1. Home

Tag Archives: Iran

Spotlight on Global Jihad (August 18-24, 2016)

Published:
Spotlight on Global Jihad

Spotlight on Global Jihad

The area of the Syrian Air Force’s Technical School from the south.

The area of the Syrian Air Force’s Technical School from the south.

Fateh al-Sham Front operatives in the area of the Technical School (The Fateh al-Sham Front’s YouTube Account, August 20, 2016)

Fateh al-Sham Front operatives in the area of the Technical School (The Fateh al-Sham Front’s YouTube Account, August 20, 2016)

Fighters from Division 13 of the rebel forces preparing to launch an anti-tank missile at ISIS operatives in the area of Al-Ra’i (Haqq, August 19, 2016)

Fighters from Division 13 of the rebel forces preparing to launch an anti-tank missile at ISIS operatives in the area of Al-Ra’i (Haqq, August 19, 2016)

A building in Al-Ra’i that housed the Islamic State’s Sharia Institute (YouTube account of Division 13, August 19, 2016)

A building in Al-Ra’i that housed the Islamic State’s Sharia Institute (YouTube account of Division 13, August 19, 2016)

Suicide bomber codenamed Abu Hamza al-Mosuli, who detonated a car bomb against the Iraqi Army south of Al-Shirqat.

Suicide bomber codenamed Abu Hamza al-Mosuli, who detonated a car bomb against the Iraqi Army south of Al-Shirqat.


Main events of the week

  • This week, the fighting in Syria was concentrated in and around the city of Aleppo and in the area west of the Euphrates River, near the Syrian-Turkish border. In this context:
  • In Aleppo, the rebel organizations (led by the Fateh al-Sham Front) managed to fend off attacks by the Syrian Army and maintain the logistical corridor in the south of the city. Most of the fighting took place in the Al-Ramousah neighborhood, in southern Aleppo, and in the area dominating the road leading south from Aleppo. The fighting is still ongoing, with neither side having the upper hand.
  • In the area west of the Euphrates River, the collapse of ISIS’s strongholds continues: on August 24, a Turkish military force along with rebel forces captured the city of Jarabulus, near the Syrian-Turkish border. The city was captured in an operation that the Turks call Euphrates Shield, without significant ISIS resistance. In addition, the Free Syrian Army took over the city of Al-Ra’i, an ISIS stronghold north of Aleppo, and its forces are also threatening the city of Al-Bab, south of Al-Ra’i (Note: This paragraph of the English version was added after the Hebrew version had already appeared. The paragraph is updated to the morning of August 25).

 

The US-led campaign against ISIS

  • During the week, the US-led coalition continued its airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq, although the intensity was still relatively low compared to previous weeks. In Syria, the airstrikes were concentrated in and around the city of Marea, north of Aleppo. Airstrikes were also carried out in Deir al-Zor, Abu Kamal, and Al-Raqqah. In Iraq, the airstrikes were concentrated mainly in the areas of Erbil and Mosul. In Libya, US airstrikes against ISIS targets in the city of Sirte continued, as support for the forces of the Government of National Accord fighting in the city (US Department of Defense website).
  • Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, the new commander of the campaign waged by the United States and the coalition against ISIS, estimated that the forces supported by the United States in Syria and Iraq were ready for the “decisive battle” against ISIS in Mosul in Iraq and Al-Raqqah in Syria. According to Lt. Gen. Townsend, the US would help local forces by significantly increasing the airstrikes as well by training and equipping the local forces. However, he stressed that the US assistance would not include expanding the involvement of US Army on the ground (The Washington Post, August 21, 2016). At this point, this statement appears to be overoptimistic, and in the ITIC’s assessment, the “decisive battle” is not expected to take place in the near future.
Coordination of airstrikes between US and Russia
  • The US Department of Defense warned Syria and Russia after airstrikes against the Kurds carried out by the Syrian Air Force in the area of Al-Hasakah endangered US forces.According to US Department of State spokesman Jeff Davis, US-led coalition aircraft circled above the city of Al-Hasakah after Syrian aircraft had attacked Kurdish targets near bases of the US Special Forces deployed in the area (Fox News, August 19, 2016).
  • During a press conference during his visit to Kenya, US Secretary of State John Kerry expressed the hope that the talks between Russia and the United States regarding operational cooperation in Syria against ISIS would soon come to an end. According to him, it is possible that there will soon be a meeting on this matter between him and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov (Reuters, August 22, 2016).

Russia’s involvement in the fighting

Airstrikes in Syria
  • On August 18, 2016, Russian aircraft attacked ISIS targets in Deir al-Zor using long-range missiles. The attack reportedly destroyed five arsenals, six headquarters and a number of armored vehicles. ISIS operatives were also hit. Russia’s Defense Ministry reported that on August 19, 2016, Russian warships stationed in the Mediterranean launched three cruise missiles against targets of the Fateh al-Sham Front (formerly the Al-Nusra Front)in the city of Aleppo. This was the first launch of cruise missiles from ships located in the Mediterranean region (TASS, August 18, 2016).
  • Iran has criticized Russia’s use of Hamadan Airport in western Iran to attack targets in Syria. Russian Defense Ministry Spokesman Igor Konashenkov announced in response that the Russian planes operating out of Iran had completed their missions and returned to Russian territory. He added that any further use of the airport by Russian aircraft would be based on agreements with Iran (TASS, August 22, 2016). Iran’s Defense Ministry said that no agreement had been signed between Iran and Russia regarding the use of the airport and that the cooperation between the two countries was temporary (TASS, August 22, 2016).

Main developments in Syria

The Aleppo campaign

This week as well, the rebel organizations managed to preserve the corridor south of Aleppo used for communicating with the rebel organizations in the east of the city, and to preventthe re-encirclement of the city. The battles between the Syrian regime forces and the rebel forces led by the Fateh al-Sham Front continued to focus on the south of the city. According to the Fateh al-Sham Front’s reports, in the current campaign in Aleppo, the Syrian Army and the forces that support it sustained 322 losses, including 70 officers of various ranks (Fateh al-Sham Front-affiliated Twitter account, August 20, 2016).

 

  • The battles between the rebel organizations and the Syrian Army and the forces supporting it continued to focus on the Al-Ramousah neighborhood in southern Aleppo. Fierce battles took place at the Syrian Air Force’s Technical School in the neighborhood, which controls the traffic routes linking the city of Aleppo and the rural area to the south. The two sides are also trying to take control of areas dominating the main road leading to the area of Khan Touman, controlled by the rebel organizations.
  • Northeast of Aleppo, there were clashes between ISIS operatives and the Free Syrian Army. The Free Syrian Army took over the city of Al-Ra’i from ISIS. The city is located about 2 km south of the Syrian-Turkish border (YouTube account of the Sultan Murad Division, August 19, 2016). This means the loss of another important ISIS stronghold and the weakening of its position in the area between the Euphrates River and Aleppo, near the Syrian-Turkish border.
The area west of the Euphrates River
  • After the takeover of Manbij, the SDF forces continue to cleanse the surrounding villages. They are reportedly advancing towards the city of Jarabulus, near the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey, which fears the fall of the city to the predominantly Kurdish forces, is encouraging the Free Syrian Army, which has taken over Al-Ra’i, to take over Jarabulus.
  • On August 24, a Turkish military force, along with rebel forces, captured the city of Jarabulus (Note: an analysis of the Turkish move will be published soon).
  • As usual, ISIS responded with guerilla warfare and terrorist attacks:A suicide bomber named Rami Musa Hamad, aka Abu Ahmad al-Ghazawi (i.e., the Gazan), detonated a car bomb in an SDF staging zone southwest of Manbij. The blast reportedly killed about 30 soldiers (ISIS-affiliated Twitter account, August 19, 2016). Another suicide bomber, codenamed Khattab al-Tunisi (i.e., the Tunisian), detonated a car bomb against an SDF staging zone southwest of Manbij (Haqq, August 19, 2016). ISIS operatives blew up a water pipe on the outskirts of Manbij (Local Coordinating Committees, August 22, 2016). According to the Aamaq News Agency, ISIS’s media foundation, a US soldier was killed near Manbij. The Central Command of the US Army denied the report.

Main developments in Iraq

ISIS’s terrorist activities and guerilla warfare continue
  • ISIS continues its intensive terrorism and guerrilla warfare against the Shiites, the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi government, and residents perceived as opponents of ISIS in the various provinces of Iraq:
  • August 22, 2016 – Six people were killed and five others were wounded by a roadside IED planted by ISIS operatives in the area of Hawija in the Kirkuk Province in northern Iraq (Al-Arabiya TV, August 22, 2016).
  • August 21, 2016 – Iraqi police reported that a minor was caught while trying to carry out a suicide bombing attack with an explosive belt in the city of Kirkuk. During his interrogation he said that he came from Mosul, where he was kidnapped by a masked man who put the explosive belt on him and sent him to the area (Al-Arabiya, August 21, 2016).
  • August 21, 2016 – A policeman was killed and another wounded by an IED deployed against a patrol about 16 km west of Ramadi (Al-Sumaria, August 21, 2016).
  • August 20, 2016 – Five suicide bombers detonated five car bombs against the Iraqi Army south and southwest of Al-Shirqat (south of Mosul, west of Kirkuk). Dozens of soldiers were killed or wounded and a large quantity of military equipment was destroyed (ISIS-affiliated Twitter account, August 20, 2016)
  • August 19, 2016 – ISIS operatives killed 14 Iraqi civilians in the city of Mosul, who were accused of providing information to the Iraqi forces. They were put into metal cages in the Mosul city center and drowned (Al-Bawaba, August 19, 2016).
The area of Qayyarah
  • According to a report by the Iraqi Army, it has managed to take over around 75% of the city of Qayyarah, situated about 60 km south of Mosul. Many ISIS operatives were reportedly killed in the fighting. According to Iraqi Army sources, the Iraqi Army managed to take over the city center and ISIS operatives have withdrawn from there (Al-Jazeera, August 23, 2016). An ISIS suicide bomber blew himself up among the Iraqi forces in central Qayyarah (Al-Nashra, August 23, 2016). The area of Qayyarah is perceived as a springboard for a future takeover of the city of Mosul, ISIS’s stronghold in Iraq.

The global jihad in other countries

Libya
The campaign for the liberation of Sirte
  • During the week, the attempt to complete the takeover of the city of Sirte from ISIS continued.Libyan Army forces fighting in Sirte continue to receive support from the US Air Force. The Libyan forces have advanced and took over a number of positions and neighborhoods from ISIS, including Neighborhood No. 1, situated in the heart of the region which still remains under the control of ISIS. The Libyan forces also took over the former Libyan homeland security headquarters, which had been used by ISIS as a prison, and the headquarters of ISIS’s Islamic morality police (hisba) (Al-Jazeera, August 22, 2016; Facebook page of the information center of the campaign over Sirte, August 21, 2016).
  • According to a spokesman for the Libyan government forces, ISIS suicide bombers carried out a double car bomb attack in western Sirte. The attacks killed 10 soldiers and wounded 20 others. After the attack, government forces raided a residential neighborhood in Sirte, killing three ISIS operatives (AP, August 18, 2016). During the fighting, the Libyan Army forces killed Abu Mariam al-Masri, a senior ISIS operative in Sirte. Abu Mariam al-Masri is the one who ordered the execution of 21 Copts in February 2015. He also sentenced more than 50 Libyan citizens to death (Al-Fajr, August 19, 2016).
Russia
  • On August 17, 2016, two Russian traffic policemen were attacked in the Balashikha region, some 20 km east of Moscow.The two policemen were wounded, one of them seriously. Two gunmen, who were also armed with axes, shot and injured the policemen. They were shot dead by the security forces. The two terrorists were reportedly Chechens.
  • The Aamaq News Agency, ISIS’s media foundation, claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack. A video released by the news agency the day after the attack (with subtitles in Arabic) shows the two terrorists before leaving on their mission. Their codenames are Uthman Mardalov and Salim Israilov. In the video, one of the terrorists declares in Russian and Arabic that they are “fighters of the Islamic State” who pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (heavy.com, August 18, 2016). The speakers on the video say that the attack was carried out in revenge for the Russian airstrikes in Syria (Reuters, August 18, 2016).
  • Earlier that day, four suspects were killed during a raid carried out by Russian Special Forces in an apartment building in St. Petersburg. According to the Russian anti-terrorism committee, the suspects were the leaders of a “terrorist underground” operating in the Kabardino-Balkaria region in the northern Caucasus. At least three of the dead were wanted men. According to security forces, the suspects were killed after opening fire at the security forces surrounding the building where they were staying. Weapons and explosives were found in the apartment where the suspects were hiding.
Turkey
  • A suicide bombing attack was carried out during a wedding in the Kurdish city of Gaziantep, in southern Turkey. According to the reports, 51 people were killed and 69 were wounded. The attack was carried out by a suicide bomber, a boy in his teens. Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan said that there were signs that the attack was carried out by ISIS (AFP, August 20, 2016). ISIS has not yet publicly claimed responsibility for the attack and we do not have any further information linking it to the attack.

Counterterrorism and preventive activity

Germany
  • German police arrested a man who had been under police surveillance. In the suspect’s apartment there were fireworks, gas masks, camouflage suits, a replica Kalashnikov rifle, and material linking him to ISIS (Reuters, August 17, 2016).
Britain
  • Two women were arrested after attempting to go to Syria to join ISIS. According to London police, they are 16 and 20 and were arrested in central London. Police say there has been a recent increase in the number of young people attempting to join the ranks of ISIS. A week earlier, a British girl was killed in an airstrike in the city of Al-Raqqah. She was one of three schoolgirls who joined the ranks of ISIS (The Independent, August 22, 2016).
The Philippines
  • Three men suspected of being operatives in Ansar al-Khilafah, a local ISIS-affiliated group in the southern Philippines, were killed by security forces.  According to the police, a special task force searching for the organization’s leader entered an apartment where there were ISIS flags and materials and instructions for making IEDs. The three men who were killed may have been involved in the attack during the festival in June 2016, in which eight people were injured (The Manila Times, August 20, 2016).

The battle for hearts and minds

Closing Twitter accounts of jihad operatives
  • According to Twitter’s management, since mid-2015 it has closed 360,000 accounts used for propaganda on behalf of terrorist organizations. The management claims to have shortened the response time and increased the staff that scans messages. In the past, Twitter’s management was criticized for not doing enough to terminate the activity of ISIS-affiliated accounts. According to an announcement released by ISIS, it perceives anyone who is active on social media as a fighter for all intents and purposes (Twitter account, August 20, 2016).  

Related Articles

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 18 – 25 , 2024)

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 16-23, 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Hezbollah Communications Devices Explode

Spotlight on Iran

July 31 – August 14, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Hossein Sheikholeslam (Tasnim, August 3, 2016).

Hossein Sheikholeslam (Tasnim, August 3, 2016).

Hossein Salami (Fars, August 4, 2016).

Hossein Salami (Fars, August 4, 2016).

Mohamed Maradi, Iranian regular army officer, killed in Syria (Qassemsoleimani.ir, August 1, 2016).

Mohamed Maradi, Iranian regular army officer, killed in Syria (Qassemsoleimani.ir, August 1, 2016).

Soleimani at the house of Fatemiyoun commander Tavasoli, killed in Syria (Tasnim, August 2, 2016).

Soleimani at the house of Fatemiyoun commander Tavasoli, killed in Syria (Tasnim, August 2, 2016).

Alaeddin Boroujerdi meets with Hassan Nasrallah (Fars, August 2, 2016).

Alaeddin Boroujerdi meets with Hassan Nasrallah (Fars, August 2, 2016).

Ali Shamkhani and the PUK delegation meet in northern Iraq (IRNA, August 9, 2016).

Ali Shamkhani and the PUK delegation meet in northern Iraq (IRNA, August 9, 2016).

Mahmoud Abbas meets with Maryam Rajavi (Asr-e Iran, July 31, 2016).

Mahmoud Abbas meets with Maryam Rajavi (Asr-e Iran, July 31, 2016).

Abdollahian meets in Tehran with al-Zawawi (NASNIM, AUGUST 7 2016).

Abdollahian meets in Tehran with al-Zawawi (NASNIM, AUGUST 7 2016).


Main Points
  • At least six Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters and one regular army officer were killed during the past two weeks battling Syrian rebels in the Aleppo region.
  • Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, recently paid a visit to the family of the commander of the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade who was killed in Syria in February 2015. Soleimani praised the brigade, which so far has lost about 400 of its fighters in combat in Syria.
  • A delegation of members of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) national security and foreign policy committee visited Lebanon and Syria. Meeting with senior Lebanese and Syrian officials they stressed Iran's continuing support for the "resistance front" in the fight against radical Sunni Islamic organizations and Israel.
  • A spokesman for the Iraqi Shi'ite militias said that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, was expected to participate in the campaign for the liberation of Mosul from ISIS, noting that his presence on the battlefield was vital. The London-based newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat reported that Soleimani had recently toured Nineveh Province in northern Iraq in preparation for the campaign.
  • Iran strongly condemned the meeting held by Mahmoud Abbas and Maryam Rajavi, the leader of the Iranian opposition organization Mojahedin-e-Khalq. They met in Paris at the end of July 2016.
  • The Iranian foreign ministry denied the claim of a spokesman for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who said that Iran had sent arms to Yemen.
  •  Ahmad Vahidi, the former Iranian defense minister, who is wanted by Interpol for involvement in blowing up the Jewish community center (the AMIA building) in Argentina in 1994, was recently appointed head of Iran's Supreme National Defense University.

 

General Information
  • Hossein Sheikholeslam, advisor to the Iranian foreign minister interviewed by Tasnim News, said that Iranian-Syrian military cooperation had existed since 1982, and that in certain instances Syria supported Iran and in others Iran supported Syria. He stated that Iran operated a factory in Syria for the production of missiles that had been used by Hezbollah against Israel in the Second Lebanon War. He claimed that Iran's involvement in the current Syrian crisis only began after foreign terrorists had arrived to fight the Syrian regime.
  • Hossein Sheikholeslam, formerly the Iranian ambassador to Damascus, said that one of the most significant events during his tenure as advisor to the speaker of the Majlis for international affairs was the convening of the international conference in support of the intifada in Palestine, at which the supreme leader had been present. The committee responsible for organizing the conference, he claimed, had five members. Its chairman was appointed by the Majlis speaker, two members were nominated at the Majlis open session and two others by the Majlis committee for national security and foreign policy. He stated that Iran was investing efforts to implement the supreme leader's instructions regarding the necessity of arming the West Bank (Tasnim, August 3, 2016).
  •  Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, meeting with clerics during a visit to the Azeri capital of Baku last week, said Iran regarded it as its duty to rescue the Islamic world from terrorism and that if a request were made, Iran would offer support to Muslims anywhere they were affected by terrorism. He claimed Iran had been quick to support the Iraqis and had not allowed Baghdad and Irbil to fall (Tasnim, August 8, 2016).
  •  Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, commander of the Iranian armed forces, recently appointed Ahmad Vahidi, former Iranian defense minister, as head of Iran's Supreme National Defense University. The university is located in Tehran and is a subsidiary of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its objective is to increase the research ability of high-ranking commanders and managers in the armed forces and defense and security officials, and prepares skilled manpower for holding command and management positions at high levels in the Iranian armed forces[1] (Mehr, August 3, 2016). At the time of the AMIA attack in Argentina (1994) Ahmad Vahidi was commander of the IRGC's Qods Force. He is wanted by Interpol for his involvement in the attack, and the warrant for his arrest is still outstanding.
  •  Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the IRGC, gave a speech in the northern Iranian city of Orumiyeh. He claimed Iran alone was capable of taking a stand to fight the takfiri organizations that enjoyed the support of the West. He said that for Iran's enemies the coordination between Iran and Syria, Iraq and Yemen was unbearable, and that as long as Muslims continued resisting their enemies could not achieve their goals (Tasnim, August 9, 2016).
  •  Hossein Salami, deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, said at a conference in Kermanshah that the Iranians fighting in Syria and Iraq ("the defenders of the shrines") had taken up positions against the plots of their enemies and had turned the lands of Islam into a graveyard for the aspirations of "arrogance" [i.e., the West] (Fars, August 4, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  •  At least six Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters and one regular army officer were killed during the past two weeks in combat against Syrian rebels in the Aleppo region.
  •  On August 2, 2016, the Tasnim news agency reported that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, had recently paid a visit to the family of Ali Reza Tavasoli, the commander of the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade who was killed in Syria in February 2015. Soleimani praised Tavasoli and the activities of the Fatemiyoun Brigade in Syria, saying their fighting was particularly influential in the Syrian campaign and important in defending the Muslim world. "The Fatemiyoun Brigade," he said, "is a blessing, not only for the Muslims here, but for the entire Muslim world." He added that the Fatemiyoun Brigade fighters had changed the way Iranians perceived Afghans living in Iran, and they were now respected. About 400 Afghan fighters have been killed in Syria since the beginning of the Syrian civil war.
  •  At the beginning of August 2016 a delegation of members of the Majlis' national security and foreign policy committee visited Lebanon and Syria. They met with the Lebanese prime minister, foreign minister, speaker of the Lebanese parliament and Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah. In Syria they met with President Assad, the Syrian prime minister, foreign minister and speaker of the Syrian parliament. In Beirut Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Majlis committee, said that Lebanon's security, unity, independence and stability were very important for Iran. He told journalists that Iran was still prepared to provide Lebanon with military support to fight against "Zionists and takfiri terrorists" (IRNA, August 1 and 2, 2016). At a press conference in Damascus he said the visit to Syria was an expression of Iran's policy of supporting the "resistance axis" against the "Zionist entity." He stressed Iran's support of Syria, saying that the attacks in the countries that supported terrorism in Syria proved terrorism had no borders (SANA, August 4, 2016).
  •  Shahrouz Barzegar, a member of the Majlis national security and foreign policy committee delegation visiting Syria and Lebanon, said Iran was prepared to collaborate in rebuilding Syria. He said Syrian and Iranian officials had examined ways of repairing the damages caused by the Syrian civil war. He said Iran would not provide financial support but wanted to integrate the Iranian private sector in the construction projects (IRNA, August 8, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  •  Ahmad al-Assadi, spokesman for the Iraqi Shi'ite militias, said Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, was expected to participate with the Iraqi militias in the campaign to liberate Mosul from ISIS and that his presence on the battlefield was vital. He said every region where Soleimani had been present was rapidly liberated and that ISIS suffered heavy losses. He claimed Soleimani's participation in the war on ISIS expressed Iran's overall support. He added that Soleimani was the military advisor of all the Iraqi forces fighting ISIS, among them the popular militias, the army, counterterrorism headquarters and the federal police. Soleimani's participation in the campaign, he said, could remove all the obstacles on the road to victory. As to the sensitivity of the inhabitants of Mosul to the presence of an Iranian advisor in the liberation of the city, al-Assadi said a distinction had to be made between the desire of most of the civilians who were held hostage by ISIS and the desire of those who wanted to keep the campaign from succeeding (ISNA, August 1, 2016).
  •  On August 3, 2016, the London-based, Saudi Arabian funded newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat quoted an Iraqi parliament member as saying that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, had recently toured Nineveh Province in northern Iraq in preparation for the campaign to liberate Mosul from ISIS. According to the report, Soleimani had crossed the border between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan and reached Nineveh Province by passing through Kirkuk. His passage, according to the report, had been coordinated with the Iraqi security authorities and did not require a passport.
  •  A delegation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) from northern Iraq visited Tehran last week. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, met with the members of the delegation. He told them Iraq's interests and regional standing required unity, and that only a strong, united Iraq could defeat the takfiri terrorist groups operating in the country. Regarding the continuing cooperation between Iran and the Kurdish groups in Iraq, he said the abiding friendship between Iran and the Kurds in Iraq was the foundation for their cooperation and long-time common struggle. He added that Iran was prepared to broaden its economic and political collaboration with the Kurdish Autonomous Region in northern Iraq within the framework of the central Iraqi regime (Tasnim, August 9, 2016).
 Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  •  Iran strongly condemned the meeting held by Mahmoud Abbas and Maryam Rajavi, the leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Iranian opposition organization, in Paris on July 30, 2016. Hossein Sheikholeslam, advisor to the Iranian foreign minister, said Mahmoud Abbas' conduct showed he was a puppet of the Americans. He added that documents found in the American embassy in Tehran clearly indicated Abbas was a CIA agent. He said it was not surprising that the Palestinian faction pressured by the United States to surrender to Israel had met with [Iranian] terrorists. According to Hossein Sheikholeslam, in view of Abbas' weak, disturbed personality, Iran did not have to relate seriously to the meeting (Asr-e Iran, July 31, 2016).
  • Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, advisor to the Majlis speaker for international affairs and a former deputy foreign minister, said that without a doubt the Palestinians were displeased that Mahmoud Abbas supported terrorists instead of fighting against them. Abbas' problem, he said, was that he was not focused on restoring the Palestinians' rights. Supporting terrorists instead of fighting them would not lead to the liberation of Jerusalem and weakening of the "Zionist regime," making the meeting a source of regret for the Palestinians (Mehr, August 2, 2016). On August 7, 2016, Hossein Amir Abdollahian met in Tehran with Sallah al-Zawawi, the Palestinian ambassador, to discuss regional developments and ways of "strengthening the resistance axis" (Tasnim, August 7, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in the Gulf States
  •  Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, rejected the claims of a senior British official who said Iran had sent arms to Yemen. Edwin Samuel, a spokesman for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office for Middle Eastern and African affairs, recently accused Iran of sending arms to Yemen and meddling in the country's internal affairs. The accusation was made in an interview with a Saudi Arabian newspaper. Qasemi claimed the accusation was a bald-faced lie and called it "clear meddling in the internal affairs of regional [i.e., Middle Eastern] countries and a continuation of divisive British policy." He added that Iranian policies were based on regional stabilization and security, but unfortunately the military presence of foreign countries contributed to regional instability, extremism and the spread of terrorism (Fars, August 3, 2016).

[*] Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.
[1] http://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/supreme-national-defense-university

Related Articles

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 18 – 25 , 2024)

Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (September 17- 24 , 2024)

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 16-23, 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Spotlight on Iran

July 17 – 31, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Hossein-Amir Abdollahian (IRIB News, July 20, 2016)

Hossein-Amir Abdollahian (IRIB News, July 20, 2016)

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and the president of Nigeria (Mehr, July 25, 2016).

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and the president of Nigeria (Mehr, July 25, 2016).

Hossein Sheikholeslam (pointing (Tasnim, July 17, 2016).

Hossein Sheikholeslam (pointing (Tasnim, July 17, 2016).

Fatemiyoun Brigade fighter interviewed by (Tasnim News, July 24, 2016).

Fatemiyoun Brigade fighter interviewed by (Tasnim News, July 24, 2016).

Mohammad-Reza Naghdi in the Quneitra region (ISNA, July 27, 2016).

Mohammad-Reza Naghdi in the Quneitra region (ISNA, July 27, 2016).

Ayatollah Mohsen Araki and Imad Mohammad Deeb Khamis (Fars, July 27, 2016).

Ayatollah Mohsen Araki and Imad Mohammad Deeb Khamis (Fars, July 27, 2016).

Sheikh Abu-Taleb al-Saeedi (right) interviewed by Tasnim News, July 21, 2016.

Sheikh Abu-Taleb al-Saeedi (right) interviewed by Tasnim News, July 21, 2016.

The Iranian ambassador to Iraq (left) and the speaker of the Iraqi parliament (Jamnews.ir, July 24, 2016).

The Iranian ambassador to Iraq (left) and the speaker of the Iraqi parliament (Jamnews.ir, July 24, 2016).


Main Points
  • Hossein Dehqan, Iranian minister of defense, said Iran was proud of the support it gave the "resistance front," and that it deployed advisors to Syria to aid in recruiting the Syrian public for the struggle against the country's enemies.
  • Mohammad-Reza Naghdi, commander of the Basij wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), recently visited the region of Quneitra in the Golan Heights and was observed near the Israeli-Syrian border.
  • According to an Iranian report, Hossein Sheikholeslam is expected to be appointed Iranian ambassador to Syria. Sheikholeslam, who held the post in the past, was recently appointed advisor to the Iranian Foreign Minister.
  • Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, Head of the World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, visited Syria where he and the Syrian minister of Muslim endowments agreed to broaden the Forum's religious activity in Syria.
  • Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the IRGC, said that today the defense of Iraqi civilian security was in the hands of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force.
  • Senior Iranian officials renewed their threats to Bahrain in view of the trial of senior Shi'ite cleric Sheikh Mohammad Issa Qassim, which was scheduled to begin last week.

 

General Information
  • Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, interviewed by al-Ahd, Lebanese Hezbollah's website, spoke about regional developments. He claimed Hezbollah played an important role in defeating "the terrorist groups" operating in Syria and in defending Lebanon's security. He repeated Iran's official position that Syria's future and fate had to be determined exclusively by Syrians. From the beginning, he said, weakening the Syrian regime had been the plan of America and Israel, with the collaboration of regional countries, and its eventual objective was to defeat the resistance front. Shamkhani said the countries supporting ISIS had assumed it would be possible to limit ISIS's operations to Syria and Iraq, but time proved them wrong (ISNA, July 19, 2016).
  • Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, former deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs, interviewed by the Iranian broadcasting authority, said the regional governments owed their security to the IRGC's Qods Force, commanded by Qasem Soleimani. He said that when it was a matter of its own security, Iran recognized no borders in its struggle against the terrorists in Syria and Iraq. He said that without a doubt America and Israel were behind the developments in Syria and their objective was to destabilize the Middle East. The objective of the United States in Iraq, he claimed, was to control the activities of ISIS and not to defeat it, in order to ensure American influence and an American presence. The former Iranian foreign minister, who was appointed last week as special advisor to the speaker of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament) for international affairs, said no changes were to be expected in Iran's regional policies now that he had left his post (Fars, July 20, 2016).
  • Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iranian foreign minister, visited western Africa last week, where he met with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari. He told Buhari that Iran was prepared to collaborate with Nigeria in its struggle against the radical Islamist Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations (IRNA, July 25, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  •  Javad Karimi Ghodousi, member of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said the Iranian foreign ministry had decided to appoint Hossein Sheikholeslam as Iranian ambassador to Syria. Hossein Sheikholeslam, who held the post between 1998 and 2003, recently completed his duties as Majlis foreign policy advisor and was appointed as advisor to Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. During the 1980s and 1990s he served as deputy foreign minister for Arab and African affairs (Tasnim, July 17, 2016).
  • Hossein Dehqan, Iranian minister of defense, at a ceremony commemorating ten IRGC fighters from Hamadan Province who were killed in Syria, said Iran was proud of the support it gave the "resistance front." He said Iran had deployed its fighters as advisors to help recruit the Syrian public and guide its struggle against its enemies. He said that for the past three years the Iranian government had given the resistance front material and moral support, as well as the best military advice possible (Fars, July 25, 2016).
  • On July 24 and 25, 2016, Tasnim News published a video-taped interview with two fighters from the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade, which operates under IRGC aegis in Syria. The fighters were recently released from Syrian rebel captivity. They were captured in April 2015 in Dara Province in southern Syria and released in June 2016 as part of a prisoner exchange deal. One of them related how he and eight other Fatemiyoun Brigade fighters had gotten lost, found themselves behind enemy lines and were captured. They claimed they had been tortured, endured forced labor, and coerced into making false statements in interviews conducted by Al-Jazeera TV and Al-Arabiya TV. They said they had been forced to say that they had been deployed by Iran against their will to fight in Syria.
  • On July 27, 2016, Iran's ISNA news agency reported that Mohammad-Reza Naghdi, the commander of the Basij wing of the IRGC, had recently visited the Quneitra region near the Syrian border with Israel. Several dozen Iranian Basij fighters have been killed in Syria since the beginning of the Syrian civil war.
  • Last week Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, Head of the World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, went to Syria, where he met with senior Syrian officials and visited Islamic religious centers. He met with Imad Mohammad Deeb Khamis, prime minister of Syria, who expressed his gratitude for Iran's support of Syria, saying that the Islamic Republic was supporting Syria under extremely difficult conditions. Ayatollah Mohsen Araki told him that the Syrian government was now fighting terrorism, but once it was victorious both the Syrian government and its clerics would have to spread "true Islam" throughout the country. He told the prime minister he had suggested to the Syrian minister of Muslim endowments that "Islamic unity" could be broadened in Syria by establishing a framework for a Shi'ite-Sunni dialogue to bring the schools of Islam closer to one another. Araki and the Syrian minister of Muslim endowments agreed to extend collaboration between the World Forum and Syria's ministry of Muslim endowments (Fars, July 27, 2016). The Iranian World Forum operates under the aegis of the office of the supreme leader and most of its activity focuses on establishing dialogue between Sunni and Shi'ite clerics in the Arab-Muslim world.
  • Interviewed by the Iranian newspaper Arman-e Emrouz on July 26, 2016, Javid Qorbanowghli, a commentator on international news, said that in his assessment the détente between Russia and Turkey was liable to exert pressure on Iranian influence in Syria. He said that if President Putin's effort to convince Turkish President Erdogan to collaborate with him on Syria were successful, it might pose problems for Iran, which so far had collaborated with Russia and Syria. He added, however, that an Iranian-Russian-Turkish agreement for resolving the Syrian crisis could prevent the West from implementing its plans to establish a regional order that would serve Western interests.
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the IRGC, gave a speech at the university in Mashhad where he said that today the security of Iraq's civilians was in the hands of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force (Tasnim, July 20, 2016).
  • On July 21, 2016, Sheikh Abu-Taleb al-Saeedi, a high-ranking fighter in the Iraqi Shi'ite "Hezbollah Iraq" militia, told Iran's Tasnim News that all the Iraqi politicians, including Kurds and Arabs, were convinced that without Iranian military support ISIS would have reached Baghdad. He said that after ISIS took over extensive territories in Iraq in 2014, the Iraqi army would have been unable to continue fighting it without the military and logistic support of the Iranian ministry of defense and the IRGC.
  • His interview joins other interviews given to Iranian media in recent weeks by high-ranking Iraqi Shi'ite militia commanders. These objective of the interviews is apparently to stress the importance of Iranian support for the Shi'ite militias in preparation for the campaign to liberate Mosul from ISIS, expected to be waged soon, and to counter the growing criticism in Iraq over Iranian intervention.
  • On July 24, 2016, Hassan Danaeifar, Iranian ambassador to Iraq, met with Salim al-Jabouri, the speaker of the Iraqi parliament, to discuss political and security developments in Iraq, and ways the two countries could collaborate in the fight against ISIS (IRNA, July 24, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in The Gulf States
  • Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, former deputy foreign minister and current advisor to the speaker of the Majlis for international affairs, claimed Iran did not meddle in Bahrain's internal affairs, but rather supported democracy, freedom of speech and human rights (IRNA, July 26, 2016). Iran recently renewed its strong criticism of the Bahrain authorities because of the trial of senior Shi'ite cleric Sheikh Mohammad Issa Qassim, which was scheduled for last week. The trial was postponed because the sheikh failed to appear in court. In June the Bahraini authorities revoked his citizenship, claiming he had exploited it to "serve foreign interests" and preach separatism and violence. Senior Iranian officials threatened that continued abuse of Sheikh Mohammad Issa Qassim would lead to a popular uprising that would overthrow the Bahraini regime.

[*] Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

Related Articles

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 18 – 25 , 2024)

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 16-23, 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Hezbollah Communications Devices Explode

Spotlight on Iran

July 4-17, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Mohammad Bagheri (ISNA, July 4, 2016).

Mohammad Bagheri (ISNA, July 4, 2016).

Sheikh Mokhtar, commander of the Iraqi Shi'ite al-Nujaba militia (Fars, July 9, 2016).

Sheikh Mokhtar, commander of the Iraqi Shi'ite al-Nujaba militia (Fars, July 9, 2016).

An Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade sniper (Tasnim News, July 9, 2016).

An Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade sniper (Tasnim News, July 9, 2016).

President Rouhani at the home of the family of Hamid Reza Asadollahi

President Rouhani at the home of the family of Hamid Reza Asadollahi

Iraj Masjedi Yjc.ir, July 8, 2016).

Iraj Masjedi Yjc.ir, July 8, 2016).

Basij commander Mohammad Reza Naghdi (right) and Ayyub Hassan Faleh al-Rubaie (Abu Azrael), commander of the Iraqi Shi'ite militia (second from right) in Mashhad in Iran

Basij commander Mohammad Reza Naghdi (right) and Ayyub Hassan Faleh al-Rubaie (Abu Azrael), commander of the Iraqi Shi'ite militia (second from right) in Mashhad in Iran

Khosrow Arouj (Mehr, July 9, 2016).

Khosrow Arouj (Mehr, July 9, 2016).


Main Points
  • Mohammad Bagheri, newly appointed commander in chief of the Iranian armed forces, held a press conference where the said that improving Iran's military capabilities and supporting "the oppressed peoples of the region" were at the top of the Iranian military's priority list.
  • A new group of snipers from the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade, operating under the aegis of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), was deployed to the front in Syria after receiving advanced training from Hezbollah.
  • Abbas Araghchi, deputy Iranian foreign minister, said Iran would not agree to sacrifice Hezbollah in the negotiations conducted with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body combatting money laundering and terrorist financing.
  • Seyyed Ammar al-Hakim, chairman of the Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council, paid a visit to Tehran and met with senior Iranian officials. The officials stressed Iran's commitment to continued support of Iran in its battle against ISIS.
  • Ayyub Faleh Hassan al-Rubaie (Abu-Azrael), a prominent Iraqi Shi'ite militia commander, visited Iran during the second week of July 2016. Interviewed by the Iranian media, he noted the collaboration between the IRGC and the Shi'ite militias. Seyyed Hamed al-Jazayeri, another senior Iraqi Shi'ite militia commander interviewed by the Iranian media, stressed the importance of the presence of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, on the fighting front in Iraq.
  • The senior advisor of the IRGC denounced Hamas' willingness to negotiate with Israel. In the wake of his remarks, which were criticized by Hamas, the IRGC issued a clarification, saying his remarks reflected only his personal opinion, and that Hamas was still in the forefront of the resistance to Zionism in Palestine.

 

General Information
  • Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, briefing the Majlis (Iranian parliament) on July 5, 2016, said Iran's political and military involvement had reduced to a minimum the destabilizing influence and activities of various regional countries and groups. He briefed a closed Majlis session on the challenges facing Iran and on recent regional and international developments. He said the takfiri terrorist organizations in Iraq were on the brink of collapse and that the operation in Fallujah had transferred the military initiative to the Iraqi government. As to developments in Syria, Shamkhani said that the military-political coalition of Iran, Russia and Syria was currently the most important influence on the balance of power (ISNA, July 5, 2016).
  • Mohammad Bagheri, the newly-appointed commander in chief of the Iranian armed forces, told a press a press conference that improving Iran's military capabilities and defending "the oppressed peoples of the region" against aggression and terrorist attacks were the Iranian military's top priority. He said currently regional conditions were "special," and that despite Iran's unprecedented military might, various enemies posed threats to its security.
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • At least three more IRGC fighters were killed in the fighting in Syria during the past two weeks, one of them a lieutenant colonel. More than ten Afghan and Pakistani fighters operating under IRGC in Syria were also killed.
  • Hossein Almasi, commander of the IRGC's 23rd (Hazrat-e Khatam) battalion in Tehran, said the war in Syria was more difficult than the Iran-Iraq War because the takfiri organizations were inspired by ideology and enjoyed the support of the United States, Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries. He called for volunteers for the fighting in Syria or Iraq to enlist at Basij centers and receive the necessary training before being deployed on "advisory missions." He added that the rebels were very familiar with the battlefields in Syria and that gave them an advantage, but in locations where the fighters supporting the Syrian regime were familiar with the terrain the rebels were incapable of repelling them. He said that the presence of many villages throughout Syria made the fighting very difficult (Shaheed News, date, 2016).
  • Sheikh Mokhtar, commander of the Iraqi Shi'ite al-Nujaba militia in Aleppo, said the militia was prepared to fight in any location Iran thought necessary because it was committed to Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei (Fars, July 9, 2016).
  • On July 9, 2016, Tasnim News reported that a new group of snipers from the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade, operating under the aegis of the IRGC, had recently been deployed to the front in Syria, after having been trained by Hezbollah. Their training included firing various arms, sniping with guns provided with cameras, using weapons munted with night-vision cameras, and various types of camouflage and concealment tactics.
  • Iranian President Hassan Rouhani paid a condolence call to the family of Hamid Reza Asadollahi, an IRGC fighter killed in Syria in December 2015. He told them that in some respects the sacrifice of Iranian martyrs in Syria was more difficult than in the Iran-Iraq War. The war with Iran, he said, was fought to defend the homeland and country, while the war in Syria was being fought in a foreign country to defend Muslims and Shi'ite shines. He said that the Iranian fighters in Syria were also defending Iran. He added that the terrorists' barbaric acts proved they were worse than former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein (Website of Hassan Rouhani, July 13, 2016).
  • On the occasion of the first anniversary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Abbas Araghchi, deputy Iranian foreign minister, told Iranian TV that Iran would not agree to sacrifice Hezbollah in the negotiations with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). He said Iran regarded its national security and interests as a "red line," and that its priority was to provide support for the "resistance axis," and that could not be changed. He said there were other countries that did not agree with FATF about the definition of "terrorism" (Fars, July 12, 2016).
  • Araghchi's remarks reinforce our assessment that no significant change can be expected in the quality and quantity of Iran's support for Hezbollah, despite its effort to lift the international economic restrictions imposed on the country in recent years. Iran will be prepared to continue paying the diplomatic, media and even financial price in its relations with the United States and the West for continued fostering of Hezbollah as a military-political force and Iranian proxy.
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, said in an interview that in the wake of the liberation of Fallujah, a comprehensive plan was necessary that would include the Iraqi army, the Shi'ite militias, the Kurds and "advisory help" from Iran for liberating Nineveh Province in northwestern Iraq. He said ISIS had a large force in Mosul and that the city's liberation was important to "closing the ISIS file" in Iraq (Yjc.ir, July 8, 2016).
  • Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, meeting in Tehran with Sayyid Ammar al-Hakim, chairman of the Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council, said Iran would continue providing "advice" to Iraq and Syria until the threat of terrorism had been eliminated. Shamkhani praised al-Hakim for the successful liberation of Fallujah, saying the collaboration of Iran, Russia, Syria and the "resistance front" would put an end to terrorism in Syria as well. Al-Hakim briefed Shamkhani on recent political and military developments in Iraq and thanked Iran for its support of Iraq in the battle against ISIS. While in Tehran, al-Hakim also met with Iranian President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.
  • Ayyub Hassan Faleh al-Rubaie (Abu-Azrael), a prominent Iraqi Shi'ite militia commander, visited Iran during the second week of July 2016. In an interview he expressed his great esteem for Iran, saying that when he visited Iran he did not feel like a foreigner. He said that for centuries British imperialism had tried to sow discord between the peoples of Iran and Iraq, but their efforts had failed and today Iran stood shoulder to shoulder with Iraq in the war on terrorism. He praised the joint struggle of the IRGC, the Iraqi militias and the Iranian and Afghan fighters against the takfiri organizations. He issued a warning to Saudi Arabia, saying that once the struggle against ISIS had been completed in Iraq and Syria, the fighters would also go to Yemen and liberate the holy places in Saudi Arabia from the Saudi rulers.
  • Seyyed Hamed al-Jazayeri, commander of a brigade in the Iraqi Shi'ite militias, was interviewed by the Iranian Mizan website on July 12, 2016, and spoke about Iranian involvement in Iraq. He said Iran sent "advisors" to Syria and Iraq, but since the battle zone was small, the Iranian forces could not be prevented from taking an active part in the fighting.
  • In response to a question about the presence of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, in Iraq, al-Jazayeri said he raised the fighters' morale. Soleimani's presence on the front, he said, was no less important than that of Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, because he served as the main advisor and executor of battle strategy, and had the authority to deploy and replace forces. Al-Jazayeri said Soleimani had only a small number of body guards (no more than one or two) even when he was in dangerous battle zones. However, all the fighters on the ground defended him, and they were all prepared to sacrifice their lives for him.
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Khosrow Arouj, senior advisor to the IRGC commander, interviewed by the Iranian news agency Mehr on July 9, 2016 on the occasion of Global Jerusalem Day, criticized the willingness of the Palestinian organizations, among them Hamas, to negotiate with Israel. He said Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Revolution, had strongly stated that no one had the right to sit at a negotiating table with "the oppressor," that is, with Israel. Arouj also criticized the contacts Hamas and Fatah had with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which, he claimed, collaborated with Israel. "We thought Hamas would be the standard bearer of the struggle against Israel until its destruction, but now we see they speak differently," he said. He also noted Iran's involvement in Syria and Iraq, saying Iranian fighters were not limited by geographical boundaries and could operate anywhere in the world where Muslims were oppressed, from Bosnia and Azerbaijan to Africa.
  • Following the statements made by Arouj, which were condemned by Hamas, the IRGC issued a clarification noting that Arouj did not represent official IRGC positions. Rather, the Palestinian struggle against "the occupying Zionist regime" proved that negotiations with Israel only intensified the oppression of the Palestinians and "resistance" was the only valid strategy against Israel. The IRGC praised Hamas' ongoing struggle against Israel, and Hamas, according to the clarification, was still in the front line of the resistance to Zionism in Palestine. The IRGC, it was noted, expressed their position only through official statements or by means of the IRGC commander, the supreme leader's representative in the IRGC, and the spokesmen of the organization, and any other statement expressed only private, unofficial opinions (Sepah News, July 11, 2016). 

[1]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

Related Articles

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 18 – 25 , 2024)

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 16-23, 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Hezbollah Communications Devices Explode

Nasrallah’s Speech: Hezbollah’s Budget Is Entirely Funded by Iran, Including Weapons and Operatives’ Salaries Analysis of Significance and Implications

Published:

Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah delivers a speech, June 24, 2016 (Al-Ahed, June 24, 2016).
Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah delivers a speech, June 24, 2016 (Al-Ahed, June 24, 2016).

Overview

1.   On June 24, 2016, Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah delivered a speech dealing with Hezbollah's current challenges. One of the issues discussed at length was the pressure exerted by the United States on the Lebanese banks system to prevent them from collaborating with Hezbollah (an American-designated terrorist organization since 1995).

2.   Nasrallah attacked the Lebanese banking system for capitulating to American pressure and freezing the accounts of charitable institutions and individuals [affiliated with Hezbollah]. However, he claimed, the measures taken would not affect the organization because its entire budget came directly from Iran and not through Lebanese banks("Hezbollah's budget, salaries, funds, food, drink [and] weapons all come from Iran… As long as Iran has money, we have money," he said)

3.   His remarks were apparently motivated by the USHizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015, whose objective was "to prevent Hizballah and associated entities from gaining access to international financial and other institutions, and for other purposes," passed on December 18, 2015.[1] It resulted in the imposition of sanctions on Lebanese businesses, concerns, associations and individuals affiliated with Hezbollah. To prevent harm to the Lebanese banking system, in June 2016 the Central Bank of Lebanon blocked the accounts of organizations and individuals affiliated with Hezbollah. Immediately thereafter the banks received a concrete threat about capitulating to American pressure: on June 12, 2016, a bomb hidden in a flower pot exploded in front of the Blom Bank in western Beirut. The objective of Nasrallah's speech was probably to relieve the pressure exerted by the Americans on the Lebanese banking system and keep Hezbollah from being blamed for destroying the Lebanese economy.

4.   According to American administration sources, Iran provides Hezbollah with approximately $200 million a year.[2] Iran also provides Hezbollah with extensive military aid and support for its social institutions, worth, in ITIC assessment, hundreds of millions of dollars a year. The military infrastructure Hezbollah has constructed in Lebanonwith Iranian support is intended, in due time, to be used against Israelin accordance with Iranian interests. That was manifested as recently as July 1, 2016, in a speech given by Hossein Salami, deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), for Global Jerusalem Day: he said that in Lebanon alone there were more than a hundred thousand missiles ready for launching against Israel. Also ready for launching were tens of thousands of long-range missiles in other areas of the Muslim world. All the missiles, he said were for "removing Israel once and for all from the political geography of the entire world" (Fars, July 1, 2016).

 

The Main Points of Nasrallah's Speech
The Lebanese Banks and Financing for Hezbollah

5.   The main points raised by Nasrallah regarding the Lebanese banking system and financing for Hezbollah were the following (Al-Manar, June 24, 2016):

A.   The United States is exerting pressure on the Lebanese banking system: According to Nasrallah, regarding American sanctions, some of the Lebanese banks went so far as to become "more American than the Americans." For example, he said, banks had frozen the accounts of charitable societies [affiliated with Hezbollah] even though their names did not appear on the American list. In addition, he claimed, some of the Lebanese banks even "persecuted" relatives of Hezbollah operatives. The "irresponsible and aggressive" conduct of the Lebanese banks, he said, was an attack on Lebanese sovereignty and was "destroying" the Lebanese economy and banking system. Nevertheless, he claimed, Hezbollah was prepared to discuss the issue with the relevant parties to preserve Lebanon's economy and welfare (despite the fact that according to Hezbollah, there were Lebanese who "went to Washington and influenced the passage of the law").

B.   The American pressure on the Lebanese banks will have no influence on Hezbollah: He noted, with a smirk, that the Arab media had reported "that Hezbollah had collapsed economically." He claimed that even if the Lebanese banking system implemented the American law [to prevent funding from reaching Hezbollah] and even if the banks "exaggerated in implementing it," as far as Hezbollah was concerned, "the law will do them no good and will have no influence on Hezbollah." He said, "while it may exert psychological pressure, it will have no financial or material influence on Hezbollah." Hezbollah, he claimed, "has no commercial projects, no investments, everything is open and above board."

C.  Nasrallah emphasized that American sanctions will have no influence on Hezbollah because its entire budget comes from Iran: To illustrate, he (exceptionally) elaborated the extent of Iran's financial support for Hezbollah, saying, to applause from the audience, "Hezbollah's budget, salaries, funds, food, drink and weapons all come from Iran." He repeated that Hezbollah's entire budget came from Iran, and "as long as Iran has money, we have money." "No [American] law," he said, "can keep the money from reaching us." He claimed that even when sanctions had been imposed on Iran, "the money allotted to Hezbollah continued to reach us."[3]Nasrallah thanked Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameneifor Iran's support throughout all the years of Hezbollah's existence.

6.   Nasrallah's claim that Hezbollah's entire budget, including the military budget, came directly from Iran was an exceptional statement and to a certain extent not entirely accurate. Its objective was probably to relieve American pressure on the Lebanese banking system and keep Hezbollah from being accused of destroying Lebanese banks and economy by sending the ball to the Iranian court. ITIC commentary of Nasrallah's speech is the following:

A.   Most of Hezbollah's budget does in fact come from Iran, butit has other, although secondary, sources of income. They includedonations from Shi'ite businessmen and members of the Shi'ite communities in West Africa and Latin America. Their donations probably reach Hezbollah through bank transfers. In addition, since its founding Hezbollah has dealt extensively in organized crime in Lebanon itself and in other countries(especially in Latin America), in drugs, counterfeiting and other criminal activities. Hezbollah is connected to international drug cartels enabling it, and Iran, to conduct subversive and terrorist activities around the globe (an example of how Iran used its connections with a drug cartel in Mexico to implement the Qods Force plan to assassinate the Saudi Arabia ambassador to the United States in 2011).[4]

B.   Hezbollah maintains an extensive network of social institutions, most of them financed by Iran active in Shi'ite areas throughout Lebanon:

1)  The objective of the institutions is to reinforce the support of the Lebanese Shi'ite population for Hezbollah's military infrastructure and to give the organization added weight in Lebanese politics. The institutions deal with health, education and welfare. Lebanese youth is "educated" to prepare a new generation of Hezbollah operatives (similar to the activities of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip). Many of Hezbollah's social institutions are linked to funds, foundations and organizations in Iran, and receive financing from them.

2)  Hezbollah's social institutions include the Shaheed Foundation(supports the families of killed Hezbollah operatives), the Construction Jihad(deals with initiatives for rehabilitation and construction among the Shi'ite population), the Foundation of the Wounded(supports wounded Hezbollah operatives and their families), the Islamic Health Network(provides health services to Shi'ites and Hezbollah operatives), the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts(Hezbollah's youth movement), the al-Imdad Association(supports the needy) and the Knowledge Association(spreads Shi'ite Islam).

Nasrallah's Attack on the Lebanese Banking System – Background

7.   The American law that enraged Nasrallah was the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015, passed on December 16, 2015, by Congress and signed by the president into law. Its objective is to "prevent Hizballah and associated entities from gaining access to international financial and other institutions, and prevent Hizballah's global logistics and financial network from operating in order to curtail funding of its domestic and international activities; and utilize all available diplomatic, legislative, and executive avenues to combat the global criminal activities of Hizballah as a means to block that organization's ability to fund its global terrorist activities."[5] Once the bill had been signed into law sanctions were imposed on a list of Lebanese businesses, companies, institutions and individuals with ties to Hezbollah. As a result, the Central Bank of Lebanon blocked hundreds and perhaps thousands of Hezbollah-affiliated bank accounts in accordance with the list of American sanctions.

8.   The Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, which has access to Hezbollah, said that among the accounts blocked were those affiliated with Hezbollah's social institutionssupporting Shi'ite Muslims. Blocking the accounts will harm Hezbollah's ability to compensate its Lebanese supporters (En.iranwire). Al-Arabiya TV reported that the Lebanese banking system had recently begun implementing the American sanctions by closing bank accounts affiliated with Hezbollah. They included the accounts of the al-Imdad Association,[6] the Shaheed Foundation[7] and others (Al-Arabiya, June 12, 2016).

The logo of the al-Imdad, Islamic charitable association in Lebanon. It (deliberately) does not publicize the numbers of its bank accounts so as not to involve the Lebanese banking system. Donors inside Lebanon are requested to go to one of the association's offices. Foreigners are requested to telephone the head office in Beirut, and will be told how to send a check or email the association (Website of the association July 3, 2016).
The logo of the al-Imdad, Islamic charitable association in Lebanon. It (deliberately) does not publicize the numbers of its bank accounts so as not to involve the Lebanese banking system. Donors inside Lebanon are requested to go to one of the association's offices. Foreigners are requested to telephone the head office in Beirut, and will be told how to send a check or email the association (Website of the association July 3, 2016).

9.   Two days after Hezbollah-affiliated bank accounts were blocked, the Lebanese banking system received a message, "Lebanese style,"of what it could expect if it continued to capitulate to American pressure. On June 12, 2016, a bomb hidden in a flower pot exploded in front of the Blom Bank in western Beirut. Two people were injured and the building was damaged. Reportedly, the bank was one of the first in Lebanon planning to close dozens of Hezbollah-affiliated accounts in accordance with the American sanctions(Al-Arabiya, June 12, 2016).

Left: The damaged façade of the bank building the day after the explosion (Al-Youm Al-Sabaa, June 13, 2016). The scene of the explosion in western Beirut (Twitter account of Adel Samia, June 12, 2016).
Left: The damaged façade of the bank building the day after the explosion (Al-Youm Al-Sabaa, June 13, 2016). The scene of the explosion in western Beirut (Twitter account of Adel Samia, June 12, 2016).

The façade of the Blom Bank in Beirut before the explosion (Al-Youm Al-Sabaa, June 13, 2016).
The façade of the Blom Bank in Beirut before the explosion (Al-Youm Al-Sabaa, June 13, 2016).

The Iranian Response to Nasrallah's Speech

10.   Following Nasrallah's speech, Ramazan Sharif, IRGC spokesman, said Iran was not concerned about Nasrallah's remarks relating to Iranian support of Hezbollah. He said that so far, the "Zionists and the West" had done everything in their power against Iran and there was nothing further they could do. Iran's support for Palestine and its struggle against the "Zionist regime" were not a secret, he said. He added Iran's position had been openly expressed in declarations made by the founder of the Islamic Revolution and its supreme leader. He said the "Zionist regime" was the "number one enemy" of the Muslim countries, especially Iran. He added that what Nasrallah had said about Iran's financial support of Hezbollah was also a message for the Arab states. Their objective was to make the inexperienced rulers of Saudi Arabia and other states aware of the results of trying to turn Iran and the Shi'ites into the "number one enemy" of the Sunni Arab states. The "Zionist regime," he said was still the principal enemy (ISNA, June 26, 2016).

11.   In ITIC assessment, Sharif's response to the speech does not reflect Iran's genuine position, but a response to Nasrallah's sending the ball to the Iranian court. That is liable to make it even more for difficult for Iran to lift international economic restrictions imposed on it. Since the beginning of the year, when the nuclear agreement went into effect, Iran has found it hard to gain access to the tens of billions of its dollars in frozen foreign accounts. Some of its difficulties are the result of continuing American restrictions on commercial transactions with Iran.[8]

12.   Nasrallah's remarks are liable to lead to voices raised in the West, especially the United States, demanding continued economic restrictions on Iran. That would be a serious challenge to Tehran's efforts to improve its financial status. The American response to Nasrallah's speech included a call for Iran to stop funding Hezbollah (see below). Senior figures in the Iranian government, especially those close to President Rouhani, would probably like to downplay Iran's support of Hezbollah and not openly make a statement that would reinforce America's designation and perception of Iran as a terrorism-sponsoring state.

13.   However, even if Nasrallah's speech made some Iranians uncomfortable, no significant change can be expected in the nature and extent of Iran's support for Hezbollah. That is because Hezbollah is considered by Iran as its favorite strategic arm in its campaign against Israel, in implementing its policies in Syria and in achieving its regional goals. Hezbollah's deep involvement in the fighting in Syria and its support of the pro-Iranian Shi'ite militias in Iraq and Yemen are clear examples of its importance in promoting Iran's regional interests. Thus Iran will probably be willing to pay the diplomatic, media and even financial price in its relations with the United States and the West if it means continuing to strengthen and foster Hezbollah as a military and political force.

 

The American Response: A Call for Iran to Stop Its Support of Hezbollah

14.   During a press briefing on June 27, 2016, Eric Schultz, principal deputy press secretary, was asked to respond to Nasrallah's remarks about the funding Hezbollah received from Iran. He said the following:[9]

A.   "…we have called on all those who fund Hezbollah to stop doing so. We know that Iran supports terrorism, and we know that Iran supports Hezbollah. And that is why we've issued the most serious and most severe sanctions ever on Iran for doing so. So it's important for them to recognize their own behavior in enabling this. And we've had a conversation recently about Iran’s concerns about access to international markets. Well, those financial actors are looking at Iran’s behavior. And if Iran is going to continue to fund terrorism and continue to supply resources to Hezbollah, that is going to have impact. Those financial actors don't want to do business with a country that's doing that."

B.   Asked what leverage America had in terms of the money reaching Hezbollah through the banking system, he said America was "going to continue to use all the tools at our disposal, including sanctions, to target this group that we have, of course, designated as a foreign terrorist organization. We believe our designations over the past year designating Hezbollah procurement networks, financial and commercial front companies and other entities have been highly effective".

C.  "The sanctions regime passed earlier this year further builds on that and has created a climate throughout the world where financial institutions are rejecting Hezbollah from their institutions…if Iran is going to continue to support Hezbollah, Hezbollah is going to continue to have a funding stream and resources. That's why it's all the more important that if Iran wants access to international markets they’re going to need to curb their own behavior." (ITIC emphasis throughout)

 

[1]https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2297/text/pl
[2]According to the annual reports issued by the State Department, Iran gives Hezbollah hundreds of millions of dollars a year: in 2010 the Obama Administration reported that Iran annually gave Hezbollah between $100 and $200 million dollars. The Department of Defense estimate is the same (Loc.gov/crsinfo, June 31, 2015). Matthew Levitt, an American expert on Islamist terrorism, testified before the House Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on September 17, 2015. He said Iran gave Hezbollah $200 million a year, in addition to weapons, training, intelligence and logistic aid. He added the during the previous 18 months Iran had reduced its financial aid to Hezbollah, calling it a "collateral benefit" of the sanctions and the drop in the price of oil (Washingtoninstitute.org). Other estimates, both Western and Arab, range from $200 to $300 million per annum, and more. According to a report in the Kuwaiti paper Al-Quds in October 2011, Hezbollah receives $350 million annually. In October 2014 Le Monde reported the same figure. In June 2016 the London-based Al-Araby quoted an American intelligence source as saying Hezbollah received $200 million (En.iranwire.com).
[3]Nasrallah was not entirely accurate. Iran's annual financial support did continue reaching Hezbollah, but it was reduced, according to the testimony of Matthew Levitt to the House of Representatives (September 17, 2015). Levitt is of the opinion that Hezbollah is likely to be one of the major beneficiaries of the Iran nuclear agreement.
[4]For further information about Hezbollah's criminal activities in Latin America, see the April 18, 2012 bulletin, "Latin America as a Terrorist, Subversive, Criminal Arena for Iran and Hezbollah" http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20318. The daily Arabic newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat recently reported that the American administration established an oversight system to monitor Hezbollah's financial transactions in the United States, Latin American and Africa. That includes money laundering, drug smuggling and the trade in stolen American cars and merchandise (Al-Nashra, June 29, 2016).
[5]https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2297/text/pl
[6]The al-Imdad charitable association was founded in Lebanon in 1987 after having been given funds by the al-Imdad association of the Ayatollah Khomeini, which was founded in Iran in 1979. It has branches throughout Lebanon and runs educational and welfare institutions.
[7]Hezbollah's Shaheed Foundation operates as a branch of the Iranian Shaheed Foundation. It supports the families of Hezbollah operatives who have been killed.
[8]Washington has not lifted the sanctions that are not related to Iran's nuclear program but rather to its terrorism and human rights violations. The United States continues prevent Iran from using the American financial system. The Supreme Court recently decided not to thaw two billion dollars of Iranian assets, and instead turned the money over to American families whose relatives had been killed in terrorist attacks in which Iran was involved.
[9]https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/27/press-briefing-principal-deputy-press-secretary-eric-schultz-62716

Related Articles

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 18 – 25 , 2024)

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 16-23, 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Hezbollah Communications Devices Explode

Spotlight on Iran

June 20 – July 3, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Khamenei speaking before the families of IRGC fighters killed in Syria (Fars, June 25, 2016).

Khamenei speaking before the families of IRGC fighters killed in Syria (Fars, June 25, 2016).

Iraj Masjedi (Mehr, June 25, 2016).

Iraj Masjedi (Mehr, June 25, 2016).

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon

Soleimani (left) in Syria (Tabnak, June 20, 2016).

Soleimani (left) in Syria (Tabnak, June 20, 2016).

Qasem Soleimani (left) and Mustafa Badr al-Din (Al-Manar, June 25, 2016).

Qasem Soleimani (left) and Mustafa Badr al-Din (Al-Manar, June 25, 2016).

Hossein Jaberi Ansari meets with Hassan Nasrallah (Tasnim, June 28, 2016).

Hossein Jaberi Ansari meets with Hassan Nasrallah (Tasnim, June 28, 2016).

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in a Global Jerusalem Day procession in Tehran

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in a Global Jerusalem Day procession in Tehran

Sheikh Daqqaq, Sheikh Issa Qassim's representative, holds a press conference in Tehran (Tasnim, June 22, 2016).

Sheikh Daqqaq, Sheikh Issa Qassim's representative, holds a press conference in Tehran (Tasnim, June 22, 2016).


Main Points

On June 19, 2016, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif removed Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs, from his post and replaced him with Hossein Jaberi Ansari, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesman. The move raised speculations about possible changes in Iran's regional policies, especially regarding Syria.

At least four more Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters were killed in Syria during the past two weeks.

  • The Iranian media reported that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, had recently returned to southern Aleppo in the wake of intensified fighting. His arrival is apparently related to the battles between the Syrian army and the Al-Nusra Front-led Al-Fateh Army, currently being waged in the villages south of the city. Soleimani returned to Iraq in the last few days.
  • Last week Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme Council for National Security, went to Moscow, where he met with senior Russian officials to discuss recent developments in Syria.
  • In a speech marking 40 days since the death of Hezbollah operative Mustafa Badr al-Din, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said the organization received its funding from Iran, as it received the missiles it used to threaten Israel. In response, a spokesman for the IRGC said Iran's support for the struggle against Israel was not a secret.
  • On July 1, 2016, Iran marked Global Jerusalem Day. The event was initiated in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini, and its objective is to express the support of Iran and the entire Muslim world for the Palestinian cause and the "liberation of Jerusalem." On the eve of Global Jerusalem Day senior Iranian officials called on Iranian citizens to participate in the rallies held in city centers.
  • Iran strongly criticized Bahrain's decision to revoke the citizenship of senior Shi'ite cleric Sheikh Issa Qassim. Bahrain claimed the sheikh exploited his status as Bahraini citizen to "serve foreign interests" and preach separatism and violence. In a strongly worded and exceptional statement, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, warned the Bahrain authorities that continued "mistreatment" of the sheikh was liable to lead to an armed uprising and the overthrow of the regime.

 

General Information
  • On June 19, 2016, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif removed Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs, from his post and replaced him with Hossein Jaberi Ansari, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesman. In recent years Abdollahian had been in charge of the Iranian foreign ministry's regional and international relations concerning the situation in Syria. Abdollahian was also involved in attempts to find a solution for the crisis in Yemen. He is considered as a hard-liner, and removing him from office may be indicative of disagreements among senior Iranian officials regarding Iran's regional policies, especially concerning Syria, or of the foreign minister's intention to increase his ministry's involvement in the Syrian issue.
  • Iranian hardliners were critical of Abdollahian's removal. The students' Basij in six Tehran universities issued a statement claiming that removing Abdollahian weakened the "resistance front" and was a surrender to the US lobby and some of the Arab leaders, who wanted him replaced because of his "revolutionary and anti-imperialistic" views (Basij News, June 20, 2016).
  • Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of Iran's parliament's Foreign Policy and National Security Committee, also criticized the removal of Abdollahian. He said his committee was displeased with the removal of an "effective" individual, but noted that no change was expected in Iran's regional policies, especially with regard to its support of the "resistance front" (Mehr, June 21, 2016).
  • Foreign Minister Zarif said in response that the decision to replace Abdollahian had been taken several months ago. He categorically rejected claims that it the outcome of external pressures, and said such claims weakened the "resistance camp" and insulted Iran (ISNA, June 21, 2016).
  • Meeting with the families of IRGC and Afghan fighters killed in Syria, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei claimed the main reason for the formation of ISIS and its activity in Iraq and Syria had been to defeat Iran, but thanks to the great strength of the Iranian regime, the organization had been halted.
  • Khamenei strongly criticized the decision of the Bahraini authorities to revoke the citizenship of Sheikh Issa Qassim (see below), saying any further mistreatment would only increase the struggle of young Bahrainis against the government (Tasnim News, June 25, 2016).
  • In an interview with Al-Alam, Iran's Arabic-language TV station, Hojjat ul-Islam Ali Saedi, representative of the supreme leader to the IRGC, strongly attacked Saudi Arabia and justified the presence of Iranian "advisors" in Syria and Iraq. He said Saudi Arabia's military involvement in Yemen and Bahrain aided terrorist groups in Syria, while Iran's involvement was limited to providing advice to countries requesting it. He claimed that if Saudi Arabia stopped meddling in Iraq and if the country were secure, the presence of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Qods Force, would no longer be necessary. He added that it was not Iran's intention to harm Iraq's Sunnis, but rather to help the Iraq forces fight terrorism (Farda News, June 19, 2016).
  • On June 21, 2016, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif addressed a gathering at the International Diplomatic Academy in Paris. He said that establishing a federal government would not solve the Syrian crisis. He said Iran supported a comprehensive political solution and that the question of Bashar Assad's future was not the only issue that needed to be addressed. As to events in Bahrain, he said Iran was concerned about the situation, where a minority oppressed the majority of the country's population. The opposition in Bahrain, he claimed, did not want to overthrow the government, but the measures taken by the government of Bahrain blocked the way to a political solution (Fars, June 25, 2016).
  • In a long interview with the Mehr News Agency on June 25, 2016, in preparation of Global Jerusalem Day, Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, discussed regional developments. He said that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Qods Force, was responsible for implementing Iran's policy, aid and military support in Iraq. He said many Iraqis had pictures of Soleimani hanging on their walls next to pictures of high ranking clerics, an indication of the strong bond between the Iraqis and the Qods Force commander, based upon Iran's support of the Iraqi people.
  • Masjedi said he hoped the battle against the takfiri organizations in Iraq would be won in the near future, thanks to the joint efforts of the Iraqi government, the Iraqi army, the Shi'ite militias and the support of Iran. In his assessment the fight against those organizations in Syria might take a long time, but they would continue to be weakened there as well.
  • As to the importance of Global Jerusalem Day, he said it symbolized the rebirth of the Islamic values of the fight against Zionism and the obligation of all Muslims and Iranians to carry out their "revolutionary Islamic mission." He added that the essence of the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian regime was to support oppressed Muslims and fighters struggling against oppression, Zionism and imperialism.
  • Asked about Iran's relations with Hamas, he said Hamas deserved respect as one of revolutionary Palestinian movements fighting Zionism. He said that after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Hamas adopted policies unacceptable to Iran which led to a cooling of relations. Now, however, relations between Hamas and Tehran had improved.
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • At least four more Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters were killed in Syria during the past two weeks.
  • On June 20, 2016, the Mehr News Agency reported that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, had recently returned to the region of southern Aleppo after battles in the area intensified. His arrival is apparently related to the fighting between the Syrian army and the Al-Nusra Front-led Al-Fateh Army, currently being waged in the villages south of the city. The Syrian army, supported by Hezbollah operatives and Shi'ite militiamen supported by Iran, tried to reestablish their control over the area. The focal point of the fighting is the village of Khalsa, south of Aleppo, where the Syrians and their allies suffered heavy losses. In recent weeks Soleimani spent most of his time in the the Iraqi city of Fallujah and participated in coordinating the battle for its liberation. Soleimani has recently returned to Iraq. A picture published by social media (Iranian Telegram channels, June 30, 2016) shows him visiting the home of former Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, for a Ramadan fast-breaking meal (Iftar).
  • Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iranian foreign minister, denied the existence of a disagreement between himself and Qasem Soleimani regarding Iran's policies in Syria. Speaking at a Dutch think tank in The Hague during a trip to Europe, he said he had spoken with Soleimani and they were both of the opinion that the solution to the Syrian crisis was political (Alef, June 23, 2016).
  • Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, went to Moscow last week. Shamkhani, who is a senior coordinator for political, military and security affairs with Russia and Syria, met with Sergey Shoygu, the Russian defense minister, Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the National Security Council, and Alexander Lavrentyev, the Russian president's envoy for Middle Eastern affairs. They discussed regional developments, especially in Syria, and bilateral matters (Mehr, June 28, 2016).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, international advisor to the supreme leader, said in an interview that Iranian support had prevented the disintegration of Syria . Western countries, he said, especially the United States, had tried to topple the government of Syria, which was Iran's strategic partner. They wanted to set up a government that would follow forced American policy and had no problems with Israel. Iran opposed the move because it conflicted with Iran's strategic interests. Without Iran's support, the Syrian government would have collapsed within a few weeks, which in all probability would have led to Syria's disintegration (Fars, June 28, 2016).
  • Hossein Sheikholeslam, former Iranian deputy foreign minister, denied that Iran had changed its Syrian policy. Sheikholeslam, who was Iran's ambassador to Syria and is currently advisor to the Iranian parliament (Majlis) for international affairs, said there were people who thought Iran had changed its Syrian policy or that Russia's presence there was detrimental to Iran's status, but that was mere speculation. He said Iran's Syrian policy was unwavering and its influence was growing stronger. Russia's airstrikes, he said, were very important, but the ground activities of the Syrian army and resistance forces were far more important (Fars, June 20, 2016).
  • In a speech marking 40 days since the death of Hezbollah operative Mustafa Badr al-Din, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah admitted that Hezbollah received its funding from Iran, as it received the missiles it used to threaten Israel. He thanked Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Iranian government and President Hassan Rouhani for their support of Hezbollah, and said that thanks to Iran's direct support, the measures taken by Lebanese banks against Hezbollah and the American sanctions imposed on the banks in Lebanon would not damage the organization's operational capabilities (Al-Alam, June 24, 2026).
  • Following the speech, Ramazan Sharif, IRGC spokesman, said Iran had no reason to be concerned by Nasrallah's remarks about Iranian support for Hezbollah. He said that so far the Zionists and the West had done everything they could against Iran and there was now nothing left for them to do.
  • Iran's support for Palestine, he said, and the fight against the "Zionist regime" were not a secret. He said that Iran's position had been made clear by declarations of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, and of the supreme leader, and that "Zionist regime" was the number one enemy of the Muslim countries in general and Iran in particular. He added that Nasrallah's remarks about Iranian support for Hezbollah were also aimed at the Arab states, so that the inexperienced rulers of Saudi Arabia and the takfiris would be aware of the results of their efforts to turn Iran and the Shi'ites into the number one enemies of the Arab countries and the Sunnis, while the "Zionist regime" was still the real main enemy (ISNA, June 26, 2016).
  • Last week Hossein Jaberi Ansari, the new deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs, paid his first official visit to Lebanon, where he met with Lebanon's prime minister, its foreign minister and with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, to discuss regional developments (Tasnim, June 28, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • Ahmad Hamal, spokesman for the Iraqi foreign ministry, said the intelligence cooperation of Tehran, Moscow, Baghdad and Damascus had played a crucial role in the liberation of Fallujah. He claimed the anti-terrorism headquarters established by Iran, Russia and Iraq in Baghdad had provided the fighters with important information needed for the liberation of Fallujah (Fars, June 21, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • On July 1, 2016, Iran marked Global Jerusalem Day, which has been held since 1979, instituted by Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution. Its objective is to express the support of Iran and the rest of the Muslim world for the Palestinian cause and the "liberation of Jerusalem." On the eve of Global Jerusalem Day senior Iranian officials called on Iranian citizens to participate in the rallies held in city centers.
  • A statement released by the general staff of the Iranian armed forces asserted that the "liberation of Jerusalem" and the destruction of "the fake regime of Israel" were the most important issues facing the Muslim world today (Fars, June 8, 2016).
  • The organizers of Global Jerusalem Day issued a summation of the day saying that the Iranian nation regarded the liberation of Jerusalem and the destruction of "the cancerous growth of Israel" as the Islamic Revolution's highest priority, and as of supreme importance for the Muslim world. According to the announcement, all the Palestinian groups had to unite in the struggle against Israel, and international and regional organizations and institutions had to act against the "Israeli plots" to "Judaize the occupied Palestinian lands and destroy the national and historical identity of Palestine."
  • The announcement also condemned the "crimes carried out by the takfiri Islamic organizations and the Saudi authorities. It expressed support for the struggle being waged in Syria and Iraq against Islamic terrorism, and for the support of Iran's support through the IRGC in Syria and Iraq. The announcement called the United States enemy number one of the Iranian people and warned against attempts to increase its infiltration into Iran in the wake of the nuclear agreement (Fars, July 1, 2016).
  • Given the ongoing crisis in the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Global Jerusalem Day processions this year included slogans condemning Saudi Arabia and the royal house of Saud, alongside the usual condemnation and anti-Israeli, anti-American slogans and incitement.
Iranian Intervention in the Persian Gulf
  • Iran strongly criticized Bahrain's decision to revoke the citizenship of senior Shi'ite cleric Sheikh Issa Qassim. Bahrain claimed he exploited his status as a Bahraini citizen to "serve foreign interests" and preach separatism and violence. The decision was made only a week after Bahrain suspended the activity of al-Wifaq, Bahrain's central Shi'ite opposition group.
  • The Iranian foreign ministry said in a statement that the measures taken by the Bahraini authorities had destroyed hopes for a peaceful, negotiated solution (Mehr, June 20, 2016). In a strongly-worded and exceptional statement, Qasem Soleimani warned the Bahrain authorities that continued "mistreatment" of the sheikh was liable to lead to an armed uprising and the overthrow of the regime (Fars, June 20, 2016). Another statement released by the IRGC asserted that revoking Issa Qassim's citizenship was inhuman and anti-religious and would ignite an Islamic revolution in Bahrain that would lead to the regime's collapse.
  • Ali Larijani, speaker of the Majlis, said that revoking the citizenship of a senior Shi'ite cleric signaled "the last gasp" of the Bahraini regime. He said Bahrain should learn the lesson of the Islamic Revolution in 1979: when the Shah threatened to revoke the citizenship of those who refused to join the ruling party Rastakhiz, it was a sign that his rule was nearing

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

Related Articles

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 18 – 25 , 2024)

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (September 16-23, 2024)

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

Hezbollah Communications Devices Explode