knowledge (Al-Maaref) website which deal with spreading Khomeini's ideology in Lebanon.

4) Category 4 – Sites of municipalities in south Lebanon affiliated with Hezbollah include the Shi'ite villages of Bint Jbeil, Al-Taybeh and Jebchit. They are three large Shi'ite villages in south Lebanon, two near the Israeli border and one in the Nabatieh Heights. The objective of their websites is to strengthen the ties between Hezbollah and these three important villages: Jebchit is the Hezbollah stronghold in the south Lebanon and Bint Jbeil has become a symbol of the so-called "resistance" to Israel. In addition, Deir Qanoun al-Nahr also has an active website affiliated with Hezbollah, although that is not specifically stated.^[6]

5) Category 5 – Websites dedicated for fostering the personality cults of senior Hezbollah figures: The Somod ("firm stance") website, linked through the pro-Iranian Shi'ite ShiaWeb portal, focuses on the personality cult of Hassan Nasrallah. In addition, there is a Hezbollah-affiliated site for forums called "the site of the admirers of the Sayeed Hassan Nassrullah." His second in command, Sheikh Naim Qassem, has a personal site. Formerly there was a site of forums called Abu Hadi, a nickname of Nasrallah, but it is no longer active. Nasrallah's personal website as well, which appeared under the title "the website of the official representative in Lebanon of the Imam Khamenei" is also no longer active.

6) Category 6 – Forums affiliated with Hezbollah: The forums affiliated Hezbollah include Qawem ("resist!"), Lebanon Chat and the Admirers of Sayeed Hassan Nassrullah.

7) Category 7 – YouTube and the social networks: Hezbollah is very active in uploading propaganda videos to YouTube and in tweeting on Twitter. Facebook has imposed limits on Hezbollah since the summer of 2012. Hezbollah also uses smartphone apps (Apple's iPhone and Google's Android), although it encounters difficulties (because of the limits the United States places on Hezbollah, designated as a terrorist organization by the American administration).

18. There is also a category of news sites which do not belong to Hezbollah but are affiliated with it and disseminate its propaganda. They include:

1) Al-Akhbar is the website of a leading Lebanese newspaper, published in Beirut since 2006. The site does not belong to Hezbollah but is affiliated with it and consistently supports both Syria and Hezbollah; Hezbollah uses it as a platform to publish news items it wants to see in print.

2) Al-Mayadeen is the website of a Lebanese TV channel which began broadcasting in June 2012 as an alternative to Al-Jazeera TV and Al-Arabiya TV. It was founded by Ghassan bin Jiddo, formerly a senior Al-Jazeera correspondent and affiliated with Hezbollah. Hezbollah uses Al-Mayadeen as a platform to publicize articles, sometimes exclusively.

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[*]Update and supplement to two previous documents and Hezbollah and Iran's use of the Internet for terrorist purposes: the first, issued on December 3, 2006, "Terrorism and Internet: Hezbollah’s widespread use of the Internet as a means to distribute anti-Israeli, anti-Jewish, and anti-American incitement as part of the war for the hearts and minds;" and the second, issued on July 25, 2007, "The Internet as a battleground used by the terrorist organizations."
[2]Hezbollah wants to reach the Israeli audience even though it is not the organization's top priority. The Shia Online website recently reported that a number of media personnel plan to announce the launching of a Hezbollah satellite TV channel in Hebrew. The channel will promote the positions of the "resistance" [i.e., terrorist organizations] and introduce them to the Israeli audience.
[3] In the technical analysis of the websites used the American Haganah, WhoIs and MEMRI Reports websites.
[4]An examination of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) websites shows that opposed to the past, today most of them are registered to private individuals in the Gaza Strip and possibly Judea and Samaria. Those individuals, either journalists or computer professionals, are, in our assessment, front men serving as go-betweens for the PIJ and various Internet companies. For further information see the September 27, 2012 bulletin “Terrorism and the Internet: the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's Internet Network.”
[5]For further information see the September 12, 2006 bulletin “Hezbollah’s Shi’ite youth movement, 'The Imam al-Mahdi Scouts,' has tens of thousands of members. According to captured documents, they are indoctrinated with the principles of radical Iranian Islam. That indoctrination includes the personality cult of Iranian leader ‘Ali Khamenei and Hezbollah’s 'battle legacy;' national Lebanese symbols are minimized."
[6]Other towns and villages in south Lebanon have their own websites, among them Nabatieh and al-Khiyam, which are not affiliated with Hezbollah.

Soccer match rekindles ethnic tensions

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Soccer match rekindles ethnic tensions

A match between the Tractor Sazi soccer team from Tabriz and the Al-Jazira team from the United Arab Emirates rekindled ethnic tensions this week after a number of fans held up a sign saying “South Azerbaijan isn’t Iran” during the match.
The sign provoked angry reactions from bloggers and social network users, who protested this recent manifestation of Azeri separatism. Many of them stressed that the fans who held up the sign do not represent the vast majority of Iranian citizens of Azeri descent, who are loyal to their country. An Iranian-Azeri website posted a strong-worded commentary article accusing pan-Turkish groups funded by foreign elements of attempts to stir ethnic separatism in Iran’s soccer stadiums.
In addition to criticism of the sign incident, there were also a few comments posted online by regime opponents expressing ethnic separatist tendencies. An Iranian blogger of Azeri descent posted a blog entry in which he strongly condemned the authorities of Iran for discriminating against Azeri citizens, and called for the independence of what he referred to as “South Azerbaijan”.
This is not the first time that a soccer match played by the team from Tabriz has provoked manifestations of Azeri separatism. In November 2011 some Tractor Sazi fans wore shirts with the flags of Turkey and Azerbaijan to a soccer match. One of them even held up the flag of Azerbaijan.
The Azeri people are the largest ethno-linguistic minority in Iran, making up 20-25 percent of the population. Their integration into Iran’s society is considered relatively successful compared to the other ethnic and linguistic minorities in the country. However, after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 and Azerbaijan’s independence, Iran became increasingly concerned over the growth of separatist tendencies among the Azeri minority.
The storm provoked by the sign incident during the soccer match is yet another expression of the public sensitivity in Iran concerning the separatist tendencies of the country’s ethno-linguistic minorities. This sensitivity could be seen recently in the strong reactions against a conference held in Cairo to support the Arab residents of the Khuzestan region.

A match between the Tractor Sazi soccer team from Tabriz and the Al-Jazira team from the United Arab Emirates rekindled ethnic tensions this week after a number of fans held up a sign saying “South Azerbaijan isn’t Iran” during the match. The match, held in Tabriz as part of the AFC Asian Cup (an international soccer tournament), ended 3-1 for the Iranian team.

The sign provoked angry reactions from bloggers and social network users, who protested this recent manifestation of Azeri separatism during the soccer match. Many of them stressed that the fans who held up the sign do not represent the vast majority of Iranian citizens of Azeri descent, who are loyal to their country. One of the bloggers said that those who held up the sign were “selling their homeland”, and argued that they do not represent the Azeri residents of Iran, who have always stood at the forefront of the struggle to defend their country (http://neshador.wordpress.com/2013/02/26/baner).

Another blogger said that the term “South Azerbaijan” has no scientific or academic basis, and that it is a provocative expression invented in the Soviet era by Ja’far Bagirov, chairman of the Communist Party in Soviet Azerbaijan, to justify the occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan by the U.S.S.R. in the aftermath of World War II (http://iran-vich.blogspot.ca/2013/02/blog-post_27.html).

A blogger and a fan of the Tractor Sazi soccer team posted an entry on his personal blog playing down the significance of the incident that had taken place at the soccer stadium, arguing that the intense reactions provoked by the sign on social networks are not representative of its importance. Most of the viewers who were present at the stadium did not even notice the sign, the blogger said.

He added that a single sign in English held up by a handful of citizens whose activity is funded by foreigners is not where one should look for proof of the Azeri people’s love for Iran. Such proof, the blogger said, can be found in the significant percentage of Azeris among those killed, injured, or captured in the Iran-Iraq War, as well as in the participation of Azeri citizens in the constitutional revolution of the early 20th century and in the wars fought by Iran against its enemies, including the Ottomans and the Russians (http://terakhtoriran.blogdoon.com/?post=1).

The azariha.org website posted a strong-worded commentary article condemning the sign incident that had taken place during the soccer match. The article, which was reposted by the conservative Baztab website, said that in recent years pan-Turkish groups are trying to conceal their weakness and their inability to mobilize public support through various actions in Iran’s soccer stadiums. These groups have failed in their efforts to organize demonstrations and political gatherings of Iranian residents of Azeri descent. They were unable to get citizens to take part in the demonstrations of May 22 (the anniversary of the riots that broke out among Iranian Azeris in 2006 when the government daily Iran published an offensive cartoon that portrayed the Azeri people in a ridiculous light), or in the demonstrations for the International Mother Tongue Day marked on February 21.

According to the website, the sign that could be seen during the soccer match was held up by a group of provocateurs who often go to stadiums to take advantage of the tense atmosphere and stir provocations. The sign was held up by 20 people at the most and was shortly removed because of protests from the other fans at the stadium.

The article spoke out against the separation of the three Azeri provinces (East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, and Ardebil) from Iran, and argued that the advocates of the separation are supported by foreign intelligence services. The author of the article wondered whether these services are willing to provide the Azeri provinces with the same considerable budgets that they receive from the Iranian government every year, or pay the salaries of state, bank, and municipality employees in these provinces. Are the Azeri residents who receive social security from the government of Iran willing to give up that money? Are the Azeri employees of government ministries willing to quit their jobs? Are the citizens of Tabriz willing to remain without a flag and without a government? Those who believe that the city of Tabriz can be annexed to Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, need to remember that Iran’s Azeri residents have always been condescending and mocking towards the residents of North Azerbaijan.

The website said that those who held up the sign are hooligans without any social or economic status, unemployed people who spend their time in coffee shops, or drug addicts. Anyone with social status and social dignity wouldn’t be able to display such signs, regardless of whatever pan-Turkish inclinations that person may have.

South Azerbaijan has always been part of Iran, the article said. The residents of Iranian Azerbaijan have always expressed the warm feelings that they have towards their country, and the Iranian national movement has been carried on the shoulders of many an Azeri. After the storm on the social networks dies down, it will become clear that the damage of the action taken by the extremists in the soccer stadium outweighs the benefits that it has for them, because it has now become evident that the Azeri citizens do not support the extremist groups. Most of them are not even aware of the incident that took place, and those who are do not place any importance on it whatsoever.

The article ended by criticizing the security forces for allowing the large sign into the stadium and for not preventing radical separatist groups from going into soccer stadiums and attempting to stir separatism among the people of Iran (http://www.azariha.org/?lang=fa&muid=53&item=496).

In addition to criticism of the sign incident, there were also a few comments posted online by regime opponents expressing ethnic separatist tendencies. An Iranian blogger of Azeri descent posted a blog entry in which he strongly condemned the authorities of Iran for their discriminating approach towards the country’s Azeri citizens, and called for the independence of what he referred to as “South Azerbaijan”.

If the slogan “South Azerbaijan isn’t part of Iran” is so upsetting to Iranians, why didn’t the governments of Iran heed the voice of the Azeri people before the Islamic revolution, and afterwards ignored their human and legal demands? Why do the authorities of Iran violate their internationally recognized rights? Why can’t Azeri citizens learn their language, culture, and history, and are forced to learn Persian? Why do the authorities harm the economy of South Azerbaijan and thus force the residents of the region to flee their land? Why aren’t they allowed to publish books or newspapers in their language? Why are citizens who seek to defend their native language and heritage being arrested? Why is it that 99 percent of directors in the Azeri regions are of Persian descent? Why are there no large factories built in these regions? Why is the unemployment rate growing so quickly among the Azeri people compared to Persian-populated regions? Why is it that Azeri historic heroes are disrespected? Why are citizens who demand their rights being accused of separatism? Why do the authorities prevent the creation of NGOs in the Azeri provinces? Why is Lake Orumieh being dried up? Why are millions of trees being cut down in the forests of Azerbaijan?

The blogger noted that this is not the first time that citizens of Azeri descent have expressed their frustration during a soccer match. During past matches, there were also calls to let the Azeri people use their own language, realize their rights, and release political prisoners. The helplessness of the Iranian authorities in dealing with the victims of the earthquake that hit northern Iran last summer also provoked protests from Azeri citizens in soccer stadiums. The blogger called for the independence of South Azerbaijan and listed the benefits it would have for Iranian Azerbaijan: it will be able to preserve its language, culture, and history, its people will be considered first class citizens, it will have better relations with its neighbors and a better ability to secure its economic and cultural interests, it will free itself from Persian rule, its education institutions will be able to use Azerbaijani as their working language, and its economic situation will see a considerable improvement (http://gunayazerbayjantv.blogspot.com/2013/02/blog-post.html).

This is not the first time that a soccer match played by the Tractor Sazi team from Tabriz has provoked manifestations of Azeri separatism. In November 2011 some Tractor Sazi fans wore shirts with the flags of Turkey and Azerbaijan to a soccer match against a rival team from Shiraz. One of them even held up the flag of Azerbaijan.

The Azeri people are the largest ethno-linguistic minority in Iran, making up 20-25 percent of the population. However, their integration into Iran’s society is considered relatively successful compared to the other ethnic and linguistic minorities in the country, and they did not bring up autonomy demands even after the Islamic revolution. After the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 and the establishment of independent Muslim republics (including Azerbaijan) to the north of Iran, the latter became increasingly concerned over the growth of Azeri national consciousness. Such concerns are one of the causes of the disagreements between Iran and Azerbaijan, whose government has been accused by Iran on several occasions of encouraging separatism among Iranian Azeris. In the past, conservative Iranian media even threatened that unless the government of Azerbaijan changes its policy, Iran may demand the return of the Caucasus territory it ceded to Russia under the treaties signed between the two countries in the 19th century.

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Bahrain as a Target Preferred by Iran for Terrorism and Subversion

Published: 28/02/2013

Sites in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, where IEDs were detonated (November 5, 2012).

Bahraini supporters of Iran and Hezbollah demonstrate against the regime.

The yellow flags are Hezbollah's. The pictures at the bottom of the left-hand picture are of Khomeini and Khamenei

Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, advisor to Khamenei (Al-Jazeera, February 22, 2013).

Tariq al-Hassan, head of Bahraini general intelligence, at a press conference held February 19, 2013

Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah leader, appeals to the people of Bahrain to sacrifice and not remain silent until the oppressor is removed, March 19, 2012 (YouTube.com).

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Overview

1. On February 16 and 19, 2013, the Bahraini authorities announced they had exposed a terrorist cell run by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards. The cell's operatives had been involved in shooting policemen and were planning to assassinate public figures and carry out terrorist attacks on various sensitive targets, among them the King Fahd Bridge (which links Bahrain to Saudi Arabia), Bahrain International Airport and the ministry of the interior. Two affairs preceded the exposure: in November 2012 five suspects were detained on suspicion of placing IEDs which exploded in various locations in Manama, and at the beginning of November 2011 a terrorist cell was captured who members had been planning to carry out showcase attacks in Bahrain and attack important facilities. One of their targets wasthe King Fahd Bridge, which in our assessment is regarded as a strategic target by the Iranians.

2. Tariq al-Hassan, head of Bahraini general intelligence, said that the cell most recently exposed had been recruited by two men living in Qom, Iran. Its operatives were handled and funded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, and trained by Guards proxies in Iraq and Lebanon. In previous affairs Iran and Hezbollah were accused of handling terrorist cells in Bahrain, training them and providing them with weapons. In every instance Iran and Hezbollah denied the accusations.

3. Actually, however, in our assessment the terrorist cells are part of Iran's comprehensive, ongoing efforts at subversion and terrorism, sometimes carried out with the assistance of Hezbollah, its Lebanese proxy. Their efforts have accelerated in the past two years, the result of the upheaval in the Arab world and the intensified Iranian confrontation of the United States and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf.

4. Since the regional upheaval began, there have been protests in Bahrain by its Shi'ite majority. The Shi'ites are supported by Iran, which exploits them to further its efforts to overthrow the Bahraini regime. The regime has acted to contain the protests but the Shi'ites have become more daring and confrontations between Shi'ite demonstrators and the Bahraini security forces have become routine. This explosive situation provides, in our assessment, fertile ground for the continuation and intensification of Iran's subversive and terrorist activities within the Bahraini Shi'ite population. The Iranians do that either directly or by using proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq as subcontractors (the Iranian modus operandi in other Shi'ite communities throughout the Arab-Muslim world).

Bahrain: Iran's Choice as a Target for Its Terrorism and Subversion

5. Iran chose Bahrain as a target for terrorism and subversion because it is located in the heart of the Persian Gulf, which is strategically important for Iran, and because of its political-societal makeup: it has a Shi'ite majority and is ruled by a Sunni monarchy which has Saudi Arabia as an ally and is oriented toward America. In concrete terms there are several reasons for Iran's decades of terrorism and subversion in Bahrain:

1) The presence of the American army: Bahrain hosts the United States' largest Persian Gulf naval base, Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, home of the Fifth Fleet. NSA Bahrain has been the seat of American army support for the wars in Iraq (ended) and Afghanistan (ongoing). As far as Iran is concerned, an American military force in Bahrain is capable of providing a response to an Iranian threat to the Gulf States and can threaten vital Iranian interests (most of Iran's commercial activity, including its oil exports, is channeled through the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf). In addition, from the Iranian point of view, if and when the time comes, the American presence in Bahrain is liable to be used in an attack on Iran (as it was in the attack on the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq).

Bahrain, a tiny country with a Shi'ite majority ruled by a Sunni monarchy. Its proximity to Iran and its basic geopolitical-societal conditions have made it an attractive venue for Iranian terrorism and subversion (Map from the watanee.com website).

2) Bahrain's politics and demographics: An estimated 60%-70% of Bahrain's more than a million inhabitants are Shi'ites ruled by a Sunni minority. Bahraini Shi'ites have a long history of protesting, both nonviolently and violently, against various issues on the Bahraini and regional agenda. Iran, with Hezbollah support, intensively incites Bahrain's Shi'ite population to overthrow the monarchy. The regional upheavals escalated both the Shi'ite protests and the Iranian efforts to subvert and destabilize the Bahraini regime, which so far has been able to contain the protests.

3) Iran's irredentist aspirations: Iran claims sovereignty over Bahrain (calling it "Iran's 14^th province") and has even claimed to have found "historical proof" for the claim. In February 2009 Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei, said that until its independence in 1970, Bahrain was Iran's 14^th province and even had representation in the Iranian parliament. At the time, the statement (not the first time it was made) led to a storm of protests in Bahrain and gave rise to open expressions of solidarity with Bahrain throughout the Arab world. In 1979, during the first months of Iran's Islamic Revolution, the Ayatollah Sayyid Sadeq Rohani, an important Iranian cleric, asserted that Bahrain was an integral part of Iran and that it was illegal to separate it from Iran. He called on the inhabitants of Bahrain and the other emirates to rise up against their rulers and to institute regimes of "justice and equality" (Shia-online.ir website).

Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, advisor to Khamenei (Al-Jazeera, February 22, 2013). His claim that Bahrain was Iran's 14th province led to tension between Bahrain and Iran and a storm of protests in the Arab world.

4) Iran's aspirations to hegemony in the Persian Gulf: Iran regards the Gulf as strategically extremely important both in terms of its economy and its security. Iran seeks hegemony in the Gulf and to remove the presence of Iran's enemies, principally the United States, other Western countries, and Saudi Arabia and its allies. The Shi'ite communities in the countries in the Persian Gulf and at the entrance to the Red Sea, among them Bahrain, Yemen, southern Iraq and eastern Saudi Arabia are, in Iran's perception, bridgeheads for Iranian influence and the advancement of its regional interests.

6. Exploiting the Shi'ite community in Bahrain for subversion and terrorism is a permanent part of the Iranian pattern, carried out by the Qods Force and with Hezbollah as a subcontractor. The most recent example was in Yemen, where on January 23, 2013, a ship was intercepted and found to be carrying a large quantity of weapons from Iran. The weapons were en route to the Shi'ite Houthi rebels in north Yemen.[1] Other countries with Shi'ite communities which are targets for Iranian subversion and terrorism are Lebanon (a prominent example of Iran's success in exporting the Islamic Revolution), Syria (where Iran and Hezbollah support the Alawite regime, which they regard as Shi'ite), Iraq (where Iran established Shi'ite militias), Pakistan (where there is a large Shi'ite community) and Azerbaijan (a Shi'ite country which Iran has traditionally targeted for its subversion and terrorism).

7. Three appendices follow:

1) Appendix A: Iranian subversion and terrorism in Bahrain since the beginning of the regional upheaval.

2) Appendix B: Iranian subversion and terrorism in Bahrain in the 1980s and 1990s.

3) Appendix C: The Iranian-Hezbollah anti-Bahrain propaganda and incitement campaign.

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^[1] For further information see the February 11, 2013 bulletin “Iranian subversion in Yemen: A ship with a cargo of arms originating in Iran and en route to the Shi'ite Houthi rebels in north Yemen, was recently intercepted.”

Admission of a Hezbollah operative asked to collect information about sites frequented by Israeli tourists and their transportation made public by Cyprus.

Published: 21/02/2013

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The Golden Arches hotel in Limassol, one of the sites about which the Hezbollah operative gathered information (Picture from the Golden Arches website)

Overview

1. On February 20, 2013, Cyprus made public the written admission of Hossam Taleb Yaacoub, read into the court record at his trial in Limassol. Hossam Taleb Yaacoub, 24, a Lebanese man with Swedish citizenship detained in Cyprus on July 7, 2012, collected information about tourist sites frequented by Israelis with the objective of carrying out a terrorist attack against them. He was tried on eight counts, among them conspiracy to commit a crime, participation in a criminal organization, intent to commit a crime and obstruction of justice (Cyprus Mail, February 21, 2013).

2. The following information was also made public (New York Times ,^[1] Cyprus Mail, February 21, 2013):

1) Activity for Hezbollah – Hossam Taleb Yaacoub has been a member of Hezbollah since 2007. He used the code name "Wael" and was handled by an operative named "Ayman," who wore a mask to the meetings he held with Yaacoub. Yaacoub admitted to having been trained in the use of weapons. He also admitted to delivering packages for Hezbollah in Attalya (Turkey), Lyon and Amsterdam. He was asked to pick up a couple of bags in Lyon, and to take a cell phone, two SIM cards, and a "mysterious package" to Lebanon.

2) Activity in Cyprus – Yaacoub went to Cyprus for the first time in 2008, and again in December 2011. He claimed that both visits were business-related. On June 26, 2012, he went to Sweden to renew his passport and from there flew via Britain to Cyprus. His Hezbollah handler asked him to conduct surveillance of a number of tourist sites frequented by Israelis. They included a parking lot behind a hospital and the Golden Arches Hotel in Limassol. He was also asked to collect information about various hotels in Ayia Napa (on the southeastern coast of Cyprus) and the price of renting a warehouse. In addition, he was asked to locate Kosher restaurants but was unable to find any.

3) Collecting information in July 2012 – According to the Cypriote authorities, Yaacoub went to the Limassol airport at the beginning of July 2012 and wrote down the license plate number of buses used to carry Israeli tourists. He admitted that all his travel expenses were paid by Hezbollah.

3. Yaacoub's initial admissions indicate that like Bulgaria, locations in Cyprus frequented by Israelis were preferred targets for Hezbollah terrorist attack. The information released in Cyprus, like the information made public by the Bulgarian authorities, revealed the extent and scope of Hezbollah's terrorist activity in European Union countries as well as Hezbollah's determination to continue even after its failures (the terrorist attack in Burgas, Bulgaria, was carried out two weeks after an attack in Cyprus was prevented). Nevertheless, the European Union still hesitates to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and impose sanctions on it.

Appendix

Preventing the Terrorist Attack in Cyprus, 2012

1. On July 7, 2012, the Cypriote authorities in Limassol detained a 24-year-old Lebanese man. According to Cypriote police sources, he was there to collect information about Israeli tourists flying to Cyprus. He was carrying both Lebanese and Swedish passports,^[2] as well as documents and pictures indicating that he had been following Israeli tourists around the island (Agence France-Presse and AP, July 14, 2012). The information was collected in preparation for carrying out a terrorist attack against Israeli tourists vacationing in Cyprus .

2. The terrorist attack planned for Cyprus was part of the terrorist campaign Iran is waging against Israel. After the detention of the Hezbollah operative in Limassol, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu said that Iran was behind the affair. He said that as Iran had sent its operatives to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador on American soil and carry out terrorist attacks in Azerbaijan, Bangkok, Tbilisi, New Delhi and Kenya, it had done the same in Cyprus. He called on the international community to oppose Iran, the largest exporter of terrorism in the world (Website of the Israeli Prime Minister, July 14, 2012).

3. Two weeks after Yaacoub was detained in Cyprus, the attack on the Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria, was carried out. A comparison of the information revealed by his admission and the information revealed by the authorities in Bulgaria about the attack in Burgas shows that the attack in Limassol was planned the same way: information was gathered about buses used to transport Israelis and SIM cards were purchased, probably for use in detonating IEDs.^[3]

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^[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/world/europe/in-cyprus-trial-man-says-hezbollah-scouted-israeli-targets-in-europe.html?pagewanted=all
^[2] It was not the first time a Hezbollah operative used a Swedish passport. The Hezbollah operative involved in the terrorist attack in Thailand had a Swedish passport, as did the operatives who carried out the terrorist attack in Burgas.
^[3] For further information about the attack in Burgas, see the February 7, 2013 bulletin “The report issued by Bulgaria about the terrorist attack in Burgas clearly indicates that Hezbollah was involved in its planning and execution.”

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Struggling to make ends meet: Iran’s workers step up fight to raise minimum wage

erosion of workers’ wages as a result of the sharp price increases.
The talks on the revision of the minimum wage have highlighted differences between the approach of the workers’ representatives and that of the employers’ representatives. The workers are saying that the minimum wage should rise by tens of percent, claiming that it has to reflect the actual increase of an average family’s consumption basket and not just the official inflation rate. The employers, on the other hand, are arguing that, given the economic crisis that is gripping the productive sector, the minimum wage has to be revised by less than 20 percent. They are saying that they have no ability to compensate the workers for the erosion of their wages, and that it is the government that needs to help the workers.
The discourse on the increase of the minimum wage reflects the growing frustration among the Iranian public about the rising cost of living and the effect of inflation on Iranians’ ability to fulfill their basic needs. The reservations voiced

The Supreme Labor Council is soon expected to make a decision on revising Iran’s minimum wage ahead of the new Iranian year. The issue is drawing substantial public and media attention in light of the economic crisis and theby the employers over a considerable increase in the minimum wage reflect the growing distress of the productive sector as a result of the sanctions and of the government’s economic policy.

The Supreme Labor Council is soon expected to make a decision on revising Iran’s minimum wage ahead of the new Iranian year (1392), which begins on March 21, 2013. The council, made up of representatives of the government, the workers, and the employers, is responsible for the annual revision of the minimum wage, which affects nearly 12 million workers in Iran. The minimum wage is revised as per Clause 41 of the Labor Law, which states that the revision shall be made according to the inflation rate and in order to guarantee the livelihood of the workers’ families.

The council’s most recent revision of the minimum wage was in March 2012. Last year it was raised by approximately 18 percent from 330,000 tomans to 389,700 tomans per month (approximately 320 dollars at the official exchange rate and 110 dollars at the free-market exchange rate). Last week the council held a meeting during which representatives of the government, the workers, and the employers presented their positions on the revision of the minimum wage. A final decision on the issue will likely be made in the next few weeks. The issue has been at the center of public and media attention recently in light of the economic crisis and the erosion of workers’ wages as a result of the sharp price increases and the fluctuations in the foreign currency exchange market.

Media in Iran released various estimates about the anticipated increase in the minimum wage ahead of the council’s decision. Mehr News Agency speculated that if the minimum wage is increased according to the average monthly inflation rate this past year, it will likely be set at 474 to 501 thousand tomans per month.

The required revision to the minimum wage according to the inflation rate (Mehr, February 5)

Month	Inflation rate (in percent)	Minimum wage (in tomans)
Farvardin	21.8	474,654
Ordibehesht	22.2	476,213
Khordad	22.4	476,993
Tir	22.9	478,941
Mordad	23.5	481,279
Shahrivar	24	483,228
Mehr	24.9	486,735
Aban	26.1	491,412
Azar	27.4	496,478
Dey	28.7	501,544
Bahman	?	?

The talks on the revision of the minimum wage have highlighted differences between the approach of the workers’ representatives and that of the employers’ representatives. The workers’ representatives are saying that the minimum wage should increase by tens of percent to compensate them for the erosion of their wages. The employers’ representatives, on the other hand, are arguing that, given the economic crisis that is gripping the productive sector, the minimum wage has to be revised by less than 20 percent. They are saying that they have no ability to compensate the workers for the erosion of their wages, and that it is the government that needs to help the workers with the means it has available.

The workers’ position on the increase in the minimum wage

In the past several months the workers’ representatives have stepped up their fight for a considerable increase in the minimum wage. In December 2012 representatives of the Free Union of Iranian Workers presented the minister of labor and welfare with a petition signed by 10,000 people which included a demand to increase the minimum wage in light of the economic crisis and the rising costs of living (http://iranlaborreport.com/?p=2134).

According to the workers’ representatives, the recent years’ increase in the minimum wage has been unable to compensate them for the erosion of their wages caused by the sharp price increases. The minimum wage, they said, needs to be revised not only according to the official inflation rate released by the Central Bank, but also according to the actual changes in the consumption basket of an average family of four. Valiollah Salehi, the workers’ representative in the Supreme Labor Council, announced recently that even a 30-percent increase in the minimum wage will not be sufficient to cover the needs of the workers. He said that in recent years the minimum wage has been revised only in accordance with state interests and has been inconsistent with the spirit of the Labor Law, aimed to guarantee the needs of the workers and their families. Valiollah noted that a situation in which there are poor workers in Iran must not be allowed, and that the workers should not pay the price of the economic difficulties facing some of the factories (Tabnak, February 11).

Shahpour Ehsani-Rad, also an activist for workers’ rights, has warned that this year the workers will not give up the demand to have their wages revised and will not agree to anything less than a 25-percent increase of wages. He noted that there has been an abnormal increase in the inflation rate this past year, which has caused a significant increase in the expenses of workers’ families (Jaras, February 15). Another workers’ representative, Abdollah Mokhtari, also demanded a substantial rise in the minimum wage. The expenses of the workers’ families have grown by two times this year, he said, and the revision of the minimum wage has to reflect this sharp increase. Davoud Amiri, a workers’ representative from North Khorasan Province, warned that if the Supreme Labor Council does not take into account the price increases in its decision on revising the minimum wage, the workers will appeal the decision to the Supreme Administrative Court. Amiri stressed that receiving a sufficient salary that is consistent with the workers’ expenses is their absolute right (Jaras, February 13).

Majles member Ali-Reza Mahjoub, the head of the workers’ lobby in the Majles, expressed his support for the workers’ position on the minimum wage and announced that it needs to be doubled. He defined the employers’ proposal to raise the minimum wage by a moderate 15 percent as “unrealistic and unreasonable”, and argued that a minimum wage of less than 800 thousand tomans is not enough to cover the minimal life requirements of the workers in the current economic conditions (Tabnak, February 12).

The Iranian media, too, said that the workers should be compensated for the ongoing erosion of their wages. The reformist daily Mardom Salari argued that half of Iran’s population are unable to cover their minimal expenses. An editorial published by the newspaper on February 11 said that over 30 million people (workers and their family members) will be affected by the decision to revise the minimum wage, and that the minimum wage has to provide the workers and their family members with economic welfare that includes food, clothes, housing, education, health, leisure, and entertainment.

The daily pointed out the growing difference between the minimum wage and the line of poverty, currently set at 900 thousand tomans in smaller cities and 1.5 million tomans in Tehran and other big cities. According to the daily, the minimum wage is insufficient for the basic food needs of an average family of four, which amount to approximately 600 thousand tomans.

Figures on wage erosion and the increasing cost of the consumption basket

As part of the public discourse on revising the minimum wage, the media recently published up-to-date figures that demonstrate the ongoing erosion of workers’ wages and the need for a considerable increase in the minimum wage to allow them to keep up with their day-to-day expenses.

On February 5 the conservative website Khabar On-line released figures indicating a considerable erosion of the minimum wage compared to the inflation rate in the past two years. The website cited figures provided by Iran’s Central Bank and Statistical Center (SCI), according to which in the past 34 years the minimum wage has increased by an average 3 percent more than the inflation rate. While the average inflation rate between the years 1978 and 2012 was 19 percent, the minimum wage increased by an average 22 percent per year.

This figure, however, does not reflect the ongoing erosion of the minimum wage since the early 1980s. In 1980 – 1989 there was a considerable erosion of the minimum wage as a result of the economic crisis brought on by the Iran-Iraq War. During that time, the prices of products and services sharply increased by over 280 percent, while the minimum wage rose by less than 30 percent. After the war was over, the minimum wage did increase in accordance with the rise of the inflation rate, but that was not enough to compensate the workers for the erosion of their wages during the first decade of the revolution. What is more, in the past two years prices have once again increased by over 10 percent more than the increase of the minimum wage.

Comparison between the rise of the inflation rate and the increase of the minimum wage

Year	Minimum wage (tomans)	Increase of minimum wage (percent)	Inflation rate (percent)	Difference between increase of minimum wage and inflation rate (percent)
1974 – 1975	315	–	–	–
1975 – 1976	393	24.8	9.9	14.9
1976 – 1977	456	16.0	16.6	-0.6
1977 – 1978	540	18.4	25.1	-6.7
1978 – 1979	630	16.7	10.0	6.7
1979 – 1980	1,701	170.0	11.4	158.6
1980 – 1981	1,905	12.0	23.5	-11.5
1981 – 1982	1,905	0.0	22.8	-22.8
1982 – 1983	1,905	0.0	19.2	-19.2
1983 – 1984	1,905	0.0	14.8	-14.8
1984 – 1985	1,905	0.0	10.4	-10.4
1985 – 1986	2,160	13.4	6.9	6.5
1986 – 1987	2,160	0.0	23.8	-23.8
1987 – 1988	2,280	5.6	27.7	-22.1
1988 – 1989	2,490	9.2	28.9	-19.7
1989 – 1990	2,490	0.0	17.4	-17.4
1990 – 1991	3,000	20.5	9.0	11.5
1991 – 1992	5,001	66.7	20.7	46.0
1992 – 1993	6,801	36.0	24.4	11.6
1993 – 1994	8,982	32.1	22.9	9.2
1994 – 1995	11,682	30.1	35.2	-5.1
1995 – 1996	16,000	37.0	49.4	-12.4
1996 – 1997	20,721	29.5	23.2	6.3
1997 – 1998	25,446	22.8	17.3	5.5
1998 – 1999	30,153	18.5	18.1	0.4
1999 – 2000	36,183	20.0	20.1	-0.1
2000 – 2001	45,801	26.6	12.6	14.0
2001 – 2002	56,790	24.0	11.4	12.6
2002 – 2003	69,846	23.0	15.8	7.2
2003 – 2004	85,338	22.2	15.6	6.6
2004 – 2005	106,602	24.9	15.2	9.7
2005 – 2006	122,592	15.0	10.4	4.6
2006 – 2007	150,000	22.4	11.9	10.5
2007 – 2008	183,000	22.0	18.4	3.6
2008 – 2009	219,600	20.0	25.4	-5.4
2009 – 2010	263,520	20.0	10.8	9.2
2010 – 2011	303,000	15.0	12.4	2.6
2011 – 2012	330,300	9.0	21.5	-12.5
2012 – 2013	390,000	18.1	28.7	-10.6

To gain further support for their position on a considerable increase of the minimum wage, the workers’ representatives in the Supreme Labor Council presented figures demonstrating the sharp increase in the cost of a consumption basket for an average family of four.

Monthly expenses of an average family of four (as presented by the workers’ representatives, based on Central Bank data and the prices of 12 basic products and services, Asr-e Iran, February 5)

Description	Relative share of expenses (percent)	Month of Dey (December – January 2012) (rials)	Month of Azar (November – December 2012) (rials)
Food	28.49	6,727,813	6,508,937
Smoking	0.52	122,796	118,801
Housing	28.60	6,753,789	6,534,068
Footwear	6.22	1,468,831	1,421,046
Furniture	6.26	1,478,277	1,430,184
Health and medications	5.54	1,308,252	1,265,690
Transportation	11.97	2,826,673	2,734,731
Communications	1.63	384,919	372,396
Culture and leisure	3.8	897,357	868,163
Education	2.07	488,823	472,920
Restaurants and hotels	1.72	406,172	392,958
Various products and services	3.18	750,946	726,515
Total expenses for a family of four	100	23,614,648	22,846,393

Monthly expenses of an average family of four on 18 basic food products

Product	World daily per capita consumption (grams)	Iran’s daily per capita consumption	Monthly per capita consumption (kilograms)	Monthly consumption for a family of four	Market price range per kg (rials)
Bread	68	320	9.60	38.40	345,600
Rice	60	100	3.00	12.00	660,000-540,000
Pasta	–	20	0.60	2.40	39,600-46,800
Dairy	60	33	1.00	4.00	183,200-155,592
Potatoes	–	70	2.10	8.40	58,800-42,000
Green vegetables	356	280	8.40	33.60	504,000-436,800
Other vegetables	356	280	8.40	33.60	445,200-346,080
Fruit	400	260	7.80	31.20	686,400-569,400
Red meat	100	50	1.50	6.00	1,656,000-1,392,000
Fish	50	25	0.75	3.00	360,000-270,000
Poultry	–	67	2.01	8.04	402,000-365,820
Eggs	66	25	0.75	3.00	102,000-93,600
Milk	822	240	7.20	28.80	351,360
Cream	–	67	2.01	8.04	178,488
Cheese	–	33	1.00	4.00	320,000
Butter	–	8	0.25	1.00	120,000
Oil	–	40	1.20	4.80	202,666-188,266
Sugar	–	45	1.35	5.40	105,300-95,580
Total	14				6,727,813-5,850,185

The position of employers’ representatives on raising the minimum wage

In contrast to the workers’ representatives, the employers’ representatives, as already mentioned, said that they are unable to compensate the workers for the erosion of their wages, and that the responsibility for helping them rests with the government. Davoud Javani, chairman of the Employers Union, said recently that the revised minimum wage should be between 459,840 and 467,640 tomans. He noted that the employers will not agree to raise the minimum wage by more than 20 percent. According to Javani, the government has not given the employers sufficient support in recent years, which is why they cannot be the only ones to bear the burden of the price increases. The government has to compensate the workers in various ways, such as paying cash benefits or issuing ration stamps (Asr-e Iran, January 26).

Hossein Ahmadizadeh, another representative of the employers, also argued that it is the government that has to protect the workers by paying special cash benefits. He noted that the employers have no ability to make up for the substantial difference between the workers’ wages and expenses, and that the employers’ expenses have also increased this past year. He warned that a sharp increase of the minimum wage will lead to the shutdown of many factories, which are already forced to operate at limited capacity (Alef, February 18).

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News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (February 13 – 19, 2013)

Published: 19/02/2013

Palestinians riot in solidarity with terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israeli jails

Students from Beir Zeit University throw Molotov cocktails at the gate of the Israeli Ofer prison (Wafa News Agency, February 12, 2013).

Palestinians block the trans-Judea and Samaria road (Route 60) to the passage of Israeli vehicles.

Palestinian youths burn tires at the Jalame checkpoint (north of Jenin) (Wafa News Agency, February 15, 2013).

Turkey Builds a Hospital in the Gaza Strip

The Islamic National Bank reopens (Filastin Al-'An, February 11, 2013).

Mahmoud Abbas meets with the Pakistani president in Islamabad

The memorial service for Hezbollah leaders (Al-Ahad, February 17, 2013).

Hassan Nasrallah's broadcast speech (Maqawamah website, February 17, 2013).

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Overview

The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip achieved at the end of Operation Pillar of Defense three months ago continues. Demonstrations and rallies were held in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip in solidarity with the hunger-striking Palestinian terrorist operatives. Some of the demonstrations in Judea and Samaria turned into riots when Palestinian protesters confronted Israeli security forces.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave another speech with a deterrent message for Israel. He warned Israel that Hezbollah had the capability to attack Israel "from Kiryat Shemonah to Eilat" and that its airports, ports and power plants were within range of Hezbollah's missiles ("All that is necessary is a few missiles...to plunge Israel into darkness").

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

Rocket Fire

Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip continue to implement the understandings reached at the end of Operation Pillar of Defense. Since 2300 hours on November 21 no rockets or mortar shells hit Israeli territory.

Demonstrations of Solidarity with Imprisoned Palestinian Terrorists

Protests in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip

This past week demonstrations and rallies were held throughout Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip to express solidarity with Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israeli jails. The demonstrations were motivated by the hunger strikes of four Palestinian prisoners, two of them previously released in the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal and re-imprisoned. Issa Qaraqa, minister of prisoners' affairs in the Palestinian Authority (PA), said that if the hunger strike continued, the Palestinian people would "march toward an intifada of freedom." He added that regional and international pressure was being exerted on Israel and that Mahmoud Abbas was personally monitoring the events (Ma'an News Agency, February 18, 2013).
The protests came to a head on Friday, February 15, when Palestinians held a number of demonstrations to show solidarity with the terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel. Some of the demonstrations in Judea and Samaria turned into riots when Palestinians confronted the Israeli security forces. An IDF soldier was injured when stones were thrown at him at a riot held near the Ofer prison (west of Ramallah). Several Palestinian rioters were also injured (Ynet, February 15, 2013).
Solidarity demonstrations and rallies were also held in the Gaza Strip. Some of the statements made attempted to link the issue of the prisoners to the continuation of the lull in Palestinian violence, and warned that they would renounce the lull agreement if anything happened to any one of the hunger strikers. Khaled Mashaal, head of Hamas' political bureau, called the family of hunger striker Samer al-Issawi and spoke to his parents and sister. He stressed that the entire Palestinian people identified with him and the other hunger-striking prisoners. Mashaal said he was in contact with the head of Egyptian general intelligence to have the Egyptians exert pressure on Israel to release al-Issawi (Website of Hamas' information bureau, February 14, 2013).

On Monday, February 18, Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip held more demonstrations. The largest was in Hebron, where a mass march was organized by the Palestinian prisoners' club. Marchers held pictures of prisoners and waved signs praising their "firm stand" and condemning the silence of the international community.

Left: Mass march in Hebron in solidarity with the hunger-striking prisoners. Right: Palestinian youths confront the Israeli security forces at the Hawara roadblock near Nablus (Wafa News Agency, February 18, 2013).

Judea and Samaria

Other Events

Other prominent events in Judea and Samaria were the following:

On February 15, 2013, nine Palestinian youths were detained after they threw stones at Israeli vehicles in the region of Karnei Shomron (central Samaria), causing injuries (IDF spokesman, February 15, 2013).
On February 14, 2013, a Palestinian broke through a roadblock near Karnei Shomron and tried to run over a policeman. The policeman shot at the vehicle's tires but the Palestinian kept driving toward him. The policeman then shot at the vehicle itself, wounding the driver, who was taken to a hospital (Ynet, February 14, 2013). Note: The Karnei Shomron region has lately become a hotspot of stone- and Molotov cocktail-throwers.

Detention of Terrorist Operatives Who Attacked an IDF Soldier and Stole His Weapon

The Israeli security forces exposed a five-man terrorist squad of Fatah Tanzim operatives, residents of Qalandia and A-Ram, who infiltrated an IDF base in north Jerusalem on December 21, 2012. Two of the terrorists, armed with a toy gun and fire extinguishers, mounted the watchtower. One of them sprayed the face of the soldier on guard and the other stole his M-16 assault rifle. The soldier was wounded during the attack. According to the indictment, the members of the squad sold the rifle (IDF spokesman, February 12, 2013).

Developments in the Gaza Strip

Islam Shahwan, spokesman for the ministry of the interior of the de-facto Hamas administration, reported that for the past ten days Egyptian security forces had been closing tunnels along the Egyptian border at Rafah by flooding them with sewer water. He said the Hamas administration had not been advised in advance. He also said that the action endangered the Gaza Strip, whose economy rested on the tunnels, and that the Hamas administration would take practical steps to respond to the step taken by the Egyptians (Filastin al-Yawm, February 17, 2013).
Egyptian sources reported that the Egyptian defense minister had ordered the Rafah region be turned into a strategic military zone. To that end an Egyptian engineering unit had dug several wells along the border to flood the tunnels (Al-Youm Al-Sabea, February 15, 2013). Sidqi Sobhi, chief of staff of the Egyptian army, said that in addition to being a means of delivering basic goods they were also used to smuggle weapons which threatened Egypt's security and therefore they were being destroyed (Al-Arabiya TV, February 18, 2013).
Khalil al-Hayya, a member of Hamas' Executive Committee, criticized the Egyptian action, saying that closing the tunnels while the so-called Israeli "blockade" of the Gaza Strip was effectively an Arab decision in support of the oppression of the Palestinian people (Palinfo website, February 16, 2013). A senior Egyptian security source responded that Egypt was determined to take steps against the tunnels along the Egypt-Rafah border and that they had become an economic tool serving a number of merchants and had no connection with relieving the suffering of the Gazans. The same source said there were an estimated 225 tunnels, each with a number of openings, some of them located inside buildings, so that it was a question of about 550 tunnel openings (PalPress website, February 16, 2013).

Hamas Delegation Expelled from Bulgaria – A Political Blow to Hamas

A delegation of members of the Hamas faction of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) exited the Gaza Strip for Bulgaria to participate in a political conference. The delegation included Ismail al-Ashqar, deputy chairman of the Hamas faction in the PLC, and Salah al-Bardawil and Musheir al-Masri, both PLC members (who also have spokesman and information roles). Arriving in Bulgaria, the delegation was received by Muhammad Abu Aassi, head of the Bulgarian Center for Middle East Studies (Alresala.net website, February 14, 2013). On arrival, Salah al-Bardawil said that the delegation would also meet with senior Bulgarian officials (Filastin Al-'An, February 13, 2013).
Despite the fact that Hamas wanted to make the visit appear as a formal state visit, the Bulgaria foreign ministry made it clear that the Hamas delegation had been invited to Bulgaria by an organization and not the government, and that it was not an official visit. The delegation was requested to leave Bulgaria, and they were expelled to Turkey. In response to the expulsion of the delegation, senior Hamas figures said that diplomatic conventions had been violated and that Bulgaria had surrendered to pressure from the "Zionist lobby" (Ma'an News Agency, February 15, 2013).

Right: Members of the Hamas delegation in Bulgaria (left to right): Musheir al-Masri, Salah al-Bardawil, Ismail al-Ashqar (Shihab website, February 13, 2013).
Left: The delegation holds a press conference at the Rafah terminal on their return to the Gaza Strip (Hamas' Felesteen, February 17, 2013).

Reactions

Salah al-Bardawil, Hamas spokesman and a member of the delegation, said that the delegation's expulsion had been a political decision, the result of pressure from Israel (Alresala.net website, February 15, 2013). At a press conference held at the Rafah terminal when the delegation returned to the Gaza Strip, he called on Arab and Palestinian groups to condemn the incident and to state a clear position against the expulsion of the Hamas delegation. It was, he said, "in violation of every law and diplomatic convention," because it was carried out against parliamentarians, who had diplomatic immunity and who had entered Bulgaria on official visas (Ma'an News Agency, February 16, 2013). Ahmed Bahar, deputy chairman of the PLC and member of the Hamas faction, said that "the event grievously humiliated the Palestinian people and was a despicable Bulgarian surrender to Zionist pressure" (Dunia Al-Watan, Al-Fajar Al-Jadeed TV, February 16, 2013).
Riyadh al-Maliki, PA foreign minister, said that the arrival of the Hamas delegation in Bulgaria came as a surprise to the PA, and that their visit to Bulgaria had not been coordinated with the Palestinian legation there or with official Palestinian representatives (Voice of Palestine Radio, February 17, 2013).

Conclusion

For Hamas, a visit to Bulgaria, a member of the European Union, was supposed to have been a precedent that would help it institute formal relations between Hamas and the EU, even if Hamas refused to fulfill the Quartet's conditions. The visit was also supposed to have been a diplomatic blow to the PA, which had no prior knowledge of it (following a wave of visits of public figures to the Gaza Strip). Thus, the expulsion of the delegation was, in our assessment, a political and public blow to Hamas' efforts.

Turkey Builds a Hospital in the Gaza Strip

On February 13, 2013, Jemal al-Khadiri, a Hamas member of the PLC who is also chairman of the board of trustees of the Islamic University in Gaza City, toured the building site of the Turkish-Palestine Friendship Hospital. The hospital is being built on the ruins of the Israeli settlement Netzarim, and is funded by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister. He will reportedly visit the Gaza Strip at the end of the year to inaugurate the hospital. It will have 170 beds and employ both Palestinian and Turkish doctors (Ma'an News Agency and Filastin Al-'An, February 16, 2013).

Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas Executive Committee, said that on February 19 a delegation of senior Hamas figures headed by Khaled Mashaal, chairman of the Hamas Executive Committee, had left the Gaza Strip for an official visit to Turkey, where they would meet with Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister (Shihab website and Ma'an News Agency, February 19, 2013).

Report Says Gazan Salafist-Jihadists Are Fighting Alongside Rebels in Syria

According to Abu al-Inaa' al-Ansari, a leader of one of the Salafist-jihadi networks operating in the Gaza Strip, between 20 and 30 young men, members in the Gazan, had recently left for Syria. Their objective was to participate in the fighting alongside global jihad networks which fight on the side of the rebels, such as Jabhat al-Nusra. Palestinian sources reported that there had recently been an increase in the number of young men who left the Gaza Strip and went to Syria. They were mainly members of Salafist networks which had splintered off from the security services of the de-facto Hamas administration. It was also reported that a number of months ago two young Palestinians from the Gaza Strip had been killed in battle in Syria and that several others had been wounded (Al-Quds, February 17, 2013).

Operation Pillar of Defense – Update

Iranian Remark about Military Support for Hamas

Ali Larijani, chairman of the Iranian parliament, admitted that Iran was equipping the Palestinians with weapons and protecting Hamas and Hezbollah. He said that, as opposed to others, Iran did not hide its support for the Palestinians (Sama News Agency, February 13, 2013).

Rebuilding the Gaza Strip

Yasser Abd al-Rahman al-Shanti, deputy minister of housing and public works in the de-facto Hamas administration, said that on February 21 the Gaza Wadi bridge, which links the northern and southern Gaza Strip, would open to vehicles. The bridge was being rebuilt after it had been damaged in November 2012 during Operation Pillar of Defense. The construction, he said, was being financed by Human Appeal International in the United Arab Emirates.^[3] He also thanked the HAI in the Emirates (Paltoday website, February 17, 2013).

Left: The Gaza Wadi bridge, damaged during Operation Pillar of Defense (Hamas' Felesteen, November 27, 2012). Right: The bridge under construction.

On February 10, 2013, the main branch of the Islamic National Bank in the Rimal section of Gaza City, which suffered severe damage in Operation Pillar of Defense, reopened. The official reopening ceremony was attended by Ziyad al-Zaza, deputy head of the de-facto Hamas administration (Hamas forum website, Filastin Al-'An, website of the National Islamic Bank, February 10, 2013). The bank was established by Hamas in March 2009, and has two branches in Gaza City and another in Khan Yunis. Its director general is Hazem al-Masri and the chairman of the board of directors is Ibrahim Jabber (Website of the Islamic National Bank in Gaza, February 10, 2013).

The Palestinian Authority

Preparations for President Obama's Visit to the PA

In preparation for President Barack Obama's visit to the PA, an official PA delegation went to Washington to update American officials on the Palestinian position regarding negotiations with Israel. One member of the delegation was Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, and another was Muhammad Ashtiya member of Fatah's Central Committee. The delegation will present the Palestinian positions regarding an end to construction in the settlements, the release of the Palestinian terrorist operatives in Israeli jails, and the source of authority for any future negotiations (PalPress website, February 17, 2013).

Mahmoud Abbas Visits Pakistan

This past week Mahmoud Abbas visited Pakistan. He met with the president and other officials of the administration. He also participated in laying the cornerstone for the Palestinian embassy in Pakistan. He told the president of Pakistan that he hoped to receive him "in Jerusalem, the capital of the Palestinian state," and to pray with him in Al-Aqsa mosque (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, February 18, 2013).

Lebanon

Hassan Nasrallah's Speech

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech on February 16 at a memorial ceremony for three Hezbollah leaders (Abbas Musawi, Ragheb Kharb, Imad Mughnieh). His speech was relayed on a giant screen. Nasrallah spoke about the challenges facing Hezbollah in light of recent developments (Radio Al-Nur, February 16, 2013).
The speech centered on sending a message of deterrence to Israel, another in a series of such messages sent in previous speeches. Nasrallah emphasized that Hezbollah could attack Israel "from Kiryat Shemonah to Eilat" and that its airports, ports and power stations were within range of Hezbollah's missiles: All that is necessary is a few missiles...to plunge Israel into darkness...Will Israel be able to stand six months of darkness?...the economy of Israel and the people of Israel..."
Other issues raised by the speech were the following:

The attack in Bulgaria– Nasrallah said that there were those who were quick to blame Hezbollah and to issue a verdict against it in the name of the European Union. That might have been expected, because based on those accusations Israel would start a war against Israel. However, past experience had shown that if Israel wanted to start a war it did not need an excuse or to wait for the results of an investigation, but it would go to war based on its own considerations.
Hezbollah's military capabilities– Hezbollah, said Nasrallah, was well armed. Today it had all the weapons it needed for a possible war with Israel. It did not need weapons from Syria or Iran.
Hezbollah's support of the Palestinians– Hezbollah, he said, had given the Palestinian intifada and the Palestinian [terrorist] organizations both material and moral support, and was still supporting them. The Palestinians should follow the example of the Lebanese "resistance" [i.e., Hezbollah] which in 2000 had succeeded in freeing itself [the year the IDF withdrew from the security zone in south Lebanon], and the "resistance" which had succeeded in freeing the Gaza Strip [the disengagement, 2005], and there was no reason it would not continue to succeed.

Full document in PDF format

^[1] As of February 19, 2013. The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.
^[2] The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.
^[3] Human Appeal International is a charity established in 1984, headed by the ruler of Oman, Sheikh Hamid bin Rashad al-Naimi. It has branches in many Arab countries and in India, as well as in Denmark, Australia and Britain. It was outlawed in Israel at the time by the minister of defense.

Hezbollah sends Iranian messages of deterrence to Israel and boasts of its military capabilities

Hezbollah's main war room (Al-Manar website, December 18, 2012).

A Hezbollah sectorial operations room (Al-Manar website, December 25, 2012)

Hezbollah pickup mounted with a rocket launcher (Al-Manar website, December 25, 2012).

Picture posted on the forum of Sayid Hassan Nasrallah's admirers: Nasrallah and Khamenei under the title "Admirer of Khamenei."

Overview

The Main Themes of Hezbollah's Websites

Glorifying Hezbollah: Scenes from a 17-part Al-Manar TV documentary entitled "What if Hezbollah were defeated," broadcast beginning December 17, 2012

Hezbollah's Target Audiences

The Popularity of Hezbollah's Websites

Results of a Technical Analysis of Hezbollah Websites[3]

Main Findings of the Analysis of Hezbollah's Websites

Selling Hezbollah Publications in the United States

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Soccer match rekindles ethnic tensions

Soccer match rekindles ethnic tensions

Soccer match rekindles ethnic tensions

Soccer match rekindles ethnic tensions

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Sites in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, where IEDs were detonated (November 5, 2012).

Sites in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, where IEDs were detonated (November 5, 2012).

Bahraini supporters of Iran and Hezbollah demonstrate against the regime.

The yellow flags are Hezbollah's. The pictures at the bottom of the left-hand picture are of Khomeini and Khamenei

Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, advisor to Khamenei (Al-Jazeera, February 22, 2013).

Tariq al-Hassan, head of Bahraini general intelligence, at a press conference held February 19, 2013

Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah leader, appeals to the people of Bahrain to sacrifice and not remain silent until the oppressor is removed, March 19, 2012 (YouTube.com).

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Overview

Appendix

Preventing the Terrorist Attack in Cyprus, 2012

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Struggling to make ends meet: Iran’s workers step up fight to raise minimum wage

The required revision to the minimum wage according to the inflation rate (Mehr, February 5)

The workers’ position on the increase in the minimum wage

Figures on wage erosion and the increasing cost of the consumption basket

Comparison between the rise of the inflation rate and the increase of the minimum wage

Monthly expenses of an average family of four (as presented by the workers’ representatives, based on Central Bank data and the prices of 12 basic products and services, Asr-e Iran, February 5)

Monthly expenses of an average family of four on 18 basic food products

The position of employers’ representatives on raising the minimum wage

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Palestinians riot in solidarity with terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israeli jails

Students from Beir Zeit University throw Molotov cocktails at the gate of the Israeli Ofer prison (Wafa News Agency, February 12, 2013).

Palestinians block the trans-Judea and Samaria road (Route 60) to the passage of Israeli vehicles.

Palestinian youths burn tires at the Jalame checkpoint (north of Jenin) (Wafa News Agency, February 15, 2013).

Turkey Builds a Hospital in the Gaza Strip

The Islamic National Bank reopens (Filastin Al-'An, February 11, 2013).

The Islamic National Bank reopens (Filastin Al-'An, February 11, 2013).

Mahmoud Abbas meets with the Pakistani president in Islamabad

The memorial service for Hezbollah leaders (Al-Ahad, February 17, 2013).

Hassan Nasrallah's broadcast speech (Maqawamah website, February 17, 2013).

Overview

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

Rocket Fire

Demonstrations of Solidarity with Imprisoned Palestinian Terrorists

Protests in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip

Judea and Samaria

Other Events

Detention of Terrorist Operatives Who Attacked an IDF Soldier and Stole His Weapon

Developments in the Gaza Strip

Hamas Delegation Expelled from Bulgaria – A Political Blow to Hamas

Reactions

Conclusion

Turkey Builds a Hospital in the Gaza Strip

Report Says Gazan Salafist-Jihadists Are Fighting Alongside Rebels in Syria

Operation Pillar of Defense – Update

Iranian Remark about Military Support for Hamas

Rebuilding the Gaza Strip

The Palestinian Authority

Preparations for President Obama's Visit to the PA

Mahmoud Abbas Visits Pakistan

Lebanon

Hassan Nasrallah's Speech

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Results of a Technical Analysis of Hezbollah Websites^[3]