Tag Archives: Iran

Spotlight on Iran

June 13 – 28, 2015 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Alaeddin Boroujerdi

Alaeddin Boroujerdi

Last week Mohammad Ibrahim al-Shaa'r, Syrian minister of the interior, paid a visit to Tehran

Last week Mohammad Ibrahim al-Shaa'r, Syrian minister of the interior, paid a visit to Tehran

Hassan Ghafari, one of the three Iranians killed, with Qasem Soleimani, IRGC commander

Hassan Ghafari, one of the three Iranians killed, with Qasem Soleimani, IRGC commander

	Meeting with Prime Minister al-Abadi, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said Iran stood by Iraq in its war against ISIS.

 Meeting with Prime Minister al-Abadi, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said Iran stood by Iraq in its war against ISIS.

During the past two weeks the social networks have continually posted pictures of Qasem Soleimani, IRGC Qods Force commander, indicating his continued presence in Iraq.

During the past two weeks the social networks have continually posted pictures of Qasem Soleimani, IRGC Qods Force commander, indicating his continued presence in Iraq.

An exhibition opened in Tehran called

An exhibition opened in Tehran called "Yemen's Endurance."

On June 16, the first international cartoon competition devoted to Yemen ended in Tehran.

On June 16, the first international cartoon competition devoted to Yemen ended in Tehran.

Iranian Religious and Propagation Activities around the Globe

Iranian Religious and Propagation Activities around the Globe

Iranian Religious and Propagation Activities around the Globe

Iranian Religious and Propagation Activities around the Globe


Highlights of the week
  • Iran rejected the American State Department's annual report on terrorism that revealed Iran has continued its support for terrorism in the last year, claiming the report was politically motivated and an expression of America's double standards regarding the war on terrorism.
  • Hossein Hamedani, a senior IRGC official, described Syria as "Iran's strategic depth," and claimed the objective of Syria's enemies was to ensure Israel's security through decreasing Iran's regional influence and weakening Hezbollah.
  • Three Iranian fighters were killed when a mine exploded on the Damascus-Daraa road in Syria.
  • Iran and Syria agreed to broaden cooperation on energy and the fight against terrorism during visits carried out by Syrian interior and energy ministers in Tehran.
  • Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani remains in Iraq; another Iranian was killed by ISIS in Ramadi. Two YouTube videos documented the use of advanced Iranian technology in intelligence gathering by Hezbollah Battalions operating in Iraq under Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards' aegis.
  • Iraqi prime minister paid a visit to Iran, Iranian deputy foreign minister paid a visit to Iraqi Kurdistan and a delegation of Sunni tribal chiefs from the Al-Anbar region paid a visit to Iran to request Iranian aid to combat ISIS.


 

Spotlight on Iran is a new, bimonthly Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin intended to shed light on Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media. Spotlight on Iran is written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, a research fellow in the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies in Tel Aviv University and a research fellow at the Forum for Regional Thinking. His fields of expertise include the politics, society, foreign policy and social networks in the Islamic Republic.

 

Iranian Responses to the American State Department Annual Report on Terrorism
  • On June 19 the American State Department issued its annual Country Reports on Terrorism for 2014, revealing that during the past year Iran continued its support for terrorism. According to the report on State Sponsors of Terrorism, Iran "continued its terrorist-related activity in 2014, including support for Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, Lebanese Hezbollah and various groups in Iraq and throughout the Middle East."[1]
  • Iran rejected the report and criticized it harshly. Ms. Marzieh Afkham, an Iranian Foreign Ministry's spokeswoman, promptly rejected the report's findings, claiming the accusations were politically motivated and an expression of America's double standards regarding the war on terrorism. Afkham claimed the United States did not take serious, assertive action against terrorism, while during the past thirty years Iran had been terrorism's greatest victim (Fars News, June 20, 2015).
  • Hamid Reza Moqaddam-Far, advisor to IRGC for media and cultural affairs, responded to the report by saying that the people of Iraq, Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon and the other states in the region had a positive opinion of the IRGC. He claimed the United States had been hostile to the IRGC since its establishment after the Islamic Revolution. Following the regional "Islamic awakening" and the American defeat in Iraq, the United States had been representing the IRGC and its Qods Force as a terrorist network. The IRGC and the Qods Force, he claimed, were the symbols of the Islamic Revolution and its mechanism for exporting the revolution and Islamic awakening, but Western propaganda represented them as terrorist groups, while the people of the region regarded them as helpful.
  • Moqaddam-Far rejected the claim[2] that Iran supported Shi'ites, giving as examples its support for the Sunni Palestinians and non-Shi'ite groups in Iraq. He claimed that the United States' designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization was unacceptable to world public opinion and to most Lebanese, who regarded Hezbollah as defending Lebanon and Syria. Iran, he claimed, supported the Syrian government, which had been legally elected by Syrian citizens, against Sunni terrorist groups supported by the West and several countries in the region (Mehr News, June 22, 2015).
Senior Iranian Officials' Statements on Iran's Regional Involvement
  • Interviewed by Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV, Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, spoke about Iran's activity in Syria and Iraq. He reiterated Iran's official position that Iranian presence in both countries had been requested by their governments and that they had only advisors on the ground, whose activity was based on Iran's experience in fighting terrorism. Shamkhani said the Syrian regime and its people had been opposing terrorism for the past five years, and the resistance was capable of fighting terrorism and defending the country. Iran, he said, stood beside and would continue to stand beside Syria, and would collaborate with other countries to find a political resolution for the crisis. He stressed that Iran objected to dividing Syria and Iraq along ethnic or religious lines and that the fight against terrorism demanded the collaboration of all ethnic and religious groups (KhabarOnline, June 15, 2015).
  • Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Majlis [Iranian parliament] Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security, said that Iran's invitation to participate in the Geneva conference to discuss the situation in Syria proved that its enemies had reached the conclusion that regional problems could not be solved without Iran. He said the regional situation would change without Iran's presence, which showed its power (Mehr News, June 12, 2015).
  • Mohammad-Ali Asoudi, senior advisor to the Supreme Leader's representative in the IRGC, referring to the support Iran gave Syria and Iraq, said it was intended "to prevent the Zionists from striking the resistance axis." Asoudi claimed Israel supported the extremist Sunni organizations, including ISIS, in order to exploit them in its struggle against the resistance front (www.ycr.ir, June 21, 2015).
Iranian Intervention in Syria
  • In a speech delivered at a meeting of Basij-members university lecturers in Hamedan Province, Hossein Hamedani, senior official in the IRGC and commander of its Imam Hossein headquarters, described Syria as Iran's "strategic depth." He said Syria had become an arena where its enemies, among them the United States, the European countries and Arab states, fought its friends, Russia and China. The official objective of the enemy camp, he said, was to lessen Iran's influence in the region, weaken Hezbollah and change it from a military organization to a political organization, all for the sake of ensuring Israel's security. Hamedani claimed Iran was the nation most esteemed in Syria and Iraq today (Tasnim News, June 22, 2015).
  • Last week Mohammad Ibrahim al-Shaa'r, Syrian minister of the interior, paid a visit to Tehran, during which the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding about expanding cooperation in the fields of security, the fight against terrorism and smuggling.
  • At a joint press conference held by al-Shaa'r and Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli, the Iranian minister of the interior, Rahmani-Fazli said that the two had discussed ways to fight terrorism, especially ISIS, which was supported, he said, by the West and Israel, and endangered the stability of the countries of Islam. During the visit it was decided that Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi representatives would meet in Baghdad where they would discuss mutual collaboration in the fight against terrorism (ISNA, June 22, 2015).
  • Hossein Ashtari, commander of Iran's internal security forces, met with al-Shaa'r and expressed readiness to increase the security collaboration between the two countries. He said that in view of the Iranian police force's capabilities, especially those related to fighting organized crime and terrorism, and to investigating cyber crimes, the Iranian security forces were prepared for every type of cooperation with Syria (IBNA, June 23, 2015).
  • Imad Mohammad Deeb Khamis, Syrian minister of energy, paid a visit to Tehran in order to discuss increased cooperation with Iranian electricity and energy companies. He met with representatives of Iranian companies operating in Syria, and invited more Iranian companies to invest in water and electricity projects in Syria (Tasnim News, June 17, 2015). Khamis said the two countries intended to sign an agreement for cooperation in the field of electricity that would increase the investments of Iranian companies in Syria. Khamis met with Hamid Chitchian, the Iranian minister of energy, who said Iran was planning to increase the activity of private Iranian companies in Syria. He said the Syrian government was planning to invest €15 billion in electricity and energy industries by 2020, and that it was an opportunity for Iranian franchisees and investors to expand their activity in Syrian industry (Alef, June 17, 2015).
  • Alaeddin Boroujerdi chairman of the Majlis Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security, met with political activists in Syria visiting in Tehran. He told them that Iran would stand beside the Syrian government and its people and would not spare any effort to support them in the fight against terrorism (Mehr News, June 16, 2015).
  • The bodies of Ali Amraei, Hassan Ghafari and Mohammad Hamidi, Iranian fighters killed in Syria, were returned to Iran last week. The three were killed when a mine exploded on the Damascus-Daraa road (Tasnim News, June 24, 2015). They were buried in Iran on June 25th. Five members of Fatemiyoun Brigade (Afghan volunteers fighting in Syria alongside IRGC) who were killed recently in Syria and another IRGC member who was killed from wounds he incurred last month were buried the same day.
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • Morteza Savari, an Iranian from the city of Susangerd in Khuzestan Province, was killed in Ramadi in Iraq (Defa Press, June 14, 2015).
  • On June 17, 2015, Haider al-Abadi, Iraqi prime minister, paid a visit to Tehran during which he met with senior Iranian officials to discuss the situation in Iraq. He was accompanied by Abu-Mahdi al-Muhandis, commander of the Hezbollah Battalions militia operating under Iranian aegis. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told al-Abadi that the presence of terrorists in Iraq was temporary. Khamenei stressed the need to preserve Iraq's political and national unity, and praised the courage of the young Iraqis fighting terrorism. He said that Iran supported the unity of all Iraq's "revolutionary fighting groups" and would continue supporting the Iraqi government and its people (Entekhab, June 17, 2015).
  • Meeting with Prime Minister al-Abadi, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said Iran stood by Iraq in its war against ISIS. He called the ties between Iran and Iraq "strategic" and said that expanding them in every area served not only the interests of both countries but also those of all the countries in the region (Tasnim News, June 17, 2015).
  • On June 20, 2015, Masoud Jazayeri, deputy chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, claimed the necessary measures were being taken to liberate Iraq's Nineveh and Al-Anbar Provinces; he did not specify which measures. He said the liberation of Iraq from terrorists could take some time because of the support they received from the Arab states, Israel, the United States and Britain, but that there was not doubt the Iraqi fighters would be victorious (www.ycr.ir, June 20, 2015).
  • Hassan Qashqavi, deputy Iranian foreign minister for consular and parliamentary affairs, paid a visit to Iraqi Kurdistan and met with senior local officials, among them Jalal Talabani, former Iraqi president; Yousef Mohammad, chairman of the Kurdistan regional parliament; and Asu Fereydoun, governor of Suleymaniyeh Province. They discussed Iran's economic ties with Iraqi Kurdistan and ways to expand anti-ISIS collaboration. Yousef Mohammad thanked Iran for its support in the Kurds' fight against ISIS and called for stronger security collaboration between Tehran and Baghdad (Fars and IRNA, June 15, 2015).
  • A video posted to YouTube on June 13, 2015 by the pro-Iranian TV station Al-Etejah documented the use of an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), apparently an Ababil 3, by the Hezbollah Battalions, one of the Shi'ite militias operating in Iraq under IRGC aegis.
  • A video posted to YouTube on June 18, 2015 also documented the use of advanced technology to gather intelligence, including SIGINT capabilities, and of UAVs by Hezbollah Battalions in the Baiji region.

Iranian UAVs have been used against ISIS in Iraq since the fall of Mosul to ISIS in June 2014. In June 2014 The New York Times reported that according to American sources, Iran had begun secretly operating UAVs in Iraq from the Baghdad airport, and that an intelligence unit had been deployed to intercept communications. Last year ISIS claimed it had downed a number of Iranian UAVs in the skies over Iraq.

 

  • During the past two weeks the social networks have continually posted pictures of Qasem Soleimani, IRGC Qods Force commander, indicating his continued presence in Iraq.
  • A delegation of the Sunni tribal chiefs from Al-Anbar Province recently paid a visit to Iran to request Iranian aid to combat ISIS. According to Sheikh Ashour al-Mahlawi, chief of the al-Boumahal al-Tarabasha tribe, the delegation was composed of 14 tribal chiefs. During the visit, which had been coordinated with the central government in Baghdad, the tribal chiefs asked Iran for financial aid and weapons. Iran granted their request but on condition it be sent through the Iraqi government (Fars News, June 23, 2015). A video recently posted on Facebook documented Qasem Soleimani, meeting with Sunni tribal chiefs in Al-Anbar Province in an attempt to convince them to fight against ISIS alongside the Shi'ite militias. The recent reports indicate Iran's efforts to prove that its activities in Iraq are not limited to supporting only Shi'ites.
Iranian Intervention in Yemen
  • On June 16 an emergency meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to discuss developments in Yemen. Hossein Amir Abdollahian, deputy Iranian foreign minister, who represented Iran at the meeting, stressed the need to preserve Yemen's unity and sovereignty, and called for the immediate end of the Saudi attack and for Saudi Arabia to lift its aerial and naval siege of Yemen. He claimed that if the military attack continued it would increase extremism and terrorism, and endanger the entire region. He called on OIC members to fulfill their "Islamic and humanitarian commitment" and help the Yemeni people. Abdollahian was absent during the speech given by Yemen's president in exile, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi (IRNA, June 16, 2015).
  • An exhibition opened in Tehran called "Yemen's Endurance." It was organized by the Noandish Association of the Children of the Martyrs and the Faithful. According to the organizers, its objective was to present the "crimes" Saudi Arabia committed against the Yemenis. The exhibition's opening ceremony was attended by members of the Majlis, clerics, representatives from Yemen and families of Iranian victims of the war (Mashreq News, June 16, 2015).
  • On June 16, the first international cartoon competition devoted to Yemen ended in Tehran. More than 200 cartoonists from 33 countries entered the competition, which was organized by the Andisheh Cultural Center, and whose objective was to "present the crimes committed by Saudi Arabia against the Yemeni people." Among the themes dealt with were "Western media and the international organizations' silence," "Crimes and the murder of children in Yemen" and "The treason of Arab leaders." There were cartoons of several world leaders, among them the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Israel, France and the United States (IRNA, June 15, 2015).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Ramazan Sharif, in charge of public relations for the IRGC and chief of staff of the Council of Islamic Propaganda and Al-Quds Intifada, announced that the annual World Jerusalem Day rallies would be held on July 10 this year. World Jerusalem Day is an Iranian initiative held annually since 1979 on the last Friday of the Muslim religious month of Ramadan as a way of showing Iranian and the Muslim world's support for the Palestinian cause and the "liberation of Jerusalem." This year the Iranians decided to move Jerusalem Day up a week because the last Friday of Ramadan falls on Eid al-Fitr, whose date is determined separately by each Muslim country in accordance with the appearance of the new moon (Sepah News, June 22, 2015).
Iranian Intervention in the Gulf States
  •  Iran condemned Bahrain's decision to sentence Shi'ite opposition leader Sheikh Ali Salman to four years in prison. Salman, the Shi'ite cleric who heads the al-Wefaq association, was convicted of collaborating with foreign governments and incitement. Ms. Marzieh Afkham, spokeswoman for the Iranian foreign ministry, called on the Bahraini authorities to release Salman immediately, stating that security measures would not help solve Bahrain's problems and that only negotiation and responsiveness to the demands of the country's moderate groups would ensure Bahrain's stability (ISNA, June 16, 2015).
  • Iran rejected the Bahraini authorities' recent accusations regarding the confiscation of Iranian-made explosives intended, the Bahrainis claimed, for attacks in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. An official in the Iranian foreign ministry strongly denied the accusations, claiming that Bahrain's repeated accusations in recent years did not solve the country's problems and only made them worse. He called on Bahrain's authorities to prefer serious dialogue to "tribal and security approaches" (IRNA, June 19, 2015).

The Shi'ite rebellion against the al-Khalifa dynasty that broke out in Bahrain in February 2011 worsened the already tense relations between Iran and Bahrain. The authorities in Bahrain accused Iran of fomenting public unrest. On a number of occasions in the past Iran has raised demands for sovereignty over Bahrain, claiming it should be an integral part of Iran in view of the fact that it was once part of ancient Persian empires.

 

  • In February 2013 the Bahraini authorities announced they had exposed a terrorist cell operated by the IRGC and trained in Iraq and Lebanon. Bahrain is located in the heart of the Persian Gulf and is strategically important to Iran. The fact that it is a country with a Shi'ite majority and home to an American military presence, makes it a target for Iranian terrorism and subversion.
Iranian Religious and Propagation Activities around the Globe
  • Qorban-Ali Pour-Marjan, Iran's cultural attaché in Italy, participated in a conference dealing with Shi'ite messianism organized by the Bayt al-Hikma International Research Center in Rome. Participants included religious scholars, clerics and correspondents from Italy and Iran, who discussed the concept of Shi'ite messianism. Pour-Marjan's lecture dealt with messianic thought in modern Iran.
  • Abbas Azizi, the Iranian cultural attaché in Albania, participated in a conference organized by the Muslim Committee in Albania to discuss "The values of the month of Ramadan" (IRNA, June 22, 2015).

[1]http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm
[2]The State Department report makes no such claim.

In the second part of the interview granted by Abu Muhammad al-Julani


Al-Nusra Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani (masked) in a rare interview (Al-Jazeera TV, June 6, 2015)
Al-Nusra Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani (masked) in a rare interview (Al-Jazeera TV, June 6, 2015)

Overview

1.   On June 6, 2015, Al-Jazeera TV aired the second part of the interview granted by Al-Nusra Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani. It was broadcast as a segment of Al-Jazeera's weekly news program “Without Borders,” moderated by Ahmed Mansour. The subjects discussed in the interview included Iran’s expansionist ambitions in Syria and the Middle East, the US campaign against Al-Qaeda, the Al-Nusra Front’s relations with ISIS, the Al-Nusra Front’s ties with Al-Qaeda and the importance of the foreign fighters fighting in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front.

2.   The following are the main insights that arose from the second part of the interview:

A.  Iran’s expansionist ambitions: Al-Julani develops the theory that the Iranians aspire to dominate the Middle East and renew the days of the Persian Empire, making use of the Shiite community. In presenting the struggle as Persian-Arab (rather than Sunni-Shiite), Al-Julani attempts to downplay, to some extent, the sectarian nature of the conflicts taking place in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, thus differentiating himself from ISIS, which considers the Shiites as infidels and treats them brutally.

B.  Severe criticism of ISIS: Al-Julani says that ISIS is killing people, including Al-Nusra Front operatives, for the sake of various interests, implying that this runs counter to Islamic law. Al-Julani stresses that his organization opposes the Islamic Caliphate, established by ISIS on an illegal basis. He claims that ISIS is prioritizing the fighting in Iraq and that it is not serious in its war against the Syrian regime. Therefore, Al-Julani stresses, there is no chance of resolving the current problems between the two organizations at the present time.

C.  The Al-Nusra Front’s relations with the Al-Qaeda leadership: Al-Julani refutes the reports on the Al-Nusra Front’s intention to break off its ties with Al-Qaeda. He adds that this has been made clear to other rebel organizations that the Al-Nusra Front collaborates with. However, Al-Julani tries to allay the fears of his ties with Al-Qaeda, stressing that the Al-Nusra Front does not aspire to take over Syria, but only to establish Islamic rule in the country. In the ITIC’s assessment, these statements are nothing but lip service and, in practice, the Al-Nusra Front strives to play a dominant role in any regime established in Syria, even if this is initially accomplished in collaboration with other rebel organizations.

D.  The importance of the foreign fighters:Al-Julani notes that foreign fighters account for about 30% of the Al-Nusra Front’s operatives. He says that they include “a small number of Americans,” Europeans, Chechens, and many Asians. He says that the foreign fighters are in the front lines of the fighters and are leading in battle, and therefore their “rights” must be ensured in any Syrian regime that is established. It is evident from his statements that some of the foreign fighters are likely to settle permanently in Syria (which is why they come with their families). However, experience gained so far indicates that many foreign fighters join the Al-Nusra Front (and ISIS) for a limited period, after which they return to their home countries.

E.  Israel is not mentioned in either part of the interview.[1] In the ITIC’s assessment, this is because of the current priorities of the Al-Nusra Front, which is now concentrating on fighting against the Syrian regime. For the same reason, Al-Julani also makes it clear (in the first part of the interview) that his organization is not using Syria as a springboard for carrying out terrorist attacks against Western countries. However, these priorities are liable to change in the future, as a result of developments in Syria and relations between the Al-Nusra Front and the other organizations. If and when a decision is made to take action against Israel, the Al-Nusra Front is liable to launch terrorist attacks from the Syrian Golan Heights, where it enjoys a position of power among the rebel organizations.

Appendix
Some of the topics raised in the second part of the interview granted by Al-Nusra Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani to Al-Jazeera TV (June 6, 2015)
Iran’s expansionist ambitions

1.      According to Al-Julani, Iran’s expansionist ambitions began not with the Islamic Revolution in 1979, but thousands of years earlier.He notes that the ancient Persian Empire had its eye on the region for thousands of years. According to Al-Julani, this continued until the rise of Islam, which is what put an end to the Persian Empire.

2.      Al-Julani develops the theory that the Iranians are using Shiite Islam as a tool for “restoring the glory” of their ancient empire (like the Jews, he says, who “are now in Palestine, claiming to have been there 3,500 years ago”).Al-Julani claims that the Iranians are trying to take over the Middle East because they are Persians (i.e., they are not Arabs) and therefore they are trying to infiltrate into the region on behalf of the Shiites. According to Al-Julani, this is the modus operandi employed by the Iranians through Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, and it is happening in Iraq as well.

3.      Al-Julani adds that Iran has also infiltrated into Syria by means of the treaty signed with the regime of Hafez Assad (Bashar’s father). In Syria as well, Iran used the Shiites as a tool, and the treaty between them was based on the dissemination of Shiite Islam in Syria. According to Al-Julani, however, there is a fundamental difference between Iran’s position in Syria and its position in other countries such as Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, where the Iranians handle Shiite organizations that fight on their behalf. In Syria, in contrast, the Iranians “do not handle him [Bashar Assad] but rather support him.”

Al-Julani’s theory regarding the nature and motives of Iran’s expansion is not new. As early as January 24, 2012, about a year after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the Al-Nusra Front issued a video of him announcing its establishment.In the video, Al-Julani attacks Iran which, he says, is aspiring to reestablish the Persian Empire. In the ITIC’s assessment, Al-Julani is using this theory in an attempt to mobilize the Arab population in the Middle East for the struggle against Iran, by presenting it as an Arab-Persian struggle and not as a Sunni-Shiite one (and in doing so he is also, to a certain extent, trying to blunt the sting in the struggle between Sunni and Shiite Muslims). This position differentiates the Al-Nusra Front from the position held by ISIS, the rival organization, which regards Shiites (and Alawites) as infidels and treats them brutally. This is not new. At one time, the attitude towards the Shiites gave rise to fundamental disputes between Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (the founding father of ISIS) and the Al-Qaeda leadership (see footnote no. 3).

 

4.      Al-Julani stresses that so far Iran has not sent its own regular military forces to participate in the war in Syria and Iraq. He says that Iran has sent several commanders to these battle zones, some of whom were killed in the fighting. It also operates Shiite militias, but its forces are not fighting directly. He says that the soldiers who are fighting for Iran in the various arenas are local operatives who are totally loyal to the Iranians.

Al-Julani’s statements are compatible with the Iranian policy of refraining from sending military forces and avoiding direct involvement in the battle zones in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. In these arenas, Iran is fighting against jihadi organizations and against additional enemies through the use of Shiite proxy organizations. These proxy organizations are directed and supported by the Iranian Qods Force (Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, the Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen).


5.      Referring to the internal situation in Iran, Al-Julani warns the Iranians that they are facing a volcano that is about to explode. The reason, according to him, is that there are large groups in Iran, mostly Sunni, which are on the margins of society in the Iranian State. Among these groups, he listed the Kurds, the Arabs from Ahvaz (Southern Iran), the Baloch people and the Turks. According to Al-Julani, they represent around twenty million Sunni Muslims from various ethnic groups. Al-Julani claims that there were several uprisings recently in Ahvaz and in the Kurdish regions of Iran. Al-Julani advocates support for the millions of Sunnis living in Iran, because this would force the Iranians to divert their attention from areas in which they are expanding in the Middle East in order to address their internal problems.

The Al-Nusra Front’s relations with ISIS

6.      In the interview, Al-Julani strongly criticizes ISIS, the rival jihadi organization.He says that religious scholars have issued fatwas (religious rulings) stating that ISIS belongs to the Khawarij, a dissident radical Islamic sect whose name has become a derogatory term.[2] In view of this criticism, the interviewer asks Al-Julani why he once pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

7.      In his reply, Al-Julani mentions the chain of events that led to the rift between Al-Qaeda and its branch in Iraq:Al-Julani says the during the period of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, and even shortly after the Islamic State [in Iraq] was declared, this organization was committed to the ideology of Al-Qaeda. However, he adds, the Islamic State ignored several orders issued by the leadership of Al-Qaeda (Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri), such as the prohibition against carrying out indiscriminate killings in Shiites houses of worship and marketplaces.[3] Thus, he says, the organization ignored the orders of Al-Qaeda’s leadership, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the leader of ISIS) actually renounced his pledge of allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri (and therefore Al-Julani’s pledge of allegiance to Al-Baghdadi is no longer binding).

8.      Al-Julani mentions that a phenomenon has recently emerged in ISIS, of killing people for the sake of various interests of its own. He says that ISIS operatives kill many people unnecessarily and, by implication, not according to Islamic law. They have executed many Al-Nusra Front commanders, along with their wives and children, among others. As an example, Al-Julani mentions Mohammad Fateh, the Al-Nusra Front’s local commander (emir) in Idlib, who was executed by ISIS along with his wives and children.

9.    In his efforts (throughout the interview) to differentiate himself from ISIS, Al-Julani stresses that the Al-Nusra Front is opposed to the Islamic Caliphate, declared by ISIS. He says that the Caliphate was established on an illegal basis.This is because ISIS forced people to accept it, abolished the presence and activity of all other jihadi organizations in the territory of the Caliphate and created discord among the jihadi operatives. He says that by doing so, “ISIS did the United States a service” without being aware of it.

10.        Al-Julani, whose organization is fighting only in Syria, questions the seriousness of ISIS’s fighting against the Syrian regime.According to Al-Julani, there is a big difference between ISIS’s conduct in Iraq and its conduct in Syria. He says that ISIS, most of whose commanders are originally from Iraq, sees Iraq as its power base. Therefore, ISIS prioritizes the fighting in Iraq and attaches greater importance to it.  He said that one proof of the fact that ISIS is not serious in its war against the Syrian regime is that ISIS operatives kill Shiites in Iraq but refrain from killing members of the Alawite community in Syria (the Alawites being the power base of the Syrian regime).

11.   In view of these material differences, Al-Julani stresses that there is no chance of resolving the current problems between the Al-Nusra Front and ISIS at the present time. He expresses his hope that ISIS “will mend its ways and return to Allah and to the Sunnis.” However, he adds, “as long as this does not happen, there is nothing between us and them other than fighting.”

The United States and its war against Al-Qaeda

12.   According to Al-Julani, Osama bin Laden managed to drag the United States into a ground war in Afghanistan and Iraq. In these places, “Al-Qaeda was waiting for them,” and this was a surprise for the Americans. He said that none of the studies conducted by the Americans in 1990-2003 even conceived of the possibility that Al-Qaeda would manage to establish a presence in Iraq after the US Army’s withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan.

13.   The United States of today cannot fight against Al-Qaeda by means of ground forces.He says that after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Americans found themselves in a state of withdrawal, and the US can no longer send troops to fight outside its territory. Therefore, the US is waging a “war of intelligence” against Al-Qaeda. This causes the death of leaders but does not solve the problem for the Americans: “the United States cannot put an end to Al-Qaeda using drones. It can kill a leader here and a leader there, but praise God our nation has a high birthrate, and more and more people are born every year.”

14.   Al-Julani claims (from the perspective of a plotter) that the US has given Iran freedom of action in certain areas of the Middle East such as Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. According to him, “Some people say that Iran controls Iraq. However, the truth is that Iran did not take over Iraq; the US gave Iraq to Iran.” He adds: “The US wants to drag Iran into a war with us, with Al-Qaeda and with all the jihad fighters.”

The relationship between the Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qaeda

15.   The interviewer asks Al-Julani why his organization doesn’t sever its ties with Al-Qaeda, thereby putting an end to the international attacks against it. Al-Julani says that “the matter has been blown out of all proportion,” since the international entities that attack his organization do not define it as a terrorist organization because of its ties with Al-Qaeda, but rather according to other criteria. For example, Hezbollah, Hamas and North Korea are not affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, they have been defined as terrorists, because “those who deviate from the international system, and those who do not surrender to international entities, are classified [by them] in a negative way.”

16.   Therefore, Al-Julani continues, “we are not dealing with the matter of severing ties with Al-Qaeda” (i.e., his organization does not intend to sever the ties between them). He adds that “we have made this clear to all the factions” (i.e., the rebel organizations with which the Al-Nusra Front collaborates). According to Al-Julani, Dr. Al-Zawahiri (leader of Al-Qaeda) said that “Once an Islamic government is established in Syria, we will become the first soldiers of this government; we do not aspire to rule […]” Al-Julani reiterates that “We do not seek to rule in the country, but rather to instill the rule of Islamic law in the country. We strive to achieve justice and to eradicate injustice from all walks of life.”

17.   Hence Al-Julani refutes the rumors that have been circulating in recent months about his organization’s intention to sever its ties with Al-Qaeda. At the same time, he tries to dispel the concerns raised by his organization’s ties with Al-Qaeda, stressing that the Al-Nusra Front does not aspire to take over Syria, but only overthrow the regime of Bashar Assad and replace it with a regime that will establish the rule of Islamic law in the country. In the ITIC’s assessment, these statements are merely lip service and, in practice, the Al-Nusra Front aims and intends to play a dominant role in any regime established in Syria, even if this is initially accomplished in collaboration with other rebel organizations.

The attitude to the population and the role of the foreign fighters who joined the Al-Nusra Front

18.   Al-Julani mentions the control of the population in the areas occupied by his organization in Syria, emphasizing the difference between the Al-Nusra Front and ISIS. He says that in the “liberated areas” (in Syria), Al-Nusra Front operatives are “fighting and building simultaneously.” They provide the population with water and electricity, wheat, protection, a court system and a police force. In these areas, construction is in progress and trading is conducted at markets, and his organization enjoys great “popular support.” He says that the Al-Nusra Front does not strive to impose its control in Syria, but only to instill a rule of Islamic law in the country. He adds that his organization strives to ensure the “rights” of the “foreign migrants” who joined the ranks of the organization and play an important role in Syria.

19.   The interviewer asks Al-Julani about the percentage of “migrants” (i.e., foreign fighters) who joined the Al-Nusra Front. He replies that they constitute about 30% of the organization’s operatives. According to Al-Julani, these operatives come from all over the world. They include Europeans and “a small number of Americans.” There are also many Asians and Chechens. These migrants, he says, “are in the front lines and are leading the battles.”

Al-Julani’s remarks indicate the major role that the foreign fighters play in his organization and the considerable importance that the Al-Nusra Front attaches to them.It is also evident from his remarks that some of the foreign fighters who came to Syria to fight in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front (and, in the ITIC’s assessment, in the ranks of ISIS as well) are likely to settle permanently in Syria. This may also be the reason for the phenomenon of entire families moving to Syria, and not only individual foreign fighters (the “ceremonies” in which the foreign fighters destroy their passports from their home countries are intended to illustrate this). However, many of the foreign fighters join the Al-Nusra Front (and ISIS) for a limited period, after which they return to their home countries.

 

* For details about the first part of the interview, see the ITIC’s Information Bulletin from June 1, 2015: “Al-Nusra Front Leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani said in an interview that his organization’s overall goal was overthrowing and replacing the Syrian regime with an Islamic regime. He elaborated its military achievements, especially in the region of Idlib. Prominent were his attempts to represent his organization as pragmatic and different from ISIS.”
[1]Al-Julani mentions the Jews in the second part of the interview. He compares the Persians, who strive to reestablish their empire, and the Jews, “who are currently in Palestine, claiming to have been there 3,500 years ago”. He also accuses the West of financing the Jews “in order to reconquer our land”.
[2]Khawarij - a radical sect in Islam, dating back to those who deserted the camp of the Fourth Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. The Khawarij perceive any Muslim who is not a Khawarij as an infidel who may be killed.Over the years, the name Khawarij has become a derogatory term. Therefore, many of ISIS’s enemies frequently claim that it belongs to the Khawarij (Hezbollah, for example, calls ISIS and other jihadi organizations by the derogatory name of “Takfiris,” i.e., those who declare Muslims as infidels and allow them to be killed).
[3]After his appointment as Emir of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (October 2014), Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi formulated a strategy for managing the campaign against the United States in Iraq. From his perspective, this strategy was designed to achieve several goals: to harm the forces of the United States and its allies in the coalition; to prevent Iraqi cooperation with the United States by harming Iraq’s infrastructure, government and people; to harm Iraq’s rehabilitation efforts by attacking Iraqi civilians and aid workers involved in the rehabilitation; and to position the United States at the center of a Sunni-Shiite civil war by harming the Shiite population. A wave of terrorist attacks against the Shiite population, initiated by al-Zarqawi and stemming from his extreme anti-Shiite ideological perception, was carried out by means of suicide bombers and car bombs. They caused many casualties, sowed chaos in Iraq, made it very difficult to stabilize the internal situation in Iraq, and created a murderous legacy deeply imbedded in the ISIS of today (from which the Al-Nusra Front is trying to differentiate itself).

Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s strategy, with its emphasis on carrying out large-scale attacks against the Shiite population (and sometimes among the Sunni population as well), drew criticism from Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.They feared that indiscriminate attacks against innocent Muslim civilians could compromise public support for Al-Qaeda in the entire region. In July 2005, they criticized Al-Zarqawi’s strategy and ordered him to stop his attacks on religious and cultural sites of the Shiite community. Al-Zarqawi refused, and his relations with Al-Qaeda’s leadership deteriorated. In retrospect, this can be seen as the root of the tension between Al-Qaeda’s branch in Iraq and Al-Qaeda’s central leadership, which is now being manifested in the independent conduct of ISIS, the rift between it and the Al-Qaeda leadership, and its problematic relations with the Al-Nusra Front.

 

Spotlight on Iran

June 1 – 13, 2015 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Senior Iranian Officials' Statements on Iran's Regional Involvement

Senior Iranian Officials' Statements on Iran's Regional Involvement

Senior Iranian Officials' Statements on Iran's Regional Involvement

Senior Iranian Officials' Statements on Iran's Regional Involvement

The logo of the Fatemiyoun battalion

The logo of the Fatemiyoun battalion

The funeral held for Manouchehr Sa'idi (Farsnews.com, June 14, 2015)

The funeral held for Manouchehr Sa'idi (Farsnews.com, June 14, 2015)

ISIS threatens Iran: A notice published in Iranian media showing ISIS flags flying near the Azadi Tower in Tehran.

ISIS threatens Iran: A notice published in Iranian media showing ISIS flags flying near the Azadi Tower in Tehran.

From https://www.facebook.com/IRGCSF?fref=photo, June 9, 2015.

From https://www.facebook.com/IRGCSF?fref=photo, June 9, 2015.

From https://qasemsoleimani.ir

From https://qasemsoleimani.ir

Iranian Religious and Propagation Activities around the Globe

Iranian Religious and Propagation Activities around the Globe


Highlights of the week

  • After ISIS's recent military successes in the city of Tadmor and the Syrian desert, senior Iranian officials stressed Iran's commitment to the Syrian regime but denied reports that Iran was planning to increase the number of its forces there. The Arab media reported that Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF), recently visited Syria to formulate a military strategy to curb the progress of the radical Sunni organizations.
  • The campaign in Iraq continues claiming Iranian victims. A Kurdish member of the Iranian Basij was killed in an ISIS attack on an Iraqi village. Meanwhile, Qasem Soleimani returned to Iraq to support the anti-ISIS campaign.
  • The Iranian cargo sent to Yemen in the Middle of May aboard the ship Iran Shahed apparently reached its destination, following a significant delay after Iran had been forced to allow UN inspectors in Djibouti to examine it. In addition, Iran sent another ship carrying aid to Yemen. Remarking harshly about the situation in Yemen, Hossein Salami, deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, claimed the oppression of the civilians in Yemen was worse than the oppression in Gaza.
  • For the anniversary of the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Islamic revolution, on May 4, 2015, Iranian legations around the world held "information" activities dedicated to his memory.

 

Spotlight on Iran is a new, bimonthly Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin intended to shed light on Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media. Spotlight on Iran is written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, a research fellow in the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies in Tel Aviv University and a research fellow at the Forum for Regional Thinking. His fields of expertise include the politics, society, foreign policy and social networks in the Islamic Republic.

 

Senior Iranian Officials' Statements on Iran's Regional Involvement

  • ISIS's control of the city of Tadmor and its environs and the Syrian desert, the fall of the Iraqi city of Ramadi to the organization and Saudi attacks in Yemen were the focus of statements made by Iranian officials regarding Iran's regional intervention in the past two weeks.
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, former Iranian foreign minister, advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and head of the Center for Strategic Studies in the Iranian Expediency Council, accused the United States, Israel and the "reactionary" Arab states of responsibility for the difficult situation in Syria. Interviewed by Iranian TV on May 31, 2015, he claimed their intervention in Syria was part of a comprehensive plan to enable them to take control of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. However, he denied reports that the Assad regime was floundering and said it was "almost 100% certain" that while the terrorist organizations had occupied some of the country, they would not be able to advance or succeed in overthrowing the Syrian regime. Regarding the situation in Yemen, he said Iran maintained contact with certain elements in Yemen, including the Houthis, and supported them but did not provide weapons because Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said the Houthis had no need of Iranian weapons (ISNA, June 1, 2015).
  • At a press conference held by Velayati on June 6, 2015, after meeting with the UN secretary general's envoy for Iraqi affairs, he claimed that without Iranian support Syria and Iraq would not be able to cope easily with the terrorists. He said that Iran was helping Iraq in every way it could against the terrorists, especially ISIS, and supported unity among Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds, and the territorial cohesion of its neighbor. He said the activities of the American-led international coalition against ISIS were useless because the coalition was unwilling to support the popular Shi'ite militias (Tasnim News, June 6, 2015).
  • Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, former Iranian ambassador to Iraq and current advisor to Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif, was also asked about the developments in Syria and Iraq in an interview with the conservative KhabarOnline website. He claimed the Iraqi army had been defeated at Ramadi because the popular militias did not help it fight ISIS, and because of the objections of the Americans, who claimed their help would lead to Shi'ite-Sunni conflicts. He also noted the lack of American support for the Iraqi army during ISIS's advance as an additional reason for the defeat of the Iraqi army at Ramadi.
  • Kazemi-Qomi warned that if it became impossible to halt ISIS's territorial progress, Iran would be in serious danger, and said Iran had to broaden its regional influence and collaborate with the countries facing ISIS terrorism. He said Iran would struggle against all aggression, whether it came from takfiri organizations or from the Saudi regime attacking the innocent Houthis. If the Yemenis asked Iran for help, he said, Iran would not withhold it because it had an obligation to provide them with humanitarian, religious and national support. Asked if that would include military support, Kazemi-Qomi replied that Iran did not have a military presence in any of the countries it supported: Syria, Lebanon, Yemen or Iraq. Rather, it sent only military advisors and logistic support. The collaboration between Iran and those countries, he claimed, was only intended to protect its own national interests, and that was why so far ISIS had not succeeded in its attempts to enter Iran.

Iran does in fact not directly intervene militarily by sending Iranian military forces to the conflict zones in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. However, the claim that Iran only sends military advisors and logistic support is false. Iran uses various Shi'ite organizations and emissaries as proxies, and they do in fact both receive military support and take orders from the Iranians, mainly through the Qods Force. Such organizations include the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Shi'ite militias in Iraq and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

 

  • Noting the developments in Yemen, Kazemi-Qomi accused Saudi Arabia of employing terrorist policies and warned that if its terrorism were not halted it would spread throughout the entire region, including Iran. ISIS, he said, was not limited to Iraq and did not recognize geographical boundaries. He added that Iran's support for Iraq was intended to prevent it from being divided, because such a division was liable to have a negative influence on Iran. Iranian support for Iraq and Syria would continue as long as the security situation there made it necessary, and as long as the Iraqi and Syrian governments requested it (www.khabaronline.ir, June 1, 2015).
  • Interviewed by Fars News on June 9, Hojjat-ul-Islam Ali Sa'idi, the Supreme Leader's representative in the Revolutionary Guards, claimed that under the leadership of Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Revolution had reached the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Straits. He claimed Iran did not seek to impose Shi'a on the world but was working in the name of all Islam. He also claimed Khomeini and Khamenei had never supported particularly Shi'ite concepts, and therefore Iran supported both Hamas and Hezbollah.

Sa'idi's statements reflect Iran's understanding that defining the Middle Eastern regional conflicts as religious and between Shi'ites and Sunnis increases the concern in the Arab world regarding the "Shi'ite threat," deepens the suspicions which already exist between Iran and the Sunni Arab countries, and make it difficult for Iran to promote its regional influence. Senior Iranian figures therefore make an effort to gloss over the interethnic rift and call for Shi'ite-Sunni unity, stressing that only Islamic unity will make it possible to resolve regional issues. The influence of Iran's public diplomacy is limited, however, in view of Iran's policies which encourage Shi'ite dominance, especially in Iraq.


Iranian Intervention in Syria

  • In view of ISIS's recent military achievements in Syria, during the past two weeks Arab and Western media have issued reports on Iran's intention to increase its involvement in Syria to halt ISIS's progress and keep the Syrian regime from collapsing. Senior Iranian officials repeatedly stressed Iran's commitment to the Syrian regime, but so far there is no proof of an increase in Iranian forces or an Iranian presence in Syria.
  • During a visit Mohammad al-Laham, the chairman of the Syrian parliament, in Tehran at the beginning of June 2015, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Iran would stand beside the Syrian government and people to the end, and expressed his faith in Syria's capabilities to be victorious in the campaign against terrorism (Fars News, June 2, 2015). Ali-Akbar Velayati, senior advisor to the Supreme Leader for international affairs, also stated that Iran would continue to support Syria because Syria was a front in the struggle against the Zionists. In a ceremony held to mark the anniversary of the death of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Velayati said that Syrian President Bashar Assad was as beloved today in his country as always (Fars News, June 4, 2015). Hossein Amir Abdollahian, deputy foreign minister for Arab and African affairs, claimed that there was no change in Iran's position on Syria and that Iranian support for Syria in its struggle against terrorism was strategic and not tactical (KhabarOnline, June 9, 2015).
  • At the beginning of June the Arab media reported that Qasem Soleimani, IRGC-Qods Force commander, had visited Syria. On June 1, 2015, the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese website Al-Hadath reported that Soleimani had visited the fronts in southern and western Syria to get a first-hand look at the situation and to formulate a military strategy to halt the progress of the radical Sunni organizations. According to the report, he visited the region of Idlib in western Syria after Al-Nusra Front had taken control of the city and headed a delegation of senior military advisors from Iran and Hezbollah who visited the Al-Ghab[1] region in the northwestern part of the country to examine the Syrian army deployment and formulate ways to stop the advance of "takfiri organizations" [that is, Al-Nusra Front and its allies operating in the Idlib province, whose advance threatens Latakia and the strongholds of the Syrian regime along the coast].
  • Al-Hadath sources reported that after the visit Qasem Soleimani concluded it would not be possible to halt the advance of Al-Nusra Front in the Idlib region because of its proximity to the Turkish border, and therefore supporters of the Syrian regime had to be withdrawn to the Al-Ghab region and reinforcements had to be sent. The website also reported that during the visit Soleimani appointed a senior Revolutionary Guards figure to head a group of military advisors in Syria and to act for him in every aspect of directing military affairs in Syria in collaboration with Hezbollah and the Syrian army. The website's sources denied, however, a statement allegedly made by Soleimani to the effect that the world would be surprised by developments in Syria in the near future following the collaboration between Iran and the commanders of the Syrian army (Mashreq News, June 1, 2015). The sources claimed that Soleimani had never made such a statement and did not customarily make promises about future military successes.
  • In addition, at the beginning of June there were a number of reports in the media about Iran's intention to send thousands of Iranian and Iraqi soldiers to Syria to support the Assad regime. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Iranian Expediency Council, denied the reports, claiming that Iran had no intention of intervening directly in the Syrian civil war. After an Expediency Council meeting Rezaei also claimed that the rumor which spread in the West concerning Iran's intention to activate its bilateral defense treaty with Syria, which would enable it to send forces to defend the Syrian regime, was baseless (Mehr News, June 6, 2015). Ms. Marzieh Afkham, spokeswoman for the Iranian foreign ministry, also denied the reports about an Iranian military presence in Syria (Fars News, June 10, 2015).
  • Meanwhile, the Iranian Defa Press website posted an interview with Said Ibrahim, a fighter in the so-called Fatemiyoun Battalion, which is composed of Shi'ite Afghan refugees residing in Iran. They are recruited by Iran for the fighting in Syria in return for a monthly salary and various benefits. In February 2015 Ali-Reza Tavasoli, the battalion commander, was killed along with some of his fighters in an attack on the Assad regime supported by Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards in the Daraa province in the southern Golan Heights. Reportedly, Iran has recently decided to upgrade the force to division strength.
  • In the interview Said Ibrahim described the determination of the battalion fighters against ISIS in Syria, their strong faith and willingness to sacrifice. He said that the battalion was composed of fighters of all ages and a variety of social classes. He said that an 85 year-old fighter participated in a recent operation and had insisted on fighting alongside the younger fighters. Said Ibrahim also described the difficult personal emotions he experienced in being separated from his family in Iran. He said the last time he was in Iran after having been wounded in the fighting, his wife gave birth to their baby boy in the same hospital. He said his wife was not pleased with his fighting in Syria and that every time he wanted to leave the house and return there, he made up an excuse and went.
  • Said Ibrahim said that the fighters in the battalion received "jihadi names" which were also used by their comrades so that they could not be identified. He said there had been instances in the past when relatives of Afghan fighters received death threats, and in some cases had actually been killed, because their family members participated in the fighting. He complained that despite the participation of the Afghans in the fighting in Syria, the Afghans in Iran were still treated poorly.

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

  • Manouchehr Sa'idi, a member of the Basij militia of the Revolutionary Guards, who worked as an engineer in an Iraqi village, was killed at the beginning of June in an ISIS attack. Sa'idi, 34, from Qorveh in the Kurdistan province, was buried on June 4, 2015. His funeral was attended by the Supreme Leader's representative in the Kurdistan province, the governor of the province and other important people (IRNA.ir, June 4, 2015).
  • After ISIS took control of the city of Ramadi, senior Iranian officials tried to calm fears that ISIS might advance toward the Iran-Iraq border. Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, said that in the past ISIS had tried a number of times to extend the fighting to the Iranian border, but did not have the capabilities to do so (IRNA, May 31, 2015). Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, also claimed that ISIS did to have the courage to approach Iran's borders. He said Iran was determined to destroy the organization everywhere within 40 kilometers (about 25 miles) of the border (ISNA, June 2, 2015).Iranian social networks posted new information about the presence of the Qods Force commander, Qasem Soleimani, in Iraq. A Facebook video documented him in a meeting with Sunni tribal elders in Anbar Province, held to convince them to fight alongside the Shi'ite militias against ISIS.
  • Recent pictures were also posted of Soleimani accompanied by Jamal al-Ibrahimi (below, left) and Abu-Mahdi al-Muhandis (right), commander of the Hezbollah brigades, one of the Shi'ite militias in Iraq established by the Revolutionary Guards in 2007.                                                                                                                    
  • Qais Hassan, chairman of the Afghan parliamentary transportation committee, claimed last week that Afghan airplanes operating in collaboration with an Iranian airline were being used to transport forces from Iran to Baghdad and Najaf in Iraq (Asriran.com, June 9, 2015).

Iranian Intervention in Yemen

  • Speaking out strongly about the situation in Yemen, Hossein Salami, deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, said that the oppression of the Yemenis was worse that that of the Gazans. In a meeting with clerics in the city of Qom, he said that while journalists inform the world about the "crimes of the Zionist regime," in Yemen there were no journalists to make the cry of the oppressed heard. He called the war Saudi Arabia was waging in Yemen "illogical and the stupidest war in history." He called it part of a plot to restore regional hegemony to the United States and stressed that the resistance of the people of Yemen to the invaders would continue till victory (Sepah News, June 7, 2015).
  • The Iranian cargo sent to Yemen in the middle of May aboard the ship Iran Shahed, apparently reached its destination after a significant delay as Iran had been forced to allow UN inspectors in Djibouti to examine it. Its contents consisted of 2,500 tons of food, water, medicines, tents and blankets. The representative of the Iranian Red Crescent in Djibouti said that after having been transferred to five small ships the cargo proceeded on to Yemen (Tasnim News, June 5, 2015).
  • Two journalists who had been aboard the ship were interviewed by the Defa Press website. They reported the events that led to the change in the ship's route. They said that the decision to launch the ship had been made in Iran after several unsuccessful attempts to send aid to Yemen by air. The Iranian authorities selected as passengers the two journalists, members of the Iranian Red Crescent and several activists from the United States, France and Germany who opposed the war in Yemen. When the ship entered the Gulf of Aden it was escorted by an Iranian naval force. Reports were then received from Iran about a change in the route from Yemen to Djibouti, although initially they were told that after the cargo had been examined the ship would be allowed to proceed to al-Hudaydah port. The journalists said that they were not worried about being attacked by the Saudi and Pakistani warships that approached the ship because they were of the opinion that Saudi Arabia did not have the courage to attack it. According to the journalists, upon reaching Djibouti they were warmly received by local residents, one of whom even praised former Iranian President Ahmadinejad for his "anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist" positions. The government of Djibouti, however, refused to issue visas for the crewmembers and did not allow them to come ashore (Defa Press, June 7, 2015).
  • On June 6, 2015, another ship left the Bandar Imam Khomeini port in Khuzestan in southwest Iran, bound for Yemen. Sa'dullah Abdullahi, the chairman of the port organization of Khuzestan, said that the ship Arezou ("wish" in Persian) was carrying 8,000 tons of rice and 1,000 tons of sugar (ISNA, June 7, 2015).
  • Hossein Amir Abdollahian, deputy foreign minister for Arab and African affairs, claimed Iran was prepared to send additional humanitarian aid to Yemen through the Red Cross. Meeting with the head of the Red Cross delegation in Yemen, Abdhollahian said it was unacceptable that wounded Yemenis, women and children among them, were being denied the right to medical treatment due to the "cruel" aerial and naval closure imposed on Yemen by Saudi Arabia (Fars News June 3, 2015).

Iranian Intervention in Lebanon

  • On June 4, 2015, the Iranian embassy in Beirut held its annual ceremony to mark the death of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, who died 26 years ago. Nabih Berri, the chairman of the Lebanese parliament, send a communiqué congratulating Iran and claiming Lebanon had learned the lesson of victory from Khomeini and how to preserve it. He said that Iran could serve as a model for Lebanon and teach it how to construct communities and preserve their stability (Alef, June 4, 2015). Naim Qassem, deputy secretary general of Hezbollah, said during the ceremony that Iran helped the Lebanese "resistance" in liberating Lebanon without receiving anything in return and that today Hezbollah openly stood shoulder to shoulder with Iran, the Imam Khomeini, the Imam Khamenei, Hassan Nasrallah and all those who had chosen the Supreme Leader's path of truth (Khorasan News, June 4, 2015).
  • Amir-Hossein Ziaei, chairman of the Iranian Red Crescent, inaugurated a new medical center in Baalbek. Three floors high and with an area of 1,200 square meters, it has an operating room, a recovery room, a blood bank, a pharmacy and a physical therapy room. The ceremony inaugurating the center, whose construction began in 2011, was attended by the heads of the Lebanese Red Cross, members of the Norwegian Red Cross, which donated to the building fund, representatives of Hezbollah and the Amal movement and senior local clerics (IRNA.ir, June 5, 2015).

Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena

  • The anniversary of Khomeini's death gave senior Iranian officials another opportunity to emphasize Iran's commitment to the Palestinians. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a speech at the main ceremony, claiming Iran would never abandon the Palestinian people and that the Palestinian cause would never be taken off the Islamic Revolution's agenda (Iranian TV, June 4, 2015). Ali-Akbar Velayati, his advisor for international affairs, gave a speech before the International Islamic Awakening Conference in Tehran in which he claimed Iran would support the Palestinian people with all the means at its disposal and that no obstacle would keep Iran from sending aid to the Palestinians. Iran, he claimed, considered itself responsible for helping the oppressed people of the Muslim world, especially the Palestinians (IRNA.ir, June 3, 2015).

Iranian Intervention in the Gulf States

  • This past week the ministry of the interior in Bahrain accused Iran of involvement in anti-Bahrain terrorist activities. The accusations came in the wake of the detention of a number of Shi'ite citizens who, according to the claims of the authorities, were members of a terrorist group called Saraya al-Ashtar which had carried out a series of terrorist attacks against policemen in recent years. The detainees admitted to having been recruited for the attacks by the leaders of the group, who lived in Iran, and that they had been sent to Iraq for training (Alarabiya, June 7, 2015). A spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry rejected and denied the accusations (ISNA, June 10, 2015).

Iranian Religious and Propagation Activities around the Globe

  • This year as well, Iranian legations around the globe organized propagating activities for the anniversary of Khomeini's death. The Iranian Cultural Center in Armenia issued an edition of an illustrated book by Ali Sabzian called Living According to Ruhollah's Lifestyle, translated into Armenian. It represents the life of Khomeini and is intended to reveal to Armenian readers the story of Khomeini's life, concepts and moral qualities (Mehr News.com, June 2, 2015).
  • Last week the Iranian embassy in Brazil held a memorial service for Khomeini attended by two of his grandchildren, Hassan and Ali Khomeini, as well as Muslim clerics from Brazil (ISNA, June 4, 2015).
  • A conference was held in Thailand in memory of Khomeini, attended by Hossein Kamalian, the Iranian ambassador to Bangkok; Mostafa Najjarian-Zadeh, the cultural attaché; Mohammad-Hassan Akhtari, the secretary general of the Ahl al-Bayt World Assembly; and local Shi'ite and Sunni clerics. Speaking before the assembly, Akhtari said that Khamenei was continuing Khomeini's path. As to the campaign in Yemen, he said that those bombing Yemenis were not Muslims but traitors to the name of Islam (Abna News, June 8, 2015). A similar event was held in Istanbul attended by Ayatollah Sheikh Mohsen Araki, a member of the Ahl al-Bayt supreme council; the Iranian cultural attaché in Turkey and local clerics (Ibna.ir, June 9, 2015).
  • On June 6, 2015, the Islamic Center in Hamburg, Germany, held a conference to discuss Khomeini, attended by Abbas Badakhshan Zohouri, the Iranian consul general in Hamburg; Ms. Fatemeh Tabataba'i, wife of Khomeini's son Ahmad; Hojjat-ul-Islam Reza Ramazani, director of the Islamic Center in Hamburg and chairman of the European Union of Shi'ite Clerics; and Muslim clerics from Germany and Austria (Hawza News, June 7, 2015).
  • Hayel Daoud, the Jordanian minister of religious endowments, denied a CNN report that Iran had approached Iran with an official request to allow Iranian pilgrims to visit the holy sites and to allow Iran to open a religious seminary in Jordan. He claimed no official request had been received from Iran and that the issue had only been referred to verbally on a number of occasions. Daoud claimed that in view of regional conditions and developments, Jordan did not intend to allow Iranian religious tourism in the country (Asr-e Iran, June 7, 2015).

[1]Al-Ghab plain is located on the road from Idlib to Latakia, lying between the cities of Ariah and Jisr al-Shughur, both occupied by Al-Nusra Front and its allies.

Iranian Support for Palestinian Terrorism: Funds Transferred to Gazan Shaheeds’ Families by Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Affiliated Al-Ansar Charity Association


Left: Al-Ansar charity association announces time and place of the distribution of funds to terrorist shaheeds' families through the post office bank in the Gaza Strip (Facebook page of the Al-Ansar charity association, April 5, 2015). Right: Notice from the PIJ-affiliated Al-Ansar charity association in the Gaza Strip about the distribution of $2 million to 5000 families of shaheeds, funds transferred by the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs [i.e., shaheeds] Foundation (Facebook page of the Al-Ansar charity association, April 12, 2015)
Left: Al-Ansar charity association announces time and place of the distribution of funds to terrorist shaheeds' families through the post office bank in the Gaza Strip (Facebook page of the Al-Ansar charity association, April 5, 2015). Right: Notice from the PIJ-affiliated Al-Ansar charity association in the Gaza Strip about the distribution of $2 million to 5000 families of shaheeds, funds transferred by the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs [i.e., shaheeds] Foundation (Facebook page of the Al-Ansar charity association, April 12, 2015)

Overview

1.   The Al-Ansar charity association operates in the Gaza Strip and is affiliated with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). It was founded during the second intifada (2001) and serves the Iranians as a pipeline for funds to finance terrorism in the Gaza Strip and as a way to increase Iran's influence over the Gazan population. Al-Ansar supports the families of terrorists who were killed ("shaheeds"), families whose houses were destroyed, and families of terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel. In the past, it also supported the families of shaheeds in Judea and Samaria, with the authorization and sponsorship of Mahmoud Abbas. It is uncertain if it continues to do so today, and if it does, how the funds are delivered (See Appendices A and B).

2.   The PIJ, the second most important Palestinian terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip, is Iran's preferred Palestinian terrorist organization. Iran supports the PIJ both financially and militarily (providing weapons, training, technological knowledge, etc.). Iran transfers large sums of money, up to several mission dollars a year, to the Al-Ansar charity association through the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation (established in Iran by the Ayatollah Khomeini to aid and support the families of Iranians killed in the Iran-Iraq War). The Iranian Martyrs Foundation has two branches in Lebanon, a Lebanese branch that supports Hezbollah and a Palestinian branch that supports Hamas and the PIJ (See Appendix B for information about the Iranian Martyr's Foundation and its Palestinian branch). The funds for the Palestinians are probably transferred from Lebanon to the Gaza Strip by bank transfer but it is not clear which banks are involved.

3.   Since the days of the second intifada, the radical Islamist "charitable societies" operating in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria have served as pipelines for Iran to transfer funds to the Palestinian terrorist organizations. The money finances the terrorist organizations' social network (mosques, educational institutions, support for the families of shaheeds), especially those of Hamas and the PIJ. Past experience has shown that the funds earmarked for the social network can easily be diverted to the military-terrorist wings of the various terrorist organizations. Thus the Iranian Islamic regime provided religious legitimacy for the money transferred to support Palestinian terrorism (according to the Ayatollah Khomeini, Muslim charity funds could be given to support the Palestinians).

4.   Al-Ansar, which receives funds from the Iranian Martyrs Foundation, was outlawed in Israel in 2003. It is headed by a PIJ activist named Nafez Othman Abd al-Rahman al-A'raj (Abu Suheib). His brother Omar al-A'raj was a senior PIJ military-terrorist operative, killed in 1996 during a Palestinian Authority (PA) attempt to detain him in the Gaza Strip. (Omar al-A'raj founded the PIJ's military-terrorist network and was in charge of manufacturing IEDs for a series of deadly attacks carried out in Israel). In 2007 the Iranian Martyrs Foundation and its branches in Lebanon were designated as sponsors of terrorism by the United States Department of the Treasury because they provided Hezbollah, Hamas and the PIJ with financial support (See below).

Transfer of Funds to the Gaza Strip for Families of Shaheeds

5.   On April 12, 2015, the Al-Ansar charity association in the Gaza Strip announced that $2 million would be distributed among 5,000 families of Gazan shaheeds who had died between the beginning of the second intifada (2000) and June 31, 2014, that is, before the outbreak of Operation Protective Edge (Alansar.ps, April 12, 2015). On April 5, 2015, Al-Ansar said in a statement that the financial support was funded by the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation (Facebook page of Al-Ansar, April 5, 2015).

6.   On January 18, 2015, Al-Ansar in the Gaza Strip posted a notice on its Facebook page to Gazans whose family members had been killed in Operation Protective Edge and who had not yet registered with the society. They were requested to go to the Al-Ansar offices with a death certificate, a picture of the deceased, medical reports, and similar relevant documents, so that the transfer of funds could be arranged (Facebook page of Al-Ansar, February 11, 2005). In ITIC assessment, based on an average payment of $400 per family, the Iranian Martyrs Foundation can be expected to transfer an additional $900,000 for the families of Gazans killed in Operation Protective Edge (for approximately 2,200 families) once registration and bureaucratic procedures have been completed. Payment will mainly be made through branches of the post office in the Gaza Strip.

Appeal to the families whose relatives died in Operation Protective Edge to register at the offices of the Al-Ansar charity association (Facebook page of Al-Ansar, February 11, 2015).
Appeal to the families whose relatives died in Operation Protective Edge to register at the offices of the Al-Ansar charity association (Facebook page of Al-Ansar, February 11, 2015).

Appendices

7.   Three appendices follow:

1)  Appendix A – Profile of the Al-Ansar charity association

2)  Appendix BExamples of funds transferred by Al-Ansar charity association

3)  Appendix C – Profile of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation 

News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (March 11 – 16, 2015)

Operatives of the so-called

Operatives of the so-called "popular resistance" continue throwing stones at Israeli vehicles and the Israeli security forces.

Operatives of the so-called

Operatives of the so-called "popular resistance" continue throwing stones at Israeli vehicles and the Israeli security forces.

Beir Zeit University students clash with Israeli security forces in front of the Ofer jail (west of Ramallah) (Wafa.ps, March 10, 2015).

Beir Zeit University students clash with Israeli security forces in front of the Ofer jail (west of Ramallah) (Wafa.ps, March 10, 2015).

Beir Zeit University students clash with Israeli security forces in front of the Ofer jail (west of Ramallah) (Wafa.ps, March 10, 2015).

Beir Zeit University students clash with Israeli security forces in front of the Ofer jail (west of Ramallah) (Wafa.ps, March 10, 2015).

Exporting agricultural produce from the Gaza Strip to Israel through the Kerem Shalom crossing. Right: A Hamas policeman directs traffic (Facebook page of PALDF, March 12, 2015).

Exporting agricultural produce from the Gaza Strip to Israel through the Kerem Shalom crossing. Right: A Hamas policeman directs traffic (Facebook page of PALDF, March 12, 2015).

Exporting agricultural produce from the Gaza Strip to Israel through the Kerem Shalom crossing. Right: A Hamas policeman directs traffic (Facebook page of PALDF, March 12, 2015).

Exporting agricultural produce from the Gaza Strip to Israel through the Kerem Shalom crossing. Right: A Hamas policeman directs traffic (Facebook page of PALDF, March 12, 2015).

IHH activists distribute food packages in the Gaza Strip (Facebook page of the IHH in the Gaza Strip, March 15, 2015)

IHH activists distribute food packages in the Gaza Strip (Facebook page of the IHH in the Gaza Strip, March 15, 2015)

Graduates of

Graduates of "Course 28" in a military display in the Gaza Strip (Website of the ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip, March 12, 2015)

Palestinian police display in the northern Gaza Strip (Website of the ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip, March 15, 2015)

Palestinian police display in the northern Gaza Strip (Website of the ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip, March 15, 2015)

Palestinian police display in the northern Gaza Strip (Website of the ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip, March 15, 2015)

Palestinian police display in the northern Gaza Strip (Website of the ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip, March 15, 2015)

  • This past week Israel's south remained quiet. In Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem violence continued, part of the Palestinians' so-called "popular resistance." Most of the attacks involved the throwing of stones.
  • This past week in the Gaza Strip the Hamas-controlled internal security forces held a number of displays exhibiting their military capabilities as well as their ability to impose internal security. A senior figure in the Palestinian police force claimed the security situation in the Gaza Strip was stable and under control.
  • The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military-terrorist wing, claimed responsibility for erecting military posts at a distance of a few hundred meters from the security fence along the border with Israel. One is near the Shejaiya neighborhood and the other was built on the ruins of the former Israeli settlement of Nisanit (near the Erez crossing).
Rocket Fire Attacking Israel

This past week no rocket or mortar shell hits were identified in Israeli territory.

Rocket Fire Attacking Israel

"Popular Resistance" Terrorism and Violence Continue
  • This past week the wave of violence and rioting continued at the usual locations in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem, part of what the Palestinians call the "popular resistance." The violence mainly involved throwing stones, rocks and Molotov cocktails at Israeli security forces and vehicles. Some of the prominent attacks were the following:
  • On March 10, 2015, stones were thrown at an Israeli bus near the Dung Gate in east Jerusalem. The bus was en route to the Western Wall. One woman passenger incurred minor injuries. According to the police, a 15 year-old Palestinian was detained on suspicion of having thrown the stones (Tazpit.org.il, March 10, 2015).
  • On March 11, 2015, IDF forces detained four Palestinians on suspicion of throwing stones near Nebi Saleh (southern Samaria) (IDF Spokesman, March 11, 2015).
The Crossings – Recent Developments
The Rafah Crossing
  • Two days after the Rafah crossing opened it closed again for an unlimited period of time. During the two days it was open 1,008 Palestinians passed through (Youm7.com, March 11, 2015).
  • A "senior Palestinian" who accompanied Mahmoud Abbas to a meeting of the Economic Conference claimed Mahmoud Abbas had met privately with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. According to the source, Mahmoud Abbas asked el-Sisi to speed up the opening of the Rafah crossing to ease the distress of the Gazans. The "senior Palestinian" also claimed that the Egyptian president promised Mahmoud Abbas that the Rafah crossing would be permanently opened in the coming days (Quds.net, March 14, 2015).
  • Ibrahim al-Ashqar, a Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, stressed Hamas' objection to any proposal involving the replacement of employees at the crossings with employees of the Palestinian Authority (PA). He claimed Hamas would not transfer the crossings to the PA until after the Palestinian national consensus government had fulfilled its obligations to the Gaza Strip. The first obligation, he claimed, was paying the salaries of Hamas employees and transferring funds to the various Gazan government ministries (Al-Risala, March 11, 2015).
The Kerem Shalom Crossing
  • The Ma'an News Agency issued a report on the export of agricultural produce from the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom crossing to Israel, Judea and Samaria. It was reportedly the first time in eight years that Israel permitted the import of agricultural produce from the Gaza Strip (Maannews.net, March 11, 2015).
Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip
  • Mohammed al-Emadi, chairman of the Qatari committee for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, held a press conference in the Gaza Strip (on the ruins of Al-Wafaa hospital). He claimed that the committee intended to begin the immediate construction of 1,000 dwelling units for homeless Gazans: Qatar would send four trucks of building materials to the Gaza Strip every day. The committee also intended to provide new sources of electricity. He claimed that Qatar's promised donation of $1 billion would be given only to Gazans harmed during Operation Protective Edge. Ismail Haniya, former head of the de-facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, said he expected the Palestinian national consensus government to be responsible for implementing the reconstruction programs to enable the Palestinian people to overcome their current humanitarian crisis (Al-Quds TV, March 12, 2015).
  • Muhammad Kaya, director of the Gazan branch of the Turkish Islamist organization IHH, reported the organization had distributed 7,000 packages of food to needy families. They included the families of 3,500 Gazan employees who had not yet received salaries and 3,5000 families harmed during Operation Protective Edge. He claimed the aid cost €200,000 (Facebook page of the IHH in the Gaza Strip, March 15, 2015).
  • Muhammad Mustafa (minister of economics in the Palestinian national consensus government) and the economic advisor of the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development signed an agreement for Kuwait's planned $200 million contribution to the reconstruction of the southern Gaza Strip (Wafa.ps, March 12, 2015).
New Hamas Military Posts Erected near the Israeli Border
  • The guidance and training unit of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas' military-terrorist wing) claimed responsibility for the erection of military posts a few hundred meters from Israel's border security fence. One of them, the "Al-Yarmouk post," was erected near the Shejaiya neighborhood, and the "Palestine post" was erected on the ruins of the former Israeli settlement of Nisanit (near the Erez crossing). A senior member of the training unit claimed the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades would continue erecting posts near the Israeli border (Qassam.ps, March 14, 2015).

Left: Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades terrorist operatives face the security force. Right: Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades training facility facing the security fence (Qassam.ps, March 14, 2015).
Left: Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades terrorist operatives face the security force. Right: Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades training facility facing the security fence (Qassam.ps, March 14, 2015).

An Appeal to the Egyptian Court Decision
  • According to reports, Egyptian authorities are working to appeal the ruling of the Egyptian Court for Urgent Matters which designated the entire Hamas movement as a terrorist organization. The Administrative Court, headed by Yahya Dakrouri, deputy prime minister of Egypt, decided to transfer the appeal to the Civil Service Commission (Almasryalyoum.com, March 11, 2015). An anonymous judicial source said that on March 28, 2015, the Court for Urgent Matters would deliberate the appeal regarding the designation of the Hamas movement as a terrorist organization (Almasryalyoum.com, March 11, 2015).
  • Hamas expressed satisfaction with the Egyptian government's decision to appeal the court's ruling. Senior Hamas figure Sami Abu Zuhri praised the decision, saying he hoped it would lead to righting the wrong done to Hamas (Safa.ps, March 11, 2015). Senior Hamas figure Ismail al-Ashqar also praised the decision, saying it was a step in the right direction. He said Hamas aspired to strategic relations with all Arab countries, including Egypt, to fight the "Zionist entity." He claimed that the Egyptian decision "turned over a new leaf" after the "historic mistake," and that Egypt had learned that the Gaza Strip and Hamas were strategically important and not dangerous (Paltoday.ps, March 11, 2015).
Khaled Mashaal Meets with Senior Iranian
  • Ali Larijani, chairman of the Iranian Majlis (Parliament), headed a parliamentary delegation on visits to Kuwait and Qatar. While in Qatar he met with Khaled Mashaal, head of Hamas' political bureau. Hamas spokesman Husam Badran claimed they discussed recent developments in the Palestinian cause (Alquds.co.uk, March 11, 2015). Hamas issued a statement claiming the two had discussed the implications of the [so-called] "Israeli threat" to Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa mosque, and the continuing "siege" of the Gaza Strip (Alaraby.co.uk, March 11, 2015).
  • Senior Hamas figure Bassem Naim claimed that Larijani assured Mashaal that Iran supported the Palestinian cause in general and the Palestinian organizations and the "resistance" [i.e., terrorism and violence] in particular. He claimed holding the meeting was an important step and would lead to other visits and to strengthening the relations between Hamas and Iran (AFP.com, March 13, 2015).
Displays of Force in the Gaza Strip
  • Al-Aqsa TV broadcast of program about operatives of Hamas' "central support force – the special missions unit." According to the broadcast, its main function is to secure sensitive individuals and guard delegations paying official and unofficial visits to the Gaza Strip. All the operatives are reportedly former security personnel (Al-Aqsa TV, March 12, 2015).

The "special missions unit" in action (YouTube, March 12, 2015).
The "special missions unit" in action (YouTube, March 12, 2015).

  • On March 12, 2015, the training unit of the ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip held a military display of 600 operatives, graduates of the so-called "Course 28" (whose nature is so far unknown). The display began at the so-called "Ashqelon base" in northern Beit Lahia and ended at a training compound in the western Gaza Strip. Participating operatives demonstrated the military skills they learned during the course (Website of the ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip, March 12, 2015).
  • The Palestinian police in the northern Gaza Strip held a display that included police force officers, members of the rapid intervention force, members of the naval police, etc. During the display Alaa al-Din al-Hindi, commander of the northern Gaza Strip district, claimed the Palestinian police protected the residents of the Gaza Strip despite all the difficulties they encountered. He claimed the security situation in the Gaza Strip was stable and that the police controlled all its divisions (Website of the ministry of the interior in the Gaza Strip, March 15, 2015).
Clashes between the PA's Security Forces and Residents of the Balata Refugee Camp
  • This past week clashes continued between the PA's security forces and residents of the Balata refugee camp (near Nablus). On March 14, 2015, riots broke out (for the third time in the past two days) when dozens of residents blocked the street running parallel to the refugee camp. They burned tires and threw stones at a Palestinian security force patrol (Paltoday.ps, March 14, 2015). Akram Rajoub, governor of the Nablus district, said that certain persons were inciting the residents to riot. He said those persons wanted to undermine security, influence public opinion and force the security forces to give in to their demands (Voice of Palestine Radio, March 15, 2015).

Rami Hamdallah, prime minister of the Palestinian national consensus government, at the Balata refugee camp after the recent clashes between the security forces and the camp residents (Wafa.ps, March 13, 2015).
Rami Hamdallah, prime minister of the Palestinian national consensus government, at the Balata refugee camp after the recent clashes between the security forces and the camp residents (Wafa.ps, March 13, 2015).

The Campaign to Boycott Israeli Products Continues
  • In Judea and Samaria the campaign to boycott Israeli products continues. On March 11, 2015, Fatah activists in Nablus confiscated a truck belonging to Strauss, an Israeli dairy company, emptied it of its contents and burned them (Maannews.net, March 11, 2015). On March 10, 2015, activists in Ramallah stopped another Strauss truck, emptied it and destroyed its contents (Facebook page of PALDF, March 10, 2015).

Left: The contents of a Strauss truck burn on the ground (Maannews.net, March 11, 2015). Right: The contents of a Strauss truck destroyed (Facebook page of PALDF, March 10, 2015).
Left: The contents of a Strauss truck burn on the ground (Maannews.net, March 11, 2015). Right: The contents of a Strauss truck destroyed (Facebook page of PALDF, March 10, 2015).

Glorifying Operatives Who Carried Out Terrorist Attacks
  • Fatah's official Facebook page marked the anniversary of the Coastal Road Massacre (March 11, 1978) by posting a picture of Dalal al-Magribi (a female terrorist operative turned into a role model for Palestinian society). The text above her picture read, "Flash: Large-scale attack at Herzliya in Tel Aviv [on the Coastal road where the massacre was carried out]...80 Israelis killed and more than one hundred wounded. The Palestinian flag was flown in the center of the city...It was a most heroic victory" (Official Facebook page of Fatah, March 10, 2015).

Official Facebook page of Fatah dedicated to the memory of terrorist operative Dalal al-Magribi, March 10, 2015.
Official Facebook page of Fatah dedicated to the memory of terrorist operative Dalal al-Magribi, March 10, 2015.

[1] As of March 16, 2015. The statistics do not include mortar shell fire or rockets which misfired and fell inside the Gaza Strip.
[2] The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.

The Iranian terrorist threat


Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for 2015: Iran and Hezbollah are not mentioned in the list of terrorist threats.
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for 2015: Iran and Hezbollah are not mentioned in the list of terrorist threats.

Overview

1.  On February 26, 2015, US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper presented the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee with the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.

2.  The Threat Assessment for 2015 was presented at a time when the United States heads an international coalition leading an attack against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, in the Threat Assessment for 2015, emphasis is clearly placed on the American campaign against Sunni-jihadi terrorism (whose most prominent representatives are ISIS and Al-Qaeda). Conversely, the head of the DNI does not mention the threat of Shiite terrorism, including the challenges of terrorism from Iran and Hezbollah. In this context, Hezbollah is not mentioned (apart from a single reference, stating that it supports the Lebanese Army against the “leakage” of Sunni terrorism from Syria). Iran itself is mentioned in other contexts as a country that constitutes a substantial and diverse challenge (cyber, espionage, arms control) while engaging in its nuclear program.

3.  The lack of references to the threat of Iranian and Shiite terrorism contradicts previous publications by US government agencies (the Intelligence Community and the State Department) in 2014, which stated that Iran and Hezbollah continued to directly challenge the interests of US allies and that Hezbollah had increased its global terrorist activity in recent years to a level not seen since the 1990s (see Appendix A).

4.  In the ITIC’s assessment, the lack of reference to the Shiite terrorist threat, and Iran and Hezbollah as its generators, is not accidental.The ITIC believes that this is due to a combination of political considerations (the US dialogue with Iran over the nuclear agreement) and the idea that Iran and Hezbollah may be of assistance in the campaign against ISIS in Syria and Iraq and possibly in other countries (Iran is mentioned together with the United States, the West and the Arab countries as confronting ISIS). Under these circumstances, the US prefers to downplay Iran’s use of the “terrorist weapon” (including the massive support that it provides to Hezbollah and its use of the latter to advance its own strategic goals in the face of Israel and the entire region).

5.  It should be noted that in contrast to the review by the head of the DNI, the Qods Force and Hezbollah do appear on the DIA’s list of terrorist threats, although it seems they are mentioned in the report in rather weak terms. In the list of global threats[1] presented to Congress by DIA Director Vincent R. Stewart (February 3, 2015), Iran and Hezbollah are mentioned on the list of terrorist threats. The chapter “Terrorism” is devoted primarily to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, while Iran and Hezbollah are mentioned laconically:

“Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Lebanese Hizballah are instruments of Iran's foreign policy and its ability to project power in Iraq, Syria, and beyond. Hizballah continues to support the regime of Syrian President Asad, pro-regime militants and Iraqi Shia militants in Syria…”

6.  In practice, Iran remains a country that sponsors terrorism and perceives terrorism and subversion as a main tool for promoting its policy and its interests in the Middle East. The Iranian regime, by means of the Qods Force, an elite unit of the Revolutionary Guards, allocates significant resources in the form of money, high-caliber manpower and weapons to support terrorist organizations in the Middle East, the most prominent of which is Hezbollah. Past experience has proved that acts of terrorism and subversion promoted by Iran are not limited only to the Middle East, but are carried out in many countries around the world. In the ITIC’s assessment, as Iran’s self-confidence grows, especially if it feels that it has made achievements with the United States in the negotiations over its nuclear program, it is liable to increase the scope of its support to terrorism and its daring use of terrorism and subversion in the Middle East and around the world.

 

[1]Worldwide Threat Assessment, February 3, 2015, DIA website.