Tag Archives: Iran

In response to a letter sent by Israel to the UN Security Council Iran denied sending arms to Hezbollah


Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, at a press conference, falsely claiming that Hezbollah produced its own weapons and did not need to get them from Iran (Fars, January 23, 2017).
Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, at a press conference, falsely claiming that Hezbollah produced its own weapons and did not need to get them from Iran (Fars, January 23, 2017).

Overview

1.   On January 23, 2017, during his weekly press conference, Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, was asked to respond to Israeli accusations that Iran was smuggling weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In response he raised false claims, saying Hezbollah did not need Iranian arms because it was self-sufficient when it came to producing all the weapons and equipment it needed. Hezbollah, he added, was a legitimate political organization in Lebanon and an important part of the "resistance," and had financial resources, equipment and weapons, and could provide for its own needs (Fars in English and Persian, January 23, 2017).

2.   Qasemi made the remarks in response to a letter sent by Danny Danon, Israel's ambassador to the UN, to the Security Council, two months earlier.[1] He had alerted the Security Council to the fact that Iran was sending arms and other related material enabling Hezbollah to enlarge its missile arsenal. The weapons and equipment, he said, were packed into suitcases by the Qods Force in Tehran and delivered to Hezbollah operatives on commercial Mahan Air flights to Beirut or Damascus. From there they were transferred overland to Lebanon. The smuggling activities are a serious violation of various UN Security Council resolutions (isicrc.org, January 9, 2017; The Times of Israel and the Facebook page of Danny Danon, November 22, 2016).

3.   The claim made by Bahram Qasemi, that Hezbollah manufactures its own weapons and equipment, has no basis in fact. Hezbollah in Lebanon has neither the technology, the manufacturing capabilities nor the trained manpower necessary to manufacture advanced weaponry of the sort Iran provides. The Iranians have been directly and primarily responsible for the construction of Hezbollah's military power, from the organization's inception in 1982 to the present day. Over the years Iran has continually increased both the quantity and quality of the weapons it supplies directly to Hezbollah(with increased range, precision, strength and destructive impact). The weapons are delivered to Hezbollah by Iran, in instances by air from Iran to Damascus, and from they there are sent overland to Lebanon.[2]

4.   With Iran's massive support, Hezbollah in Lebanon constructed an extensive military-terrorist infrastructure with a large arsenal of rockets, missiles and other advanced weapons. That was clearly revealed by Hossein Salami, deputy commander of the IRGC, in a speech he gave for Jerusalem Day on July 1, 2016. He said that there were more than 100,000 missiles ready to be fired at Israel. He said Lebanon alone had 100,000. In addition, he said, tens of thousands of long-range missiles were aimed at Israel from other locations in the Muslim world. All of them, he claimed, would "remove Israel from the political geography of the world once and for all" (Fars, July 1, 2016).

5.   Bahram Qasemi's claim that Hezbollah had financial resources and could provide for its own needs is patently untrue. His claim directly contradicts a speech made by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on June 24, 2016, where he emphasized that American sanctions would have no effect on Hezbollah because all of its budget came from Iran. To illustrate the claim, in an exceptional statement, he described the financial support Iran gave Hezbollah. He said, "Hezbollah's budget, salaries, money, food, drink and weapons all come from Iran." He reiterated, saying that Hezbollah's entire budget came from Iranand that "as long as Iran has money, [Hezbollah] has money." He claimed that even when sanctions had been imposed on Iran, "the money allotted [from Iran] for Hezbollah continued to reach us."[3] He thanked Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for supporting Hezbollahthroughout the years of its existence, support, he claimed, which continued to the present day.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah speaking on July 24, 2016, claims all Hezbollah's money comes from Iran (al-Ahed, June 24, 2017).
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah speaking on July 24, 2016, claims all Hezbollah's money comes from Iran (al-Ahed, June 24, 2017).

6.   Iran's extensive military support and generous funding for Hezbollah are a fundamental part of Iran's regional strategy. Iran uses arms and money to support its proxies and armed militias in the countries where Iran has important interestsand where there are Shi'ite populations or ethnic groups close to Shi'a and Iran (such as the Alawites in Syria, the Zaydi-Shi'ites in Yemen). Iran puts the strategy into practice in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The IRGC's Qods Force, commanded by Qasem Soleimani, is responsible for distributing support, handling proxies and operating militias in various countries. The Qods Force played a central role in rebuilding Hezbollah's military infrastructure after the Second Lebanon War(2006). That included providing Hezbollah with precise missiles, advanced anti-aircraft systems and Yakhont anti-ship missiles. Hezbollah has an arsenal of more than 100,000 rockets and missiles in Lebanon threatening Israel's military and civilian infrastructureand ready to be used, primarily when the considerations of Iranian strategy deem the time has come.

[1]Iran's immediate response was provided by Gholam-Hossein Dehqani, Iranian ambassador to the UN. He claimed Israel's accusations were "absurd" and baseless, and that Israel was the country involved in terrorism (Press TV, November 23, 2017). However, he did not directly respond to the accusations. Qasemi's remarks were Iran's formal, detailed response to the letter.
[2]Mahan Air is a Iranian commercial airline with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), although theoretically it is privately owned. It has dozens of weekly domestic and foreign flights. In 2011 "the American administration designated Mahan Air according to Executive Order 13224 for providing financial, material and technological support" to the IRGC's Qods Force." (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1322.aspx). Throughout the past year it has flown flights from Iran to Syria through Abadan on the Persian Gulf coast, on which fighters, weapons and equipment for the Syrian regime and its supporters were seen (Defenddemocracy.org, February 3, 2016).
[3]For further information, see the July 10, 2016 bulletin, "Nasrallah's Speech: Hezbollah's Budget Is Entirely Funded by Iran, Including Weapons and Operatives' Salaries Analysis of Significance and Implications," at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/21033

Spotlight on Iran

January 15 - 29, 2017 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
The first international conference for an Iranian-Arab cultural dialogue  (ABNA, January 22, 2017).

The first international conference for an Iranian-Arab cultural dialogue (ABNA, January 22, 2017).

The Iranian delegation at the talks in Astana (Mehr, January 24, 2017).

The Iranian delegation at the talks in Astana (Mehr, January 24, 2017).

 Khamis (left) meets with Rouhani (Tasnim, January 18, 2017).

Khamis (left) meets with Rouhani (Tasnim, January 18, 2017).

Abdollahian (second from left) meets with Nasrallah (Fars, January 24, 2017).

Abdollahian (second from left) meets with Nasrallah (Fars, January 24, 2017).

Boroujerdi (left) meets with al-Jabouri  (Website of the Iranian broadcasting authority, January 15, 2017).

Boroujerdi (left) meets with al-Jabouri (Website of the Iranian broadcasting authority, January 15, 2017).

Abdollahian (left) and Qaddoumi (icana.ir, January 22, 2017)

Abdollahian (left) and Qaddoumi (icana.ir, January 22, 2017)


Main Points
  • The Astana talks on the future of Syria ended on January 24, 2017. Iran, Russia and Turkey agreed to establish a joint mechanism to oversee the Syrian ceasefire. They issued a statement at the end of the talks stressing their countries' commitment to preserving Syria's territorial integrity, continuing the joint struggle against ISIS and the Fateh al-Sham Front, and reinforcing the ceasefire. A delegation headed by Hossein Jaberi Ansari, Iranian deputy foreign minister, and Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, represented Iran at the talks.
  • On the eve of the talks in Astana, Iran, Russia and Turkey carried out intensive consultations. Imad Khamis, the Syrian prime minister, paid a visit to Tehran, and Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, paid a visit to Damascus. In addition, there were telephone consultations between senior Iranian and Russian officials. During Khamis' visit to Tehran, the two countries signed agreements for cooperation in agriculture, energy and communications.
  • A spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry denied claims made at the UN by the Israeli ambassador that Iran was using commercial Mahan Air flights to transfer weapons to Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon. He claimed Hezbollah did not need Iranian arms because it supplied all of its own needs.
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, met in Tehran with a delegation of the Yazidi minority in Iraq. He told them Iran would continue supporting Iraq in the war against ISIS and that Iran was serious about its support of Iraq's territorial integrity.
  • Iran strongly condemned Bahrain's execution of three Shi'ite political prisoners who were convicted in 2015 of attacking its security forces. Interviewed by an Egyptian newspaper, Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, the Bahraini foreign minister, said Iran presented the number one threat to the Gulf countries' security.
  • Hossein Amir Abdollahian, international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament), met in Tehran with Khaled Qaddoumi, Hamas representative in Iran, and assured him that Iran's support for the Palestinians was the focus of Iranian policy.

 

General Information
  • The first international conference for an Iranian-Arab cultural dialogue was held in the Iranian city of Qom on January 22-23, 2017. It was attended by fifteen representatives from Jordan, Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisian and Bahrain. According to Hojjat-ul-Islam Najaf Lakzaei, head of the Research Center for Islamic Sciences and Culture, the conference was held to promote cultural and scientific cooperation between Iran and the Arab world.
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • On January 23-24, 2017, talks about the future of Syria were held in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. A delegation headed by Hossein Jaberi Ansari, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs, represented Iran. Upon arrival in Kazakhstan, Ansari said the talks would be overseen by Iran, Russia and Turkey, and that their objective was to stabilize the ceasefire in Syria and promote serious talks for a political resolution to end the fighting between the Syrian government and the armed groups. He said he hoped the talks in Astana would pave the way for a quick end to the Syrian crisis. He said Iran's position had always been that the crisis had to be resolved by political, not military means, and that Syria's territorial integrity had to be preserved and its national sovereignty had to be honored (Fars, January 21, 2017).
  • After arriving in Astana on January 21, 2017, the Iranian delegation met with the Russian delegation, headed by Alexander Lavrentiev, President Putin's envoy to the Middle East, and with the Turkish delegation headed by the deputy Turkish foreign minister (Fars, January 21, 2017). On January 24, 2017, Iran's Mehr new agency reported that Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, a senior officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), had also been a member of the delegation. He was a senior Iranian advisor to Syria, and in April 2016 was wounded and transferred to Iran for medical treatment.
  • Following the Astana talks, Iran, Russia and Turkey decided to establish a joint mechanism to oversee the ceasefire in Syria. The details will be decided in talks to be held at a later date. After the meeting an announcement was issued stating that Iran, Russia and Turkey stressed their commitment to preserving Syria's territorial integrity, continuing their joint struggle against ISIS and the Fateh al-Sham Front, reinforcing the ceasefire agreement and transferring humanitarian aid to Syria (Fars, January 24, 2017).
  • The hardline daily Kayhan called the talks in Astana "a victory for the resistance axis" both on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena. It was the result of the "liberation of Aleppo" and the failed efforts of the terrorists and their international and regional supporters. According to an editorial published on January 24, 2017, the absence of the United States and the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, from the talks indicated that the countries supporting terrorism were isolated. The talks at Astana, claimed the editorial, proved once again that Iran had a beneficial regional presence.
  • On the eve of the talks in Astana, Iran, Syria and Russia held intensive consultations. On January 16, 2017, Imad Khamis, Syrian prime minister, arrived in Tehran to meet with senior Iranian officials, including Iranian President Rouhani. Rouhani told him that "the liberation of Aleppo and the calling of a ceasefire" were two important steps on the road to bringing peace to Syria. He said the liberation of Aleppo was a message to the world that the citizens of Syria could defend themselves from terrorists, and that groups of terrorists and their supporters would never achieve their goals. He repeated Iran's commitment to continue its support of Syria, saying that if the terrorists and their supporters had won, it would have endangered the entire Middle East.
  • At a joint press conference held after the meeting, Eshaq Jahangiri, first Iranian vice president, said the victories in Syria were won by virtue of the firm stance of the Syrian people and its army, and thanks to Iranian-Syrian cooperation. He said that consultations between Tehran and Damascus had to be increased to preserve the military and political achievements and to rebuild Syria (Fars, January 17, 2017). During the visit five agreements were signed for bilateral cooperation in the fields in agriculture, mining, energy and communications, including a cellphone network Iran would set up in Syria (Tasnim, January 17, 2017).
  • The previous week Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, paid a visit to Damascus (Fars, January 16, 2017). Senior Russian and Iranian officials also consulted by telephone. On January 16, 2017, Shamkhani spoke on the phone to Nikolay Patrushev, the secretary of the Russian security council. They discussed political, security and military developments in Syria after the ceasefire went into effect. In addition, Mohammad Javad Zarif spoke to Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister (Elaph, January 17, 2017).
  • In preparation for the talks in Astana, Iran expressed clear and strong opposition to US participation. Foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated that Iran opposed the presence of the United States at the talks and that no invitation had been sent. Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, also said Iran strongly opposed American participation in the peace talks.
  • After meeting with Syrian prime minister Khamis, Velayati said the talks at Astana had been made possible by the victory of the Syrian government and its supporters. It was likely, he said, that the terrorists and their supporters, especially the United States, having been defeated, would want to exploit the political arena. Shamkhani said the United States would play no role whatsoever in the Astana talks. He said that because of Iran's objections, the Americans had not been sent an invitation to the talks (Tasnim News and ISNA, January 17 and 18, 2017).
  • Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, denied the claims made by Danny Danon, the Israeli ambassador to the UN, that Iran was using commercial Mahan Air flights to send weapons to Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon. Qasemi claimed Hezbollah did not need Iranian arms because it manufactured all the arms and equipment it needed by itself. He said Hezbollah was a legitimate Lebanese political organization which had its own financial resources, equipment and arms, and could supply all its needs alone (Fars, January 23, 2017). During the past year Mahan Air, a private airline based in Tehran which has links to the IRGC, has flown from Iran to Syria hundreds of times, routinely delivering weapons for the Syrian regime and Hezbollah, according to Western intelligence sources.
  • Last week Hossein Amir Abdollahian, international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis, paid a visit to Lebanon and Syria, during which he met with senior Lebanese and Syrian officials, among them Syrian president Assad and Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah. He consulted with them about developments in Syria, Lebanon and the Middle East (Fars, January 24, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq and the Gulf
  • On January 14, 2017, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy, arrived in Baghdad for a two-day visit. While there he met with Salim al-Jabouri, speaker of the Iraqi parliament, to discuss developments in Iraq and the future of the country after the defeat of ISIS. They also discussed increasing bilateral relations and regional cooperation (Mehr, January 15, 2017).
  • At his weekly press conference, Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, said the ministry could not confirm reports that Iran intended to appoint Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, as Iran's new ambassador to Iraq. He said the foreign ministry would announce the name of the new ambassador to Baghdad after his appointment had been confirmed (IRNA, January 23, 2017).
  • On January 24, 2017, Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, met in Tehran with Yazidi-minority members of the Iraqi parliament and cultural figures. He told them that Iran would continue to support Iraq in its war against ISIS and that Iran was serious about its support for preserving Iraq's territorial integrity. The Yazidi delegation requested that Iran use its connections with the various political forces in Iraq to help the Yazidis and hasten the release of Yazidis abducted by ISIS (IRNA, January 24, 2017).
  • According to Majid Samadi, commander of the Iranian border police, during the past ten months 1.2 million Iraqi civilians entered Iran through the border crossings between the two countries. He said more Iraqis had entered Iran than any other group of foreign nationals (ISNA, January 22, 2017).
  • Iran condemned Bahrain's execution of three Shi'ite political prisoners who were convinced in 2015 of attacking Bahraini security forces in 2014. Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, said the trial of the three had been unfair. He said executing them proved again that Bahrain had no interest in a peaceful resolution of the country's crisis. He added that the Bahraini authorities had closed the avenue of dialogue with the opposition by imposing limitations, exerting pressure and suppressing opponents of the regime (IRNA, January 15, 2017). Hossein Amir Abdollahian, international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis, also condemned the executions. He said Iran did not meddle in Bahrain's internal affairs, but supported the legitimate demands of the citizens of Bahrain that were compatible with UN human rights conventions (Mehr, January 15, 2017).
  • Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, the Bahraini foreign minister, said that today the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were facing many complex threats, but Iran was the number one threat to their security. Interviewed by the Egyptian newspaper al-Masri al-Youm, he said the Arab League had established a permanent committee of Bahrain, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia to fight Iran's meddling in the Arab states. He said if Iran did not stop meddling in the countries' internal affairs, the GCC would, with its friends, take collective political, economic, commercial, cultural and media action against it (Asr-e Iran, January 21, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Hossein Amir Abdollahian, international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis, meeting with Khaled Qaddoumi, Hamas representative in Iran, said support for the Palestinians was at the center of Iranian policy and that Iran would continue helping the Palestinian people realize their rights. Abdollahian, who is also secretary general of an international committee to defend Palestine, said Jerusalem was the top priority for Muslims and that Iran was prepared to support a conference of the committee to defend Palestine (Fars, January 22, 2017).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

Spotlight on Iran

January 1 – 15, 2017 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Soleimani with the children of IRGC fighters killed in Syria  (Iranian Telegram channel, January 6, 2017).

Soleimani with the children of IRGC fighters killed in Syria (Iranian Telegram channel, January 6, 2017).

Gholam-Ali Qolizadeh, killed in Syria (qassemsoleimani.ir, January 1, 2017)

Gholam-Ali Qolizadeh, killed in Syria (qassemsoleimani.ir, January 1, 2017)

Javad Torkabadi, the new Iranian ambassador to Syria (Tasnim, March 29, 2014).

Javad Torkabadi, the new Iranian ambassador to Syria (Tasnim, March 29, 2014).

Al-Maliki (left) and Shamkhani (ISNA, January 2, 2017).

Al-Maliki (left) and Shamkhani (ISNA, January 2, 2017).

Majlis committee members meet with President Assad (ISNA, January 4, 2017).

Majlis committee members meet with President Assad (ISNA, January 4, 2017).

Iraj Masjedi, future Iranian ambassador to Baghdad (Asr-e Iran, November 11, 2016)

Iraj Masjedi, future Iranian ambassador to Baghdad (Asr-e Iran, November 11, 2016)


Main Points
  • At a memorial service for Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters killed in Syria, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, said that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had played a central role in the regional victory of the "forces of Islam." Soleimani, who returned to Tehran from a visit to Aleppo after the city fell to the forces of the Syrian regime, attended the funeral held last week for former Iran president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
  • Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, meeting with the families of Iran commandos members killed in Syria, said if Iran had not stopped the advance of the terrorists in Syria, it would have been forced to fight them on its own territory.
  • Gholam-Ali Qolizadeh, a high-ranking IRGC officer, was killed in Syria.
  •  Javad Torkabadi was appointed Iran's new ambassador to Syria. He will replace Mohammad Reza Raouf Sheibani, whose five-year term as ambassador to Syria ended in October.
  •  Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, denied a report about Hezbollah's withdrawal from Syria after the early January ceasefire. He said Iran gave its full and continuing support to the "resistance front."
  •  Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, responded strongly to accusations made by the Turkish foreign minister that the Syrian regime and the Shi'ite militias had violated the ceasefire. He said Turkey should take the necessary measures to restrain armed groups instead of blaming others involved in the conflict.
  •  On January 8, 2017, Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, arrived in Syria to discuss developments and the continuation of Iran-Syrian-Russian security coordination.
  •  At the beginning of January a delegation of representatives from the Majlis (Iranian parliament) committee for foreign policy and national security visited Syria and Lebanon
  •  At the beginning of January Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq's vice president and former prime minister, paid a visit to Tehran where he met with senior Iranian officials, including the supreme leader.
  •  Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, is expected to be appointed as Iran's new ambassador to Iraq.

 

General Information
  • On January 6, 2017, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, attended a memorial service for IRGC fighters killed in Syria. He spoke about recent developments in Syria and the region in general, and said that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had played a central role in the victories of the "forces of Islam." He said the enemy's main weakness was the lack of similar leadership, and wished Khamenei a long life (Nasim Online, January 6, 2017).
  • On January 9, 2017, Soleimani paid a condolence call at the home of the family of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former Iranian president and chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, who died of a heart attack last week. At the funeral Soleimani said Rafsanjani had always opposed "arrogance" [meaning the West] and Zionism (Fars, January 10, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • Gholam-Ali Qolizadeh, a brigadier general in the IRGC, was killed in Syria.
  •  On December 31, 2016, the Mehr news agency reported that Iranian President Rouhani had confirmed the nomination of Javad Torkabadi as Iran's new ambassador to Syria. He had also served as Iranian ambassador to Sudan, Bahrain and Nigeria, and was director-general of North and West African affairs in the foreign ministry. In October 2016, Mohammad Reza Raouf Sheibani's five-year term as ambassador to Damascus ended, and since then the post has been filled by a chargé d'affaires.
  • Meeting with the families of Iranian regular army commandos killed in Syria, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that if Iran had not stopped the progress of "those who wish us evil and plot against us," the agents of the United Statesand Zionism in Syria, Iran would have had to fight them in Tehran, Fars, Khorasan and Isfahan Provinces (Tasnim, January 5, 2017).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, said there was no truth to a report about Hezbollah's withdrawal from Syria after the ceasefire, calling it "enemy propaganda." He said Hezbollah had sacrificed many martyrs in Syria and provided considerable support to the Syria government, which considered the organization and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, as good friends.
  • After meeting in Tehran with former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Velayati said Iran had not retreated from its position on the crisis in Syria and gave its full and continuing support to the "resistance front." Asked about Russia's stance after the fall of Aleppo, and the possibility it ignored Iran's interests, he said the ties between Russia and Iran were both friendly and strategic, and that they coordinated to provide Syria with bilateral support (ISNA, January 3, 2017).
  • Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, responded strongly to remarks made by Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Turkish foreign minister, who accused the Syrian regime and Shi'ite militias of violating the cease fire brokered by Russia and Turkey and which had gone into effect at the beginning of January. Qasemi said Turkey should take the necessary measures to restrain armed groups instead of blaming others involved in the conflict (IRNA, January 4, 2017).
  • On January 8, 2017, Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, arrived in Syria to discuss recent developments and continue Iranian-Syrian-Russian political and security coordination in the wake of the fall of Aleppo to the Syrian regime. Arriving in Damascus, he said the ceasefire had to be preserved and talks had to begin between the Syrian government and the "armed groups." While in Syria he met with President Assad (ISNA, January 8, 2017).
  • On January 3, 2017, delegation of Iranian Majlis members, headed by Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Majlis Committee for national security and foreign policy, arrived in Syria for a visit. While there they met with senior Iranian officials, including President Assad. Assad told them the recent victories against the armed terrorist groups in Syria, especially in Aleppo, were also victories for Iran because they had been made possible through Iranian support (Fars, January 4, 2017). Speaking to correspondents, Boroujerdi said Iran supported Syria with advice at the request of the Syrian government, and did not meddle in Syria's internal affairs. Referring to Turkish involvement, he said that every country that had invaded Syria without coordinating with the government had to withdraw (Fars, January 4, 2017).
  • After the meetings in Damascus, the members of the delegation went to Lebanon where they met with senior Lebanese officials, including Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah. Following the delegation's visit to the grave of Imad Mughnieh, Boroujerdi said Iran was serious about its intentions to arm the Lebanese Army and that whether or not it did depended on the government of Lebanon (Fars, January 6, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • At the beginning of January Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq's vice president and former prime minister, paid a visit to Tehran where he met with senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. At a press conference held in Tehran, al-Maliki, who is considered close to Iran, said he had briefed Khamenei about the current situation in Iraq. He said that Iran was the only country supporting Iraq in its fight against terrorism, and that Iran had given Iraq weapons to deal with ISIS (Mehr, January 2, 2017).
  • After meeting with Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme Council for National Security, al-Maliki said the Shi'ite militias in Iraq were strategically important to preserving Iraq's security and its future. Shamkhani stressed the importance of bilateral political, economic, cultural and security cooperation for the sake of ensuring the security and development of both Iran and Iraq. He accused the United States of interfering with the efforts to liberate Mosul from ISIS and of trying to prolong the military campaign because it did not want the regional security crisis to end (Mehr, January 3; IRNA, January 4, 2017).
  • Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, is expected to be appointed as Iran's new ambassador to Iraq. He will replace Hassan Danaei-far, who will shortly quit the post after holding it for six years (Asr-e Iran, November 11, 2016).
  • Amir-Hossein Zamani-Nia, Iranian deputy minister deputy minister of petroleum for international affairs and commerce, said Iran and Iraq had signed an agreement for the joint development of the Parviz and Khoramshahr oil fields in southern Iran. He also said Iran would be prepared to export natural gas to Iraq as soon as Iraq solved the financial problems still delaying the implementation of the agreement for the transfer of gas from Iran to Iraq, signed in 2013 (Fars, January 10, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Hossein Amir Abdollahian, international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis, who is currently also chairman of the international committee for the protection of Palestine, expressed his condolences on the death of Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, the Syrian priest who in the 1970s smuggled weapons to the PLO and died at the beginning of January; he was 94. Abdollahian praised Capucci's activities for the Palestinians, saying that without a doubt the new wave of regional developments was aimed against the "Zionist regime" and that the Palestinian resistance fighters would liberate Jerusalem from the "claws of the Zionists" (Fars, January 5, 2017).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

Spotlight on Iran

December 18, 2016 – January 1, 2017 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Hossein Salami, deputy IRGC commander (Tasnim, December 25, 2016).

Hossein Salami, deputy IRGC commander (Tasnim, December 25, 2016).

Displaying the Hossein Hamedani stamp (IRNA, December 26, 2016).

Displaying the Hossein Hamedani stamp (IRNA, December 26, 2016).

The foreign ministers of Iran, Russia and Turkey meet in Moscow (Mashreq News, December 20 2016)

The foreign ministers of Iran, Russia and Turkey meet in Moscow (Mashreq News, December 20 2016)

Ali Shamkhani (Fars, December 20, 2016)

Ali Shamkhani (Fars, December 20, 2016)

Jaberi Ansari, deputy foreign minister (Mehr, December 21, 2016).

Jaberi Ansari, deputy foreign minister (Mehr, December 21, 2016).

Qasem Soleimani in Aleppo (Iranian Telegram channel, , December 27, 2016).

Qasem Soleimani in Aleppo (Iranian Telegram channel, , December 27, 2016).

Alaeddin Boroujerdi (right, on sofa) meets with Radwan al-Haimi (icana.ir, December 26, 2016).

Alaeddin Boroujerdi (right, on sofa) meets with Radwan al-Haimi (icana.ir, December 26, 2016).


Main Points
  • Hossein Salami, deputy Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander, said the fall of Aleppo to the forces of the Syrian regime foiled the plans of the West to take control of the region. He added that in view of Hezbollah's success in the fighting in Aleppo, he had no doubt it could fight just as well in the streets of Israeli cities.
  • Hossein Dehqan, Iranian minister of defense, said Iran kept a presence in Syria and Iraq because it regarded regional security as its own.
  • Iran and Russia continue consulting about developments in Syria. Iranian President Rouhani spoke with Russian President Putin three times; the foreign ministers of Iran, Russia and Turkey met in Moscow to discuss the crisis in Syria.
  • Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, said Iran and Russia were cooperating to provide the Syrian army and the "resistance" forces with advice.
  • Jaberi Ansari, deputy foreign minister, paid a visit to Syria and Lebanon, meeting with senior officials of both countries.
  • Iran dismissed the claims of the spokesman of the US Department of State that the visit of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, to Aleppo, was a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. New pictures were recently published of Soleimani in the city after it fell to the Syrian army.
  • A member of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) committee for national security and foreign policy told the reformist newspaper Ghanoon that unless Hamas changed its strategy towards Syria and stopped supporting the Syrian opposition, Iran would be forced to establish new ties with other Palestinian groups.

 

General Information
  • On December 24, 2016, Hossein Salami, deputy IRGC commander, told Iranian TV that the fall of Aleppo to the forces of the Syrian army had foiled the plans of the West and some regional states to take over the Middle East. The Americans intended, he claimed, to take over Syria, then advance to Lebanon and Iraq and finally reach Iran, after which they would establish a new Middle Eastern order. However, he claimed, the "liberation of Aleppo" had shown that they could not control events. He said that whoever controlled Aleppo could control northern Syria, and whoever controlled Damascus could control southern Syria.
  • Salami added that the United States, the Europeans and the Zionists were planning to contain Hezbollah's activity, but that Hezbollah had become a significant regional force. If Hezbollah could operate in the unlit ditches and winding alleys of Aleppo, without a doubt it could fight even better in the streets of Haifa and Tel Aviv, he claimed (Tasnim and Sepah News, December 25, 2016)
  • Hossein Dehqan, Iranian minister of defense, said the reason for an Iranian presence in Syria and Iraq was that Iran regarded their security as its own. At a ceremony launching a new postage stamp bearing a picture of Hossein Hamedani, a senior IRGC commander killed in Syria last year, he said that the takfiri terrorist organizations operating in Syria and Iraq today had been established by a coalition of local reactionary states, the United States, the Zionists and countries such as Turkey, and unless the their activities in Iraq and Yemen stopped, world order would be in danger. He claimed Iraq's war against extremists, terrorism and instability was a human and Islamic mission (Tabnak, December 25, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • On December 24, 2016, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin by phone. They discussed their regional cooperation and the situation in Syria in the wake of the fall of Aleppo to the Syrian army. It was their third telephone conversation in December (IRNA, December 24, 2016).
  • On December 20, 2016, the foreign ministers of Iran, Russia and Turkey met in Moscow to discuss the Syrian crisis. They issued a joint declaration stressing that their countries supported the preservation of Syria's independence, unity and territorial integrity. They also stressed that the resolution of the Syrian crisis had to be political, not military, that all three countries were committed to a joint struggle against ISIS and the al-Nusra Front, and distinguished between them and the other armed opposition groups (ISNA, December 20, 2016). Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, said a political solution was the only possible path for Syria and that the struggle against terrorists had to be continued not only in Syria, but everywhere (Fars, December 20, 2016).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, called the meeting in Moscow "a significant development." He said that in the past Iran and Russia had been on one side and Turkey on the other, but today all three countries were cooperating to liberate Syria from foreign domination. He said he hoped that the meeting would make it possible to stabilize Syria's territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the legitimate government, expel the terrorists and liberate the whole country (Tasnim News and IRNA, December 21, 2016).
  • Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, said the support the three countries gave to Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity showed the strategy adopted by Islamic Republic since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis had been correct (Fars, December 21, 2016).
  • Ali Shamkhani said Iran and Russia were cooperating to provide the Syrian army and the "resistance" forces with advice. He held a press conference where he said Iran was cooperating with Iraq, Russia and Syria to plan the military struggle against terrorism. He added that Russia was an ally of Iran in the war on terrorism and that the two countries coordinated at the highest levels, despite the efforts of their enemies to prevent them. As to the trilateral meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow, he said he hoped it would be based on the principle of a political solution for the Syrian crisis, not a military solution (Fars, December 20, 2016).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, met in Tehran with Adnan Hassan Mahmoud, Syrian ambassador to Iran. He told Mahmoud that the "victory of the resistance" in Aleppo had proved that great feats could be accomplished in the struggle against terrorism even without the United States and the West. He said Syria was stronger today than in the past and that the countries supporting terrorism and extremists, the "Zionist regime" among them, could no longer threaten the Syrian people and government (Tasnim, December 22, 2016).
  • On December 27, 2016, Hossein Dehqan, Iranian minister of defense, told Russian TV that Iran opposed Saudi Arabian participation in talks to resolve the Syrian crisis. He said the liberation of Aleppo headed the priority list of the Syrian government and its supporters because of the city's strategic, political and economic importance.
  • Between December 21 and 23, 2016, Jaberi Ansari, deputy foreign minister for Arab and African affairs, paid a visit to Syria and Lebanon, meeting with senior officials in both countries. Among them were Syrian President Assad, Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Imad Khamis, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem; Lebanese President Michel Aoun, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, Lebanese Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Beri, and Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah. He discussed regional developments with them. He also attended a meeting of the joint Iranian-Syrian political committee (Mehr, December 21, 2016).
  • Iran dismissed the claims of John Kirby, the US Department of State spokesman, that the visit of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, to Aleppo was a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Javad Karimi-Qoddusi, a member of the Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy, claimed the West had been roundly defeated in Aleppo and was now trying to wage a worthless media campaign against Iran. He said UN Security Council Resolution 2231 did not present obstacles to Soleiman's trip to Aleppo and that the West could not make such a decision (IRNA, December 21, 2016). Yadollah Javani, senior advisor to the supreme leader's representative in the IRGC, said Iran did not consider American sanctions imposed on senior Iranian officials as legitimate (Tabnak, December 21, 2016). During the past few days, new pictures were published of Soleimani in Aleppo after it fell to the Syrian army.
Iranian Intervention in Yemen
  • Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, said Iran did not have a presence in Yemen and that its influence there was "historical and cultural." At his weekly press conference he said the Saudi Arabian attacks on Yemen had to stop and that Iran supported negotiations between the various Yemeni groups (Fars, December 19, 2016).
  • An anonymous senior Iranian official said Iran had no military presence in Yemen. On December 21, 2016, the ISNA news agency reported that an unnamed senior Iranian official had denied Arab media reports about the death of a high-ranking Iranian officer in an aerial attack carried out in northern Yemen by the Saudi Arabian-led Arab coalition. He claimed there were no Iranian forces in Yemen and that issuing such reports was intended to conceal the treachery of those who had invited foreign forces to Yemen to destroy it and kill its citizens.
  • Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy, told Radwan al-Haimi, a member of Yemen's supreme revolutionary council who was visiting Tehran, that Iran would continue to support the Yemeni people, in view of the Saudi Arabian attacks (Fars, December 26, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • On December 21, 2016, in an interview with the reformist paper Ghanoon, Heshmatollah Fallahatpisheh, a member of the Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy, said that Hamas had to change its strategy regarding Syria and to end its support for the Syrian opposition, which served the interests of ISIS. He said the Palestinians should not forget Syria's support of the "resistance" front and that unless Hamas changed its policies, Iran would be forced to establish new relations with other Palestinians groups in a way that would not harm the "resistance." 

[1]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

Spotlight on Iran

December 4 – 18, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Khamenei meets with families of IRGC fighters who were killed in Syria (Website of Ali Khamenei, December 5, 2016).

Khamenei meets with families of IRGC fighters who were killed in Syria (Website of Ali Khamenei, December 5, 2016).

 Soleimani delivers a speech in the city of Jahrom (pasinejahrom.ir, December 7, 2016).

Soleimani delivers a speech in the city of Jahrom (pasinejahrom.ir, December 7, 2016).

Iranian minister of defense, Hossein Dehqan (Tasnim, December 13, 2016).

Iranian minister of defense, Hossein Dehqan (Tasnim, December 13, 2016).

Brigadier general Hassan Akbari, commander of an IRGC battalion in Tadmor, killed in Syria  (Fars, December 13, 2016).

Brigadier general Hassan Akbari, commander of an IRGC battalion in Tadmor, killed in Syria (Fars, December 13, 2016).

Student Basij members distribute candy and pastries in Tehran to celebrate the fall of Aleppo to Assad's forces (Iranian Telegram channel, December 14, 2016).

Student Basij members distribute candy and pastries in Tehran to celebrate the fall of Aleppo to Assad's forces (Iranian Telegram channel, December 14, 2016).

Qasem Soleimani in eastern Aleppo (Iranian Twitter accounts, December 16, 2016).

Qasem Soleimani in eastern Aleppo (Iranian Twitter accounts, December 16, 2016).

Iranian President Rouhani meets with Russian envoy Alexander Lavrentiev (Website of Hassan Rouhani, December 3, 2016).

Iranian President Rouhani meets with Russian envoy Alexander Lavrentiev (Website of Hassan Rouhani, December 3, 2016).

Hossein Sheikholeslam (Tasnim, December 12, 2016).

Hossein Sheikholeslam (Tasnim, December 12, 2016).

Khamenei meets with a delegation headed by Ammar al-Hakim (Tasnim, December 11, 2016).

Khamenei meets with a delegation headed by Ammar al-Hakim (Tasnim, December 11, 2016).

Hisham Salem, secretary general of al-Sabirin (Tasnim, December 7, 2016).

Hisham Salem, secretary general of al-Sabirin (Tasnim, December 7, 2016).

Khamenei meets with Ramadan Shallah (Tasnim, December 14, 2016).

Khamenei meets with Ramadan Shallah (Tasnim, December 14, 2016).


Main Points
  • Iran welcomed the fall of the Syrian city of Aleppo to the forces of President Bashar Assad. The deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) declared the liberation of Aleppo was the first step in the victory of "the army of Islam" against the West, and said he hoped that in the near future Mosul in Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain would also be liberated.
  • Two IRGC officers were killed in Tadmor (Palmyra), Syria.
  • Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, meeting with the families of IRGC fighters killed in Syria, said Iran was proud it had forces fighting in proximity to the borders of Israel.
  • Consultations between Russia and Iran over developments in Syria continue. At the beginning of December a Russian envoy delivered to President Rouhani a confidential letter dealing with Syria.
  • Interviewed by Iranian news agency Tasnim News, Former Iranian ambassador to Syria, Hossein Sheikholeslam, said the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States would change the balance of power in Syria, because Trump regarded ISIS and not the Assad regime as the United States' number one enemy, and was prepared to cooperate with Russia on the future of Syria.
  • Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, told the Majlis (Iranian parliament) committee for national security and foreign policy that a new ambassador had been appointed to Syria, and that his name would shortly be made public. He made the announcement following Majlis criticism of the delay in appointing a new ambassador to Damascus.
  • A delegation of members of the Shi'ite National Alliance in Iraq, headed by Ammar al-Hakim, visited Tehran last week and met with senior Iranian officials. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told them that the Shi'ite militias in Iraq were an important asset for the future of Iraq and that they had to be supported and strengthened. He called on the Alliance's leaders not to trust the Americans.
  • A delegation headed by Ramadan Shallah, secretary general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 

 

General Information
  • On December 5, 2016, the official website of Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, posted information about Khamenei's meeting with families of IRGC fighters killed in Syria. The meeting was held on November 21, 2016. Khamenei praised the fighters, saying they had been killed defending Shi'ite shrines, and that the young men who volunteered to fight in Syria and Iraq had a vision. He criticized those who had reservations about Iran's involvement in Syria, adding that Islamic religious law forbade Muslims to wait until the enemy entered their houses, and commanded them to fight against the enemy while it was still far from their borders. He said Iran was proud to have forces operating in proximity to the borders of the "Zionist regime."
  • Abolfazl Hassan Beiki, deputy chairman of the Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy, said if the supreme leader ordered a jihad in Syria or Iraq, at least a million young Iranians would volunteer to join the campaign in obedience to the supreme leader's instructions. He said young Iranians had a strong desire to go to Syria and Iraq to defend the Shi'ite shrines, and that many civilians had signed up as recruits. He added that today Iran had two missions in Syria and Iraq: to advise the Syrian and Iraqi forces fighting terrorism, and to train them (Alef, December 10, 2016).
  • On December 8, 2016, IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani reviewed regional developments and the struggle against ISIS at a meeting of the Society of Seminary Teachers in the Iranian city of Qom, held without the presence of reporters (Jamaran and Mehr, December 8, 2016). The previous day he spoke at a memorial ceremony for IRGC martyrs held in the city of Jahrom in Fars Province. He said the victory of the Islamic regime and it success had been made possible because the leadership and Iranian people were united. He praised the path of jihad and sacrifice, saying all sectors of the Iranian public honored it. The Iranian people, he said, knew exactly what their goals and who their enemies were, and it was their determination and faith that had made success possible for the more than 30 years since the Islamic Revolution (Mehr, December 7, 2016).
  • Speaking at a conference in Tehran, Hossein Dehqan, Iranian defense minister, said that once ISIS had been defeated in Iraq, it would turn towards Central Asia, Libya or the border with Jordan. He said Iraq, Syria and Yemen were tottering on the brink of partition, and their central governments were incapable of enforcing sovereignty over parts of their countries. He said partitioning would threaten regional security. He added that Iran's policy, in view of recent events, was based on an effort to improve its relations with regional countries and strengthen their defensive capabilities to create an anti-Western Islamic order. Iran, he said, regarded extremism, terrorism and the "regime occupying Jerusalem" [Israel] as immediate threats (Tasnim, December 11, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • Two IRGC officers were killed last week in Tadmor (Palmyra), Syria.
  • Interviewed on December 6, 2016, Iranian Student Day, Daoud Goudarzi, head of the Basij student organization, said so far 50 students had been killed fighting in Syria. He said the number indicated Iranian students' revolutionary presence in all areas and Islamic Revolution success in transmitting its cultural values to the younger generation (Defa News, November 6, 2016).
  • Iran welcomed the fall of Aleppo to the forces of Syrian President Bashar Assad. On December 14, 2016, Iranian President Rouhani called to congratulate him and said the liberation of Aleppo was an important step towards restoring stability to Syria (Fars, December 14, 2016).
  • Hossein Salami, commander of the IRGC, said at a press conference that the liberation of Aleppo was a clear victory for the "resistance front" and a defeat for the West and its regional allies, which for the past six years had been trying to overthrow the Syrian regime and defeat the "resistance front." He said the recent developments in Aleppo had completely changed the balance of power in Syria, tipping it towards the Syrian regime. He said the liberation of Aleppo was the first step towards the victory of the army of Islam, and that Mosul in Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain would soon be liberated, with the help of Allah (Tasnim, December 13, 2016).
  • After the fall of Aleppo, Rahim Safavi, senior advisor to the supreme leader for security issues, said the Americans understood that Iran was the most important power in the Middle East. The liberation had been made possible, he claimed, by the coalition of Iran, Russia, Syria and Hezbollah, and that the liberation of Mosul would soon be achieved (YJC, December 14, 2016).
  • Mohammad Marani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force ground forces, said the liberation of Aleppo had been made possible through the help of Shi'ite and Sunni forces. He claimed the support of Saudi Arabia and the "Zionist regime" had not led to the defeat of the Islamic fighters and that the day would come when the flag of Islam flew over al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and the enemies of Islam had been humiliated (Fars, December 9, 2016).
  • The social networks in Iran recently posted a picture of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, being shown around the eastern part of Aleppo.
  • The Kremlin confirmed that Russian President Putin sent Iranian President Rouhani a confidential letter concerning Syria. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Paskov said he could not reveal the details of the letter (Press TV, December 6, 2016). At the beginning of December, Russian envoy Alexander Lavrentiev met with President Rouhani and delivered the letter. Around the same time, Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian deputy foreign minister, paid a visit to Tehran to discuss developments in Syria. On December 5, 2016, he met with Hossein Jaberi Ansari, Iranian deputy foreign minister, who told him that Iran regarded its strategic relations with Russia and their continuing consultations over regional developments as very important (ILNA, December 5, 2016). On December 14, 2016, foreign ministers Zarif and Lavrov discussed the situation in Syria on the phone (Mehr, December 14, 2016).
  • Interviewed by Tasnim News on December 12, 2016, Hossein Sheikholeslam, former Iranian ambassador to Syria, said Trump's election to the presidency of the United States would change the balance of power in Syria, because unlike outgoing President Obama, he viewed ISIS and not the Syrian regime as America's number one enemy, and he was prepared to cooperate with Russia about Syria's future. In addition, he said, Trump was opposed to American intervention in the Middle East and emphasized the need to focus on finding solutions for the problems of America. As to Iran's involvement in Syria, Hossein Sheikholeslam said it was based on the concept of fighting terrorists when they were far from Iran's borders to keep them from approaching. If el-Quseir falls, he said, Damascus will fall and ISIS will attack Iraq, and if Baghdad falls, the war will arrive at the gates of Iran.
  • A group of Majlis members sent a communiqué to Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, asking him to explain the delay in the nominating a new Iranian ambassador to Syria. They claimed that in view of the sensitivity of the situation, the term of Mohammad-Reza Raouf-Sheibani as ambassador to Damascus should not have been ended before a replacement had been appointed (Mehr, December 11, 2016). Zarif answered that the next ambassador had been nominated and his name would shortly be announced (Fars, December 13, 2016). Last month Mohammad Irani, general manager for Middle Eastern affairs in the Iranian foreign ministry, said a pro tem ambassador would be sent to Damascus until a permanent ambassador could be appointed. At the end of October Mohammad-Reza Raouf-Sheibani's five-year term as ambassador ended without a replacement's being named.
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • On December 11, 2016, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with Ammar al-Hakim, chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and with members of the National Shi'ite Alliance in Iraq. He said that the Shi'ite militias in Iraq were an important asset for Iraq's future and they had to be supported and strengthened. He called on the leaders of the Shi'ite alliance not to trust the Americans who, he claimed, opposed strong Islamic countries, Iraq among them, and supported the terrorists in Syria and Iraq. He emphasized the need for strong cooperation between Iran and Iraq, which served the interests of both countries (Fars, December 11, 2016). While in Tehran, al-Hakim met with other senior Iranian officials, among them the president, the speaker of the Majlis and the head of the Iranian Judiciary.
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Interviewed by Tasnim News on December 7, 2016, Hisham Salem, secretary general of the Gaza Strip-based al-Sabirin movement, said Iran supported the movement in every area, including with weapons and guidance, to enable the Palestinians to "resist" Israel. He said the movement agreed with Iran far more than it disagreed, and that relations with Iran had proved that its strategic position towards the Palestinians was stable and unchanging.
  • A Tasnim News correspondent in the Gaza Strip interviewed Hammad al-Raqqab, a senior Hamas official in Khan Yunis, who said that Iran's support for the Palestinian "resistance" and Hamas' Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades could not be denied. He said the Islamic "resistance" owed Iran its ability to confront the "Zionist regime" and strike deep at the heart of Israel.
  • The al-Sabirin movement is a terrorist network established in 2014 by Palestinian Islamic Jihad defectors. It is affiliated with Hezbollah and Iran. On December 16, 2015, it claimed responsibility for attacking an IDF patrol with an IED near the border security fence in the southern Gaza Strip. In July 2015 the Hamas government announced it had dismantled the movement, which operated a series of Iranian-funded Shi'ite charitable organizations. However, movement operatives apparently continue their activities. Interviewed in January 2016, al-Sabirin head Salem said the movement did in fact receive funds from Iran, but they were meant mostly to fund da'wah activities for the dissemination of Shi'a. He refused to say whether the organization also received military support from Iran, but did say that the organization's operatives did not receive salaries for their activities (Ma'an, January 14, 2016). Iranian support is a visible attempt to reassume a significant role in the Palestinian arena, in the wake of the crisis in its relations with Hamas caused by the civil war in Syria. After Operation Protective Edge (2014), Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for more Iranian support for the Palestinians and for the West Bank to be armed.
  • Last week a Palestinian Islamic Jihad delegation headed by the organization's secretary general Ramadan Shallah paid a visit to Tehran and met with senior Iranian officials. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei promised the delegation that in 25 years Israel would no longer exist if Palestinians and Muslims waged a joint struggle to defeat it. He said that despite the fact that Iran was involved in other regional problems, it had always regarded the Palestinian cause as the most important issue facing the Muslim world (Tasnim, December 14, 2016).
  • Meeting with Ramadan Shallah, President Rouhani said that "resistance" and jihad were the only way for the Palestinians to deal with the "Zionist regime" and that the liberation of Jerusalem and the realization of the rights of the Palestinians had to be the most important issues for Muslims. He stressed Iran had supported the Palestinians since the Islamic Revolution, and said Iran would not hesitate to aid and support the Palestinians (Tasnim, December 13, 2016).
  • Meeting with Shallah, Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said that the defense of Palestine and the liberation of Jerusalem were the Muslim world's top priority, and that any activity that detracted from the struggle against the "Zionist regime" was a betrayal of Muslims. He said that Israel and some Middle Eastern countries were the strategic partners of regional terrorist groups and provided them with arms, medicine, intelligence and funds. Ramadan Shallah expressed his and the Palestinian "resistance's" thanks for the support of the supreme leader, the government of Iran and the Iranian people, and said the Islamic Republic of Iran was the only government in the world that supported the Palestinians and did not officially recognize the "Zionist regime" (Mehr, December 10, 2016). While in Tehran he also met with Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, and Ali-Akbar Velayati, senior advisor to the supreme leader for international affairs.
  • Hossein Amir Abdollahian, international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis, said defending the Palestinians and Jerusalem were the top priorities of every Muslim government and the entire Muslim world, and that Iran supported the Palestinian people in its struggle against the "Zionist regime." He made the remark in the wake of Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's visit to Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. Abdollahian strongly condemned the visit, saying its objective was to ignite the fires of hostility in Central Asia and the Caucasus (IRNA, December 11, 2016).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

The ISIS Branch in Yemen and Its Role in the Power Struggles


ISIS operatives drive along a coastal road in Yemen, apparently in the region of the port city of Aden (dailymotion.com, February 21. 2016)
ISIS operatives drive along a coastal road in Yemen, apparently in the region of the port city of Aden (dailymotion.com, February 21. 2016)

Overview

1.   Yemen lies at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. Its population is estimated at more than 26 million, two thirds of which are Sunni Muslims, and one third Zaydi-Shi'Ite. Yemen has disintegrated as a state, has no effective, stable central administration and is governed by armed tribal-like organizations. For decades the Yemenis have been waging civil wars of fluctuating intensity. The Middle East upheaval that began in 2011 only served to increase the country's chronic instability.

2.   Yemen's location gives it great geostrategic importance. It commands the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which leads to the Indian Ocean. It is a main sea route for ships and oil tankers on their way from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Yemen is also close to the Horn of Africa(Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia), and can be used by terrorist organizations as a gateway to the entire African continent. Yemen has a long border with Saudi Arabia (1,700 kilometers, more than 1,000 miles) which has become a turbulent area of subversion against Saudi Arabia because of the Houthi rebel takeover of the northern part of the country.

3.   Because of Yemen's geostrategic importance, lack of governance and polarized society, it has become an arena for a regional strugglein which the United Statesis also involved. Most of the struggle is currently waged between Saudi Arabia, which leads the Sunni Arab camp, and Iran, which leads the Shi'ite "resistance axis." Saudi Arabia, concerned lest Iran become a state sponsor for Yemen, heads a Sunni Arab coalition which is waging a campaign against the Iranian-supported Zaydi-Shi'Ite Houthi rebels. The main objective of the Saudi Arabian campaign is to end the Iranian-supported Houthi rule and restore the rule of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was forced to leave the capital city of Sanaa for Aden after it was taken over by the Houthi rebels.

Yemen and its neighbors (infoplease.com, August 17, 2016)
Yemen and its neighbors (infoplease.com, August 17, 2016)

4.   In 2014 ISIS enteredYemen's internal power struggles and governmental vacuumas another minor player alongside the various countries and organizations already involved in the fighting. ISIS had several reasons for establishing a foothold in Yemen: its geostrategic importance, its lack of effective governance, its political, sectarian and tribal schisms, and its topography, which has both mountains and deserts. The Houthi rebellion was an important catalyst for ISIS because it intensified the tensions between Shi'ites and Sunnis, led to the takeover of Sunni provinces by the rebels (including the capital, Sanaa), and increased Shi'ite Iran's influence. The presence and activity of a rival organization, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), also supported the establishment of ISIS and the beginning of its gaining a foothold (some of the operatives who founded the ISIS branch in Yemen were AQAP deserters).

5.   In Yemen ISIS organized itself into provinces (wilayat), as it did in other countries. In the summer of 2016 ISIS stated it had six provinces in Yemen: Sanaa, Aden-Abyan, Shabwah, al-Bayda, Hadramawt and "the Green Brigade" (al-Liwaa' al-Akhdar). Ta'izz and Ibbare also apparently provinces (in the past ISIS also mentioned Lahij, which may no longer be active).

6.   The branch of ISIS in Yemen is under the command of the ISIS leadership in Iraq and Syria. It is controlled by an institution known as "the directorate of the far provinces,"which is directly subordinate of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Haq, July 7, 2016). Because of the distance, the ISIS branch in Yemen(like other distant branches) apparently does not receive attention and resources from the leadership in Iraq and Syria, and its control is fairly shaky.

Yemeni governorates where ISIS is active marked in yellow (Wikimedia, August 17, 2016)
Yemeni governorates where ISIS is active marked in yellow (Wikimedia, August 17, 2016)

7.   ISIS in Yemen apparently has several hundred operatives. As opposed to Iraq and Syria, where there are many foreign fighters, most of the ISIS operatives in Yemen are local inhabitants. Some of them left AQAP and others are new recruits from various Yemeni governorates which have a Sunni population. In Yemen ISIS wages guerilla warfare and carries out terrorist attackstargeting Zaydi-Shi'Ite Houthi rebels (supported by Iran) and President Hadi's central administration (supported by Saudi Arabia). Between the branch of ISIS in Yemen, directed by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, directed by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, there is fierce rivalry and competition for influence, usually manifested by propaganda warfare encouraging AQAP operatives to desert and join ISIS.

8.   As opposed to Iraq and Syria, the ISIS branch in Yemen has not acquired control over significant stretches of territory in the regions where it is active and to enforce its governance. That is probably because of the relatively short time in which it has been operating in Yemen and the pressures exerted on it by its many enemies. That means its operatives do not provide services for the local population, do not enforce the Sharia(Muslim law) in any organized way and have not established their own governmental institutions(as they have in Iraq and Syria, and until recently, in Libya). However, if ISIS's power in Yemen increases and its operatives become more self-confident, it will most likely try to carve out an area of territorial control in one of the regions where its military activities are focused to serve as a launching pad for other areas.

9.   ISIS in Yemen has extensive operational capabilities, especially in Hadramawt, Shabwah and Aden-Abyan Provinces in the south and east of the country(See map, above). So far its operatives have carried out dozens of terrorist attacks and waged guerilla warfare targeting the Houthi rebels and Yemeni government (individuals, institutions and facilities). They have carried out suicide bombing attacks, detonated IEDs, and attacked sites of government and Houthi power. They have also carried out abductions and executions, and assassinated important Yemeni figures.

10.   There are three territories, distant from one another, where ISIS focuses its terrorist and guerilla activities: Sanaa, the capital, where ISIS operatives attack power centers and key locations controlled by Houthi rebels; Aden, President Hadi's stronghold; and al-Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt Province and the Yemeni government's legislative and economic center.

Sana'a, the Yemeni capital, and the port cities of Aden and al-Mukalla are central locations for ISIS's military-terrorist activities (Google maps)
Sana'a, the Yemeni capital, and the port cities of Aden and al-Mukalla are central locations for ISIS's military-terrorist activities (Google maps)

11.   Currently ISIS in Yemen is apparently still organizing and establishing itself, and has not yet deeply extended its influence within the local population (as has AQAP, which is larger and better established). However, in the future ISIS's branch in Yemen has the potential to continue becoming stronger because of the local conditions.

12.   However, ISIS's branch in Yemen also has several weaknesses which pose difficulties for its continuing establishment and expansion: its rival, AQAP, is larger and better established; Yemen's distance from the leadership in Iraq and Syria makes it difficult for its operatives to obtain attention and resources, and Yemen is not high on the leadership's list of priorities; the tribal divisions, large number of armies and armed groups and the influence of both Iran and Saudi Arabia also make it difficult for ISIS to operate in Yemen. As a result, ISIS has not managed to establish an area of control or gain influence within the population.

13.   The establishment of an ISIS foothold in Yemen poses a series of local, regional and international dangersLocally, it may make it more difficult to stabilize Yemen's internal situation and is liable to prolong the chaos in the country. Regionally, ISIS in Yemen may export terrorism and subversion to neighboring countries (Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa). Internationally, ISIS in Yemen may acquire operational capabilities which will endanger the shipping lanes passing nearby and may initiate terrorist attacks in other countries, as does AQAP.

 

14.   Will the weakening of the Islamic State and the damage done to the areas of its territorial control in Iraq, Syria and Libya influence its branch in Yemen, and if so, how? In ITIC assessment, Salafi jihadist ideology and organizations will continue enjoying a strong foothold in Yemen. That is because of the basic attributes of Yemen's politics and society, which are not likely to change in the near future. However, the significant damage done to ISIS in Iraq and Syria may weaken its branches in other countries, Yemen among them. If that happens some of its operatives may return to AQAP.

Methodology and Structure

15.   Current studies of ISIS's branch in Yemen are limited in scope and most of them are not fully updated. This comprehensive study is an attempt to give an updated picture of the ISIS branch in Yemen and the forces against which it is fighting. For the most part it is based on Arabic, English and Hebrew sources, mostly ISIS-affiliated websites, social media accounts and reports in the Arabic and international media dealing with ISIS's activity in Yemen. This study also used several academic reports issued by experts and institutions tracking the organization.

16.   This study contains the following sections:

   Section 1: The establishment of ISIS in Yemen

   Section 2: Ideology and strategy

   Section 3: Structure and manpower

   Section 4: Guerilla warfare and terrorist activity

   Section 5: Analysis of types of guerilla warfare and terrorist activity 

   Section 6: ISIS's propaganda network

   Appendix: Internal Yemeni conditions leading to the establishment of an ISIS branch