1. Home

Tag Archives: Iran

Spotlight on Iran

Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Source: E’temad, December 22

Source: E’temad, December 22

''We are young people out of jobs'' (source: ISNA News Agency)

''We are young people out of jobs'' (source: ISNA News Agency)


       Release of unemployment figures reopens discourse on job crisis

Last week the Statistical Center of Iran released up-to-date figures on labor force participation, employment, and unemployment in the country in recent years, broken down into categories according to age, province, and economic sector (services, industry, and agriculture). The figures released by the Statistical Center show that this past summer Iran’s unemployment rate was 12.4 percent, an increase of 1.3 percent compared to the same period last year.

The release of the Statistical Center figures has reopened the discourse on the severe problem of unemployment in Iran and the reliability of official data. Government critics argued that the official data is not an accurate representation of the true state of affairs. The daily Tehran Emrooz discussed the great difference between what Iranian citizens feel is the actual unemployment rate and the official unemployment figures, saying that the difference stems from the fact that the Statistical Center considershousewives and people who work just one hour per week to be participating workers.

Government critics also criticized the performance of the government and warned that the unemployment crisis could have serious consequences. The Tabnak website warned that unemployment in Iran is gradually turning into structural unemployment and that it may lead to an economic catastrophe, while former Majles member Mohammad Khoshchehreh referred to the unemployment situation as a social and security time bomb.

The figures published in the Statistical Center’s report

Last week the Statistical Center of Iran released up-to-date figures on labor force participation, employment, and unemployment in the country in recent years, broken down into categories according to age, province, and economic sector (services, industry, and agriculture). The figures released by the Statistical Center show that this past summer Iran’s unemployment rate was 12.4 percent, an increase of 1.3 percent compared to the same period last year.

The Statistical Center’s report indicates that, this past summer, the labor force participation rate among people aged 10 and up was 38.2 percent: 62.3 percent among men and 14.1 percent among women. The labor force participation rate for this age group in rural areas was 41.1 percent, compared to 37.2 percent in urban areas.

The labor force participation rate among people aged 15 and up was 41.8 percent: 68.3 percent among men and 15.4 percent among women. The labor force participation rate for this age group in rural areas was 45.5 percent, compared to 40.5 percent in urban areas.

The highest labor force participation rate (in the entire population) was recorded in the 25-29 age group (55.9 percent). The highest labor force participation rate among men was found in the 40-44 age group (93.2 percent), while the highest labor force participation rate among women was found in the 25-29 age group (25.4 percent).

In comparison with the summer of 2011, there was an increase of 1.2 percent in the labor force participation rate among people aged 10 and up. For this age group, there was an increase of 1.6 percent in urban areas and an increase of 0.1 percent in rural areas. The labor force participation rate increased by 1.0 percent among men and by 1.7 percent among women.

In comparison with the spring of 2011, there was an increase of 0.1 percent in the labor force participation rate. An increase of 0.1 percent was recorded in urban areas; no change was recorded in rural areas. The labor force participation rate increased by 0.3 percent among men and by 0.2 percent among women.

The unemployment data contained in the report published by the Statistical Center shows an unemployment rate of 12.4 percent among people aged 10 and up. The unemployment rate among men was 10.2 percent; among women—22.1 percent. The unemmployment rate for this age group in urban areas was 14.5 percent, compared to 7.1 percent in rural areas. The same unemployment rate (12.4 percent) was recorded in the 15 and up age group.

In comparison with the spring of 2012, there was a decrease of 0.5 percent in the unemployment rate. A 0.4-percent decrease was recorded in the cities, and a 0.8- percent decrease was recorded in rural areas. The unemployment rate increased by 2.1 percent among women and decreased by 1.0 percent among men.

In comparison with the summer of 2011, there was an increase of 1.3 percent in the unemployment rate. A 2.0-percent increase was recorded in the cities and a 0.5-percent decrease was recorded in rural areas. The unemployment rate increased by 2.1 percent among women and by 0.9 percent among men.

The highest unemployment rate was recorded in the 20-24 age group (29.8 percent). In this age group, the unemployment rate was 24.8 percent among men and 48.5 percent among women.

The report of the Statistical Center indicates that the number of unemployed people in the 15 to 24 age group is on the rise: the unemployment rate for this age group was 23.3 percent in 2005, 23.5 percent in 2006, 22.3 percent in 2007, 23 percent in 2008, and reached 24.7 percent this past year.

In its analysis of employment data by economic sector, the report indicates that the highest rate of employment is in the services sector (46.9 percent) followed by the industry sector (32.7 percent), and that the lowest rate of employment is in the agriculture sector (20.3 percent). The report indicates that the number of employed farmers has decreased from 5.1 million in 2005 to 4.3 million in the past year.

Of Iran’s 31 provinces, West Azerbaijan Province had the highest rate of employment in the agriculture sector: 43.8 percent. The lowest rate of employment in the agriculture sector was in Tehran Province: just 1.7 percent. A total of 20.3 percent of the labor force was employed in the agriculture sector in 2012.

Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province had the highest rate of employment in the industry sector: 43.8 percent. The lowest rate of employment in this sector was recorded in Bushehr Province: 21.5 percent. A total of 32.7 percent of Iran’s labor force was employed in the industry sector in 2012.

Tehran Province had the highest rate of employment in the services sector: 67.3 percent, compared to West Azerbaijan Province, which had the lowest rate of employment in this sector: 31.6 percent. A total of 46.9 percent of Iran’s labor force was employed in the services sector.

Employment rate by sector (in percent)

Year

Agriculture sector

Industry sector

Services sector

2005

27.7

29.3

43

2006

26.2

30.7

43.1

2007

25.1

31.5

43.3

2008

22.3

31.9

45.7

2009

21.9

31.9

46.2

2010

21.1

31.5

47.5

2011

20

33

47

2012

20.3

32.7

46.9

The report also discusses the rate of underemployment (a situation in which a person qualified for a certain position works in a job that requires lower qualifications). 8.2 percent of workers were underemployed this past year: 9.8 percent of men and 4.7 percent of women. The rate of underemployment in urban areas was 7.2 percent, and 10.5 percent in rural areas.

The report also includes an analysis of employment and unemployment data by province. The highest labor force participation rate was recorded in the provinces of West Azerbaijan (45.2 percent) and Gilan (43.4 percent). The lowest labor force participation rate was recorded in Sistan-Baluchistan Province (24.6 percent).

The highest unemployment rate was recorded in Fars Province (21.2 percent), followed by Lorestan Province (20.5 percent). The lowest unemployment rate was recorded in South Khorasan Province (6.3 percent). The unemployment rate increased in 20 provinces and decreased in 10 provinces compared to the same period last year (the full report is available at http://www.amar.org.ir/Portals/0/Files/fulltext/1391/n_niru_t91.pdf).

Government critics dispute report data

The release of the Statistical Center figures has reopened the discourse on the severe problem of unemployment in Iran and the reliability of official data. Hossein Kamali, the former minister of labor in the reformist administration, said in an interview given to ILNA News Agency that the unemployment data released by the Statistical Center is not an accurate representation of the true state of affairs. He criticized the Statistical Center for not publishing real data, saying that the release of the data is misleading to the public and has become an instrument in the hands of the government, which does not make actual figures available to its citizens (ILNA, December 22).

Tehran Emrooz, a daily affiliated with Tehran’s Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, also argued that the data released by the Statistical Center does not reflect reality and that the unemployment rate is much higher than what the official data suggests. An editorial published by the daily earlier this week said that the difference between what Iranian citizens feel is the actual unemployment rate and the official unemployment figures stems from the fact that the Statistical Center considers every person working at least one hour per week to be “employed”, and also counts housewives as participating workers. While this definition has in fact changed the employment data, the real question is whether people who work just one hour per week can provide for themselves and for their families. Even someone who is single is unable to provide for himself if he only works one hour per week, and placing him within the definition of “employed person” does not change reality and only makes the public more distrustful of the official data.

The daily said that the Statistical Center of Iran needs to explain how it has arrived at the official unemployment rate of 12.3 percent, and how many people who are considered to be employed work just one hour per week. Answers to these questions may shed light on the difference between the official data and the feelings of Iranian citizens, who believe that the unemployment rate—particularly among young people—is approaching 50 percent (Tehran Emrooz, December 22).

The unemployment is a social and security time bomb

Following the release of the unemployment data, government critics once again criticized the economic performance of the government and warned that the unemployment crisis could have serious consequences. The Tabnak website argued that, unlike the inflation rate, the high unemployment rate does not receive sufficient attention even though it may lead to the collapse of Iran’s markets.

According to a commentary article posted on the website, economic experts agree that a high unemployment rate not only creates severe problems for individuals and families but also has adverse effects on the macroeconomic level. The website listed a number of severe economic and social consequences that result from the ongoing unemployment crisis. In the economic sphere, the high rate of unemployment leads to a loss of economic resources, damage to economic growth, decline in the state’s tax revenues, increase in state expenses on unemployment benefits and social services, and severe impact on human capital, since people who are not employed gradually lose their professional skills after the state invested considerable amounts of money in their training. In the social sphere, unemployment at its current level leads to an increase in crime (economic, criminal, and even political), growing desperation among the Iranian people, rise in divorce rates, and increased prevalence of physical and mental illness. Tabnak warned that unemployment in Iran is gradually turning into structural unemployment and that it may lead to an economic catastrophe (Tabnak, December 22).

In an article published by the reformist daily E’temad, former Majles member and economist Mohammad Khoshchehreh also warned about the consequences of unemployment. He argued that unemployment in Iran is an economic, security, cultural, and social time bomb, and that it is impossible to ignore a situation where one third of the population are unemployed. The only thing that has so far prevented a security flare-up as a result of the high unemployment rate is the money paid by the government to Iranian citizens under the subsidy reform. Given the decrease in economic and financial resources as a result of the government’s mismanagement and the escalating sanctions, it is impossible to keep paying money to the citizens. Accordingly, the issue of employment has to be put at the top of the economic priority list and promptly resolved (E’temad, December 22).

Ahmad Shohani, a Majles member for Ilam Province, strongly criticized the government’s performance, saying that, contrary to statements made by top government officials according to which the government has produced 2.5 million jobs in recent years, it has not even produced 500 thousand jobs. Shohani noted that the employment situation is particularly severe in periphery provinces, such as Ilam, where the government sector makes no investments while the private sector is too weak and is either unable or not interested to invest (Mardom Salari, December 23).

Related Articles

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 18 – 25 , 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Hezbollah Communications Devices Explode

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis

News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (December 12-18, 2012)

Published:
Demonstrators carry models of rockets at a rally in Nablus marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of Hamas

Demonstrators carry models of rockets at a rally in Nablus marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of Hamas

Hamas symbols at the weekly demonstration against the security fence in Ni'lin

Hamas symbols at the weekly demonstration against the security fence in Ni'lin

Ismail Haniya, head of the de-facto Hamas administration, and the Qatari ambassador launch a project for the Qatari-funded rebuilding the Gaza Strip infrastructure

Ismail Haniya, head of the de-facto Hamas administration, and the Qatari ambassador launch a project for the Qatari-funded rebuilding the Gaza Strip infrastructure

The Iranian-supported PIJ proudly displays the weapons it used to attack Israel in Operation Pillar of Defense

The Iranian-supported PIJ proudly displays the weapons it used to attack Israel in Operation Pillar of Defense

The Iranian-supported PIJ proudly displays the weapons it used to attack Israel in Operation Pillar of Defense

The Iranian-supported PIJ proudly displays the weapons it used to attack Israel in Operation Pillar of Defense

Hamas flags at the rally in Qalqiliya, December 15 (Ajnad Facebook page, December 15, 2012)

Hamas flags at the rally in Qalqiliya, December 15 (Ajnad Facebook page, December 15, 2012)

Mahmoud Abbas and Pope Benedict XVI (Shihab website, December 17, 2012)

Mahmoud Abbas and Pope Benedict XVI (Shihab website, December 17, 2012)

A cartoon from Al-Ayam reading ''In real time…Palestine calls on you to boycott Israeli products'' (Al-Ayam, December 17, 2012).

A cartoon from Al-Ayam reading ''In real time…Palestine calls on you to boycott Israeli products'' (Al-Ayam, December 17, 2012).

Overview

  • Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip continue to implement the understandings reached at the end of Operation Pillar of Defense. Since November 21 no rockets or mortar shells have been fired into Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip. In addition, frictions between Palestinians and IDF forces near the security fence have lessened.
  • This past week the focus of violence was in Judea and Samaria. The most glaring incident occurred near the Cave of the Patriarchs when a woman Border Police soldier killed a Palestinian youth who had drawn a gun (which was later discovered not to be a real gun) and aimed it at a Border Police soldier. There were also violent incidents between Palestinians and IDF forces in other locations where stones and Molotov cocktails were thrown.
  • Hamas marked the 25th anniversary of its founding with a series of rallies and demonstrations in Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah, Qalqiliya, Tulkarm and other locations. The events, which had been authorized by the Palestinian Authority, emphasized the path of "resistance" [i.e., terrorism] and participants carried models of rockets. The Palestinian Authority security forces supervised the events, which were held without exceptional occurrences.
  • Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip continue to implement the understandings reached at the end of Operation Pillar of Defense. Since 2300 hours on November 21 no rockets or mortar shells have been fired into Israeli territory.
Rocket Hits in Israeli Territory since the Beginning of 2011[1]

Rocket Hits in Israeli Territory since the Beginning of 2011

Annual Distribution of Rocket Fire[2]
Annual Distribution of Rocket Fire
Increase in Violence in Judea and Samaria
Overview
  • The level of violence has risen in Judea and Samaria since Operation Pillar of Defense, especially since the UN upgraded the PA's status. Throughout Judea and Samaria the number of stone-throwing and Molotov cocktail-throwing incidents increased, as did confrontations with IDF forces.

Incident near the Tomb of the Patriarchs

  • The most glaring incident occurred on the evening of December 12 at an improvised Border Police post near the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. Border Police soldiers noticed a young Palestinian acting suspiciously. They approached and asked him to identify himself. He then attacked one of the soldiers and threw him to the ground, drew a gun and pointed it at him. A female Border Police soldier near the post shot and critically wounded the Palestinian, who later died. An IDF explosives expert arrived later and determined that the gun was not real but rather a metal imitation (Border Police website, December 12, 2012). The Palestinian media reported the Palestinian's name as Muhammad Ziyad Awad (Alresala.net, Safa News Agency and Filastin al-'Aan websites, December 12, 2012).
  • The Palestinian Authority strongly denounced the killing. In a formal statement it said that the shooting was a manifestation of the Israeli government's extremist policies. The statement claimed that Israel had removed the limitations on the instructions the soldiers received for opening fire. According to the statement, the event brought the PA closer to appealing to the International Criminal Court and all the committees, courts and international organizations whose job it was to protect civilians (Wafa News Agency, December 12, 2012).
  • The Palestinian's funeral was held in Hebron and attended by hundreds of participants, among them Aziz Dweik, a member of the Hamas faction in Palestinian Legislative Council, as well as the governor of Hebron and others. Hamas and Palestinian flags were waved during the funeral and participants called for the Palestinian terrorist organizations, especially the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, to respond to the incident. Some of the participants confronted IDF soldiers (Safa News Agency, December 13, 2012).
Other Incidents
  • The following incidents occurred this past week:
  • On December 14, after the Friday prayer in the mosques in Hebron, Palestinians threw stones at IDF soldiers.
  • At the weekly riots in Bila'in, Ni'lin, Qadoum and Qalandia, scores of Palestinians threw stones and mosques at Israeli vehicles. During the riots in Bila'in rioters waved Hamas flags and carried Hamas symbols, which they had not done for a long time. In Qalqiliya three IDF vehicles were damaged (Ynet, December 14, 2012). 
Rebuilding the Gaza Strip
  • Ismail Haniya, head of the de-facto Hamas administration, held a press conference on the ruins of an administration building leveled during Operation Pillar of Defense. He announced that the first stage of rebuilding the Gaza Strip, financed by Qatar, had begun. The project, he said, would include rebuilding roads at a cost of $22 million. Present at the press conference was Muhammad al-Imadi, head of the Qatari committee for the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip, who said that the first stage was part of a donation of $407 million from Qatar to Gaza (Ma'an News Agency, December 13, 2012).
  • Regarding the project, Abd al-Islam Siam, Hamas administration secretary, said that Hamas there was an agreement in principle with Egypt for delivering the building materials. However, he said, if Hamas could not acquire them in conventional ways, they would come in "underground" (that is, through the smuggling tunnels) (Paltoday website, December 15, 2012).
  • As to the tunnels, it has been reported that many of the ones attacked in Operation Pillar of Defense have returned to their previous levels of activity. Most of the tunnels are used to smuggle in building materials and basic goods (Samaa News, December 16, 2012).
Lawfare and Propaganda in the Wake of Operation Pillar of Defense
  • Hamas and Palestinian NGOs specializing in lawfare against Israeli are collecting "testimonies" and "evidence" about what they refer to as the so-called "crimes" Israel committed during Operation Pillar of Defense:
  • Raji Sourani, director of the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), an NGO based in the Gaza Strip which plays a leading role in anti-Israeli lawfare, said that a team of experts in international law had arrived in the Gaza Strip, entering through the Rafah crossing, to help the Center conduct examinations of IDF activities during Operation Pillar of Defense. He said the team would remain in the Gaza Strip for a number of days and examine sites where the IDF carried out what he referred to as "war crimes" and meet with residents and local experts who were investigating the issue. The team, whose members come from Norway, Britain and Ireland, would form a legal opinion with the objective of bringing suit in the International Criminal Court in The Hague against IDF officers who were responsible for making decisions in Operation Pillar of Defense (Ma'an News Agency, December 15, 2012).
  • Issam Younis, director of the Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, an NGO based in the Gaza Strip, emphasized that the harm done to civilians, the destruction of houses and the Gaza Strip infrastructure during the operation were "deliberate Israeli actions." Noting what he referred to as the so-called "violations" "documented" by his NGO during the operation, he claimed that most of the actions were "war crimes or crimes against humanity," and had been premeditated. He claimed that the Israeli prime minister and the Israeli legal system held joint criminal responsibility for the so-called "war crimes" (Al-Quds TV, December 12, 2012).
  • At the same time, Hamas continues to issue spurious claims branding Israel as a "war criminal" and to reject claims that Hamas itself carries out war crimes. For example, Abu Obeida, spokesman for Hamas military-terrorist wing, claimed in an interview that 95% of the IDF attacks focused on civilian targets (Note: an out-and-out lie) and that most of the targets Hamas attacked in Israel were military and not civilian (Note: another out-and-out lie) (Al-Jazeera TV, December 15, 2012).
Using Civilian Facilities for Military-Terrorist Purposes during Operation Pillar of Defense
  • During Operation Pillar of Defense Hamas again extensively used civilians as human shields and carried out military activity from within civilian facilities. According to our information, during the operation Hamas used a large number of mosques and schools for military purposes, turning them into command and control headquarters and into protected areas for the use of terrorist operatives. In addition theAl-Shifaa hospital in the western part of Gaza City was also used for military purposes.
  • Using the Al-Shifaa hospital for military purposes is a well-known method often employed by Hamas during Operation Cast Lead. During that operation senior operatives of Hamas' military-terrorist wing sought refuge in the hospital, closing off some of the wings and turning them into closed areas secured by armed operatives. Among those seeking refuge in the hospital were Mahmoud al-Zahar and Sayid Siam, while Ismail Haniya, head of the de-facto Hamas administration, set up his headquarters in the Al-Shifaa burn unit.[3] Using medical facilities for military-terrorist purposes, is exploitation based on the knowledge that Israel will not attack a humanitarian facility.
Iranian Support for the Gaza Strip
  • nterviewed in Cairo, Ramadan Shalah, secretary general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, said that Iran was generous with the help it gave the Palestinian people. Iranian support, he said, was meant to reinforce the "firm stand" of the Palestinians," and it was expressed in terms of money and weapons. He said all the countries in the Arab-Muslim world should follow Iran's example and support the Palestinians because "Palestine" was not only an Iranian issue but one that was relevant to the entire Arab-Muslim world, and that defending "Palestine" was a religious and moral duty (Anadolu News Agency, Turkey, December 17, 2012). Ramadan Shalah's remarks were more in a series by PIJ and other terrorist organization leaders made to glorify Iran as militarily supporting the Palestinians.
Delegations to the Gaza Strip
  • While the experts look for "evidence" of so-called Israeli "war crimes," international aid continue arriving in the Gaza Strip:
  • The Iranian government appealed to the Egyptian authorities to allow an Iranian aid convoy to enter the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing in two weeks. The Egyptians reportedly agreed and a ship bringing humanitarian aid is supposed to dock in El-Arish. Its cargo allegedly consists of food and medicines, and it will be accompanied by a delegation of Iranians who will tour the Gaza Strip (Ma'an News Agency, December 12, 2012).
  • Hamas members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, led by Ahmed al-Bahar, received a Bahraini delegation to the Gaza Strip which entered through the Rafah crossing (Safa News Agency, December 12, 2012).
  • In addition, a Greek anti-Israeli network called Ship to Gaza sent a delegation of activists to the Gaza Strip. They entered the Gaza Strip after several days of bureaucratic delays. Their main objective is to collect information about the situation in the Gaza Strip following Operation Pillar of Defense.
Fatah Rally in Gaza?
  • While the Palestinian Authority allowed Hamas to hold rallies in Judea and Samaria (see below), the de-facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip continues raising obstacles for Fatah. Islam Shahawan, spokesman for the ministry of the interior of the Hamas administration, said in an announcement that Fatah would not be given permission to hold a rally on the anniversary of its founding in the Al-Katiba square in Gaza City (a suitable venue for mass rallies). He said the administration had given permission in principle for a rally but its location had not yet been decided. (Hamas' Felesteen and the Hamas forum, December 16, 2012).
  • Official sources in Fatah "expressed sorrow" over the decision. Fatah spokesman Fayez Abu Ita said that the Hamas' response to the request was an implicit refusal and that it would have a negative influence on the positive atmosphere in the territories and on the efforts for reconciliation (Wafa News Agency, December 17, 2012). Hamas' response led to criticism of Fathi Hamad, Hamas minister of the interior, from people surfing the social networks, who claimed he was trying to sabotage the reconciliation.
Hamas Rallies in Judea and Samaria
  • Hamas marked the 25th anniversary of its founding with mass rallies and demonstrations in Judea and Samaria. The events, which were held with the authorization of the Palestinian Authority, made a popular impact. They were a striking demonstration of Hamas' strength in Judea and Samaria after a number of years during which the PA had forbidden or limited Hamas from conducting that sort of activity.
  • The main rallies were held in the large cities, among them Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah, Qalqiliya and Tulkarm. They featured the "victory narrative" of the "resistance" in Operation Pillar of Defense, and demonstrators carried cardboard models of rockets, symbolizing the "resistance" [i.e. terrorism and violence] and "victory." The rallies were held under PA security apparatus supervision, preventing them from turning into confrontations with the IDF.

Poster issued by Hamas for the rallies in Judea and Samaria making the 25th anniversary of its founding
Poster issued by Hamas for the rallies in Judea and Samaria making the 25th anniversary of its founding: "The [West] Bank renews its commitment and swears allegiance to the resistance" (Ajnad Facebook page, December 15, 2012).

  • Summary of the Hamas rallies in the main cities in Judea and Samaria:
  • Hebron: A mass rally was held, attended by Aziz Dweik, Hamas chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and representatives of the local Palestinian organizations. Ismail Haniya greeted the participants in a telephone conversation. Aziz Dweik gave a speech in which he called on Mahmoud Abbas to end the internal Palestinian schism, put an end to political detentions in Judea and Samaria and release Hamas operatives from Palestinian jails (Safa News Agency, December 14, 2012). Palestinian policemen prevented the demonstrators from approaching IDF forces (Ajnad Facebook page, December 14, 2012).

Right: A rally in Hebron to mark the 25th anniversary of the founding of Hamas (Hamas forum, December 14, 2012). Left: Palestinian police prevent demonstrators from approaching IDF forces (Ajnad Facebook page, December 14, 2012).
Right: A rally in Hebron to mark the 25th anniversary of the founding of Hamas (Hamas forum, December 14, 2012). Left: Palestinian police prevent demonstrators from approaching IDF forces (Ajnad Facebook page, December 14, 2012).

  • Nablus: A mass rally was held in the center of the city on December 13, attended by Hamas members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, public figures, the governor of the Nablus district, and Amin Maqboul, secretary of Fatah's Revolutionary Council. A speech relayed by telephone was given by Husam Badran, a terrorist operative released from an Israeli jail and deported to the Gaza Strip. He said that "resistance" [i.e., terrorism] was the only way to restore the rights of the Palestinian people and the only way to achieve national unity. Amin Maqboul also spoke praising Hamas and "the hands which brought victory to Pillar of Defense" (Safa News Agency, December 13, 2012).
  • Tulkarm: A mass rally was held in Tulkarm on December 14, where demonstrators waved Hamas and "Palestine" flags and chanted slogans praising the "resistance." A speech was given by Hassan Kharisha, deputy chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council affiliated with Hamas. He said that the Palestinian people wanted to unite around the idea of resistance (Ajnad Facebook page, December 14, 2012).
  • Qalqiliya: A rally was held on December 15 at which demonstrators called for support of Hamas and its military-terrorist wing after Operation Pillar of Defense, and for national Palestinian unity. A speech was given by Nasser Abd al-Jawad, a Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. He said that Hamas had preserved a strong presence in Judea and Samaria despite the difficulties it had encountered over the past few years. Sheikh Talal al-Baz, a Palestinian terrorist released from an Israeli jail who currently lives in Qatar, gave a speech relayed by telephone in which he emphasized Hamas' adherence to the concept of jihad and "resistance" until the liberation of "Palestine" (Alresala.net website, December 15, 2012).
Mahmoud Abbas' Remarks in Turkey
  • Mahmoud Abbas visited Turkey where he met with senior officials in the Turkish government and spoke at length about the negotiations with Israel:
  • Speaking before members of the Turkish parliament he said that the Palestinian Authority wanted to create a chance for peace and had called on the government of Israel to fulfill its commitment to freeze construction in the settlements, release prisoners and restart negotiations from where they left off at the end of 2008 with an agreed-on time limit (Wafa News Agency, December 10, 2012).
  • At a press conference held by Turkish President Abdullah Gul after meeting with Mahmoud Abbas in Ankara, Abbas said the Israeli government had to choose between continuing construction in the settlements and the occupation on the one hand, and peace which would ensure security and stability based on legitimate international decisions on the other. He claimed that the Israeli government's recent announcement about the construction of new neighborhoods was "aggression" and "a red line" which violated international agreements (Wafa News Agency, December 11, 2012).
  • From Turkey Mahmoud Abbas flew to Portugal and from there to Italy, arriving on December 16. On December 17 he met with Pope Benedict XVI at the Vatican and discussed the upgrading of the PA's status in the UN. Mahmoud Abbas presented the Pope with a mosaic of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. It bore the heading "Mahmoud Abbas, President of the State of Palestine." It was the first time Mahmoud Abbas used the title in a visit to the Vatican (Shihab website, December 17, 2012).
Continuing Threats to Appeal to the International Criminal Court
  • The Palestinian Authority, after having had its status upgraded by the UN, continues to deal with possible lawsuits against Israel in the International Criminal Court. Palestinian Authority foreign ministerRiyadh al-Maliki said in an interview that the PA had not ruled out an appeal to the International Criminal Court. He said it was a card the PA could play but for the time being the PA wants to play it wisely. He also quoted Mahmoud Abbas, saying that if Israel did not fulfill its commitments regarding the settlements, the PA would appeal to the International Court to try Israelis for so-called "war crimes" carried out against the Palestinian people over the years (Voice of Palestine Radio, December 12, 2012).
  • Salah Rafat, a member of the PLO's Executive Committee, said that the Palestinians wanted to appeal to the International Criminal Court and were deliberating the signing of the Rome Statute[4] to be able to bring a suit against the Israeli government because the settlements constitute a war crime (Palestinian TV, December 13, 2012).
Boycotting Israeli Products
  • The weekly meeting of the Palestinian Authority government, headed by Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, denounced the Israeli freeze of the Palestinian tax revenues and called it "an attempt at political blackmail." The PA government warned that the freeze could paralyze the PA's ability to provide services and deepen its financial crisis (Wafa News Agency, December 12, 2012).
  • Salam Fayyad, during a meeting with media correspondents in Ramallah that he called on the Palestinian public to boycott products made in Israel in protest of the Israeli decision not to transfer tax revenues owed them from Israel to the Palestinians. He said that "the steps taken by Israel are piracy and aggression toward the source of income of Palestinian residents." He called on the United States and the European Union to intervene (Wafa News Agency, December 16, 2012).

Left: A cartoon from Al-Ayam reading "In real time…Palestine calls on you to boycott Israeli products" (Al-Ayam, December 17, 2012). Right: Salam Fayyad calls for the boycott of Israeli products at a meeting with Palestinian media correspondents in Ramallah (Wafa News Agency, December 16, 2012).
Left: A cartoon from Al-Ayam reading "In real time…Palestine calls on you to boycott Israeli products" (Al-Ayam, December 17, 2012). Right: Salam Fayyad calls for the boycott of Israeli products at a meeting with Palestinian media correspondents in Ramallah (Wafa News Agency, December 16, 2012).

[1] As of December 18, 2012. The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.

[2] The statistics for 2008 and 2009 include rocket hits identified during Operation Cast Lead. They do not include mortar shell fire.

[3] For further information see the March 2010 bulletin "Hamas and the Terrorist Threat from the Gaza Strip –The Main Findings of the Goldstone Report Versus the Factual Findings," Part Two, Section II, p. 143 ff.

[4] The Rome Statute is an international convention and source of authority for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. It became valid in July 2002, signed by 139 countries and authorized by 67. It defines the authority of the International Criminal Court and the types of crimes tried there.

Related Articles

Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (September 17- 24 , 2024)

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 16-23, 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis

Spotlight on Iran

Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Still image from the video documenting an armed robbery in Tehran

Still image from the video documenting an armed robbery in Tehran


The economic crisis, the extent of crime, and the problem of official data in Iran 
  • Esma’il Ahmadi Moqaddam, chief of Iran’s internal security forces, said this week that there is no direct link between the economic sanctions and the increase in the extent of crime in Iran. He did admit, however, that the recent months’ economic upheavals and rising prices have led to an increase in crime, particularly incidents of theft.
  • Ahmadi Moqaddam’s lenient position on crime, which has drawn criticism from website readers and social network users, reignites the debate on the link between the economic sanctions, the economic crisis, and the increase in the extent of crime, reopening the issue of accessibility to official data on social and economic topics. In recent months, Iranian media—particularly those affiliated with the reformist opposition—have reported on a considerable increase in the extent of crime in Iran, motivated by the economic crisis.
  • Crime figures in Iran are not clear-cut and remain a subject of controversy. A 2002 article by Dr. Parviz Ejlali published in the Iranian Sociological Association periodical discussed the problems pertaining to the official crime figures published in Iran. These problems, Ejlali said, undermine the ability to seriously study the issue and formulate an effective strategy to combat crime.
  • The problem of accessibility to official and reliable data can be seen in various areas of society and economy. On several past occasions the issue has been criticized by the Iranian media, which accused the authorities of trying to deny public access to information on sensitive economic and social subjects.

Esma’il Ahmadi Moqaddam, chief of the internal security forces, said this week that there is no direct link between the economic sanctions and the increase in the extent of crime in Iran. He did admit, however, that the rising prices contribute to the increase of crime. Speaking at a press conference held last Thursday, December 6, Ahmadi Moqaddam said that while the sanctions may put more pressure on the public, they should not be considered particularly significant, and that it is business as usual for the citizens of Iran (Mehr, December 6). Several days earlier, Ahmadi Moqaddam pointed out the link between the economic crisis and the extent of crime, saying that the recent months’ economic upheavals and rising prices have led to an increase in crime, particularly incidents of theft. The internal security forces chief discussed the crime figures, saying that police data reflect the actual state of affairs concerning those types of criminal incidents that are usually reported to the police, such as murder, armed robbery, and car theft. On the other hand, thefts of cell phones or cases of pickpocketing are not always reported to the police, and its data on these criminal incidents therefore do not necessarily reflect the phenomenon’s true extent (Fars, December 3).

Commenting on a video uploaded on websites and social networks this week documenting a resident of Tehran being mugged by a group of motorcyclists, Ahmadi Moqaddam said that the Tehran police chief is the one responsible for dealing with the phenomenon of robbery in Iran’s capital (Mehr, December 8). His remarks drew criticism from website readers, who took issue with the fact that the internal security forces spend most of their efforts rounding up satellite dishes, arresting bloggers, and enforcing the Islamic dress code instead of dealing with crime in the streets (Baztab, December 6).

The remarks made by the internal security forces chief reignite the debate on the link between the economic sanctions, the economic crisis, and the increase in the extent of crime in Iran, reopening the issue of accessibility to official data on social and economic topics. In October the reformist website Jaras published an article written by journalist and sociologist Hamid-Reza Jalaeipour, which analyzes the social situation in Iran this past year while examining the link between the escalation of social pathologies and the escalation of the economic situation. In his article, the author argues that the Iranian society is experiencing an escalation of social pathologies and that in recent years there has been a considerable increase in the extent of crime in Iran. The judiciary opened 16 million criminal cases last year, compared to 12 million cases in 2005. The researcher notes that it is difficult to assess the extent of the negative social phenomena in Iran because the authorities try to sweep them under the rug (Jaras, October 24).

This week the reformist website Rooz On-line reported on an increase in incidents of violence in the streets these past several months (Rooz On-line, December 9). On the other hand, the conservative website Alef reported that in recent years there has been a decrease in the number of people killed with cold weapons, except for in Tehran. The website’s report cited figures provided by the Forensic Medicine Organization of Iran, indicating that, in the first seven months of the current Iranian year (which began in March 2012), 500 people (397 men and 103 women) died after being assaulted with a cold weapon. This represents a decrease of nearly 11 percent compared to the same period last year. Sixty-five people died in Tehran in the first seven months of the year, 32.7 percent higher compared to the same period last year. In the past 11 years a total of 11,995 people have died from injuries inflicted with cold weapons. The highest number of deaths was recorded in 2006, and the lowest in 2011, indicating that the number of deaths has been steadily declining since 2006 (Alef, December 9).

Crime figures in Iran are not clear-cut and remain a subject of controversy, as is the case with official data in other areas. A 2002 article by Dr. Parviz Ejlali published in the Iranian Sociological Association periodical discussed the problems pertaining to the official crime figures in Iran.[1] The sociologist discusses various kinds of data published in the world on the extent of crime: “real” crime data, which does not actually exist since some of the crimes are not exposed and/or go without being reported; police data, which differs from the real data for various reasons: some of the crimes are not reported, some crimes are reported but not documented, and in some cases the police misrepresents the data to conceal the extent of crime; court data, which concerns only criminals who have been brought to trial; data obtained from crime victims, which is problematic as well since not all crimes have victims while some crimes have several; data based on reports obtained from the criminals themselves during questioning; and data on the number of prisoners held in jails, which is problematic because not all prisoners actually committed the crime for which they are incarcerated. Deriving any useful insight from data of this last kind is difficult, since it does not always mention the date of the criminal incident in question.

The researcher indicates three main official sources that collect data on crime in Iran: the Office of Statistics at the Ministry of Justice, the Department of Statistics at the Planning Section of the internal security forces, and the Prisons Organization. These three institutions collect and document data on crime that is not published on their own initiative but can be accessed by the public and by researchers. This data is the basis for the criminal database that is documented in the yearbook published by the Statistical Center of Iran starting in 1967. In addition to the data compiled by the national organization for statistics, crime data is also compiled in reports released on behalf of Iran’s various provinces.

In his article, Dr. Ejlali lists a series of problems involved in the use of official crime data for research purposes:

1)    The data obtained from the Ministry of Justice, the main source of information on crime in Iran, concerns the number of criminal cases opened rather than the number of criminal incidents. In many cases, more than one criminal case is opened for a criminal incident, or one case is opened for several crimes.

2)    Some of the cases concern events that are not defined as criminal incidents, such as vehicular homicide or negative social phenomena related to morality.

3)    The crimes discussed in the yearbook published by the Statistical Center of Iran appear under various categories according to the type of the crime. These categories have changed over the years and it is difficult to use them for an analysis of crime data. For example, such crimes as pickpocketing, selling stolen property, fraud, and so forth are not included in any of the categories in the yearbook. Even drug trafficking is not included in the data that comes from the Ministry of Justice, since criminal cases involving drug trafficking are heard in revolutionary courts, not in regular public courts.

4)    In many cases there is no specific mention of the crime type, and even when there is, there are no details on the number of crimes committed or the number of criminals involved in the incident.

5)    In some cases, the Ministry of Justice data makes no distinction between suspects and convicted felons.

6)    All crime data collected by the official institutions across Iran is pooled together. At best, it is classified by province. It is therefore impossible to compare crime data for specific cities and villages in the country.

7)    The crime data published in provincial reports provides an incomplete picture, since not all provinces publish such data. In addition, the data is difficult to analyze because each province divides criminal incidents into different categories: by the legal venue in which the case was heard, by city, or by the penalty imposed in each particular case.

In light of these problems, it is extremely difficult to rely on this data to conduct research into social pathologies, and generally speaking, none of the official types of data can be relied on to compile a report that would reflect the real state of crime in Iran, Dr. Ejlali said. He further added that the data problem is detrimental to social research and to the ability to formulate an effective strategy to combat crime.

The problem of accessibility to official and reliable data is evident in various areas of Iran’s society and economy. On several past occasions the issue has been criticized by the Iranian media. In June 2012, for instance, the reformist daily Shargh took issue with the fact that the Health Ministry refrains from publishing official and up-to-date figures on the number of mental disorder sufferers, saying that the most recent official figures date back to 2005 even though the ministry is required to publish up-to-date figures every five years. An expert interviewed by the daily said that the official figures released by the Ministry of Health in 2005 on the number of mental disorder sufferers is considerably lower than their number really is (Shargh, June 19).

In addition, the authorities are often criticized for not publishing official, reliable data on major economic indicators, such as the inflation rate, unemployment rate, and economic growth rate. In the past, ‘Adel Azar, head of the Statistical Center of Iran, admitted before the Majles Planning and Budget Committee that the center he leads had been instructed by the authorities to avoid publishing official data on the inflation rate. Government critics have claimed in recent years that the government conceals economic data from the public and the Majles and presents distorted data to mask the true severity of the economic crisis.

[1] اجلالی،پرویز. "نگاهی به مشکلات آمار جرایم در ایران",جامعه شناسی و علوم اجتماعی » جامعه شناسی ایران », تابستان 1381 - شماره 14.

Related Articles

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 18 – 25 , 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Hezbollah Communications Devices Explode

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis

Spotlight on Iran

Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt

       Is Rahim Masha'i's removal from office just a layoff or a launching pad for him to run in the elections? 
  • President Ahmadinejad’s decision to dismiss his controversial office chief Rahim Masha’i and name him the president’s advisor and head of the secretariat of the Non-Aligned Movement is drawing considerable interest from Iran’s political system and media. In a number of commentaries recently published in the media, the president’s critics have speculated that the dismissal is intended to raise Masha’i’s political clout, allow him to better prepare for possible participation in the coming elections, and pave the way for a coalition between government supporters and the right wing of the conservative camp ahead of the elections.
  • At the same time, the president’s remarks praising Masha’i came under harsh criticism. The editor-in-chief of the daily Kayhan strongly condemned Ahmadinejad’s praise of Masha’i, saying that the president is still under the influence of the “deviant faction” and that his decision serves the interests of Iran’s enemies. The Alef website said that, instead of thanking the Supreme Leader for blocking the initiative to summon Ahmadinejad to a hearing before the Majles, the president chose to praise the person whose appointment as vice president was opposed by the Supreme Leader. A reformist blogger said that Ahmadinejad’s decision to appoint Masha’i was a punch in Khamenei’s face. The message that the president wanted to send to the people of Iran, the blogger said, is that he no longer has respect for the Supreme Leader.

President Ahmadinejad’s surprising decision to dismiss his controversial office chief Rahim Masha’i and name him the president’s advisor and head of the secretariat of the Non-Aligned Movement is drawing considerable interest from Iran’s political system and media. In a number of commentaries recently published in the Iranian media, the president’s critics have speculated that the dismissal is intended to allow Masha’i to better prepare for possible participation in the coming elections, or at least pave the way for a coalition between government supporters and the right wing of the conservative camp ahead of the presidential elections, slated for June 2013. At the same time, the president’s remarks praising Masha’i came under harsh criticism from his opponents.

The daily Tehran Emrooz, affiliated with Tehran’s mayor and the president’s political rival Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, offered two possible explanations for the president’s decision. The first explanation is that the president wants to free up Masha’i’s schedule, which will allow him to focus on preparations for the presidential elections and spend more time working inside and outside of Iran ahead of a possible run for office. A second explanation is that, as the elections approach, the president wants to bring in political personalities affiliated with the right wing of the conservative camp (members of the Steadfast Front), particularly Gholam-Hossein Elham, who has recently been reappointed as the government’s spokesman. These politicians are opposed to Masha’i, and by removing him from office, the president stands a better chance of forming a coalition with the Steadfast Front ahead of the elections, having realized that the odds of Masha’i being approved as a presidential candidate by the Guardian Council are very slim.

Tehran Emrooz mentioned that Seyyed Hasan Mousavi, who has replaced Masha’i as the president’s office chief, is considered one of Masha’i’s friends and close allies, which is why Masha’i’s dismissal will not diminish the influence of the “deviant faction” in the government (Tehran Emrooz, December 2).

The Farda website also speculated that the president’s decision has to do with his desire to reinforce the status of his allies in his office to pave the way for Masha’i’s future return to the president’s office. According to Farda, Masha’i’s dismissal will keep him away from the heat of media criticism and remove some legal restrictions he faced on his previous job. He will now be free to formulate his plans for the elections. In addition, he will not have to resign his position—as required by law—if he decides to run for president, and will be able to announce his candidacy at the last moment. Like other media outlets, Farda pointed out the possibility that a political coalition will be formed between government supporters and Steadfast Front supporters ahead of the elections, and that one of the high-ranking members of the front, such as Elham or Baqer Lankarani, will run in the elections with the support of Ahmadinejad’s allies (Farda, December 2).

According to the website, the reshuffle announced by the president lends credence to speculations it published this weekend about increasing efforts on the part of the “deviant faction” to pave the ground for Masha’i’s possible participation in the elections. As part of their efforts, the president’s supporters work to clear Masha’i’s name of the allegations and criticism he has come under in recent years to allow him to take part in the elections, or at least set the stage for another government-endorsed candidate to run in the elections and implement the “Putin-Medvedev” model in Iran after the elections. Pro-Ahmadinejad media are leading a campaign to promote Masha’i’s candidacy for president, and publishing public opinion poll results that allegedly indicate broad public support for Masha’i, the website said (Farda, December 1).

The editor-in-chief of the daily Kayhan strongly criticized the reshuffle announced by the president. In his editorial, Hossein Shariatmadari condemned the president’s decision, saying that it serves his enemies, the ones who criticized him during his presidential terms. The president would do better to concentrate on solving the economic problems facing the people of Iran, Shariatmadari said, rather than on a reshuffle of little significance.

The focus of Shariatmadari’s criticism was the praise lavished by the president on Masha’i in the decree naming him head of the secretariat of the Non-Aligned Movement. How is it, Kayhan’s editor-in-chief wondered, that the president has such kind words of praise concerning a person whose remarks have been offensive to Islam and to Muslims, who says that the “Iranian school of thought” should be given precedence over the “Islamic school of thought”, and who defends those accused of involvement in economic corruption scandals? The president’s decision and his praise for Masha’i indicate that he is still under the influence of the “deviant faction”, which has ties to the reformist opposition. The president’s decision serves the enemies of Islam and Iran and hurts the president himself, Iran, and the Iranian people (Kayhan, December 3).

The Alef website also criticized the president for praising Masha’i. The president lavished more praise on his office chief this time than in 2009, when he wanted to appoint Masha’i as his first vice president after the presidential elections, an appointment that was revoked by the Supreme Leader. Even though Ahmadinejad knows how the Supreme Leader feels about Masha’i, he does not refrain from giving him high praise, which shows how close the two of them are. After Khamenei blocked the initiative to summon Ahmadinejad to a hearing before the Majles, public opinion in Iran expected the president to thank him for that. Instead of showing gratitude to the Supreme Leader, however, he praises the person who was removed from office by the Supreme Leader (Alef, December 2).

Masha’i’s dismissal also drew reactions on social networks. Mojtaba Vahedi, the former advisor of reformist opposition leader Mehdi Karoubi, said in a blog post that the president’s decision to appoint Masha’i as head of the secretariat of the Non-Aligned Movement is a punch in Khamenei’s face. Vahedi said that Masha’i’s appointment is intended to achieve two objectives: to fuel rumors about his possible participation in the forthcoming elections and boost his status by having him make more trips abroad, meet with foreign leaders, and use larger budgets in his new capacity.

Vahedi noted that, unlike the letter of appointment given by Ahmadinejad to Masha’i in 2009, the current letter of appointment does not mention Masha’i’s commitment to the Supreme Leader. By appointing Masha’i, Ahmadinejad wanted to let the Iranian people know that he no longer has any respect for his former master (Khamenei), and send a message to foreign governments saying that he is willing for his representatives to hold talks with them outside of the framework set by the Supreme Leader (http://seyedmojtaba-vahedi.blogspot.com, December 1).

Related Articles

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 18 – 25 , 2024)

Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (September 17- 24 , 2024)

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 16-23, 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (November 28-December 4, 2012)

Published:
The Palestinian delegation after the vote in the UN General Assembly upgrading the Palestinian Authority to a non-member observer state.

The Palestinian delegation after the vote in the UN General Assembly upgrading the Palestinian Authority to a non-member observer state.

The vote (UN website, November 30, 2012).

The vote (UN website, November 30, 2012).

Mahmoud Abbas addresses the UN General Assembly (Wafa News Agency, November 30, 2012).

Mahmoud Abbas addresses the UN General Assembly (Wafa News Agency, November 30, 2012).

Ramallah celebrates the UN vote (Wafa News Agency, November 30, 2012).

Ramallah celebrates the UN vote (Wafa News Agency, November 30, 2012).

Palestinians gather near the security force (Hamas forum website)

Palestinians gather near the security force (Hamas forum website)

The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades on parade for the 25th anniversary of the founding of Hamas (Palestine-info website, December 3, 2012).

The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades on parade for the 25th anniversary of the founding of Hamas (Palestine-info website, December 3, 2012).

Overview

  • Since the end of Operation Pillar of Defense on November 21, 2012, no rockets or mortar shells have been fired into Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip. Gazans continue gathering near the security fence to demonstrate presence and defy Israel. In several instances the IDF was forced to fire warning shots to disperse rioters. The minister of the interior in the de-facto Hamas administration said that the administration's security forces would control the area of the border for a distance of 300 meters from the fence (the "perimeter").
  • On November 29, a symbolic date in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the UN General Assembly voted by a large majority to upgrade the status of the Palestinian Authority to non-member observer state. In response, Israel announced it would authorize the construction of thousands of residential units in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem, including in area E1, which joins Maaleh Adumim to Jerusalem. The announcement led to a wave of international condemnation, including from the United States and Europe.
The UN Upgrades the PA's Status to Non-Member Observer State
  • On November 29, a symbolic date in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the UN Gaza Strip voted 138 for, 41 against and nine abstentions, to upgrade the status of the PA to non-member observer state.
  • According to the resolution, the status of the PA as a  non-member observer state does not affect the authority of the PLO in the UN to represent the Palestinian people. It stresses the necessity of the two-state solution based on the pre-1967 borders, the right of all the countries in the region to live in peace with secure borders and recognition from the international community. A separate statement issued by Mahmoud Abbas expresses hope that the UN Security Council will one day soon recommend the PA's application to the General Assembly for full UN membership (Unispal.un.org website, November 29, 2012).
  • Beyond the symbolic aspect, a practical significance of the resolution is that the PA can now request membership in international organizations and conventions open only to recognized states. Membership in such organizations will make it easier for the Palestinians to wage political warfare and lawfare in the international arena. The PA will now be able to appeal to the International Criminal Court in the Hague to pursue its lawfare against Israel.

The UN resolution (Unispal.un.org website, November 29, 2012).
The UN resolution (Unispal.un.org website, November 29, 2012).

Mahmoud Abbas' Belligerent Speech on the Eve of the Vote

Before the UN vote Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestinian Authority, delivered a defamatory, slanderous speech describing Israel as a racist country with an "apartheid regime," which spreads hatred and engages in the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians. He did not extend his hand in peace based on the two-state solution.

The main points of his speech were the following (Palestinian National TV, November 30, 2012):

  • Slander of Israel:
  • The "Israeli aggression" in the Gaza Strip, he said, again emphasized the need to push for an end of the Israeli occupation, for the end of the adherence of the government of Israel to the path of force, oppression and war.
  • No senior Israeli, he said, had expressed the desire or "genuine diligence" to rescue the peace process. The Palestinians have witnessed an unprecedented escalation in acts of military aggression, siege, settlement activities and ethnic cleansing, especially in occupied east Jerusalem, extensive detentions, acts of aggression and war crime and other steps which complete the nature of the [Israeli] apartheid regime.
  • The occupation [i.e., Israel], he said, was building settlements, anchoring the plague of racism in laws and giving root to hatred and incitement. Israel, he said, is convinced it is above international law and has immunity which protests it from having to give an account of its actions or having them investigated.
  • Recognition of Israel: Mahmoud Abbas said he did not intend to delegitimize the state which for decades has been known as Israel, but rather to stress the legitimacy of the state which had to be established quickly, the state of Palestine.
  • The peace process: Mahmoud Abbas paid lip service to adherence to a peaceful solution, claiming that the Palestinian move in the UN was not intended to harm the peace process or Israel's legitimacy. We did not come here, he said, to add complications to the peace process "after Israel['s steps] threw it into the emergency care unit," but to give a serious last chance to implementing it.
  • The Palestinian conditions for negotiations: The PLO, he said, was the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians would not accept any agreement except for the establishment of a Palestinian state on all the territory occupied in 1967, with east Jerusalem as its capital. Any negotiations would have to include a solution for the problem of the Palestinian refugees, based on UN Security Council Resolution 194.
  • The popular resistance: The Palestinian people, he said, adhered to its right to defend itself from [Israeli] aggression and the occupation. Palestinians would continue what they could, which was waging a non-violent popular resistance.
Israel's Response to Mahmoud Abbas' Speech
  • In response to Mahmoud Abbas' speech in the General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu said that "the world watched a defamatory and venomous speech that was full of mendacious propaganda against the IDF and the citizens of Israel. Someone who wants peace does not talk in such a manner."
Demonstrations and Rallies in Judea and Samaria to Celebrate the Vote
  • On the day of the UN vote, and more so after the votes had been counted, large demonstrations and rallies were held in the cities in Judea and Samaria to celebrate. Organized by Fatah and the PA, they stressed the national character of the event by including representatives from all the Palestinian organizations.
  • A festive reception was held for Mahmoud Abbas when he returned from New York. In a speech delivered at the presidential residence in Ramallah, he said that the Palestinian people should be proud of themselves, because they had resisted the intense pressure exerted on them to postpone the move. He added that UN recognition changed many parameters, created a new situation and deepened Israel's isolation (Palestinian TV, December 2, 2012).
  • The main theme of senior Palestinians speaking at the rallies was the change in the status of the PA vis-à-vis Israel:
  • Saeb Erekat, a member of the PLO's Executive Committee, said the UN was the beginning, and that the road ahead was still long and difficult, but that Palestine was now on the map. Israel had to understand, he said, that now negotiations had to be based on the UN decision and that from now on the occupation was an international crime. He said that from the moment the UN had voted, the equation had changed and from now on any Israeli annexation of territory would be a war crime (AKI, November 30, 2012).
  • Jibril Rajoub, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, gave an extremist, belligerent speech at a rally that was broadcast by Palestinian TV. He said that the time had come for everyone to have a united plan for the struggle: "All your options for resistance are open [i.e., including violence and terrorism]"…[and] "anyone who enters this region will leave in a coffin" (Palestinian TV, November 29, 2012).
Initiating Advances to International Institutions
  • Nasr Safaa al-Din, Palestinian minister of communications, began taking practical steps following the upgrading of the PA's status. She appealed to all the companies, international institutions, human rights organizations and institutions in the private sector to begin using the term "state of Palestine" in all their business dealings and on their websites, and not the "National Palestinian Authority." She is also seeking full membership for "Palestine" in the International Communication Association and the International Postal Union (The PIJ's PalToday website, November 30, 2012).
Responses to the Upgrading of the PA's Status
Israel
  • In response to the UN's vote to upgrade the status of the Palestinian Authority Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu said that the decision would not change anything on the ground. The decision, he said, only distances the founding of a Palestinian state because a Palestinian state cannot be established until the Palestinians declare an end to the conflict and until there is a settlement that ensures the security of Israeli citizens. The UN decision, he said, makes no mention of security arrangements for Israel, does not recognize the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish People, and makes no mention of the end of the conflict (Israeli Prime Minister's website, November 29 and December 2, 2012).
  • At the government meeting on December 2, Benyamin Netanyahu said that the PA's unilateral move in the UN General Assembly was a gross violation of agreements the Palestinians signed with the State of Israel and there the Israeli government rejected the UN vote. He said that "[t]he response to the attack on Zionism and the State of Israel must reinforce and underscore the implementation of the settlement plan in all areas in which the Government decides regarding settlement" (Israeli Prime Minister's website, December 2, 2012).
  • The Israeli media reported that on November 29 the Israeli government made the decision to authorize the construction of 3,000 residential units in Judea and Samaria, and thousands of units in Jerusalem and other locations, including E1, the designation of the area joining Maaleh Adumim (east of Jerusalem) to Jerusalem. It also reported that the transfer of tax money to the PA would be frozen.
  • The Israeli decisions led to a wave of condemnations from the international community, which claimed that they were detrimental and harmed the efforts to renew the peace process: American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said they were posing additional obstacles to the peace process and that an agreement could only be reached through direct negotiations (AP, November 29, 2012). Condemnations were also voiced by Britain, France, Germany and Russia.
Hamas
  • The de-facto Hamas administration allowed a rally to be held on the occasion of the UN vote, attended by an estimated 1,000 Palestinians. It was held in a closed hall in the middle of Gaza City and its theme was "The Rally for Unity and Victory" (Wafa News Agency, November 29, 2012) to lend the issue an air of pan-Palestinian nationalism.
  • Khaled Mashal said that the UN's recognition of Palestine as a non-member observer state, in conjunction with the most recent confrontation between the Gaza Strip and Israel, was a strategy which would increase the might of the Palestinians. He expressed support for the move in the UN by telling Mahmoud Abbas he wanted the move to be part of an overall Palestinian national strategy which, he said, included the "armed resistance" [i.e., terrorist campaign against Israel] (Reuters, November 30, 2012).
Iran
  • Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs, said the UN vote it was a positive step that showed how an international organization related to the rights of Palestine and the illegitimacy of the "Zionist regime." He said that it could be viewed as the first step toward enforcing the absolute rule of Palestine over its historic lands, the return of all the Palestinians to their homeland and the resistance against Israel (FARS News Agency, Iran, November 30, 2012).
Rocket Fire
  • Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip continue to honor the understandings reached at the end of Operation Pillar of Defense. Since 2300 hours on November 21 no rockets or mortar shells have been fired into Israeli territory.
Rocket Hits in Israeli Territory since the Beginning of 2011[2]

Rocket Hits in Israeli Territory since the Beginning of 2011

Annual Distribution of Rocket Fire[3]
Annual Distribution of Rocket Fire
Friction near the Gaza Strip Security Fence
  • Since the end of Operation Pillar of Defense, Gazans have gathered daily near the security fence to demonstrate presence and defy Israel. Some of them also try to cross the fence or damage it. According to reports in the media, since the end of Operation Pillar of Defense, IDF forces have not been operating in the area 300 meters from the fence on the Gaza Strip side, which they did until the operation (the area referred to as "the perimeter").
  • The following were some of the incidents in which IDF forces responded with gunfire to Palestinian provocations near the security fence (according to reports in the Palestinian  media):
  • On November 28 the Palestinian media alleged that seven or eight Palestinians had been wounded by IDF fire near the security fence east of the refugee camps of al-Maghazi and al-Bureij. A Palestinian from Khan Yunis  was wounded by IDF fire in the region of the Sufa crossing (Safa and Ma'an News Agencies, November 28, 2012).
  • On December 1 the Palestinian media alleged that a Palestinian had died from wounds incurred when he was shot by IDF forces in the Rafah region. In addition, eight Palestinians were allegedly wounded (Alresala.net website, December 1, 2012). In response, Abu Ahmed, spokesman for the military-terrorist wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, said that Israel was trying to evade its commitment to the [ceasefire] agreement, which clearly illustrated its aggressive intentions toward the Palestinian people. He called on the [Egyptian] mediators to make Israel fully honor the lull. He said that if Israel continued to violate the agreement the Palestinians would respond (Jerusalem Brigades website, December 1, 2012).
  • On December 3 the Palestinian media alleged that a Gazan farmer had incurred a minor wound from IDF gunfire near the security fence (close to the Al-Bureij refugee camp) (Qudsnet website, December 3, 2012).
  • Fathi Hamad, minister of the interior of the de-facto Hamas administration, said that the security forces of the Hamas administration were overseeing the 300 meter the so-called "perimeter"] on the Gazan side of the security fence (Website of the Hamas administration's ministry of the interior, December 2, 2012).
Deliberations in Egypt to Complete the Lull Agreement
  • According to reports in the Arab media, on November 27 indirect Israel-Palestinian talks were held through Egyptian mediation. The Egyptians met with the Palestinian delegation, headed by Ziad Zaza, deputy head of the Hamas administration, and with the Israeli delegation. A senior Hamas figure present at the meeting said that the negotiations dealt primarily with implementing the articles of the agreement dealing with "lifting the [so-called Israeli]  siege" (Al-Hayat, November 29, 2012). Ziad Zaza said that in the indirect negotiations authorization had been given for international commercial concerns and institutions to deliver all the materials necessary to rebuild the Gaza Strip. He said the authorization would ensure the implementation of articles of the lull agreement (Safa News Agency, November 29, 2012).
Terrorist Operative Killed while Attacking Israeli Security Personnel
  • On the morning of December 3, a Palestinian resident of one of the village in the Tulkarm district, used his vehicle to attack Israeli security personnel and then rushed at them holding an axe. The Palestinian media reported that his name was Hatem Mustafa Shadid  and thathe was a construction worker from the village of Alar (north of Tulkarm) (Ma'an and Safa News Agencies, December 3, 2012).
  • The initial investigation of the incident revealed that during operational security activities in the region of  Deir Sharaf (a village between southeast of Shavei Shomron in the  Nablus district), a Palestinian swerved his vehicle and rammed into a jeep. The jeep was overturned and its passengers incurred cuts and bruises. The Palestinian then jumped out of his vehicle and rushed the jeep brandishing an axe and shouting "Allahu akbar." He wounded two of the Israeli passengers; another shot and killed him. Five security personnel were wounded in the incident (IDF Spokesman, December 3, 2012).
Weapons Seized in Judea and Samaria
  • On the night of November 28, in an operation conducted by Israeli security forces in the village of Yatta (near Hebron), a large quantity of weapons and ammunition was seized, including a pistol, ammunition for a heavy machine gun, ammunition for a sniper rifle and military equipment; knives were also found (IDF Spokesman, November 29, 2012).

Some of the weapons seized in Yatta (IDF Spokesman's website, November 28, 2012)
Some of the weapons seized in Yatta (IDF Spokesman's website, November 28, 2012)

The 25th Anniversary of the Founding of Hamas
  • Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum told a press conference held near the house of Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin that events for the 25th anniversary of the founding of Hamas had officially begun. The high point would come on December 8 (Al-Aqsa TV, November 29, 2012). A senior source in Hamas confirmed that the main rally, held on December 8, would be attended by Khaled Mashal, chairman of Hamas' Executive Committee, and that he would be accompanied by other senior Hamas figures as well as high-ranking members of the Egyptian administration (Safa News Agency, November 29, 2012). If Khaled Mashal actually attends it will be the first time he sets foot in the Gaza Strip.

The 25th Anniversary of the Founding of Hamas
Left: The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades on parade for the 25th anniversary of the founding of Hamas (Palestine-info website, December 3, 2012). Right: Erecting the stage in the Al-Katiba plaza in the center of Gaza City in preparation for a Hamas rally (Hamas forum website, November 28, 2012).

The Hamas-Iran Connection
  • Senior Hamas figures continue praising Iran for its military support of the Gaza Strip: Ali Barake, Hamas representative in Lebanon, said in an interview that Iran was the principal military and financial supporter of most of the Palestinian [terrorist] organizations in the Gaza Strip, and did not, he said, demand anything in return or impose conditions. He stressed that the ties between Hamas and Iran were strategic and continued even after Hamas had announced its position on Syria. He added that during Operation Pillar of Defense a senior Iranian had contacted him every day for updates. The Iranian has said Iran was ready to provide material and military support during the operation, in the name of its "ideological and moral commitment." As for the long-range M75 rockets fired during Operation Pillar of Defense, said Barake, they were the local version of the Fajr-5, whose technology had come from Iran (NTV, November 25, 2012).
  • A new initiative is being organized, this one called the March Freedom Ride. According to its organizers, its objective is to make the public aware of the "condition of the Palestinian communities in the Jordan Valley and the south Hebron region." The events will take place between March 17 and 27, and will include joint agricultural labor with local Palestinian farmers, construction and rebuilding work, and being present on the ground to protect the Palestinians, what the organizers refer to as "protective presence activity." There will be guided tours, workshops and cultural events. Activists interested in participating are asked to pay $35 a day to cover expenses. A group sponsored by the Free Theatre is organizing to tour Judea and Samaria by bus (ISM website, November 28, 2012).

[1] http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Spokesman/Pages/spokeUN291112.aspx

[2] As of December 4, 2012. The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.

[3] The statistics for 2008 and 2009 include rocket hits identified during Operation Cast Lead. They do not include mortar shell fire.

Related Articles

Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (September 17- 24 , 2024)

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 16-23, 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis

Spotlight on Iran

November 27, 2012 - Adar 9, 1391 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Iran still gives credit to Morsi: the Iranian media and the political crisis in Egypt

Iran still gives credit to Morsi: the Iranian media and the political crisis in Egypt

Iran still gives credit to Morsi: the Iranian media and the political crisis in Egypt

Iran still gives credit to Morsi: the Iranian media and the political crisis in Egypt


       Iran still gives credit to Morsi: the Iranian media and the political crisis in Egypt[1]

The political crisis in Egypt in the wake of President Morsi’s decision to assume sweeping powers is being widely covered by the Iranian media. The media outlets provide in-depth reports on the protests against Morsi and his government. More often than not, however, they tend to express support for the president of Egypt, show understanding for his decision, and portray it as a manifestation of his desire to complete the revolutionary move in his country.

The reactions in the Iranian media to the developments in Egypt show that Iran still has hopes for the new Egyptian regime to be willing to work for improving Iran-Egypt relations. However, the relatively extensive coverage of the political protest against Morsi, coupled with the admittedly reserved criticism he has come under from some media, also reflect Tehran’s disappointment with the policy pursued by the president of Egypt so far on the developments in Syria, the improvement of relations with Iran, and the continuation of his country’s ties with the United States and Israel. 

The political crisis in Egypt in the wake of President Morsi’s decision to assume sweeping powers is being widely covered by the Iranian media. The media outlets provide in-depth reports on the protests against Morsi and his government. More often than not, however, they tend to express support for the president of Egypt, show understanding for his decision, and portray it as a manifestation of his desire to complete the revolutionary move in his country.

An editorial published this week by the daily Khorasan defended the president’s decision to grant himself sweeping political powers. In the article, titled “Back to Tyranny or Saving the Revolution?”, the daily rejected the claims heard from Morsi’s opponents that his decision heralds a return to the time of tyranny. Unlike most social revolutions, the 2011 revolution in Egypt did not end with a total collapse of the political, juridical, military, and security apparatuses in the country, the article said. Only the leadership of the executive branch was replaced. There were no accompanying changes in the country’s other apparatuses, which still hold considerable power even after the parliament and presidential elections and seek to put impediments in the way of reforms. The armed forces continue threatening a military coup, and the security forces continue supervising the government’s activity.

Given this complex state of affairs, the Muslim Brotherhood government adopted a conservative policy and, at the same time, took measures for a gradual implementation of the reforms. It is in this context that Morsi’s recent decision has to be viewed. The decision comes at a time when he enjoys broad-based public support in and outside of Egypt thanks to his successful efforts to establish a ceasefire in Gaza and in light of the developments that have taken place in Egypt’s armed forces these past several months, which have substantially reduced the possibility of a military coup against his government.

According to Khorasan, Morsi’s decision to assume sweeping political powers is not a return to the Mubarak era—instead, it is intended to complete the process of the revolution. The president feels that, being the only person elected by the people after the Mubarak era, he has to reinforce his political status vis-à-vis the “establishment”, complete the reforms, and have a new constitution approved for revolutionary Egypt. Those political groups that oppose his government, including the left wing and the liberals, are trying to form a coalition with the remnants of the old regime to delay the approval of the new constitution, their motivation being their defeat in the presidential and parliament elections and the public support enjoyed by the Islamic groups. Morsi’s new government is characterized by its pragmatism, the newspaper concluded, and it remains to be seen what price Morsi and his advisors are willing to pay to implement the new reforms in Egypt (Khorasan, November 26).

The reformist daily Arman, too, expressed its support for Morsi’s decision, arguing that it is a necessity when considering the anti-revolutionary measures taken by the justice system in Egypt. Morsi took advantage of the Egyptian people’s broad-based opposition against the justice system to change it for the first time since the 2011 revolution. The daily referred to Morsi’s decision as the bravest move he has taken so far, arguing that, even though it is not supported by all the organizations in his country, it has to be accepted because he had no other choice (Arman, November 26).

The daily Kayhan also expressed its support for President Morsi, saying that his decision poses a threat to the West. The unity of Egypt’s Islamists and the powers President Morsi would like to assume are paving the way for the introduction of religious principles into the constitution, which is highly dangerous for the West, said an editorial published by the newspaper. The United States and the West have no problem with “secular Islam” as in the Turkish model or the kind of Islam espoused by the Syrian opposition; however, the path of the Islamists in Egypt is more like the Iranian model, which represents true Islam, than the model of Turkey or the Taliban. If Morsi can have a new constitution approved and establish a new political regime in the country, Egypt will undergo a process similar to that undergone by Iraq, which will make it possible for it to expel the occupiers from its territory. The cries of the United States and Saudi Arabia can’t eliminate this new regime, Kayhan concluded (November 27).

The daily Siyasat-e Rooz argued that Israel, Western countries, and Arab countries are involved in the political crisis in Egypt due to their concerns over the growing strength of Morsi’s political power base and the fact that they do not fully trust him. The “Zionists” wish to take advantage of the current conditions to conceal their defeat in the Gaza war, while the Arab countries want to divert public opinion from the way they oppress their own citizens, their silence during the war in Gaza, and their involvement—with the Zionists, Turkey, and Western countries—in the developments in Syria.

The daily warned about the political and economic consequences that will result if the crisis in Egypt continues—consequences that may divert the popular revolution from its path in such a way that will be exploited by the enemies of Egypt, particularly the Zionists and the United States. Siyasat-e Rooz called on the government of Egypt to engage in a national dialogue with the various political elements and reach an agreement with them that will bring back peace and quiet to the country (Siyasat-e Rooz, November 25).

The daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami, which in recent months has on several occasions criticized President Morsi’s conduct and his deviation from the revolutionary path, said that it is still too early to tell whether he is following in the footsteps of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s former president. An article titled “Pharaoh’s Early Return to Egypt?” said that it is difficult to know whether his decision to assume sweeping political powers has to do with the go-ahead he has been given by the United States in exchange for his help in resolving the crisis in Gaza.

The newspaper argued that the riots that broke out in the wake of his decision do not serve his own interests or those of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian revolution. It is too soon to tell, the article said, whether Morsi is following in the footsteps of Mubarak and turning into Egypt’s new pharaoh; however, it is necessary to wait and see whether he is true to his promise to protect the people’s revolution in his country. Even though some believe that nothing has changed in Egypt since the revolution, the fact that the Egyptian people are breaking their silence is a considerable development that can prevent the premature return of the pharaoh to Egypt, Jomhuri-ye Eslami concluded (November 25).

The conservative daily Javan also linked Morsi’s decision to the crisis in Gaza, arguing that the president of Egypt is using the political prestige he has gained in the wake of the crisis to promote his political status in Egypt. An editorial titled “Which Way is Mohamed Morsi Going?” said that the conflict in Gaza was a golden opportunity for the president of Egypt, who has become a major political player thanks to his efforts to broker a ceasefire.

The daily criticized—albeit in circumspect language—the president of Egypt, arguing that his decision to assume political powers reflects his over-confidence in his new political status. Morsi believed that he could use his achievements in the war to impose his will on the Egyptian institutions, particularly the justice system. He didn’t take into account that his decision would be opposed by those who had called for Mubarak’s fall. Morsi should know that he can’t take advantage of the Palestinian resistance to deal with the domestic problems in his country, particularly when considering the fact that he is facing not only the Supreme Military Council and the justice system but also those who made it possible for him to become president. His decision provides his critics with an opportunity to give him another reminder about the path of the resistance in Egypt (Javan, November 26).

The reactions in the Iranian media to the developments in Egypt show that Iran still hopes that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s coming to power will eventually lead to an improvement in Iran-Egypt relations, which will serve the interests of the Islamic republic. However, the relatively extensive coverage of the political protest against Morsi, coupled with the admittedly reserved criticism he has come under from some media, also reflect Tehran’s disappointment with the policy pursued by the president of Egypt so far on the developments in Syria, the improvement of relations with Iran, and the continuation of his country’s ties with the United States and Israel.

[1] This publication is a new format that will be released instead of the weekly edition of Spotlight on Iran. From now on, the weekly edition will be replaced by regular reports on specific issues as well as research-oriented publications that will be released periodically. 

 

 

Related Articles

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 18 – 25 , 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Hezbollah Communications Devices Explode

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis