Tag Archives: Iran

Spotlight on Iran

October 2012-Aban 1391 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Ali-Akbar Velayati

Ali-Akbar Velayati

Cartoon: Taher Shabani

Cartoon: Taher Shabani

Alternative to visiting Evin prison: fourteen places the president needs to visit

Alternative to visiting Evin prison: fourteen places the president needs to visit

Opposition to Facebook at a military parade in the city of Esfahan

Opposition to Facebook at a military parade in the city of Esfahan

Printing market recession in city of Qom

Printing market recession in city of Qom

Printing market recession in city of Qom

Printing market recession in city of Qom

Printing market recession in city of Qom

Printing market recession in city of Qom

Printing market recession in city of Qom

Printing market recession in city of Qom


Highlights of the week
  • Media discourse continues on possibility of negotiations with the United States
  • Strategic Studies Center report: what did the government do with its immense oil revenues?
  • Alternative to visiting Evin prison: fourteen places the president needs to visit
  • Legal fight escalates against anti-regime activity on Facebook

Spotlight on Iran

October 2012-Mehr 1391 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
While on a visit to North Khorasan Province, Supreme Leader recognizes effects of sanctions, continues to demonstrate resolve

While on a visit to North Khorasan Province, Supreme Leader recognizes effects of sanctions, continues to demonstrate resolve

Majles starts proceedings to summon Ahmadinejad to hearing for second time in a year

Majles starts proceedings to summon Ahmadinejad to hearing for second time in a year

The new E.U. sanctions against Iran (Fars, October 15)

The new E.U. sanctions against Iran (Fars, October 15)

Import of luxury cars into Iran on the rise despite economic crisis

Import of luxury cars into Iran on the rise despite economic crisis

''Sexual revolution'' in Islamic republic

''Sexual revolution'' in Islamic republic

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province

Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan Province


  • While on a visit to North Khorasan Province, Supreme Leader recognizes effects of sanctions, continues to demonstrate resolve
  • Majles starts proceedings to summon Ahmadinejad to hearing for second time in a year
  • Commentary article: what are the reasons for the sanctions against Iran and how should they be presented to the public?
  • Import of luxury cars into Iran on the rise despite economic crisis
  • “Sexual revolution” in Islamic republic

While on a visit to North Khorasan Province, Supreme Leader recognizes effects of sanctions, continues to demonstrate resolve

In recent days Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has reiterated his well-known views about issues on the Iranian agenda while on a seven-day visit to North Khorasan Province in the country’s northeast. The Supreme Leader demonstrated resolve, expressed his confidence in Iran’s ability to overcome the problems it is facing, and restated his position that the sanctions imposed on Iran have nothing to do with its nuclear program.

During his main speech, given on Wednesday, October 10 in the city of Bojnord, Khamenei said that the main objective is for the Iranian nation to achieve progress. He stressed, however, that the meaning of the term in Islam is different than the meaning it has in the West. While progress in Western thought applies only to material things, such as progress in wealth, science, army, and technology, the Islamic concept of progress includes also spiritual notions: scientific progress, justice, public welfare, economic development, international status, and political independence. Khamenei said that while the road to progress, which is a final objective of the Islamic revolution, may be fraught with problems and obstacles, they can be solved through determination, hope, hard work, planning, and readiness. No problem is real and no danger is certain unless the people lose their hope, patience, and determination, grow lazy, and become confused and aimless. The Supreme Leader discussed the significance of Iran’s younger generation to achieving progress, and admitted to having been part of the wrong birth planning policy which, as he said, should have been changed already in the 1990s.

Khamenei went on to discuss the economic situation in Iran. He said that the price increases and unemployment are the main problems facing the Iranian people. According to Khamenei, these problems can be solved because for 33 years the Islamic revolution has faced even more serious issues, such as attempts to provoke ethnic conflicts after the revolution and the Iran-Iraq War. The Iranian people overcame these problems thanks to their firm stand and intelligence. Khamenei said that, according to a survey held among North Khorasan residents prior to his visit, they, too, list the price increases and unemployment as the main problems.

Speaking about the economic sanctions imposed on Iran, Khamenei said that it is incorrect to draw a connection between the economic problems and the sanctions. He admitted that, while the sanctions create problems for Iran that may escalate as a result of mismanagement, these are not problems that Iran is unable to solve. He argued that the sanctions are nothing new, and that they had started immediately after the victory of the Islamic revolution. Iran’s enemies in the West are trying to maximize their impact and there are some in Iran who unfortunately repeat the claims made by the West about the issue. Khamenei noted that the Western argument of the sanctions having to do with the nuclear program is false, since they had started even before Iran began considering the possibiltiy of using nuclear energy. Those who say that the sanctions will be lifted if Iran gives up its right to nuclear energy are lying. What angers the West is the Iranian people’s dignity, spirit of independence, and unwillingness to surrender. The Western countries are using the irrational and “barbaric” sanctions to wage a war against the Iranian people, but it is a war in which they will be defeated.

Khamenei dismissed the recent demonstrations in the Tehran bazaar, arguing that, while several people were burning dumpsters on the streets for two or three hours, the Western countries were celebrating. He noted that, just as in the 2009 riots there were some who took advantage of the protests to instigate violent riots, this time, once again, there were some who instigated riots in the name of the bazaar merchants, who were wise to denounce the acts of violence. Khamenei said that the economic situation in Iran is better than that in European countries, which for the past year have been faced with incessant protests by people on the streets.

In implicit criticism of the president, the Supreme Leader called on top regime officials to cooperate with the other branches of government, work within the confines of the law, and refrain from putting blame on others. All branches need to work in accordance with their responsibility, which is well defined in the constitution, and cooperate with each other. In another speech, given by Khamenei on Monday, October 15 in the city of Shirvan, the Supreme Leader called on top officials to maintain a relaxed political atmosphere ahead of the presidential elections. He said that the enemies of Iran would like to destabilize the country’s security, and that all authorities must work for the preservation of political stability.

Speaking about developments on the regional and international scene, Khamenei said that the events in the region are a threat for the “Zionist regime” and could cause damage to the West, particularly the United States. He criticized European countries for following the lead of the United States, warning them that this only makes the Iranian people hate them more (Fars, October 10).

During a meeting held with clerics in the region, the Supreme Leader stressed the significance of the clerics and the importance of their relationship with the regime. He argued that the enemies of Iran are trying to separate the clerics from the regime, but that the clerics are “soldiers of the regime” and cannot cut themselves off from it. He said that, in light of the attempts made by Iran’s enemies to break the determination of the Iranian people, the clerics are entrusted with a special responsibility, the way they were during the “faction war” (a term used to refer to the Battle of the Trench, or the Battle of Khandaq, fought in 627 between on one hand Prophet Muhammad and his supporters and on the other the Quraysh tribe, who laid a siege to the city of Medina and assaulted the Prophet). Early in the history of Islam, some people of little faith called on the believers to turn from their path, but the Prophet’s supporters replied that they were unafraid of the pressure exerted on them and that they would continue on their path. The Iranian people, too, are now drawing upon all their resources and powers to resist the pressure exerted on them (Fars, October 11). Khamenei’s remarks were one more example of the continuing use made by top regime officials of religious arguments and Islamic narratives as part of their efforts to mobilize public support in the economic crisis. In recent months Khamenei has on several occasions compared the current situation in Iran to the situation faced by the Muslim community in the early days of Islam, saying that, at that time, the Muslims who supported the Prophet also faced many threats and challenges, which they were able to overcome thanks to their determination and faith.

In another speech, given to military units in the province, the Supreme Leader said that the high readiness of Iran’s armed forces is the main factor able to deter the enemies of Iran from launching a war against the country. He stressed that, while the Iranian nation is not aggressive, Iran will not back down in the face of any act of aggression (Fars, October 12).

The Supreme Leader’s visit to northern Iran has been at the center of media attention in recent days. Given the state-controlled media’s intensive coverage of the Supreme Leader’s visit and the welcome he received, regime opponents accused Khamenei of squandering public funds for propaganda and of fostering a personality cult. The reformist website Kalemeh compared the characteristics of Iran’s current regime to the rule of the first Shi’ite imam, Ali bin Abi Talib. One of the most important features of the political model adopted by Ali during his caliphate was the human, moral, and legal bond between the government and the citizens, the website said. Comparing the situation in Ali’s time to the current situation in Iran reveals the growing difference between the two periods. Khamenei’s trip to North Khorasan Province and the conduct of his supporters ahead of the visit are manifestations of a personality cult and indicate that there is a big difference between Iran’s current leaders and Imam Ali, who expressed his disapproval of the grand welcome he was given on his way to the Battle of Siffin (which he fought against Syria’s ruler Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan in 657) and of the pomp and ceremony that were lavished on him as caliph.

A commentary article published by Kalemeh said that the media are widely covering the Supreme Leader’s visit to northern Iran while completely ignoring the foreign currency crisis, the economic crisis, the employment problems facing Iranians, inflation, the government’s powerlessness, and the mismanagement. The media does not even mention that North Khorasan is one of the poorest provinces in Iran, and that it has a particularly high unemployment rate (Kalemeh, October 10).

A number of Iranian anti-regime bloggers also criticized the Supreme Leader’s visit to North Khorasan. One blogger pointed out the discrepancy between Khamenei’s call to adopt an “economy of resistance” and the considerable expenses involved in the trip. At a time when the Supreme Leader is talking about an economy of resistance, the people of Iran need to bear the financial burden of his trip, and while those close to the Supreme Leader do not feel the consequences of the economy of resistance, the difference between them and the common people grows increasingly wider. While the people are worried about how difficult it is to obtain bread, the Supreme Leader’s allies are worried about how to turn Khamenei into an “imam”. The Supreme Leader’s propaganda-oriented trip is a reflection of the growing rift between the regime and the people. Khamenei’s rise from the religious rank of Hojjat-ol-Eslam to Ayatollah, then to Ayatollah Ozma, and now to Imam does nothing to change his reputation as tyrant among the people, and the heavy cost of his trip during a time of severe economic crisis is evidence to him being an anti-popular, absolute ruler (http://gostaresh-agaahi.blogspot.com, October 9).

Implicit criticism of the extravagant welcome given to Khamenei during his visit was also made by the conservative daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami. An editorial summarizing the events of the week said that the Supreme Leader himself had said during his latest visit to Kermanshah Province that displaying his pictures everywhere is an unjustified waste of money that does not serve the interests of the regime. It is important to remember his remarks, Jomhuri-ye Eslami said, particularly considering the economic crisis and the negative effect of such unnecessary expenditures in the current conditions (Jomhuri-ye Eslami, October 11).

The Supreme Leader’s admission of his mistake with regard to Iran’s birth planning policy also received considerable attention. In an editorial titled “The culture of admitting mistakes”, the daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami said that other top Iranian officials would do well to take to heart the Supreme Leader’s willingness to admit his mistake (Jomhuri-ye Eslami, October 13). The Digarban website reported that Khamenei’s admission sparked an animated debate among regime supporters on social networks about whether the Supreme Leader is infallible. A number of bloggers had praise for his willingness to admit his mistake, claiming that portraying him as being infallible is wrong. Those who say that the Supreme Leader is infallible do so in order to portray those who dare criticize them as enemies to the Supreme Leader and to religion, and justify their oppression. Other web surfers said, on the other hand, that the Supreme Leader’s remarks should not be construed as evidence that he is not infallible. One web surfer wrote that he still believes “Imam Khamenei” is infallible, because otherwise he would not be the guardian jurisprudent (Digarban, October 15).

Majles starts proceedings to summon Ahmadinejad to hearing for second time in a year

This week 102 Majles members submitted to the Majles presidency a motion to summon President Ahmadinejad to appear before the Majles members and answer their questions on the foreign currency crisis. According to Article 88 of the Iranian constitution, the Majles can summon the president to a hearing with the support of at least one quarter of its members. If the initiative to summon the president comes to fruition, it will be the second time in less than a year that President Ahmadinejad is asked to appear before the Majles members and answer their questions. The first initiative to summon the president was submitted to the Majles presidency in June 2011, but did not gain enough support after a number of Majles members withdrew their signatures from it. The initiative was resubmitted in December 2011, forcing the president to appear before the Majles plenary session in March 2012. After the motion to summon the president to a hearing was approved by the Majles presidency, it was forwarded to the Majles Planning and Budget Committee, where it will be discussed with the president’s representatives. In case the explanations they provide are found unconvincing by the Majles members, the president will have to appear for a hearing within one month. In principle, the hearing initiative could even result in the president’s impeachment.

Ali Iranpour, one of the Majles members behind the motion, said in an interview to Fars News Agency that the Majles members who have signed the initiative are determined to compel the president to appear before the Majles plenary session and answer their questions on the foreign currency market crisis and the price increases. He noted that the Majles members would like to have the president discuss inflation, the foreign currency crisis, the government’s economic performance, the Central Bank governor’s refusal to appear before the Majles, and the claims brought up by the president against the other branches of government and the security forces during the press conference he convened about two weeks ago (Fars, October 10).

Majles member Mohammad Damadi, another co-author of the initiative to summon the president to appear before the Majles, said in an interview to the reformist daily E’temad that the initiative reflects public concerns over the economic situation and is intended to help solve the problems faced by Iranians. Damadi said that it would have been better had the government conducted itself in a manner that would not require the Majles to summon the president. He criticized the government’s claims about the economic crisis being the result of the sanctions, saying that the Supreme Leader himself had declared that the Western sanctions were not to be blamed for the economic problems.

Damadi said that the president will only be required to discuss the crisis on the foreign currency exchange market and the fact that the Central Bank, which is his area of responsibility, refrains from injecting foreign currency into the market. At one point in the interview Damadi was asked whether it is possible that the motion to summon the president will eventually be taken off the agenda of the Majles, like the recently failed initiative by Majles members to impeach the minister of sports. He replied that there is a considerable difference between the two cases, because the Majles members are highly motivated to solve the economic problem. The Majles member discussed the possibility of the president once again avoiding a serious discussion of the questions asked by the Majles, as he did when he appeared before the Majles in March 2012. He expressed his hope that, this time, the president will provide clear answers and put public concerns at ease, adding that if the problems cannot be solved through unity, the Majles members will have to make a decision on how to proceed (E’temad, October 11).

While the initiative to summon the president is supported by some Majles members, others oppose it. A number of Majles members are arguing that the economic crisis calls for national unity, while others believe that the initiative is pointless since the term of the current government will end in a few months anyway. Abdolreza Azizi, a member of the Majles Social Committee, said that Majles members need to hold joint meetings with government representatives instead of summoning the president to a hearing. He noted that, considering the actions of Iran’s enemies, it is necessary for the branches of government to cooperate with each other. Majles member Zahra Tabibzadeh also said that the current conditions require the cooperation of all branches of government to deal with the economic sanctions and solve the economic problems, and that the initiative to summon the president will not solve the problems but only heighten the tensions plaguing Iranian society (Tehran Emrooz, October 10).

Majles member Ahmad Tavakoli, considered one of the president’s major opponents in the conservative camp, also had reservations about the initiative and referred to it as being ineffective. In an interview given to Mehr News Agency, Tavakoli suggested filing a complaint against the president to the judiciary instead of summoning him to a hearing for the second time. According to Tavakoli, the president has already proven that he does not act in accordance with national interests, and that he may take advantage of the hearing to make statements that will further destabilize the foreign currency market (Mehr, October 13).

Lotfollah Forouzandeh, the president’s deputy on parliament affairs, dismissed the initiative to summon the president to a hearing, saying that the general atmosphere in the Majles shows that the Majles members do not support it. He said that he had discussed the matter with several Majles members who told him they did not agree with the initiative (ISNA, October 10).

In addition to the hearing initiative, the president has come under increasing criticism from the conservative camp. Some have even spoken in favor of impeaching him before the presidential elections slated for June 2013. Avaz Heydar-pour, a member of the Majles National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said this week that Iran is facing a crisis, and that even conservative Majles members believe that this situation cannot go on. Public opinion expects the Majles to take the necessary measures to improve the situation. While some Majles members believe that the government should be allowed to finish its term, others believe that the necessary measures should be taken to put an end to the current situation and shorten the term of the current government.

In an interview given by Heydar-pour to the Asr-e Iran website, he said that if Majles members reach the conclusion that the president is unable to answer the demands of the regime and the state, they need to remove him from office. Conservative Majles members can’t turn a blind eye to the severe situation in Iran. In 2005, Heydar-pour said, he, too, believed Ahmadinejad capable of becoming a worthy president and bringing Iran back to the values of the revolution. It turned out, however, that his values are completely contradictory to public and national interests, and it is now Heydar-pour’s opinion that there is no reason to tolerate Ahmadinejad’s government until the end of its official term and let it continue with its policy. Ahmadinejad made some serious mistakes in the past three years, he said, which caused considerable damage to Iran, particularly in the area of economy. Ahmadinejad should know that, if he does not correct his mistakes, the Majles may impeach him even on the last day of his government’s tenure (Asr-e Iran, October 9). In another interview given by Heydar-pour, the Majles member discussed the initiative to summon the president to appear before the Majles, saying that if the president once again does not provide relevant and serious responses to the questions asked by the Majles, his microphone should be turned off (Farda, October 9).

The Iranian media, too, once again strongly criticized the president and his conduct. Asr-e Iran, a website affiliated with the pragmatic right wing of the conservative camp, argued that summoning the president to a hearing is no longer enough, and that more severe measures have to be taken against him. A commentary article published by the website said that, when the president appeared before the Majles this past March, he did not respond to any question addressed to him and left the meeting with a smile on his face. The question that needs to be asked, therefore, is: what is the point of summoning him to appear before the Majles for the second time? If the president will once again talk, laugh, and go back to his office with the Majles members doing nothing but watch him, it will be a waste of time for them and for all Iranians. Summoning the president to a hearing is a “yellow card”, and if he does not take it seriously, he should be given a “red card”. If Majles members do not believe that Iran’s interests will be served by the president remaining in office, then, considering the previous hearing which caused no improvement in his conduct or policy, the Majles needs to apply the legal measures it has available instead of settling for yet another hearing (Asr-e Iran, October 6).

The conservative daily Resalat criticized the president’s conduct on three main issues. First, his decision to introduce significant cuts in the budget of government apparatuses, which, according to the daily, goes against the constitution, which stipulates that any change in the budget has to be approved by the Majles. Second, his impingement on the independence of the judiciary, manifested in his conduct on the arrest of his press advisor Ali-Akbar Javanfekr and his criticism of the closing down of the reformist daily Shargh. And finally, his remarks in favor of negotiating with the United States, made during his latest visit to the U.N. General Assembly in New York, which go against his duty of standing on the front line of the struggle against Western countries and the United States in light of the escalation of the economic war that they are waging against the Iranian people.

An editorial published by Resalat says that the people expect the president to put himself at the forefront of the fight against the threats made by the West, work in concert with the other authorities while demonstrating unity and coordination, adopt a strategy based on an “economy of resistance”, and take advantage of the government’s capabilities to bring the effects of the sanctions under control. The president has a key role in thwarting the enemy’s plans, which are intended to create a division in the Muslim world and embroil Iran in a war, and has to maintain national unity and Islamic solidarity. It is unclear, Resalat concluded, whether the president’s conduct and statements are in keeping with his responsibility (Resalat, October 11).

The strong criticism against the president was joined this week by the conservative politician Habibollah Asgaroladi. Asgaroladi is a top member of the Islamic Coalition Party, which is affiliated with the traditional-conservative right wing and has close ties to bazaar merchants. Asgaroladi strongly condemned the president, saying that while he was presented as a presidential candidate for the conservatives in 2005, once he became president he argued that he was not aligned with any party. He pushed aside all those with partisan or organizational affiliations and only put his trust in a small “secret group” of like-minded individuals. It is unheard of, Asgaroladi said, for a president not to have ties to parties and to society. When the president says that he is not involved with any organization or party, this means that he directs the republic all by himself. The veteran conservative politician noted that it is imperative that the person elected in the next presidential elections is one with social and institutional roots (E’temad, October 10).

As President Ahmadinejad comes under increasing criticism, it was reported this week by Saham News, a website affiliated with reformist opposition leader Mehdi Karoubi (currently under house arrest), that the Supreme Leader’s office recently denied the president’s request to meet with Khamenei to discuss the arrest of his press advisor Ali-Akbar Javanfekr (Saham News, October 7). In addition, Jaras, a reformist website affiliated with the supporters of reformist opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi, reported citing a top Revolutionary Guards official that various elements had recently attempted to persuade Khamenei to remove Ahmadinejad from office due to the escalating economic crisis and his controversial speech before the U.N. General Assembly, and entrust state affairs to a new president appointed by the Supreme Leader. According to the report, Khamenei refused to grant the requests, saying that the president’s impeachment would please Iran’s domestic and foreign enemies, which is why the president should be allowed to continue his term (Jaras, October 10).

Commentary article: what are the reasons for the sanctions against Iran and how should they be presented to the public?

In recent months Ahmadinejad’s government and its critics have been engaged in a debate on responsibility for the economic crisis in Iran. While the president and his top government officials say it is the economic sanctions against Iran that are mostly to blame for the crisis, government critics argue that the main cause of the crisis is the faulty economic policy pursued by the government. On the backdrop of the debate, Alef, a website affiliated with Majles member Ahmad Tavakoli, one of President Ahmadinejad’s major critics in the conservative camp, published an article by the political commentator Dr. Yaser Sobhani-Fard. The article discusses two main issues pertaining to the sanctions: what are the reasons that led the West to impose the sanctions, and how should the sanctions and their effects be presented to the Iranian public?

 

In the first part of the article, Dr. Sobhani-Fard discusses the various views prevailing in Iran on the main reason why the sanctions have been imposed on Iran, arguing that the sanctions should not be blamed on the nuclear policy or Iran’s hostility towards Israel. Even though the main reason why the sanctions have been imposed apparently has to do with Iran’s refusal to suspend the enrichment of uranium, that is neither a real nor a sufficient reason, since the sanctions against Iran were imposed by the United States even before the enrichment of uranium started. Iran has been facing Western sanctions since the beginning of the Islamic revolution, and the commitments of the West to complete the nuclear reactor in Bushehr have not been realized regardless of Iran’s nuclear policy. Furthermore, even Western countries refuse to commit themselves to lift the sanctions completely if Iran suspends the enrichment of uranium. It is perfectly clear that if the enrichment of uranium stops, the West will find other excuses, such as launching missiles, Iran’s military strength, human rights, the freedom of religion and expression. A retreat on the issue of uranium enrichment will not solve the problem—on the contrary, it will make the West even more motivated to bring up additional demands. This will undermine Iran’s independence, achieving which was the very purpose of the Islamic revolution.

The hostility towards Israel cannot explain the Western sanctions either, the commentator said. Iran is not the only country that has no relations with Israel, does not recognize it, and is considered its enemy. For instance, Yemen, too, is considered an enemy of Israel, while Saudi Arabia and Turkey support the Palestinian people even more than Iran.

Another possible reason for the sanctions is Western countries’ distrust of Iran. Iran has always taken a stand against Western interests. Iran’s principal position, based on striving for justice and resistance against oppression, has made the West distrustful of the country and its government. At times, this principal, justified stance was coupled with incorrect conduct by Iran’s governments, which contributed to the West’s loss of trust. Some examples of such incorrect conduct were the takeover of the British embassy in Tehran and the actions taken against the Canadian national (the author is referring to Zahra Kazemi, the Iranian-born Canadian photojournalist, who was arrested during the 2009 riots and died in Tehran’s Evin prison). According to the author, the situation could have been improved by appropriate diplomatic conduct, but in any case, the loss of Western trust in Iran is not a main reason for the sanctions.

The main reason for the sanctions, according to Sobhani-Fard, has to do with the very essence of the Islamic republic. Iran has made the world aware of a new Islamic way, one that is different from the liberal and humanist way adopted by the West. The West is concerned that the separate way proposed by Iran may threaten its views and future, and it is therefore determined to make sure that this way does not win. The Western countries try to keep Iran from making any achievement that could portray its way as a success, and the way to do that is through economic sanctions. These sanctions will only be removed if Iran gradually changes its very essence, as was the case in Maoist China and Communist states.

In the second part of the article Sobhani-Fard discusses the question of how the sanctions and their effects should be presented to the Iranian public. He argues that it is wrong to hide the reality about the sanctions and their effects from the public. The authorities and media should portray reality the way it is because the people of Iran will be willing to endure the difficulties of the sanctions based on the understanding that it is by persevering through the current adverse conditions that Iran’s long-term interests will be secured.

Those government officials and media that hide the truth from the public are making a severe mistake. The commentator takes issue with the fact that the media does not report that Iran is barely able to sell one million barrels of oil. If the public knows how serious the situation is, it will be willing to cooperate in dealing with the effects of the sanctions. The people need to be told that the sanctions are even more severe than those imposed on Iran during the war with Iraq, and that they need to stand firm. Even if the truth is not told, the public will hear it from Western media. The people will be willing to endure the sanctions since they understand that this will serve the interests of the next generations, just as the sanctions imposed on Iran during the nationalization of oil by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in the early 1950s eventually proved beneficial for Iran’s long-term interests. Iranians need to be told that it is better to endure the pressure in the short term to ensure a better future for themselves and for the next generations.

Also to be avoided is the claim that the sanctions have no effect. In order to mobilize the support of the people, it should be admitted that the sanctions do have an effect and call on Iranians to endure it. Even if the authorities and the media claim that the sanctions have no effect, the people themselves will feel the increase in the prices of products and, in that case, will also accuse the leaders of not telling them the truth.

At the end of the article, the commentator calls on politicians to refrain from taking advantage of the sanctions for the coming presidential elections. Some are trying to exploit the sanctions to gain political profit ahead of the elections. Some politicians conceal the sanctions and argue that they have no effect to emphasize the failure of government policy. The government, on the other hand, is trying to put all responsibility for the economic crisis on the sanctions. Using the sanctions for political interests is inappropriate, Sobhani-Fard concludes, since it is tantamount to deceiving the public for political needs (Alef, October 15).

The article was widely commented on by the website readers. Many of them agreed with the argument that there is no hiding the truth from the public, and that the people understand the situation themselves. One reader said that the Iranian people are already willing to bear the burden of the sanctions thanks to their understanding of the situation and their feelings about Islam and their country, not because of the illusions that they are expected to believe.

Other readers said that while the sanctions do have an effect, it could have been minimized with a different conduct on the part of the government, which made the situation worse due to its faulty economic policy.

Some readers had reservations about the claim brought up by the author of the article that the sanctions have nothing to do with the nuclear policy. One reader said that while Iran has been under sanctions since the early days of the revolution, they have never been as severe as now. Another reader said that it is the faulty conduct of top officials on the nuclear issue that contributed to the escalation of the sanctions, and called for the improvement of Iran’s international reputation by reelecting Mohammad Khatami as president. Another reader suggested taking a different approach towards the West on the nuclear issue. Iran needs to convince the West that it is interested in nuclear energy for civilian needs. It has to suggest to the West that it will suspend the enrichment of uranium only after the West starts providing Iran with nuclear fuel and building nuclear reactors for it. Another reader said that external pressure is better handled through internal unity. He stressed, however, that in order to achieve such unity, the country needs to belong to all its citizens and allow the Iranian society as a whole to share in government and wealth.

Import of luxury cars into Iran on the rise despite economic crisis

Several members of the Majles Industry Committee reported this week that they intend to investigate how thousands of luxury cars have been imported into Iran these past several months at the official exchange rate of 12,260 tomans per dollar, intended solely for the import of basic products.

For the past two weeks reports about the import of luxury cars have been causing a controversy, after the Iranian customs authorities released official data on the extent of the import activities. According to the data, in the first five months of the current Iranian year (which began in March 2012) there were 15,700 cars imported to Iran with a total worth of 341 million dollars. Seventy-eight percent of the cars (with a total worth of 265 million dollars) were imported at the official exchange rate set by the Central Bank (12,260 tomans per dollar). Last year some 40,000 cars were imported to Iran with a total worth of 830 million dollars. Eighty-six percent of them were imported at the official exchange rate. This rate is intended solely for the import of vital commodities and drugs. Some of the models imported to Iran at the official exchange rate are Porsche, Mercedes Benz, and Maserati (E’temad, October 5). Data published by the Eghtesad Online website (www.eghtesadonline.com, October 10) show that during the first six months of the current year 19,380 cars were imported to Iran with a total worth of over 429 million dollars, compared to 16,563 cars with a total worth of 369 million dollars during the same period last year. Of these cars, 9,447 (with a total worth of 246 million dollars) were imported from the UAE, 7,169 (with a total worth of 120 million dollars) from Korea, 710 (with a total worth of 14 million dollars) from Kuwait, and 2,054 (with a total worth of 47 million dollars) were imported from other countries.

Following the release of the customs data, Majles members and media strongly criticized the government’s inability to put an end to the phenomenon, saying that the import of luxury cars at the official exchange rate is evidence of corruption in the car import market. Majles member Zahra Tabibzadeh said in an interview to Fars News Agency that it is baffling how luxury cars are imported at the official exchange rate when the government is facing numerous difficulties in selling oil and guaranteeing the country’s foreign currency needs. She said that she intends to ask the minister of industry, who is in charge of importing goods to Iran, for clarifications on the figures released by the customs authorities (Fars, October 12).

Mohammad Bayatyan, a member of the Majles Industry Committee, also voiced strong criticism after the release of the data, saying that the judiciary needs to check how it is that hundreds of luxury cars were imported into Iran at the official exchange rate. He noted that, even if there is need to import such cars into Iran, there is no reason to make them available at an exchange rate intended for higher-priority products.

Bayatyan said that the import of luxury cars at the official exchange rate means that there is a “mafia” which takes advantage of the official exchange rate to import non-vital goods. This mafia, he said, has ties to government apparatuses and is linked to the current crisis in the foreign exchange market. He noted that the activity of the mafia working in the car import market is intended not only to achieve financial gains but also to realize political interests, which include funding the expenses of the coming presidential elections (Mehr, October 8). After the affair was exposed, several news websites reported that the Majles members intend to ask President Ahmadinejad to discuss the figures released by the customs on the import of luxury cars to Iran during the hearing to which he may be summoned soon.

The Farda website attacked the government for its inability to control the import market, particularly given the fact that this year was declared by the Supreme Leader as the “year of national production”. The website said that a significant part of imports to Iran, which total 21 billion dollars, include products that can be manufactured in Iran, or consumer and luxury products bringing which into Iran has a negative effect on the economy. A government which declares itself a protector of revolutionary values is making it possible to import Western luxury cars at the official exchange rate, Farda said.

The website reported that, in addition to the increase in car imports, this past year there has also been a significant increase in the import of other consumer products, including cell phones, cigarettes, and clothing. According to data published by Farda on October 13, in the first four months of the current year, 3,173 tons of cigarettes with a total worth of 37 million dollars were imported to Iran (an increase of over 130 percent compared to last year), as well as 568 tons of clothing with a total worth of nearly 7 million dollars (an approximately 8-percent decrease in quantity and a 9-percent increase in the value of the imported goods).

The reformist website Kalemeh said that, while patients are having trouble obtaining drugs and medical equipment, and various industries are on the verge of bankruptcy and having trouble obtaining foreign currency for the import of raw materials, there has been an increase in the import of luxury cars whose users do not represent even five percent of Iran’s population. The import of hundreds of Porsche cars last year with an unprecedented value of 50 million dollars is an indication that luxury car importers enjoy a strong lobby that allows them to obtain foreign currency at the official rate for making profits which in some cases may reach 30 to 40 percent (Kalemeh, October 8).

“Sexual revolution” in Islamic republic

This week the Meliyat website published an investigative report on the “sexual revolution” that has taken place in the Islamic republic in the past two decades. The article deals with the gradually spreading phenomenon of premarital sex in young Iranians despite the authorities’ strict control of relations between men and women. The website said that, if the phenomenon was once limited to narrow sectors of society, in the past two decades it has grown to include almost all sectors of society.

This phenomenon is directly linked to the continuing increase in the age of marriage (the average age of marriage in men increased from 26.2 in 1996 to 26.7 in 2001, and in women from 23.3 in 1996 to 23.4 in 2001), and the increase in the number of single-parent families caused by the financial difficulties involved in starting a family (an increase from 5.2 percent of Iranian families in 2006 to 7.1 percent in 2011). Premarital sex among young people has become so widespread that more and more voices in the Iranian establishment are calling for the encouragement of “temporary marriage” (Mut’a or Sigheh marriage, which is permitted in Shi’ite Islam) to allow partners to find temporary solutions for cementing their relationship legally until they are officially wed.

According to Meliyat, the change in the sexual habits of young Iranians is not an imitation of Western patterns. Instead, it is the result of deeper reasons associated with processes that have been taking place in Iranian society for the past decades. Young Iranians have no first-hand experience of the Western lifestyle, and the exposure to Western habits through films and TV shows has existed for many years. Therefore, Iran’s sexual revolution cannot be explained as an imitation of Western patterns. The sexual revolution is the result of a change in the behavior of young people and their different views on life and on interpersonal relations in the past two decades. The younger generation no longer sees religion as a collection of juridical instructions to be carefully followed. And unlike the generation of the revolution, it ascribes no political significance to sexual behavior.

The website takes issue with the fact that there have been almost no scientific studies in Iran about the roots of the change in the sexual habits of young people, because the subject of sex is still viewed as taboo in the country’s public space. With public opinion research institutes closed down and their directors detained for conducting polls about public views on possible negotiations with the United States, it is no wonder that no one dares research issues pertaining to sex. Reliable public opinion polls about sexual behavior in young people are also nearly impossible since it is a sensitive issue that many Iranians fear, which has to do with the penalties imposed by law for sex outside of marriage. Without the ability to directly collect the data, what is needed is an examination of evidence and data pertaining to the consequences of sex outside of marriage, such as data on the number of abortions or the number of hymen reconstruction operations. Figures on these issues do get published from time to time, and they do, in fact, indicate that there has been an increase in the number of abortions and hymen reconstruction operations among single women in Iran.

The website lists four main elements that underpin Iran’s sexual revolution:

      1. The urbanization process. Many young people become free of the tight parental control that exists in rural areas. Moving to cities allows them more freedom to have relationships and sex away from the eyes of others. Cities also allow young people to live their lives without their actions becoming known to or scrutinized by others. Over 70 percent of Iran’s population lives in cities.

      2. The growth of communications technology. Girls from traditional families are closely watched by their parents, and their freedom of movement is restricted. Communications devices (phones, text messages, internet) have made it possible for them to have relationships with members of the opposite sex with greater ease and without supervision.

      3. The growth of non-government media. In the past three decades there has been a penetration of non-government media into Iran: videos (followed by DVDs), satellite TV channels, and the internet. These media present different models of sexual behavior and men-women relations. Much of the content they present, particularly on the internet and DVDs, is made in Iran.

      4. The growth of higher education. About 4 million Iranian students attend universities and higher education institutions as well as colleges for teachers in Iran. About 60 percent of them are women. Despite the limitations on relations between male and female students, such relations have become commonplace. They are not limited to the campus, but are also expanding to private homes.

The website cites some evidence of the expanding phenomenon of sex outside of marriage. In 2008 Ali-Akbar Assarniya, the head of Culture and Society Department of the National Youth Organization, reported that 58 percent of men polled by the organization said that they had had a relationship with a woman when they were young. Twenty-six percent of these relationships ended in sex, and in 13 percent of the cases the sex led to unwanted pregnancies and abortions. In addition, Tehran Province reported in 2008 that criminal proceedings for “moral corruption” had been initiated against one third of the divorced women in the province.

Many young Iranian people are currently aware of the issue of sex, the website concluded. Religious and moral views no longer prevent sex outside of marriage, and even religious young people find ways to deal with the restrictions imposed on the issue by the Shari’ah. Many young people no longer consider having sex before marriage as taboo, and they are not ashamed to talk about it or even openly criticize the traditions and limitations that exist with regard to the issue. The sexual revolution pushes the age of marriage even higher by allowing young men and women to lead independent lives without having to get married. According to the website, the phenomenon is impossible to stop, since unlike the norm several decades ago, most men and women in Iran no longer believe in abstinence (www.meliyat.com, October 10).

The article published on the Meliyat website joins more evidence of young Iranians’ changing attitudes on relationships with the opposite sex. In August 2009 the Farda website strongly criticized the proliferation of online dating websites operating in Iran. The website said that, even though the websites were for marriage-minded dating, they were often “abused” by young men seeking to meet women for other purposes.

The website reported that there are dozens of online dating websites operating in Iran, whose features include chat rooms. According to an expert interviewed for the article, the proliferation of dating websites resulted in the emergence of new ways for young Iranian people to meet each other. According to that expert, various studies indicate that about 80 percent of men using dating websites have no intention of finding a woman for purposes of marriage, their sole intention being to seduce women for sex. Farda also discussed the increasing opposition from clerics to the growing use of online dating websites, saying that they could lead to a moral and social crisis. The article also brought up a number of suggestions intended to have these websites more strictly controlled by the authorities.

News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (October 10-16, 2012)

: One of the rockets that fell in the southern Israeli city of Netivot.

: One of the rockets that fell in the southern Israeli city of Netivot.

Damage done to a civilian home in Netivot (Pictures by Nili Trachterman, courtesy of Tarik Publications, Israel, October 12, 2012).

Damage done to a civilian home in Netivot (Pictures by Nili Trachterman, courtesy of Tarik Publications, Israel, October 12, 2012).

The motorbike ridden by Abu al-Walid al-Maqdisi and his aide in the Jabalia refugee camp in the Gaza Strip (Wafa News Agency, October 13, 2012).

The motorbike ridden by Abu al-Walid al-Maqdisi and his aide in the Jabalia refugee camp in the Gaza Strip (Wafa News Agency, October 13, 2012).

Friday demonstration at Nabi Salih (Wafa News Agency, October 12, 2012).

Friday demonstration at Nabi Salih (Wafa News Agency, October 12, 2012).

Logo of the events marking the anniversary of the prisoner exchange deal (Filastin al-'Aan, October 15, 2012).

Logo of the events marking the anniversary of the prisoner exchange deal (Filastin al-'Aan, October 15, 2012).

Mahmoud Abbas meets with Israeli Knesset members in Ramallah (Wafa News Agency, October 14, 2012).

Mahmoud Abbas meets with Israeli Knesset members in Ramallah (Wafa News Agency, October 14, 2012).

Hezbollah video simulating sending the drone, referred to as the ''[Hussein] Ayoub operation,'' over Israel (Al-Manar TV, Lebanon, October, 2012)

Hezbollah video simulating sending the drone, referred to as the ''[Hussein] Ayoub operation,'' over Israel (Al-Manar TV, Lebanon, October, 2012)

Hussein Ayoub, for whom sending the drone into Israeli territory was named (Hamas forum, October 13, 2012).

Hussein Ayoub, for whom sending the drone into Israeli territory was named (Hamas forum, October 13, 2012).

A picture of Hussein Ayoub alongside Hezbollah flags near his family's home in Salaa, Lebanon, after the drone was launched (Al-Manar TV, Lebanon, October 13, 2012).

A picture of Hussein Ayoub alongside Hezbollah flags near his family's home in Salaa, Lebanon, after the drone was launched (Al-Manar TV, Lebanon, October 13, 2012).

Hassan Nasrallah delivers a speech claiming responsibility for sending a drone to penetrate Israeli airspace (Al-Manar TV, Lebanon, October 11, 2012).

Hassan Nasrallah delivers a speech claiming responsibility for sending a drone to penetrate Israeli airspace (Al-Manar TV, Lebanon, October 11, 2012).

  • This past week rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory continued. Seven rocket hits were identified. Some of them were long-range rockets which hit the southern Israeli town of Netivot and the surrounding area. The IDF attacked terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip, hitting two senior terrorist operatives who belonged to a network affiliated with the global jihad.
  • The Palestinian Authority continues its political activities to promote a vote in the UN General Assembly for non-member status of a Palestinian state. According to Mahmoud Abbas and other Palestinians, when the Palestinian Authority receives non-member status, the Palestinians will be willing to return to negotiations with Israel to discuss the issue of the final status arrangement, based on the two-state solution.
Israeli Security Forces Counterterrorism Activities in the Gaza Strip
  • As part of the IDF's counterterrorism activities, on the night of October 12 Israeli Air Force aircraft struck a motorbike carrying two passengers in the Jabalia refugee camp. The two were terrorist operatives affiliated with a global jihad network in the Gaza Strip. One of them was Hisham Ali Abd al-Karim Saidani, aka Abu al-Walid al-Maqdisi, who was a senior operative in the Jihad wal-Tawhid network and a cofounder of a relatively new group calling itself the Shura Council of the Jihad Fighters of Greater Jerusalem (IDF Spokesman, October 13, 2012). According to reports from the Palestinian media, the other terrorist operative was Ashraf Sabah, 42, one of Saidani's aides (Ma'an News Agency, Filastin al-Yawm and Filastin al-'Aan, October 13, 2012).
Continuing Rocket and Mortar Shell Fire
  • This past week seven rocket hits were identified in Israeli territory, some of them long-range 122-mm rockets which fell in and around the southern city of Netivot. One of the rockets launched on October 12 fell in the yard of a civilian residential dwelling. One man was treated for shock and the house was damaged. In addition, a number of mortar shells were also fired, falling in open areas. There were no casualties and no damage was reported.
  • Several organizations claimed responsibility for the rocket and mortar shell fire, among them the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP Facebook page, October 14, 2012) and the Popular Resistance Committees (Website of the organization's military-terrorist wing, October 14, 2012). Responsibility was also claimed by networks affiliated with the global jihad, among them the Shura Council of the Jihad Fighters of Greater Jerusalem (Global jihad forum website, October 10, 2012) and a network calling itself "Taliban Palestine" (Global jihad forum website, October 14, 2012).
IDF Response to the Rocket Fire
  • In response to the rocket and mortar shell fire Israeli Air Force aircraft struck a number of terrorist targets and rocket firing squads in the Gaza Strip:
  • October 14: During the morning hours IAF aircraft struck a squad of terrorist operatives in the southern Gaza Strip who were making final preparations to launch rockets into Israeli territory (IDF Spokesman, October 14, 2012). In the afternoon IAF aircraft struck a terrorist squad in the central Gaza Strip a short time after it had launched mortar shells into Israeli territory (IDF Spokesman, October 14, 2012). The military-terrorist wing of the Popular Resistance Committees said in an announcement that the two killed in the strike were the commander of the organization's artillery unit in Deir al-Balah and an operative from the same unit. According to the announcement, they were killed after they had launched five mortar shells into the Israeli village of Kissufim (Website of the PRC's military-terrorist wing, October 14, 2012).
  • October 13: IAF aircraft struck a center for terrorist activity in the northern Gaza Strip and two terrorist targets in the central Gaza Strip (IDF Spokesman, October 13, 2012).
  • October 10: IAF aircraft struck a terrorist tunnel in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF Spokesman, October 10, 2012). The Palestinian media reported that the strike damaged a post belonging to Hamas' military-terrorist wing in Beit Lahia (Filastin al-'Aan, Wafa and Ma'an News Agencies, October 10, 2012).
Hamas Reactions to IAF Strikes
  • Hamas spokesmen reacted strongly to what they referred to as "Israeli escalation" and related it to "an Israeli attempt to drag the Gaza Strip into a confrontation before the Israeli elections" (completely ignoring and making no reference to the continuing rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel). However, Mahmoud al-Zahar, a member of Hamas' Executive Committee, said that Hamas was committed to the lull agreements with Israel which had been brokered through Egyptian mediation and agreed upon by all the Palestinian [terrorist] organizations (BBC, October 14, 2012).
  • The following were the main reactions given by Hamas:
  • Taher al-Nunu, spokesman for the de-facto Hamas administration, accused Israel of having initiated the latest round of escalation and that the steps taken by the Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip were in response. He denied Hamas administration involvement in the attacks but mentioned that during the last round of escalation there had been a joint Hamas-Palestinian Islamic Jihad response (Al-Jazeera, October 14, 2012). Interviewed by Al-Aqsa TV, he warned Israel not to think that the Gaza Strip had become part of the Israeli government's election campaign (Al-Aqsa TV, October 14, 2012).
  • Fawzi Barhoum, Hamas spokesman, said that the latest round of escalation was part of an Israeli plan to make political capital before the elections (Fawzi Barhoum's Facebook page, October 14, 2012).
  • Islam Shahawan, spokesman for the ministry of the interior of the de-facto Hamas administration, said that what he called Israel's "aggression" was the result of internal problems and the failures of the current Israeli government. He said that the Hamas ministry of the interior had declared it was fully prepared to preserve stability and calm (Al-Aqsa TV, October 14, 2012).

Rockets Fired into Israeli Territory since the Beginning of 2011[1]

Rockets Fired into Israeli Territory since the Beginning of 2011

 

Riots at the Friction Points
  • This past week as well there were violent demonstrations at the traditional friction points throughout Judea and Samaria. Rioters threw stones at the IDF forces, who in certain instances used riot control equipment to disperse the demonstrators. In addition, in a number of instances stones and Molotov cocktails were thrown at Israeli civilian and security vehicles.

Friday demonstration at Nabi Salih (Wafa News Agency, October 12, 2012).
Friday demonstration at Nabi Salih (Wafa News Agency, October 12, 2012).

The Anniversary of Gilad Shalit's Release
  • Plans are currently being made in the Gaza Strip to mark the first anniversary of the deal with led to the liberation of abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in return for the release of Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israeli jails. The events are planned for October 15-18; their slogan is "Keeping the faith with the released [prisoners]."
  • Among the events planned are the following (Filastin al-'Aan, October 15, 2012):
  • A rally in front of Red Cross headquarters in the Gaza Strip, during which a document will be presented to the Red Cross describing the condition of the Palestinian terrorists released to the Gaza Strip.        
  • A festive ceremony sponsored by Hamas attended by terrorist operatives who participated in the abduction and featuring a video documenting it.
  • A festive session of the Legislative Council.
  • A march in the northern Gaza Strip.

Interviewed by the Israeli website Walla! on the anniversary of the prisoner exchange deal, Mahmoud al-Zahar, deputy head of Hamas' Executive Committee and in charge of negotiations for Hamas, said that the main conclusion drawn by Hamas was that exerting pressure was the only thing that influenced Israel. He added that the released prisoners had become important factors in supporting the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip. Some of them, he said, were now leaders in "the political and other arenas," exploiting their experience in international and especially Israeli issues (Walla! News, October 12, 2012).

Activity to Promote the Palestinian Appeal to the UN General Assembly
  • PA activity to promote its appeal to the UN General Assembly for recognition as a non-member state continues. According to Saeb Erekat, the appeal will be lodged next month (November 2012). Senior PA figures have also stated that UN recognition will lead to a Palestinian return to the negotiating table with Israel.
  • To that end Mahmoud Abbas held a number of meetings, among them the following:
  • On October 10 he held a meeting with consuls and representatives of European Union countries, during which he said he hoped EU members would support the Palestinian bid to the UN. He also said that the PA agreed that EU documents regarding the Palestinians would be the basis for a return to negotiations with Israel. He said that as soon as the Palestinian Authority received non-member status in the General Assembly, the Palestinians would be willing to return to the negotiations and would discuss the final status arrangement (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, October 10, 2010).
  • Meeting with members of the Israeli Knesset (parliament) in Ramallah, Mahmoud Abbas said that after the Palestinian Authority received non-member status in the UN, it would return to negotiations with Israel based on implementing the two-state solution (Wafa News Agency, October 13, 2012).

Mahmoud Abbas meets with Israeli Knesset members in Ramallah (Wafa News Agency, October 14, 2012).
Mahmoud Abbas meets with Israeli Knesset members in Ramallah (Wafa News Agency, October 14, 2012).

  • Saeb Erekat, a member of the PLO's Executive Committee, said that the United States would not be able to prevent the UN General Assembly session next month where the vote on Palestinian membership would be held. He said that an affirmative decision would make it possible for the PA to return to negotiations, because recognition of "Palestine" as a state under occupation would serve as a source of authority for the Palestinian demand that Israel withdraw to the 1967 lines, as well as recognition of the illegality of the settlements and the annexation of Jerusalem (Voice of Palestine Radio, October 15, 2012). Saeb Erekat said in an interview that receiving non-member status in the UN would give the PA access to the International Court where the Palestinians could sue Israel (Ma'an News Agency, October 13, 2012).
Hezbollah Sends a Drone into Israeli Airspace (Follow-Up)
  • On October 11, 2012, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech focusing on the drone sent into Israeli airspace. The information he provided was biased and clearly intended as propaganda. Its main objective, in our assessment, was to reinforce Nasrallah's position in Lebanon in view of the increasing criticism of the aid and support Hezbollah extends to the Syrian regime.
  • The main points of his speech were the following (Radio Nur, October 11, 2012):
    • Claiming responsibility for sending the drone: Hezbollah, said Nasrallah, had carried out "a very high-quality and important operation" by sending an advanced reconnaissance drone from Lebanese territory into Israel from the sea on an intelligence-collecting mission. The mission was called "the Hussein Ayoub operation," named for one of the founders of Hezbollah's aerial forces, who died under circumstances Hassan Nasrallah did not mention.[2]
    • The drone's route: Hezbollah, said Nasrallah, directed the plane over the sea for hundreds of kilometers and then turned it eastward over Israel's south ("occupied southern Palestine"). Once over Israeli territory it flew dozens of kilometers until it was downed by the IAF near the southern town of Dimona, according to Hezbollah claims.
    • Drone type: Nasrallah did not mention the type of drone. He said the mission had been a demonstration, the first of its kind, of Hezbollah's improved aerial capabilities, and that the drone was superior to those used in the Second Lebanon War. He said the drone was not Russian but rather Iranian, and had been manufactured and assembled by superior professional Hezbollah activists ("The Lebanese," he said, "should be proud of having young people with brains like these.")
    • Propaganda and the battle for hearts and minds: Nasrallah boasted about the drone's penetration deep into Israeli territory and represented it as a first in the achievements of Hezbollah and the "resistance movement" [i.e., the terrorist organizations]. He claimed the drone had flown for hundreds of kilometers in a region paved with Israeli, American, NATO and UNIFIL radar without being discovered, until it was finally shot down, which, he said, was "natural and expected, and it was not [to be considered] an [Israeli] achievement." The penetration into Israeli airspace, he said, embarrassed Israel, which had boasted that its airspace could not be breached.
    • Hezbollah will continue sending reconnaissance drones over Israel: Hezbollah, claimed Nasrallah, had the "natural right" to operate reconnaissance flights into "occupied Palestine" as long as it chose. That was because of the Israeli violation of Lebanese airspace and the helplessness of the Lebanese government. Therefore, he said, "this flight was neither the first nor the last, with the aid of Allah, may he be praised and exalted."
Lebanese and Iranian Reactions
  • Iranian spokesmen boasted of Hezbollah and Iran's achievement using themes similar to those used by Nasrallah:
    • Ahmad Vahidi, Iranian minister of defense, said that Hezbollah's drone flight demonstrated the helplessness and weakness of Israel ("the Zionist regime"). He claimed that in view of Israel's frequent flights over Lebanon, Hezbollah regarded the drone incursion as its "natural right." As to the fact that the plane was of Iranian manufacture, and regarding the support Iran gave Hezbollah, he said that "Iran's capabilities are very high, and they are available to serve the Islamic nations" (FARS News Agency, Iran, October 14, 2012).
    • Hassan Rowhani, representative of supreme leader Ali Khamenei in Iran's national Security Council, claimed the drone had flown over sensitive areas and had been a "painful blow" to Israel (ISNA, Iran, October 14, 2012).
  • Fouad Siniora, head of the Al-Mustaqbal ("Future") party faction in the Lebanese parliament and one of Hezbollah's opponents, responded to the drone by saying that the decision to send it had been Iranian, because dispatching it required technology possessed only by Iran. He said he was concerned that dispatching the drone would entail a risk for Lebanese national security and might embroil Lebanon in an Israeli response and in regional and international struggles (NOW Lebanon news site, October 14, 2012).
Estelle En Route to the Gaza Strip
  • The Estelle, which set sail on October 6 from Naples, continues its voyage toward the Gaza Strip. The ship is currently near Crete and is expected to reach its destination in the coming days (Gaza's Ark website, October 15, 2012).
  • Activists aboard the ship issued a declaration stating that they had undergone training during the voyage to prepare themselves for non-violent resistance should Israel take over the ship (Gaza's Ark website, October 15, 2012).
  • Amjad al-Shawa, coordinator for the Campaign to Break the Siege of the Gaza Strip, said that despite Israeli threats the ship's organizers were determined to reach the port of Gaza and that preparations were being made in the Gaza Strip to receive it (Al-Quds TV, October 9, 2012).

Left: Reception for the Estelle in the port of Naples. Right: The Estelle anchored in Naples (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website, October 14, 2012).
Left: Reception for the Estelle in the port of Naples. Right: The Estelle anchored in Naples (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website, October 14, 2012).

New Initiative from the Organizers of the Fly-In to Israel
  • The organization calling itself "Welcome to Palestine" officially announced on its website that it was planning another campaign to show solidarity with the Palestinians. This time the organization will try to send a delegation to the Gaza Strip through Egypt. The target date for arrival in Cairo is December 25 and the entrance into the Gaza Strip is planned for December 27 (Organization website, October 10, 2012). Behind the new initiative are those who orchestrated the protest fly-in in July 2011 and the march to the Allenby Bridge in August 2012. In both cases most of the activists were refused entry into Israel.
Plaque Awarded to the Family of Suicide Bomber Hanadi Jaradat
  • On October 13, lawyers belonging to the Cairo-based Arab Lawyers' Union[3] held a festive ceremony in Jenin to award a plaque to the family of suicide bomber Hanadi Jaradat, who blew herself up in the Maxim restaurant in Haifa in October 2003.[4] The plaque was presented to mark the anniversary of her death. It was another example of turning terrorists into role models for the Arab-Muslim world in general and the Palestinians in particular.

Left: A member of the Arab Lawyer's Union presents a framed plaque to the family of suicide bomber Hanadi Jaradat to mark the anniversary of her death. Right: The plaque (Hamas forum website, October 13, 2012).
Left: A member of the Arab Lawyer's Union presents a framed plaque to the family of suicide bomber Hanadi Jaradat to mark the anniversary of her death. Right: The plaque (Hamas forum website, October 13, 2012).

[1] As of October 14. The statistics do not include mortar shell fire.

[2] Hussein Anis Ayoub was from the village of Salaa in the Tyre district. He was formerly commander of Hezbollah's aerial forces and is considered as having made the greatest contribution to Hezbollah's aerial wing. He was involved in several showcase terrorist attacks against IDF forces in south Lebanon. He died on March 4, 1996, in an attack in the central sector of south Lebanon in which four IDF soldiers were killed. His family "joyfully" received the news that sending the drone into Israeli territory was named for him and pictures of him were put up in the streets alongside Hezbollah flags (Radio Nur, October 12; Al-Manar, October 13, 2012).

[3] The Arab Lawyers' Union was founded in 1944. It is an umbrella organization for all the lawyers' unions in the Arab world. Its headquarters are in Cairo. The organization advises the UN's Economic and Social Council and UNESCO. It is also a member of the International Criminal Court's union of lawyers, the French International Lawyer's Union (UIA) and the international Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC). Among its stated objectives are the promotion of the legal profession in the Arab world and the struggle against all forms of imperialism.

[4] Hanadi Tyasir Abd al-Malek Jaradat was a suicide bomber from Jenin who blew herself up in the Maxim restaurant in Haifa on October 4, 2003. In the attack 21 Israeli civilians were murdered and 51 wounded. Among the murdered were two families and four children, including a one-year-old baby girl. Hanadi Jaradat was a lawyer and a member of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

 

Spotlight on Iran

October 2012-Mehr 1391 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Authorities attempt to calm the market, step up enforcement on the ''black market''

Authorities attempt to calm the market, step up enforcement on the ''black market''

Authorities attempt to calm the market, step up enforcement on the ''black market''

Authorities attempt to calm the market, step up enforcement on the ''black market''

Government’s narrative: crisis the result of psychological factors, effects of sanctions, and speculators’ activities

Government’s narrative: crisis the result of psychological factors, effects of sanctions, and speculators’ activities

''Mr. President, how many thousands of tomans does the dollar have to reach for you to resolve the matter?''

''Mr. President, how many thousands of tomans does the dollar have to reach for you to resolve the matter?''

''Mr. Ahmadinejad, are you the president of the country?''

''Mr. Ahmadinejad, are you the president of the country?''

Reactions among Iranian public: from online comments to violent clashes

Reactions among Iranian public: from online comments to violent clashes

Reactions among Iranian public: from online comments to violent clashes

Reactions among Iranian public: from online comments to violent clashes

Reactions among Iranian public: from online comments to violent clashes

Reactions among Iranian public: from online comments to violent clashes

Bazaar riots: merchants or hooligans?

Bazaar riots: merchants or hooligans?

Supreme Leader keeps silent and (for now) remains defiant on nuclear policy

Supreme Leader keeps silent and (for now) remains defiant on nuclear policy


  • Authorities attempt to calm the market, step up enforcement on the “black market”
  • Government’s narrative: crisis the result of psychological factors, effects of sanctions, and speculators’ activities.
  • Government critics’ narrative: crisis the result of government’s failed economic policy and mismanagement
  • “Mr. President, how many thousands of tomans does the dollar have to reach for you to resolve the matter?”
  • Nation’s dignity lies not only in nuclear energy but also in currency value
  • “Mr. Ahmadinejad, are you the president of the country?”
  • Reactions among Iranian public: from online comments to violent clashes
  • Bazaar riots: merchants or hooligans?
  • Supreme Leader keeps silent and (for now) remains defiant on nuclear policy

The collapse of the rial has been at the center of Iran’s public and media discourse this week. The free-market rate of the Iranian currency dropped by nearly 40 percent this past week alone. The rial has lost a total of 125 percent in the past four months and nearly 250 percent since the beginning of 2011.

On Tuesday the dollar was trading at 36,500 against the rial. The dollar lost some ground due to intervention by Iran’s Central Bank and was trading at 32,600 against the rial, only to climb back up to 35,500 rials after a press conference convened by President Ahmadinejad ended with no mention of any practical plan to bring the foreign currency market under control. The dollar declined on Thursday, October 4; according to various reports it was trading at 27,000 to 36,000 against the rial. The dollar’s official exchange rate, which was set by the Central Bank on January 28, remains unchanged at 12,260 rials.

News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (October 3-9, 2012)

Rocket hit at the entrance to a village near the Gaza Strip (Pictures by Yehuda Lahiani and courtesy of NRG, October 7, 2012).

Rocket hit at the entrance to a village near the Gaza Strip (Pictures by Yehuda Lahiani and courtesy of NRG, October 7, 2012).

Residents of a village near the Gaza Strip seek shelter from the shelling.

Residents of a village near the Gaza Strip seek shelter from the shelling.

The motorcycle ridden by the two terrorist operatives in Rafah (Filastin al-'Aan, October 8, 2012).

The motorcycle ridden by the two terrorist operatives in Rafah (Filastin al-'Aan, October 8, 2012).

Global jihad terrorist operative Abdallah Makawi (Hamas forum, October 8, 2012).

Global jihad terrorist operative Abdallah Makawi (Hamas forum, October 8, 2012).

Damage to a local petting zoo (Pictures by Yehuda Lahiani and courtesy of NRG, October 7, 2012).

Damage to a local petting zoo (Pictures by Yehuda Lahiani and courtesy of NRG, October 7, 2012).

A mortar shell at the entrance to one of the villages near the Gaza Strip.

A mortar shell at the entrance to one of the villages near the Gaza Strip.

The site of the downing of the drone in southern Israel (Pictures by Yehuda Lahiani and courtesy of NRG, October 7, 2012).

The site of the downing of the drone in southern Israel (Pictures by Yehuda Lahiani and courtesy of NRG, October 7, 2012).

Friday demonstration at Nili'in (Wafa News Agency, October 5, 2012).

Friday demonstration at Nili'in (Wafa News Agency, October 5, 2012).

Hamas police deployed in the Gaza Strip (Hamas forum, October 6, 2012).

Hamas police deployed in the Gaza Strip (Hamas forum, October 6, 2012).

Abu Obeida al-Jarah, commander of Hamas' national security forces, visits the streets of Gaza during the exercise.

Abu Obeida al-Jarah, commander of Hamas' national security forces, visits the streets of Gaza during the exercise.

A military display of force held by the Salah al-Din Brigades (Hamas forum, September 29, 2012).

A military display of force held by the Salah al-Din Brigades (Hamas forum, September 29, 2012).

A military display of force held by the Salah al-Din Brigades (Hamas forum, September 29, 2012).

A military display of force held by the Salah al-Din Brigades (Hamas forum, September 29, 2012).

  • This past week there was another round of escalation in rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, the aftermath of a counterterrorism activity carried out by Israeli security forces targeting global jihad operatives in the Gaza Strip. A rocket and several dozen mortar shells were launched, primarily by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In response Israeli aircraft struck terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip. (Note: on October 9 as well, a number of rockets and mortar shells were fired into Israeli territory.)
  • On October 6 the IDF intercepted and downed a drone which entered Israeli territory from the sea. The Israeli media reported that according to Israeli security sources, it is assumed that Hezbollah, backed by Iran, was responsible for sending the plane in an attempt to collect intelligence. 
Rocket and Mortar Shell Fire Escalates
  • As part of Israeli counterterrorism activities, on October 7 the Israeli Air Force attacked a motorcycle ridden by two global jihad terrorist operatives. The Palestinian media reported that both were critically injured and that one, Abdallah Makawi, died; his funeral was held the following day. According to a report from the Palestinian ministry of health, nine Palestinian civilians were wounded.
  • According to the IDF Spokesman, October 8, 2012, the two were:
  • Abdallah Muhammad Muhsan Makawi, born in 1988, belonged to a Salafist jihadi network calling itself the Shura Council of Jihad Fighters in Greater Jerusalem.[1] Abdallah Makawi was involved in terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians and IDF forces which included rocket fire, planting IEDs and manufacturing weapons. He was also involved in the June 18, 2012 attack on the security fence being built along the Israel-Egypt border in which an Israeli civilian was killed. In the days before he was killed he was involved in preparations for another terrorist attack
  • Tala'at Khalil Muhammad al-Gharbi, born 1989, is a resident of Rafah and terrorist operative in a Salafist jihadi network affiliated with the global jihad.
Responses of the Terrorist Organizations and of the IDF
  • In response the IDF's counterterrorism activity, beginning in the early morning hours of October 8 a rocket and several dozen mortar shells were fired into Israeli territory. Most of the mortar shell fire targeted the Israeli villages and towns near the central and southern Gaza Strip. There were no casualties but a number of civilian structures and a local petting zoo were damaged (IDF Spokesman, October 8, 2012).
  • The military-terrorist wings of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the rocket and mortar shell fire. In addition, the Popular Resistance Committees and networks affiliated with the global jihad also claimed responsibility. Abu Obeida, spokesman for the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military-terrorist wing, said "shelling Israeli posts [sic]" was a message to Israel that the "resistance" [i.e., terrorist organizations] would not allow unilateral Israeli "aggression," and that Israeli "aggression will lead to a more powerful and extensive response." He claimed that the response had been coordinated at the highest levels with the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad(Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website, October 8, 2012).

Hamas terrorist operatives launch rockets into Israeli territory (From videos posted to the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website, October 8, 2012).
Hamas terrorist operatives launch rockets into Israeli territory (From videos posted to the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website, October 8, 2012).

  • In response to the massive shelling, Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked terrorist squads preparing to fire rockets and mortar shells into Israeli territory. The IDF also attacked a number of terrorist targets belonging to Hamas, among them civilian buildings used to store weapons (IDF Spokesman, October 8, 2012). The Palestinian media reported that attacks on two mosques in Khan Yunis wounded five Palestinian civilians (Filastin al-'Aan, Wafa News Agency, Safa News Agency, October 8, 2012).
The Israeli Air Force Intercepts and Downs a Drone in Southern Israel
  • On the morning of October 6 the IDF's monitoring system identified a drone which had entered Israeli air space from the sea. It was tracked in Israel on both land and in the air, and was intercepted and downed in the Yatir Forest, in southern Israel. The site of the downing of the drone was chosen to avoid possible damage to populated areas (IDF Spokesman, October 6, 2012).
  • Near the close of the Second Lebanon War (August 2006) Israeli aircraft used air to air missiles to intercept two Hezbollah "Ababil" drones. One was downed over the sea in Lebanese territorial waters, the other north of Haifa (IDF Spokesman, October 6, 2012).
  • According to the Israeli media, the results of an initial investigation carried out by the Israeli security agencies indicated that the drone had flown over the Mediterranean Sea from north to south and then entered Israeli air space. It is assumed that Hezbollah, backed by Iran, was responsible for launching the drone and that it was on an intelligence mission(NRG website and Haaretz, October 7, 2012).
Other Rocket and Mortar Shell Fire
  • This past week two rocket hits were identified in the western Negev, falling in open areas. There were no casualties and no damage was done. Note: On October 9 as well, after this document was issued, a number of rockets and mortar shells were fired into Israel's western Negev.

Rockets Fired into Israeli Territory[2]

Rockets Fired into Israeli Territory
Two Palestinians Carrying an IED Detained at an IDF Base in Samaria
  • On October 8 two Palestinians were detained at the entrance to an IDF base in Samaria. They arrived at the gate to the base and told the soldiers stationed there that they had an IED in their possession. An examination of the two revealed an improvised IED, which was detonated in a controlled explosion by demolitions experts. An initial investigation of the pair revealed that they had come from Nablus but it was not immediately clear whether they belonged to an organization (IDF Spokesman, October 18, 2012).

One of the two Palestinians detained by IDF forces (IDF Spokesman, October 8, 2012).
One of the two Palestinians detained by IDF forces (IDF Spokesman, October 8, 2012).

Four IDF Soldiers Injured by Hit-and-Run Palestinian Taxi Driver
  • On October 2 four IDF soldiers were injured in a hit-and-run incident by a taxi driven by a Palestinian near Neveh Daniel, an Israeli village in Judea. A group of soldiers was standing at the side of the road near their vehicle, which had broken down. A passing Palestinian taxi slammed into the vehicle and soldiers and fled the scene. One soldier was seriously injured and the others escaped with minor injuries (IDF Spokesman, October 2, 2012). It is currently unclear whether the incident was a terrorist attack or an accident.

The site of the event (Spokesman for the Judea and Samaria District of the Israel Police Force, October 2, 2012).
The site of the event (Spokesman for the Judea and Samaria District of the Israel Police Force, October 2, 2012).

Violent Demonstrations at the Friction Points
  • This week as well there were violent demonstrations at the traditional friction points in Judea and Samaria. Rioters threw stones at the IDF forces, who in certain instances used riot control equipment to disperse the demonstrators. In addition, in a number of instances stones and Molotov cocktails were thrown at Israeli civilian and security vehicles. 
Hamas' Security Forces Hold Large-Scale Exercise
  • On October 6 a large exercise was held in the Gaza Strip by operatives from Hamas' security forces and police. It began with the extensive deployment of security forces and police from the Rafah border crossing in the south to Beit Lahia in the north. According to Islam Shahawan, spokesman for the ministry of the interior of the de-facto Hamas administration, the exercise, which he called "routine," was meant to examine the functioning and capability of the forces' operatives in emergency situations (Website of the ministry of the interior of the de-facto Hamas administration, October 6, 2012).
Marking the Anniversary of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's Founding
  • The Palestinian Islamic Jihadheld a series of displays of force to mark various events, among them the 31st anniversary of the organization's founding, the 25th anniversary of its terrorist activities and the 17th anniversary of the death of Fathi Shqaqi, the organization's founder and first leader. The PIJ held rallies, demonstrations and military marches throughout the Gaza Strip. They were attended by senior organization figures who gave speeches emphasizing that "jihad" [i.e., terrorism] was the organization's strategy for dealing with Israel (The PIJ's Paltoday website, date, 2012).

Jerusalem Brigades operatives in a display to commemorate Fathi Shqaqi (The PIJ's Paltoday website, October 2, 2012).
Jerusalem Brigades operatives in a display to commemorate Fathi Shqaqi (The PIJ's Paltoday website, October 2, 2012).

The Popular Resistance Committees Hold a Military Display of Force
  • TheSalah al-Din Brigades, the PRC's military-terrorist wing, held a military display to mark the anniversary of the organization's founding. Armed terrorist operatives wearing explosive belts participated (Hamas forum, September 29, 2012).
Request to Upgrade the Palestinian Authority's Status in the UN
  • The Palestinians continue to deal with their request for a vote in the General Assembly to upgrade their status to observer state in the UN agencies. Mahmoud Abbas said that he expected the vote would be held in the coming months. He said the Palestinians had no opposition to the UN agencies' recognition of the PA as a state under occupation, after which it would be "impossible to expel the Palestinians from their lands."
  • Saeb Erekat, a member of the PLO's Executive Committee and head of the Palestinian negotiating team, met with a series of American, British and Danish diplomats. He told them that the Palestinian decision to appeal to the UN General Assembly was final and that the request would be lodged after consultations had been held to finalize its wording (Wafa News Agency, October 1, 2012). However, the president of the General Assembly said that in the middle of November the General Assembly would deliberate on the Palestinian request for upgrading (Reuters, October 3, 2012).
Protests against the Palestinian Authority
  • Protests against the PA continue:
  • On October 2 an estimated 200 Palestinians demonstrated in Ramallah against detentions carried out by the PA's security forces. The demonstrators marched from Al-Manar Square to the presidential building, shouted slogans against the detentions and demanded that Mahmoud Abbas resign (Agence France-Presse, October 2, 2012).
  • Also on October 2 several dozen dismissed teachers demonstrated in front of the government building in Ramallah and demanded the implementation of a court order to reinstate them. Most of the teachers had been fired after the PA's security forces had not authorized their employment (Filastin al-'Aan, October 2, 2012). According to Lamis al-Alami, Palestinian minister of education, 750 teachers were fired for security reasons and about 300 had already returned to work (Ma'an News Agency, October 2, 2012).
The Estelle Sails to the Gaza Strip
  • On October 6 the Estelleset sail from Naples on her way to the Gaza Strip. In Naples as well the ship's passengers encountered difficulties with local customs authorities. While the ship was anchored in the port it acceded to a request from local activists to fly the Palestinian flag. The mayor of Naples visited the ship in a show of solidarity and expressed his support, saying that both the Palestinians and Israel had the right to live in peace and security (Facebook page of the mayor of Naples, October 5, 2012).
  • Dror Feiler and Michael Lofgren, two of the ship's organizers, said that the activists aboard were being trained in "non-violent resistance" and that they had been briefed on how to behave if the ship were taken over. They said that everyone had signed a "non-violent declaration." According to Feiler, the ship as carrying 41 tons of cement, theatrical equipment, musical instruments and 600 soccer balls (Ynet, October 7, 2012)
Turkish Law Suit against Israel
  • A Turkish newspaper reported that three families of terrorist operatives killed aboard the Mavi Marmara were suing Israel over the deaths of their relatives and demanding money. Ugur Yildirim, the families' lawyer, said that a suit had been filed against Israel for 33 various incidents for a sum total of 10 million Turkish liras (almost $5.5 million) (World Bulletin, October 5, 2012).
The United States Outlaws Hamas Charities
  • The US Treasury Department said in an announcement that it had outlawed two Lebanese-based charities belonging to and controlled by Hamas, the Al-Quds International Foundation and Al-Waqfiya. Doing so freezes the charities' assets under United States jurisdiction and forbids funds from being transferred to them (American Treasury Department website, October 4, 2012).

[1] The Shura Council is a relatively new overall network in the Gaza Strip composed of various networks in the Gaza Strip affiliated with the global jihad. For further information see the date bulletin "The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli civilian was killed.."

[2] The statistics do not include rockets fired which fell inside the Gaza Strip. As of October 9, 2012.

Spotlight on Iran

October 2012-Mehr 1391 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Iran dismisses and mocks Israeli PM Netanyahu’s speech before the U.N. General Assembly

Iran dismisses and mocks Israeli PM Netanyahu’s speech before the U.N. General Assembly

Iran dismisses and mocks Israeli PM Netanyahu’s speech before the U.N. General Assembly

Iran dismisses and mocks Israeli PM Netanyahu’s speech before the U.N. General Assembly

Ali Shirazi, the Supreme Leader’s Qods Force representative

Ali Shirazi, the Supreme Leader’s Qods Force representative

Reformist daily Shargh closed down after cartoon sparks controversy

Reformist daily Shargh closed down after cartoon sparks controversy

Cartoon by Mana Neyestani

Cartoon by Mana Neyestani

Soccer game in women’s premier league

Soccer game in women’s premier league

Soccer game in women’s premier league

Soccer game in women’s premier league

Soccer game in women’s premier league

Soccer game in women’s premier league

Soccer game in women’s premier league

Soccer game in women’s premier league


  • Irandismisses and mocks Israeli PM Netanyahu’s speech before the U.N. General Assembly
  • Iranian website: the situation in Iran is grave, but drinking from the poisoned chalice will not solve the country’s problems
  • Supreme Leader’s Qods Force representative gives rare interview to conservative weekly
  • Reformist daily Shargh closed down after cartoon sparks controversy
  • Google ban in Iran comes under increasing public criticism