Tag Archives: Iran

News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (January 29 – February 4, 2014)

Published: 04/02/2014

Jibril Rajoub (left), a member of Fatah's Central Committee, meets in Tehran with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (right) (Al-Alam TV, Iran, January 28, 2014)

The official Fatah death notice for terrorist operative Muhammad Mahmoud Mubarak (Official Facebook page of Fatah's recruitment and organization bureau, January 29, 2014).

Rami Hamdallah (red tie), Palestinian prime minister, and Said Abu Ali, minister of the interior (holding microphone), pay a condolence call to the family of the terrorist (Wafa News Agency, January 29, 2014).

Masked Palestinians rioting near the Ofer Jail (Wafa News Agency, January 40, 2014).

Gazan children demonstrate for the immediate opening of the Rafah crossing.

Atallah Abu Sabah, minister of prisoner affairs, calls for the abduction of IDF soldiers (Filastin Al-'Aan, January 30, 2014).

The funeral held by the PA for two suicide bombing attacks (Wafa News Agency, February 3, 2014).

Bawabat al-Awda (Ma'an News Agency, February 2, 2014)

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Overview

This past week two rocket hits were identified in Israeli territory, one in the region of Eilat (intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system) and the other near the southern city of Netivot. In response Israeli Air Force aircraft struck a number of terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip.
Mahmoud Abbas, in an interview with the New York Times and in a recorded speech given at a conference held at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies, made an attempt to send "softened" messages that would resonate with American and Israeli public opinion. Hamas, however, rushed to reiterate that it would not relinquish an inch of Palestinian soil or renounce the armed struggle.
Jibril Rajoub, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, paid a visit to Iran this past week during which he expressed the Palestinian Authority's desire for closer relations with Iran. He employed his usual extremist rhetoric when referring to Israel, calling it "the foremost enemy of Palestine and of all Arabs and Muslims." He also said that "armed resistance" was an option if the negotiations failed.

The Situation in Israel's South

Rocket Fire

This past week two rocket hits were identified in Israeli territory.

On January 30, 2014, a rocket landed in an open area near the southern city of Netivot. There were no casualties and no damage was reported.
On the evening of January 31, 2014, a rocket was fired from the Sinai Peninsula at Eilat, Israel's southernmost city. It was intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system. There were no casualties and no damage was reported. The Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, a terrorist organization affiliated with the global jihad, claimed responsibility for the attack (the same organization that claimed responsibility for rocket fire targeting Eilat on January 20, 2014).

Israel's Response to the Rocket Fire

In response to the rocket fire targeting Netivot, on January 31, 2014, Israeli Air Force aircraft struck a number of terrorist sites in the Gaza Strip. Among the targets were a site for manufacturing weapons and a center for terrorist activity in the northern Gaza Strip, and a site for storing weapons in the southern Gaza Strip (IDF Spokesman, January 31, 2014). The Palestinian media reported that seven Palestinians had incurred minor wounds, three in the northern Gaza Strip and four in the south (Paltoday website and the Safa News Agency, January 31, 2014).
The media reported that in response to the Israeli attacks Hamas removed the operatives of its "restraint" forces who had been deployed to prevent the so-called "rogue" organization from launching rockets into Israel (Agence France-Presse, February 1, 2014). Two days later the media reported that they had been redeployed (PalPress, February 1, 2014).

IDF Officer Killed by Friendly Fire

On the night of February 3, 2014, an IDF officer was killed by friendly fire near the security fence in the northern Gaza Strip. The circumstances of the incident are under investigation. The officer was Tal Nahman, 21, from the central Israeli city of Nes Tziona (IDF Spokesman, February 4, 2014).

Judea and Samaria

Hamas Network Uncovered in East Jerusalem

In recent weeks a joint security force operation exposed an extensive Hamas network, some of whose operatives were residents of east Jerusalem and carried Israeli identity cards. Some of them were senior operatives in Hamas' regional headquarters. They directed and financed Hamas' activities in east Jerusalem and in the Temple Mount compound. Sixteen operatives, residents of east Jerusalem, were detained. Activists of the northern branch of the Israeli Islamic Movement who collaborated with Hamas on the Temple Mount were also detained (Israel Security Agency, January 29, 2014).
Among the detainees were the following:

Rami Zakaria Ibrahim Baraka – Born 1975, resident of Sur Baher, one of the senior operatives in the headquarters in Jerusalem. Previously convicted of Hamas activity.
Khalil Atia Muhammad Ghazawi – Born 1973, resident of Abu Tor in Jerusalem, one of the senior operatives in the headquarters in Jerusalem. Previously convicted of Hamas activity.
Majed Rajeb Muhammad A'shour Ju'ba – Born 1981, resident of the Old City in Jerusalem, senior Hamas operative. Released from prison in November 2012 and returned to terrorist activity immediately. In the months before his detention he was involved in transferring funds from the Gaza Strip to operatives in Jerusalem.
Hitham Rajeb Muhammad A'shour Ju'ba – Born 1982, brother of Majid, resident of the Old City in Jerusalem. High-ranking Hamas operative on the Temple Mount.

In addition, in December 2012, two Jerusalem offices of the Islamic movement institutions, Al-Quds Development and Amarat al-Aqsa, were closed following information that Hamas activities were carried out there. An investigation into the offices' activities revealed that the Islamic movement had been funding "an educational project" on the Temple Mount called "Platforms of knowledge." As part of the project the Islamic movement gave money to operatives in return for their presence on the Temple Mount. The project was funded, at least in part, by Hamas. A video was uploaded to the Internet in which Ismail Haniya, head of the de-facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, admitted he was promoting the project by funding it (ISA, January 29, 2014).

Terrorist Operative Shooting at IDF Post Killed

On January 29, 2014, a Palestinian opened fire at an IDF post near the village of Bir Zeit (north of Ramallah). An IDF force returned fire at the Palestinian, a worker employed on a project at the post. The exchange of fire lasted a number of minutes, and the terrorist was shot and killed. The Palestinian was Muhammad Mahmoud Mubarak, a resident of the Jelazoun refugee camp (near Ramallah) (IDF Spokesman, January 30, 2014).
Senior Palestinian Authority (PA) figures condemned his killing and demanded that Israel give an account of its actions (Ma'an News Agency, January 29, 2014). Fatah issued a formal death notice for Muhammad Mahmoud Mubarak (Official Facebook page of Fatah's recruitment and organization bureau, January 29, 2014). Lila Ghanem, governor of the Ramallah district, paid a condolence call to the family and gave them a personal letter from Mahmoud Abbas condemning the killing (Facebook page of the governor of the Ramallah district, January 29 and 30, 2014). Rami Hamdallah, the Palestinian prime minister, and Said Abu Ali, the PA's minister of the interior, also paid condolence calls to the family (Wafa News Agency, January 30, 2014).
Sultan Abu al-Inin, a member of Fatah's Central Committee and advisor to Mahmoud Abbas for NGOs, posted a notice on his Facebook page praising the terrorist operative who, he said, "had risen to heaven from the battlefield as a shaheed, challenging the Zionist enemy" (Official Facebook page of Sultan Abu al-Inin, January 29, 2014).

Left: Facebook page of Sultan Abu al-Inin with praise for the terrorist operative (January 29, 2014). Right: IDF soldier holds the gun used by the terrorist (Tazpit News Agency, January 29, 2014).

Palestinian Violence Continues

This past week violent incidents continued in Judea and Samaria, part of the so-called popular resistance. Stones were thrown at Israeli civilians and Israeli security forces and Molotov cocktails were thrown at vehicles on main roads. An attempt to smuggle weapons into Israel was prevented:
The main incidents were the following:

On January 30, 2014, three Karl Gustav submachine guns were seized at a crossing in the region of Tulkarm. The guns were hidden in the trunk of a car on its way into Israel.
On January 31, 2014, three Molotov cocktails were thrown at the balcony of a private house on French Hill in Jerusalem. They ignited and the owner of the house put out the fire. There were no casualties; minor property damage was incurred (Ynet, January 31, 2014).
On January 31, 2014, a Palestinian armed with a knife was detained at the entrance to the village of Nahliel (west of Ramallah) (Tazpit News Agency, January 31, 2014).

Left: The knife found in the possession of a Palestinian (Tazpit News Agency, January 31, 2014). Right: Three submachine guns seized near Tulkarm (IDF Spokesman, January 30, 2014).

Developments in the Gaza Strip

The Crossings

The Rafah Crossing

In view of the continuing difficulties experienced by Palestinians wanting to use the Rafah crossing, Hamas organized a demonstration of dozens of Gazan children to protest Egyptian policy. The demonstration took place near the crossing. Young women held laptops and children waved signs calling for the Egyptians to open the crossing. They were protesting the frequent closing of the Rafah crossing caused, according to the Egyptian claim, by "computer problems," and even offered to give their own laptops to the Egyptians (Safa News Agency, January 29, 2014).

Egypt-Hamas Relations

Following the increasing severity of Egypt's accusations against Hamas during Mohamed Morsi's trial, Hamas issued a special statement appealing to "regional Egyptian, Arab and Islamic public opinion." Hamas denied any interference in internal Egyptian affairs and claimed that all the accusations directed against it were baseless. Hamas added that all of its weapons were aimed at Israel. It called for an independent Arab committee to be appointed by the Arab League to investigate the allegations (Filastin Al-'Aan, January 28, 2014).

Hamas Minister of Prisoner Affairs Calls for Abduction of IDF Soldiers

At a press conference held in Dir al-Balah front of the house of a Palestinian prisoner, Atallah Abu Sabah, minister of prisoner affairs in the Hamas administration, called for the abduction of IDF soldiers to effect the release of Palestinian prisoners (Filastin Al-'Aan, January 30, 2014).

The Palestinian Authority

Statements from Mahmoud Abbas

Interviewed by the New York Times, and in a recorded speech played at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies INSS), Mahmoud Abbas made an attempt to send "softened" messages that would resonate with American and Israeli public opinion. However, in both instances he emphasized that he would not recognize Israel as a Jewish state. Hamas spokesman rushed to make it clear that remarks made by Mahmoud Abbas reflected only his personal opinion, and that Hamas would not agree to relinquish an inch of Palestinian soil or renounce the armed resistance.
During a conference held at the INSS, Mahmoud Abbas, in a recorded speech, presented his plan for peace with Israel:

He expressed readiness to accept a gradual Israeli withdrawal over a period not exceeding three years. He said the Palestinians did not object to the presence of a third party after or during the Israeli withdrawal, and said NATO would be an appropriate body.
He expressed willingness to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu at any time. He said that there was nothing to prevent it, but that the issue had to be examined. However, he did not explicitly relate to Netanyahu's invitation to speak before the Knesset or the possibility that Netanyahu would speak before the Palestinian Legislative Council.
He claimed that Hamas was not an obstacle to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. He said Hamas and Fatah had a written agreement in which both sides stated their willingness to negotiate with Israel based on the 1967 borders and on the so-called peaceful "popular resistance." Note: A "senior Hamas figure" denied the existence of such an agreement, saying that Hamas could not possibly agree to such a solution. He added that it would never relinquish one inch of Palestinian soil (Filastin Al-'Aan, January 27, 2014).

Mahmoud Abbas told the New York Times that he told John Kerry he agreed that Israel soldiers could remain in Judea and Samaria for up to five years, and not three, as he had previously stated. He said he had proposed to Secretary of State John Kerry that an American-led NATO force patrol a future Palestinian state indefinitely, with troops positioned throughout the territory, at all crossings, and within Jerusalem, indefinitely. "Palestine," he said, would not have its own army, "only a police force [ITIC emphasis throughout]"^[3]
On recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, he said, “This is out of the question.” As to ending the negotiations on April 29, he said, "If, after nine months, we didn’t get anything, if there is nothing on the horizon, we will stop.” He said he had been resisting pressure from the Palestinian street and leadership to join UN agencies. He said he wanted to "take advantage of every minute now. He would not, he said allow a third intifada [ITIC emphasis throughout].^[4]
Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri used his Facebook page to denounce Mahmoud Abbas' New York Times interview, saying that Abbas had been stating his personal views and that they did not reflect the overall Palestinian position, which rejected negotiating with Israel or any solution that threatened the rights and national principles of the Palestinians (Facebook page of Sami Abu Zuhri, February 3, 2014).

Remarks Made by Saeb Erekat Regarding the Negotiations with Israel

A panel discussion was held at the Munich Middle East Peace Conference. Two of the panel members were Saeb Erekat, a member of the PLO's Executive Committee and head of the Palestinian negotiating team, and Tzipi Livni, Israeli minister of justice and chairman of the Israeli negotiating team. Saeb Erekat was extremely critical of Israel's policies in Judea and Samaria. He said Israel used the word "security" to justify "its racist apartheid regime" in the "territories." He added that he recognized Israel's right to exist in security and peace, but the demand for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state meant changing Palestinian history, which the Palestinians could not accept. He also attacked what he called Israel's "shrugging off" its responsibility for the suffering of the Palestinian refugees (Wafa News Agency, date, 2014).

Glorifying Two Dead Suicide Bombers

On February 2, 2014, the bodies of two more terrorist operatives were transferred to the Palestinian as part of an agreement reached following an Israeli Supreme Court decision. The two were suicide bombers who had carried out suicide bombing attacks in Jerusalem during the second intifada:

Ayat al-Akhras, who blew herself up in a supermarket in the Kiryat Yovel neighborhood in Jerusalem on March 29, 2002. Two people were killed and 27 and wounded. Fatah-Tanzim claimed responsibility for the attack.
Daoud Abu Suwe, who blew himself up in the Hilton Hotel in the Mamilla neighborhood of Jerusalem on December 5, 2001. Five people were wounded; the Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.

On February 3, 2014, the PA held a funeral for them with full military honors in Bethlehem, attended by many Palestinians. Their coffins were carried on the shoulders of Palestinian national security operatives. Tawfiq al-Tirawi, a member of Fatah's Central Committee who is also president of the PA's military academy in Jericho, praised their sacrifice and the sacrifice of the other Palestinian shaheeds. He said that the "Palestinian people will continue to wave the flag of the resistance until it has achieved its goals" (Al-Ayam, February 4, 2014).

Jibril Rajoub Visits Iran

Jibril Rajoub, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, paid a visit to Iran, calling it "turning over a new leaf in the relations between Iran and the Palestinian Authority" (France Press, January 29, 2014). While in Iran he met with Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's foreign minister, and other senior figures. The media reported that he gave a communiqué to Zarif from the Palestinian leadership to the Iranian leadership, expressing interest in creating ties between Iran and Palestine.

Jibril Rajoub holds hands with Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (Jibril Rajoub's Facebook page, January 28, 2014).

Interviewed by Al-Alam TV on January 29, 2014, and Al-Quds Al-Arabi on January 30, 2014, Jibril Rajoub related to the following issues:

Relations with Iran: He said that Iran was not an enemy and that the Palestinians would not participate in an attempt to exchange Iran for Israel, because Israel was "the foremost enemy of Palestine and all Arabs and Muslims." He said relations with Iran had "become warmer" following the visit of the Iranian foreign minister to the region. He also said that the PA's openness towards Iran was within Palestinian national interests and part of the Palestinian strategy to open the PA to the world. Note: When asked, following Jibril Rajoub's visit to Iran, about the nature of the PA's relationship with Iran, Fatah spokesman Ahmed Assaf said that Mahmoud Abbas regarded developing relations with Iran as very important (Ajyal Radio, January 30 2014).
The negotiations with Israel: Jibril Rajoub said that the problem of the refugees had to be resolved based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194. He said it was the last time negotiations were being held and that after they were over the Palestinians would seek other options, especially appeals to international institutions. He added that if the negotiations failed, 2014 would be the "year of decisiveness," either a [Palestinian] state would be established or Israel would no longer have either security or stability. In a different interview he said that the Palestinians had entered into the negotiations to "expose the truth about the right-wing rule and the person in charge of it."
The issue of the "resistance" [i.e., violence and terrorism]: According to Jibril Rajoub, the option of "resistance" was a strategic option, and the option of "armed resistance" was also a possibility. In 2014, he said, the Palestinian people would decide whether to opt for an arrangement or for the path of confrontation, which would include escalating the "resistance," severing ties with Israel, imposing a closure on Israel and boycotting it. In another interview he said that all options were open, and that all forms of "resistance" would be on the table if the political-diplomatic efforts for establishing a Palestinian state failed. He added that the "resistance" would be limited to "the occupied areas" because international legitimacy allegedly permitted it (Al-Mayadeen TV, February 2, 2014).

Tawfiq al-Tirawi Speaks in Favor of the Armed Struggle against Israel

Tawfiq al-Tirawi, a member of Fatah's Central Committee and president of the PA's military academy in Jericho, attended Fatah award ceremony for Palestinian security force veterans in Bethlehem on February 3, 2014. At the ceremony he gave a speech in which he said that "Fatah has not laid down its arms and will not lay them down until its national goals have been achieved." He said that "various means have to be developed to reach those goals and that includes military struggle, popular struggle, diplomacy in the UN and negotiations." He also said that "all of us in Fatah, from the younger generation to the veterans, are prepared to return to resistance and to the struggle using all means" (Qudsnet website, February 3, 2014).

The Battle for Hearts and Minds

Campaign to Erect Outposts in the Jordan Valley

Popular resistance activists announced the launching of a new campaign called "the salt of the earth." Its objectives, according to the activists, are to erect settlements on land Israel allegedly intends to seize, especially in the Jordan Valley. According to Fatah spokesman Ahmed Assaf, the campaign activists represent the entire political spectrum. Mahmoud al-'Alul, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, who heads the campaign, said that its goal was to ensure that the Jordan Valley would remain Palestinian and part of the territory of the Palestinian state (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, February 2, 2014). Another campaign activist is Mustafa al-Barghouti, a member of the legislative council and secretary general of the Palestinian national initiative movement (Ma'an News Agency, January 31, 2014)

As part of the campaign Palestinian and foreign demonstrators have so far erected two outposts in the Jordan Valley:

On January 31, 2014, an outpost called Eyn Hijla was constructed near the entrance to Deir Hijla. According to the activists, it was erected in an area where Israel was planning to seize land and proclaim it a closed military area (Palestinian TV, January 31, 2014). The activists distributed a flysheet claiming that "the outpost was erected to protest the current political situation and the negotiations that rob the Palestinian people of their independence and freedom, and as part of the popular resistance and to protest the sir desire to annex the Jordan Valley." Senior Fatah and PA figures arrived at the site, among the Saeb Erekat, a member of Fatah's Central Committee and head of the Palestinian negotiating team.

Saeb Erekat visits the illegal outpost Eyn Hijla in the Jordan Valley (Qudsnet website, February 3, 2014).

On the evening of February 1, 2014, popular resistance and foreign activists erected another outpost, this one named Bawabat al-Awda ("the gate of return") in the northern Jordan Valley. According to the Palestinian activists, the name expresses their adherence to the so-called "right of return" of the Palestinian refugees (Ma'an News Agency, February 2, 2014).

Al-Muqawama Internet Café Opens in the Jenin Refugee Camp

Hamas' Al-Aqsa TV broadcast the opening of an Internet café in the Jenin refugee camp called Al-Muqawama ("the resistance"). It was opened by a young Palestinian named Mahmoud Abu Hashish, and Hamas, Fatah and PIJ flags were hung on the walls, along with pictures of Palestinian terrorist operatives killed in Operation Defensive Shield. According to Abu Hashish, the name expresses "the spirit of the place" and it has won appreciation from the people who come to the café (Al-Aqsa TV and the Palinfo website, January 31 and February 2, 2014).

Al-Muqawama Café in the Jenin refugee camp, inside and outside (Palinfo website, January 31 and February 2, 2014)

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^[1]As February 4, 2014. The statistics do not include mortar shell fire and rocket hits inside the Gaza Strip.
^[2]The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.
^[3]http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/world/middleeast/palestinian-leader-seeks-nato-force-in-future-state.html?_r=0
^[4]Ibid.

Mass-casualty double suicide bombing attack carried out at the Iranian embassy in Beirut.

Published: 27/11/2013

The area of the embassy after the explosion (M3n4.com website)

The Iranian embassy after the explosion (Al-Alam TV, Iran, November 23, 2013).

The black car bomb photographed by an on-site security camera a number of seconds before it blew up (Al-Alam TV, Iran, November 23, 2013)

The remains of the motorcycle near the Iranian embassy in Beirut (Al-Safir, Lebanon, November 25, 2013)

Suicide bomber Muin Abu Zaher (Bint Jbeil website, November 23, 2013).

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Overview

1. On November 19, 2013, a complex, mass-casualty suicide bombing attack involving two suicide bombers was carried out at the entrance to the Iranian embassy in Lebanon, located in the southern (Shi'ite) suburb of Beirut. In our assessment, its objective was to demolish the building and harm as many embassy workers as possible. The attack killed 23 people and wounded 146. Among those killed was Ibrahim Ansari, the Iranian cultural attaché. In the days after the attack funerals were held for ten Hezbollah operatives killed in the blast, at least some of them belonging to the embassy's security staff.

2. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades, a terrorist organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad, claimed responsibility for the attack. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades operate in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern arenas. The organization, whose Lebanese stronghold is the Eyn al-Hilweh refugee camp in south Lebanon, claimed responsibility for rocket fire into Israel's Western Galilee (October 22, 2013), which was meant to challenge Hezbollah.^[1]

3. The attack was carried out as the Syrian regime and its supporters (Iran, Hezbollah) were organizing a campaign to cleanse the region of the Qalamoun Mountains, a strategic mountain range northeast of Damascus. In Lebanon the attack on the Iranian embassy was regarded as an attempt to deflect Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah pressure from the rebel strongholds in Syria by sending the message that global jihad networks affiliated with Al-Qaeda could strike Syria and its supporters in the Lebanese back yard.

4. The attack on the embassy was the most conspicuous "success" in a series of attacks carried out in recent months by extremist Sunni organizations, among them the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, to challenge Iran and Hezbollah. In our assessment the attack was a significant blow to Hezbollah and Iran's security and image. Using suicide bombers to drive car and motorcycle bombs is a modus operandi characteristic of the Al-Nusra Front, a branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria,^[2] which in our assessment was transferred to Lebanon and turned against Hezbollah and Iran. The method was used in Lebanon by Hezbollah as early as 1983 (the deadly suicide bombing attacks carried out by Hezbollah with Iranian support that targeted the American embassy and American and French military bases in western Beirut). Thus, thirty years later the attacks came full circle and Hezbollah, with Iranian backing, which initiated such attacks and used them to make political capital, became targets themselves.

5. In our assessment, the trickling of the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict from Syria into Lebanon and the increasing intensity of the violence between the rivals are liable to undermine even more the authority and ability to govern of the shaky Lebanese administration and lead to the growing destabilization of the Lebanese arena. The Lebanese security forces lack the operational and internal political capabilities to resist the violent struggles of skilled terrorist organizations supported by part of the Lebanese population and external powers, whether they belong to the global jihad (where they find a safe haven in the Palestinian refugee camps) or to Hezbollah (based within the Shi'ite sect in Lebanon and supported by Iran and Syria).

6. In conclusion: The double suicide bombing attack at the Iranian embassy, and the attacks that preceded it, indicate, in our assessment, the increased operational capabilities of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades and the Salafist Sunni jihadist networks operating in the Lebanese arena. Those capabilities are now being turned against Iran and Hezbollah, and may also be turned against Israel (as was manifested by the rocket fire into the western Galilee). Iran and Hezbollah, which suffered a serious blow to their security and image, can be expected to take steps against the Abdullah Azzam Brigades with regard to both security (securing important figures and facilities) and offense (retaliation against important figures and facilities affiliated with Al-Qaeda and extremist Sunni networks). All of the above may lead to a worsening of the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict in Lebanon, and possibly also beyond Lebanese borders, even as the civil war continues to rage in Syria.

Initial Description of the Attack

7. On November 19, 2013, a double suicide bombing attack was carried out at the entrance to the Iranian embassy in Beirut. The embassy is located in the Bir Hassan neighborhood on the outskirts of the southern Shi'ite suburb of Beirut, Hezbollah's stronghold in Lebanon. According to the Lebanese and Hezbollah media, the attack began when a suicide bomber riding a motorcycle blew himself up near the barrier in front of the embassy.^[3] A few minutes later a black Chevrolet Blazer (4X4) drove up, driven by another suicide bomber. The car held a large quantity of explosives (between 50 and 100 kilograms, or between 110 and 220 pounds). Eyewitnesses interviewed by Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Mayadeen TV claimed that the first suicide bomber did not blow himself up but was shot to death by embassy security guards.

8. According to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Safir, the car used in the attack was bought in the village of Britel in the Beqa'a Valley in Lebanon. The explosives were placed in it in the region of Yabrud, in the Qalamoun Mountains. The car was then driven to Syria via the Sunni village of Arsal, in the northern Beqa'a Valley. According to Lebanese "security sources," the attack was planned and orchestrated in Syria (Al-Safir, Lebanon, November 25, 2013). According to the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily newspaper Al-Akhbar, Hezbollah head Hassan Nasrallah said that the attack had been carefully planned and the planners were very familiar with the Iranian embassy. Its objective had been to destroy the section of the building near the entrance because that was where the office of the Iranian ambassador was located, which had been the target of the attack (Al-Akhbar, November 25, 2013). According to the Lebanese media, the investigation showed that this attack and previous ones in the southern suburb of Beirut had been planned by Al-Qaeda operatives in Syria, part of transferring the confrontation against Hezbollah in Lebanese territory (Al-Akhbar, November 20, 2013).

Casualties of the Attack

9. According to the Lebanese media, 23 people were killed in the attack, among them Ibrahim al-Ansari, the Iranian cultural attaché, and 146 were wounded. The Lebanese media also reported that al-Ansari was killed while waiting in his car for Ghadanfar Rokon Abadi, the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon (Al-Joumhouria and Al-Nahar, November 20, 2013). Hezbollah's media reported the funerals of ten Hezbollah operatives, some of whom at least, were on the embassy's security staff (See below).

Pictures from the site of the attack (Left: Al-Arabiya TV. Right: Al-Alam TV, Iran)

The Identity of the Suicide Bombers

10. The Lebanese media published pictures and information about the suicide bombers: both lived in the Sidon region and were supporters of anti-Hezbollah Salafist Sunni Sheikh Ahmed Asir. It was also reported that a branch of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which collaborates with Ahmed Asir, is active in the Eyn al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon (Al-Nahar, October 23, 2013).

11. Initial information about the two suicide bombers:

A. Muin Adnan Abu Zaher, from Sidon, a supporter of the anti-Hezbollah Salafist Sunni Sheik Ahmed al-Asir (Al-Nahar, Lebanon, November 22 and 23, 2013). Three days before the attack he wrote on his Facebook page that he intended to take revenge for the sake of Ahmed al-Asir. According to Al-Arabiya TV, he had lived in Denmark and from there went to Kuwait to work, later going to Syria and Lebanon (Al-Arabiya TV, November 23, 2013). On October 31, 2013, he contacted a friend through Facebook, writing that he planned to reach paradise before him (Alkhabarpress website, November 22, 2013). According to an article written by Sa'ad al-Hariri, the leading Sunni leader in Lebanon, the suicide bomber (who is not mentioned by name) was a young Sunni from Sidon whose mother was a Shi'ite. He who fought with "an armed group" in Syria, which had sent him to blow himself up in Lebanon (Al-Mustaqbal, November 24, 2013). According to Al-Nahar (November 25, 2013, he entered Lebanon from Syria at the Al-Masnaa' crossing with Lebanese identity papers.

B. Adnan Musa al-Muhammad, of Palestinian origin,^[4] whose family lives in the village of Bissarye', south of Sidon. He worked as a mechanic. He reportedly had psychological problems (Al-Jadeed TV, November 24, 2013). For the past year he lived in Al-A'aqabia. He had been detained by Lebanese army intelligence. He had cut off relations with his family during the past year (Jibshit website, November 23, 2013). His mother condemned the attack, saying that "the religion of Muhammad does not call for suicide bombings." She said he had not known her son worshipped at the Bilal bin Rabah mosque in Eyn al-Hilweh [the mosque of Sheikh Ahmed al-Asir) or that he had belonged to al-Asir's network (Bint Jbeil website, November 23, 2013).

Left: Suicide bomber Adnan Musa al-Muhammad (Bint Jbeil website, November 23, 2013). Right: Adnan Musa al-Muhammad in military uniform (Bint Jbeil website, November 24, 2013).

Hezbollah Operatives Killed in the Attack

12. After the attack ten funerals were held in south Beirut for Hezbollah operatives who had reportedly been killed. In our assessment, at least some of them belonged to the Iranian embassy's security staff. One of them, Radwan Muhammad Fares, was in charge of security for the embassy (See picture). Another, Ahmed Zaraqat, was reportedly an embassy guard. The funerals of the Hezbollah operatives held on November 20 and 22, 2013, were massively attended. On November 20 the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon was present at a funeral (Al-Ahed, November 20 and 22; Bint Jbeil website, November 20, 2013).^[5]

Claiming Responsibility

13. The Lebanese Sunni Sheikh Siraj al-Din Zariqat, affiliated with the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Tweeted on November 19, 2013, claiming that the Abdullah Azzam Brigades were behind the attack on the Iranian embassy in Beirut. He said that two Sunni shaheeds [i.e., two suicide bombers] had been killed. He said that attacks would continue in Lebanon until two demands had been met: the withdrawal of Hezbollah ("the Iranian camp") from Syria, and the release of Abdullah Azzam Brigades prisoners held in Lebanese jails. It was Sheikh Siraj al-Din Zariqat who reported on August 22, 2013, that the Abdullah Azzam Brigades were behind the launching of four rockets that targeted Haifa and other "strategic areas" in Israel. Al-Akhbar, a Lebanese newspaper affiliated with Hezbollah, reported that Sheikh Zariqat had been in Syria for more than year and that his announcements were issued from there (Al-Akhbar, November 20, 2013).

Iranian and Hezbollah Reactions to the Attack

14. Iran's immediate reaction to the attack was to blame Israel. The Iranian ambassador, interviewed by Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Mayadeen TV on November 19, 2013, said that "the Zionist entity and its agents were behind the terrorist attack." On another occasion he said that "everyone" knew that the Zionist enemy supported the terrorist groups in Syria, Iraq and recently, in Lebanon (Fars News Agency quoting an interview with the Iranian ambassador with Al-Nashra TV, November 24, 2013).

15. Hezbollah later joined the Iranian ambassador in blaming Israel, but senior Hezbollah figures also accused Al-Qaeda, described as a tool in Israeli hands. Interviewed by a Lebanese radio station, Sheikh Naim Qassam, deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah, said that "these are the criminal hands of the takfirs [i.e. Al-Qaeda^[6]] and Israel, which enjoy Lebanese instability [are responsible for the attack]" (Inn.co.il website, November 21, 2013). During a ceremony held in the Lebanese village of Jibshit, Muhammad Ra'ed, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese parliament, said that the attack in Beirut was "an Israeli message sent by means of takfir [organizations]." He said its objective was not only to destroy the embassy building, but also to destabilize Lebanon and destroy its national unity (Al-Nasra, Lebanon, November 23, 2013). Nabil Qauq, deputy chairman of Hezbollah's executive council, said that the attack showed "how serious the terrorist Israeli takfir threat was to Lebanon" (Lebanese News Agency, November 24, 2013).

16. "[Anonymous] high-ranking sources in Hezbollah" related to the significance of the attack and to possible responses. The sources, interviewed by the Lebanese daily Al-Joumhouria (November 20, 2013), said that "we have entered a new, very dangerous phase, the phase of suicide bombers." They added that they were taking extraordinary measures because as far as they were concerned, everything had changed. They said they were concerned about additional suicide bombing attacks targeting facilities or Shi'ite population concentrations, "like what is happening in Iraq." They also said that Hezbollah was making a serious security effort to prevent car bombs from entering [Shi'ite population concentrations], but "it is hard to cope with suicide bombing attacks." On November 20, 2013, Al-Joumhouria reported that the Hezbollah leadership had held high-level security consultations, where it had been recommended that the organization's offices, houses and headquarters "take exceptional measures" to protect themselves from suicide bombing attacks.

Threatening Saudi Arabia

17. Two days after the attack the Saudi Arabian embassy in Lebanon called on Saudi citizens to leave Lebanon and take security precautions (AP, November 21, 2013). The call came after items appeared in the Lebanese media and social networks baselessly accusing Saudi Arabia of involvement in the attack. One of them was an aerial photograph of the Saudi Arabian embassy labeled "Saudi embassy in Lebanon, only serious [people] need apply" (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, November 21, 2013).

18. Particularly threatening was a column entitled "A gift from the [Saudi Arabian] kingdom to Iran," by Ibrahim al-Amin, editor of the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily newspaper Al-Akhbar. It accused Saudi Arabia of responsibility for the terrorist attack in Lebanon (Al-Akhbar, November 20, 2013). According to the column, "no one expected the kingdom of oppression [i.e., Saudi Arabia] would rush to move the battle to a new stage, including an attempt to copy Iraqi suicide bombing attacks in Lebanon." It also stated that the fighting in Syria would not be influenced by suicide bombing attacks in Lebanon, and hinted that the campaign might be extended to other countries in the Saudi camp, such as Yemen and Bahrain. It added that Hezbollah, along with the Lebanese security services, had prevented many terrorist attacks in Lebanon but beginning a series of suicide bombing attacks would force them to "take preemptive deterrent actions." The column ended by saying that "the global front to destroy the Arab East" [i.e., Saudi Arabia and its allies] had decided to enter into a war of blood against Iran and that what could be expected were "additional waves of insanity in the form of red royal [Saudi] gifts." However, Iran had its own methods and its own deterrent capabilities, and could cope with the attacks, it said.

Previous Attacks against Hezbollah and Shi'ite Population Concentrations

19. The attack on the Iranian embassy was a peak in the wave of varied attacks carried out in Lebanon in recent months targeting Hezbollah and Shi'ite population concentrations. In our assessment some of them were carried out by Salafist Sunni networks in Lebanon, and some by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades and other organizations affiliated with the global jihad. So far Hezbollah has failed to curb the attacks, which illustrate how the Syrian civil war has trickled into Lebanon, and how its Shi'ite-Sunni confrontation has entered the Lebanese arena. The attack on the Iranian embassy may indicate a worsening in the confrontation in the Lebanese arena and possibly elsewhere as well.

20. There were two serious car bomb attacks in the southern suburb of Beirut, which is a Hezbollah stronghold.

A. On July 9, 2013, a car bomb exploded in a parking lot the Bir al-Abd neighborhood in the southern suburb of Beirut, killing a number of people and wounding several hundred. No organization claimed responsibility for the attack.

B. On August 15, 2013, a car bomb exploded in the southern suburb of Beirut between the Bir al-Abed and Al-Rawis neighborhoods, killing 25 people and wounding hundreds. No organization claimed responsibility for the attack.

21. In Lebanon in general and within the ranks of Hezbollah in particular, there is a fear that the wave of attacks initiated by organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda will continue. The Lebanese media reported that on November 22, 2013, the Lebanese army identified a car bomb in the northern part of the Beqa'a Valley, which is controlled by Hezbollah. According to media reports, the vehicle was identified by Lebanese army soldiers (according to a different account, by Hezbollah) as it was en route from Syria to Lebanon (in the region of Arsal). As the soldiers chased the car its passengers opened fire on them. After an exchange of fire, the vehicle was captured and found to be carrying between 400 and 500 kilograms of TNT, or between 880 and 1100 pounds, and two mortar shells. The Lebanese army closed off the area, evacuated residents, neutralized the explosives and opened an investigation. The vehicle's passengers managed to escape (Alhayat.com website and Al-Joumhouria, November 25; Lebanonfiles website, November 23, 2013).

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^[1]For further information about the Abdullah Azzam Brigades see the August 28, 2013 bulletin “The global jihad-affiliated Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed responsibility for firing rockets from south Lebanon into the western Galilee on August 22.”
^[2]For further information see the September 22, 2013 study “The Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) is an Al-Qaeda Salafist-jihadi network, prominent in the rebel organizations in Syria.”
^[3]According to a different version, the suicide bomber was on foot, but photographs of the remains of the motorcycle support that version.
^[4]On November 24, 2013, the Palestinian Authority (PA) condemned the attack against the Iranian embassy, saying that the participation of a Palestinian "in a criminal act" was an individual attack serving only the enemies of the Palestinian cause. The PA expressed its condolences to the families of the victims and said it stood side-by-side with Lebanon (Wafa News Agency, November 24, 2013).
^[5]In addition to ten operatives in the attack in Beirut, Hezbollah also recently had losses in Syria. On November 20, 2013, the Lebanon 24 website, quoting "Lebanese sources" reported that an estimated ten Hezbollah operatives had been killed in the area around Damascus during the previous days, and that the organization would bury them in their places of residence in the Beqa'a Valley and south Lebanon.
^[6]Hezbollah calls groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda "takfir groups," i.e., groups which declare a Muslim individual or group to be infidel because they do not adopt radical Islam (which gives them legitimacy to attack the individual or group).

The Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) is an Al-Qaeda Salafist-jihadi network, prominent in the rebel organizations in Syria.

Published: 17/09/2013

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It seeks to overthrow the Assad regime and establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, a center for regional and international terrorism and subversion.

The insignia of the Al-Nusra Front (whose full name is the Front for Assistance to the Residents of Greater Syria). It shows the map of Syria, the Islamic crescent and the silhouette of a jihad fighter (Almadenahnews.com website)

Overview

Al-Qaeda Entrenchment in Syria

1. During the Syrian civil war two branches of Al-Qaeda established themselves among the rebel organizations fighting to overthrow the regime of Bashar Assad. The most prominent is the Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra), directly subordinate to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The other is The Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, subordinate to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. In addition, other Salafist-jihadi military organizations not necessarily affiliated with Al-Qaeda operate in Syria. The two Al-Qaeda branches have an estimated 6,000-7,000 operatives, and in our assessment the number is growing.

2. This study deals mainly with the Al-Nusra Front,^[1] an organization established at the end of January 2012, ten months after the outbreak of the Syrian uprising. Initially it operated as a branch of the Islamic State in Iraq, a Salafist-jihadi umbrella network affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq. To make its status official, in April 2012 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, announced the union of the two organizations, to be called "The Islamic State in Iraq and in Al-Sham (Greater Syria)." However, the union was not honored by the Al-Nusra Front and was annulled by Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in June 2013, who said the Front was the official Al-Qaeda branch in Syria. That resulted in a split between the two branches of Al-Qaeda in Syria and today they are antagonistic toward both each other and rivals.

3. The Al-Nusra Front identifies with Al-Qaeda's Salafist-jihadi ideology. It seeks to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, which includes Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which will be ruled by religious Islamic law (the Shari’ah). The Al-Nusra Front is hostile to Israel and the West, rejects Western values (among them democracy, pluralism and freedom of worship) and objects to all Western intervention in the Syrian civil war. It is also hostile to Syria's minority sects and religions, especially the Alawites and the Shi'ites, whom it regards as infidels. The path of jihad is its proclaimed strategy for toppling the Syrian regime and realizing its other far-reaching objectives, and it regards jihad as the personal duty of every Muslim (following the teachings of Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's ideological mentor).

4. Both the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda's representative in Syria, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria seek to promote long-term strategies: the first stage is to gain a hold over the rebel groups and establish a strong foundation in Syria for jihad, which will support the overthrow of the Assad regime. That will be done through collaboration (even if only partial and temporary) with other groups of rebels, especially those with Islamic affiliation. The second stage will be to take over the new Syrian regime formed by the union of all the Salafist-jihadi forces operating in Damascus, or at least to gain significant influence in it. The third stage will be for the jihadist regime established in Damascus (or for any other regime with a jihadist orientation) to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, serving as the front line for Al-Qaeda and the global jihad in the heart of the Middle East. It will wage a terrorist campaign against Israel from the Golan Heights, export terrorism to the West and other countries around the world and be a center for Islamic subversion and terrorism against the pro-Western Arab and Islamic countries.

Assessment of the Al-Nusra Front's Military Capabilities

5. The Al-Nusra Front isthe most prominent Salafist-jihadi organization fighting in the Syrian civil war and is headed by a leader called an Amir ("leader," a common title in contemporary jihadist organizations). It refers to a leader with both political and religious authority, as was set down at the dawn of Islam. Subordinate to him are local leaders (u'maraa) in Syria's cities and governorates (sometimes there is more than one amir in a governorate). The highest body in the Al-Nusra Front Is the Majlis Shura al-Mujahedeen (the Consulting Council of the Jihad Fighters). Within the leadership there are designated staff and operatives dealing with military operations, fund raising, acquiring weapons and smuggling them into Syria, religious affairs, information and public relations. The Al-Nusra Front operates military units in the various governorates. They are usually called battalions or companies. They are accompanied by governance, religious and information networks, whose objective is to strengthen the Al-Nusra Front's influence among the people, gain their trust and fill the void created by the collapse of Syrian administration in broad areas of Syria.

6. The Al-Nusra Front leader on the ground goes by the name of Abu Muhammad al-Julani (there are contradicting, unverified versions of his real name). He is apparently a Syrian, possibly from the Golan Heights, who gained operational experience in Iraq fighting the United States and its allies. In the past, he was a follower of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led the jihad fighters sent to Iraq by Al-Qaeda after the American invasion in March 2003. After the outbreak of the uprising in Syria, Abu Muhammad al-Julani was sent there by Al-Qaeda in Iraq to establish the Al-Nusra Front. Other Al-Qaeda operatives who gained experience in Iraq are also prominent in the Al-Nusra Front command, while the rank and file is made up of Syrian operatives and thousands of jihad fighters from the Arab-Muslim world (particularly Libya, Tunisia, Chechnya, Saudi Arabia and Egypt) and many hundreds from the West (prominent among whom are 500-600 volunteers from Europe, mainly France and the UK).Those who survive are expected to return to their home countries when the fighting in Syria is over and spread jihad to their native countries (there are an estimated 5,000 foreign nationals fighting in Syria today, most of them in the Al-Nusra Front).

7. The Al-Nusra Front has issued claims of responsibility for hundreds of attacks. Its operations, and those of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, focus on Damascus and its environs, and areas in northern and eastern Syria (Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Idlib and Deir ez-Zor). The Al-Nusra Front also conducts intensive military activities in the region of Daraa, in southwestern Syria, where the uprising against the Assad regime began. In several governorates in northern and eastern Syria the Al-Nusra Front enjoys considerable power and influence over the local population (in collaboration with other Islamic organizations). Along the coast, however, where the Alawite population lives (Tartus and Latakia regions), or in the Al-Suwayda Governorate in southern Syria, where the Druze population is dominant, the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations do not have a significant military presence or civil administration. The Al-Nusra Front is also trying to obtain a foothold in the Golan Heights. In our assessment, it does not yet have a significant military foothold, although in one instance it carried out a suicide bombing attack in the village of Sasa, harming an important symbol of the Syrian regime. (The attack destroyed military intelligence headquarters of the Quneitra Governorate).

8. In the governorates noted above the Al-Nusra Front wages a guerilla-terrorist campaign against bases, facilities and individuals affiliated with the Syrian army and regime (especially the army and security forces, and government institutions). Its objectives are to create chaos for the regime and its supporters and to sever connections between the various governmental regions, disrupt their ability to govern, and to give the Al-Nusra Front (and other rebel groups) control over large territories, especially in northern and eastern Syria. To that end the Al-Nusra Front employs a variety of combat tactics: car bombs detonated by suicide bombers or remote control; suicide bombing attacks using explosive belts; attacking bases, facilities and airfields with light arms and mortars; detonating IEDs along main roads (the organization's operatives gained experience in using IEDs in Iraq); and attacking army and security force roadblocks.

9. Suicide bombing attacks are the signature brand of the Al-Nusra Front (the organization has claimed responsibility for most of those carried out in Syria). Suicide bombing attacks, especially those attacking Syrian regime centers in Damascus and Aleppo, have given the Al-Nusra Front an operational bonus painful to the Syrian regime, but successful attacks create a negative image. The West and Arab-Muslim countries have become increasingly worried about the infiltration of Al-Qaeda elements into the ranks of the rebels and in consequence are less willing to support the opponents of the Syrian regime. In addition, the suicide bombing attacks alienate some of the Syrian public because they are sometimes carried out indiscriminately, killing innocent civilians who were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Apparently, the use of suicide bombings was inspired by Iraq, where for many years Al-Qaeda organizations have carried out mass-casualty attacks which kill and maim many civilians.

10. The Al-Nusra Front and other Salafist-jihadi organizations collaborate with Islamic rebel groups that do not necessarily share Al-Qaeda's ideology. There is also ad-hoc collaboration between them and the Free Syrian Army, the organization leading the fighting against the Syrian regime, which is Syrian nationalist and secular in character (although many of its fighters clearly have an Islamic affiliation). In several areas there is military collaboration between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, despite their rivalry. On the other hand, there is tension between on the one hand the Al-Nusra Front and other Salafist-jihadi organizations, and on the other the Free Syrian Army, which in some instances deteriorated into violent confrontations. There are also tensions within the Salafist-jihadi organizations. At this point, as long as fighting the Syrian army, their common enemy, continues, they are willing to contain their basic differences to prevent deterioration to a general confrontation. However, the morning after, and perhaps before, a violent struggle is liable to break out to determine the nature and image of the future Syrian regime, in which the Al-Nusra Front is expected to play an important role.

Assisting the Syrian Population

11. Many areas in northern and eastern Syria which fell under the influence of the Al-Nusra Front and other rebel groups have turned into what are known as "liberated zones." For the Al-Nusra Front it is particularly important to provide local Syrian residents with support and assistance and to establish an alternative rule in areas where the Syrian regime is no longer sovereign. To that end the Al-Nusra Front has set up designated bodies in the various zones. They distribute food, clothing, blankets and other necessary items and operate legal, policing, educational and health systems. Western correspondents who visited the liberated zones reported in most cases that the local residents were satisfied with their lives, which had returned to normal after the collapse of local Syrian governance. However, in some places, complaints were heard, especially about the strict code of behavior that had been enforced (the insistence on "modest" dress for women, for example) and acts of cruelty (takeover of resources, execution of prisoners, maltreatment of minority sects).

12. In northern Syria the Al-Nusra Front and its allies successfully took over vital governmental facilities, among them oil and gas fields and pipelines, dams, power plants and grain silos. They and other rebel groups operate the facilities, sometimes in tacit agreement with the Syrian regime (delivering oil and gas to the regime they are fighting in return for payment). The profits (especially from the oil fields) provide the Al-Nusra Front with a high monthly income enabling it to pay its operatives' salaries, purchase weapons and assist the population.

Evaluation of Risks for Israel, the West and the Pro-Western Arab-Muslim Countries

13. The civil war turned Syria into a magnet for Al-Qaeda and global jihad operatives, and they continue to arrive in large numbers. Jihadist fighters who came to Syria from Iraq, other Arab-Muslim countries and the West joined the local Syrian operatives and established jihadist organizations which include the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria. Some of the volunteers joined the Free Syrian Army and other Islamic military organizations not affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. Some of them moved from one organization to another and wound up in jihadist organizations with upgraded military capabilities and strong ideological attraction. However, at this point it is difficult to predict how the civil war will end, what the relative power of the Al-Nusra Front and the other jihadist organizations will be, what the balance of power will be between the various organizations affiliated with the global jihad and the national Syrian organizations or the Islamic Syrian organizations, and how the events of the second wave of regional upheaval in Egypt will influence the power of the various organizations and further developments.

14. In any event, at this time (summer 2013), the Al-Nusra Front, designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and a number of European countries, is one of the prominent organizations among the rebels. That is because of its operational capabilities and influence among the population. Its top priority is currently fighting the Syrian regime to topple it, not, at this time, to impose Islamic religious law in Syria or promote an agenda of regional or global jihadist terrorism. To that end the organization often tries to behave pragmatically, joining with other rebel organizations (including those which have reservations about Al-Qaeda). It generally does not enforce its radical ideology on the Syrian population in the regions it controls, and invests a great deal of effort in assisting the local population and filling the administrative vacuum in the "liberated zones."

15. However, in our assessment, for the medium- and long-term future, the Al-Nusra Front and other Salafist-jihadi organizations can be expected to make an attempt to take control of the Syrian uprising (if it succeeds) and realize their vision of an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria. In our assessment, they will face many difficulties in attaining their goal, caused by Syria's political and social character as a state with many ethnic groups and religions and with a governmental and ideological tradition of secular Arab nationalism. In addition, there are many differences between the Islamic organizations operating in Syria, even those affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Thus it can be assumed that the Al-Nusra Front's chances of taking control of the Syrian revolution and establishing a Syrian regime affiliated with Al-Qaeda are low. Nevertheless, in our assessment the Al-Nusra Front has the ability to become more powerful and may be the dominant player among the rebels, even the morning after. Such a force will have to be recognized and may be difficult to suppress.

16. Today the Al-Nusra Front is prominent among the rebel organizations because of its military and financial capabilities, its effective chain of command and control, and the deep ideological commitment of its operatives. Even if it does not take control of the Syrian revolution, in our assessment it will be an important factor in shaping its religious-sectarian character, will destabilize Syria and make it difficult for any Syrian regime to govern (whether a weakened Assad regime or one that is propped up by a flimsy coalition of rebel organizations). In the likely scenario of long-term, unstable governance by an administrative center in Damascus, the Al-Nusra Front might emerge as stronger and influence events in Syria. It will try to exploit its status to promote its (and Al-Qaeda's) end goal of turning Syria into Al-Qaeda's front-line base in the heart of the Middle East, in close geographical proximity to Israel, Europe and the pro-Western Arab-Muslim states.

17. The Al-Nusra Front's strengthening in Syria (even without taking control of it) has the potential to be regionally and internationally threatening:

1) Turning Syria into a center for the global jihad of anti-Israeli terrorism:

A. Ideologically, for the Al-Nusra Front and other Salafist-jihadi organizations operating in Syria, the State of Israel should be annihilated. The Islamic Caliphate that will arise in Greater Syria will include Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and "Palestine." The first video issued by the Front after its foundation shows a picture of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem flying the flags of the Al-Nusra Front and the global jihad. On February 12, 2012, Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri said that after the fall of the Syrian regime Syria would become a base for jihad warfare whose objective would be "to found a country to defend Muslim lands, liberate the Golan and pursue jihad until the flags of victory fly over the hills of occupied Jerusalem." Other Al-Nusra Front operatives made similar declarations.

B. Practically, the Al-Nusra Front can be expected to establish an operative terrorist infrastructure in the Golan Heights, a continuation of the military infrastructure it is currently constructing in Daraa in southwestern Syria. In our assessment, Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations may integrate themselves into terrorist attacks from the Golan Heights, despite the fundamental ideological differences between them, the Al-Nusra Front and other global jihad organizations. In addition, in our assessment the Al-Nusra Front will also try to join jihadist networks and organizations in the territories bordering on Israel to attack it (such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in the Sinai Peninsula, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades in Lebanon, and the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem in the Gaza Strip) .

Ayman al-Zawahiri in a video posted on February 12, 2012, calling for the establishment of a state in Syria which would "liberate" the Golan Heights and wage a jihad against Israel "until the flags of victory fly over the hills of occupied Jerusalem" (YouTube 2013)

2) Taking control of advanced weapons belonging to the Syrian regime, including chemical weapons: The Al-Nusra Front and the other global jihad organizations make an ongoing effort to take over the Syrian regime's weapons depots. As the central government loses its power and ability to rule, there is an increasing danger that the weapons of the Syrian army, including advanced systems, may fall into jihadist hands. They may also be able to acquire weapons supplied to the Free Syrian Army and other organizations with ties to the West.^[2] In addition, as the Syrian regime weakens, the Syrian army's chemical and biological weapons may fall into the hands of the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations. They may use them for terrorist attacks in the absence of the considerations of restraint that influence other terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations. In addition, weapons from Syria may be transferred to other arenas of terrorist activity, as happened in Libya (weapons looted from the Libyan regime arsenals found their way to terrorist hotspots, including the Gaza Strip).

3) Exporting terrorism to the West: After gaining operational experience and skills fighting in Syria, jihadist operatives may establish terrorist infrastructures to carry out terrorist attacks in their countries of origin. They may do so on their own initiative or following directions from the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations (a kind of return to the model of Afghanistan in the 1980s and 90s). Bashar Assad, interviewed by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on June 17, 2013, warned the EU that "If the Europeans supply weapons [to the rebels], Europe's backyard would become a terrorist haven, and Europe would pay a price for this."

4) Emerging as a regional center for terrorism and subversion: A jihadist center in Syria will be a danger to the pro-Western Arab-Muslim countries. Countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt, which, one way or another, support the anti-Assad uprising, may find themselves, on the morning after, as targets for subversion and terrorism originating in Syria. Global jihad operatives in Syria may collaborate with Salafist-jihadi organizations in Arab-Muslim countries to subvert their regimes. The strengthening of the Al-Nusra Front and the other jihadist organizations in Syria, and their radical Sunni Muslim nature, have already made themselves felt in Lebanon and have led to tension and violent confrontations between Sunnis and Shi'ites throughout the Arab-Muslim world.

18. The United States is aware of the potential dangers inherent in the Syrian crisis. On August 6, 2013, Michael Morell, deputy director of the CIA, was interviewed by the Wall Street Journal. He called the crisis in Syria the "top threat" facing the United States today, and warned that the fall of the Syrian regime, which possessed chemical and other advanced weapons, might turn Syria into Al-Qaeda's new haven replacing Pakistan. He added that the violence in Syria could leak into its neighbors, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (Wall Street Journal website, August 6, 2013).

The Methodology Used in This Study

19. The main methodological difficulty in preparing this study was the lack of historical perspective on the Syrian civil war. The study was finished in the summer of 2013 at a time when the war was still being fought in all its fury and far from being decided. A more thorough examination of the Al-Nusra Front, its capabilities, intentions, place in Syria the morning after and its influence on Israel, the Arab-Muslim world and the West, will have to be carried out in the future in light of the results of the war and regional and international developments. However, even now it is possible to describe the nature of the organization, its operational methods and to make an attempt to evaluate the variety of potential dangers it poses for the Middle East and the world at large.

20. Another difficulty was the lack of reliable, detailed information about the organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad operating in Syria alongside the rebel organizations. The rival sides (the supporters and opponents of the regime) customarily issue biased, manipulative reports whose sole objective is to further their own interests. (Each side claims to be winning and each side slanders the other.) Another difficulty was the nature of the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria. They are both closed, decentralized organizations with many rivals and which are careful to preserve their secrecy and do not reveal, even to their own operatives, information about their leaders or about how they operate.

21. The study focuses on the Al-Nusra Front, the most significant organization among the jihadist organizations operating in Syria, which has an important role among the rebels. However, to complete the picture the study also relates to the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria and other Salafist-jihadi organizations, although with less detail.

22. The study is based on the analysis and cross referencing of information from open sources, especially information from sources affiliated with the Al-Nusra Front (videos, announcements, claims of responsibility, interviews with organization operatives). In addition, use was made of information posted on the Internet and in the various Syrian, Arab and Western media (note should be made of Syria Comment, which posts important articles about the Syrian civil war and the role the jihadist organizations play in it). Helpful information was found in reports filed by Western and occasionally Arabic correspondents who visited the regions under Al-Nusra Front control in northern and eastern Syria. Correspondents reported from the field about the governance activities of the Al-Nusra Front and other rebel organizations, and about the mood of the local population, despite the limitations placed on reporting.[3]

23. This study also used a number of reports published in 2012-2013 by Western research institutes specializing in Al-Qaeda and radical Islam:

1) The Quilliam Foundation, a London-based think tank, issued a report, apparently in the middle of 2012, entitled "Jabhat al-Nusra: Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad, A Strategic Briefing" (without date or author's name).

2) The International Crisis Group, an international,organization committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict, issued a study on October 12, 2012 entitled "Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition" (no author's name given).

3) The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), a British think tank based in King's College, London, whose article by Aaron Y. Zelin on foreign fighters in Syria was particularly helpful.

The Structure of the Study

Overview

1.Al-Qaeda entrenchment in Syria

2. Assessment of the Al-Nusra Front's military capabilities

3. Assisting the Syrian population

4. Evaluation of risks for Israel, the West and the Pro-Western Arab-Muslim Countries

5. The methodology used in this study

Section One: The Founding of the Al-Nusra Front and its Collaboration with Other Rebel Organizations

1. General description of the civil war in Syria

2. Entrenchment of Al-Qaeda operatives in Syria before the establishment of the Al-Nusra Front

3. Declaration of the founding of the Al-Nusra Front (January 24, 2012)

4. The split of the Al-Qaeda branches in Syria and Iraq

5. The emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria as a competitor for the Al-Nusra Front

6. Collaboration between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic rebel organizations:

1) Overview

2) Prominent Islamic organizations that collaborate with the Al-Nusra Front

3) Founding joint military frameworks of the Al-Nusra Front and other Islamic organizations

7. The relationship between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria

8. The Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria's connections with the Free Syrian Army

9. The confrontation between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria on the one hand and the Kurds on the other

Section Two: The Al-Nusra Front's Ideology

1. Overview

2. The Al-Nusra Front's ideological identification with Al-Qaeda

3. The Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria's ideological affiliation with Al-Qaeda

4. The meaning of the term "Al-Nusra Front"

5. Greater Syria as an arena for Islam's historical struggle

6. The Al-Nusra Front's overall goal

7. The Al-Nusra Front's anti-West orientation

8. Hostility to Israel

9. The concept of jihad

10. The Al-Nusra Front's worldview of takfir and its implementation

1) Overview

2) Hostility to Shi'ites and Alawites

3) Attacks on Christians and other sects and religions, destruction of statues and attacks on religious facilities and symbols

Section Three:The Al-Nusra Front's Structure, Leadership and Functioning

1. The Al-Nusra Front's strength and areas of deployment

2. The Al-Nusra Front's structure

3. The Al-Nusra Front leadership

4. Security and intelligence

5. Fundraising

6. Acquiring weapons and smuggling them into Syria

Section Four: The Human Composition of the Al-Nusra Front

1. An overall description of foreign volunteers

2. The approximate number of foreign volunteers

3. Foreign operatives killed in Syria

4. Operatives from the Arab-Muslim world

5. Volunteers from the West

6. Al-Nusra Front recruitment and training

7. Indoctrination/Brainwashing and military training for children and adolescents

Section Five: Description of the Al-Nusra Front's Military Activity

1. General description of the fighting

2. Car bombs detonated by suicide bombers

3. Car bombs detonated by remote control

4. Motorcycle bombs

5. Attacks on airfields

6. Attacks on Syrian military bases in rural areas

7. Use of IEDs

8. Attacks on border crossings

9. Rocket fire

10. Attacks on roadblocks

11. Al-Nusra Front activity in southern Syria

1) The environs of Daraa

2) The Golan Heights

12. Execution of captives

13. The Al-Nusra Front response to the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime

Section Six: Filling the Governmental Vacuum by the Al-Nusra Front and Other Jihadist Organizations

1. Overview

2. The Al-Nusra Front's civil governance of various regions

1) The Al-Raqqa Governorate

2) The Aleppo Governorate

3) The Deir ez-Zor Governorate

4) The Idlib Governorate

5) The Al-Hasakah Governorate

6) The Daraa Governorate

7) The Al-Suwayda Governorate

3. Managing the oil and gas fields in northern and eastern Syria

Section Seven: The Al-Nusra Front's Battle for Hearts and Minds

1. Overview

2. The Al-Nusra Front's media

1) "The White Minaret" (al-manara al-baydhaa')

2) Websites

3. Conduct of the Al-Nusra Front media

1) Overview

2) Preaching in the mosques

3) Distribution of CDs

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^[1]The full name of the organization is Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham, ("the front for the assistance of the residents of Greater Syria"). The term al-Sham may be translated as both Syria and "Greater Syria." However, because of the global Islamic concept of the Al-Nusra Front and its goals, which go beyond the state of Syria, it should be translated as "Greater Syria." The organization is generally called the Al-Nusra Front, and that is the name that will be used in this study.
^[2]Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov raised the concern that weapons sent to Syria would fall into the hands of the Al-Nusra Front. He said that "Jabhat al-Nusra is the most effective functioning structure of the armed opposition, and I have no doubt that the overwhelming majority of weapons that have already ended up in Syria, as well as those [weapons] that will end up in Syria, will be distributed via that structure” (http://eaworldview.com/2013/06/syria-today-the-war-on-the-economy). Despite his clear bias (an echo of the Syrian regime's tactic to exaggerate the jihadist threat), his statement apparently reflects a genuine concern that is not baseless (because of the presence of a Chechen military unit fighting in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front, among other things).
^[3]Nevertheless, it can be assumed that Western and Arab correspondents visiting the areas of jihadist control are limited in what they can report and sometimes are in personal danger. An article was published in the New York Times on August 22, 2013 about an American photographer who was captured by the Al-Nusra Front. He was tortured but managed to escape after about seven months. According to the article, during 2013 there were 17 foreign nationals in Syria who were abducted or disappeared.

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Support for Syria comes to Facebook: supporters of Iran’s military involvement in Syria increase their social network presence

In the past several months, elements affiliated with the Iranian regime have considerably stepped up their Facebook activity in a public relations move to spread a message of support for the Iranian military involvement in Syria.

The activity is gathering momentum as more and more reports are being released by Iranian media on the broad support of the Qods Force-led Revolutionary Guards for the Syrian regime and on Revolutionary Guards fighters killed in battles with the rebel forces in Syria. Those fighters are usually referred to as “defenders of Zainab’s Mosque”, referring to a mosque situated in a southern suburb of Damascus which in Shi’ite tradition is the final resting place of Imam Ali’s daughter.

As of this writing, there are approximately ten active Facebook pages dedicated to the fighting in Syria from the perspective of the Iranian fighters taking part in it. The content posted on the social network includes:

1. Reports on the fighting between the Syrian regime and its allies from Iran and Arab countries on one hand and the rebels on the other, with an emphasis on the achievements made by the regime and its supporters.

2. Anti-rebel PR content focusing on the rebels’ involvement in terrorist activities against civilians.

3. PR content that includes press reports and cartoons against countries allegedly supporting the rebels, mainly the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel.

4. Details on commanders fighting for the rebel army.

5. Reports (mostly photographs) on fighters from Iran, Hezbollah, and Arab countries involved in the fighting against the rebels.

6. Extensive reports on losses incurred by fighters from Iran, Hezbollah, and Arab countries fighting alongside the Syrian regime in combat with the rebels. The reports include information on the fighters’ death circumstances, eulogies, and details on their funeral ceremonies.

7. Religious Islamic content accompanied by photographs of Zainab’s Mosque in Damascus and Shi’ite-oriented encouragement for the fighters.

In addition to the activity of the supporters of the Iranian involvement in Syria, its critics, too, maintain a presence on the social network, albeit on a smaller scale. The focus of their activity is a Facebook page titled “Solidarity with the Syrian people: Iranians support the Syrian popular revolution” (https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Syria), which contains reports on the Syrian regime’s activity against the rebels that emphasize its use of chemical weapons and the casualties sustained by innocent civilians, as well as reports on the achievements made by the rebels in their fight against the regime.

The dissemination of content dedicated to the fighting in Syria by Iranian elements fits into the growing cyberspace presence of regime supporters. In recent years, activists of the Revolutionary Guards’ Basij force known as “soft war soldiers” have created hundreds of websites, blogs, and Facebook pages with the objective of spreading online content that reflects the views of the regime.

The extensive public relations activity on the social network in support of the Iranian military involvement in Syria may be indicative of a deliberate policy pursued by the Iranian regime and the Revolutionary Guards to get Iranian public opinion support for the ongoing fighting in Syria and curb any possible criticism that might be provoked by the increasing reports on the losses suffered by the Iranian forces sent to fight alongside the Syrian regime. It is not inconceivable that the increased scope of the PR effort on the military involvement in Syria since July 2013 also reflects concerns harbored by the Revolutionary Guards over a possible change in the policy of the new Rowhani-led administration with regard to such involvement.

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News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (July 31 – August 6, 2013)

Published: 06/08/2013

Jerusalem Day demonstration in the Gaza Strip (Palinfo website, August 2, 2013)

Confrontations between Palestinians and the Israeli security forces at Qalqiliya (Wafa News Agency, August 2, 2013)

Muhammad Mashaal: recruited an Israeli Arab from Shefaram into Hezbollah (ISA website, July 2013).

Jerusalem Day events in Iran (Press TV website, August 2, 2013)

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Overview

Israel's south was quiet this past week. In Judea and Samaria violent events continued, part of the so-called "popular resistance." According to information from the Israel Security Agency (ISA), in July 2013 there was a slight decrease in the scope of terrorist attacks in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem. Most of the attacks involved throwing stones and Molotov cocktails.
After the renewal of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in Washington, the two sides are expected to meet locally to continue the talks. On the agenda is the first stage of releasing 104 Palestinian terrorist operatives, agreed on by Israel, who were imprisoned before the Oslo Accords. According to Saeb Erekat, head of the Palestinian negotiating team, 26 prisoners will be released.

The Situation in Israel's South

Rocket Fire

This past week no rocket hits were identified in Israeli territory.

Judea and Samaria

Palestinian Violence Continues

Violent confrontations and friction between Palestinians and the Israeli security forces continue, part of the so-called "popular resistance," including the weekly demonstrations and protests. On the morning of August 5, 2013, several stones were thrown at an Israeli bus near El-Aroub near Hebron, damaging it (Tazpit News Agency, August 5, 2013).
On July 28, 2013, a dummy IED was found on the Alon road, between the Megadlim Junction and Kokhav Hashahar in the Benyamin mountains. Local residents called police demolitions experts. It was the third time a dummy IED had been found in the region (Tazpit News Agency, July 28, 2013).

Decrease in the Number of Terrorist Attacks in July

During July 2013 there was a slight decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem. There were 76 attacks^[3] in July (as compared with 99 in June). Of them 50 were carried out in Judea and Samaria and 26 in Jerusalem. Most of the attacks (about 60) involved Molotov cocktails. Eleven involved IEDs, four involved shots fired from light arms and there was one stabbing attack (at the Nablus Gate in Jerusalem, July 16, 2013), which resulted in injury to an Israeli civilian (Israel Security Agency website, August 6, 2013).

Developments in the Gaza Strip

The Rafah Crossing

The de-facto Hamas administration is worried by the worsening humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip caused by the closing of the Rafah crossing. The administration appealed to Egypt to open the crossing fully to the passage of people and goods (Filastin al-Yawm, July 31, 2013). The foreign ministry of the Hamas administration warned of a "humanitarian catastrophe" caused by the closing of the Rafah crossing, and appealed to the Egyptians to open it. The ministry claimed the crossing was open only four hours a day and the number of people allowed through was limited to 150 (about 20% of the activity at the crossing before the coup in Egypt). As a result, thousands of Palestinians are stranded in various Arab countries and cannot return to the Gaza Strip (Al-Jazeera, August 2, 2013).
In the meantime, Egypt continues destroying the smuggling tunnels along the Egypt-Gaza border.The Egyptian army reportedly discovered and destroyed a fuel reservoir with a capacity of 2.5 million liters, or a little over 660,000 gallons, containing about 100,000 liters, or about 26,500 gallons. It also destroyed two pumps attached to the reservoir (Safa News Agency, July 31, 2013).

Visit of Turkish Prime Minister to the Gaza Strip Cancelled

Egypt cancelled the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to the Gaza Strip. The reason given was his support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and ousted President Mohamed Morsi. Erdogan had been planning the visit for some time and was supposed to enter via Egypt (UPI.com website, August 5, 2013)

Deterioration of Hamas-Palestinian Authority Relations

The de-facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip continues accusing the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah of helping foment Egyptian incitement against Hamas and trying to turn the population in the Gaza Strip against Hamas. An anti-Fatah demonstration was held in the northern Gaza Strip, during which Musheir al-Masri, a Hamas faction member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, called for legal action against the heads of the PA involved in incitement (Palinfo website, July 31, 2013).
Senior Hamas figures made the following remarks:

Sami Abu Zuhri, Hamas spokesman, repeatedly accused Fatah of being behind the "Rebellion" campaign in the social media. He said it did not have a public base and was an organized political move led by Fatah as part of its campaign against Hamas (Filastin al-Yawm, August 4, 2013).
Islam Shahwan, spokesman for the ministry of the interior of the Hamas administration, claimed that his office had tapes proving that the PA was carrying out the anti-Hamas incitement campaign. As to the incriminating documents made public by Hamas, he said that they had been taken from the personal computer of a Fatah activist detained by Hamas' security services (Palinfo website, July 31, 2013).
Musheir al-Masri, a Hamas faction member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, said that in view of Fatah's involvement in the anti-Hamas incitement campaign, Hamas would take media, legal and security steps against it. He also threatened to escalate Hamas' activity against Fatah if it did not stop its incitement (PalPress website, August 1, 2013).

Hamas-Iran Relations

Hamas continues sending positive signals to Iran. Senior Hamas figure Mahmoud al-Zahar said in an interview that Hamas had not lost its allies, Iran and Syria. He said Iran had not cut off relations with Hamas but that they had become loose (ASIA, August 2, 2013). Osama Hamdan, in charge of foreign relations for Hamas' political bureau, said Hamas was rehabilitating its relations with Iran. He said they were in agreement on every issue regarding the Palestinian cause but had differences of opinion over the issue of Syria (Alresala.net website, July 29, 2013). On the other hand, the Lebanese daily newspaper Al-Akhbar, which is affiliated with Hezbollah, reported that Iran and Hezbollah would renew relations with Hamas but on a new basis, although the decision rested with Hamas.

The Palestinian Authority

Renewing the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations

After the initial talks in Washington ended and after President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry met with Tzipi Livni and Saeb Erekat, a spokesman for the White House reported that the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians with American mediation had begun. The spokesman would not provide additional information (White House website, July 31, 2013)

Summing up the meeting in Washington (Facebook page of Tzipi Livni, July 31, 2013)

Mahmoud Abbas said during a visit to Egypt that as part of the final status solution there would be no Israeli civilian or military presence at the borders of the Palestinian state (Wafa News Agency, July 30, 2013). Saeb Erekat, head of the Palestinian negotiating team, confirmed that veteran prisoners would be released in four stages. He said Israel had agreed to release 26 of the 104 prisoners on August 13. He also said that the Palestinian leadership had informed America and Israel that it would not accept any temporary solution and would put all the issues of the final status agreement on the negotiating table, headed by borders, Jerusalem, the refugees, water and the settlements. He stressed that the PA wanted to return to the agreement allegedly arranged in the past by Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert, according to which international forces would be stationed in the future Palestinian state (Ma'an News Agency, August 3, 2013).
Hamas continues to strongly oppose the renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. At its weekly meeting the Hamas administration condemned the PA's return to the negotiating table, saying it was nothing more than "another link in the chain of [PA] failures," which have a negative effect on the Palestinian cause. It warned that Israel and the United States would exploit the negotiations as a cover for their "occupation plans" and to force concessions from the PA (Filastin Al-'Aan, July 31, 2013).
Mahmoud al-Zahar, senior Hamas figure, said Hamas did not consider the negotiations legitimate in any sense and that Mahmoud Abbas did not represent the Palestinian street (ASIA, August 2, 2013). Yousef al-Rizqa, political advisor to Ismail Haniya, said that renewing the negotiations was the most dangerous step in the history of the Palestinian problem. He added that the atmosphere of the talks in Washington reminded him of the atmosphere during the talks in Oslo, which led to "a setback of fifty years for the Palestinian problem" (Alresala.net website, July 30, 2013).

Hezbollah

Trial Begins in Nigeria of Three Lebanese Citizens Suspected of Working for Hezbollah

In Nigeria the trial of three Lebanese citizens apprehended with a cache of weapons in their possession has begun. The Nigerian prosecution has added other charges to the original one. The three are now accused of suspicion of having contacts with Hezbollah, planning terrorist attacks on Western and Israeli targets in Nigeria, laundering money and illegally importing goods. The prosecution also decided, for reasons of security, to limit access to the hearings and not to reveal the identity of the witnesses. The three accused admitted their membership in Hezbollah but denied the other charges (Agence France-Presse, July 30, 2013). The three Lebanese were detained on May 28, 2013, in the city of Kano in northern Nigeria, after a weapons cache had been discovered in one of their apartments.^[4]

Israeli Arabs Detained on Suspicion of Collaborating with Hezbollah

It was revealed to the media that in May 2012 a number of Israeli Arabs from the northern town of Shefaram were detained on suspicion of having been recruited by Hezbollah and of having collected information in Israel for the organization. One of the detainees was Zaher Yusifoun, 46, from Shefaram. During interrogation he admitted that in 2007, while on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, he was recruited to Hezbollah (ISA website, July 2013).
The investigation revealed that he had been recruited by two Hezbollah activists, Muhammad Mashaal (aka Abu Ismail), a Lebanese living in Denmark, and Khaled al-Nablousi, who represented himself as an operative of the "Lebanese resistance" (i.e., Hezbollah). After his recruitment and until he was detained he used various methods to contact Muhammad Mashaal (telephone, emissaries and a meeting in Saudi Arabia). He gave his handlers information, primarily about the mood of the Israeli Arab sector, security arrangements at the border crossings and the names of Israeli Arabs who he though might be suitable for recruitment into Hezbollah.
Muhammad Mashaal, Yusifoun's recruiter, has been known for years as an organizer of pilgrimages to Mecca and as having tried in the past to recruit Israeli Arabs for Hezbollah. In 2008 he recruited Aadel Warda, and Israeli citizen living in Denmark, and charged him with gathering information in Israel. Warda was detained as he entered Israel before he carried out his mission.

Hezbollah also recruits Israeli Arabs as part of its effort to obtain information about Israel. A number of attempts have been discovered. For example, in September 2012 Milad Muhammad Mahmoud Khatib, from the village of Majd al-Kurum in the Galilee, was detained. Interrogated by the ISA, he confessed to having been recruited by a Lebanese living in Denmark, who gave him a series of security missions in Israel. On October 24, 2012, Issam Hashem Ali Mushahrna, an Israeli Arab living in east Jerusalem (Jabal Mukaber) was detained. During interrogation he confessed he had been recruited to Hezbollah during a visit to Lebanon in June 2012. His recruiter him instructed him to return to Israel and maintain contact with Hezbollah through the Internet.^[5]

Propaganda Events

Iran and the Shi'ite Muslims World Mark Jerusalem Day

On August 2, 2013, the last Friday of the Muslim religious month of Ramadan, Iranian-sponsored International Jerusalem Day was marked with marches, demonstrations and rallies throughout the Arab-Muslim world and by Muslim communities in the West. The main events, as usual, were held in Iran and attended by the leaders of the Iranian regime.
The events were generally characterized by the following:^[6]

Themes– As in previous years, the events were exploited for hate propaganda and incitement against Israel and the United States, and calls were heard for the destruction of Israel. Slogans condemning the renewal of the Israel-Palestinian negotiations were also heard, as were slogans in support of Syria and the regime of Bashar Assad.
Scant participation outside Iran– The demonstrations and events were mainly held in Iran. In other countries, as in years past, there were few participants at the events. Apparently the recent dramatic events in the Middle East (the second coup in Egypt, the ongoing fighting in Syria) have overshadowed the issue of the Palestinians in general and Jerusalem in particular. The relatively small number of participants might also be a result of the anti-Iranian criticism in the Sunni Arab-Muslim world, caused by Iran's support for the Assad regime.
The prominent Iranian-Shi'ite nature of the events– Despite the desire to make Jerusalem Day a pan-Muslim event, it is still identified as Iranian-Shi'ite. Most of the events were organized by the Shi'ite communities in the various countries and attended by Shi'ites or pro-Iranian activists. Conspicuous this year was the absence of Sunni activists, possibly in protest of the killing of Sunnis in Syria by the Assad regime, which is supported by Iran and Hezbollah.
Media coverage– The events were not well covered by the media. Most of the ] reports of international events appeared in the Iranian media.

All the media paid particular attention to the remarks made by the new Iranian president,Hassan Rouhani. At the Jerusalem Day march in Tehran he said "In our region, a sore has been on the body of the Islamic world for many years in the shadow of the occupation of Palestine and holy Al-Quds." He was careful not to explicitly say "Israel," allowing the Iranians to issue a "clarification" claiming his statement had been distorted. However, during the Jerusalem Day events in Iran, Lebanon and elsewhere, there were specific calls for the destruction of Israel (for example, a poster at the march in Tehran quoting Ali Khamenei as saying that "the Zionist regime must be toppled," and a speech given by Hassan Nasrallah quoting the Ayatollah Khomeini as calling Israel "a cancerous growth that has to be excised").

Palestinian Delegation Visits the Mavi Marmara

The Turkish organization IHH held a fast-breaking meal aboard the Mavi Marmara, anchored in Istanbul. The meal was attended by a Palestinian delegation whose members included Issa Qaraqa, the PA minister for prisoner affairs, Qadoura Fares, chairman of the Palestinian prisoners' club, the Mufti of Jerusalem and Muhammad Barake, chairman of the Israeli Communist party. Relatives of the Turkish operatives killed aboard the Mavi Marmara were also present. Bülent Yildirim, IHH chairman, who was responsible for dispatching the Mavi Marmara, said that Turkey would continue supporting the Palestinian people. During the Palestinians' visit to Turkey he also announced the establishment a Turkish endowment fund for solidarity with Palestine to raise contributions for the Palestinian prisoners(Wafa News Agency, August 2, 2013).

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^[1]As of August 6, 2013. The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.
^[2]The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.
^[3]Not including the dozens of incidents of stone throwing.
^[4] For further information see the June 19, 2013 bulletin “A cache of Hezbollah weapons was recently discovered in Nigeria and a Hezbollah network was exposed.”
^[5]For further information about Hezbollah's efforts to recruit Israeli Arabs, see the November 29, 2012 bulletin “Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization,” Appendix I, The Israeli Arena.
^[6] For further information see the August 5, 2013 bulletin in Hebrew. The English translation will soon be available on our website.

This year events were again held for Iranian-sponsored Jerusalem Day.

Published: 06/08/2013

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Burning Israeli, American and British flags at an International Jerusalem Day march in Tehran (Mehr News Agency, Iran, August 2, 2013)

Overview

1.On August 2, 2013, the last Friday of the Muslim religious month of Ramadan, Iranian-sponsored International Jerusalem Day was marked with marches, demonstrations and rallies throughout the Arab-Muslim world and by Muslim communities in the West. The main events, as usual, were held in Iran and attended by the leaders of the Iranian regime.

2. The events were generally characterized by the following:

1) Themes – As in previous years, the events were exploited for hate propaganda and incitement against Israel and the United States, and calls were heard for the destruction of Israel. Slogans condemning the renewal of the Israel-Palestinian negotiations were also present, as were slogans in support of Syria and the regime of Bashar Assad.

2) Scant participation outside Iran – The demonstrations and events were mainly held in Iran. In other countries, as in years past, there were few participants at the events. Apparently the recent dramatic events in the Middle East (the second coup in Egypt, the ongoing fighting in Syria) have overshadowed the issue of the Palestinians in general and Jerusalem in particular. The relatively small number of participants might also be a result of the anti-Iranian criticism in the Sunni Arab-Muslim world, caused by Iran's support for the Assad regime.

3) The prominent Iranian-Shi'ite nature of the events – Despite the Iranian desire to make Jerusalem Day a pan-Muslim event, it is still identified as Iranian-Shi'ite. Most of the events were organized by the Shi'ite communities in the various countries and attended by Shi'ites or pro-Iranian activists. Conspicuous this year was the absence of Sunni activists, possibly in protest of the killing of Sunnis in Syria by the Assad regime, which is supported by Iran and Hezbollah.

3. Media coverage – The events were not well covered by the media. Most of the reports of international events appeared in the Iranian media. Particular attention was paid by the media to the statement made by the new Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani. At the Jerusalem Day march in Tehran he said "In our region, a sore has been on the body of the Islamic world for many years in the shadow of the occupation of Palestine and holy Quds." He was careful not to explicitly say "Israel," or even the "Zionist regime," allowing the Iranians to issue a "clarification" claiming his statement had been distorted. However, during the Jerusalem Day events in Iran, Lebanon and elsewhere, there were specific calls for the destruction of Israel (for example, a poster at the march in Tehran quoting Ali Khamenei as saying that "the Zionist regime must be toppled," and a speech given by Hassan Nasrallah quoting the Ayatollah Khomeini as calling Israel "a cancerous growth that has to be excised").

Events in Iran

Overview

4.As in years past, Jerusalem Day was marked in Iran with marches, demonstrations and rallies held throughout the country. The main rally was held in Tehran. Marchers carried anti-Israeli, anti-American and anti-British signs and chanted slogans including "Down with to Israel," "Down with America" and "Down with Britain" [in Farsi and Arabic they signs read "Death to Israel" and "Death to America"], and stamped on Israeli, American and British flags. There were also "ceremonies" in which the Israeli, American and British flags were burned. They also called on the government to impose sanctions on "the merchandise manufactured by the Zionists" (Fars and Mehr News Agencies, Iran, August 2, 2013).

5. The office of the president issued an announcement for Jerusalem Day stressing the day's importance and Iran's support for the Palestinians' struggle. Senior members of the Iranian regime attended the march in Tehran, among them newly-elected President Hassan Rouhani, Hashemi Rafsanjani, chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, former Iranian president Ahmadinejad, and others (ISNA, Iran, August 2, 2013).

The demonstration in Iran. The red posters read "Down with Israel" (Press TV Facebook page, August 2, 2013).

Statements by Iranian Leaders

6. Newly-elected Hassan Rouhani was interviewed at the march. He said that for many years in the Middle East there had been a sore on the body of the Islamic world in the shadow of the occupation of Palestine and holy Jerusalem. He added that Jerusalem Day was a reminder that the Muslim nation would not forget its historic right and would always stand firm against oppression and aggression (ISNA, Iran, August 2, 2013).^[1]

7. Outgoing president Ahmadinejad said that Jerusalem Day was one of the great Islamic days and that it was important for all of humanity, in the hope it would lead to the isolation of the so-called "Satanic front" (Fars News Agency, Iran, August 2, 2013).

8. Seyed Abbas Araghchi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign minister, said that this year Jerusalem Day was doubly important because it fell at the time of the renewal of the talks between Israel and the Palestinians. He said that if all the Muslims in every Muslim country demonstrated their loyalty to the Palestinians' aspirations for the "liberation of Jerusalem," without a doubt it would lead to the failure of the talks. He condemned the negotiations because he said they did not relate to the "rights of the Palestinian people." He said that the "Zionist regime" did not want peace and existed on a foundation of war and occupation (Fars News Agency, Iran, August 1, 2013).

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^[1]Initially, the various media quoted Rouhani as saying that "the Zionist regime has for years been a sore on the body of the Islamic world and the wound must be healed." A number of hours later an Iranian clarification was issued to the effect that the media had misquoted him and that he had not said what had been attributed to him (ISNA, Iran, August 2, 2013). In fact, Rouhani did not explicitly mention "the Zionist regime" but the spirit and the message, were consistent with the main theme of Jerusalem Day, i.e., the destruction of the State of Israel.

Jibril Rajoub (left), a member of Fatah's Central Committee, meets in Tehran with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (right) (Al-Alam TV, Iran, January 28, 2014)

The official Fatah death notice for terrorist operative Muhammad Mahmoud Mubarak (Official Facebook page of Fatah's recruitment and organization bureau, January 29, 2014).

Rami Hamdallah (red tie), Palestinian prime minister, and Said Abu Ali, minister of the interior (holding microphone), pay a condolence call to the family of the terrorist (Wafa News Agency, January 29, 2014).

Masked Palestinians rioting near the Ofer Jail (Wafa News Agency, January 40, 2014).

Gazan children demonstrate for the immediate opening of the Rafah crossing.

Atallah Abu Sabah, minister of prisoner affairs, calls for the abduction of IDF soldiers (Filastin Al-'Aan, January 30, 2014).

The funeral held by the PA for two suicide bombing attacks (Wafa News Agency, February 3, 2014).

Bawabat al-Awda (Ma'an News Agency, February 2, 2014)

Overview

The Situation in Israel's South

Rocket Fire

Israel's Response to the Rocket Fire

IDF Officer Killed by Friendly Fire

Judea and Samaria

Hamas Network Uncovered in East Jerusalem

Terrorist Operative Shooting at IDF Post Killed

Palestinian Violence Continues

Developments in the Gaza Strip

The Crossings

The Rafah Crossing

Egypt-Hamas Relations

Hamas Minister of Prisoner Affairs Calls for Abduction of IDF Soldiers

The Palestinian Authority

Statements from Mahmoud Abbas

Remarks Made by Saeb Erekat Regarding the Negotiations with Israel

Glorifying Two Dead Suicide Bombers

Jibril Rajoub Visits Iran

Tawfiq al-Tirawi Speaks in Favor of the Armed Struggle against Israel

The Battle for Hearts and Minds

Campaign to Erect Outposts in the Jordan Valley

Al-Muqawama Internet Café Opens in the Jenin Refugee Camp

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The area of the embassy after the explosion (M3n4.com website)

The Iranian embassy after the explosion (Al-Alam TV, Iran, November 23, 2013).

The black car bomb photographed by an on-site security camera a number of seconds before it blew up (Al-Alam TV, Iran, November 23, 2013)

The remains of the motorcycle near the Iranian embassy in Beirut (Al-Safir, Lebanon, November 25, 2013)

Suicide bomber Muin Abu Zaher (Bint Jbeil website, November 23, 2013).

Overview

Initial Description of the Attack

Casualties of the Attack

The Identity of the Suicide Bombers

Hezbollah Operatives Killed in the Attack

Claiming Responsibility

Iranian and Hezbollah Reactions to the Attack

Threatening Saudi Arabia

Previous Attacks against Hezbollah and Shi'ite Population Concentrations

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It seeks to overthrow the Assad regime and establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, a center for regional and international terrorism and subversion.

Overview

Al-Qaeda Entrenchment in Syria

Assisting the Syrian Population

Evaluation of Risks for Israel, the West and the Pro-Western Arab-Muslim Countries

The Methodology Used in This Study

The Structure of the Study

Overview

Section One: The Founding of the Al-Nusra Front and its Collaboration with Other Rebel Organizations

Section Two: The Al-Nusra Front's Ideology

Section Three:The Al-Nusra Front's Structure, Leadership and Functioning

Section Four: The Human Composition of the Al-Nusra Front

Section Five: Description of the Al-Nusra Front's Military Activity

Section Six: Filling the Governmental Vacuum by the Al-Nusra Front and Other Jihadist Organizations

Section Seven: The Al-Nusra Front's Battle for Hearts and Minds

Related Articles

Support for Syria comes to Facebook: supporters of Iran’s military involvement in Syria increase their social network presence

Related Articles

Jerusalem Day demonstration in the Gaza Strip (Palinfo website, August 2, 2013)

Confrontations between Palestinians and the Israeli security forces at Qalqiliya (Wafa News Agency, August 2, 2013)

Muhammad Mashaal: recruited an Israeli Arab from Shefaram into Hezbollah (ISA website, July 2013).

Jerusalem Day events in Iran (Press TV website, August 2, 2013)

Jerusalem Day events in Iran (Press TV website, August 2, 2013)

Overview

The Situation in Israel's South

Rocket Fire

Judea and Samaria

Palestinian Violence Continues

Decrease in the Number of Terrorist Attacks in July

Developments in the Gaza Strip

The Rafah Crossing

Visit of Turkish Prime Minister to the Gaza Strip Cancelled

Deterioration of Hamas-Palestinian Authority Relations