Tag Archives: Iran

Spotlight on Iran

September 2012 - Shahrivar 1391 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
President’s interview provokes sharp criticism and spurs speculations on his political intentions

President’s interview provokes sharp criticism and spurs speculations on his political intentions

''A colony run by Britain'': Iranian reactions to Canada’s decision to cut off ties with Tehran

''A colony run by Britain'': Iranian reactions to Canada’s decision to cut off ties with Tehran

The cover of Democracy or Demoghrazeh

The cover of Democracy or Demoghrazeh

Tehran hosts its first-ever Startup Weekend, an event dedicated to encouraging technological entrepreneurship

Tehran hosts its first-ever Startup Weekend, an event dedicated to encouraging technological entrepreneurship

Tehran hosts its first-ever Startup Weekend, an event dedicated to encouraging technological entrepreneurship

Tehran hosts its first-ever Startup Weekend, an event dedicated to encouraging technological entrepreneurship

Tehran hosts its first-ever Startup Weekend, an event dedicated to encouraging technological entrepreneurship

Tehran hosts its first-ever Startup Weekend, an event dedicated to encouraging technological entrepreneurship

Back to school preparations, Western-style

Back to school preparations, Western-style

Back to school preparations, Western-style

Back to school preparations, Western-style

Back to school preparations, Western-style

Back to school preparations, Western-style

Back to school preparations, Western-style

Back to school preparations, Western-style

Back to school preparations, Western-style

Back to school preparations, Western-style


  • President’s interview provokes sharp criticism and spurs speculations on his political intentions
  • “A colony run by Britain”: Iranian reactions to Canada’s decision to cut off ties with Tehran
  • Fiction or fact? Online release of Iranian novel reignites media frenzy
  • Rial continues losing ground against dollar and euro
  • Central Bank: significant increase in informal economy in Iran
  • Tehranhosts its first-ever Startup Weekend, an event dedicated to encouraging technological entrepreneurship

Why did Ayatollah Khomeini agree to drink from the poisoned chalice? *


Ayatollah Khamenei (right). Will he be forced to follow the example of his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini (left), and drink from the poisoned chalice? (khamenei313.blogfa.com)
Ayatollah Khamenei (right). Will he be forced to follow the example of his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini (left), and drink from the poisoned chalice? (khamenei313.blogfa.com)

Overview

1.   On July 17, 2012,Iran commemorated the anniversary of the decision made by Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to agree to a ceasefire with Iraq. It was a historically significant decision and a strategic departure from Khomeini’s previous stance, which was that the war had to continue until Iraq’s defeat. Khomeini’s strategic decision, which brought an end to the eight-year war between the two countries,was made on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 from 1988.

2.   The anniversary of Khomeini’s decision was marked by an extensive and rather uncharacteristic discourse by Iran’s media on his agreement to the ceasefire. Top regime officials, including Iran’s current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, expressed their support for the difficult decision made by Khomeini and provided explanations to the turn in Khomeini’s stance and Iran’s policy. Supreme Leader Khamenei and other members of the Iranian leadership argued that the turn had been largely the result of domestic reasons, chiefly the economic problems brought on by the sustained fighting, which put Iran in a difficult position and caused considerable suffering to its citizens.

3.   With that in mind, we attempted to look into the historic reasons which, at the time, led to Ayatollah Khomeini’s decision. Granted, what we may learn will not necessarily be pertinent to the present circumstances and the set of considerations which guide Khamenei, who directs Iran’s policy in a completely different strategic environment than that of Khomeini, his predecessor. And yet, an examination of the reasons behind Khomeini’s decision may offer us a glimpse into a better understanding of the set of constraints and considerations that influence the Islamic regime in Tehran—which regards Khomeini as its role model—should the time come for it to make a difficult strategic decision that would mean a sharp turn in policy (or “drinking from the poisoned chalice”, as Khomeini once put it).

4.   We examined the reasons behind Khomeini’s decision from two perspectives: the way they were portrayed by Khomeini in his letter to top regime officials, and the reasons indicated by historians who studied the Iran-Iraq War. These two (highly consistent) perspectives show that the main reason behind Khomeini’s decision was the difficult military situation brought on by the defeats Iran suffered on the battlefield of the war against Iraq. For Iran, these defeats meant losing territory it had conquered in Iraq, sustaining severe damage to its infrastructure, suffering massive casualties, and experiencing a decline in public morale. This brought Khomeini to believe that the Islamic regime in Iran was facing a no-choice situation, since the fighting, had it persisted, could have jeopardized its very survival. Even though Iran’s economy was badly hit by the war and the country found itself under international pressure, it is our impression that these were all secondary reasons for the difficult decision made by Khomeini.

5.   These insights are different than those presented by the Iranian leadership in the media discourse that took place on the anniversary of Khomeini’s decision. The focus in the statements made by Khamenei and other top officials was on the economic problems that had faced Khomeini and the day-to-day difficulties experienced by the Iranian people, playing down the difficult military situation and the low morale. It is our assessment that shifting the focus from the military defeats to the economic difficulties was primarily intended to cast Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic republic and Khamenei’s role model, in a positive light, as a leader who cared about the needs of his people and did not yield to external pressure, and to stave off criticism that his leadership brought Iran to the precipice of collapse.

6.   Are these insights relevant to the currently prevailing approaches within the Iranian leadership on the way Iran needs to contend with the pressure exerted by the United States and the West—and if so, to what extent? In our assessment, the precedent set by Khomeini’s decision—a significant turn in Iran’s policy which contradicted his previous strategy and even ideological stance—may be used at some point by Khamenei and the Iranian leadership, if and when the regime believes that its policy is in a dead end and that its survival is at stake. On the other hand, Khamenei and the hardliners may be encouraged by the fact that Iran’s current situation is still much better than the predicament the country was facing in 1988 after eight years of exhausting fighting with Iraq.[1]

7.   The following three appendices deal with various aspects of Khomeini’s decision:

i. The chain of events that led to the cessation of fighting between Iran and Iraq

ii. The reasons for Khomeini’s decision according to a letter he sent to top regime officials

iii. The reasons for Khomeini’s decision according to literature on the Iran-Iraq War

* This is a follow-up to our July 26, 2012 Information Bulletin: “Will Iran’s Supreme Leader once again be forced to drink from the poisoned chalice? Iran’s media has recently focused on Ayatollah Khomeini’s agreement to the ceasefire with Iraq in 1988. The media discourse, which expresses unequivocal support for Khomeini’s decision, may indicate an understanding in Iran that the country’s leadership may be required to make another strategic decision on the nuclear issue”.

[1] For more information on the various approaches, see “Will Iran’s Supreme Leader once again be forced to drink from the poisoned chalice?”

News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (August 29-September 4, 2012)

A home in Sderot takes a direct rocket hit (Photo by Edi Israeli for NRG, August 31, 2012)

A home in Sderot takes a direct rocket hit (Photo by Edi Israeli for NRG, August 31, 2012)

A home in Sderot takes a direct rocket hit (Photo by Edi Israeli for NRG, August 31, 2012)

A home in Sderot takes a direct rocket hit (Photo by Edi Israeli for NRG, August 31, 2012)

A Palestinian rioter at Nebi Saleh throws a Molotov cocktail (Wafa News Agency, August 31, 2012).

A Palestinian rioter at Nebi Saleh throws a Molotov cocktail (Wafa News Agency, August 31, 2012).

The Hamas administration's new ministers (Picture from the Al-Risala website, September 4, 2012).

The Hamas administration's new ministers (Picture from the Al-Risala website, September 4, 2012).

Hamas security force operative displays his weapon (Picture from the Filastin al-'Aan website, September 1, 2012).

Hamas security force operative displays his weapon (Picture from the Filastin al-'Aan website, September 1, 2012).

Mahmoud Abbas at the meeting of the nonaligned nations in Tehran (Picture from the Wafa News Agency website, August 30, 2012).

Mahmoud Abbas at the meeting of the nonaligned nations in Tehran (Picture from the Wafa News Agency website, August 30, 2012).

  • This past week there was an increase in rocket hits targeting the western Negev; 12 hits in all were identified. One of them, a Grad rocket with a range of about 20 kilometers, or almost 12.5 miles, landed near the southern town of Netivot. Another hit the city of Sderot and damaged two residential buildings. Networks in the Gaza Strip affiliated with the global jihad claimed responsibility for most of the rocket attacks. In response Israeli Air Force aircraft struck a number of terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip.
  • The de-facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip announced a change of faces and appointed a government of 14 ministers, seven of them new. A Hamas delegation headed by Musa Abu Marzouk, deputy chairman of the Hamas Executive Committee, and Ahmed Jaabari, deputy commander of the Hamas military-terrorist wing, went to Egypt to increase security collaboration with Egypt along their joint border.
  • The Palestinian Authority is still trying to decide on a date to lodge an appeal with the UN General Assembly to upgrade its status to non-member state.
Rocket Fire Continues
  • This past week there was an increase in rocket hits targeting the western Negev; 12 hits in all were identified. Most of them fell in open areas and did not cause casualties or damage, among them were the following:
  • On August 31 two rocket hits were identified in the southern city of Sderot. One of them hit two residential buildings. There were no casualties but the buildings were damaged.
  • In addition, on September 2 a Grad rocket hit was identified near the town of Netivot; Grad rockets have a range of about 20 kilometers, or almost 12.5 miles. It fell in an open area and did not cause casualties or damage (NRG website, September 2, 2012).
  • Responsibility for most of the rocket fire was claimed by networks in the Gaza Strip affiliated with the global jihad (Qudsnews and global jihad forum websites).
  • The Palestinians reported that following the increase in rocket fire, Hamas's security apparatuses stepped up their activity against the global jihad-affiliated organizations in the Gaza Strip. Other organizations were warned not to collaborate with them. Global jihad sources expressed surprise that Hamas would prevent rocket fire (Global jihad forum website, September 2, 2012). They also accused Hamas of using the events as an excuse to weaken them (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, September 1, 2012).
IDF Response to the Rocket Fire from the Gaza Strip
  • In response to the rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, Israeli Air Force aircraft struck a number of terrorist targets:
  • On September 1 two terrorist sites were struck (IDF Spokesman, September 1, 2012). The Palestinian media reported that two bases were hit, one of them belonging to Hamas. Two Palestinians were injured in the strike (The PIJ's Paltoday website, Safa News Agency and Al-Aqsa TV, September 1, 2012).
  • On the night of September 2 IAF aircraft stuck a terrorist site in the Gaza Strip (IDF Spokesman, September 3, 2012). The Palestinian media reported that the target was training ground for Hamas's military-terrorist wing at Al-Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip. They reported that the base had been damaged but no one had been injured (Safa News Agency and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website, September 3, 2012).

Rockets Fired into Israeli Territory[1]

Rockets Fired into Israeli Territory

Palestinian Poisoners Detained
  • Adnan Otman Nas’arafrom Beit Furiq, near Nablus, and two residents from the village of Tira, near Kfar Saba in the center of Israel, were detained following an Israel Security Agency-Israeli police investigation into the poisoning of a family in Raanana a year ago. The three had been doing work in the family's house. According to the police, they broke into the house and introduced pesticides into bottled drinks in the refrigerator. They were motivated by Palestinian nationalism.
  • Nas'ara admitted having committed the crime, which was carried out last October. He claimed that he poisoned the food and drink because he "hated Jews." His two accomplices from Tira were detained on suspicion of involvement in the crime. After family members drank the poisoned soft drink they were hospitalized; the husband spent a week in intensive care (Ynet, September 2, 2012).
Weekly Demonstrations
  • This week as well there were riots at the traditional friction points in Judea and Samaria, especially the villages of Nebi Saleh, Bila'in and Nili'in. Rioters threw stones at the IDF forces, who in certain instances used riot control equipment to disperse the demonstrators. In addition, in a number of instances stones and Molotov cocktails were thrown at Israeli civilian and security vehicles.

A Palestinian rioter at Nebi Saleh throws a Molotov cocktail (Wafa News Agency, August 31, 2012).
A Palestinian rioter at Nebi Saleh throws a Molotov cocktail (Wafa News Agency, August 31, 2012).

A Hamas Delegation Goes to Egypt to Discuss Security Collaboration
  • A Hamas delegation headed by Musa Abu Marzouk, deputy chairman of Hamas's Executive Committee, and Ahmed Jaabari, deputy commander of Hamas's military-terrorist wing, left the Gaza Strip for Egypt. The visit was part of a Hamas-Egyptian agreement to set up a joint security committee following the investigation of the terrorist attack at Kerem Shalom (Al-Hayat, August 31, 2012).
  • Members of the delegation met with senior figures in Egyptian general intelligence and the Egyptian ministry of the interior, as well as with senior figures in the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Masri Al-Yawm, August 29, 2012). The Palestinian media reported that a plan for joint Palestinian-Egyptian collaboration had been formulated to prevent terrorist attacks in Egyptian territory (Al-Hayat, September 2, 2012).
  • According to the Egyptian media, the Hamas delegation promised that the de-facto Hamas administration would step up its security activities along the Egypt-Gaza border and initiate activities to suppress extremist elements which might endanger Egyptian national security (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, September 2, 2012).
  • On their return to the Gaza Strip, Ismail Haniya, head of the de-facto Hamas administration, met with the members of the delegation and asked them to remain in contact with Egyptian security to strengthen their collaboration. He said he admired Egypt for its solidarity with the Palestinian people, particularly with the residents of the Gaza Strip, and that "Gaza has never been and will never be a threat to Egypt's security" (Hamas' palestine-info website, September 1, 2012).
Delivery of Merchandise and Fuel
  • Amro Mostafa, deputy chairman of the Egyptian fuel authority, said that Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi had given instructions to have an additional 30 thousand tons of diesel fuel sent to the Gaza Strip to run its power station. That is over and above the fuel donated by Qatar and delivered to the Gaza Strip by Egypt. He said the fuel would be delivered through the Nitzana and Kerem Shalom crossings (Sama News Agency, August 29, 2012).
  • Meanwhile, the de-facto Hamas administration is making preparations to establish a free trade zone on the Gaza-Egypt border. The Land Authority of the Hamas administration announced it had completed leveling and preparing an area of 200 dunams, or about five city blocks, which had been allotted by the national economic ministry for the zone (Ma'an News Agency, August 28, 2012). Alaa al-Din al-Rifati, minister of economy in the Hamas administration, said he hoped Egypt would react favorably to the project (The PIJ's Paltoday website, August 30, 2012).
  • Interviewed by a correspondent for Al-Watan, Ismail Haniya said that if Egypt opened the Rafah crossing to commercial traffic and if a free trade zone were established, the era of the smuggling tunnels would end (Al-Watan, August 29, 2012).
A Change of Faces in the De-Facto Hamas Administration
  • On September 2, after receiving authorization from the Palestinian Legislative Council in the Gaza Strip, Ismail Haniya announced the formation of a new government, which he would head. The government would have 14 ministers, seven of them new faces. A number of ministers would be replaced and new ministries would be established which had either not had formal heads or which had been headed by ministers with more than one post. Most of the new ministers are technocrats who hold senior positions in the Islamic University in the Gaza Strip, considered a Hamas stronghold (Al-Aqsa TV, September 2, 2012).

The Hamas administration's new ministers (Picture from the Al-Risala website, September 4, 2012).
The Hamas administration's new ministers (Picture from the Al-Risala website, September 4, 2012).

  • According to Hamas sources, the change in personnel is not intended to send a political message or influence the internal Palestinian reconciliation process, but rather to "refresh" the ranks.
  • For example:
  • Salah al-Bardawil, senior Hamas figure, said that the objective of the change was to bring in new blood and rouse government activity to deal with public needs (Ma'an News Agency, September 3, 2012).
  • Yousuf Rizqa, Ismail Haniya's political advisor, said that the aim was to solve problems which had so far gone unsolved and to bring new blood into the government. Moreover, he said, some of the former ministers had themselves asked to be replaced (Sama News Agency, September 3, 2012).
  • The Palestinian Authority opposed the move, claiming that the administration in the Gaza Strip was not legal and that the change of faces was additional proof that Hamas was widening the gap between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Qudsnet website, date, 2012). PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas was particularly critical of Hamas, saying that the objective of the move was political and that the PLO was the only and exclusive political representative of the Palestinian people (Egyptian daily newspaper Ruz Al-Yusuf, September 2, 2012).
The Ministry of the Interior Organizes a Military Display
  • The ministry of the interior of the Hamas administration held a military display throughout the Gaza Strip with the participation of its police and security forces. According to the organizers, the objective was to show the forces' preparedness to defend civilians on the home front (Alresalah.net website, September 1, 2012).

Hamas security force operative displays his weapon (Picture from the Filastin al-'Aan website, September 1, 2012).
Hamas security force operative displays his weapon (Picture from the Filastin al-'Aan website, September 1, 2012).

The Nonaligned Nations Conference in Tehran
  • On August 30-31 Mahmoud Abbas participated in the conference of the nonaligned nations in Tehran. He and his advisors exploited the opportunity to put the Palestinian issue on the agenda and to enlist support for the Palestinians' planned move in the UN to upgrade the status of the PA delegation. After the conference Mahmoud Abbas met with Ahmadinejad, and the two discussed various topics related to the Palestinian issue. Mahmoud Abbas declined the Iranian offer to oversee the internal Palestinian reconciliation.
  • At the end of the conference the participants expressed support for the Palestinian cause, the legal rights of the Palestinian people, the end of the so-called Israeli "occupation," the establishment of an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital and the so-called "right of return" of the Palestinian refugees. They also noted their support for the steps taken by the Palestinian Authority to upgrade its status in the UN, and even called on their various UN representatives to support the Palestinians in their effort. In addition, they called for the immediate release of the Palestinians terrorists imprisoned in Israeli jails (Qudsnet website, September 2, 2012).

Mahmoud Abbas at the meeting of the nonaligned nations in Tehran (Picture from the Wafa News Agency website, August 30, 2012).
Mahmoud Abbas at the meeting of the nonaligned nations in Tehran (Picture from the Wafa News Agency website, August 30, 2012).

The Palestinian Authority Appeal to the UN General Assembly
  • The Palestinian Authority has still not decided exactly when it will lodge its appeal with the UN General Assembly to upgrade its status from observerto non-member state, although the move is planned for September 2012. Palestinian sources reported that because of the situation in the Arab world, the events in Syria, the American presidential election and the efforts of the United States to renew negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, at this point the appeal would be temporarily shelved (Qudsnet website, August 30, 2012).
  • Senior figures in the Palestinian Authority had the following to say about the appeal to the UN:
  • Nabil Abu Rudeina, spokesman for the president's office, said that the date would be set only after the meeting of the Arab League's monitoring committee in Cairo on September 5-6 (Agence France-Presse, August 30, 2012).
  • Riyadh al-Maliki, PA foreign secretary, said that the PA would postpone the appeal until a later date. He said that on September 27 Mahmoud Abbas would give a speech in the UN General Assembly where he would stress his determination to promote the step and would even demand that the PA representative to the UN begin contacts to achieve the majority vote the Palestinians needed (Qudsnet website, August 30, 2012).
  • Tawfiq al-Tirawi, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, criticized al-Maliki's remarks, claiming he did not have the authority to express an opinion regarding the date. He said that al-Maliki's remarks had harmed the Palestinian leadership and credibility in the eyes of the Palestinians, and was similar to the demands made by the United States and Israel (Ma'an News Agency, September 1, 2012). Following al-Tirawi's criticism, al-Maliki rushed to deny having made the statements attributed to him.
Welcome to Palestine 3 Activists Hold Protest in Jordan
  • After having been refused entry to Israel, Welcome to Palestine 3 activists held a rally in front of the French embassy in Amman to protest and called on the French government to exert its influence with Israel. There was also a protest rally in front of the Israeli embassy in Amman. Jordanian security forces requested that the demonstrators not approach the Israeli embassy. Some of them refused to comply, and seven were detained and released a short time later (Welcome to Palestine 3 blog, August 30 2012).
  • Note: On August 26 an estimated 100 Welcome to Palestine 3 activists attempted to enter Judea and Samaria through the Allenby crossing in Jordan, but were refused entry by Israel.

[1]As of September 4, 2012. 

Iranian-sponsored Jerusalem Day events were poorly attended this year and received little media coverage.


The traditional burning of Israeli and American flags on World Jerusalem Day in Tehran (Pictures from the Mehr News Agency, Iran).
The traditional burning of Israeli and American flags on World Jerusalem Day in Tehran (Pictures from the Mehr News Agency, Iran).

Overview

1. The annual Iranian-sponsored World Jerusalem Day events were held, as expected, in Iran, the Arab-Muslim world and other countries. As usual, Iran was the focus of the events and they were attended by the leadership of the regime. Notable events were also held in Lebanon under Hezbollah aegis. In the West, there were demonstrations in London, Berlin and several cities in the United States, and in other countries.

2. The events can generally be described as follows:

1) A relatively small number of participants in Iran – The organizers in Iran invested in a great deal of propaganda and advertising to encourage the general populace to participate in the events, and claimed that "millions" of people were in attendance. However, foreign correspondents reported that there were fewer participants this year than last and far fewer than in the first years after the Islamic Revolution.

2) Poor attendance in other countries – Attendance was markedly poor in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas did not lead the events. In Judea and Samaria as well the events did not make an impression, while in the West, including focal points like London and Berlin, few people attended (even though in London large sums of money were invested in hanging banners on buses). There was also little media coverage, and events around the world were mostly reported by the Iranian media.

3) The Iranian-Shiite character of the events was marked – The original intention of holding Jerusalem Day was to show Muslim unity, Shi'ite and Sunni, for the Palestinian cause. In reality, most of the participating organizations and activists were either Shi'ite or affiliated with Iran (in Western countries they were joined by anti-Israeli activists participating in the campaign to delegitimize Israel). Some of the themes of the events were Shi'ite in nature and those on Iran's political agenda, such as support for the Alawite regime in Syria, for the Shi'ites in Bahrain and the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen.

3. The Iranian leadership and Hezbollah repeatedly stressed two issues:

1) The call to destroy the State of Israel, variously described as "an artificial entity," "a malignant tumor," and "a threat to humanity." The campaign was accompanied by anti-Semitic hate propaganda describing the "Zionists," that is the Jews, as controlling the United States and in fact the entire world (in the spirit of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion mythology).

2) Warning Israel not to attack Iran: The Iranian leaders stressed the necessity of continuing the so-called "resistance" (i.e., terrorism) to destroy Israel while warning it not to attack Iran's nuclear installations ("If Israel miscalculates and attacks Iranian nuclear installations Iran's strong response will destroy the Zionist entity."). Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah added that Hezbollah can also attack the Israeli home front with precision missiles which "will turn the lives of hundreds of Zionists into a living hell."

To the Full Document in PDF Format Click Here

The Iranian regime is preparing for its annual Jerusalem Day events, which will be held in Arab-Muslim countries around the globe and in the West.

From the Facebook page of the IHRC, an Islamic organization affiliated with the Iranian regime operating with Britain, which organizes World Jerusalem Day events in London. The posters show Khomeini and Khamenei and call for the boycott of Israel.

From the Facebook page of the IHRC, an Islamic organization affiliated with the Iranian regime operating with Britain, which organizes World Jerusalem Day events in London. The posters show Khomeini and Khamenei and call for the boycott of Israel.

The World Jerusalem Day logo.

The World Jerusalem Day logo.

A sign held in Trafalgar Square in last year's Jerusalem Day rally (Picture from Richard Millet's Blog).

A sign held in Trafalgar Square in last year's Jerusalem Day rally (Picture from Richard Millet's Blog).

Publicizing Jerusalem Day events. The banners read ''Jerusalem belongs to the Muslims'' and ''Death to America and Israel''

Publicizing Jerusalem Day events. The banners read ''Jerusalem belongs to the Muslims'' and ''Death to America and Israel''

Poster for the cartoon contest stressing the so-called ''right of return'' of the Palestinian refugees, announced by the Iranian national academy of art. The stone in the slingshot symbolizes the intifada

Poster for the cartoon contest stressing the so-called ''right of return'' of the Palestinian refugees, announced by the Iranian national academy of art. The stone in the slingshot symbolizes the intifada

Iranian girls hold posters reading, ''Jerusalem is ours'' Picture from the FARS website, August 11, 2012).

Iranian girls hold posters reading, ''Jerusalem is ours'' Picture from the FARS website, August 11, 2012).

Picture accompanying the news item about the mayor of Ardal (Picture from the FARS website, August 12, 2012).

Picture accompanying the news item about the mayor of Ardal (Picture from the FARS website, August 12, 2012).

A Bahraini poster for Jerusalem Day. The picture is of the Ayatollah Khomeini (Picture from the alalam.ir website)

A Bahraini poster for Jerusalem Day. The picture is of the Ayatollah Khomeini (Picture from the alalam.ir website)

Advertisement for the marches in New York and Washington, DC

Advertisement for the marches in New York and Washington, DC


Overview

1. On August 17 events will be held throughout the Arab-Muslim world and in other countries around the globe to mark World Jerusalem Day. They have been held since 1979 on the last Friday of the Muslim religious month of Ramadan, in accordance with a decision made by the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian government. Their stated objective is to express the support of Iran and the Muslim world for the Palestinian cause and for the "liberation" of Jerusalem, but they are used as a stage for strong anti-Israeli and anti-American propaganda and incitement. In recent years they collaborated with Western networks to promote the campaign to delegitimize Israel.

2. This year events are planned for a number of locations around the globe, a partial list of which is the following[1]:

1) Iran – Iran is traditionally the focal point for Jerusalem Day events and many preparations are being made. District governors, mayors and many local functionaries have been asked to help organize the events. Iranians have been asked to attend the events in their cities en masse. This year the organizers are planning the events "to bolster the axis of resistance."

2) Turkey – There will be a series of events to mark Jerusalem Day in Turkey's largest cities (Istanbul, Ankara and Bursa), which are being organized by Turkish anti-Israeli Islamist groups; Turks are being asked to participate in them. In Ankara an event in front of the Israeli embassy is being planned by a Turkish Islamist group.

3) Britain and other countries in Western Europe – The main event will be a march and protest in central London on August 17 to "show solidarity with Palestine and the oppressed throughout the world" (Ihrc.org.uk website). This year, like last year, the event in London is being organized by a local organization affiliated with Iran. Anti-Israeli propaganda and incitement can be expected this year as well.

4) Australia – A march is planned for Sydney on August 17, and will leave from Hyde Part to show support for the Palestinians (YouTube).

5) United States – There are a number of events planned throughout America for August 17, among them a march in Washington, DC. Marches are also planned forTimes Square, NYC, and Detroit, Michigan (Alqudsday.org website).

6) Canada – On August 18 a march is planned for Vancouver, BC (Facebook)

3. Throughout Lebanon, including its south, events will be held, led by Hezbollah. One of them is expected to be held near the Fatma gate, near the Lebanese-Israeli border, on August 16. The main event will be held in Beirut on August 17, where a speech will be given by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

4. The Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria – So far, not many preparations are being made for Jerusalem Day. A march is planned for the Gaza Strip. In our assessment, after the Friday prayer, local rallies and demonstrations will also be held in Judea and Samaria.

5. Details of the events:

To the Full Document in PDF Format Click Here

[1] As of August 16, 2012.

Spotlight on Iran

August 2012-Mordad 1391 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Broadcasting as usual: a look at Iranian TV stations after the earthquakes

Broadcasting as usual: a look at Iranian TV stations after the earthquakes

''What earthquake? Keep watching for more news on the Syrian people’s support for Bashar Assad'' (cartoon by Nikahang Kowsar, Rooz Online, August 12)

''What earthquake? Keep watching for more news on the Syrian people’s support for Bashar Assad'' (cartoon by Nikahang Kowsar, Rooz Online, August 12)

Media coverage of developments in Syria comes under growing criticism

Media coverage of developments in Syria comes under growing criticism

The cost of the NAM meeting in Tehran: expenses will reach tens of millions of dollars, activity in the capital will grind to a halt

The cost of the NAM meeting in Tehran: expenses will reach tens of millions of dollars, activity in the capital will grind to a halt

Brief spotlight on Supreme Leader’s shoes

Brief spotlight on Supreme Leader’s shoes

Aftermath of the earthquakes in northwestern Iran

Aftermath of the earthquakes in northwestern Iran

Aftermath of the earthquakes in northwestern Iran

Aftermath of the earthquakes in northwestern Iran

Aftermath of the earthquakes in northwestern Iran

Aftermath of the earthquakes in northwestern Iran

Aftermath of the earthquakes in northwestern Iran

Aftermath of the earthquakes in northwestern Iran

Aftermath of the earthquakes in northwestern Iran

Aftermath of the earthquakes in northwestern Iran


Highlights of the week
  • Earthquakes in western Iran: state-controlled media keeps silent, infrastructure remains neglected, citizens become indignant
  • Media coverage of developments in Syria comes under growing criticism
  • The cost of the NAM meeting in Tehran: expenses will reach tens of millions of dollars, activity in the capital will grind to a halt
  • Official unemployment figures released: slight increase in overall unemployment rate, decrease in unemployment rate in most provinces
  • Brief spotlight on Supreme Leader’s shoes
Earthquakes in western Iran: official media keeps silent, infrastructure remains neglected, citizens become indignant

The earthquakes that hit northwestern Iran last Saturday, August 11, and claimed the lives of over 300 people have rekindled the debate on the poor performance of Iran’s state-controlled media in times of emergency. News websites affiliated with government critics and Iranian bloggers strongly criticized the state-controlled media for almost completely ignoring the strong earthquakes in the first few hours after they had taken place. The disaster received no coverage from media outlets, which continued their regular programming, including reports from ceremonies for the month of Ramadan. One day after the earthquakes, the Iranian television even aired a regularly-scheduled entertainment show.

In an editorial published earlier this week, the Asr-e Iran website said that Iran Broadcasting once again failed in its performance after the earthquakes. While news websites, news agencies, and social networks provided fast and continuous coverage of the earthquakes and their consequences, it took many hours for the state-controlled media to begin reporting the events. This is a grave offense to the people of Iran, the article said. Iran Broadcasting, not even one of whose TV channels provided reports from the disaster area, saw fit to run news stories on a car accident involving a truck and a cyclist in Germany in which one person was killed and three were injured, and on several United States citizens protesting against the economic situation in their country. The official broadcasting authority, which interrupted its regular programming during the Olympics to broadcast live coverage from London, did not consider the earthquake in western Iran as newsworthy as the Taekwondo, wrestling, and ping pong contests. The website wondered when Iran Broadcasting, which gets the enormous sum of thousands of billions of tomans from the state budget every year, will stop being nothing more than a vehicle for government propaganda and earn the right to be called Iran’s National Broadcasting Authority—one that will appeal to all citizens. The website also criticized the daily newspapers Resalat and Keyhan, whose Sunday editions did not report the earthquakes at all (Asr-e Iran, August 12).

The Tabnak website also strongly condemned the nearly complete disregard shown by the state-controlled media for the earthquakes. Hundreds of people died, thousands more were injured, and widespread destruction was caused in the area, but it was still not enough to make those in charge of the state-controlled media interrupt their regular broadcasting or at least provide some reports about the developments, the website said.

Tabnak also criticized the performance of the government, whose actions in the first few hours after the earthquakes were limited to issuing a statement of condolence as well as several recommendations on the need to collect funds and aid. When similar incidents took place in other countries, governments quickly declared days of national mourning, but not the government of Iran. The achievements of Iran’s Olympic athletes were immediately commented on by the president and the state-controlled media, but no such immediate reaction from the president or the national broadcasting authority was forthcoming in the case of the earthquake (Tabnak, August 12). In their comments, many of the website’s readers said that they had first heard about the earthquake on BBC rather than on Iranian TV.

Criticism of the media’s conduct in the aftermath of the earthquake was also voiced by Majles members. One of them, Ali-Reza Manadi Safidan, said that the citizens and their representatives are upset with the coverage of the earthquake on Iran’s official media (ISNA, August 12). Mas’oudi Reyhan, a former Majles member, said that foreign TV networks had done a better job than Iranian TV channels, and that, as a result of the insufficient media coverage, it had taken longer for aid to reach the areas hit by the disaster, which pushed up the number of casualties (ILNA, August 12).

Iranian bloggers, too, expressed their anger over the performance of the state-controlled media after the disaster. One blogger said that one drop of Palestinian blood spilled in the Gaza Strip would generate more coverage by the Iranian media (http://tatanahoo.blogfa.com/post/397). Another blogger affiliated with opponents of the regime called on the people of Iran to ask the government to help them instead of providing assistance to the tyrannical regime in Syria and to terrorist organizations (http://iran-darband.blogspot.ca/2012/08/blog-post_11.html). Yet another blogger wrote about the day of mourning marked last week to commemorate the death of Ali bin Abi Taleb, the first Shi’ite Imam, saying that he prefers to mourn the deaths of his fellow Iranians in the earthquake. While Shi’ites are going to mosques to mourn the death of a person who lived 1,400 years ago and the government is spending considerable sums of money on mourning ceremonies in his honor, it is unable to deal with earthquakes or extend medical assistance to their victims. A government whose philosophy is based on Imam Ali cannot provide welfare to its citizens or extend medical assistance when necessary. In such a country, the blogger said, the importance of people long dead overshadows that of the living (http://unirani.blogspot.com/2012/08/blog-post_11.html).

The criticism was not limited to the performance of the media but also extended to the neglect of infrastructure, which led to the high number of casualties. In an interview given by Prof. Bahram Akashe to ILNA News Agency, the top Iranian seismologist said that no other country in the world would sustain such massive casualties as a result of a 6-magnitude earthquake, and that the high number of victims stems from the neglect of construction infrastructure in cities and towns across Iran and from faults pertaining to crisis management (ILNA, August 12).

In an interview given to Mehr News Agency, Allahverdi Dehqani, a Majles member who represents one of the earthquake-stricken provinces in western Iran, took issue with the fact that there is not a single hospital in the villages hit by the disaster, which is why the victims had to be transported to the city of Tabriz. He noted that the first rescue teams hadn’t arrived in the disaster area until seven hours after the earthquake (Mehr, August 12). Mas’oud Pezeshkian, who represents Tabriz in the Majles, also pointed out severe problems in extending assistance to those hit by the earthquake. Pezeshkian said at a Majles meeting that the rescue teams had not operated in an organized fashion, and that private citizens had to transport those needing medical assistance in their own cars. He also said that, as of Monday, August 13, the 8,000 tents that were to be sent to the disaster area to shelter the residents did not arrive.

Also criticized was President Ahmadinejad’s departure on a political trip to Saudi Arabia. According to the Asr-e Iran website, the fact that the president and some of his government ministers traveled to Saudi Arabia only two days after the earthquake was cause for surprise. It is common practice around the world, Asr-e Iran said, that when such an event takes place while the leader of the country is abroad, he cuts short his visit and returns home to closely supervise the rescue operations. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, saw fit to go on his official visit—one of questionable necessity—preferring to travel in Saudi Arabia over a trip to the regions hit by the earthquake (Asr-e Iran, August 13).

This week a number of websites and blogs affiliated with government critics published a strong-worded article about President Ahmadinejad. The article criticized his huge investments in building infrastructure outside of Iran while infrastructure in Iran is being neglected, the results of which were clearly evident in the earthquake. While the government builds power plants and energy facilities free of charge in Pakistan, Tajikistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, the energy infrastructure in Iran is in a state of severe distress and many companies are on the verge of bankruptcy. Instead of providing power plants to other countries, the state needs to increase the cash benefits paid to Iranian citizens, while the special headquarters established by the government after the second Lebanon war to rebuild the infrastructure in Beirut now has to rebuild the 63 villages completely wiped out in the earthquake (Asr-e Iran, August 13).

Media coverage of developments in Syria comes under growing criticism

The kidnapping of 48 Iranian pilgrims in Syria last week set off a new flurry of criticism of how the bloody events in Syria are covered by Iran’s state-controlled media. An editorial published by the Tabnak website, titled “Don’t Iranians know what’s going on in Syria?”, said that the reports in Iran about the developments in Syria are influenced by domestic political power struggles (between reformists and government supporters), making it impossible for the people of Iran to get an accurate picture of the complex state of affairs in Syria.

The developments in Syria, according to the website, are presented in two diametrically opposed ways. There are some Iranian commentators whose reports and assessments of the situation in Syria reflect a worldview influenced by the Western discourse on human rights and democracy. They do not acknowledge the complexity of the situation in Syria and focus on portraying the “massacre” committed by the regime in that country. These commentators do not even take the cautious approach that is characteristic of Turkey and the United States, which recognize that the opponents of the Syrian regime are not democracy lovers but rather Al-Qaeda and radical Islamic operatives whose actions are guided by a Saudi, Bin-Ladenesque model. Iranian commentators whose take on the developments in Syria is similar to that of Assad’s opponents are unaware of the gradual change undergone by the opponents of the Syrian regime, tending to ignore the bloodshed in the country and the difficult future that awaits Syria with or without Assad. They do not acknowledge the possibility that the fall of Syria could seriously threaten Iran’s western borders. They ignore Iran’s national interests and forget how the popular uprisings in Yemen and Bahrain eventually benefited the interests of Saudi Arabia.

At the other end of the spectrum, there are those who believe that it is acceptable to deny Iranian citizens access to information on what is happening in the region and in the world by covering up reports and spreading false news stories. They don’t realize that, in today’s reality of mass media, the flow of news and information to the people cannot be stopped. Some consider blocking the news on the situation in Syria to be the easiest strategy, although it is not the best solution. Iranian officials very often look for the simplest strategy since they are unable to cope with possible future developments. It’s impossible, the article said, to share with the information-seeking public only those news stories that happen to coincide with Iran’s national interests and prevent it from acquiring contradictory information through other media outlets. Such a false “black-or-white” portrayal of the situation in Syria is the result of domestic political power struggles and is not conducive to national interests, the website concluded (Tabnak, August 9).

The website www.daypress.ir, which is also affiliated with government critics, said after the kidnapping of the Iranian nationals in Syria that characterizing the situation in that country as calm is no longer possible. An article published on the website said that, for the past several months, Iran’s official media reported that the situation in Syria was calm. Even as various news agencies made reports on fierce clashes in Damascus and Aleppo, Iran Broadcasting reported that things were peaceful and quiet across the country. The kidnapping of the 48 Iranian pilgrims in Damascus calls into question the reliability of the reports released by Iran’s media about the situation in Syria. If things are indeed perfectly calm in Damascus, who was it that kidnapped the Iranian citizens? Was it the government of Syria that kidnapped the pilgrims? And if so, how can the Iranian media keep expressing its support for the current Syrian regime? If, on the other hand, the pilgrims were kidnapped by Bashar Assad’s opponents, what is to be made of the reports about the peace and quiet in Syria?

The website put on Iran’s national broadcasting authority the responsibility for the personal safety of those Iranians who continue to travel to Syria. The Organization of Pilgrimage has temporarily stopped sending Iranian pilgrims to Syria. The Foreign Ministry has also issued a warning to Iranian citizens not to travel to Syria at the present time. However, it is impossible to terminate all flights to Syria, just as it is impossible to stop citizens from other countries in the world from going there. The difference between those citizens and the citizens of Iran is that the media outlets in other countries conduct themselves responsibly and provide their citizens with accurate reports on what’s going on in Syria. It could be that Iran Broadcasting officials have not considered that, by presenting false reports, they are endangering the lives of Iranians who continue traveling to that country. The website expressed its hope that Iran Broadcasting officials will show responsibility in their reports about the developments in Syria and reconsider their policy on the issue. Most Iranians are unable to access foreign-language news reports shown on international media, and their lives may be at risk if the state-controlled media reports on the situation in Syria are not reliable (www.daypress.ir, August 5).

Meanwhile, the Baztab Emrooz website criticized the daily Keyhan, which printed a photograph of a little child last week under the title “Terrorists in Syria hang 3-year-old child”.

The daily reported that the opponents of the Syrian president had murdered a Shi’ite family originally from Iraq and then hanged the child, who was the last survivor of his family. According to Baztab, the photograph has nothing to do with the developments in Syria, and the child whose photograph appeared in Keyhan had been murdered in the city of Aleppo in 2010 after suffering sexual abuse. The website called on Keyhan’s editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari to show compassion and morality at least for Journalist Day and Laylat al-Qadr, marked last week. There is no question that Salafi forces commit crimes against Shi’ite Muslims across the globe, the website said, but that is no reason to misrepresent information and publish lies in the media. With over 40 Iranians having been kidnapped by the Syrian armed forces, such behavior by the media only serves the Salafi faction (Baztab, August 7).

This is not the first time that news websites affiliated with government critics have criticized the way that the developments in Syria are covered by the media. The Asr-e Iran website argued last month that the official media in Iran portrayed the situation in Syria as being much more secure and stable than what was reported even by Syria’s own media. The website warned that the public could lose its trust in the official media and turn to foreign media instead.

The cost of the NAM meeting in Tehran: expenses will reach tens of millions of dollars, activity in the capital will grind to a halt

The Non-Aligned Movement summit, scheduled to take place in Tehran from August 26 to 31, is drawing strong criticism for its high cost and the plans to halt almost all economic activity in the Iranian capital while the summit convenes. The reformist daily Shargh reported this week that the cost of shutting down all activity in the capital is expected to reach 7,140 billion tomans—approximately 3.5 billion dollars (Shargh, August 12).

Manouchehr Jahanian, the deputy chief of Iran’s Organization of Tourism, reported last week that the hotel and tourism services provided to the 7,000 conference attendees will likely cost in excess of 50 million dollars. Those taking part in the conference will occupy over 3,500 hotel rooms and suites at a total cost of about 12.5 million dollars. The Day News website reported that, ahead of the conference, Iran had imported 200 Mercedes Benz S500 limousines at a total cost of at least 50 billion tomans (about 25 million dollars) and booked 700 suites, hotel rooms, and apartments in northern Tehran for the conference attendees (Day News, August 6). In addition, the government has authorized the almost complete suspension of all economic activity in Tehran during the four days of the summit.

Asadollah Asgaroladi, the former chairman of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, strongly criticized the decision to suspend activities in Tehran while the conference will be taking place, saying that there is no reason to close government ministries, banks, government institutions, and private businesses. Asgaroladi, a prominent businessman and current member of the board of Tehran’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said that shutting down Tehran for almost a week due to the presence of the NAM country leaders will result in irreparable damage to the city’s economy. He said that it would be acceptable to impose restrictions on movement in various city areas for the conference and improve the security of those areas where the conference attendees will be staying, but that there is no reason to suspend economic activities in other parts of the city. He further added that even in London, where the Olympics were being held, all municipal services were not shut down, and that the government does not have the power to decide that activity in Tehran will be suspended during the conference period (Khabar Online, August 9).

The Baztab website also criticized the extraordinary measures taken in preparation for the summit. Given the heavy economic pressure that Iranians are facing as a result of the subsidy policy reform and the sanctions, it is beyond reason to spend billions of tomans from the national budget to host the conference and shut down the capital, whose economic activity accounts for nearly 50 percent of all economic activity in Iran. The website also argued that there is no reason to import limousines from abroad for the conference attendees to use when Iran manufactures its own perfectly good cars. Even if the government considers the summit meeting to be the pinnacle of diplomatic success in the history of Iran, there is no need to exaggerate its significance. The website said that even when Tehran hosted the conference of the leaders of Islamic countries in 1997, the costs involved were smaller and the authorities were firm on the use of Iranian-made products rather than imported ones. What is more, the government’s decision to suspend economic activity in the city for a week comes in a year declared by the Supreme Leader to be the year of national production and support for Iranian labor and capital. There is no other place in the world where all activity is suspended during conventions and conferences, Baztab said, citing the example of New York, which annually hosts the U.N. General Assembly. The NAM summit, which could have been a celebration of diplomatic success for Iran, has turned into a period of national mourning for some of the residents, the website complained (Baztab, August 9).

Official unemployment figures released: slight increase in overall unemployment rate, decrease in unemployment rate in most provinces

This week the Iranian Center for Statistics released up-to-date unemployment figures for the first three months of the current Iranian year (March – May 2012). According to the data, the official unemployment rate in the spring of 2012 reached 12.9 percent, a 0.6-percent increase compared to the same period last year and a 1.2-percent decrease compared to the winter of 2011. The report indicates that the unemployment rate is higher among women and the urban population.

The unemployment rate among the 15 to 24 year old demographic is 28.6 percent, up by 2.9 percent compared to the same period last year. The unemployment rate among the 15 to 29 demographic is 25.8 percent, which is 2.7 percent higher compared to the same period last year.

A look at unemployment rates by province indicates that there are 22 provinces with double-digit unemployment (compared to 20 provinces in the same period last year) and 9 provinces with single-digit unemployment (compared to 11 in the same period last year).

The highest unemployment rates in the first three months of the Iranian year were recorded in the west Iranian provinces of Ilam, with an unemployment rate of 21 percent, and Lorestan, with an unemployment rate of 19.3 percent. High unemployment rates were also recorded in the provinces of Fars (18.3 percent), Alborz (16.9 percent), Tehran (14.6 percent), Qom (14.3 percent), and Esfahan (14.2 percent).

The lowest unemployment rates were recorded in the provinces of South Khorasan (6.5 percent), Kerman (7.5 percent), Golestan (7.8 percent), North Khorasan (9.1 percent), West Azerbaijan (9.7 percent), and Kohgiluyeh Va Boyer Ahmad (9.8 percent). Fourteen provinces posted an increase in unemployment rate in the spring of 2012 compared to the same period last year, while 17 provinces posted a slight decrease in unemployment rate during that period. The figures released by the Center for Statistics show that only 41.8 percent of people who hold jobs (aged 15 and up) work an average of over 49 hours per week.

Unemployment rates in Iran by province (www.fararu.com, August 12)

Province

Unemployment rate in spring 2012

Unemployment rate in spring 2011

Alborz

16.9

20.7

Ardabil

11.8

14.7

Azerbaijan, East

12.6

8.8

Azerbaijan, West

9.7

10.1

Bushehr

11.2

11.7

Chahar Mahaal and Bakhtiari

10.6

12.3

Fars

18.3

20.6

Gilan

14.5

11.7

Golestan

7.8

8.3

Hamadan

12

10.6

Hormozgan

11.2

12

Ilam

21

16.7

Isfahan

14.2

14.8

Kerman

7.5

13.8

Kermanshah

13

13.8

Khorasan, North

9.1

9.9

Khorasan, Razavi

10.4

8.9

Khorasan, South

6.5

9.4

Khuzestan

10

9.7

KohgiluyehVaBoyer Ahmad

9.8

19.2

Kurdistan

11.9

12.4

Lorestan

19.3

17.3

Markazi

13

9.8

Mazandaran

12.6

7.9

Qazvin

11.6

12.6

Qom

14.3

10.1

Semnan

10

12.8

Sistan and Baluchistan

12.1

9.6

Tehran

14.6

12.5

Yazd

9.5

7.4

Zanjan

10.3

8.1

Also according to the Center for Statistics’ report, 47.3 percent of those employed in Iran’s economy work in the service sector, 32.4 percent work in the industry sector, and 20.3 percent work in agriculture. In an interview given to ILNA News Agency this week, the economist Ahmad Khatami-Yazd warned that while most people employed in the services sector in the world’s developed countries are technicians, engineers, and software developers, a significant number of service sector employees in Iran work in commerce, health, and transportation, which is why their contribution to national production is significantly smaller (ILNA, August 13).

The official unemployment rate published in Iran has been a subject of contention for commentators, who argue that the actual unemployment rate is considerably higher than official figures suggest. According to some commentators, the official unemployment figures are based on the government’s slanted definition of employment, under which soldiers, students, and housewives are considered to be "employed”

Brief spotlight on Supreme Leader’s shoes

At a recent ceremony for the publication of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s new biography, The Explanation of a Name (Sharh-e Esm), Hojjat-ol-Eslam Ali Akbar Rashad, the head of the Center for Publishing the Supreme Leader’s Works, discussed Khamenei’s qualities. Speaking about the simple lifestyle led by the Supreme Leader, Rashad said: “Those who believe that [Khamenei] has a horse and that he rides horses need to take a look at the shoes he has been wearing for nearly twenty years. They are so worn that, whenever I look at them, I remember the shoes of Amir al-Mu’minin” (a term used by Shi’ites to refer to the first imam, Ali bin Abi Taleb) (www.snn.ir, August 4).

The remarks made by Hojjat-ol-Eslam Rashad drew many mocking comments on social media, websites, and blogs affiliated with regime opponents. In response to the remarks, one blog posted the following image under the title “Exposing Hojjat-ol-Eslam Rashad’s lies about Khamenei’s worn shoes”:

Rashad’s remarks on Khamenei’s simple lifestyle join a number of reports published in recent years on the Supreme Leader’s supposed humility. In February 2012 Iran’s Fars News Agency issued a report on the Supreme Leader’s flight habits. The report was based on the recollections of one of the pilots who accompany the Supreme Leader on his flights across Iran and was intended to testify to his great humility. Among other things, the pilot said that the Supreme Leader usually takes “regular” flights with common people, insists that they should not be prevented from approaching him during a flight, and refuses to receive special treatment compared to other passengers. In addition, his meal during a flight usually consists of nothing more than a cup of tea and a small cake.

The distribution of Khamenei’s new biography recently resumed after a number of minor changes were made. The biography was first unveiled at the international book fair held in Tehran in the beginning of May. However, its distribution was put on hold several days after its release on orders from the authorities to make changes and coordinate its distribution with the Supreme Leader’s office.