Tag Archives: Iran

Spotlight on Iran

February 26 – March 12, 2017 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Hojjat ul-Islam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi, chairman of the Iranian Shaheed (Martyrs) Foundation (Asr-e Iran, March 6, 2017)

Hojjat ul-Islam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi, chairman of the Iranian Shaheed (Martyrs) Foundation (Asr-e Iran, March 6, 2017)

Rouhani and Erdogan (Tasnim News, March 1, 2017)

Rouhani and Erdogan (Tasnim News, March 1, 2017)

A Mahan Air plane, used to transport wounded fighters from Syria and Yemen to Iran (Tasnim News, February 25, 2017)

A Mahan Air plane, used to transport wounded fighters from Syria and Yemen to Iran (Tasnim News, February 25, 2017)

Esmail Qa'ani (Tasnim News, March 1, 2017)

Esmail Qa'ani (Tasnim News, March 1, 2017)

Abdollahian and Mahmoud (ISNA, March 5, 2017).

Abdollahian and Mahmoud (ISNA, March 5, 2017).

Ali Karimi, the Basij fighter killed in Mosul (Twitter, February 27, 2017).

Ali Karimi, the Basij fighter killed in Mosul (Twitter, February 27, 2017).

Iraqi ambassador to Tehran (center) with the president of the Sepah bank  (banksepah.ir, February 27, 2017).

Iraqi ambassador to Tehran (center) with the president of the Sepah bank (banksepah.ir, February 27, 2017).

The Voice of Bahrain radio station (ABNA, February 28, 2017).

The Voice of Bahrain radio station (ABNA, February 28, 2017).

Weapons confiscated by the Bahrain authorities from the terrorist network  (Asr-e Iran, March 5, 2017).

Weapons confiscated by the Bahrain authorities from the terrorist network (Asr-e Iran, March 5, 2017).


Main Points
  • The chairman of the Iranian Shaheed Foundation said 2,100 fighters deployed from Iran to Syria and Iraq had been killed. The number does not relate only to Iranians, but to all the fighters deployed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to fight in Syria and Iraq, including Afghans and Pakistanis.
  • Despite the tension between Iran and Turkey, Iranian President Rouhani and Turkish President Erdogan met on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit meeting held in Pakistan. Rouhani noted that Iran objected to any action that harmed the territorial integrity of the countries in the region, especially Syria and Iraq.
  • Responding to reports that the American administration planned to designate it as a terrorist organization, senior Iranian officials declared their support for the IRGC.
  • An Iranian opposition website posted photos allegedly showing that planes belonging to the Iranian airline Mahan Air, which has ties to the IRGC, are used to transport Iranian, Syrian and Yemeni dead and wounded to Iran.
  • The military advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force threatened that Iran would "destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa" if Israel attacked Iran.
  • A Basij fighter was killed in Mosul, Iraq, at the end of February.
  • The authorities of Bahrain exposed an Iranian-supported terrorist network allegedly planning to carry out terrorist attacks against Bahrain's security forces. In the meantime, the Iranian broadcasting authority launched a radio station called "the Voice of Bahrain" to transmit "revolutionary messages" in support of a Shi'ite uprising against the Bahraini regime.

 

General Information
  • Hojjat ul-Islam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi, chairman of the Iranian Shaheed Foundation, said 2,100 of the fighters deployed by Iran to Syria and Iraq, the so-called "defenders of the shrines," had been killed (Asr-e Iran, March 7, 2017). The number does not relate solely to Iranians, but also to fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan who were deployed to Syria and Iraq by the IRGC. In November 2016 Shahidi said the number of Iranians killed in Syria had passed the 1,000 mark (Tasnim, November 22, 2016).
  • On March 1, 2017, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani met with Turkish President Erdogan on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit meeting held in Pakistan. Rouhani told Erdogan that Iran opposed any action that harmed the territorial integrity of the countries in the region, especially Syria and Iraq. The two discussed bilateral relations (Tasnim, March 1, 2017). The meeting was held under the cloud of tension following accusations made by Erdogan and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Turkish foreign minister, of Iran's regional subversion. The accusations resulted, at the end of February, in the Iranian foreign ministry's summoning the Turkish ambassador to Tehran for clarifications. A spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry said in a statement that there was a limit to Iran's patience in dealing with Turkey's positions.
  • Responding to reports that the American administration planned to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, senior Iranian officials declared their support for the IRGC. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, said it was not in the United States' best interests to designate the Corps as a terrorist organization because the entire world knew the IRGC provided the most support to Middle Eastern countries fighting terrorism (Mehr, February 25, 2017). Ali Larijani, chairman of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament), also defended the activities of the IRGC, claiming they defended the Islamic Revolution at home and Iranian interests abroad (Tasnim, February 27, 2017). Rasoul Sanaeirad, deputy commander of the IRGC for political affairs, also reacted to the possibility that the United States would designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, saying that the support and advice the IRGC gave Syria and Iraq was given at their governments' request . He said announcing the American intention to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization was a publicity stunt, and that Iran had exploited the sanctions imposed previously as an opportunity to increase its defensive capabilities (yrc.ir, March 5, 2017).
  • Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, Tehran's substitute Friday prayer leader warned in his March 3, 2017 sermon against attempts made by the enemy, especially the United States, to divide the countries of the Middle East. He said he opposed the West's intentions to establish no-flight zones in Syria, because, he claimed, that would facilitate the infiltration of terrorist operatives into Syria and lead to a division of the country. He claimed that without Iran, ISIS would already have established governments in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon (IRNA, March 3, 2017).
  • 5. On February 25, 2017, the amadnews.com website, which is affiliated with the Iranian opposition, posted pictures allegedly documenting the use of planes belonging to the IRGC-affiliated Air Mahan airline to transport dead and wounded Iranian, Syrian and Yemeni fighters to Iran. The website claimed it had received the pictures from "a source within the IRGC," and that the airline had covered the seats to protect them from the blood of the wounded. During the past year Mahan Air has flown dozens of planes from Iran to Syria, used, according to Western intelligence sources, to routinely deliver weapons to the Syrian regime and Hezbollah.
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • At a memorial service for fighters of the Fatemiyoun Brigade killed in Syria, Esmail Qa'ani, deputy commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, praised the brigade, which fights under the supervision of the IRGC. He said the Fatemiyoun Brigade knew no boundaries and fought wherever it was necessary to defend the values of Islam. He added that the Brigade was fighting in Syria but its influence went far beyond Syria, and expressed the "culture of the resistance" against the West. Syria and Aleppo, he said, were only part of the goals of the fighters, and their main objective was to institute a global government lead by the "Hidden Imam." He added that today the Americans and Israelis mourned the regional blossoming of the culture of resistance and that the United States would not have agreed to negotiating the future of Syria had it not been for the might of the Fatemiyoun Brigade fighters on the battlefield (Tasnim, March 1, 2017).
  • Hossein Amir Abdollahian, special international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis, issued in an announcement after the city of Palmyra had been retaken from ISIS by Syrian army forces. He said there was no doubt but that Iran would continue its strong support of Syria, which stood at the front of support for "the liberation of Jerusalem" (Mehr, March 3, 2017). Meeting with Adnan Mahmoud, the Syrian ambassador to Tehran, Abdollahian said the liberation of Palmyra from the control of terrorists was proof of the strong resistance and stance of the Syrian army and the "resistance forces" in the fight against ISIS terrorism. Regarding the conference for the support of the Palestinian intifada which met in Tehran at the end of February, Abdollahian said it showed the need for Muslim unity, the continued support of the Palestinian people, and preparing the ground for a condemnation in the international arena of the "inhuman, illegitimate actions of the Zionist regime" (ISNA, March 5, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq and the Gulf
  • An IRGC Basij fighter was killed in Mosul, Iraq, at the end of February.
  • Mohammad Kazem Choghazardi, general manager of the Sepah bank, in a meeting with Rajeh al-Mousavi, Iraqi ambassador to Tehran, said the bank was prepared to broaden its connections with banks in Iraq (banksepah.ir, February 27, 2017).
  • In view of the ongoing protest of Bahraini Shi'ites to the local authorities, the Iranian broadcasting authority launched a new radio station called the Voice of Bahrain to export the "message of the revolution" to Bahrain. The station will broadcast news, commentary on political and social issues, and provide information about confrontations between the authorities and the opposition. It will operate through the Internet, social networks and smartphone apps (Fars, March 4, 2017).
  • Bahrain authorities announced the exposure of a network of 54 terrorists who, with Iranian support, were planning to carry out attacks on the country's security forces. According to Bahrain's attorney general, the leader of the network, who lives in Germany, helped the group organize trips for its operatives from Bahrain to Iran and Iraq for training in IRGC camps (ABNA, March 4, 2017). A spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry strongly rejected Bahrain's accusations. Since the outbreak of the popular uprising in Bahrain in 2011, the authorities have accused Iran of supporting the rebels and planning terrorist attacks. In the summer of 2015 Bahrain announced it had uncovered a direct connection between Iran and Hezbollah to an attack in which two member of the Bahraini security forces had been killed when an IED exploded. In October 2015 Bahrain announced it had recalled its ambassador from Tehran and expelled the Iranian chargé d'affaires from Manama in protest against the involvement of the IRGC in planning terrorist attacks in Bahrain.
  • Hossein Amir Abdollahian, special international affairs advisor to the speaker of the Majlis, meeting with Wolfgang Amadeus Bruelhart, assistant state secretary and head of the Middle East and North Africa division in the Swiss foreign ministry, said the claims that Iran was supplying weapons to Yemen by sea were baseless. He said that for Iran the only resolution for the crisis in Yemen was political talks and honoring the decisions of the Yemeni people (Mehr, March 8, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Ahmad Karimpour, military advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, warned that Iran would destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa in the case of Israeli "aggression" against Iran. At a memorial service for Iranian martyrs, Karimpour said Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had not been joking when he said that if necessary, Iran would turn Tel Aviv and Haifa into dust in seven seconds. He said the Iranian armed forces had identified all the important centers in Israel and could attack them with their Sijil and long-range Shehab-3 missiles within seven and a half minutes. He added that no one in the world had the courage to speak out against Israel, but that Supreme Leader Khamenei had made it plain Iran would support anyone who helped the Palestinians (dolatebahar.com, March 2, 2017).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

Iranian conduct in the early days of the Trump administration

“Donald Trump, a global menace” (Tasnim News, January 18, 2017).

“Donald Trump, a global menace” (Tasnim News, January 18, 2017).

Arab countries and Israel encourage President Trump to go to war against Iran  (Fars News, February 5, 2017).

Arab countries and Israel encourage President Trump to go to war against Iran (Fars News, February 5, 2017).

President Donald Trump and the Israeli prime minister hiding behind him marked Iran as a target (Fars News, February 15, 2017).

President Donald Trump and the Israeli prime minister hiding behind him marked Iran as a target (Fars News, February 15, 2017).

Khamenei delivering the speech to Iranian Air Force officers (Supreme Leader’s website, February 7, 2017).

Khamenei delivering the speech to Iranian Air Force officers (Supreme Leader’s website, February 7, 2017).

Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohammad-Ali Ja’fari: The enemies of the Islamic Revolution also recognize the military might of Iran (Tasnim News, February 8, 2017).

Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohammad-Ali Ja’fari: The enemies of the Islamic Revolution also recognize the military might of Iran (Tasnim News, February 8, 2017).

Launch of an Iranian Mersad short-range surface-to-air missile (Fars News, December 27, 2016).

Launch of an Iranian Mersad short-range surface-to-air missile (Fars News, December 27, 2016).


Overview

1.   Donald Trump’s inauguration as president triggered a change in the attitude of the US administration toward Iran and increased the tension between the new administration and Tehran within a short while. The change was reflected both by the escalation of anti-Iranian rhetoric on the part of American senior officials, and first and foremost by President Donald Trump, as well as by an expansion to a certain extent of the economic sanctions against Iran. Even though both sides have so far refrained from undesired escalation, the change in the stance of the US administration strengthened the Iranian concern about the intentions of the new president.

2.   In their public reactions to the declarations by senior officials of the US administration, Iranian senior officials usually tried to belittle the significance of the threats on the part of Washington. They warned the United States not to threaten Iran; They claimed that those were idle threats and that the United States could do nothing against Iran; They stressed that the US threats would not influence Iran and not change its policy, including in relation to the missile program and Iran’s regional policy. Senior Iranian military officials, on the other hand, adopted more vehement rhetoric against the US, emphasizing Iran’s military power and threatening the new administration not to dare act against Iran.

3.   However, despite the Iranian public attempts to belittle the significance of the change of the US administration, the ITIC believes that an authentic Iranian concern about the policy of the Trump administration is evident. Indeed, since President Trump entered office, Tehran became even more convinced that he would not cancel the nuclear agreement, especially in view of the opposition to such a step on behalf of the other powers which are signatories to the agreement. On the other hand, there is increased concern in Iran that more pressure would be exerted by the American administration on Iran, which would deter European companies from entering Iranian markets and foil Iran’s intention to bring about an economic improvement following the nuclear agreement. In addition, it is evident that the Iranians are concerned about the formation of an anti-Iranian regional coalition and an American reaction to Iranian provocations against the US and the international community.

4.   In an initial attempt to respond to anti-Iranian steps by the US, Iran evidently increases its diplomatic activity in the regional and international arenas. President Rouhani’s recent visit to Oman and Kuwait may indicate Iran’s increasing conviction that that it needs to alleviate the tension in the region and improve its relations with its Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, Iran is acting in the international arena to ensure that the other countries that signed the nuclear agreement remain committed to it. Iran also strives to enhance its economic ties with Russia, the Euro-Asian Union, and other countries.

5.   In the domestic Iranian scene, President Hassan Rouhani’s political opponents on the conservative right take advantage of the tension with the Trump administration to exacerbate their criticism against the president. As part of their attempts to express their disapproval of the president prior to the upcoming elections for the Iranian presidency, which are due to take place in May 2017, his opponents claim that his policy of appeasement and his trust in the US administration have led to the escalation in the US stance toward Tehran. However, even the radical opponents refrain for the time being from calling for a deliberate violation of the nuclear agreement on the part of Iran. It is evident that even President Rouhani’s harsh critics prefer that the responsibility for the possible collapse of the agreement, which wasn’t to their liking in the first place, be borne by the US administration rather than Iran.

6.   In the ITIC's assessment, in spite of the mounting pressure on the part of the US, Iran is not expected to change significantly the essential elements of its policy, mainly with reference to its missile program, its desire to achieve regional hegemony, and its support of terrorism, which, from the perspective of the Iranian regime, serve its vital national interests.In the ITIC's assessment, at most, Iran would be willing to tone down publicly and partially its provocative behavior toward the US and the international community. This includes detention of Western nationals of dual citizenship, operating against US vessels in the Persian Gulf, etc.[1] This is due to the fear of a retaliatory action by the US or mounting American pressure, which may have an adverse influence on Western countries’ willingness to expand their economic ties with Iran.

7.   In conclusion, the ITIC believes that Iran will continue in its policy of testing the limits, while trying not to create situations that would get out of control, such as a blatant violation of the nuclear agreement. Iran will refrain as much as possible from providing the new administration with a pretext to engage in an aggressive action against it and to mobilize the support of the international community for that purpose. At the same time, Iran will continue its diplomatic efforts to strengthen its relations in the international arena (with an emphasis on European countries, Russia and East Asia), and alleviate as much as possible the regional tension, in order to make it difficult for the United States to mobilize international and regional support for an anti-Iranian coalition.

 

The tension between Iran and the US after the inauguration of Donald Trump as president

8. Donald Trump’s inauguration as president on January 20, 2017, created within a short while a significant change in the stance of the US administration toward Iran and escalated the tension between the new administration and Tehran. The test launch of a ballistic missile carried out by Iran in late January 2017 triggered a wave of vehement statements by senior US administration officials, and first and foremost by President Trump, against Iran: Following the test launch, General Michael Flynn, the president’s former national security adviser, declared that Iran “was on notice.” The president himself sent a warning to Iran, accusing it of “playing with fire,” as he put it, and made clear that he didn’t rule out a military action against it. In an interview with Fox News (February 6, 2017), Trump called Iran the world’s No. 1 terrorist state. He reiterated his previous criticism of the nuclear agreement, which he had described as the “worst agreement he had ever seen.” Trump’s Vice President Mike Pence declared in an interview with ABC News (February 5, 2017) that Iran would act properly if it didn’t test the new president’s resoluteness, and said that it must consider carefully its belligerent and provocative actions.

9.  The US administration did not settle with declarations. Following the test launch of the ballistic missile, the US treasury announced on February 3, 2017, the imposing of economic sanctions against thirteen senior officials (eight of whom were Iranians) and a dozen Iranian or Iran-affiliated companies.

10. Even though both parties have so far refrained from escalating measures, the American conduct increased the concern in Tehran of the new president’s intentions. Statements made by Iranian officials expressed the concern that the new American president would carry out the threats he had made during the election campaign to cancel the nuclear agreement and exacerbate sanctions on Iran on various pretexts, such as the continuation of the long-range missile program, Iran’s regional policy, and the violation of human rights.[2] This concern grew stronger after it had turned out that the new administration was adamant to change the attitude taken by the Obama administration and embrace a more aggressive line toward Tehran.

The Iranian reaction to the threats of the Trump administration: belittling the significance of the American threats

11. In their public reactions to the statements by the US administration senior officials, senior Iranian officials tried to belittle the importance and significance of the threats by Washington. They warned the United States not to threaten Iran; They claimed that these were idle threats and that the US could not do anything against Iran; and stressed that the American threats would not influence Iran and would not bring about a change in its policy, including in relation to the missile program and Iran’s regional policy.

12. In his first reaction to the threats by the United States, Supreme Leader Khamenei declared that he thanked Trump for exposing the United States’ true face to the world. In a speech he delivered to Iranian Air Force officers on the eve of the Islamic Revolution Day, Khamenei referred to Trump’s statement that Iran should thank the Obama administration for its conciliatory policy toward it. Khamenei said that Iran had no reason to thank an administration that imposed sanctions on Iran, created ISIS, set fire to Iraq and Syria, and assisted the riots against the Iranian regime in the summer of 2009. Khamenei reiterated his own stance that the “Great Satan” (i.e., the United States) should not be trusted and no hopes should be placed in those opposing the very existence of the Islamic regime in Iran (the Supreme Leader’s website, February 7, 2017). In another speech, Khamenei claimed that the US threats to take military action against Iran were intended to deflect Iranian senior officials’ attention from the true war waged by the US against Iran in the economic battlefield and the cultural arena (the Supreme Leader’s website, February 15, 2017).

13.        Other Iranian senior officials also belittled the significance and the importance of the American threat:

A.   President Hassan Rouhani rejected the US threats. Talking to journalists on the anniversary of the Revolution, Rouhani declared that the massive presence of Iranian citizens in the Revolution Day rallies was intended to send a message to the US leaders that they should refrain from threats and intimidation against the Iranian people. Rouhani noted that during the 38 years that had passed since the Revolution, the Iranian people proved that anyone talking to them in the language of threats would have to regret that. He announced that the American threats would not succeed in deterring Iran from continuing to follow in the path of the Revolution (Fars News, February 10, 2017).

B.   Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif declared that the US threats against Iran do not affect it. According to Zarif in an interview with NBC, Iran is not frightened by the threats and the sanctions against it are ineffective. However, he pointed out that his country does not desire any confrontation with the US (IRNA, February 20, 2017).

C.  “Iranian senior officials”pointed out, in response to the US claims regarding the test launch of the surface-to-surface missiles carried out by Iran that the Iranian missile program is defensive in nature. According to them, these tests do not represent any violation of the UN Security Council resolutions because the missiles were not intended to carry nuclear warheads. Ali-Akbar Velayati, the Supreme Leader adviser for international affairs, declared that Iran would continue with its missile program, which is intended for defense purposes only. Following the statements by US National Security Adviser Flynn, who warned Iran after the test that it had carried out in late January 2017, Velayati said that it wasn’t the first time an unexperienced man from the US threatened Iran and that in time, also President Trump would understand that hollow, vain statements against Iran only damage his credibility (ISNA, February 2, 2017).

D.  Iranian senior officialsalso dismissed reports that the US administration intends to designate the Revolutionary Guards a terror sponsoring organization. Foreign Minister Zarif said that the United States has no interest in doing so since the whole world knows that the Revolutionary Guards provide the most support to the countries of the region in their struggle against terror (Mehr, February 25, 2017). In an interview with Al-Jazeera, Ali-Akbar Velayati said that Iran is not afraid of threats and that an American operation against the Revolutionary Guards would not influence their support of Hezbollah, Iraq and Syria (Fars News, February 9, 2017).

E.   Khamenei’s advisor Ali-Akbar Velayatialso tried to calm the situation and said that a military confrontation between Iran and the US is unlikely. In an interview with the Tasnim News Agency (February 12, 2017), Velayati referred to Trump as a “calculated man” and estimated that the American president would not initiate a confrontation with a powerful country such as Iran, which may end up in an unprecedented fiasco in American history. Velayati noted that the US is not as strong today as it was when it attacked Iraq and Afghanistan, and that Iran, in comparison, is stronger than these countries. Therefore, not only would Trump not dare attack Iran, but conditions in the United States do not allow him to act as he pleases.

14. Iranian media also tried to belittle the importance of the US threats. A series of editorials published in recent weeks in the Iranian media claimed that the threats by the new American administration are baseless. Iranian commentators estimated that President Trump is not interested in a military confrontation with Iran since this is contradictory to his wish to address his country's domestic matters as his top priority. Commentators also pointed out the weighty constraints facing Trump, which have already forced him to back down from some of his intentions, for instance, regarding the transfer of the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Thus, for instance, the conservative daily Javan (February 14, 2017) claimed that the new president is occupied with domestic challenges and therefore cannot execute a military option against Iran. The military threats by the US are part of a psychological war conducted by Western media in an attempt to instill fear of war in Iranian society, the newspaper said. The reformist daily Mardom Salari (February 25, 2017) also estimated that the American president is not expected to take any military action against Iran because he is occupied with other issues, including China and Russia, and that at any rate he does not have the required legitimacy in his own country to declare war against Iran.

15. Notwithstanding the relatively cautious tone of the statements of Supreme Leader Khamenei, senior political officials, and the Iranian media, senior Iranian military officials adopted a harsher rhetoric toward the US and warned the new administration not to dare act against Iran. Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohammad-Ali Ja’fari declared in a ceremony on the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution that the American administration must recognize the uselessness of threats against Iran while the enemies of the Islamic Revolution recognize its might. Ja’fari claimed that even American commentators are aware of the risks entailed in a confrontation with Iran and present to President Trump assessments that Iran is treating the US as a “paper tiger” (Tasnim News, February 8, 2017). Revolutionary Guards Deputy Commander Hossein Salami also warned the US against using a military option against Iran, saying that the enemy knows that opting for the military approach would turn its country into a “cemetery for the aggressors” (Fars, February 20, 2017).

Public rhetoric vs. authentic Iranian concern

16.        In spite of the public rhetoric, which usually tried to belittle the risks posed to Iran by the new American administration, the ITIC believes that as a matter of fact, the Iranian regime does not completely rule out these possible risks. The main such risks from the Iranian perspective:

A.   Concern about economic damage: The main Iranian concerns are centered in the creation of a negative international atmosphere that would have a negative effect on Western companies’ willingness to once again do business with Iran. This may compromise Tehran’s efforts to improve its economic situation following the nuclear agreement.

B.   Iranian concern of possible retaliatory measures by the US and the international community in response to Iranian provocations.

C.  Notwithstanding the above, it seems that in the weeks that have passed since Trump took office, there is an increasing conviction in Iran that President Trump does not intend to cancel the nuclear agreement, especially in view of the expected opposition to such a step by the other countries that have signed the agreement.


Calls in Iranian media not to give President Trump an excuse to take steps against Iran

17. The Iranian press, especially the media affiliated with the pragmatic camp and the supporters of President Rouhani, claimed that the US threats should be taken seriously. Iranian commentators speculated that even if President Trump’s ability to take steps against Iran is limited due to domestic and international opposition, it would be a mistake to ignore his threats. This is especially true in light of the inability to predict his behavior and given the fact that countries in the international arena, led by Israel and Saudi Arabia, are making a major effort to encourage the new administration in Washington to increase the pressure on Iran. These commentators are calling on the government in Tehran to adopt a cautious approach in view of the American threats and to avoid any action that would provide the administration in Washington with an excuse to take action against Iran.

18.A n editorial published in the reformist newspaper Ebtekar (February 5, 2017) warned that President Trump and his national security adviser had designated Iran as a target for their aggressive policies. The daily claimed that the US is in need of excuses to justify its hostility toward Iran, and Tehran should therefore be careful not to provide President Trump with the slightest excuse to implement his “adventurous policy.” According to the daily, the Trump administration’s strength against Iran lies in its ability to find a legitimate ally for an operation against Iran, and Saudi Arabia and Israel are unable to provide him with the necessary legitimacy to do so.

19. The Asr-e Iran website (February 4, 2017) also called on the government in Tehran to adopt a cautious approach in light of the US threats. The website warns that the domestic opposition to President Trump is liable to increase his efforts to seek external threats and initiate a war against Iran. The international community’s opposition to the US president serves the interests of Iran, and Tehran must continue its diplomatic efforts and avoid taking steps that would change the international atmosphere against it. The adoption of extremist policies by Iran, claimed Asr-e Iran, is precisely what Trump, “the Zionists,” and the Saudis want. If the government continues to exercise political moderation in its foreign relations and to improve its relations with other countries around the world, the United States will not be able to mobilize an international coalition against Iran even if it wants to. The website summed up the situation by saying that the required response to Trump’s “insanity” is not insanity but logic.

20 .Initial indications of Iran’s concern over the US administration’s intentions and the public calls in the Iranian media to adopt a cautious policy can also be found in Tehran’s practical moves. In early February 2017, Western media reported that in view of the threats against the United States, Tehran had withdrawn its intention to carry out an additional test launch of a long-range surface-to-surface missile. Instead, it launched a Mersad short-range surface-to-air missile on February 8, 2017 (Fox News, February 8, 2017). However, it should be stressed that it is still too early to assess whether Iran intends to change its overall policy in relation to its missile program.

 

Iran’s diplomatic effort to recruit supporters and allies

21. With the election of US President Trump, Iran’s concern over the establishment of a regional anti-Iranian coalition led by Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Israel has increased. This concern intensified in recent weeks in light of statements by senior Saudi, Turkish and Israeli officials against Iran. During a recent visit to Bahrain, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused Iran of striving to disseminate “Persian nationalism” in Syria and Iraq. At the same time, in a speech in the Munich Security Conference, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu claimed that Iran is promoting Shiite separatism in the region. At the same conference, Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir accused Iran of being the main sponsor of terrorism in the world and a destabilizing force in the Middle East. Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said in his speech at the conference that Iran wants to destabilize every country in the Middle East, and described the Iranian Revolutionary Guards as the world’s biggest terrorist organization. Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir’s visit to Iraq on February 25, 2017, the first visit to Iraq by a Saudi foreign minister since 2003, was perceived in Iran as another expression of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to expand its regional influence and curb Iran’s influence.

22. Commentary in the Iranian press recently called on the government in Tehran to strengthen its ties with Europe, Russia and China, in order to counterbalance the pressure from the US, taking advantage of the international opposition to President Trump’s policy. The newspaper Mardom Salari called on the government to act urgently to strengthen its ties with Europe, especially France, Germany, Britain and Italy, to maintain good relations with China and Russia, and to initiate the convening of conferences of the Islamic countries with the aim of curbing anti-Iranian efforts of the United States. The economic daily Donya-ye Eqtesad wrote that the international consensus against Washington has created an opportunity for Iran to expand its ties with Europe and East Asia, which improved in the wake of the nuclear agreement.

23. The Iranian effort to counterbalance the US pressure in the international arena has found expression in statements made by Iranian Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri. The Vice President announced Iran’s plans to upgrade its economic relations with Russia during President Rouhani’s visit to Moscow, which will take place in a few weeks. According to Jahangiri, Iran is interested in expanding its economic ties with the Euro-Asian Economic Union, whose members are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia (Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), February 21, 2017). In the regional arena, President Rouhani visited Oman and Kuwait in mid-February 2017. The visit was made in light of Iran’s growing recognition of the need to improve ties with the Gulf States as part of the diplomatic solution to the regional risks.

President Rouhani’s opponents take advantage of the fear of the Trump administration

24. In view ofthe tension between Iran and the US, President Rouhani’s hardline political opponents have increased their criticism of him, claiming that the radicalization of the US stance is rooted in his erroneous policy. In their efforts to attack the Iranian president shortly before the presidential elections scheduled for May 2017, his adversaries have reiterated that it was his policy of appeasement and his trust in the US administration that led to escalation in the US policy toward Tehran.

25. An article published in the radical daily Kayhan (February 5, 2017) claimed that the recent steps by the US administration against Iran, including the ban forbidding Muslims to enter the United States and the sanctions against Iranian individuals and companies, are a direct result of the nuclear agreement. These developments indicate that the nuclear issue was only an excuse for the US administration to present Iran as a threat and to exert pressure on it. According to Kayhan, the steps taken by Trump stem from President Rouhani’s weakness, the “smile politics” that he adopted toward the West, and his continuing silence in view of the threats and demands made by the US during the nuclear negotiations and after the signing of the nuclear agreement. Had the government crossed the “red lines” defined by the Supreme Leader and reacted aggressively to violations of the agreement by the US, the Trump administration would not dare to treat Iran this way.

26. However, despite the harsh criticism of Rouhani, the hardliners in Iran also avoid explicit calling for a deliberate violation of the nuclear agreement on the part of Iran. It is evident that even President Rouhani’s harshest critics prefer that the US administration, rather than Iran, bear the responsibility for the possible collapse of the nuclear agreement, which they had reservations about from the outset.

[1]On the background of the Iranian fears and the uncertainty regarding the steps taken by the Trump administration, media outlets affiliated with President Rouhani and the pragmatic camp maintained that cautious behavior is necessary and that the US threats should not be taken lightly. This may be initially reflected by Iran’s actual behavior. In early 2017, Western media reported that given the US threats, Iran withdrew its intention to carry out yet another launch of a long-range surface-to-surface missile, and launched a long-range surface-to-air missile instead.
[2]For more information, see the ITIC's Information Bulletin from November 22, 2016: “Initial Reactions in Iran to the Election of Donald Trump as President of the United States,” http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/21096.

An analysis of threats against Israel made by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah


Hassan Nasrallah in a speech on the annual memorial day for the three high-ranking Hezbollah shahids (“the shahid commanders”) Sheikh Ragheb Harb, Abbas Mussawi, and Imad Mughniyeh. The figures of the three shahids, whom Hezbollah has turned into symbols of sacrifice, appear on the left (Al-Manar, February 16, 2017)
Hassan Nasrallah in a speech on the annual memorial day for the three high-ranking Hezbollah shahids (“the shahid commanders”) Sheikh Ragheb Harb, Abbas Mussawi, and Imad Mughniyeh. The figures of the three shahids, whom Hezbollah has turned into symbols of sacrifice, appear on the left (Al-Manar, February 16, 2017)

Overview

1.   In his speech on the anniversary of the killing of Hezbollah’s three high-ranking shahids (Sheikh Ragheb Harb, Abbas Mussawi, and Imad Mughniyeh), and in an interview with an Iranian TV channel, Hassan Nasrallah referred at great length to the issues of war with Israel. According to Nasrallah, Israel considers Hezbollah a paramount strategic threat, and therefore it often threats with war and elaborates on the heavy damage that will be caused to Lebanese infrastructures in that war (the so-called Dahiya doctrine). Nasrallah says that threats of this kind have been made in the past, but they recently increased in number after Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. Nasrallah notes that he doesn’t believe that Israel intends to go to war. He says once again that Israel is deterred from going to war because it is well aware of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, which will prevent it from achieving a decisive victory in the next war.

2.   To demonstrate these capabilities, thereby strengthening the message of deterrence, Nasrallah emphasizes the ability of Hezbollah’s precision missiles to inflict heavy damage on Israel. He points out his own “contribution” to the transfer of the ammonia tank from Haifa Bay, and boasts (based on monitoring Israeli media) that even if the ammonia tank is transferred to another site, Hezbollah will hit it.Nasrallah adds that Hezbollah is able to hit the ship the carries the ammonia to Haifa Bay. In addition, he notes that Hezbollah is able to hit the nuclear reactor in Dimona and inflict heavy damage on Israel. As he points out, Israel is aware of the fact that “if [Hezbollah’s] missiles hit this reactor, it [i.e., Israel] will be hit, their entity will be hit”. To the Iranian interviewer’s question whether Hezbollah will really attack Dimona, Nasrallah replies, “We are ready to carry it out and we have the courage to do so…”


Analysis of the background and the significance of Nasrallah’s statements

3.   In the ITIC's assessment, at the background of Nasrallah’s statements are the regional and international developments, which raised the level of fears of Hezbollah (and Iran, Hezbollah’s sponsor). In the United States, a new president came to power, who is perceived as pro-Israel and as one who may resort to a more vehement policy towards Iran. In Syria, Hezbollah carries on with its deep involvement in the civil war, while investing a lot of resources in it and sustaining many casualties,[1] and is harshly criticized in Lebanon and in the Arab world. In the regional arena, a struggle is going on between the Shiite axis under the leadership of Iran and the Sunni axis led by Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah, which is Iran’s “long arm”, is involved in supporting Iran’s proxies in the various arenas (Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen).

4.   In the ITIC's assessment, the rising level of fear has caused Nasrallah once again to send messages of deterrence against Israel. Nasrallah’s statements on the heavy damage that Hezbollah is capable of inflicting on Israel, which he has repeated over and over again during the recent years, are based on the upgrade of Hezbollah’s military capabilities after the Second Lebanon War. Part of this upgrade is the supply of state-of-the-art weapons by Iran, including long-range precision missiles. In addition, Hezbollah possesses drones that can be launched against pinpoint targets in Israel. These capabilities allow Hezbollah to seriously hit strategic targets inside Israel, causing many losses among civilians in wartime.

5.    The availability of these capabilities in Hezbollah’s hands allows Hassan Nasrallah in recent years to threat Israel over and over again in order todeter it from a military move against Hezbollah. In his statements he points out that Hezbollah has a pool of targets, the hitting of which “can turn the lives of hundreds of thousands of Israelis into hell.” This pool of targets includes, according to Nasrallah, targets of civilian, economic and industrial nature, including power stations and nuclear facilities (Al-Mayadeen Channel, September 3, 2012). One such statement was Nasrallah’s speech about a year ago, in which he threatened hitting the ammonia tank in Haifa, claiming that the effect of such hit will be similar to a “nuclear bomb”.[2]   

Cartoon of Hassan Nasrallah standing on coffins of Hezbollah’s operatives while saying, “We are in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria” (Twitter account of someone calling himself in Arabic “ex-Hezbollah member”, February 16, 2016)
Cartoon of Hassan Nasrallah standing on coffins of Hezbollah’s operatives while saying, “We are in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria” (Twitter account of someone calling himself in Arabic “ex-Hezbollah member”, February 16, 2016)

6.   The ITIC believes that, given the regional and international developments, Nasrallah wishes to strengthen once again the message of deterrence against Israel. This message, from Hezbollah’s perspective, relies on Hezbollah’s advanced military capabilities, mainly its arsenal of rockets and missiles, which creates an “equation of deterrence” between Hezbollah and Israel.The main point of this equation is that both sides refrain from military initiatives against each other for fear from the damage that the other side can cause them. This “equation of deterrence”, from Nasrallah’s perspective, is the basis for the calm in the Israeli-Lebanese border, which allows Hezbollah to deepen its involvement in the war in Syria without having to fear that Israel would seize this opportunity to engage in an offensive initiative against Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena.

Appendices

7.   This document includes three appendices:

a.   Appendix A:Reference to Israel in Hassan Nasrallah’s speech on the annual memorial day for the three high-ranking shahids of Hezbollah (February 16, 2017)

b.   Appendix B:Reference to Israel in Hassan Nasrallah's interview with Iranian TV, Channel 1 (IRIB1) (February 20, 2017)

c.   Appendix C:Commentary in the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, expressing Hezbollah’s positions (February 24, 2017)

[1]According to an article in the Israeli daily Haaretz, Israeli Army Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot said in the Israeli Knesset’s Foreign Relations and Defense Committee that Hezbollah had had 1,700 dead and over 6,000 wounded in the war in Syria (article by Amos Harel, Haaretz, February 24, 2017).
[2]See the ITIC's Information Bulletin from February 25, 2016: “Hassan Nasrallah’s “Ammonia Speech:” The Threat for Israel and its Significance.”

Spotlight on Iran

February 12-26, 2017 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Qasem Soleimani (center) at a memorial service for Hassan Shateri (Defa Press, February 16, 2017).

Qasem Soleimani (center) at a memorial service for Hassan Shateri (Defa Press, February 16, 2017).

Mostafa Zalnejad (left) with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Qasem Soleimani (ABNA, February 14, 2017).

Mostafa Zalnejad (left) with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Qasem Soleimani (ABNA, February 14, 2017).

Hassan Rouhani meets with Hadiya Abbas (Website of the Iranian president, February 22, 2017).

Hassan Rouhani meets with Hadiya Abbas (Website of the Iranian president, February 22, 2017).

Mohammad Javad Zarif meets with Sergey Lavrov on the sidelines of the Munich conference (IRNA, February 18, 2017).

Mohammad Javad Zarif meets with Sergey Lavrov on the sidelines of the Munich conference (IRNA, February 18, 2017).

Iraqi president Fuad Masum interviewed by Tasnim News, February 12, 2017

Iraqi president Fuad Masum interviewed by Tasnim News, February 12, 2017

Velayati meets with Bahaeddin (Tasnim, February 15, 2017)

Velayati meets with Bahaeddin (Tasnim, February 15, 2017)

Khamenei speaking at the conference (Tasnim News, February 21, 2017)

Khamenei speaking at the conference (Tasnim News, February 21, 2017)


Main Points

Fox News reported that during the second half of February 2017, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Qods Force, paid a visit to Moscow. He met with senior officials in the Russian administration to express Iran's dissatisfaction with the improvement in Russia's relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.

  • Tension has surfaced between Iran and Turkey. The Iranian foreign ministry summoned the Turkish ambassador to Tehran for clarifications after senior Turkish officials criticized Iran's regional policies and accused Iran of Shi'ite subversion.
  • Two Iranian fighters were killed in Syria during the past two weeks.
  • Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, said Iran would continue to allow Russian planes to use Iranian airspace to attack in Syria.
  • In the middle of February 2017, another round of talks was held between the Syrian opposition and the Syrian regime. The talks were held in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, under the aegis of Russia, Iran and Turkey.
  • Na'im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, said his organization was proud of its relations with Iran, and called on other regional countries to strengthen their relations with Iran which, he claimed, had changed the face of the Middle East.
  • Interviewed by the Iranian news agency Tasnim News, Fuad Masum, president of Iraq, defended the presence of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, in Iraq. He claimed it his presence natural, and that there were other foreignmilitary advisors in Iraq.
  • On February 21-22, 2017, the Sixth International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Intifada was held in Tehran.

 

General Information
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, 1. On February 15, 2017, Fox News reported that on February 14 Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, had arrived in Moscow to meet with senior Russian administration officials. The report was based on Western intelligence sources, which reported that the visit lasted a number of days and that its objective was to express Iran's dissatisfaction with the improvement in Russia's relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Iran, according to the sources, was especially displeased by arms deals and increasing economic ties. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Paskov refused to comment. During the past two years Soleimani has gone to Moscow at least twice for broadening Iranian-Russian security and political cooperation in Syria.
  • On February 16, 2017, Soleimani attended a memorial service in Tehran for Hassan Shateri, a high-ranking IRGC officer killed in February 2013, when a convoy of weapons for Hezbollah was attacked on the Syrian-Lebanese border. At the time the attack was attributed to Israel.
  • The Iranian foreign ministry summoned the Turkish ambassador to Tehran for clarifications after senior Turkish officials criticized Iran's regional policies.
  • While on a visit to Bahrain, Turkish President Erdogan accused Iran of seeking to spread Persian nationalism in Syria and Iraq.
  • Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Turkish foreign minister, speaking at the security conference held in Munich last week, said Iran promoted regional Shi'ite separatism. Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, criticized the Turkish minister's statements, saying there was a limit to Iran's patience with Turkey's positions. He said that anyone who supported terrorist groups and caused bloodshed, escalation and regional destabilization could not point a finger and accuse others (Mehr, February 20, 2017).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, said those who entered Syria or Iraq without an invitation or authorization were aggressors and had to leave. They could leave of their own volition or be forced to leave by the Syrian or Iraqi people. He made the remark in response to the anti-Iranian statements of senior Turkish and Saudi Arabian officials at the Munich security conference. At a press conference held after he met with Hadiya Abbas, speaker of the Syrian parliament, Velayati said Turkey had not achieved any of its goals in Syria (IRNA, February 21, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • Two Iranian fighters were killed in Syria during the past two weeks. They were Mostafa Zalnejad from Mazandaran Province, killed on February 14, 2017, and Mehdi Na'maei Aali from Alborz Province, killed on February 11, 2017.
  • Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, said Iran would continue allowing Russian planes to use its airspace to attack in Syria because Iran and Russia enjoyed full bilateral cooperation. He said Iran was willing to coordinate with Russia in every respect regarding Syria, and that Russian flights in Iranian airspace were carried out after having been planned and coordinated with Tehran. He said Russian bombers had recently flown over Iran but had not conducted any refueling operations (Fars, February 11, 2017). In August 2016 Russian warplanes used the military airfield in Hamedan, Iran, for attacking targets in Syria. That stopped temporarily because of internal Iranian criticism, but senior Iranian officials have already announced that Iran may again allow the base to be used for operational needs.
  • Last week Hadiya Abbas, speaker of the Syrian parliament, paid a visit to Tehran on the eve of the conference supporting the "Palestinian intifada." She met with President Hassan Rouhani, who told her that Syria was in the front lines of the "resistance" to Israel and that Iran would support the Syrian people until the final victory over terrorism. Abbas thanked Rouhani for Iran's support of Syria, and said strengthening relations with Iran was of special importance to Syria (Fars, February 22, 2017).
  • Meeting with Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese parliament, on the sidelines of the conference, Rouhani said that had Iran and Lebanon not coordinated with Syria, Damascus would have turned into the capital of ISIS in the region (Tasnim, February 22, 2017).
  • On February 16, 2017, another round of talks was held in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, between the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime, under the aegis of Russia, Iran and Turkey. The Iranian delegation was headed by Hossein Jaberi Ansari, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs. He gave a speech in which he reiterated Iran's official position, which stressed the preservation of Syria's territorial integrity as a principle for the political resolution of the Syrian crisis (Mehr, February 16, 2017).
  • At the security conference held in Munich, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, met with Staffan de Mistura, UN envoy to Syria. He also met with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, with whom he discussed developments in Syria and bilateral relations (IRNA, February 18, 2017).
  • Na'im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, said Hezbollah was proud of its ties to Iran, and called on other countries to strengthen their ties with Tehran to promote increased regional stability. At a conference in Beirut he said Iran had changed the face of the Middle East, breathed new life into the Palestinian cause and provided support for Hezbollah and Syria. He added that in 2000 Iranian support had made it possible for Hezbollah to achieve its first victory over the "Zionist enemy" and liberate south Lebanon (Fars, February 18, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq and the Gulf
  • Interviewed by Tasnim News on February 12, 2017, Iraqi president Fuad Masum defended the presence of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, in Iraq. He claimed Soleimani's presence was "natural" and that there were other foreign military advisors in the country from the United States, Britain, France and other European countries. He said Iran could not be denied the right to deploy military advisors to Iraq. He also said that the historical ties between Iran and Iraq served Iraqi interests, adding that strategic relations with Iran were important and had to be fostered because of Iranian support for Iraq in various areas, including the supplying of arms and the deployment of military advisors.
  • Iraq's national consensus party accused Iran of violating the sovereignty of Iraq's territorial waters. On February 15, 2017, former Iraqi vice president Ayad Allawi said in a statement that Iran was seeking to take control of areas subject to a historical dispute between the two countries. They included the Shatt al-Arab waterway in the Persian Gulf and the al-Fao peninsula on the Iraqi side. The statement called on the Iraqi government and parliament to respond quickly and with determination to "Iran's aggression" and to reach agreements with Iran to prevent the loss of Iraqi access to international waters, which would endanger its security and economy (Baghdad Post, February 15).
  • In the middle of February, Saleheddin Bahaeddin, the secretary general of the Islamic Unity Party of Iraqi Kurdistan, paid a visit to Tehran where he met with senior Iranian officials. Ali Larijani, speaker of the Majlis (parliament), meeting with Bahaeddin, stressed the importance of preserving Iraq's territorial integrity. He called on the Kurdish parties in Iraq to reach an agreement among themselves, claiming that reducing disagreement in Kurdistan and increasing cooperation between Kurdistan and the central government in Baghdad would support stability and security in Iraq.
  • Bahaeddin also met with Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, who also stressed the need to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity. Velayati warned that splitting Iraq between Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds served the "plots of the enemies of the Iraqi people" and contradicted Baghdad's policies (IRNA and Tasnim, February 15, 2017).
  • On February 17, 2017, Ayatollah Kazem Sedighi, Tehran's provisional Friday Prayers Leader, said the defeat of the Bahraini regime was close, and that the fate of the rule of the House of Khalifa would be the same as the fate of the deposed Shah. As to the ongoing protests in Bahrain, Sedighi said the citizens of Bahrain wanted free elections and independence, and were not prepared to accept a dictator. There was no doubt, he said, of their victory (Fars, February 17, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • On February 21-22, 2017, the Sixth International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Intifada was held in Tehran to express the support of Iran and the Muslim world for the Palestinian cause and the "liberation of Jerusalem." There were 700 participants from 80 countries, including representatives of parliaments, NGO activists, activists from pro-Palestinian organizations and leaders or Palestinian organizations. Ali Larijani presided over the conference, and the closing speech was given by Iranian president Hassan Rouhani.
  • Heads of the Iranian regime gave speeches attacking Israel ("the cancerous tumor") and its policies towards the Palestinians, called for the continuation of the "resistance" until the complete liberation of Palestine, stressed Iran's commitment to its continued support of the Palestinians and their struggle, criticized the willingness of several Middle Eastern states to establish relations with Israel, and warned of distracting the attention of the Arab-Muslim world from the Palestinian cause to focusing on internal regional problems. In the opening speech, supreme leader Ali Khamenei said Palestine had to be the axis on which Muslim unity turned, despite the internal disagreements in the Muslim world. He said the path of "resistance" had curbed the expansion of the "Zionist regime" and kept it from realizing its plot to take over the Middle East (Tasnim, February 21, 2017). 

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

Support for violence and terrorism and calls for the destruction of Israel at the Sixth International Conference on Palestinian Intifada in Tehran

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivering his speech at the conference (Tasnim News, February 21, 2017)

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivering his speech at the conference (Tasnim News, February 21, 2017)

Logo of the Sixth International Conference on Palestinian Intifada (Tasnim News, February 21, 2017)

Logo of the Sixth International Conference on Palestinian Intifada (Tasnim News, February 21, 2017)

Session of the International Conference on Palestinian Intifada (Tasnim, February 21, 2017)

Session of the International Conference on Palestinian Intifada (Tasnim, February 21, 2017)

PIJ leader Ramadan Shalah delivers a speech at the conference (YouTube, February 21, 2017)

PIJ leader Ramadan Shalah delivers a speech at the conference (YouTube, February 21, 2017)

Osama Hamdan, who is in charge of Hamas’s external relations and serves as Hamas’s representative in Lebanon, delivers a speech at the closing ceremony of the conference in Tehran (PalToday Channel, February 22, 2017)

Osama Hamdan, who is in charge of Hamas’s external relations and serves as Hamas’s representative in Lebanon, delivers a speech at the closing ceremony of the conference in Tehran (PalToday Channel, February 22, 2017)

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem delivers a speech at the conference (YouTube, February 21, 2017)

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem delivers a speech at the conference (YouTube, February 21, 2017)

 “All for Palestine” (Twitter, February 20, 2017)

“All for Palestine” (Twitter, February 20, 2017)


Overview

1.   On February 21-22, 2017, the Sixth International Conference on Palestinian Intifada was held in Tehran. The conference has been held since 1991 in accordance with the “Law on the Support of the People of Palestine’s Islamic Revolution” passed in the Iranian Majles in April 1990. So far, the conference has been held five times (in 1991, 2001, 2006, 2008 and 2011). About 700 delegates from eighty countries attended the conference, including parliament members from the region and elsewhere and NGO activists. Among the attending parliament members were the speakers of the Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi parliaments, parliament speakers from several African countries, the speaker of the North Korean parliament, and the deputy speaker of the Russian parliament. Prominent among the participants were representatives of Middle Eastern terror organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

2.   At the background of the conference this year are the tension between Iran and the new American administration; the vehement Israeli statements against Iran; and the reports of rapprochement between Israel and several Sunni Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, which is leading the regional anti-Iranian axis. Similar to the “Global Jerusalem Day” which has taken place in Iran every year since 1979, the Conference on Palestinian Intifada was intended to express Iran’s support for the Palestinian cause and the “Liberation of Jerusalem” as the main component of the Iranian aspiration for regional hegemony. Like every year, this year as well, the conference served as a podium for blatant incitement against Israel, calls for the elimination of the State of Israel, and inflammatory rhetoric against the countries of the region which are willing to recognize Israel and maintain relations with it. Israel was portrayed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a “malignant tumor” which developed in stages and therefore should be dealt with gradually. This “malignant tumor” should be dealt with through the Palestinian Intifada (i.e., by violence and terrorism) until the annihilation of the State of Israel (the “complete liberation” of Palestine).

3.   Holding the conference in Tehran expresses once again the Iranian hostility toward Israel, which is still a major component of the regime’s ideologyThe nuclear agreement not only failed to bring about a change in Iran’s policy toward Israel, but to a great extent encouraged the Iranian regime to emphasize even more its hostility toward Israel as one of the symbols that it uses to prove its adherence to the values of the Islamic Revolution.[1] Holding the conference at the present time also provided Iran with the opportunity of demonstrating to the United States and the countries of the region its regional leadership and mobilizing public opinion from within and without through the outspoken hostility toward Israel and the support of the Palestinians.

 

The conference
Overview

4.   The conference was chaired by Iranian Majles Speaker Ali Larijani. It was opened by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s speech, and closed by President Hassan Ruhani’s speech. In their speeches, the leaders of the Iranian regime lashed out against Israel and its policy against the Palestinians and called for the continuation of “resistance” until the “complete liberation of Palestine” (i.e., the annihilation of the State of Israel). The Iranian speakers emphasized Iran's commitment to continue its support for the Palestinians and their struggle. They criticized the willingness of some of the countries of the region to maintain relations with Israel and warned against deflecting the Islamic and Arab world’s attention from the Palestinian problem to the internal crises faced by the region.

5.   Shortly before the opening of the conference, Kazem Jalali, the spokesman for the conference and member of the Majles Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy, explained the importance of holding the conference at the present time due to the deflection of the Islamic world’s attention to regional issues, and the decrease in the importance of the Palestinian issue in the regional list of priorities. According to Jalali, while Israel continues in its oppression of the Palestinians, its siege on Gaza and policy of settlements, part of the Arab countries are willing to establish ties and normalize their relations with it. He said that convening the conference under these conditions was intended to stress that the Palestinian issue should be placed on top of the Muslim world’s priorities and that internal differences of opinion and religious struggles among the Muslims should be abandoned in favor of Muslim unity in the struggle against the “Zionist regime.” Jalali added that the conference would discuss the methods of the struggle against the Zionists’ efforts to Juidize Jerusalem, especially in view of President Donald Trump’s statements on moving the US embassy to Jerusalem (ISNA, February 18, 2017).

Participation of representatives of the Palestinian organizations and Hezbollah

6.   Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations attended the conference in Tehran. Hezbollah was represented by Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem. Among the Palestinian organizations, prominent were Ramadan Abdallah Shalah, the leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a terrorist organization supported by Iran and maintaining close ties with it. Other organizations settled with delegations including senior echelons. The Lebanese Al-Akhbar daily reported that Egypt had prevented Hamas’s Gaza Strip delegation from traveling through its territory. The delegation was originally headed by Mahmoud al-Zahar and Khalil al-Hayya, and included over 35 other Hamas operatives (Al-Akhbar, February 21, 2017). Faute de mieux, Hamas eventually sent a lower-ranking delegation, which included Khaled al-Qadoumi, Hamas’s representative in Iran, Osama Hamdan, who is in charge of Hamas’s external relations, Sami Abu Zuhri, Hamas’s spokesman, and Ali Baraka, Hamas’s representative in Lebanon (alarabpost.com, February 21, 2017). On behalf of Fatah, Central Committee member Abbas Zaki was sent to represent the organization, as well as Salim Zanoun, chairman of the PLO’s Palestinian National Council (alarabpost.com, February 21, 2017).

7.   Following are several outstanding statements:

a.   Ramadan Abdallah Shalah, the PIJ leader, praised the “resistance”(i.e., terrorist organizations) in the Gaza Strip which stood fast during three wars against Israel. He added that the Palestinians would strive to develop the capabilities of the “resistance” and its weapons. He lashed out against the Palestinian Authority and described it as a governance authority which does not represent the Palestinians but works to maintain Israel’s security, defending the settlements and undermining the “resistance” (Pal-Info, February 21, 2017). His statement was denounced by Fatah, which described it as “irresponsible” (Safa, February 21, 2017).

b.   Osama Hamdan, who is in charge of Hamas’s external relations and serves as Hamas’s representative in Lebanon, gave a speech at the closing ceremony of the conference. He praised the “resistance” (i.e., the terrorist organizations) which, according to him, succeeded in defeating Israel in all the wars in the Gaza Strip. He also praised the so-called popular terrorism (Al-Quds Intifada) which, as he put it, expressed the heroism of younger Palestinians. He called for the escalation of the “resistance” and strengthening of the Gaza Strip as a “basis for the resistance” through the supply of weapons and measures to support steadfastness in the Gaza Strip (PalToday Channel, February 22, 2017).

c.   Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem said that Palestine would be “liberated” step by step through the “resistance.” He pointed out that Hezbollah is the solution, and that the organization recognizes only one Palestine whose capital is Jerusalem. He said that Iran hadn’t ceased supporting the Palestinian people and its intifada despite all pressures. At the end of his speech, he stressed that the Palestinians are the spearhead of the struggle against Israel and should be assisted and joined (Al-Ahed, February 21, 2017).

The closing announcement of the conference and a propaganda campaign on social media

8.   Following are the main points of the closing announcement of the conference:

a.   The participants of the conference pointed out the need to place the Palestinian problem on top of the priority list of the Muslim world and the Arab countries. The closing announcement recognized the “resistance” (i.e., terrorism) as the only way to realize the “legitimate rights” of the Palestinian people and portrayed the intifada as the only way to struggle against the “occupation.” The conference participants called for employing all means to support the Palestinians, the continuation of the efforts to put an end to “seven decades of Zionist occupation”, working towards solving the internal crises and struggles in the Muslim world, and demanding from the international community to exert pressure on Israel to put an end to its “inhuman” behavior.

b.   The announcement pointed out the “right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their own country,” called on Arab and Muslim countries to close down their embassies in the United States in the event of the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem, called on all countries to sever their relations with Israel and boycott Israeli products, and demanded that parliaments in the Muslim and Arab world pass a legislation preventing the establishment of any relations with  the “Zionist regime” (Tasnim, February 22, 2017).

Propaganda campaign on social media

9.  While the conference was underway, supporters of the Iranian regime initiated a propaganda campaign on social media under the name “All for Palestine.” As part of this campaign, Iranian and Muslim Internet users posted their comments under the hashtag #All4Palestine in Arabic, Persian and English (Mehr, February 20, 2017). Comments included calls for the liberation of Palestine, expressing support for the Palestinian “resistance” and intifada, quoting declarations by the Iranian Supreme Leader according to which Israel will cease to exist within 25 years, and calls for the elimination of Israel.

Appendix: Statements by Senior Iranian leaders at the conference
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei

10. In the opening speech of the conference, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei referred to the crisis in the region. He said that crises in some countries of the region had led to diminishing support for the Palestinian problem and for the sacred value of the Liberation of Jerusalem. Those who forced the “Zionist regime” on the region so as to undermine its stability are the ones behind the internal struggles in the region. The enemies of the Muslim nation have managed to force internal wars on the peoples of the region and weaken the status of the Palestinian problem. In spite of the internal differences of opinion among the Muslim countries, Palestine can and should serve as the axis of unity for all Muslim countries. One of the achievements of the conference is in the declaration that the Palestinian problem is the top priority of the Muslim peoples and freedom seekers. The Muslim peoples should jointly act for the liberation of Palestine.

11.        According to Ali Khamenei, the Palestinian people has no other choice but to maintain the flames of struggle as they have done so far. The intifada, which broke out in the occupied territories for the third time, is moving forward, and with Allah’s help will be able to force another defeat upon the occupying regime. According to Khamenei, the “malignant tumor” (i.e., Israel) evolved in stages, and dealing with it should also be gradual. Several intifadas and ongoing resistance managed to achieve several important goals, and the Palestinian intifada will continue until the complete liberation of Palestine (i.e., the annihilation of Israel). The “illegitimate” existence of the “Zionist regime” is based on the destruction of the identity and existence of Palestine, and therefore, maintaining the Palestinian identity is essential and represents a holy war (jihad).

 

12.  Khamenei ruled out any possibility of compromise with Israel, and criticized those who challenged the “way or resistance” (i.e., terrorism) arguing that it hadn’t brought about the liberation of Palestine. He noted that even though the “resistance” did not succeed in bringing about the complete liberation of Palestine, it did manage to keep the Palestinian problem alive. The most important achievement of the “resistance” is blocking the “Zionist projects” and thwarting the major plan of the “Zionist regime”, which is to take over the entire region. According to Khamenei, if it weren’t for the “resistance,” the Zionist aggression would also spread to other countries in the region: from Egypt to Jordan, from Iraq and the Persian Gulf to other regions. The “resistance” brought about the liberation of south Lebanon and Gaza, thereby blocking the process of geographical expansion of the “Zionist regime.”

13. Khamenei pointed out that one shouldn’t ignore the dangers inherent in the presence of the “Zionist regime” in the region. Therefore, all the peoples and governments in the region should cater for the Palestinians’ needs. Implicitly criticizing Hamas’s position toward the civil war in Syria and the war in Yemen, Khamenei called on the Palestinians to learn from the past and avoid interfering in the differences of opinion among Muslim and Arab countries. He also addressed the internal struggles among the Palestinians and said that the existence of differences of opinion among the Palestinian groups is natural and understandable, but they should not lead to confrontations and fierce struggles which serve the enemy’s interests. National unity on the basis of the jihadi plan is a national requirement for Palestine.

14. According to Khamenei, the “resistance” is currently facing a new conspiracy, which is the attempt to derail it from its course and sell it to the enemies of the Palestinian people by establishing clandestine relations with them. However, the resistance will not fall into this trap because the Palestinian people is able to prevent that. Even if one group lays down the banner of “resistance,” another group will rise from among the Palestinian people and raise it again (Supreme Leader’s website, February 21, 2017).

Iranian President Hassan Ruhani

15. In the president’s speech, closing the conference, Hassan Ruhani said that the Palestinian problem is not a problem of one people but an expression of oppression, violation of international rights, and impotence of international institutions. He noted that Palestine is a symbol for a people’s ongoing efforts to realize its rights.

16.Ruhani warned against Israel’s efforts to normalize its relations with the Muslim worldso that its crimes in Palestine and the Muslim countries would be forgotten. He noted that the Zionists consider wars and internal differences of opinion among the Muslims a historic opportunity to render the Arab states supporting Palestine from enemies into allies against the resistance and its main supporter, Iran. The Muslim world should be clear on its stance about normalization with Israel and explain whether the leaders of the Muslim world are leaders of the Muslim nation or part of the trend of normalization with the occupiers and oppressors.

17.The president noted that Israel's most important goal today is to present the current conditions as natural. The Zionists want to convince the world that the Palestinians are refugees who should live without a territory and that resistance is terror. “The fake regime” (i.e., Israel) holds some of the Western leaders as hostages operating as if every struggle against Israel compromises the vital interests of the United States and Europe.

18. Ruhani reiterated Iran’s official position, according to which establishing just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is only possible through the end of the occupation of Palestine and the full implementation of the Palestinian people’s rights, including the right of self-determination, the return of all Palestinians to their lands, and the establishment of a unified government in Palestine, with Jerusalem as its capital, through a referendum among the original inhabitants of historic Palestine. He pointed out Iran’s unconditional support for the Palestinians and their struggle (ISNA, February 22, 2017).

Majles Speaker Ali Larijani

19. In his speech at the conference, Larijani said that the support for the Palestinians is anchored in the Iranian constitution and in the political legacy of the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who emphasized the support for the Palestinian people and the struggle against “arrogance” (i.e., the West) and the “region’s malignant tumor” (i.e., Israel).

20. According to Larijani, the Palestinian people is currently facing double oppression: on the one hand, the “Zionist regime” increases its pressure on the Palestinians and continues its settlement policy in the West Bank and Jerusalem. On the other hand, the “Zionist regime” is working to deepen the internal differences of opinion among the Muslim world and increases its penetration into the countries of the region, so as to make them replace their main enemy, which is Israel, with another imaginary enemy (Fars, February 21, 2017).

Chief of the Judiciary Sadeq Amoli Larijani

21. In a speech delivered on the morning of the second day of the conference, Larijani said that the Palestinian problem is not limited to any particular geographic territory but is related to the entire Muslim world, as it reflects an ideological struggle between Islam and a Western liberal-democratic worldview supporting the “Zionist regime.” He referred to the large economic and military support which the United States extends to Israel as indicative of the West’s support for Israel as part of its comprehensive struggle against Islam and its aspiration to impose its liberal worldview on the region. Larijani accused Israel of committing war crimes against the Palestinians and said that Israel’s policy in the occupied territories is a test for the Western commitment to human rights.

[1]For further details, see the ITIC's Information Bulletin from October 13, 2016: “Hostility towards Israel continues to be a fundamental element of Iranian foreign policy,” http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/21081.

Spotlight on Iran

January 30, 2016 – February 12, 2017 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt

Main Points
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, said Iran would welcome any just ceasefire recognized by the Syrian people and the country's legal government. He reiterated Iran's official position that the resolution of the crisis in Syria had to preserve the country's territorial integrity and end the intervention of countries operating in Syria without its government's authorization.
  • Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Iranian Expediency Council and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander, justified Iranian military intervention in Syria, claiming IRGC commanders who served as military advisors on Mediterranean coast [i.e., Syria] kept Iranian enemies from its borders.
  • An IRGC fighter was killed when a mine exploded near the T4 military base in the Homs Governate of Syria. A senior IRGC advisor was killed in Mosul, Iraq.
  • Iran and Russia continue consultations on developments in Syria following the Astana talks. At the beginning of February the Russian president's special envoy for Syrian affairs arrived in Tehran and met with Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security. Shamkhani said that Iran was committed to finding a political resolution for the crisis in Syria and supported a military solution only against groups unwilling to lay down their arms. Shamkhani, meeting withFrench foreign minister, who paid a visit to Tehran at the end of January 2017, rejected the establishment of safe zones in Syria, claiming they would encourage Syria's disintegration and strengthen terrorism. On February 8, 2017, Abbas Araghchi, the deputy Iranian foreign minister, went to Moscow, where he met with the Russian deputy foreign minister to discuss the situation in Syria and the nuclear agreement.
  • Sami Abu Zuhri, Hamas spokesman in the Gaza Strip, said that Hamas had recently been in contact with Iran to strengthen bilateral relations. He said he hoped there would be a positive outcome. Ismail Radwan, a senior Hamas official, interviewed by the Iranian Tasnim News agency's correspondent in Gaza, claimed Hamas' relations with Iran and Hezbollah had never been broken off and would not be in the future, despite political differences.
  • On January 28, 2017, Tasnim News reported what it claimed was a documentation of tunnels dug from the Gaza Strip to an Israel army base. A video was shown of an interview with operatives of the "Mujahideen Battalions."

 

General Information
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, said Iran would welcome any just ceasefire recognized by the Syrian people and the country's legal government. Speaking with correspondents after a meeting with Adel Abdolmahdi, the former Iraqi oil minister, Velayati reiterated Iran's official position that resolving the crisis in Syria had to include the preservation of Syria's territorial integrity and end the intervention of countries operating in Syria without authorization from the Syrian government. Regarding Iran-Iraq relations, he said Iran would support the Iraqi government's struggle against terrorism. He said an independent, strong Iraq, and a strong Iran were two links in the "chain of resistance" against foreigners, that is, Zionists and regional reactionaries (Tasnim, February 7, 2017).
  • Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Iranian Expediency Council and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander, claimed the IRGC commanders who served as military advisors on the Mediterranean coast [i.e., Syria] kept Iranian's enemies away from its borders. He said the Iranian forces had demonstrated their capabilities in open clashes with the Zionists and Turkey, which had received technology from the United States. He denied claims that Iran supplied weapons to Yemen, saying that in the past Yemen had received large quantities of missiles from Russia (Fars and Alef, February 2, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • Javan Sanjevani, an IRGC fighter, was killed when a land mine exploded near the T4 Syrian military air base in the Homs Governate in Syria.
  • Iran and Russia continue consultations on developments in Syria. On February 5, 2017, Alexander Lavrentiev, special Russian envoy for Syrian affairs, arrived in Tehran. He met with Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, to discuss developments in Syria in the wake of the talks in Astana. Shamkhani said Iran was committed to a political resolution for the Syrian crisis, and believed a military solution was necessary only for groups unwilling to lay down their arms. He said as long as ISIS, the al-Nusra Front and affiliated groups operated in Syria and were supported by regional countries, no political resolution could be achieved in Syria or the region. He described the Astana talks as a successful approach which could be used as model for ending regional crises (Fars, February 6, 2017). On February 8, 2017, Abbas Araghchi, deputy Iranian foreign minister, met in Moscow with his Russian counterpart to discuss the situation in Syria and the nuclear agreement (Fars, February 5, 2017).
  • Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, expressed objections to the idea of establishing safe zones in Syria. Meeting with French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, who visited Tehran at the end of January, Shamkhani said solutions such as establishing safe or security zones in Syria would pave the way for Syria's disintegration, strengthen terrorism and continue the regional crisis (Fars, January 31, 2017).
  • Hojjat-ul-Islam Shahidi Mahallati, head of the Iranian Shaheed Foundation, claimed that more than 1,000 families of martyrs killed in Syria ("the defenders of the shrines") were receiving support from the foundation (Tasnim, February 7, 2017). In November 2016 he told a meeting of Basij members that more than a thousand fighters from Iran had been killed in Syria, probably referring to the number of IRGC fighters deployed from Iran to Syria, including Iranian citizens, Afghans and Pakistanis.
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • Kheirollah Ahmadi, senior IRGC advisor from Kermanshah, was killed while fighting ISIS in Mosul.
  • Iraj Masjedi, senior advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, praised Iran's military involvement in Syria and Iraq, saying the victory over ISIS in Mosul would give Iran 250 kilometers (about 155 miles) of security. At a memorial service for fallen IRGC fighters from the city of Roudehen in Tehran Province, he said IRGC fighters in Syria and Iraq did not only defend Shi'ite shrines, but also Iran's geopolitical position and security (Tasnim, January 31, 2017). According to recent reports in the Iranian media, in the near future Masjedi is expected to be appointed Iranian ambassador to Baghdad.
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, said Iran's presence in Iraq was based on a legal, constitutional request from Iraq. Meeting with Ján Kubiš, special representative and head of the United Nations assistance mission in Iraq, Velayati said the UN had to help put an end to the involvement of foreign countries in Iraq's internal affairs, and claimed Iran played a positive role in bringing regional peace, stability and development, including in Iraq and Syria (Tasnim, February 5, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri claimed contacts had recently been held between Hamas and Iran to strengthen the bilateral ties. He said he hoped the contacts would have a positive outcome (al-Alam, January 30, 2017). The Syria civil war and Hamas' support for the rebels in Syria, along with the Saudi Arabian attack in Yemen, led to a deep rift between Iran and Hamas, although Iran's connections with Hamas' military-terrorist wing have continued despite political tensions.
  • On January 28, 2017, the Iran Tasnim News agency issued a video allegedly documenting tunnels dug from the Gaza Strip to an Israeli military base. The video shows a Tasnim correspondent interviewing "Mujahideen Battalions" operatives in Arabic. One of them expressed his esteem and thanks to the "Iranian people and regime" for their support of "the Palestinian people and the Palestinian resistance."
  • Senior Hamas official Ismail Radwan, in an interview with Tasnim News in the Gaza Strip, spoke about developments in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority, clashes between the Palestinians and Israel, and relations between Hamas and Iran. He claimed Hamas' relations with Iran and Hezbollah had never been broken off, despite political differences and views regarding regional developments. He said Hamas was interested in conducting good, continuing relations with all the resistance groups and with anyone who supported the Palestinian people (Tasnim, February 7, 2017).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.