Tag Archives: Iran

Hamed Bafandeh and Ahmad Gholami, who were killed fighting in Syria (defapress.ir, April 24, 2017).

Mohammad Pakpour, commander of the IRGC's ground forces (Fars, May 2, 2017).

Javad Tork Abadi (second from left) presents his credentials to the Syrian foreign minister (Mehr, April 26, 2017).

The Syrian chief of staff (left) meets with the Iran defense minister (IRNA, May 1, 2017).

The defense ministers of Russia, Iran and Syria meet in Moscow (Tasnim, April 27, 2017).

Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, former mayor of Tehran (Tasnim, May 1, 2017).

Iranian ambassador to Iraq Iraj Masjedi (second from left) meets with Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi (right) (ABNA, April 24, 2017).

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Overview

Two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters were killed in the region of Hama, Syria.
The commander of the IRGC's ground forces said his fighters would continue to serve as advisors in Syria alongside the Qods Force. He said Iranian support for Syria, which included advice on fighting techniques and tactics, demanded its advisors' presence in the field.
Javad Tork Abadi has assumed his position as the new Iranian ambassador to Damascus. He replaced Mohammad-Reza Raouf-Sheibani, whose term as ambassador ended in October 2016.
At the beginning of May, Ali Ayoub, the chief of staff of the Syrian army, paid a visit to Tehran and met with Mohammad Bagheri, his Iranian counterpart, and Hossein Dehqan, the Iranian defense minister. They discussed recent developments in Syria and ways to strengthen Iranian-Syrian military ties.
Iran denounced the April 27, 2017 attack on Hezbollah arms storehouses near the Damascus airfield, attributed to Israel. The Iranian foreign ministry spokesman claimed the objective of the Israeli attacks was to weaken the Syrian government.
Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, former mayor of Tehran, caused an uproar in Iran by publicly criticizing Iranian's military involvement in Syria. The attorney general of Isfahan said the judiciary planned to bring him to trial.
Iraj Masjedi, the new Iranian ambassador to Iraq and former senior advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, assumed his position at the end of April. He met with senior Iraqi officials and held a reception at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad for representatives of the Iraqi public.
Iran denounced Turkey's aerial attacks on targets in northern Iraq affiliated with the Turkish underground on April 26, 2017.
Iran and the Palestinian Authority (PA) fiercely criticized one another after an advisor to the Iranian foreign minister accused the PA chairman of committing "crimes" in the service of the United States and Israel by cutting both the salaries of public servants in the Gaza Strip and fuel subsidies to the Strip's power plant.
The Arabic newspaper Al-Hayat reported that Iran increased its funding for Hamas' military-terrorist wing following Yahya al-Sinwar's election as the new leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Iranian Intervention in Syria

Two IRGC fighters were killed in the region of Hama, Syria.
On May 2, 2017, Mohammad Pakpour, commander of the IRGC's ground forces, told the Fars news agency that his fighters would remain as advisors in Syria, alongside the IRGC's Qods Force. He said the advisors were experienced fighters whose support included advice on fighting techniques and tactics, and that demanded their presence in the field. He said advisors from the Saberin special forces brigade were also operating in Syria. According to Pakpour, deploying advisors was sufficient and there was no need for regular army forces because the number of terrorists operating in Syria was not exceptionally large and the Syrian forces could deal with them by themselves.
Pakpour said Syria was particularly important because it was at the forefront of the resistance to Israel. If Hezbollah, which should be in readiness to fight Israel, were not today fighting the terrorists in Syria, Syria would fall to the supporters of the Zionists, and that would weaken the struggle against Israel. He said that if all the groups fighting against the Syrian regime joined forces to fight against Israel, Israel's situation was not as good as it currently was.

Javad Tork Abadi, Iran's new ambassador to Damascus, assumed his position at the end of April. On April 26, 2017, he presented his credentials to Walid al-Muallem, the Syrian foreign minister, and on May 2 to President Assad. Javad Tork Abadi, who was formerly Iranian ambassador to Sudan, Bahrain and Nigeria, as well as Iranian chargé d'affaires in Kuwait, replaced Mohammad-Reza Raouf-Sheibani, who ended his term as ambassador in October 2016 (Mehr, April 26, 2017). In recent months the delay in appointing a new ambassador to Damascus led to strong criticism in Iranian political circles, especially in view of the ongoing civil war in Syria. In December 2016 several members of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) appealed to Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, with an urgent demand that he appoint a new ambassador to Damascus immediately.

On May 1, 2017, Ali Ayoub, the Syrian chief of staff, paid a visit to Tehran and met with Mohammad Bagheri, the Iranian chief of staff, and with Hossein Dehqan, the Iranian defense minister. They discussed recent developments in Syria and strengthening Damascus-Tehran military ties. The Iranian chief of staff praised the resistance of the Syrian army and people to the "takfiri terrorists" operating in the country, and condemned the aerial attacks recently carried out in Syria by the United States and Israel. Ali Ayoub thanked Iran for its military support and said it played a definitive role in Syria's continuing resistance and victories over the terrorists (IRNA, May 1, 2017).

On April 27, 2017, the defense ministers of Iran, Russia and Syria met on the sidelines of the Sixth Moscow Conference on International Security and discussed recent developments in Syria. Sergey Shoygu, the Russian minister; Hossein Dehqan, the Iranian minister, and Fahd Jassem al-Freij, the Syrian minister, noted that their countries would continue their joint efforts in the ongoing military campaign in Syria. They criticized the April 6, 2017 American attack on the Syrian air force base in Homs (western Syria). At a previous meeting of the Iranian and Russian defense ministers, Shoygu said Russia was pleased with Iranian-Russian cooperation in the "struggle against terrorism" in Syria (Tasnim, April 27, 2017).

On May 3, 2017, peace talks recommenced in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, attended by representatives of Russia, Iran and Turkey. The Iranian delegation was headed by Hossein Jaberi Ansari, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs. As part of ongoing Iranian-Russian consultations about Syria, on May 3, 2017, Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, spoke on the phone with Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of Russia's Security Council. They discussed recent Syrian political and security developments, and their countries' cooperation in Syria (Asr-e Iran, May 3, 2017).
Iran strongly condemned the April 27, 2017 attack on Hezbollah arms storehouses near the Damascus airfield, allegedly carried out by Israel. Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, claimed Israel's ongoing aggression was a violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of international law. He said the objective of Israel's attacks was to weaken the Syrian government and called on the UN to keep Israel from attacking again (ISNA, April 28, 2017).
Writing to Hassan Qazizadeh Hashemi, Iran's minister of health, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, thanked him for his ministry's support of the IRGC fighters in Syria. That included, he wrote, guidance, supplying medicine and medical equipment, and medical treatment for the wounded. In reply Hashemi wrote to Soleimani, thanking him for the activity of the IRGC in Syria against the "takfiri groups." He said the Iranian people would never forget the IRGC fighters who had sacrificed their lives in Syria, fighting for the sake of Iran's security (Fars, April 28, 2017).
Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, former mayor of Tehran and affiliated with Iran's reformist camp, was strongly criticized by conservatives in Iran when he publicly spoke against Iran's military involvement in Syria. At the end of April a video of a speech made by Karbaschi at a conference of President Rouhani's supporters in Isfahan circulated on social media. Karbaschi said that restoring peace in Syria did not require military involvement and that the crisis could be resolved through diplomacy. He said no one contested the need to bring peace to Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and to support the Shi'ites in those countries, but there were other ways to do it besides sending money, selling arms and killing (Tasnim, May 1, 2017). Supporters of the Iranian regime were enraged by his speech, accusing him of being an enemy of Iran. The attorney general of Isfahan said his judiciary was planning to bring Karbaschi to trial because of the speech.
It is not the first time Iran's support for the Assad regime has been the subject of public criticism. In recent years criticism of Iran's continuing support of the Assad regime has increased among political circles affiliated with the reformist movement in Iran. It has had, however, no practical influence on Iran's policies in Syria.

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

On April 24, 2017, Iraj Masjedi, Iran's new ambassador to Iraq, met with Iraqi President Fouad Masoum to discuss bilateral relations and cooperation. Masjedi stressed Iran's support for Iraq in its fight against ISIS (ISNA, April 24, 2017). The following day Masjedi met with Iraq Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi for the first time. They discussed Iran-Iraq relations, regional developments and Iran's support for Iraq in its fight against ISIS (Fars, April 25, 2017). On April 28 Masjedi held a reception at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad, attended by members of the Iraqi parliament and local councils, representatives of the various ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, newspaper correspondents, academics, community activists, religious figures and commanders of the Iraqi militias (Tasnim, April 28, 2017).

Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, condemned the aerial strikes carried out by Turkey on April 26, 2017, on targets affiliated with the Kurdish underground (PKK) in northern Iraq. He said the attacks in the region of Sinjar in northwestern Iraq were a violation of Iraq's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and increased regional destabilization (Fars, April 26, 2017).

Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena

Hossein Sheikholeslam, advisor to the Iranian foreign minister for international affairs, strongly attacked the Palestinian Authority (PA), saying that its chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, had committed crimes in the Gaza Strip in the service of the United States and Israel. His statement came in the wake of the PA's decision to cut both the salaries of workers in the public sector in the Gaza Strip and fuel subsidies for the Strip's power plant. Interviewed by Hamas' al-Risalah, he said the PA was waging an unjust war on the Gaza Strip, and called on the PA chairman to change his current policy which, said Hossein Sheikholeslam, served Israel and worked against the interests of the Palestinians.
Nabil Abu Rudeina, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas, angrily replied to Iran, saying that those who had signed the nuclear agreement [with the West] and been a partner in the creation and continuation of two Palestines, one in the Gaza Strip and the other in the West Bank, had no right to talk about Palestine, interfere in its internal affairs or insult the PA chairman. Nabil Abu Rudeina criticized Iran's regional policies, saying Iran helped wage internal wars throughout the Arab world. He said Hossein Sheikholeslam's remarks served only the interests of Israel and the enemies of the Arab nation (Asr-e Iran, May 1, 2017).
On May 2, 2017, the daily newspaper al-Hayat reported that Iran had increased its support for Hamas' military wing and that there had been a significant improvement in Iranian-Hamas relations. Palestinian sources told the paper that Yahya al-Sinwar, the new leader of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip, had played a major role in the improvement. Iran-Hamas relations had reached an impasse over the civil war in Syria and Hamas' decision not to side with the Assad regime. Iranian support for Hamas' military-terrorist wing has continued, however, even in recent years.

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* Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

Fars cartoon published after the American attack in Syria (Fars, April 8, 2017).

Ali Khamenei meets with high-ranking armed forces commanders (website of the Supreme Leader, April 9, 2017).

The Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy meets with Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani (IRNA, April 17, 2017).

Qasem Soleimani (right) meets with Ali Larijani (Alef, April 19, 2017).

Iraj Masjedi, Iran's new ambassador to Iraq, presents his credentials to the Iraqi foreign minister (IRNA, April 19, 2017).

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Overview

Iran strongly condemned the American missile attack on Syria, vowing to continue supporting Syria in the struggle against terrorism. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani told Syrian president Bashar Assad that the attack served only to strengthen the terrorists.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called the American attack on Syria a "strategic mistake," saying that the United States was repeating the mistakes made by Europe, which had strengthened ISIS and led to a situation in which European civilians were no longer safe in their homes or on the street.
After the attack, senior Iranian, Syrian and Russian military and political officials held consultations to better coordinate their ongoing military campaign in Syria. The countries' chiefs of staff consulted by phone, their foreign ministers met in Moscow.
At the beginning of April, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Qods Force, visited northern Iraq and met with senior Kurdish officials. They discussed the Kurdish authorities' intention to hold a referendum about the future of Iraqi Kurdistan and the dispute between the Kurds and the central government in Baghdad over flying the Kurdish flag in Kirkuk. On a number of occasions Iran has objected to any measure taken by the Kurds that could be considered as threatening Iraq's territorial integrity.
Last week Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, went to Baghdad where he assumed the post of Iranian ambassador to Iraq.

General Information

Last week in Saudi Arabia James Mattis, the American secretary of defense, accused Iran of destabilizing the Middle East. In response Hossein Dehqan, the Iranian defense minister, said it was the United States that was supporting the takfiri terrorist groups operating around the globe, especially in Syria and Iraq. He said it would be better for America's secretary of defense and its leaders to solve their own internal problems instead of fomenting new crises in Korea and the Middle East (Mehr, April 19, 2017).

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon

Following the April 7, 2017 American attack on the Syrian airbase, Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian president, spoke on the phone with Bashar Assad. Rouhani condemned the attack, saying it was a violation of international law and only served to strengthen the terrorists. He told Assad Iran would continue to stand beside Syria in its struggle against terrorism and would continue to defend Syrian territorial integrity. Assad thanked Rouhani for Iran's ongoing support of Syria (Fars, April 9, 2017). There were also telephone consultations between the defense ministers of both countries and between Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, the Iranian chief of staff, and Ali Ayoub, the Syrian chief of staff. Baqeri condemned the American attack, saying Iran and its armed forces were proud of the support they gave the Syrian resistance against the Western-backed terrorists (ISNA, April 9, 2017).

In the meantime, in the wake of the attack Iran, Syria and Russia held consultations to increase their coordination in the campaign against the rebels. On April 14, 2017, the foreign ministers of all three countries met in Moscow. They condemned the attack and called on the United States not to attack Syria again. At a joint press conference held by the three foreign ministers, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, said Iran would continue cooperating with Russia in the struggle against terrorism (ISNA, April 14, 2017).
Meeting with high-ranking military commanders in Tehran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said the United States had made a "strategic mistake" in attacking Syria. He said the Trump administration strengthened ISIS and similar groups, and repeated the mistakes of his predecessors, who created ISIS or assisted in its establishment. He claimed Europe was paying the price for strengthening terrorists and that its citizens were not secure in their homes or on the street. The United States, he claimed, was repeating the European mistake. Khamenei rejected the claim that America had attacked Syria to send a deterrent message to regional states. He said Iran had already proved it did not surrender to threats (Fars, April 9 , 2017).

Ahmad Reza Pourdastan, deputy chief of staff of the Iranian army, said the United States continued recruiting fighters and strengthening the terrorist groups in Syria. He said the White House aspired to strike a blow at Syria's defense system by increasing the number of terrorist groups operating in the country (Fars, April 17, 2017).
Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy, said America's foreign policy in Syria was doomed to fail. At a meeting of his committee members with senior cleric Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani, Boroujerdi said America and Saudi Arabia's failures in Syria and Yemen were quite evident. He praised the Iranian fighters killed in Syria, and said that if the "resistance" had fallen in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq would have fallen, threatening the security of the Iranian borders. (IRNA, April 17, 2017).

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

On April 11, 2017, the London-based Arabic newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat reported that on April 9, 2017, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, had arrived in Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq. His objective was to meet with senior Kurdish officials to discuss the proposed referendum regarding Iraqi Kurdistan's political future, and to convince Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurds (PUK) not to support holding it. Hossein Yazdan-Panah, deputy chairman of the Kurdish Freedom Party, told the paper that Soleimani had emphasized the need to avoid a referendum, which Iran felt was liable to endanger Iraq's territorial integrity.
Iran recently expressed its objection to flying the Kurdish flag in Kirkuk (northern Iraq), claiming that the Kurdish authorities had taken the step contrary to the position of the central government in Baghdad. In addition, he claimed, it was unconstitutional and caused regional tension. Nazim Dabag, the representative of Iraqi Kurdistan in Iran, said Tehran had appealed to the various parties in northern Iraq to resolve the issue of the Kurdish flag in Kirkuk through dialogue in accordance with the constitution (rudaw.net, April 14, 2017).
Returning to Iran, on April 19, 2017, Soleimani met with Ali Larijani, speaker of the Majlis along with other several high-ranking IRGC commanders (Alef, April 19, 2017).

On April 18, 2017, Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, arrived in Baghdad to take up the post of Iranian ambassador to Iraq (IRNA, April 18, 2017). After receiving Masjedi's credentials, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the Iraqi foreign minister, said the Iraqi people would never forget Iran's support in their struggles against the regime of Saddam Hussein and ISIS. Masjedi said he hoped to expand bilateral cooperation, especially economic cooperation (IRNA, April 19, 2017). Masjedi replaces Hassan Danaei-far, who served as Iranian ambassador to Iraq for six years.

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^[1]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

Yahya Rahim Safavi (Tasnim, March 26, 2017).

Qasem Soleimani in Hama (qasemsoleimani.ir, March 31, 2017).

Khamenei meets with families of Afghan shaheeds in Syria (Tasnim, March 28, 2017).

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Overview

During the past two weeks at least eight Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters were killed in the region of Hama, Syria in the ongoing battles between the rebels and the forces of the Syrian regime. Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, paid a visit to the area.
Iran condemned the chemical weapons attack on Idlib, Syria, but without accusing the Syrian regime of responsibility. The Iranian foreign ministry said in a statement that any use of chemical weapons had to be condemned regardless of who used them or who their victims were, and that Iran demanded the terrorist groups in Syria be disarmed of such weapons.
Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iranian foreign minister, who accompanied Iran's President Hassan Rouhani on his visit to Russia at the end of March, said Russia would again be permitted to use Iranian military bases to attack in Syria, according to necessity and on a case to case basis.
A senior Iranian foreign ministry official, interviewed by an Iranian diplomatic website, said Iran did not have a Syrian exit strategy. He said that despite Iran's military support of Syria, Russia was more important to the Syrian regime than Iran, and therefore Assad preferred to seek rapprochement with Moscow at the expense of Tehran.
In response to the final communiqué issued by the Arab League summit condemning Iranian intervention in the internal affairs of Arab states, a spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry said Iran had no need to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.
Iran supported the position of the Iraqi government in its dispute with the Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq over flying the Kurdistan flag in the city of Kirkuk. A spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry said flying the flag of Kurdistan was unacceptable, violated the Iraqi constitution and fomented tension

General Information

Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, said Iran had no need to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, and that honoring the sovereignty of other countries and not intervening in their affairs was a basic tenet of Iran's policy. He added that the three islands disputed by Iran and the UAE were Iranian and would remain Iranian, and that repeating lies would not change historical truths (Fars, March 30, 2017). Qasemi made the statements in response to the final communiqué issued by the Arab League summit that met in Jordan at the end of March 2017, where Arab leaders condemned Iran's intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and its attempts to incite sectarian fanaticism.
At a conference in Kashan, Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military advisor to the supreme leader, said Iranian advisors in Iraq had organized more than 20 teams of Iraqi Shi'ite militias to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria (Tasnim, March 26, 2017).
Ahmad Salek, vice-chairman of the Majlis' cultural committee, warned that the United States was planning a "new offensive" against Syria and Iraq. He said the popular forces enlisting in Iraq and Syria terrified the plotters of the war in Syria, and they were now planning a new offensive and would send more forces to the region. Interviewed by ICANA, the news agency of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (i.e., the Iranian parliament) on April 2, 2017, Salek accused the intelligence services of the United States, Britain and Israel of deploying thousands of terrorists of various nationalities to Syria in order to topple the regime in Damascus. He claimed the United States had deployed thousands of fighters to the Middle East to besiege Iran, but had instead found itself besieged by the "resistance front."

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon

During the past two weeks at least eight IRGC fighters were killed in the rural area north of Hama Syria in the ongoing battles between the rebel organizations and the Syrian forces.
Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, visited the Hama area at the end of March 2017. Arab sources reported that Soleimani, whose picture was circulated on social networks, went to Hama to consult with the commander of the regional Syrian forces in preparation for the large-scale attack soon to be waged against the forces of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Fateh al-Sham Front.
A video published by several Iranian and social network sites at the end of March showed Qasem Soleimani giving a speech on an undisclosed date. In it he said the defense of the Shi'ite shrines in Syria was as important as defending those in Karbala and Najaf in Iraq, and the Eighth Imam Reza's shrine in Mashhad. He said that if Syria fell to the enemy all the Shi'ite shrines would be destroyed (yjc.ir, April 1, 2017).
In response to the chemical weapons attack in Idlib, Syria, Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, condemned the use of chemical weapons but did not accuse the Syrian regime of using them. He said that anyone who used chemical weapons should be condemned, regardless who was responsible and who their victims were. He said it was not the first time such weapons had been used during the "Syrian crisis" and that it was important not to jump to conclusions and manipulate such incidents to benefit certain parties. He said Iran demanded that the armed terrorist groups be disarmed of their chemical weapons and that as a victim of their use [in the Iran-Iraq War], Iran was prepared to offer the medical treatment to the wounded (Fars, April 5, 2017).
Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iranian foreign minister, accompanied Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on his visit to Russia at the end of March 2017. He told Reuters that Russia would again be permitted to use Iran's military bases to attack Syria, according to necessity and on a case to case basis (Reuters, March 28, 2017). In August 2016 Russian war planes used the Iran army airfield in Hamedan to attack targets in Syria. That ended at the time because of internal Iranian criticism of allowing a foreign army to use Iranian military bases, but senior Iranian officials have already announced that Iran may renew permission, in accordance with operational needs
Hossein Sheykholeslam, advisor to the foreign minister, said Iran's decision to allow Russia to use its airfields to attack in Syria was "rational and vital for the struggle against terrorism in Syria." He said there was a need for a strong, effective air force to reduce the number of losses on the ground, and that the Syrian air force was not sufficiently equipped for the task. He claimed Iran had not turned over one of its bases to Russia but would allow Russia to use one on the condition that Syria, Russia and Iran had previously agreed on the targets that would be attack. He also said he believed Russia would continue to side with Iran and Syria until the complete defeat of the "axis of evil" seeking to divide the region (Fars, March 30, 2017).
On March 27, 2017, families of Afghan fighters killed fighting under the aegis of the IRGC forces in Syria met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Mashhad, Iran. At the meeting, held on the occasion of Norooz, the Iranian new year, Khamenei spoke with the families and thanked them. Afterwards he gave a speech praising the willingness of the fighters of the Fatemiyoun Brigade (the Afghan brigade in Syria under the aegis of the IRGC) to sacrifice their lives fighting in Syria (Tasnim, March 28, 2017).
On March 30, 2017, Mostafa Zahrani, head of policy planning and strategic issues at Iran's foreign ministry, told the "Iranian Diplomacy" website that in his opinion, Russia agreed with Israel and the United States not to permit an Iranian and/or Hezbollah presence along the Israel-Syria border. He said that despite the military aid Iran gave Syria, Russia's aerial support and the international advantages it could give Syria made Moscow more important to Bashar Assad than Tehran, and therefore he was leaning towards Russia and turning his back on Iran. Zahrani said that most of the actors in the Syrian arena, including Iran and Turkey, had gone into Syria without an exit strategy. Russia, on the other hand, did have such a strategy because its role was limited to aerial support.

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

Iran expressed its support for the central Iraqi government in the dispute between Baghdad and the Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq over the Kurds' decision to fly the flag of Kurdistan in Kirkuk. At the end of March the Kurds flew the flag over a local government building in Kirkuk. Haidar al-Abadi, Iraqi prime minister, strongly condemned the act and warned that any measure violating the constitution could lead to the dissolution of Iraq. This past week Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, expressed support for the position of the Iraqi government, saying that flying any flag in Kirkuk other than the Iraqi flag was unacceptable, violated the Iraqi constitution and fomented tension. He said Iran's fundamental position was support for Iraq's territorial integrity, and that flying the flag of Kurdistan in Kirkuk might distract the Iraqi government and people from the struggle against terrorism (Asr-e Iran, April 3, 2017).

Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena

Hossein Amir Abdollahian, international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament), who is also secretary of the international committee for the support of the Palestinian intifada, said that the only way to realize the rights of the Palestinians was to continue the intifada and the "resistance." In a declaration released for Palestinian Land Day, which falls on March 30 every year, he said that Land Day served as a reminder of the importance of "resistance" to the "illegitimate Zionist regime" and of the need for unity to liberate Jerusalem. Land Day, he said, was an opportunity for the Palestinian people to emphasize their resistance to the continuing existence of the "Zionist regime" on its historical land (IRNA, March 29, 2017).

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Spotlight on Global Jihad (March 30 – April 5, 2017)

Published: 05/04/2017

Spotlight on Global Jihad

SDF off-road vehicle on fire west of Al-Karamah area, southeast of Al-Raqqah, after being hit by an ISIS anti-tank missile (Haqq, April 1, 2017).

Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani visits the Hama area (Al-Hadath News, April 2, 2017)

Top: ISIS operatives fighting against the Iraqi security forces in west Mosul (Haqq, April 2, 2017). Bottom: Two suicide bombing attacks against the Iraqi security forces in the western part of the city (Aamaq, March 30, 2017)

Salameh Abu Adhan al-Tarabin al-Ansari, one of the founders of ISIS’s Sinai Province, killed in an airstrike (Haqq, April 1, 2017)

Spreading leaflets on behalf of ISIS’s Sinai Province threatening the inhabitants not to collaborate with the Egyptian government (Haqq, April 1, 2017)

ISIS operative codenamed Abu Faruq the Persian describes the persecution of the Sunni Muslims by the Safavid dynasty, which embraced Shia in the 16th century.

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Main events of the week^[1]

The pressure on ISIS in Iraq and Syria is increasing:

Following the takeover of the Tabqa Dam and the airfield to its south, SDF forces operating with American support advanced to the city of Tabqa, which is controlled by ISIS (around 60,000 residents). The city was almost completely besieged. Its fall would symbolize the loss of another vital territory for ISIS, and the intensification of the pressure on ISIS’s stronghold in Al-Raqqah.
After several weeks of fighting, the Syrian forces took over the town of Deir Hafer, located on the road from Al-Bab to Lake Assad and the Euphrates Dam. At this stage, it is not yet clear whether the Syrian Army will try to take advantage of its success and continue to advance eastward, in view of the pressure exerted by the rebel organizations on the Syrian regime in core areas of Damascus and Hama.
Fighting in west Mosul continues to focus on the Old City, with no significant change on the ground. ISIS is apparently displaying resolute fighting and its operatives, who are skilled in fighting in built-up areas, are making it difficult for the attacking Iraqi forces. In any case, the Iraqi political leadershippublicly expresses optimism. Iraq’s interior minister declared that the liberation of Mosul from ISIS would be achieved within a few weeks.

This week, Turkey announced the successful conclusion of Operation Euphrates Shield.During the operation, Turkey managed to create a security zone in the area west of the Euphrates River, formerly controlled by ISIS, and to create a buffer zone between the Kurdish control zone east of the Euphrates River and the Kurdish enclave in the west (the Ifrin region.) Turkey’s success is overshadowed by its failure to take over the city of Manbij and its environs, which remained a sort of Kurdish-dominated enclave in the Turkish security zone, and by the US preference for the Kurdish-dominated SDF forces over Turkey.

The Coalition countries

Turkey announces the successful conclusion of Operation Euphrates Shield

At the end of a meeting chaired by Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish National Security Council announced the successful conclusion of Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria (which began in August 2016). The objectives of the operation, according to the announcement, were to ensure Turkey’s national security, to return Syrian refugees to their homes, and to remove the threat of ISIS from the Turkish-Syrian border (Anatolia News Agency, March 29, 2017).
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced that despite the successful conclusion of Operation EuphratesShield, Turkish Army forces would not soon withdraw from the territories that they had taken over. He said that before the withdrawal of the troops, the urban areas in the region should be rehabilitated and the local security forces should be trained and equipped (Anatolia News Agency; Hürriyet, April 1, 2017).Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Işık stressed that the Turkish forces were not about to withdraw since the threats against Turkey had not ceased. He added that Turkey would not hesitate to launch another operation if it felt threatened (Dimashq al-Aan, March 31, 2017).

From Turkey’s perspective, Operation Euphrates Shield ended successfully. The rebel forces (the Free Syrian Army), supported by the Turkish Army, took over most of the area that had been under the control of ISIS west of the Euphrates River, creating a Turkish-influenced security zone. Another achievement, from Turkey’s perspective, is the creation of a buffer zone between the Kurdish control zone east of the Euphrates River and the Kurdish enclave in the west (the Ifrin region.) From Turkey’s perspective, however, these achievements are overshadowed by two failures: one, due to the intervention of US and Russia, Turkey and its supporters did not manage to take control of the city of Manbij and its environs(which remains a sort of Kurdish-controlledenclave in the Turkish security zone west of the Euphrates River); and the second, the Kurdish-dominated SDF forces, with US support, are conducting the campaign to take over Al-Raqqah, while Turkey remains (at least for the time being) out of the game. Both of these issues are expected to be raised in talks between Turkey and the United States.

US Secretary of State meets with senior Turkish government officials

The day after the Turkish announcement about the conclusion of Operation Euphrates Shield, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited Turkey and met with senior government officials. At the meetings, the two sides discussed coordination in the continuation of the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. At a press conference held by Tillerson after his meeting with the Turkish foreign minister, he said that the two countries had examined a number of options and alternatives in order to continue fighting against ISIS and take over Al-Raqqah. However, Tillerson admitted that the United States was facing tough choices about its partners in the struggle against ISIS (cbsnews.com, March 30, 2017).

Main developments in Syria

The Syrian Army’s advance towards the Euphrates Valley

After several weeks of fighting, on March 29, 2017, the Syrian forces took over the town of Deir Hafer, on the route leading from Al-Bab to Lake Assad and the Euphrates Valley. They have also taken over several towns and villages in the Deir Hafer area. ISIS operatives began to retreat from the area (Al-Durar Al-Shamiya, March 24, 2017). In the campaign for the takeover of Deir Hafer, hundreds of ISIS operatives were reportedly killed or wounded, and dozens of armored vehicles were destroyed. According to reports, there were ISIS headquarters in the town, as well as military workshops and hospitals (all4syria, March 29, 2017). At this stage, it is unclear whether and to what extent the Syrian advance will continue eastward toward the Euphrates Valley, in view of the pressure exerted on the Syrian regime in Damascus and Hama (see below).

The campaign for Al-Raqqah

The encirclement of the city of Al-Tabqa

Following the takeover of the Tabqa Dam and the airfield to its south, the SDF forces, with US support, advanced towards the city of Al-Tabqa. The city, which is held by ISIS, has 60,000 inhabitants. On March 31, 2017, the SDF forces and US Special Forces advanced towards Al-Tabqa from the military airfield south of the city. At the same time, the forces also advanced from the Tabqa Dam northeast of the city. On April 3, 2017, they reached the eastern entrance of Al-Tabqa and encircled it almost completely. Battles are still ongoing in the area (ARA News, April 3, 2017).

Aircraft of the anti-ISIS international coalition scattered leaflets in Al-Raqqah calling on the inhabitants to evacuate and on ISIS operatives to surrender. According to several sources, a “safe passage” was opened for the inhabitants through the Euphrates River Dam to allow them to flee Al-Raqqah to areas held by the SDF forces (Al-Arabiya Al-Hadath, March 31, 2017). At the same time, there are still reports that ISIS evacuates its people from the city. According to a website affiliated with ISIS opponents, ISIS operativesevacuated their families taking advantage of the flow of refugees coming out of the city. The number of ISIS operatives that have left the city is estimated at several hundred. They were reportedly transferred to the city of Al-Mayadeen, down the Euphrates Valley, southeast of Deir ez-Zor (Raqqa-sl.com, April 3, 2017).

Recommissioning the military airfield south of Al-Tabqa

Following the takeover of the military airfield (March 26, 2017), USengineers and technical teams started the recommissioning work on the airfield. According to an SDF commander, the anti-ISIS international coalition forces will use the airfield during the operation to liberate the city (Sputnik, March 29, 2017). Kurdish senior officials noted that after the recommissioning of the airfield, it would be able to use it as a base for sending supplies, weapons and forces fighting in the campaign for the takeover of Al-Raqqah (Voice of America, April 2, 2017).
ISIS operatives continue to wage guerrilla warfare against the forces in the airfield, even after it has been taken over.On March 31, 2017, ISIS announced that thirty SDF operatives were killed and military vehicles were destroyed in an attack against SDF outposts near the military airfield of Al-Tabqa (Haqq, April 1, 2017). SDF forces reported that they had intercepted near the airfield an ISIS drone carrying bombs (Khotwa, April 3, 2017).

Damascus area

This week as well, fighting continued in the eastern neighborhoods of Damascus. The rebel organizations’ momentum subsided, and the Syrian forces have managed to retake several sites taken over by the rebel organizations at the beginning of the attack. Although the Syrian Army declared that it had regained control of the Jobar neighborhood, the rebel organizations reportedly managed to repel an attack of the Syrian regime forces in the neighborhood’s industrial area (Al-Sham Network, 2017). It was also reported that Syrian fighter planes supported by Russian aircraft had carried out intense airstrikes against targets in the Jobar neighborhood (Local Coordination Committees, April 3, 2017). Fighting in the eastern neighborhoods of Damascus is still ongoing.

Hama

In the area north of Hama, the momentum of the rebel organizations’ attack also subsided. The Syrian forces reportedly retook several towns and villages from the rebel organizations. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the Syrian forces, supported by Iran and Hezbollah, managed to retake 75% of the territory taken by the rebel organizations north of Hama (Al-Arabiya, April 1, 2017).

A Twitter account released a photo of Iranian Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani visiting the Hama area. Soleimani reportedly met with the commander of the Syrian forces in the area (Al-Hadath News, April 2, 2017). His visit was apparently madeas part of Iran and Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian effort to halt the rebel attack north of Hama (in late March, Iranian media reported the death of two IRGC commanders in battle in the area of Hama).

Main developments in Iraq

The campaign for the takeover of Mosul

Fighting in west Mosul continues, focusing on the Old City, with no significant change in the situation on the ground since last week. The Iraqi Army continues to fight in the streets near Al-Nuri Mosque, which is a site of symbolic importance for ISIS. The Iraqi interior minister declared that Mosul would be liberated from ISIS within a few weeks. According to him, ISIS currently holds only about 25%-30% of the territory of west Mosul (Sputnik, April 1, 2017).
ISIS continues making widespread use of car bombs. A video released on March 29, 2017, shows two suicide bombing attacks carried out one after the other in the west Mosul neighborhood of Al-Yarmouk. According to ISIS, they were carried out by two of its female operatives (Aamaq, March 29, 2017). Another video, released by ISIS on March 30, 2017, shows another suicide bombing attack in the western part of the city (Aamaq, March 30, 2017).

Killing senior ISIS operatives

This week, it’s been reported that several ISIS operatives have been killed:

The Iraqi Air Force commanderannounced that Ayad Al-Jumaili, described as ISIS’s “war minister” and the deputy of ISIS leader, had been killed in an Iraqi forces’ airstrikein the Al-Qaim area (near the border between Iraq and Syria).
The US Army reported that on March 25, 2017, Ibrahim al-Ansari, who headed ISIS’s propaganda apparatus, had been killed in the Al-Qaim area. Four of his aides were reportedly killed along with him. According to US officials, Al-Ansari had played a major role in recruiting foreign operatives to ISIS and instigating terror attacks against the United States and Turkey (US Department of Defense, March 30, 2017).
The Iraqi Federal Police commander said that its forces had killed ISIS’s “health minister” Saad Abu Shoeib. He was shot dead by police forces when they targeted his vehicle near a hospital in the Old City of Mosul (Sputnik, March 29, 2017).

Sinai Peninsula

In early April 2017, the Egyptian security forces carried out a widespread “security operation” in the Al-Arish neighborhood of Al-Samran with the objective of detaining wanted men and terrorist operatives (Al-Watan, April 2, 2017). In the ITIC's assessment, the operation was intended to restore security and strengthen Egyptian governance in Al-Arish, which has recently been the main target of terrorist activity for ISIS’s Sinai Province.
The Egyptian security forces reported that 18 ISIS operatives had been killed in airstrikes. One of the dead was Salameh al-Ansari, one of the founders of ISIS’s Sinai Province, who had been in charge of training operatives and equipping them with weapons (official Facebook page of the Egyptian Armed Forces, April 2, 2017).
ISIS’s Sinai Province announced the death of Salameh Abu Adhan al-Tarabin al-Ansari, senior ISIS operative and one of its founders, in an airstrike (Al-Araby al-Jadeed, April 1, 2017).
Operatives of ISIS’s Sinai Province stopped a bus carrying female teachers working in Rafah, ordered them to put on veils and threatened that they would be punished (Sola Press, March 28, 2017). ISIS’s Sinai Province spread leaflets threatening the inhabitants not to collaborate with the government. ISIS operatives also executed several inhabitants accused of spying.

Other countries

The Philippines

On March 31, 2017, ISIS claimed responsibility for the detonation of an IED against a vehicle of the Philippine Army, killing six soldiers and wounding others. The terrorist attack occurred in Mamasapano, an autonomous region in the Muslim Mindanao, south of the Philippines (Haqq, April 1, 2017).

Counterterrorism activity

Turkey

A joint operation of the Turkish security forces led to the arrest of Safwan Qahwati, a Syrian citizen suspected of being a senior ISIS operative who recruited foreign fighters from European countries to the ranks of ISIS and trained them. His wife was arrested along with him. According to reports, on March 15, 2017, the two illegally entered from Syria into the Hatay Province in southern Turkey. They traveled to Istanbul in order to reach Europe from there. The Turkish authorities discovered a connection between the operative and two other senior ISIS operatives: Mohammad Laban, a Danish citizen who was arrested in Adana on February 10, 2017; and a Swedish citizen named Mohammad Tawfiq Saleh (Anatolia, March 29, 2017).

Propaganda activity

ISIS threats against Iran

On March 27, 2017, ISIS’s Diyala Province (in Iraq) released a 35-minute video containing threats against Iran. The video is in Farsi with Arabic subtitles. It shows a Farsi-speaking ISIS operative codenamed Abu Faruq the Persian, who notes that the Safavid dynasty, which embraced Shia in the 16th century, encroached on territories of Iraq, Azerbaijan and Khorasan (today’s Pakistan and Afghanistan) and forced many of the Sunni Muslims to become Shiite. Another speaker in the video, codenamed Abu Mujahed the Baluchi, who also speaks Farsi, notes that “infidel” Iran serves as a center for concocting schemes against Sunni Muslims in the world. Yet another speaker calls (in Arabic) on the Sunnis in Iran to initiate jihad against the Iranian regime (Haqq, March 27, 2017).

Mohsen Rezaee,Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, referred in his Instagram page to ISIS’s threat against Iran. Rezaee threatened that if ISIS carries out any step, even the smallest one, or acts against the Iranian interests, Iran would retaliate forcefully. He pointed out that the lesson that ISIS would learn from that would be even greater than the defeat it incurred in Mosul and Aleppo (Fars, April 2, 2017).

Findings of a study in a British research center: decrease in the scope of ISIS propaganda and changes in its content

Charlie Winter, a senior researcher at the ICSR British research center, conducted a comprehensive study on propaganda publications on ISIS’s media outlets. The study covered the propaganda publications during February 2017 (January 30 – February 28) in comparison with the period of July 17 – August 15, 2015 (when ISIS was in its heyday). The study reveals that recently there has been a significant decrease (about 36%) in the scope of propaganda activity by ISIS and there have been changes in the propaganda content.
Following are several insights from the study:

The vast majority of ISIS propaganda materials were produced in Iraq and Syria. The scope of propaganda materials produced in ISIS’s other provinces is limited.
Emphasis was placed on publications dealing with the fighting: ISIS completely changed the narrative on which its propaganda focused. Recently, mainly prominent are propaganda materials dealing with the fighting(80% in February 2017), overshadowingthe descriptions of life in the Caliphate, which represented a significant part of ISIS’s publications in the past (53%).
Change in the content of the propaganda regarding the campaign for Mosul: During the first months of the fighting in Mosul, ISIS disseminated videos showing daily life in the city, which, as the organization claimed, was not adversely affected by the fighting. Recently, the dissemination of such videos decreased. Currently, ISIS disseminates mainly videos that focus on the destruction of the city and the suffering of its inhabitants.

In the ITIC's assessment, the changes in the scope and content of ISIS’s propaganda result from the heavy pressure under which ISIS finds itself in Iraq and Syria. The death of senior operatives in ISIS’s propaganda network, the loss of vital territories, along with the decrease in the revenues of the terror organization, adversely affected ISIS’s capabilities in the battle for hearts and minds. The utopian vision of idyllic life in the Islamic Caliphate was replaced by military-oriented propaganda, intended to deter ISIS’s enemies and raise the morale of the operatives in the various combat zones, first and foremost in Mosul. The ITIC believes that the videos showing destructionand suffering of inhabitants were intended to strengthen the Sunni-Muslim population’s support of ISIS, instill hate among the local population against the US and the international coalition, and at the same time evoke internal criticism among the Western countries with the hope that this will affect the airstrikes on ISIS.

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^[1]Due to the Passover vacation, Spotlight on Global Jihad will not appear next week. We wish all our readers a happy holiday.

Hojjat-ul-Islam Ali Saidi, representative of the supreme leader to the IRGC (Sepah News, March 15, 2017).

Rasoul Sanaeirad (Tasnim, March 12, 2017).

Mahmoud Alavi, Iranian minister of intelligence (Tasnim, March 14, 2017).

Members of the Tasnim News delegation to Lebanon visit the graves of Imad and Jihad Mughnieh (Tasnim, March 14, 2017).

Mojtaba Sardad IRGC fighter killed at Tel Afar (Twitter, March 19).

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Main Points

The political deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) rejected reports published following Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's visit to Moscow that Iran was planning to construct a naval base in Latakia, Syria. The deputy commander claimed that the reports were intended to incite the countries of the region against Iran and justify the deployment of American forces in Syria.
Mahmoud Alavi, Iranian minister of intelligence, said Iran had sent equipment to Syria to collect information about terrorists operating in the country.
Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, warned the United States and Saudi Arabia against deploying military forces to Syria.
Iran strongly condemned the Israeli attack in Syria on the night of March 17, 2017, and called on the UN to prevent further attacks.
A delegation of the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency visited Lebanon and Syria, and met with senior Hezbollah officials, including Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general.
An IRGC fighter was killed near Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Iraq.

General Information

1. Hojjat-ul-Islam Ali Saidi, representative of the supreme leader to the IRGC, said the Islamic Revolution in Iran was a prelude to the internationalizing of Islam. He said the revolution faced both internal and external threats, especially from the "arrogance front" led by the United States and secular liberals within Iran. Speaking at a conference in Tehran, he said the might of the Islamic Revolution had so far succeeded in thwarting American plots and plans. He added that the United States itself considered Iran as one of the most influential powers in the world and that its influence could be seen in the regional balance of power. The American strategy of providing the Zionists with security had not only failed, but the "Zionist occupiers," who in the past pursued a strategy of "from the Nile to the Euphrates," were not secure even within the borders of the "occupied territories" (Sepah News, March 15, 2017).

2. Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, strongly rejected American claims that Iran supported terrorism. He claimed the American accusations of Iranian involvement in terrorism were fabricated, baseless and entirely political. He made the statement in response to the decision of the American State Department to designate the Bahraini al-Ashtar Brigades, which are supported by Iran, as a terrorist organization and impose sanctions on the organization's activists (Tasnim, March 18, 2017).

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon

3. Rasoul Sanaei-Rad, IRGC commander's political deputy, rejected reports published in the media following Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's visit to Moscow, according to which Iran was planning to construct a naval base in Latakia, Syria. He claimed the reports were baseless and that their objectives were to accuse Iran of establishing a permanent presence in an Islamic state, incite the countries of the region against Iran and justify the deployment of American forces in Syria. Rasoul Sanaeirad said Iran had no interest in constructing a naval base in Latakia, where the Russians have a military base, and that Iran's presence in Syria was based exclusively on advisors, who were there at the official request of the Syrian government (Tasnim, March 12, 2017).

4. Mahmoud Alavi, Iranian minister of intelligence, said Iran has sent equipment to Syria to collect information about terrorists operating in the country. At a conference in Isfahan he said a technical crew from the ministry of intelligence had installed powerful surveillance devices in Syria to monitor activity at terrorist bases (Fars, March 14, 2017).

5. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, warned the United States and Saudi Arabia not to deploy military forces to Syria. He said the presence of foreign forces in Syria without its government's authorization was "occupation" and support for terrorist elements in the country. He accused the American administration and the Saudi Arabian regime of ongoing support for the terrorists operating in Syria (IRNA, March 17, 2017). His remarks were in response to statements made by Mohammad bin Salman al-Saud, minister of defense and deputy crown prince of Saudi Arabia, who, after having met with James Mattis, the American secretary of defense, said Riyadh might consider deploying forces to fight in Syria.

6. Iran strongly condemned the Israeli attack in Syria on the night of March 17, 2017. Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, called on the UN to condemn the attack and act to prevent the "Zionist regime" from further attacks, which undermined peace and security. He said the Israel attack proved that Israel was interested in strengthening the "Zionist-infidel terrorists" (Fars, march 18, 2017).

7. A delegation of the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency visited Lebanon and Syria, and met with senior Hezbollah officials, including Hassan Nasrallah, the organization's secretary general. Meeting with Nasrallah, Majid Qolizadeh, Tasnim News managing director, said his agency had invested large sums of money in its foreign bureau to provide the best possible coverage of international news for its regional audience. The delegation also met with Sheikh Na'im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, and with the head of Hezbollah's operational committee, Hashem Safi al-Din (Tasnim, March 14, 2017).

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

8. Mojtaba Sardad, an IRGC fighter, was killed at Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Iraq.

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^[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

The head of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation admits that 2,100 fighters sent by Iran to Syria and Iraq have been killed so far

Published: 19/03/2017

Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani, the prominent figure in the Iranian involvement in Syria, at the grave of an IRGC fighter killed in Syria (afsaran.ir, April 14, 2015)

Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi, the head of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation (Mehr, March 6, 2017).

Hossein Hamedani, killed in the Aleppo area in October 2015 (Tasnim News, October 9, 2016)

Joint Syrian-Iranian operations room set up in Aleppo before the Syrian Army attack in October 2015, with the participation of Iranian fighters. The poster in the upper left-hand corner shows Khomeini, Khamenei and an unidentified person. The Iranian correspondent who reported about the activity of the operations room is seen on the right (Fars, October 22, 2015)

Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani briefing fighters, apparently in the Latakia area in Syria (Facebook, October 13, 2015)

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http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20909Overview

1. In a conference held on March 6, 2017, to commemorate the Martyr Day in Tehran, the head of the Martyrs Foundation Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi said that the number of fatalities among the fighters sent by Iran to Syria and Iraq had reached 2,100 (Mehr, March 6, 2017).^[1] The number of fatalities announced by the Foundation director does not refer only to fighters of Iranian nationality, but to all fighters sent on behalf of Iran to Syria and Iraq. These fighters include Lebanese Hezbollah operatives as well as Shiites of Afghan, Pakistani and Iraqi descent, handled by the IRGC.^[2]

2. Ali Alfoneh, IRGC researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who monitors the involvement of Iran and its proxies in Syria and Iraq, has so far identified 2,603 fatalities (thus, there is a discrepancy of 503 dead between his findings and the figure cited by the head of the Martyrs Foundation). From Ali Alfoneh’s findings we learn that:

a. In Syria, 473 Iranian fighters, 1,045 Hezbollah operatives, and 801 operatives of the Shiite militias operating in Syria (Pakistanis, Afghans, and Iraqis)were killed. Thus, the total of fatalities among the Iranian forces and Iran’s proxy organizations in Syria has reached 2,319.

b. In Iraq, Alfoneh identified 38 Iranian fighters and 246 operatives of the Iraqi Shiite militias. Thus, the total of fatalities in Iraq has reached 248.

c. The total of fatalities in Syria and Iraq is 2,603. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 503 dead between this figure and the figure cited by the head of the Martyrs Foundation, which, in the ITIC's assessment, stems from different database and methodologies for counting the dead (for instance, maybe the head of the Martyrs Foundation doesn’t count the Iranian fatalities in Iraq).

3. Among the dead in Syria, particularly high is the percentage of Hezbollah operatives (about 40 percent of the total number of fatalities). In the ITIC's assessment, this stems from the fact that Hezbollah operatives are a quality, available force,which has been involved in the most important, deadly battles (such as the battle for Aleppo), and therefore sustained a large number of fatalities. The number of the Iranian fatalities, relative to the limited scope of the Iranian force in Syria, is also relatively high (with more than ten high-ranking officers of the rank equivalent to a brigadier general). The percentage of the Shiite militias in the total number of fatalities is small as they mainly serve as an auxiliary force rather than a quality military force sent to the front line in the important battle zones.

4. What is the impact of the Iranian fatalities on the decision makers in Tehran?In the ITIC's assessment, decision makers in Iran are highly sensitive to fatalities. At least in the past, this sensitivity drew internal criticism and raised questions as to whether the campaign in Syria is worthwhile. The Iranian fatalities, which were high relatively to the scope of the force stationed in Syria, required the Iranian leadership to provide explanations as to the benefit and legitimacy of the Iranian involvement in Syria. These explanations included the use of Shiite religious symbols, glorification of the value of sacrifice and defending the Shiite holy sites, and emphasizing the importance of involvement in Syria for protecting Iran’s interests and national security. On the other hand, the level of sensitivity in Tehran to Hezbollah’s fatalities and all the more so to fatalities of the Shiite militias is much lower.

5. The large numberof fatalities among the Iranian fighters and the concern that the fatalities would draw criticism of the involvement in Syria were apparently what led to a significant decrease of the Iranian order of battle in Syria. The order of battle decreased from about 1,500-2,000 at its peak to several hundred fighters and advisors at present. Today, the Iranians prefer to conduct their involvement in the fighting by proxy organizations, among which Hezbollah is the most prominent in its performance (see Appendix: Milestones of the Iranian involvement in the civil war in Syria). The modus operandi of a widespread use of proxies and limited direct Iranian involvement also characterizes the network of subversion and terror which Iran employs in the Middle East for promoting its interests and regional influence.^{^[3]}

Affiliation of the fatalities of Iran and its proxy organizations in Syria and Iraq

6. As a rule, the Iranian media does not refrain from reporting on fatalities among the Iranian fighters and the forces operating on behalf of Iran in Syria and Iraq. These reports also include details of senior officers who died in the fighting. Yet, the Iranian media does not always provide full information regarding the identity, rank and organizational affiliation of the dead.

7. Ali Alfoneh, an IRGC researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has been closely monitoring the IRGC fatalities in Syria and Iraq. His findings are based on official reports published in Iranian media regarding the dead as well as on media reports about funerals of fighters killed in Syria and Iraq. Until mid-February 2017, Alfoneh estimated that 473 Iranian fighters had been killed in Syria since the beginning of 2012, of which 466 belonged to the IRGC and seven to the Iranian regular army. In addition, since April 2014, a total of 38 IRGC fighters had been killed in Iraq. Thus, the total of Iranian fatalities in Syria and Iraq, according to Alfoneh, reaches 511.

8. According to Alfoneh's findings, the number of fatalities among Iran’s proxy organizations in Syria and Iraq has reached 2,092 fighters. Following is their breakdown:

a. 1,045 Hezbollah operatives have been killed in Syria since October 2012.

b. 584 Afghan fighters, operating in Syria as part of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, have been killed in Syria since September 2013.

c. 136 Pakistani fighters, operating in Syria as part of the Zainabiyoun Brigade, have been killed in Syria since November 2014.

d. 81 Iraqi fighters, from among the Shiite pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, have been killed in Syria since October 2012

e. 246 Iraqi fighters, from among the Shiite pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, have been killed in Iraq since July 2014.

9. Among the Iranian fighters killed since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, there are more than ten senior Iranian officers in a rank equivalent to brigadier general. Among the dead, there is a senior officer who was killed at the Syrian-Lebanese border (in an attack attributed to Israel), and another officer killed in the Golan Heights (also in an attack attributed to Israel). Several other officers were killed innorthern Syria (in the areas of Aleppo and Hama), where the Iranian and their proxies sustained the heaviest losses.

10. Following are details on the senior Iranian officers killed:

a. Hassan Shateri – killed in February 2013 at the Syrian-Lebanese border in an attack attributed to Israel.

b. Abdollah Eskandari –former head of the Martyrs Foundation in Fars Province, killed in May 2014.

c. Mohammad Ali Allahodadi – killedin an airstrike attributed to the Israeli Air Force in the Quneitra area, in January 2015.

d. Hadi Kajbaf –killed in April 2015 in the Daraa area

e. Hossein Hamedani –served as a senior military advisor in Syria, on behalf of the IRGC, and was killed in the Aleppo area in October 2015.

f. Reza Khavari – killed in the Hama area in October 2015.

g. Farshad Hassounizadeh – former commander of the Saberin Special Forces Brigade, killed in October 2015.

h. Hamid Mokhtarband – former commander of the IRGC Brigade in Ahvaz, killed in October 2015.

i. Sa’id Sayyah Taheri – killed in January 2016 in the Aleppo area.

j. Hassan Ali Shamsabadi – killed in March 2016.

k. Gholam-Reza Samaei– killed in October 2016.

l. Gholam-Reza Qollizadeh– killed in January 2017.

Appendix

Milestones of the Iranian involvement in the civil war in Syria

1. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, the IRGC’s Qods Force under the command of Qassem Soleimani has led the Iranian involvement in Syria. In the first stage of the civil war, when the existence of the Assad regime was in jeopardy, the Iranian involvement was intended to prevent the fall of Damascus and strategic outposts in northern Syria in the hands of the rebels and the collapse of the Syrian regime. Subsequently, the involvement of Iran and its proxies was intended to assist the Syrian regime to expand its control territories, stabilize its rule in the areas taken over, defend Shiite population and Shiite holy sites, secure the Syrian-Lebanese border area, and prevent the “spillover” of the global jihad to Lebanon. In the long run, the Iranian involvement was intended to secure Iran’s hold on Syria and its influence on the Syrian regime, and allow the use of Syrian territory as a launching pad for Iranian presence and activity in the Middle East.

2. The Iranian involvement in the various stages of the civil war in Syria has been expressed in several ways: At first, in the transfer of weapons, providing economic assistance and sending Iranian advisors, who operated in close coordination with the Syrian Army and the Syrian security forces. Then, the indirect Iranian involvement has turned into direct involvement through an Iranian force which was dispatched to Syria. Side by side with this force, Iran employed proxy organizations. Among these proxy organizations, the most professional has been the Lebanese Hezbollah, while organizations of lesser quality have been units of Shiite fighters of Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani descent.

3. Until September 2015, the Iranian involvement in Syria had been conducted by several hundred Iranian advisors and several thousand Shiite fighters belonging to military frameworks handled by the Qods Force. The IRGC’s military presence on Syrian soil was intended in the first place mainly for advisory missions. At that stage, the Iranians refrained from employing organic army units against the rebel organizations, and usually were not directly involved in the fighting. However, the IRGC operatives were caught from time to time in the crossfire between the Syrian forces and the rebel organizations and thus died in the fighting.

4. The cumulative achievements of ISIS, the Al-Nusra Front and other rebel organizations in northwestern Syria during 2014-2015 raised doubts among the Iranians as to President Bashar Assad’s ability to remain in power in the long run. This required Iran to substantially increase its support of the Assad regime and change its modus operandi in Syria. In view of the Syrian regime’s predicament, in mid-September 2015 Iran reinforced its troops in Syria, apparently adding 1,500-2,000 fighters, some of whom took an active part in the fighting. The Iranian reinforcement, which consisted of IRGC operatives and Shiite fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, was intended to assist the Syrian Army in the attack started in northern Syria in early October 2015. At the same time, the scope of Hezbollah’s force operating in Syria increased, as did its involvement in the various fighting zones.

5. The fierce battles in northwestern Syria in late 2015 caused heavy losses to the Iranian fighters, who were at the front lines of the attack. During the first months of the attack, over a hundred Iranian fighters were killed, with a large number of officers, including senior officers. The majority of the dead belonged to the IRGC’s regular combatant units. Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani led the attack in northwestern Syria, coordinating the activity of the Syrian Army, the IRGC, and Hezbollah. Most of the military effort was based on fighters who belonged to the IRGC’s regular units (infantry, armor, and Special Forces). The relative size of these units (compared to the Qods Force, relatively limited in scope) allowed them to send larger numbers of fighters to the battlefield and address Iran’s constraint at that time in Syria.^[4]

6. In the spring of 2016, Iran sent to Syria forces of the Iranian regular army limited in scope (probably several hundred fighters), with the objective of reinforcing the IRGC forces. This was the first time since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) that fighters belonging to the Iranian regular army were sent to a military campaign outside the borders of Iran. Within a short while, the regular army troops also sustained losses.

7. The heavy losses among the Iranian fighters required the Iranian leadership to reassess the deployment of Iranian troops in Syria. In late 2015, there were widespread Western media reports that Iran had started to withdraw its military troops from Syria due to its heavy losses. These reports were denied by senior Iranian officials, who stressed that Iran’s “military advisors” continued to operate along with the Syrian regime to assist it in its campaign against terrorism. The ITIC believes that even though Iran had not withdrawn its forces from Syria, it significantly decreased its order of battle in Syria, which is currently estimated at several hundred advisors and fighters.

8. The military achievements of the Syrian forces with Russian support during the recent year, which culminated in the takeover of Aleppo once again from the rebel organizations in late 2016, allowed Iran to once again rely mainly on Hezbollah fighters and the Shiite foreign fighters operating along with the Syrian Army, and content itself with a limited cadre of advisors.The return to the previous modus operandi reduced Iranian fatalities. However, in the ITIC's assessment, it also compromised Iran’s ability to impact events on the ground and Iran’s political influence in Syria. Iran’s role as the main superpower on which the Syrian regime relies was now taken by Russia, while Iran had to content itself with a secondary role in the military and political moves that took place during recent months.

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^[1]The Iranian Martyrs Foundation was established in the early 1980s on the order of Revolution Leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Its purpose is to assist families of the martyrs of the Islamic Revolution and the martyrs of the Iran-Iraq War that broke out in September 1980. Today, the Foundation also supports the families of fighters who died in the course of the Iranian involvement in Syria and Iraq. The Foundation also has a Lebanese branch, which supports the families of Hezbollah martyrs, and a Palestinian branch, which also operates from Lebanon, supporting families of Palestinian martyrs.
^[2]It is not the first time that Shahidi cites the number of fatalities among the troops sent by Iran (referred to by Iran as the “Defenders of the Holy Sites”). In November 2016, Shahidi said that the number of fatalities among the Iranian forces in Syria alone exceeded 1,000 (Tasnim News, November 22, 2016). In both cases, Shahidi did not specify the breakdown of the fatalities and did not refer to their national affiliation. In the ITIC's assessment, this may partially account for the discrepancy between the two figures. It seems that the current figure also includes operatives of the proxy organizations handled by Iran in Syria and Iraq.
^[3]Iran employs proxy organizations in the various arenas in the Middle East: In Lebanon, it operates through Hezbollah; In Iraq, through Shiite pro-Iranian militias; In Yemen, through the Houthi rebels; In the Palestinian arena, the organization which is most clearly affiliated with Iran is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
^[4]For further details, see the ITIC's Information Bulletin from November 16, 2015: “Profile of IRGC fighters Killed in Syria during the Past Month (Updated to November 16, 2015)”, www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20909.

Hamed Bafandeh and Ahmad Gholami, who were killed fighting in Syria (defapress.ir, April 24, 2017).

Mohammad Pakpour, commander of the IRGC's ground forces (Fars, May 2, 2017).

Javad Tork Abadi (second from left) presents his credentials to the Syrian foreign minister (Mehr, April 26, 2017).

The Syrian chief of staff (left) meets with the Iran defense minister (IRNA, May 1, 2017).

The defense ministers of Russia, Iran and Syria meet in Moscow (Tasnim, April 27, 2017).

Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, former mayor of Tehran (Tasnim, May 1, 2017).

Iranian ambassador to Iraq Iraj Masjedi (second from left) meets with Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi (right) (ABNA, April 24, 2017).

Overview

Iranian Intervention in Syria

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena

Related Articles

Fars cartoon published after the American attack in Syria (Fars, April 8, 2017).

Ali Khamenei meets with high-ranking armed forces commanders (website of the Supreme Leader, April 9, 2017).

The Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy meets with Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani (IRNA, April 17, 2017).

Qasem Soleimani (right) meets with Ali Larijani (Alef, April 19, 2017).

Iraj Masjedi, Iran's new ambassador to Iraq, presents his credentials to the Iraqi foreign minister (IRNA, April 19, 2017).

General Information

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

Related Articles

Yahya Rahim Safavi (Tasnim, March 26, 2017).

Qasem Soleimani in Hama (qasemsoleimani.ir, March 31, 2017).

Khamenei meets with families of Afghan shaheeds in Syria (Tasnim, March 28, 2017).

Overview

General Information

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena

Related Articles

Spotlight on Global Jihad

SDF off-road vehicle on fire west of Al-Karamah area, southeast of Al-Raqqah, after being hit by an ISIS anti-tank missile (Haqq, April 1, 2017).

Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani visits the Hama area (Al-Hadath News, April 2, 2017)

Top: ISIS operatives fighting against the Iraqi security forces in west Mosul (Haqq, April 2, 2017). Bottom: Two suicide bombing attacks against the Iraqi security forces in the western part of the city (Aamaq, March 30, 2017)

Salameh Abu Adhan al-Tarabin al-Ansari, one of the founders of ISIS’s Sinai Province, killed in an airstrike (Haqq, April 1, 2017)

Spreading leaflets on behalf of ISIS’s Sinai Province threatening the inhabitants not to collaborate with the Egyptian government (Haqq, April 1, 2017)

ISIS operative codenamed Abu Faruq the Persian describes the persecution of the Sunni Muslims by the Safavid dynasty, which embraced Shia in the 16th century.

Main events of the week[1]

The Coalition countries

Turkey announces the successful conclusion of Operation Euphrates Shield

US Secretary of State meets with senior Turkish government officials

Main developments in Syria

The Syrian Army’s advance towards the Euphrates Valley

The campaign for Al-Raqqah

The encirclement of the city of Al-Tabqa

Recommissioning the military airfield south of Al-Tabqa

Damascus area

Hama

Main developments in Iraq

The campaign for the takeover of Mosul

Killing senior ISIS operatives

Sinai Peninsula

Other countries

The Philippines

Counterterrorism activity

Turkey

Propaganda activity

ISIS threats against Iran

Findings of a study in a British research center: decrease in the scope of ISIS propaganda and changes in its content

Related Articles

Hojjat-ul-Islam Ali Saidi, representative of the supreme leader to the IRGC (Sepah News, March 15, 2017).

Rasoul Sanaeirad (Tasnim, March 12, 2017).

Mahmoud Alavi, Iranian minister of intelligence (Tasnim, March 14, 2017).

Members of the Tasnim News delegation to Lebanon visit the graves of Imad and Jihad Mughnieh (Tasnim, March 14, 2017).

Mojtaba Sardad IRGC fighter killed at Tel Afar (Twitter, March 19).

Main Points

General Information

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

Related Articles

Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani, the prominent figure in the Iranian involvement in Syria, at the grave of an IRGC fighter killed in Syria (afsaran.ir, April 14, 2015)

Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi, the head of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation (Mehr, March 6, 2017).

Hossein Hamedani, killed in the Aleppo area in October 2015 (Tasnim News, October 9, 2016)

Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani briefing fighters, apparently in the Latakia area in Syria (Facebook, October 13, 2015)

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20909Overview

Affiliation of the fatalities of Iran and its proxy organizations in Syria and Iraq

Appendix

Milestones of the Iranian involvement in the civil war in Syria

Related Articles

Main events of the week^[1]