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The military show of strength held by Hezbollah in the Syrian city of Al-Qusayr

Published: 06/12/2016

A column of Hezbollah's armored vehicles, including APCs, tanks, and self-propelled guns, which appeared in the military show of strength held in the Syrian city of Al-Qusayr (Araby 21, November 14, 2016). Right: The second and third APCs were identified as BMP of Soviet origin. Left: APC identified as BMP-1, with a Sagger anti-tank missile on it.

100 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun mounted on a hull for an SA-6 anti-aircraft missile system (As-Safir, November 16, 2016)

122 mm rockets mounted on a truck. The distant smaller truck carries 50 rocket barrels (Al-Hadath News, November 22, 2016)

ATVs with Kornet anti-tank missiles mounted on them. A pair of Kornet missiles mounted on a single launcher can be seen on the first ATV from the left (Al-Diyar, November 15, 2016). This unique combination of ATVs and anti-tank missiles allows better mobility on the ground and increases the chances of survival of the crew.

Cartoon presenting Hezbollah's military show of strength in Al-Qusayr as yet another step toward floundering in the bloodshed of fighting in Syria. The Arabic title reads, “A Hezbollah military show [of strength] in Al-Qusayr, Syria” (Lebanon 360, November 16, 2016)

US-made M-113 APCs in Hezbollah’s military show of strength (treckat.com, November 14, 2016)

A Lebanese Army announcement, on its official Facebook page, that the military vehicles (i.e., the M-113 APCs) were not taken from the Lebanese Army depots and do not belong to it (official Facebook page of the Lebanese Army, November 15, 2016)

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Units and weapons shown at the show of strength

1. On November 13, 2016, Hezbollah held a first-of-its-kind military show of strength, exceptional in scope. The show of strength took place near the Syrian city of Al-Qusayr, in the northern Bekaa Valley (about 15 km from the border with Lebanon). It was part of a series of events held to commemorate Hezbollah's Martyr’s Day annually held by the organization on November 11 (close to Lebanon's Independence Day held on November 22, 2016). Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah did not attend the event, but a representative on his behalf, Hashem Safi al-Din, participated and held a speech whose contents was not disclosed in public.

2. In its military show of strength, Hezbollah exposed some of its military power. Hezbollah's elite units, some of them taking part in the fighting in Syria, were displayed. Among the units displayed were the Armor Regiment,^[1] the Artillery Regiment, the Radwan elite force (which takes part in the campaign to take over Aleppo), and the off-road motorcycle unit. According to reports on the Lebanese media, these units represent the spearhead of Hezbollah's military power.

3. The military show of strength demonstrated Hezbollah weaponry (some of it for the first time). It can be divided into three categories (based on the identification of photos from the event which appear in Appendix A):

a. Tanks of Soviet origin and US-made APCs, including T-72 tanks with reactive armor protection (against anti-tank missiles); T-54/T-55 and T-62 tanks; BMP APCs (one of them was identified as a BMP-1 APC with a Sagger missile mounted on it); US-made M-113 APCs with 14.5 mm guns of Soviet origin mounted on them.

b. Self-propelled artillery, including anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, 100 mm anti-tank guns and other self-propelled guns on hulls for SA-6 anti-aircraft missile systems; 122 mm rockets mounted on trucks (a truck with 50 barrels was identified); 302 mm rocket launchers mounted on trucks (with an estimated range of 90-180 km); self-propelled 122 mm guns; 130 mm (?) guns mounted on trucks; 23 mm twin anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks.

c. ATVs and off-road motorcycles, used by Hezbollah for rapid movement and for improving its guerrilla warfare capabilities. The weaponry identified in the photos includes ATVs with Kornet anti-tank missiles mounted on them (at least on one of them were installed two Kornet missiles on a single launcher).

Assessment of the significance of the military show of strength

4. The ITIC does not know how the weapons displayed in the show of strength ended up in Hezbollah's hands. However, it is clear that state-owned capabilities, some of them advanced, were delivered to Hezbollah, which is a terrorist organization. The ITIC believes that the tanks, APCs, artillery and rockets (originally of Soviet origin) originated from Syria and Iran, where most of Hezbollah's weaponry comes from. On the other hand, the M-113 APCs, in the ITIC’s assessment, are from the Lebanese Armed Forces (even though such APCs are also used by other armies in the region).

5. Although the weapons that appeared in the military show of strength were displayed in the context of Hezbollah’s fighting in Syria, in the future they may be directed against Israel, taking advantage of the combat experience acquired in Syria. Special attention should be paid to the self-propelled rockets (including 302 mm rockets with a range of 90-180 km) and the ATVs with the Kornet anti-tank missiles mounted on them (which allow better mobility on the ground and improve the chances of survival of the crew).

6. In the ITIC's assessment, the military show of strength in Al-Qusayr should be considered in the context of Hezbollah's deep involvement in Syria under Iran’s directions. Given the major offensive in Aleppo by the Syrian forces and their allies (including Hezbollah), Hezbollah sought to convey to the Syrians and to the internal Lebanese scene an image of power and demonstrate that its military capabilities were not eroded due to its heavy losses in Syria (as claimed by Hezbollah's critics). The military show of strength was also intended to demonstrate that Hezbollah had turned from a guerrilla organization into a semi-military, well-trained organization that had acquired rich combat experience in Syria and formed new units equipped with heavy weapons (tanks and APCs) which usually characterize regular armies of states rather than a guerrilla organization.^[2]

7. This message is based, in the ITIC's assessment, on a process that Hezbollah has been undergoing during the recent years, in which it changes its character and turns from a terrorist and guerrilla organization into an organization with clear military characteristics. This framework is put into action to promote the Iranian interests not only in Lebanon or against Israel, but also in regional confrontation zones between Shiites and Sunnis in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, and Yemen).

8. Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hassan Nasrallah's deputy, held a speech in Beirut where he referred to the military show of strength in Al-Qusayr. Sheikh Naim Qassem, who was quoted in the Lebanese daily newspaper As-Safir, noted that Hezbollah had turned from a guerrilla organization into a “trained army” with advanced capabilities, and the military show of strength made it clear to everyone. According to Sheikh Qassem, Hezbollah acts to protect Lebanon and its interests and maintains a high level of coordination with the Syrian regime.^[3] Apparently, internal Lebanese criticism which arose following the military show of strength caused Hezbollah to come out with a quick denial and release “clarifications” for Sheikh Naim Qassem’s statement. Moreover, the Lebanese newspaper As-Safir (which was the one that reported on Sheikh Naim Qassem’s speech) joined these “clarifications.” However, the ITIC believes that the first wording as published in As-Safir properly reflected the message which Hezbollah intended to convey (see Appendix B).

9. The military show of strength in Al-Qusayr was an exceptional event not only due to the weaponry it presented but also because it was the first time such an event took place in a Syrian city, outside Lebanon’s territory (in previous years, Hezbollah marked its Martyr’s Day by events that were held in Lebanon, especially in the Beirut Shiite southern suburb).The ITIC believes that the decision to hold the military show of strength in the Syrian city of Al-Qusayr of all other sites was not incidental but was intended to strengthen the image of power in the Syrian context. This is because, from Hezbollah’s perspective, Al-Qusayr has a majorsecurity importance, and in spite of the fact that it is situated in Syrian territory, it is actually under Hezbollah’s control. Al-Qusayr has been taken over by Hezbollah on June 5, 2013, and has become a symbol of a remarkable military victory. In retrospect, the takeover of the Syrian city symbolized the beginning of a process in which Hezbollah’s military involvement in the Syrian civil war increased. This involvement currently comes into expression by thousands of Hezbollah operatives fighting in various battle zones in Syria, including the campaign to take over Aleppo^[4] (for details, see Appendix D).

Reactions to the military show of strength

10. Hezbollah's military show of strength sparked immediate reactions in Lebanon and abroad:

a. In the internal Lebanese scene, the military show of strength demonstrated the fundamental contradiction between the Lebanese identity of Hezbollah, which presents itself as “Lebanon’s defender” and as working to uphold Lebanon’s interests; and Hezbollah being an organization handled by Iran to promote the latter’s regional interests, representing part of the so-called “axis of resistance.”Hezbollah’s quick denial of the use made by Sheikh Naim Qassem of the term “army” indicates that the organization is aware of the problematic nature of using the term and tries not to go too far. However, Lebanese senior figures and commentators were quite critical in reference to the military show of strength. Thus, for instance, Fouad Siniora, the head of Al-Mustaqbal faction opposing Hezbollah, noted that “The rifle which has been pointed at Israel is now pointed into Lebanon,” as Hezbollah has turned into a pawn in the hands of Iran, which employs it to intervene in the internal affairs of Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon (Al-Arabiya, November 13, 2016) (for reactions in Lebanon, see Appendix C).

b. In the international and the internal Lebanese scenes, the fact that M-113 APCs took part in the show of strength raised questions as to the way Hezbollah acquired them. The Lebanese Army spokesman was quick to deny any connection to the APCs which are in Hezbollah's possession. However, Lebanese senior figures and commentators estimated that these were APCs previously provided by the United States to the Lebanese Army as part of the American military support, and then they were transferred from the Lebanese Army to Hezbollah. The US State Department spokeswoman Elizabeth Trudeau noted that the American embassy was working with the Lebanese armed forces to investigate the issue of Western weapons in the hands of Hezbollah. She noted that the photos show M-113 APCs, which are common in the region.

Appendices

11. Following are four appendices:

a. Appendix A: Hezbollah's military show of strength in Al-Qusayr and the identification of units and weapons shown there

b. Appendix B: Presenting Hezbollah's military power as an “army” by Hassan Nasrallah’s deputy, and Hezbollah’s quick denial

c. Appendix C: Internal Lebanese reactions to Hezbollah's military show of strength

d. Appendix D: The Syrian city of Al-Qusayr and its importance for Hezbollah

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^[1]The Arabic term “foj” will herein be referred to as “regiment.”
^[2]According to a Lebanese news website, Hezbollah has recently been engaged in a reorganization process of its forces in Syria by setting up “military brigades” that will substitute the classical structure of the organization, which is based on companies and units (lebanondebate, November 13, 2016). The message of Hezbollah's turning from a guerrilla organization into an army was also conveyed in the speech of Sheikh Naim Qassem, Nasrallah’s deputy, who pointed out that Hezbollah had turned from a guerrilla organization into a “well-trained army” (see below).
^[3]What did Qassem mean by saying that the coordination between Syria and Hezbollah reached a high level?The ITIC believes that he did not only refer to Hezbollah holding the military show of strength on Syrian soil, but beyond that. A demonstration of the character of coordination was published in an article by Abdallah Suleiman Ali in the Lebanese daily As-Safir (which is used by Hezbollah for leaking news items). The article stated that several combat commanders of Hezbollah and groups of operatives are expected to join the Syrian Fifth Corps currently being formed. According to the article, this is Hezbollah’s “dream team” which has a great deal of military know-how and quality commanding skills. The reporter referred to it as a “step forward” by Hezbollah in deepening its participation in the fighting in Syria. He added that there is a new elite force of Hezbollah which had recently joined one of the fighting fronts in Syria and would operate under the command of the Fifth Corps or in direct operational coordination with it (As-Safir, November 28, 201).
^[4]Around the time of the military show of strength in Al-Qusayr, a meeting was held in Aleppo between Hezbollah’s field officers and Russian Army officers. The meeting was convened on the Russians’ request due to Hezbollah’s major involvement in the campaign for Aleppo. The Russians congratulated Hezbollah's commanders for the high military capabilities they have shown during the battles (Al-Akhbar, November 24, 2016).

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Main Points

Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), said Iranian forces were not participating in the fighting in Mosul because the Shi'ite militias in Iraq did not need Iranian fighters. He said Iran had deployed a small number of advisors to Iraq. In a speech delivered for Basij Week, he criticized those who claimed Iran had to focus exclusively on its internal issues and not become involved in regional matters.
Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, commander of the Iranian armed forces, said that in the future Iran might construct military bases along the Yemeni or Syrian coast to increase its naval capabilities in foreign waters.
During the past two weeks three IRGC fighters were killed in combat in Syria. The director of the Iranian Shaheed Foundation said more than 1,000 fighters from Iran had been killed in Syria. The number apparently refers to IRGC fighters who lived in Iran and were deployed to Syria, among them citizens of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Senior Iranian officials expressed satisfaction with the military successes of the Syrian regime supporters in the eastern part of Aleppo during the past week.
Hossein Dehqan, the Iranian defense minister, said that if necessary, Iran would again allow Russian fighter planes to carry out attacks in Syria from the Iranian air force base in Hamedan.
Dozens of Iranian pilgrims returning to Iran from Iraq were killed in an ISIS attack at a gas station in the city of Hilla (about 100 kilometers, or 60 miles) south of Baghdad on November 24, 2016.
Mohammed Reza Naqdi, commander of the IRGC's Basij militia, told students in Tehran that Iran would liberate Palestine within ten years.

General Information

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, meeting with Turkish Defense Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, said that regional stability and security, especially in Iraq and Syria, had to be founded on Iranian-Turkish cooperation. He said that if the important regional powers cooperated, the problems of Iraq and Syria could be solved without the intervention of foreign powers. He said Iran and Turkey agreed on the basic principles for solving the regional crises: preservation of the territorial integrity and national unity of Iraq and Syria, establishment of a government determined by the people, the prevention of mass murder and of the destruction of the infrastructure, and assisting the refugees and wounded to return to the homes (Tasnim, November 28, 2016).

Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the IRGC, said the Shi'ite militias in Iraq did not need Iranian fighters for the Mosul campaign. He said Iran had deployed a limited number of advisors to Iraq, but Iranian forces were not participating in the fighting in Mosul. In a speech for Basij Week, he justified Iranian intervention in regional countries, saying the Islamic Revolution was based on defending oppressed Muslims. Therefore, those who claimed there was no reason for Iran to operate in Lebanon, Syria or Yemen, and that Iran had to focus exclusively on internal problems, were wrong (Tasnim News and Fars, November 24, 2016).
Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, commander of the Iranian armed forces, said that in the future Iran might construct military bases along the Yemeni or Syrian coast. He told a meeting of Iranian naval commanders that in the future Iran might need to increase its naval capabilities in foreign waters (Fars, November 26, 2016).
Following this statement, Mehdi Mashat, one of the Yemeni Houthi leaders, strongly criticized Bagheri. On November 27, 2016, he wrote on his Facebook page that if the commander of the Iranian armed forces knew anything about the history of Yemen, which over the years had become a graveyard for invaders, he would not have dared to say what he did about Iran's intention to build a naval base in Yemen.

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon

Three IRGC fighters were killed in combat in Syria over the past two weeks
Hojjat-ul-Islam Shahidi Mahallati, director of the Iranian Shaheed (martyr) Foundation, told a meeting of Basij members last week that more than 1,000 fighters from Iran had been killed in Syria (Tasnim, November 22, 2016). The number apparently relates to IRGC fighters who lived in Iran and were deployed to Syria, including citizens of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Mohammad Hossein Bagheri told a conference in Tehran that with authorization from the supreme leader, hundreds of thousands of Basij fighters could be deployed to Syria. He said that so far only a limited number had been deployed to Syria in order to guard and defend Shi'ite shrines (Tasnim, November 24, 2016).

Hossein Dehqan, Iranian minister of defense, said that if necessary, Iran would again allow Russian fighter planes to attack Syria from the Iranian air force base in Hamedan. As to information published in the Russian media, Dehqan said that in supporting the Syrian government, Iran was cooperating with its friends, especially Russia, and would do anything necessary to defend Syria (Tasnim, November 26, 2016).
In August 2016 the Russians used the Iranian air force base at Hamedan (western Iran) for aerial strikes in Syria. Following the stationing of Russian planes at Hamedan, the Iranian defense minister confirmed Iran would allow Russian planes to use the air field as necessary, but had reservations about the Russian ministry of defense's publicizing the information.
Hossein Amir Abdollahian, special international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament), congratulated the Syrian leadership, people and army for the "recent victories in the Aleppo region." In view of the Syrian army's takeover (with the Russian air support) of more neighborhoods in northeastern Aleppo, Abdollahian said Aleppo was about to be liberated from the control of terrorist groups and Iran would continue to provide support by advising the Syrian and Iraqi people and governments (Mehr, November 28, 2016).
Rasoul Sanaeirad, deputy IRGC commander for political matters, also expressed satisfaction with the military achievements of Assad's supporters in the eastern part of Aleppo. Interviewed by Tasnim News on November 30, 2016, he said the recent successes of the Syrian army in eastern Aleppo were clear proof of the complete defeat of the terrorists in Syria. He criticized Turkey's interference in Syria, saying that instead of interfering in Syria, President Erdogan would do better to answer to public opinion in his own country regarding the results of Turkey's interference in Syria in past years. He said Erdogan was incapable of toppling the Assad regime. His remarks came in the wake of a statement made by Erdogan the previous week to the effect that the objective of the Turkish forces in Syria was to end Assad's rule.

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

Dozens of Iranian pilgrims were killed in an ISIS attack on a gas station in the city of Hilla (about 100 kilometers, or 60 miles) south of Baghdad on November 24, 2016. The explosions set fire to five buses of pilgrims parked near the restaurant at the gas station. The pilgrims were returning to Iran from Karbala, where they had marked Arba'een,^[1] the annual pilgrimage to the Hussein mosque.
Senior Iranian officials strongly condemned the terrorist attack. President Rouhani called on the Iraqi government to intensify the fight against the terrorists and declared Iran's commitment to continue fighting terrorism (Tasnim, November 26, 2016). Hossein Salami, deputy commander of the IRGC, said the attack was a response to the terrorists' defeats in Iraq and that the response to the attack would come on the battlefield.

Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena

Mohammed Reza Naqdi, commander of the IRGC's Basij militia, speaking before students in Tehran, said Iran would liberate Palestine during the next ten years. He said that 35 years ago Iran had been under American control but the Islamic Revolution liberated Iran from the Americans, and after that rescued it from Iraq ruler Saddam Hussein. Today, he said, Iran had rescued capital cities from the Americans and would liberate Palestine in the near future as well (Fars, November 21, 2016).

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^[*]The Arba'een is the 40^th day of mourning for the death of the Shi'ite Imam Hussein, Muhammad's grandson, who was buried in Karbala in 680 AD.
^[1]The Arba'een is the 40^th day of mourning for the death of the Shi'ite Imam Hussein, Muhammad's grandson, who was buried in Karbala in 680 AD.

Initial Reactions in Iran to the Election of Donald Trump as President of the United States – Dr. Raz Zimmt

Published: 22/11/2016

(Fars, November 15, 2016)

(Fars, November 12, 2016)

"The crazy person beat the liar: Trump elected president of the United States," the front-page headline of Kayhan, November 9, 2016.

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Overview

1. Donald Trump's election as the 45^th president of the United States was received in Iran with great surprise. Senior Iranian officials, among them Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, reacted with care and restraintin their initial references to his victory, claiming Iran was not worried but rather prepared to cope with any possible challenge. However, they did express concern that the president-elect would make good on his campaign threatsto revise the nuclear agreement. Iran's hardliners have been particularly critical of President Hassan Rouhani, representing him as having been misled by empty promises from the American administration.

2. Initial Iranian reactions were restrainedbut did note that Iran was not worried by the election:

a. On November 16, 2016, Supreme Leader Ali Khameneigave a speech in which he referred to the election for the first time. He claimed that as far as Iran was concerned, it did not matter who the president of the United States was and that Iran was not worried by the results. He said that since the Islamic Revolution, both the Democratic and Republican parties had been hostile to the Iranian people.

b. Senior Iranian officials called for restraint and caution in dealing with the president elect. They said he should be judged by his conduct and not by his campaign slogans, which did not necessarily reflect his true intentions. Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military advisor the supreme leader, said it was too early to judge the president elect, and that it could only be hoped he would make significant changes in America's Middle Eastern and Iranian foreign policy.

Concerns Lest the Nuclear Agreement be Scrapped and Increased Sanctions Imposed on Iran

3. Statements by senior Iranian officials and op-ed articles in local newspapers noted that Trump would find it difficult to scrap the nuclear agreement. They may well have indicated fears that the new American administration would, in fact, try to cancel the agreement and increase sanctions on Iran:

a. Less than 24 hours after the election results were announced, President Hassan Rouhani noted the possible consequences of a Trump presidency and rejected the possibility of the nuclear deal being cancelled.He said Iran's improved relations with Western countries would make it impossible to mobilize a new international consensus against Iran. Earlier, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, said Iran expected Trump to understand global realpolitik and honor the nuclear agreement.

b. Senior Iranian officials and local newspapersvoiced the opinion that the commitment of the other powers to the nuclear agreement would not allow Trump to cancel the agreement and that cancelling it unilaterally would lead to an American confrontation with the EU, Russia and China. Sadeq Zibakalam, a professor at the University of Tehran,wrote in an op-ed piece that "Not only will he not burn the nuclear agreement, he will put it in a safe place in the White House" (Arman-e Emruz, November 12, 2016).

4. Reactions in Iran also voiced concern that the new American administration would make it more difficult for Western companies to invest in Iran and would impose new sanctions, using various excusessuch as Iran's continuing its long-range missile program, its regional policies and its violations of human rights. Such American measures might make it even more difficult for Iran to thaw the billions of dollars it had in foreign accounts and to convince companies and banks to renew business dealings with Iran.

5. According to an article published by the Donya-ye Eqtesad (Economic World) daily on November 13, Iran had to recognize that the nuclear agreement would not have the desired results. Thus President Rouhani was advised to increase Iran's collaboration with the EU, especially with Germany, France and Italy, to neutralize, insofar as was possible, the influence of the sanctions the United States was unilaterally capable of imposing.

The Internal Iranian Aspect

6. President Rouhani's hardliner political rivals were quick to exploit America's elections results for harsh criticism of their own presidentas part of their campaign to weaken Rouhani in preparation for Iran's presidential elections, set for May 2017. They represented him and Foreign Minister Zarif as being misled by the American administration's empty promisesto lift the sanctions on Iran and as fostering vain hopes among Iraniansthat the nuclear agreement would improve Iran economically.

7. Throughout the American presidential campaign Iranian hardliners claimed there was no difference between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, they were equally hostile to the Islamic Republic. Hardliners also claimed that Trump's victory could benefit Iran because it had removed the mask from the face of the arrogant, racist American administration. Iranian hardliners claimed that Trump's victory was more proof that the United States could not be trusted. Iran's economy could only be improved, they asserted, through a "resistance economy," which would rely on Iran's independent resources and be less dependent on foreign factors.

8. Opponents of the government who had reservations about the nuclear agreement from the beginning, claiming it imposed far-reaching limitations on Iran without significant compensation, did not seriously consider the possibility that the president elect would cancel the agreement. On November 11, 2016, Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the radical daily Kayhan, published an editorial claiming that the best thing Trump could to would be to tear up the agreement and "save the Iranian people from its evil."

9. However, both the hardliners and the conservatives have not called for a deliberate Iranian violation of the nuclear agreement. Clearly, all of Rouhani's most vocal critics prefer to have America, not Iran, responsible for its possible collapse. On November 10, 2016, the daily Donya-ye Eqtesad warned that the president elect was liable to increase the pressure on Iran to cause it to violate the agreement of its own accord, so that Iran could be blamed.

Possible Benefits to Iran from Trump's Presidency

10. Alongside concerns that Trump will adopt an aggressive foreign policy towards Iran, various Iranian commentators also pointed to potential benefits. Some of them voiced the opinion that the president elect would focus mainly on domestic issues and limit American involvement in the Middle East (that is, make it easier for Iran to seek regional hegemony). It was also claimed that Trump, as a businessman, would be more influenced by economic interests and pragmatic considerations and less by uncompromising ideological concepts.

11. Reports about Trump's close relations with Russia and President Putin, Trump's position on the war in Syria and his hostility during the campaign to the Saudi Arabian regime were of great interest to Iran and received with satisfaction. Ali Motahari, deputy speaker of the Majlis(the Iran parliament), reacted positively to Trump's statement that he would stress fighting ISIS in Syria and not attempt to oust President Assad. Such statements raised expectations in Tehran that the new administration would be willing to cooperate with Russia in the war against ISIS and promote a political arrangement that would make it possible for Iranian ally Assad to remain in poser.

Appendix

Reactions of Senior Iranian Officials to Trump's Victory

1. Supreme Leader Ali Khameneisaid that the results of the election made no difference to Iran. Speaking to civilians from Isfahan Province, he said Iran neither mourned not celebrated the results. Iran was not worried and was prepared to deal with any possible eventuality. He said America was still the same America, and that the 37 years since the Islamic Revolution had made both the Democratic and Republican parties hostile to the Iranian people (Website of Iran's supreme leader, November 16, 2016).

2. President Hassan Rouhanisaid at a government meeting that the results of the presidential elections exposed American's internal tensions and instability, which would continue. He said today the United States did not have the ability, as it had in the past, to exploit Iranophobia to mobilize a global consensus against Iran. He added that by virtue of Iran's prudence and forethought, the nuclear agreement had not been signed with only one state or government, but had been ratified through a UN Security Council resolution. Therefore, it could not be changed unilaterally by one country (ISNA, November 9, 2016).

3. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, while on a visit to Romania, said the United States had to implement the international commitments it took upon itself as a party to the agreement, even though it did not have political relations with Iran. He said that the American president had to understand global realpolitik (ISNA, November 9, 2016).

4. Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Bahram Qasemisaid that what was important for Iran and its citizens was how the new American administration implemented its foreign policy. He said that over the last decades the experience of the Iranian people and the Islamic Republic with American politicians had been bitter (ISNA, November 9, 2016).

5. Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said that the results of the elections in the United States showed the increasing frustration and lack of trust of most of American society for the system of government. He added that the results of the election would have no influence on Iran because Iran was an independent country and its policies were not influenced by changes in the governments of other countries (ISNA, November 9, 2016).

6. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, interviewed by Iranian newspaper Arman-e Emruz on November 14, 2016, said that from the beginning of the Islamic Revolution to today, Iran had not seen any difference between the Democratic and Republican parties. He said they were identical even if their rhetoric was different. The positions Trump took during the election showed he was dangerous and unprincipled, he claimed.

7. Hossein Salami, deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, said the experience of the past four decades showed that American foreign policy towards Iranian had not changed, regardless of the change in presidents, and that its hostility towards Iran was the same whether the president was Democratic or Republican (Sepah News, November 9, 2016).

8. Mohammed Reza Naqdi, commander of the IRGC's Basij militia, said Trump represented the true face of the United States. His election, Naqdi claimed, could hasten the expected collapse of the United States, and it could take less than ten years (Fars, November 13, 2016).

9. Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior advisor to the supreme leader for military affairs, said it was too early to judge the president elect, and it could only be hoped he would significantly change his country's foreign policies towards Iran, Syria and Iraq. He said past experience had shown that presidential candidates in various countries changed their positions once they had won the election and the same could be true for the United States, since the American political system did not allow the president to do whatever he pleased (Fars, November 14, 2016).

10. Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, senior advisor to the supreme leader and former speaker of the Majlis, said that in his opinion America's foreign policy towards Iran would not change in the wake of the Trump victory. He said presidents customarily make promises during their campaigns they did not keep afterwards. He added that if Trump actually did what he promised, it would influence not only Iran and the nuclear agreement, but also relations between the United States, the EU and the Arab states. Such a change, he said, might be beneficial for Iran, which had not profited at all from previous arrangements (Fars, November 12, 2016).

11. Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said that it was necessary to wait and see what the president elect's foreign policy would actually be. He said Iran was prepared for every scenario. Every country that had signed the nuclear agreement and acted logically had to continue implementing it. Asked about the possibility that Trump might cancel the agreement, he said that it was in America's interest to support the agreement and that the new administration had to find solutions for the remaining problems, especially in finance and banking (ISNA, November 9, 2016).

12. Majlis speaker Ali Larijanisaid that it was inadvisable to judge the president elect too hastily, and that the "diplomatic apparatus" should be allowed to formulate a clear position regarding him (ISNA, November 13, 2016).

13. Ali Motahari, deputy speaker of the Majlis,said Trump's victory would be good for Iran because he was more honest than Clinton, his positions on Syria were "good," he was against Saudi Arabia and he wanted to improve America's relations with Russia (ISNA, November 9, 2016).

14. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy, said Trump's victory showed that Americans were against the "war-mongering" policies of the American administration. He said the American administration was committed to the nuclear agreement and that any action it took would be met with a proper reaction. He added that there was a difference between "Trump running for election" and "Trump as president," and that if the president elect wanted to keep his election promises, he at least had to stop sending weapons to Saudi Arabia (ISNA, November 9, 2016).

15. Mohammad Reza Pour Ebrahimi, chairman of the Majlis economic committee, said the United States' new approach to ISIS and Saudi Arabia could offer Iran a chance to increase its regional economic involvement (ISNA, November 9, 2016).

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