Tag Archives: Iran

Iran and the regional upheaval: summary of a convention held in Tehran on ''Developments in the Middle East and the Future of the Regional Order''

The homepage of Hassan Khomeini’s new website

Central Bank steps up efforts to combat bounced checks

''The first Islamic necktie'' (Bultan News)

Processions held on the death anniversary of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic revolution

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Highlights of the week

Iran and the regional upheaval: summary of a conference held in Tehran on “Developments in the Middle East and the Future of the Regional Order”
Speech given by Islamic revolution founder’s grandson on anniversary of Khomeini’s death once again interrupted by pro-regime demonstrators
Central Bank steps up efforts to combat bounced checks
Neckties are next in campaign for enforcement of Islamic dress code

Iran and the regional upheaval: summary of a convention held in Tehran on “Developments in the Middle East and the Future of the Regional Order”

Last Tuesday, May 29, the Strategic Studies Center of the Expediency Discernment Council held a special conference titled “Developments in the Middle East and the Future of the Regional Order”. It was attended by members of the Iranian administration, diplomats, and researchers from the academia. The opening statements of the conference were given by Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the chief of the Expediency Discernment Council, and Ali-Akbar Velayati, the advisor to the Supreme Leader on international affairs and chairman of the World Association of the Islamic Awakening.

At the beginning of his statement, Rafsanjani spoke about the various terms used to define the developments in the Arab world. He expressed his opinion that there is no need to insist on a particular definition to be used in reference to the developments, and that various definitions can be applied: “Islamic awakening”, “Arab spring”, or “popular revolutions”. The developments in the Arab world can be considered as the awakening of the Islamic commonwealth, an important movement in the Arab world, and also a change in the conduct of the region’s nations, Rafsanjani said, which is why it is acceptable to use different definitions.

Rafsanjani pointed out the main reasons behind the revolutions in the Arab world, particularly the dissatisfaction and anger felt by the people for the tyrannical and corrupt regimes; the dependence of the old regimes on foreign powers, which led to the humiliation of the Arab nations; the indifference of the regimes to the religion and religious beliefs prevailing among the Arab nations and their use of religion for their own interests; and the weakness of the parties and the non-government organizations, which ultimately results in a revolutionary outbreak in the absence of any other way to implement changes and gradual reforms.

Speaking about Iran’s ability to serve as a role model for the revolutions in the Arab world, Rafsanjani said that Iran can serve as a role model for the rest of the nations in the region thanks to its long history, marked by the people’s involvement in its political developments. He added, however, that if Iran was able to better solve the problems it is currently facing, it could be a more successful inspiration for the nations of the Middle East and the Islamic revolution would spread quicker.

Rafsanjani then went on to discuss the central place of religion in the developments in the region, saying that even though there were various elements operating in Iran at the time of the constitutional revolution (in the early 20th century) and the Islamic revolution, including communists and nationalists, in the end the overwhelming majority of the people ended up supporting the clerics.

Rafsanjani cited the information explosion as a main factor behind the developments in the Arab world. Any event that takes place anywhere across the globe is immediately reported by all the media in the world, and the impact of one Facebook page on millions of people is comparable to that of many television and radio channels. According to Rafsanjani, telecommunications and social media have had a profound significance and an enormous impact on the developments these past two years. He argued that these are welcome changes that help humanity in its struggle against oppression.

Rafsanjani concluded his remarks by pointing out the dangers and threats faced by the revolutions in the Arab world, particularly the internal differences of opinion. He noted that Iran, too, experienced differences of opinion in the first two years after the revolution, and that some groups were unwilling to accept the majority opinion and agree to have the state affairs managed by the clerics, who enjoyed a great deal of support among the people. Iran was able to overcome the challenge thanks to the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini and the considerable support he enjoyed. Rafsanjani said that if the Arab countries that underwent revolutions are able to gain the support of the majority of the people and act in accordance with the desires that underpinned the revolution, they will be able to overcome the problems. If they stray from the path of the revolution and prove unable to achieve an internal unity, they will find themselves facing many dangers. He called on the Arab countries to cooperate with Iran and take advantage of its experience, stressing that Iran has no hostile aspirations or intentions towards Arab countries, and that it is interested in cooperating with them (ISNA, May 29).

Contrary to the opinion of Rafsanjani on the correct terminology for defining the developments in the Arab world, former Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati said that “Islamic awakening” is the only definition that is appropriate for the developments. He noted that, after the revolutions, there appeared numerous interpretations of their significance. While some claimed that they were “color revolutions”, others said that it was an “Arab spring”, and others still referred to them as an “Islamic awakening”. Velayati said that, as time went by, it became clearer that the correct term was “Islamic awakening”, since it cannot be denied that the elections held after the toppling of the regimes in the Arab world led to the victory of the Islamists.

He said that various elements, particularly the West, Israel, and some of the countries in the region, would like to derail and contain the revolutions in the Arab world, bring back the conditions that prevailed prior to the revolutions, and above all prevent the Islamists from winning. It was his assessment that, considering the unprecedented popular mobilization that led to the revolutions, there will be no turning back the clock (Aftab, May 29).

Dr. Hossein Ala’i, a member of the scientific committee of Imam Hossein University and a former commander in the Revolutionary Guards, listed 12 challenges facing the new governments in the Arab world:

1. Philosophical differences of opinion between the Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the secularists over the nature of the government and the administration. Ala’i listed four main models that are currently available for the revolutionaries in the Arab world: the Iranian model, which integrates religious democracy, protection of Palestine, and struggle against the “Zionist regime”, the establishment of a new order in the region, cooperation between Muslims, and independence of action vis-à-vis the United States; the Turkish model, based on a democratic, secular government, good relations with the West, and recognition of Israel coupled with support for the Palestinian groups; the Saudi model, based on a royalist regime seeking to implement Islamic religious law, which supports Palestine without being hostile to Israel and cooperates with the United States; and the national model, which seeks to restore the historic dignity of the Arabs while putting an emphasis on hostility to Israel and support for the Palestinians.

2. The remnants of the “old regime” and its apparatuses, which used to protect the dictatorship and continue posing a threat to the new regimes.

3. The intervention of international players, particularly the United States, which could be seen in the American support for the military council in Egypt and the American intervention in Bahrain.

4. Israel and the way of dealing with the Palestinian issue. The biggest loser from the developments in the Arab world is Israel, and the Zionists fear for the fate of the Camp David Accords and the future of their relations with the next government of Egypt. The Egyptian people are calling for the peace treaties to be reexamined, but Egypt needs the annual assistance provided by the United States.

5. Countries in the region. Saudi Arabia would like to keep the developments in the Arab world away from its borders and maintain the stability of the regime, which is why it is sending troops to Bahrain, making efforts to encourage Salafi thought, working through its television networks, and channeling funds to Arab countries, including Egypt. Turkey would also like to expand its influence in the Arab world in cooperation with the United States.

6. The expectations of the civilians. The revolutionaries are interested in a fundamental change in economy and social welfare, the establishment of a government that will facilitate social and political liberties as well as free elections, laws that coincide with Islamic religious law, government support for the Palestinian people, stability, and better relations with other governments in the region.

7. Security challenges. In some Arab countries, such as Libya and Yemen, tribal and religious conflicts destabilize the internal situation and lead to the emergence of such groups as Al-Qaeda.

8. The economic challenge.

9. Rivalry between various parties.

10. The new governments’ lack of experience in managing state affairs.

11. The lack of leadership. The movements in the Arab world have no leaders, which creates room for foreign powers to intervene in the internal affairs of Arab countries.

12. Differences of opinion among the revolutionaries between the young people interested in a quick, radical change, and the veteran leaders, who have spent many years in prison and prefer a gradual change (www.snn.ir, May 29).

The former diplomat Hamid Aboutalebi, of the Foreign Policy Studies Department in the Expediency Discernment Council, analyzed the characteristics of the revolutionary movements in the Arab world. He argued that one common characteristic shared by these movements is that they had no aspirations of causing a change in the sociopolitical regime—they set their sights only on their victory and did not lay out objectives for the future. In addition, they had no particular slogans, such as the need for the revival of Islamic religious law.

Dr. Davoud Firhi, a member of the scientific committee in the University of Tehran, also pointed out the unique characteristics possessed by the revolutionary movements in the Arab world, particularly the Islamic movements. Firhi argued that the September 11 events led to the emergence of a new Islamic movement which differs in two aspects from those Islamic movements that operated in the past. First, while the traditional movements worked under a single leader and were not democratic, the new Islamic movements are more popular. Second, while the old Islamic movements sought to establish an Islamic government as a means for the Islamization of society, the new movements ascribe no particular significance to the government, and put most of the emphasis on society. Their expectations from the government focus on the need to establish a limited order and provide welfare for the citizens—they no longer expect the government to entrench Islam in society (www.snn.ir, May 29).

Dr. Hossein Salimi, a member of the scientific committee in Tehran’s Allameh Tabataba’i University, said that in recent years there has been an increased regional kinship between Arab countries, describing it as the result of economic, media-related, and philosophical processes. Arab countries need stronger economic cooperation with each other to satisfy their need for raising funds and economic development, they need one telecommunications network in light of the global media developments, and they have a shared democratic-Islamic philosophical foundation, since most of the new rulers to emerge after the revolutions in the Arab world are leaning towards the Muslim Brotherhood. Salimi said that Iran needs to formulate a policy that will take advantage of the new opportunities in the region (ISNA, May 29).

Dr. Mohammad Farazmand, the former Iranian ambassador to Bahrain, discussed the developments in that country and pointed out its economic dependence on Saudi Arabia. He noted that, while Iran enjoyed a great deal of influence in Bahrain, it did not become involved in the happenings that took place there these past two years. The ones responsible for creating the problems in Bahrain are Saudi Arabia and the United States, Farazmand said, and they are also the ones that need to solve them.

Dr. Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour, a member of the scientific committee in the Foreign Ministry’s School of International Relations, discussed the involvement of foreign powers in the region, motivated by their desire for hegemony. He noted that, in recent years, such involvement has been expressed in non-direct means, since direct involvement has become too expensive. Speaking about Israel, Sajjadpour said that, while the West once sought to use that country for the realization of its policy in the region, Israel has now become a problem for the West.

Ali Jannati, the former Iranian ambassador to Kuwait, spoke about the developments in Syria and stressed that the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia would like to see the Bashar Assad regime toppled. Jannati argued that the conditions currently prevailing in Syria are the same conditions that existed in the Arab countries where revolutions took place: a tyrannical regime, poverty, social differences, corruption at the highest echelons of the regime, and lack of respect for human rights. He said that the policy of the regime in Syria has given rise to dissension among the Sunni majority in the country.

He spoke about the involvement of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Western countries in Syria, and their support for the Syrian opposition. He noted that the government of Turkey made a strategic mistake by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, since it failed to understand the differences between Syria and the other regimes in the Arab world. Speaking about the continuing support offered by Iran to the Bashar Assad regime, the former ambassador said that, even though Iran partly disagrees with the way the Syrian regime is conducting itself and is interested in promoting reforms in the country, it has no choice but to support the Assad regime in light of the cooperation between the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia aimed at toppling the Syrian regime, which may lead to a loss of support for the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine. Jannati referred to Iran’s decision to support the Syrian regime as choosing the lesser of two evils (www.snn.ir, May 29).

Speech given by Islamic revolution founder’s grandson on anniversary of Khomeini’s death once again interrupted by pro-regime demonstrators

A speech given by Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic revolution, was interrupted this week during a ceremony marking the 23rd anniversary of Khomeini’s death. The speech, given by Hassan Khomeini at a mausoleum dedicated to his grandfather south of Tehran, was interrupted a number of times by supporters of the regime and the Supreme Leader, who shouted condemnations against him and against those who oppose the regime and the concept of “rule of the religious jurisprudent”. The slogans heard at the ceremony included “Death to the opponents of the rule of the religious jurisprudent”, “The blood in our veins is a gift to the Leader [Ali Khamenei]”, and “This entire army is mobilized and ready for the sake of the Leader’s love”. During this year’s main ceremony, supporters of the Supreme Leader also chanted slogans against the “deviant faction”, affiliated with President Ahmadinejad and his office chief Rahim Masha’i. In spite of the slogans chanted against him, Khomeini was able to finish his speech as planned (ISNA, June 3).

In the speech, which reflected Khomeini’s reformist worldview, he praised the path of his grandfather and said that the management of state affairs should only be entrusted to righteous leaders, like his grandfather, since they are the only ones who are able to solve the problems faced by the Iranian society. Khomeini spoke about the concept of the “oppressed” (mostaz’afin), which was emphasized by the founder of the Islamic revolution, and said that oppression does not exist merely in the sphere of economy and that it needs to be considered in the cultural context as well. Society has to help those who are oppressed in any way and uplift them from the oppression, while the righteous leaders need to weed out corruption at the root (Mehr, June 3).

In response to the interruptions of Hassan Khomeini’s speech, the former reformist Majles member Qodratollah Alikhani said that the slogans shouted by a handful of citizens during the speech given by Khomeini’s grandson were intended to drown out the calls heard against President Ahmadinejad at the ceremonies marking the anniversary of Khomeini’s death. Alikhani condemned those who interrupted Khomeini’s speech, stressing that they were a small handful of about 200 people who were unable to disrupt the ceremony. He noted that the calls were meaningless, and that the large crowd that attended the ceremonies marking the anniversary of Khomeini’s death did not join the calls due to the considerable sympathy enjoyed by the family of the founder of the Islamic revolution (Khabar Online, June 3).

Two years ago, Hassan Khomeini, considered to be one of the major supporters of the reformist movement, had his speech interrupted at a ceremony marking the 21st anniversary of Khomeini’s death. In an unprecedented act, pro-regime demonstrators shouted slogans against him and against the reformist opposition and its leaders, preventing Khomeini from completing his speech. The incident sparked a controversy and was widely reported by the Iranian media. Senior figures in the reformist opposition, including a number of top clerics, strongly criticized the offense caused to the grandson of the founder of the Islamic revolution, claiming that the interruption of his speech had been planned in advance by regime supporters as part of the campaign waged against the reformist opposition since the 2009 presidential elections and the riots that broke out in their wake. The regime supporters, on the other hand, justified the slogans chanted against Khomeini, saying that his close relations with the leaders of the opposition and his deviation from the path of his grandfather were the reasons that had fanned the public protest against him.

Hassan Khomeini has recently denied reports according to which he intends to run in the elections for president of Iran, slated for 2013, on behalf of the reformist faction. His speaker has confirmed, on the other hand, a report about a meeting he has recently held with President Ahmadinejad, whose details are still unknown (Mehr, May 21).

Central Bank steps up efforts to combat bounced checks

This week the Central Bank has issued new instructions intended to curtail the ongoing increase in the number of bounced checks in Iran. Figures released by the Central Bank in April show that the combined value of bounced checks in the last Iranian year (2011-2012) reached 31 trillion tomans (about 25 billion dollars). Nearly 13 percent of all cashier checks were defined as “bounced checks”. The daily Donya-ye Eqtesad (“World of Economy”) has recently reported that, in the first 11 months of the year 1390 (March 21, 2011 – February 19, 2012) 6 million checks bounced out of the total 46 million checks traded in the banks. The figure represents an increase of nearly 25 percent in the number of bounced checks compared to the previous year. An opinion held by most economic experts is that the increase in the number of bounced checks is the result of the uneasy atmosphere that has prevailed in Iran’s business system this past year (Donya-ye Eqtesad, April 21).

In light of the increase in the number of bounced checks, a top official at the Central Bank has announced this week that the Central Bank issued new instructions to all the banks in Iran with the intention of imposing restrictions on those writing bounced checks. Amir-Hossein Amin Azad, a Central Bank official in charge of bank instructions and the fight against money laundering, said at a press conference that 12.5 percent of all cashier checks bounce, twice as many as in 2009. The top official noted that the increase in the number of bounced checks is the result of economic factors, the lack of legislation and instructions for monitoring bank accounts, and the incorrect use of checks by the public. He said that, in the absence of clear instructions on the issue, a Central Bank team looked into ways to impede the spread of the phenomenon and suggested imposing various restrictions on those who write bounced checks. Under the new instructions, account owners who bounce a check will be denied access to banking services for seven years. They will also suffer additional restrictions: among other things, they will be denied access to loans and foreign currency, prohibited from opening a new bank account, prevented from receiving bank credit and bank guarantees, and denied access to electronic banking services. The banks have also been instructed to take various measures intended to make sure that the bank accounts of customers who pay by checks have sufficient funds to cover the checks that they write. The new instructions also discuss the prohibition on opening more than one bank account with any bank by a single customer, and require banks to confirm with the Interior Ministry the address given by a person opening a new bank account to make sure that it is their real address. Amin Azad explained that the new instructions do not prevent people who bounce checks from leaving the country (ISNA, May 30; Tejarat Press, June 1; Aftab, June 4).

In response to the new instructions issued by the Central Bank imposing restrictions on those who write bounced checks, Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, the chief inspectorate director in the judiciary, said that the instruction denying customers whose checks have bounced access to bank services for seven years is illegal. He noted that he will look into the issue, and that if it turns out that such an instruction has indeed been issued, the organization which he heads will prevent it from being implemented (Fars, June 3).

Neckties are next in campaign for enforcement of Islamic dress code

ISNA News Agency reported last week that the interior security forces began enforcing the ban on selling neckties in clothes stores in Tehran. One of the salesmen told a reporter for the agency that, in recent days, the stores have been asked to take all the neckties off the shelves. The head of the shirt retailers union said that while the authorities had banned the sale of neckties after the victory of the Islamic revolution, the ban had not been seriously enforced most of the time. He reported that the stores were also instructed to change their logo, which featured a picture of a necktie, and that supervisors on behalf of the authorities prohibited the stores from displaying neckties in their store windows (ISNA, May 29).

This week the Tabnak website expressed its reservations over the considerable escalation in the campaign for the enforcement of the Islamic dress code, which is currently seen in the enforcement of the ban on selling neckties. The website wondered why the interior security forces have chosen this particular timing to enforce the law banning the sale of neckties, which has not been enforced for years; whether there are no other laws that should be enforced first; would it not have been better for the internal security forces to engage in more important missions than collecting neckties from stores; and whether the campaign for the enforcement of the Islamic dress code in recent years was so successful that it is now appropriate to expand it to include neckties (Tabnak, June 2).

Ever since the Islamic revolution of 1979, neckties have been considered in Iran as a symbol of Western culture, and the authorities have taken measures to eliminate their use. Yet even so, in recent years more and more Iranians—particularly young people—wear neckties, being part of the increasing influence of Western culture on dress norms in the country. Top regime officials and government ministry employees still avoid wearing neckties in public.

In May 2008 the chief of the Iranian customs annoucned that the customs authorities intended to ban the import of neckties, saying they were contradictory to the culture of Iran. In August of that year more than 30 medicine students from the Emirkabir University in Tehran were asked to report to the university’s discipline committee for wearing neckties to their graduation ceremony.

In November 2010 the conservative news website Bultan News released a report on the first “Islamic necktie” made in Iran.

The necktie was designed to resemble Zulfiqar, the sword wielded by Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shi’ite imam, and is decorated with a hadith (a tradition attributed to Prophet Muhammad) pertaining to the sword. Hemat Komeili, the designer of the necktie, noted that he had decided to design a necktie that would be compatible with the values of Islam because many clerics were opposed to the use of Western neckties. According to Komeili, the necktie he designed gained the approval of several top Shi’ite clerics (Bultan News, November 16, 2010).

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The burden of ''inflation'' in the transition from ''phase 1'' (of the subsidy reform) to ''phase 2''

Iranian demonstrators in Tabriz.

Islamic dress code increasingly enforced as summer approaches

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano visits Tehran

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Iranlowers expectations and stresses need for fundamental change in Western policy ahead of Baghdad talks

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the chairman of the Majles National Security and Foreign Policy Council, has announced this week that the differences of opinion between Iran and the West with regard to the nuclear issue cannot be expected to go away in just one or two meetings. Those who expect the meeting in Baghdad to mark the end of the talks between Iran and the West are mistaken, Boroujerdi said at a press conference. He noted that the talks in Baghdad are a follow-up to the talks held earlier in Istanbul, and that what is important for Iran is to protect its right for peaceful nuclear energy despite the international pressure exerted on it and the resolutions passed against it. He went on to say that Israel and the United States have no interest in solving the crisis that surrounds the nuclear program and therefore continue bringing up false accusations against Iran. He expressed his hope that the G5+1 countries will change their policy towards Iran in the course of the Baghdad talks and adopt a realistic, cooperation-based approach, while recognizing that Iran is within its right to develop nuclear technology (Mehr, May 20).

On the eve of the launch of the talks in Baghdad, 203 Majles members released a statement calling on the West to change its policy towards Iran and adopt an approach based on cooperation instead of one based on conflict. The statement said that it is now up to the West to engage in trust-building measures towards Iran. Over the past two decades the United States and its allies have put pressure on Iran, even though the latter has fulfilled its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Western countries must recognize the rights of the Iranian people and proceed in accordance with the NPT, regardless of "Zionist pressure". The Majles members called on Iran's negotiators to protect their rights in the forthcoming talks (IRNA, May 20).

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast also called on the West to change its policy and lift the sanctions imposed on Iran. He noted that the talks in Baghdad need to end with the lifting of the sanctions, which have no legal basis whatsoever. By lifting the sanctions, the West will prove that it is willing to change the inappropriate policy it has been pursuing towards Iran and its nuclear program. He further added that the West would be completely mistaken to believe that Iran would give up its rights as a result of the sanctions (Fars, May 20). A similar demand for lifting the sanctions during the talks in Baghdad has been heard in recent weeks from other top Iranian officials.

Meanwhile, the daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami warned against harboring unrealistic hopes for the talks in Baghdad. An editorial published by the daily on May 21 said that some have high hopes for the coming talks with the West, thinking that they will bring a solution to all problems facing Iran in all spheres of life. There is a tendency in Iran to link everything to the nuclear talks: the rise in taxi fares, the reduction in the size of bread loaves, the delays on the subway system, and even the defeats suffered by the soccer team. There can be no doubt, the article said, that the political, economic, cultural, and social spheres are interconnected and dependent upon each other, and that the outcome of the talks in Baghdad is going to have an impact on the political and economic relations between Iran and other countries in the world. There is also no doubt that the results of the talks are going to have an impact on how easy or difficult it is to carry out transactions between Iran and the West, which, in turn, will influence the value of the Iranian currency, the price of imported goods, the price of products, the stock exchange situation, and the state of the real estate market.

One should not, however, give the talks more importance than they really deserve and think that all of the problems facing Iran depend on their results. It is true that the Iranian economy will be put in a more difficult situation if the talks fail; however, this does not mean that the consequences of failure are insurmountable. In the past, the Iranian people extricated themselves from worse situations than this. On the other hand, even if the talks go well and the West recognizes Iran’s right for nuclear technology, that on its own will not be enough to solve all the problems, since many of them have nothing to do with the sanctions but rather with problematic management, wrong decisions on the part of the government, undesirable policy pursued in recent years, and problems with the infrastructure. While the sanctions have exacerbated these economic problems, it is not the sanctions that caused them in the first place. Even if the talks succeed and the sanctions are reduced or lifted altogether, the fundamental problems will still be there. Jomhuri-ye Eslami warned that chalking up all the problems to the sanctions may cause despair in society. The right thing to do is to prepare society for two options: the talks either fail or succeed. The expectations from the talks will then be realistic, and national dignity can be defended.

Sobh-e Sadeq, a weekly published by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, also took a reserved stance when discussing the results of the talks. An article written by Yadollah Javani, the head of the Political Department of the Revolutionary Guards, said that, in the assumption that the Western proposal that will be presented to the Iranians during the talks in Baghdad is the same proposal on which the Western media has been reporting these last few days, it does not contain anything that can satisfy the Iranians, and must not be accepted by the representatives of Iran. The only kind of arrangement that Iran needs to accept is one based on the NPT. According to this treaty, the West has no right to negotiate with Iran the rate of uranium enrichment or the shut-down of the nuclear facilities, or to present Iran with conditions it needs to meet in order to pursue its nuclear program. The only thing that the West can negotiate with Iran is the monitoring of its nuclear activity, which needs to be discussed between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Other than that, the West has no legal right to meddle in Iran’s nuclear activity.

The West needs to stop its propaganda against Iran and fully recognize its nuclear rights, the article said. It is only in this case that Iran will be willing to put the West’s concerns to rest, whether the concerns are real or whether they are false. Talks with no threats and deceptions may end with positive results, and in such a way that both sides feel that their rights have been realized. However, if the West persists with its old policy and backs out of the principles agreed upon in the Istanbul talks, the negotiations will go back to square one (Sobh-e Sadeq, May 21).

Second phase of subsidy policy reform delayed once again

Despite a statement made by President Ahmadinejad saying that he is determined to move forward with the implementation of the subsidy policy reform, the government has pushed back the launch of the second phase of the program, which was scheduled to begin this week. On Sunday, May 20, Iranian media reported that the launch of the second phase was pushed back to an unknown date due to various reasons. Mehr News Agency reported that the main reason for the delay is a resolution passed by the Majles last week to let the government increase the budget allocated towards the implementation of the reform from 44 billion dollars to only 53.8 billion dollars, significantly lower than the nearly 110 billion dollars requested by the government (Mehr, May 20).

As preparations continue for the launch of the second phase of the reform plan, its implementation continues to draw criticism. In an interview given this week to the daily Mardom Salari, Abdolhossein Sasan, an economist from the University of Esfahan, warned about the inflationary impact of the reform, saying that it needs to be implemented gradually over the course of five years at the very least.

Sasan argued that 99 percent of the consequences of the reform have yet to become manifest, and that its impact on the industrial sector and on the people of Iran will be fully seen only in about 4-5 years. He pointed out that, as a result of the implementation of the first phase of the reform, the government was forced to run the money printing press at an unprecedented rate, and nevertheless found itself facing a severe budget deficit due to errors in the economic assessments carried out prior to the launch of the plan. For example, assessments of the economic growth rate were considerably higher compared to the actual growth rate. The inflation rate, too, was worked out incorrectly, since the calculation did not take into account the increase in the prices of housing and of some public services.

The top economist warned that, if the government moves forward with the implementation of the plan, the prices will keep rising and the economic growth rate will keep dropping. He noted that the government needs to take a number of preliminary measures to improve the state of the economy and increase its revenues before continuing the implementation of the plan. The government needs to scale up support for the weaker sectors of society and carry out the reform gradually, over at least five years, since paying cash benefits to the people of Iran will not be enough to minimize the harm done to the citizens. It is Sasan’s assessment that, among other things, a gradual implementation of the reform will make it possible for Iranians to make the move from traditional energy sources to new heating methods based on solar panels, and for factories to switch to production methods based on energy-efficient systems. These processes will make it possible to diminish the impact of the rise in gas prices as a result of the subsidy policy reform, he said (Mardom Salari, May 20).

The burden of “inflation” in the transition from “phase 1” (of the subsidy reform) to “phase 2”

In the meantime, uncertainty remains over the plan to terminate the eligibility of several million Iranians who belong to the higher income deciles for the cash benefits. Iranian media have reported this week that, in accordance with the national budget approved by the Majles last week, 10 million citizens will be removed from the list of cash benefit recipients. So far the government has made no announcement about its plan to terminate the eligibility of some Iranians for the cash benefits; however, in recent months the organization in charge of implementing the reform has called on citizens who do not require the cash benefits to give them up on their own initiative.

This week the Asr-e Iran website took issue with the uncertainty that continues to surround the reform. A commentary article published by the website said that, while 10 million Iranians are to be made ineligible for the cash benefits, it is unclear who they are or whether they are the same people who have recently received a text message from the organization responsible for the implementation of the reform calling them to give up the cash benefits. If they are, indeed, the same people, then that is a serious problem: while some of them belong to the weaker sectors of society, many high-income individuals have received no such text message from the subsidy reform organization. Asr-e Iran demanded that the government provide explanations as to the criteria it uses to select the citizens who will be removed from the list of benefit recipients, to make sure that no one is taken off the list by mistake. The website claimed that the government has not acted transparently since the beginning of the implementation of the reform, and that the lack of correct, reliable information has created a breeding ground for rumors and unreliable reports on the cash benefits, which put further psychological pressure on Iranians and make their concerns worse. Top officials in the reform organization must therefore provide the people with quick, reliable, and correct information about the cash benefits and the implementation of the second phase of the subsidy reform (Asr-e Iran, May 18).

Iranobjects to Eurovision song contest in Azerbaijan: another expression of mounting tensions between the two countries

The Iranian protest against the Eurovision song contest in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, has reached a peak in recent days. Most of the criticism is directed at the plan of the LGBT community to use the occasion of the contest to hold a first-ever gay pride parade in Baku.

Last weekend Ayatollah Kazem Sediqi, the Friday prayer leader in Tehran, strongly condemned what he referred to as Azerbaijan’s “anti-Islamic” policy, and called on the authorities of the republic to cancel the gay pride parade. He stressed that homosexuality is incompatible with Islam, and argued that it is inappropriate to spend millions of euros on a “homosexual parade” while millions of Azerbaijanis are struggling to overcome poverty. The top cleric strongly condemned the policy of the Azerbaijani authorities, accusing them of letting Israeli officials visit the republic whenever they wish even as the country’s mosques are being destroyed, supporters of women’s veils are being arrested, and severe restrictions are being imposed on Islamic activity. Sediqi called on the Baku authorities not to play with the religious sentiments of billions of Muslims across the globe just to please Israel and the United States (Mehr, May 18). The top cleric Ayatollah Ja’far Sobhani also condemned the plan to hold a gay pride parade in Baku, saying that, by doing so, the government of Azerbaijan will encourage corruption and promiscuity among its young men and women. He called on the media to report and protest against the parade (ISNA, May 18).

The strong criticism leveled by the clerics against the Eurovision song contest and the gay pride parade was also joined by Ayatollah Mohsen Mojtahed Shabestari, the Supreme Leader’s representative in East Azerbaijan Province, who referred to the Azerbaijani authorities as “puppets of the Zionist regime”. In a Friday sermon given in the city of Tabriz, the cleric fiercely condemned the upcoming gay pride parade and demanded that the authorities of Azerbaijan call it off. Islamic countries must not fall into the trap of the anti-Islamic policy pursued by the West, Mojtahed Shabestari said. He noted that holding a gay pride parade in a country where Muslims make up 95 percent of the population and Shi’ites make up 85 percent is an inappropriate, immoral act that offends the religious sentiments of Muslims. He expressed his hope that the government of Azerbaijan is taking seriously the warnings voiced by Muslim nations about the parade, and warned that if the government does not prevent the parade from taking place, it will provoke increased anger not only from its own citizens but also reactions of rage and hatred from the people of Iran (Fars, May 18).

Last week Mojtahed Shabestari argued that the Eurovision song contest in Baku is “a plot of the Zionist regime”. According to the cleric, the plan to hold the parade in Baku is proof that the government of Azerbaijan follows the policy of the United States and Israel, and that holding the Eurovision song contest in Baku is part of the “Zionist regime’s” plans. He called on the people of Azerbaijan to join the protest rallies held by the people of Iran against the Eurovision contest and the gay pride parade, and said that the authorities of Azerbaijan should invest their energy in solving the border dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia (over the Nagorno-Karabakh region) instead of putting efforts into organizing the contest and the parade (Roydad Online, May 15).

An announcement dealing with a number of domestic and foreign issues released this week by the Combatant Clergy Association, affiliated with the conservative religious establishment in Iran, also condemned the authorities in Baku for hosting the Eurovision song contest. The developments in Azerbaijan are a cause for concern, according to the association, since they constitute an offense against the Islamic faith. Holding the Eurovision contest and the “parade of beastly homosexuals” in Baku is contradictory to Islam and the values of morality, said the announcement, which was signed by Ayatollah Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, the chairman of the Assembly of Experts. These events give rise to differences of opinion among Muslims, offend their religious sentiments, and are tantamount to bending the knee to foreign influence and anti-human culture (ISNA, May 18).

Meanwhile, media in Iran have provided extensive coverage of the growing protests among the Islamic opposition in Azerbaijan against the Eurovision song contest and the gay pride parade. Press TV, an Iranian television channel broadcasting in English, widely reported on the preparations for the contest in Baku. In its commentary, Press TV said that the contest and the growing protests it has sparked reflect the serious internal problems faced by Azerbaijan and the increasing domestic resistance to the government and to its secular, pro-Israeli policy (Press TV, May 18).

In the past two weeks a number of protests have been held in the Azeri provinces of northern Iran against the Azerbaijani authorities, Azerbaijan’s “anti-Islamic policy”, and the Eurovision song contest in Baku. Last week in Ardabil Province, hundreds of students and lecturers from two local universities took part in a demonstration against the contest and the “anti-religious conduct” of the government of Azerbaijan. The protestors chanted slogans against the authorities in Baku and shouted “death to Israel” and “death to America”. At the end of the demonstration, the protesters released a memorandum of opinion condemning the policy pursued by the authorities of Azerbaijan.

On May 8 a march against the government of Azerbaijan and the Eurovision song contest was also held in the city of Tabriz. In a demonstration that took place in front of the local consulate of Azerbaijan, the protestors called on Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev to abandon his anti-Islamic policy, prevent the Eurovision and the gay pride parade from taking place in Baku, release detained members of the Islamic opposition, and cut off ties with Israel. One of the participants of the march was Mohammad Sa’idi, a Majles representative for Tabriz, who strongly criticized the policy of the Azerbaijani government and the arrest of Islamic opposition activists in that country. Sa’idi declared that Azerbaijan has become a stronghold of “the Zionist regime and the United States”, and that the “homosexual parade” in Baku was masterminded by the Zionists and is paid for with the money of “the downtrodden citizens” of the republic as part of the cultural attack launched by the enemies of Islam.

Iranian demonstrators in Tabriz. The sign carried by the demonstrator reads: “Mr. Ilham Alief [Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev], instead of holding a homosexual parade, think about how to free Karabakh”

The Iranian protest against the Eurovision song contest and the gay pride parade in Baku reflects the mounting tensions in the relations between the two countries these past several months. The tensions can be seen in exchanges of accusations between Iran and Azerbaijan and in their waging a media propaganda campaign against each other. While the government of Azerbaijan has accused Iran of planning terrorist attacks in its territory against Israeli targets, Tehran has claimed that Azerbaijan helps Israel carry out espionage activities against Iran from its territory and encourages separatism among the Azeri minority in the Islamic republic. Iran has also submitted its protest to the authorities of Azerbaijan in light of reports on Azerbaijan’s intention to let Israel use military bases in its territory for a military offensive against the Iranian nuclear facilities. Meetings that took place in recent months between top officials from the two countries, including a visit held by Azerbaijan’s defense minister to Tehran this past March, proved unable to allay the growing tensions between them.

In recent months the Iranian media has adopted a particularly aggressive approach towards the authorities of Azerbaijan, accusing them of pursuing an anti-Islamic policy and encouraging the growing Israeli involvement in the country. Media in Iran have widely covered the measures taken by the authorities in Baku to restrict the freedom of action of Azerbaijan’s Islamic opposition and limit religious Islamic activities.

Islamic dress code increasingly enforced as summer approaches

Last week the Tehran police began the implementation of a new phase in the campaign for the enforcement of the Islamic dress code in the city. Last Wednesday, May 17, internal security forces were sent to the main squares and streets of the capital and began enforcing the dress code for women and for men. ISNA News Agency reported that on Thursday the operation was expanded to include shopping centers and major trade centers.

Top officials in the Tehran police have announced that in the coming days the police will be launching additional phases of the program. Hossein Sajediniya, the chief of the internal security forces in Tehran, has recently announced the intention to implement the program, saying that the police will fight against any expression of non-compliance with the Islamic dress code in the city. He noted that the police intends to conduct the program among manufacturers and importers of banned clothing and also among citizens making use of such clothing. According to Sajediniya, all the centers for the manufacturing and sale of clothing in Tehran have received warnings about the instructions in place with regard to the dress code, and any center found in violation of the instructions will be shut down. In addition, Sajediniya noted that, as part of the program, mobile patrols on motorcycles and vehicles will be regularly conducted across the city. The patrols will operate on the streets, commercial centers, and highways.

Ahmad-Reza Radan, the deputy chief of the internal security forces, spoke about the program as well, saying that the internal security forces intend to fight against violations of the Islamic dress code and enforce the principles that ban clothing incompatible with the values of Islam. Ahmad Rouzbahani, the chief of morality police in the internal security forces, warned that any civilian apprehended by the police for violating the dress code or sporting a Western-style haircut will be taken in to a police station and released only after he or she has been provided with appropriate clothing by family members. The cases of persons committing such an offense for the second time will be transferred to the judiciary (ISNA, May 19).

Last week Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stressed how important it is for women to adhere to the standards of appropriate clothing. Speaking at a meeting with women held on May 12 on the occasion of Mother’s Day, celebrated on the birthday of Fatimah, Prophet Muhammad's daughter, Khamenei said that women need to preserve their dignity and modesty and make certain to wear the veil. According to the Supreme Leader, violating the Islamic dress code has disastrous consequences for the state, the society, morality, and politics. If there is a difficulty in adhering to the religious principles that govern forms of behavior and dress code, it is a difficulty only in the short run, while its influence is deep and extends into the long run. He noted that the veil is a source of pride for women and that it guarantees their freedom. Women who do not wear a veil are humiliated, exposing what God has ordered them to conceal. The veil provides women with dignity and should be considered one of God's gifts.

In addition to launching stricter enforcement of the Islamic dress code in Tehran, this week the internal security forces announced their intention to take measures against underground musical performances held without the approval of the authorities. Ahmad Rouzbahani, the chief of the morality police, said that the security forces intend to intensify their fight against anyone who organizes performances without the approval of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, and against singers and musicians who perform without such an approval. He warned that those who are apprehended for these kinds of violations will receive a criminal record (ISNA, May 19). In recent years the internal security forces have conducted raids on underground performances featuring Western-style musicians and attended by mixed-gender audiences.

In previous years the security forces also intensified the enforcement of the Islamic dress code ahead of the summer season. In recent years the authorities have significantly stepped up the enforcement of the Islamic dress code, after a certain period of leniency in enforcement in the mid-1990s. Conservative clerics repeatedly claimed, however, that the policy of enforcement pursued by the government was unsatisfactory and even accused the president of having a too tolerant approach to the enforcement of the Islamic dress code. This week Majles member Ali Motahari, one of President Ahmadinejad’s strongest critics, said that the difficult situation in which Iran has found itself with regard to women’s veils is the result of the policy adopted by the president and his office chief Rahim Masha’i, which goes against the principles of Islam, encourages women to wear pants and coats that do not extend past their knees, and even leads to the establishment of cabarets and night clubs (Fars, May 20).N

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Highlights of the week

Iran shows resolve ahead of resumption of nuclear talks in Baghdad.
From the memoirs of former chief nuclear negotiator: Hassan Rouhani exposes new details on Iran’s nuclear policy.
Persian Gulf tensions escalate: Iran reacts strongly to Saudi Arabia-Bahrain union initiative.
Salman Rushdie affair, 2012 version: Shahin Najafi and the song that angered Shi’ite clerics.
New restrictions on use of foreign email servers.

Iran shows resolve ahead of resumption of nuclear talks in Baghdad

On the eve of the nuclear talks between Iran and the West, scheduled to resume in Baghdad on May 23, top officials and media in Iran show resolve and demand that Western countries change their hostile stance towards the Islamic republic.

Sa’id Jalili, chairman of the Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, warned Western countries this week that making pointless statements just as the talks are about to resume in Baghdad may jeopardize their success. At a meeting with former French PM Michel Rocard, who visited Tehran this week, Jalili said that the age of the anti-Iranian “pressure strategy” is over. According to Jalili, Iran has adopted a reasonable approach towards the talks and it now expects Western countries to take measures to gain the trust of the Iranian people (Mehr, May 13).

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast also called on Western countries to adopt a positive approach towards Iran in the coming talks. Speaking at his weekly press conference, Mehmanparast said that the policy of pressure will not achieve the desired results, and that if the West shows willingness to cooperate with Iran, it will be reciprocated in kind, which will benefit both sides (Fars, May 14). Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a member of the Majles National Security and Foreign Policy, also took a tough stance towards the West, warning that any attempt by the West to suspend the enrichment of uranium will derail the negotiations (Fars, May 12).

The resolute stance taken by Iran could also be seen in editorials published by the conservative press this week. Yadollah Javani, the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ Political Department, said in an article published in the daily Javan that it is the West that has to use the talks to find a way out of the dead-end situation it has found itself in. The talks in Baghdad are highly significant, Javani argued, since they will tell if the change that could be seen in the Western stance during the Istanbul talks is fundamental or tactical.

The recent remarks and conduct of American and European officials towards Iran are proof that the West persists with its past policy, Javani said. The pressure exerted by the United States on various countries not to purchase Iranian oil, the statement made by the German foreign minister that the Iranian nuclear program is a “big threat”, and the visit of E.U. Foreign Affairs Representative Catherine Ashton to Israel add further weight to concerns that the West still considers the negotiations a means to exert pressure on Iran.

The ones who need to seize the new opportunity to promote talks between Iran and the Group of 5+1 are Western countries. The West’s decade-long efforts to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear country have failed. Iran has now mastered the nuclear fuel cycle, and its regional and international status is stronger than ever. According to Javani, Western countries keep ignoring the changing reality. Thanks to the Islamic revolution and the impact of such factors as the nuclear progress, the Islamic awakening, and the crisis in the West, the Iranian people have been transformed and are now more confident than ever in their ability to overcome the difficulties, the threats, and the sanctions. As far as Iran is concerned, it is the West that is facing a dead end and has to use the opportunity presented by the Baghdad talks to adopt a more realistic stance towards Iran. The talks may provide an opportunity for Western countries to make up for their past mistakes, open up a path for dialogue and cooperation with Iran, and offer them a way out of the dead end they are currently facing (Javan, May 13).

The daily Resalat demanded that Western countries change their stance towards Iran and questioned their intentions. Starting in 2003, the West adopted an aggressive stance towards Iran and rejected the trust-building measures it took, said an article titled “Realistic look at the Baghdad talks”. In the Istanbul talks, Western representatives recognized Iran’s rights and agreed to hold the negotiations under the NPT. However, the statements made by some Western leaders are proof that their promises are not to be trusted. Iran has proven its good faith with the fatwa issued by the Supreme Leader banning the use of nuclear weapons, and with its non-use of chemical weapons against Iraq during the war between the two countries. It is now up to Western countries to take trust-building measures towards Iran and stop the sanctions and the threats. According to Resalat, the Iranian public is not concerned that the Baghdad talks will fail, having already gotten used to the West’s conduct towards its country (Resalat, May 14).

The reports published this week about military nuclear activity taking place in the Parchin facility were portrayed in Iran as further evidence of Western attempts to step up pressure on the Iranian negotiators as the nuclear talks are about to resume.

The Tabnak website argued that these claims have been heard for the past nine years, and that two visits held by IAEA inspectors to Parchin produced no evidence of nuclear activity. Reports on activity on that base tend to resurface before talks between Iran and Western representatives or IAEA meetings about the Iranian nuclear program. They are intended solely as an excuse to exert pressure on Iran (Tabnak, May 14).

In an interview given to the Fararu website, the political commentator Hassan Beheshtipour also said that the reports about nuclear activity in Parchin are nothing new, and are an extension of the psychological and propaganda campaign waged by Western media against Iran in an attempt to influence the results of the negotiations. These are old reports already published and rejected by Iran. He noted that Iran has already allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the facility, and that there is no reason it would agree to expose a sensitive military installation to the inspectors—who have already proven themselves unable to maintain secrecy—just to demonstrate its good intentions (Fararu, May 14).

From the memoirs of former chief nuclear negotiator: Hassan Rouhani exposes new details on Iran’s nuclear policy

Dr. Hassan Rouhani, the Supreme National Security Council chairman under presidents Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and chief nuclear negotiator in the first half of the previous decade, has recently published a new book titled National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy.

In an in-depth interview given to the Mehrnameh periodical to mark the publication of the book, he addressed a number of issues pertaining to Iran’s foreign policy and nuclear strategy over the last decade.

Speaking about Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s fatwa banning the development and use of nuclear weapons, Rouhani noted that the ban was first brought up by Khamenei during a Friday prayer he gave in Tehran University in early November 2004, on the eve of the Paris talks between Iran and European countries. During the talks, Rouhani said, the fatwa was presented to the Europeans as proof that Iran had no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Rouhani told the Europeans that the fatwa was more important for Iran than the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. According to Rouhani, the Europeans understood the implications of the fatwa and even suggested making it part of Iranian law, an initiative which did not come to fruition.

Rouhani argued that the main reason for the failure of the talks held by Iran with European representatives in the mid-2000s was the position taken by the United States, which sought to undermine the negotiations. The Europeans themselves admitted, Rouhani said, that the Americans did not let them achieve an understanding with the Iranians. He said that in 2006, having left his position as chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, he traveled to Berlin to meet Germany’s former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who told him that even though an agreement with the Iranians could have been reached, the Americans prevented it by putting pressure on the European countries that conducted the negotiations.

Rouhani noted in the interview that he was in favor of bringing the Americans into the nuclear talks. He said that he likened negotiating with the Americans to driving a Mercedes Benz, compared to negotiating with European countries, which is like driving a Paykan (an Iranian-made car), or negotiating with the Non-Aligned Movement, which is similar to driving a bicycle.

Rouhani told Mehrnameh that in 2004 he got a call from IAEA Director General Mohammad ElBaradei in Washington, who urgently requested a personal meeting in Tehran. During their conversation, ElBaradei brought Rouhani up to date about his conversation with U.S. President George Bush. ElBaradei had told Bush that the Americans needed to join the nuclear talks to solve the issue. Bush told him that all problems pertaining to Iran’s relations with the West had to be solved, not just the nuclear issue, and expressed his willingness to personally negotiate with Iran. The IAEA director general told Rouhani that it was an opportunity, and that Iran needed to appoint someone to negotiate with the United States. However, the Tehran regime made a decision not to negotiate. In Rouhani’s view, the Americans didn’t want the Europeans to solve the all-important nuclear issue on their own, and therefore worked to derail the negotiations between Iran and European representatives.

Rouhani then proceeded to discuss the Iran-Saudi Arabia relations and the stance taken by Arab countries on the nuclear talks. He noted that all members of the Iranian leadership fully agreed that Iran needs good relations with Saudi Arabia. In 1998 Rouhani went to Riyadh for the first time and reached an agreement with the Saudis. He went to Saudi Arabia for the second time in 2005 and reached an agreement on the establishment of four joint Iranian-Saudi Arab committees. When he vacated his position in the Supreme National Security Council, the contacts with Saudi Arabia stopped, Rouhani said, and in the end no committee was established. He noted that the Arabs attempted to sabotage the negotiations between Iran and the West since they wanted to maintain a balance between Iran and the Arab world. After the Iraqi regime and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan were toppled, Iran’s position grew stronger, much to the displeasure of the Arabs. They therefore tried to step up pressure on Iran over the nuclear issue.

Rouhani also discussed a decision made during the Ahmadinejad administration to bring more countries into the nuclear talks, particularly Russia, China, Turkey, and Brazil. He said that he was not in favor of bringing Russia and China into the negotiations, since the Russians, too, wouldn’t want to see Iran having its own nuclear fuel cycle. He didn’t believe that the nuclear problem could be solved with China and Russia’s help. The option of addressing Russia or China was never discussed by the Supreme National Security Council, Rouhani said, adding that the first time he heard about it was in a TV interview given by Ali Larijani, who succeeded him as chairman of the council. As for bringing Turkey and Brazil into the negotiations, Rouhani noted that he does not believe that Turkey can play a major role in the nuclear issue, and that Turkey’s involvement is a sensitive issue due to the fact of its being Iran’s neighbor and the need for a balance of power between the two countries. Brazil and South Africa, on the other hand, can actually help advance the negotiations.

Speaking about Iran’s relations with France, Rouhani said that, during Jacques Chirac’s presidency, France was looking to establish strategic ties with Iran. While Britain and Germany were saying that they were only interested in good relations with Iran, France wished to achieve higher-level relations due to the significance it places on the Persian Gulf and in view of Iran’s influence on developments in Syria and Lebanon, countries that are of particular importance for France. He related how the French had thanked Iran after Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah prevented his supporters from shouting slogans against France during a speech he gave at a major conference in Lebanon.

Rouhani discussed the 2005 launch of the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan and its impact on the nuclear negotiations. He noted that Iran warned the Europeans in advance about its intent to launch the facility, and was surprised by the West’s strong reaction when the launch finally took place.

According to Rouhani, Gholam-Reza Aqazadeh, the former chairman of Iran’s Nuclear Energy Organization, had reservations about the Paris agreement signed between Iran and the West, and voiced his reservations to the Supreme Leader. Rouhani noted that it was natural for the Nuclear Energy Organization to take that position, as it sought to make progress with the nuclear program and didn’t want to see it halted for any reason. The organization leaders wished to prove that the nuclear scientists could move ahead with the program, since there were many, including university physics experts, who claimed that the program was unfeasible.

The Iranians were surprised when the nuclear dossier was referred to the Security Council after the launch of the Esfahan facility, Rouhani said. He noted that he doesn’t know what would have happened if Iran had believed that the issue would be referred to the Security Council, arguing, however, that top officials were in agreement that the activity in Esfahan and Natanz would have to be resumed eventually.

Speaking about the government’s involvement in setting the nuclear strategy, Rouhani said that the government does not shape the overall nuclear policy and that there are principles decided above the government level. The government, however, has an important role in managing the nuclear policy, and a change of government may lead to a change in strategy, not only in tactics. He argued that while there were no considerable differences between the Khatami and Rafsanjani administrations, Ahmadinejad’s government pursued a much different course. Rouhani stressed, however, that the decision to launch the Esfahan facility was made at the end of the Khatami administration. The first time that the Supreme Leader issued an instruction to launch the conversion facility in Esfahan was on April 26, 2005, according to Rouhani. The decision remained even after Rouhani explained to Khamenei its domestic and foreign implications. After the decision was made, Rouhani informed the Europeans in London, and they expressed no actual objections to the launch of the facility. Britain’s then Foreign Minister Jack Straw traveled to Washington to get the Americans to agree to an arrangement with the Iranians. The Americans claimed that there was no point in reaching an agreement with the outgoing Iranian government and wanted to wait and see which president would be elected next.

At the end of the interview Rouhani also discussed the domestic differences of opinion on the nuclear issue. He claimed that the first to visit the nuclear facilities was former prime minister and current opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a fact that reflects the existing consensus in Iran on the nuclear program. He said that even if another president is elected, Iran’s position on nuclear technology will not change. Domestic differences of opinion arise only over the desired pace of progress.

He stressed the need for coordination between the nuclear negotiating teams and the government. While it is the Supreme Leader who makes the decisions, the negotiating team needs to be in sync with the government, since the government has an important role in formulating foreign policy and the negotiations have repercussions the government has to deal with. That is the reason why, as soon as the most minor differences of opinion emerged between Ahmadinejad and Larijani, Larijani had to step down even though it was Ahmadinejad who had appointed him. Rouhani said that, after the 2005 elections, he asked the Supreme Leader for permission to resign his position as chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, claiming that the position required him to have complete mutual trust with the president, the kind of trust he had had with Rafsanjani and Khatami. Rouhani told Khamenei that, since he didn’t know President Ahmadinejad and the president didn’t know him, he could not retain his post, and the Supreme Leader accepted his argument (Supreme National Security Council Research Center website, www.csr.ir/Center.aspx?lng=fa&subid=-1&cntid=2497, May 7).

In addition to the interview, last weekend the daily Tehran Emrouz published an excerpt from Rouhani’s book about his first meeting with Ahmadinejad shortly after the latter became president in 2005. Rouhani said that, two days before the IAEA Board of Governors meeting scheduled for August 9, 2005, Ahmadinejad summoned him and inquired about the reason for the special Board of Governors meeting. Rouhani replied that the board was going to discuss the launch of the facility in Esfahan. Ahmadinejad said that the IAEA had no right to discuss the issue, and instructed Rouhani to bring it up in a conversation with IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei. Rouhani told the president that ElBaradei did not decide upon every issue pertaining to the IAEA, and that the Board of Governors of the agency consisted of ambassadors from 35 countries whose decision was based on the director general’s report.

Having discussed the Western influence on the IAEA, the president asked Rouhani about its cause. Rouhani answered by saying that it had to do with the fact that most of the IAEA’s budget came from Western countries. In response, Ahmadinejad instructed him to call ElBaradei and say that from now on Iran will cover the entire budget of the agency. Rouhani said that this was impossible since the IAEA followed certain rules and would not agree to such a proposal, and because it would require the approval of the Majles.

This response angered the president, who said that this was none of Rouhani’s concern. Rouhani refused to comply with the president’s instructions and told him to speak to ElBaradei himself if that’s what he had in mind. He asked the president whether he had called him to hear his advice or to give his own advice on the nuclear issue. He told Ahmadinejad that, if he wanted to issue instructions without consulting him first, he had better appoint a new chairman for the Supreme National Security Council. At the end of the meeting, Rouhani informed Ali Larijani that he had better start preparing for his new position as secretary (Tehran Emrouz, May 10).

Persian Gulf tensions escalate: Iran reacts strongly to Saudi Arabia-Bahrain union initiative

The initiative to establish a new political union between Persian Gulf countries, primarily Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, drew strong reactions from Iran this week. On Monday, May 14, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders convened in Riyadh to discuss a schedule for the establishment of the new political bloc.

In response to the initiative, Majles members released a special announcement strongly condemning the plan. Signed by 190 Majles members, the announcement said that the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain should know that their plan will bring the Bahrainis closer together against the forces of occupation in their country and lead to the spread of the popular uprising from Bahrain to Saudi Arabia. According to the Majles members, the plan will destabilize the region and exacerbate existing problems. They expressed their support for the 15-month-long uprising of the Bahraini people and for maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of their country (Fars, May 14).

Majles Speaker Ali Larijani said during a Majles meeting that Saudi Arabia will have a hard time swallowing Bahrain, and that the conduct of the two countries will have a negative impact on both. Majles member Hossein-Ali Shahriari mentioned during the meeting that Bahrain was considered Iran’s 14th province until 1961, at which point it became an independent country because of “the Shah’s treason”. If there’s any country Bahrain needs to form a union with, the Majles member said, it’s Iran, not Saudi Arabia (Mehr, May 14).

Media in Iran also harshly criticized the Saudi Arabia-Bahrain union plan and extensively reported on opposition to the plan among the people of Bahrain, saying it is a threat to that country’s independence and sovereignty. The Tabnak website argued that Saudi Arabia has been seeking to swallow Bahrain for years, and warned that Iran, which never got involved in developments in Bahrain and was content with “morally supporting” the Shi’ite uprising there, will not be able to allow the Saudis to change the regional status quo. The union plan, formulated with the approval of the United States and Britain, is a threat to Iran’s national security, Tabnak said, and Iran will not be able to remain silent. Experience shows, according to the website, that the only language the Arabs understand is the language of power (Tabnak, May 14).

The daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami also strongly condemned the union plan, saying that it is a dangerous conspiracy to save the rulers of Bahrain from the popular uprising of their people. An editorial titled “The octopus attempts to swallow Bahrain” said that there is no doubt that the Saudi conspiracy will be met with considerable resistance, both from other Persian Gulf states concerned about being swallowed up by Saudi Arabia and by the people of Bahrain. The plan has no legal foundation and its only objective is to guarantee the survival of the rulers of Bahrain. The daily estimated that the union attempts between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain will make Bahrainis more determined to topple the Al Khalifa family. Not only will the Saudi plan prove unable to prevent the fall of Bahrain’s tyrannical regime, it will lead to the spread of the popular uprising to Saudi Arabia and exacerbate the woes of the Saudi regime (Jomhuri-ye Eslami, May 14).

Iranhas historical territorial claims on Bahrain, and has insisted on its sovereignty over that territory ever since the islands of Bahrain were under Persian rule (1602-1782). When in 1968 Britain announced its plan to withdraw its forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971, Iran renewed its push for sovereignty over Bahrain. After a U.N.-sponsored referendum held in 1970, in which most Bahrainis decided in favor of independence, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi dropped the issue but continued opposing the establishment of American military bases on Bahraini soil. After the Islamic revolution the Iranian authorities once again brought up their claims and resumed their subversive activity in Bahrain, taking advantage of the fact that most of the island’s population is Shi’ite Muslim. A considerable improvement in the relations between the two countries took place during the administration of President Mohammad Khatami, who in 2003 became the first Iranian president to come on an official visit to Bahrain.

And yet, Iran’s claim to its Arab neighbor keeps surfacing every once in a while in public statements made by Iranian officials. In the summer of 2007 Keyhan’s editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari provoked a serious crisis in the relations between the two countries by claiming that Bahrain was an Iranian province separated from Iran by an illegal agreement signed between the Shah and the governments of the United States and Britain, and that Bahrainis, too, wished to be reintegrated into Iran. A similar statement was made in 2009 by Ali-Akbar Nateq Nouri, the Supreme Leader’s advisor, who referred to Bahrain as Iran’s 14th province. The popular riots that broke out in Bahrain in February 2011 once again widened the rift between Iran and Arab Persian Gulf countries, which accused Iran of meddling in Bahrain’s Shi’ite uprising.

Salman Rushdie affair, 2012 version: Shahin Najafi and the song that angered Shi’ite clerics

The life of Shahin Najafi, an Iranian artist, singer, and rapper who lives in Germany for the past several years, is under threat after a controversial song he released recently has sparked demands for his execution in Iran.

The song Naghi, released on YouTube, deals with a variety of social and political problems facing Iran, including the economic sanctions, corruption, political suppression, and the powerlessness of the Iranian opposition. In the song, Najafi calls on the Tenth Imam, Ali al-Hadi (also referred to as Ali al-Naghi) to reappear and solve these problems instead of the Twelfth Imam—the Vanished Imam. According to religious circles in Iran, the song is an offense to the Tenth Imam, considered in Shi’ite tradition to be the grandfather of the Twelfth Imam. The image that appears in the YouTube video of the song also provoked anger from the clerics. It features a mosque resembling the tomb of Reza, the Eighth Imam, in the city of Mashhad, with its dome shaped like a female breast and the rainbow flag flying on top.

The inspiration for Najafi’s new song was apparently a satirical Facebook page created in May 2011, titled “The campaign for the commemoration of Imam al-Naghi for Shi’ites” (http://www.facebook.com/Emam.Naghi). The page, which currently has over 17,000 “likes”, satirizes and criticizes Shi’ite beliefs, particularly those pertaining to Shi’ite imams.

When asked to comment on the status of those who offend the imam in Islamic religious law, the two top clerics Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani and Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi ruled recently that anyone who offends Shi’ite imams is an infidel (Fars, May 9; May 13).

Fars News Agency reported that the release of Najafi’s new song sparked a public online campaign for his execution. Those behind the campaign have called on all Shi’ites and Muslims to track down Najafi, execute him, and “send him to hell” under clause 513 of Iran’s criminal code, which calls for execution for anyone who offends the sanctity of Islam and the prophets, Shi’ite imams, and Prophet Muhammad’s daughter (Fars, May 9). The Shi’a Online website also demanded that the singer be executed for blasphemy and even offered a $100,000 reward for his killing. The website reported that the reward will be sponsored by a wealthy individual from one of the Persian Gulf states (Shi’a Online, May 10). The campaign surrounding Najafi’s song also expanded into Facebook. A number of Facebook pages created during the week call for his elimination, while Najafi’s own Facebook page was bombarded with comments from well-wishers and haters alike.

In an interview given to BBC Persian following the controversy sparked by his song, the singer said that he had no intention of offending the Shi’ite imams. He added, though, that as an artist he is not particularly concerned with the meaning that emerges from his musical creations. Najafi, born in 1980, moved to Germany in 2005 due to restrictions imposed by the Iranian authorities on his musical activity. He writes and performs songs touching upon a variety of political and social issues. In 2009 he released the single Neda to commemorate Neda Agha Soltan, who died in the riots that broke out after the last presidential elections.

New restrictions on use of foreign email servers

Last week Telecommunications Minister Reza Taqipour issued a series of instructions imposing new restrictions on the use of foreign email servers, including Yahoo, Hotmail, Gmail, and MSN. A letter sent by the minister to Mahmoud Bahmani, the governor of Iran’s Central Bank, instructed the governor to prohibit all commercial banks in Iran from sending emails to addresses linked to foreign email servers or receiving emails sent from such addresses.

Similar instructions were sent to insurance companies, cellular telephone operators, universities, and other government companies. A letter sent by the telecommunications minister to Mohammad Karampour, the head of the Radio Communications and Regulations Organization, said that the instructions apply to all government ministries, universities, and government companies. In his letter the minister noted that public email is used to send information out of the country, which is why the use of foreign email servers has to be banned. According to the minister’s instructions, government institutions will be able to send and receive email only to and from domains featured on a list of Iranian-based email service providers. Under the new instructions, customers of banks, cellular telephone operators, and so forth will not be able to receive their bills or contact these institutions by email unless they open a new email address on a domestic email server (http://www.irwebnews.com/foreign-email-use-prohibited-in-bank.html, May 10).

In addition, the telecommunications minister instructed all government ministries and government organizations to only use websites in the .ir top-level domain. A message sent to all government apparatuses said that the use of the Iranian extension is now obligatory for all government institutions. Government ministries and their affiliated independent organizations will be required to use the gov.ir extension, non-government organizations and institutions such as municipalities and trade unions will be required to use the org.ir extension, universities and higher education institutions will use ac.ir, and schools will use sch.ir (Fars, May 8).

Mehr News Agency reported this week (May 13) that 20,000 Iranians have so far joined Chapar, an Iranian-based email service provider. It was recently recognized by the Information Technology Organization as one of the providers whose email services can be used. Following the ban on the use of foreign email service providers, the organization announced that the email services offered by the following websites are permitted: http://mail.iran.ir/Mail, http://mail.post.ir, and https://www.chmail.ir.

The minister’s instructions, which make it highly difficult for Iranians to interact with government institutions and organizations, have already drawn strong criticism. Ali Motahari, chairman of the Majles Telecommunications Committee, said this week that the minister’s instructions prohibiting the use of foreign email servers are illegal, and that his instructions requiring the use of the .ir top-level domain can be considered as mere recommendation. The only ones qualified to issue such instructions are the Supreme Cyber Council and the Majles, he said (ILNA, May 12).

Some media also criticized the instructions issued by the telecommunications minister. The Khabar Online website had reservations about the instructions, saying that they negatively impact customers of banks and other government services. Even though Iranians haven’t actually been obliged to use Iranian-based email services, the website said, that’s just what the Telecommunications Ministry’s instructions mean, since people will be forced to connect to domestic email servers to contact banks and other government institutions (Khabar Online, May 10).

The reformist daily Shargh also argued that the instructions issued by the telecommunications minister are inappropriate. An editorial published by the daily said that the Telecommunications Ministry has yet to define the meaning of “national email”, mobilize the private sector for supporting the efforts to establish a domestic email network, get the public to trust domestic email services, and inform the public about these services.

The interest to safeguard the information of customers of banks, insurance companies, and other government companies is perfectly obvious, the article said, but the people need encouragement to move to domestic email services before releasing instructions banning the use of foreign email servers. Instead of banning such servers, the government needs to apply gradual measures to ease the transition to domestic email services, encourage the public to connect to government services through domestic servers, provide the appropriate technological infrastructure, and take all the necessary measures, which include licensing, creating a support company, acquiring international certificates, and carrying out testing. Only then will it be reasonable to publish instructions banning foreign email servers (Shargh, May 10).

The new instructions intended to encourage Iranians to open domestic email accounts are part of the national effort to promote an internal national internet network and separate email services. The establishment of a separate national network is considered one of the government projects designed to provide the regime with a greater ability to control and monitor internet traffic. In addition, in the past two years Telecommunications Ministry officials have announced that the authorities intend to launch separate email services as well as a national search engine to function as a substitute for its international counterparts.

This February the Iranian authorities blocked access to Google and Yahoo, including their email services. In recent months Iranian top officials have repeatedly stressed that these services are used by the enemies of Iran to gather information on happenings in the country.

Full document in PDF format

Latin America as a Terrorist, Subversive, Criminal Arena for Iran and Hezbollah *

Published: 18/04/2012

Ahmadinejad visits Venezuela in January 2012, seen here in the company of the Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez

The presidents of Venezuela and Iran, Hugo Chávez and Ahmadinejad, meet in Caracas

''Get out,'' graffiti on the wall of a synagogue in Caracas, Venezuela's capital

HispanTV, Iran's Spanish-language TV station

Full document in PDF format

Overview

Background Information

1. Since Ahmadinejad was elected president in August 2005, Iran has extended and solidified its relations with several Latin American countries, especially Venezuela and Bolivia, and increased its efforts to obtain a political foothold in the others. According to findings brought before the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Iran has significantly increased its diplomatic representation in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil. It was also reported that since 2005 Iran has increased the number of its embassies in Latin America from five to 11, and set up 17 "cultural centers" as well.[2]

2. The common factors in the increasingly close relations between Iran and some of the Latin American countries are their anti-American ideologies and policies, and their desire to present a revolutionary alternative to what they perceive as American imperialism. Iran exploits those relations to strengthen its foothold in Latin America (also employing Hezbollah), to establish a presence and gain political, economic, cultural and religious influence. As in other areas of the world, in Latin America Iran employs terrorism and subversion, and works to instill radical Shi'ite Islamic ideology into the local Muslim communities.

The presidents of Venezuela and Iran, Hugo Chávez and Ahmadinejad, meet in Caracas
(Press TV, January 9, 2012)

3. Iran's increased activity in Latin America is part of its global strategy, whose objectives go far beyond the desire for hegemony in the Middle East. Iran regards itself as hemmed in by the United States and its allies, stubbornly pursues the nuclear crisis with the West, andseeks to present the United States with a revolutionary challenge in its own backyard by exploiting its relative advantages with countries and populaces in Latin American: Iran's anti-American ideology and rhetoric fall on willing ears; Iranian petrodollars, which can be used for political and propaganda purposes; and a Muslim large population, some of it Lebanese, living in key Latin American countries.

4. Iran's interests and objectives in Latin America are the following:

1) Politics and strategy: Iran has found ideological-political sympathy in a number of Latin American countries, which may enable it to escape from its increasing political isolation and strengthen the so-called "resistance camp" it leads (including Syria, Hezbollah, and Palestinian terrorist organizations). Iran also regards Latin America as good area for defiance and also for challenging the United States in various ways: increased political and military collaboration, economic infiltration and extensive activities to disseminate Shi'ite Islam and eventually export the Islamic revolution to Latin America.

2) Economics: Iran focuses on economic relations with Latin American countries regarding energy and oil, and strives to increase them to help it circumvent the sanctions which have been imposed on it. Thus Iran's relations with Venezuela enable it to coordinate prices with a large oil exporter like itself (Iran and Venezuela are respectively the fourth and fifth largest oil exporters in the world). In addition, Iran wants to exploit uranium deposits in Venezuela and other Latin American countries (in 2009 Venezuela publicly stated that Iran was helping it explore for uranium.) However, Iranian-Latin American economic collaboration is still limited and a relatively small factor in Iran's overall trade.

3) Harming Israel's political relations with Latin America countries: One example was the terminating of Israeli-Venezuelan and Israeli-Bolivian relations during Operation Cast Lead. In addition, Iran's close relations with Venezuela and other countries creates an internal political atmosphere and even infrastructure (encouraged by Iranian propaganda) to harm the Jewish communities in those countries (where, as in other parts of the world, often no distinction is made between anti-Israel policy and harming and Jewish communities).

"Get out," graffiti on the wall of a synagogue in Caracas, Venezuela's capital
(Photo by Carlos Garcia Rawlins for Reuters, January 31, 2009).

4) Constructing secret intelligence and terrorist networks: Those networks give Iran operational-terrorist options, using the Quds Force and other bodies, to launch terrorist activities against Israel and the United States, both routinely and as the order of the day. Iran exploits the subversive and terrorist capabilities of Hezbollah, which undertakes extensive activity in Latin America and has increased its presence there while engaging in drug-trafficking and other crimes.

Limitations of Iran's Political Power in Latin America

5. Ahmadinejad's last visit to Venezuela (January 9, 2012) and other Latin American countries (Nicaragua, Cuba and Ecuador) illustratedthe gap between Iranian aspirations in Latin America and the limitations of its political power. He visited in view of the increasing tension between Tehran and the West and Iran's growing international isolation. One of the visit's objectives was to demonstrate Tehran's ability to advance its relations with countries beyond the borders of the Middle East and in a region considered America's backyard, and show it could defy, and perhaps even threaten, the United States. However, in reality, Ahmadinejad and the Latin American countries did not sign new agreements, and his visit was accompanied by broad criticism from local media for Iran's not having honored previous economic commitments.

6. The considerable efforts made by Iran to strengthen its ties with additional important Latin American countries, beyond those where it has gained a foothold thanks to its relations with Venezuela, were unsuccessful. For example, Iran's relations with Argentina, virtually destroyed after the two terrorist attacks on the Israeli embassy and the AMIA Jewish community center in the early 1990s, have never been repaired (the attacks are still a cause of tension in the Argentinean arena). In May 2011, Bolivia forced Vahidi, Iran's minister of defense, to cut short a state visit following political pressure from Argentina. Brazil has distanced itself from Iran since Dilma Rousseff was elected president, and Iran's relations with Colombia and Mexico are strained (both of which accuse Iran of promoting drug-trafficking and terrorism within their borders). In addition, Iran's broad activity in Latin America has so far not significantly damaged Israeli-Latin American relations (with the exception of Venezuela).

Iranian-Venezuelan Relations

7. Since Ahmadinejad was elected president in August 2005, Iran had strengthened its relations with revolutionary Latin American countries which defy the United States and object to its regional influence. Ahmadinejad's vision, ambitious as it is, to lead the world camp opposing American hegemony and create a new (Islamic) world order, and his determination to export the ideology of the Islamic Revolution, found a willing disciple in the form of Hugo Chávez, Venezuela's president. The Iranian strategy was also integrated into political, societal and economic changes both in Venezuela and in other countries. Chávez, whose policies are defiantly anti-American, succeeded in marketing Iran to other Latin American countries, among them Nicaragua, Ecuador and Cuba.

8. In recent years political and economic cooperation between Venezuela and Iran has increased significantly. They signed many agreements regarding their economies, banks, oil and natural gas. Military relations were strengthened following a visit to Caracas (April 30, 2009) by Iran's minister of defense, Mostafa Muhammad Najjar, who headed a military delegation. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding intended tostrengthen joint military collaboration.

9. Political and economic collaboration between the two countries were manifested in two specific fields:

1) Exploring for and mining uranium: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace issued a report in December 2008 about possible Iranian-Venezuelan collaboration in mining Venezuelan uranium. According to the report, Venezuela is estimated to have 50,000 tons of unmined uranium and might mine it for Iran.[3] According to an article in The Guardian, Iran was helping Venezuela look for uranium using geophysical flights and geochemical deposit analysis. The article stated that uranium had been found in western Venezuela and the southeastern Bolivar state.[4]

2) Banking and financial services: In 2009 it was reported that Iranians had opened an international development bank in Venezuela called the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo. It is an independent subsidiary of Iran's Export Development Bank. In 2008 the United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions of both banks for having provided or attempted to provide financial services to the Iranian ministry of defense and Armed Force Logistics, both Iranian entities which promote Iran's nuclear program.[5]

10. Roger Noriega, formerly a diplomat with the American State Department and today a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), said in testimony before the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 2012 that Iran had provided Venezuela with weapons systems. He said the systems gave Hugo Chávez, Venezuela's president, unprecedentedcapabilities to threaten Venezuela's neighbors, and indirectly to threaten the United States[6] (See below for further details about Noriega's testimony).

The Iranian Battle for Hearts and Minds

11. Several million Arabs and Muslims live in Latin America, most of them Sunnis (with a Lebanese Shi'ite minority), and are the principle objective of Iran's propaganda activities. Two main communities exist: one whose roots are in India, Indonesia and Pakistan, and the other, mainly Arabs from Syria and Lebanon, descendents of immigrants who moved to Latin America in the 19^th and 20^th centuries. While the percentages of the Arab-Muslim populations in each country are not statistically significant, their socio-economic status is relatively high.

12. The two largest Arab-Muslim communities in Latin America are in Brazil and Argentina. There are about a million to a million and a half Muslims in Brazil, including about 10,000 Brazilians to converted to Islam (less than 1% of the entire population). About 700,000 Muslims live in Argentina (about 2% of the population), most of them descendents of immigrants from Syria and Lebanon.[7] Large concentrations of Muslims can also be found in Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico and the Caribbean Islands.

13.The spread of Muslims throughout Latin America, especially Shi'ite Muslims originating in Lebanon, are a convenient environment for Iran and Hezbollah for establishing subversive, terrorist and occasionally criminal networks. Iran also conducts extensive ideological, religious, cultural and social activities within the Muslim communities to disseminate Khomeini's radical Shi'ite Islam. The activities are often interrelated, as will be discussed below.

14. Iran's intensive efforts to export the Islamic Revolution to Latin America take many forms: financing the construction of mosques and cultural and religious centers; translating books and ideological and religious material into Spanish and distributing them throughout Latin America; providing local residents with religious-political training in Iran, who then return to their own countries imbued with radical Islam and anti-American, anti-Israeli ideology; sending Iranian clerics to preach and spread Khomeini's ideology in Latin America; and establishing a Spanish TV station which broadcasts 24/7 (HispanTV, which began broadcasting onFebruary 1, 2012);[8] and providing assistance in establishing Spanish-language Internet sites.

HispanTV, Iran's Spanish-language TV station:
"strengthening relations with Latin America is currently Iran's number one priority."

Subversion and Terrorism

15. In the overall Iranian view, Latin America is a secondary arena. Its principle venues for widespread subversion and terrorism are Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian arena, Central and Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf and Sudan. Nevertheless, Iran and Hezbollah find Latin America attractive for purposes of terrorism, subversion and crime. As elsewhere, in Latin America their activities are led by the Quds Force in collaboration with various other bodies and entities within the Iranian regime.

16. Iranian activity in Latin America, as in other arenas, combines exporting the Islamic Revolution with terrorism and crime, worries Washington and is often represented as a threat – or at least a potential threat – to American interests. However, specialists, officials in the administration and members Congressmen who monitor Iranian and Hezbollah activity in Latin America sometimes differ as to how serious they think the threat and its significance are.

17. In our opinion, there is a methodological difficulty in assessing the nature and seriousness of the Iranian threat because it is not easy to distinguish between Iran's vast subversive activities and those undertaken to export the Islamic Revolution, on the one hand, and its terrorist activities on the other: On the one hand, experience has taught that subversive and propaganda activity (with the addition of criminal activity) prepares the ground for a network of people who are liable, given the right circumstances, to participate in terrorist activity. On the other, Iran's preoccupation with disseminating Shi'ite Islam and exporting the Islamic Revolution to Latin America may not necessarily be translated only into terrorist activity, but has the potential to endanger other American interests in Latin America (such as fostering hatred for the United States and the radicalization of the Latin American Muslim population).

18. On January 5, 2012, the American Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued a study called "Latin America: Terrorism Issues," written by Mark Sullivan, a specialist in Latin American affairs.[8] It quoted the State Department's Country Report on Terrorism (published in August 2011), which stated that "There are no known operationalcells of either Al-Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the [western] hemisphere." However, according to the Report, "ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and moral support to these and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia." (ITIC emphasis)

19. Other Latin American experts in the United States, however, give greater importance to the threats to American interests, including the threat of terrorism, resulting from Iran and Hezbollah's extensive activities in Latin America. One of them is Roger F. Noriega, who testified many times before Congressional committees. He is familiar with Latin American affairs: between 2003 and 2005 he was the American ambassador to the Organization of American States and today is a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and one of a team of experts monitoring Iranian activity in Latin America.

20. On February 16, 2012 a hearing was held by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee to discuss Iran's influence and activity in Latin America. Roger Noriega presented the subcommittee with the results of his team's research, which dealt with threats to the United States caused by Iranian activity in Latin America. "Our exhaustive work," he said, "leads to the following conclusions:"[10]

· "Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chaves and Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are conspiring to wage an asymmetrical struggle against U.S. security and to abet Iran's illicit nuclear program. Their clandestine activities pose a clear and present danger to regional peace and security. (Emphasis in the original throughout)

· "Iran has provided Venezuela conventional weapon systems capable of attacking the United States and our allies in the region.

· "Iran has used 30$ billion in economic ventures in Venezuela as means to launder money and evade international financial sanctions.

· "Since 2005, Iran has found uranium in Venezuela, Ecuador and other countries in the region and is conducting suspicious mining operations in some uranium-rich areas.

· "Two terrorist networks one home-grown Venezuelan clan and another cultivated by Mohsen Rabbani, a notorious agent of the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, proselytize, fund-raise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas.

· "Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networks in South America as a means of raising resources and sharing tactics.

· "The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates regular service from Caracas to Damascus and Teheran – providing Iran, Hezbollah, and associated narco-traffickers a surreptitious means to move personnel, weapons, contraband and other materiel."

21. Iran's activities in Latin America and its readiness to carry out terrorist attacks on American soil (manifested by the attempted assassination in Washington of the Saudi Arabian ambassador) led Roger Noriega to the conclusion that "Tehran's activities near our homeland constitute a very real threat that can no longer be ignored." (ITIC emphasis) Despite with the grave assessments of the Iranian threat as expressed in a number of expert testimoniesbefore Congress, certain members of the American administration are of the opinion thatIran's influence in Latin America is limited and that the United States can minimize it.

Investigating How Iran and Hezbollah Operate in Latin America

22. The following study deals with Iranian and Hezbollah activities in Latin America in three inter-related areas:

1) Section I – Terrorism: Latin America as an arena for iranian-Hezbollah terrorism

2) Section II – Criminal activities: Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in criminal activities which serve as a source of revenue and and also serve their subversive and terrorist activities in Latin America.

3) Section III – Subversion and exporting the Islamic Revolution: Exporting radical Islam and Shi'a, and fostering hatred for the United States and its allies (including Israel) in Latin America as part of Iran's global strategy.

Full document in PDF format

* Follow-up of the ITIC April 19, 2009 study "Iran increases its political and economic presence in Latin America, defying the United States and attempting to undermine American hegemony" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/18291. (The Hebrew version of this study can be found in its entirety on the ITIC website. The full English version will be available shortly.)

^{^[2]}According to Ambassador Roger F. Noriega before the US Senate, February 16, 2012. See below.

^{^[3]}http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/12/18/venezuela-nuclear-profile/2xwc

^{^[4]}http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8725168

^{^[5]}Online.wsj.com, September 8, 2009

^{^[6]}In November 2010 and May 2011 the German daily newspaper Die Welt reported that Venezuela and Iran had signed an agreement for the joint operation of a missile base in Venezuela. In response the American State Department said that it had not evidence to support Die Welt's report.

^{^[7]}Based on Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis C. Connell, [US Air Force] Air University, Cadre Paper No. 21, "Understanding Islam and Its Impact on Latin America," Air University Press, March 2005.

^{^[8]}Mohammad Hosseini, Iran's minister of culture and Islamic guidance, referred to the establishing of HispanTV as a step meant to fill Iran's needs in Latin America. He said that "strengthening relations with Latin America is currently Iran's number one priority...Iran wants to increase its presence in that area of the world" (ilna.ir website).

^{^[9]}http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf.

^{^[10]}http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Roger_Noriega_Testimony1.pdf

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